Critical Pedagogy Taking the Illich Turn

Richard Kahn

Che’s political perspective evokes a Promethean image of humans struggling to change their world. Contemporary globalists evoke Schopenhauer’s pessimism regarding the prospects of transforming capitalism. Today the fundamental theoretical and political conflict is precisely between Che’s Promethean perspective and the globalist Schopenhauerian pessimism and/or its euphoric Panglossian counterpart, holding that this is already the “best of all possible worlds.”

We now need a name for those who value hope above expectations. We need a name for those who love people more than products. . . . We need a name for those who love the earth on which each can meet the other. . . . We need a name for those who collaborate with their Promethean brother in the lighting of the fire and the shaping of iron, but who do so to enhance their ability to tend and care and wait upon the other. . . . I suggest that these hopeful brothers and sisters be called Epimethean men.

For decades the educational left has dwelt at length on the iconic theories of critical pedagogy as developed by the radical Brazilian educator Paulo Freire and those under his influence. The result has been the wide adoption of a set of promethean ideas relating, in part, to the need to articulate a politicized definition of literacy in which one reads both the world and the word, to foment popular education as a form of historical praxis, to understand how educational institutions reproduce the oppressor and oppressed relationship, and to militate for schools as a possible source/site of human emancipation and resistance. However, the emphasis on Freire’s philosophy of education has served in many ways to occlude the concurrent history of anarchist educational theory that developed alongside it—itself following a trajectory that owes little to either the cynicism about the larger human project evinced by the positions of Drs. Pangloss and Schopenhauer or the revolutionary optimism of Guevara’s promethean hope for a new man.

It is true that Freire himself was happy to extend an olive branch of solidarity to anarchist comrades on occasion, and while there have been attempts to integrate a Freirian critical pedagogy with anarchist political/educational perspectives, the conceptual foundation for doing so is arguably tenuous. While a self-avowed “libertarian” educator—a moniker which

3 By “Freirian critical pedagogy” I mean both the critical pedagogy developed by Freire himself and its first-order reinvention by a wide-range of primarily North American critical pedagogy theorists. Critical pedagogues like Peter McLaren have identified interest in Mexican anarchism such as developed classically by Ricardo Flores Magon or more recently by the E.Z.L.N, as well as in the work of Emma Goldman. See Peter McLaren, Schooling as a Ritual Performance: Towards a Political Economy of Symbols and Gestures (New York: Routlege, 1999) and Paulo Freire, Che Guevara, and the Pedagogy of Revolution (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). Others such as Curry Malott and Mark Pruyn have sought to unite versions of Marxism and anarchism, primarily through the promotion of the pedagogical potential of subversive punk culture, and Abe DeLeon has theorized anarchism as a strategic contribution to the present organization of critical pedagogy as a movement. See for instance Curry Malott

DOI 10.4198.116
thereby locates Freire within a tradition that includes social anarchist educators such as Paul Goodman, Paul Robin, Jean Grave and Francisco Ferrer—historians of libertarian education such as Joel Spring\(^5\) note that this educational tradition is also composed of anarcho-individualists such as Max Stirner, as well as laissez-faire styled anarchists such as A. S. Neill, John Taylor Gatto, or many of those behind the Free School and Unschooling movements.\(^6\) Most bear scant resemblance to Freirian liberatory pedagogy. Hence, the inability of “libertarian” to denote a particular type of political and pedagogical approach has led scholars such as Judith Suissa to want to more clearly differentiate between anarchistic, libertarian, and liberal educational philosophies.\(^7\)

Unfortunately, although Suissa asserts that a tactical, multidimensional anarchism for social revolution is “reminiscent” of Freire’s situational method, she does not base this claim in a careful examination of Freire’s epistemology or in any of the specifics of his political biography.\(^8\) Further, her oversight comes in the context of a flawed reading of Marxism, which she perceives as pedagogically prone to “offer abstract, general answers to political questions outside of the reality of social experience and experimentation.”\(^9\) By these terms, Freire could not clearly be considered a Marxist educator. Yet, a more sophisticated reading of the aims of Marxist pedagogy in which structures are understood situationally, as well as a closer reading of Freire himself, would unquestionably find that the gnosiological aims of his work are consistent exactly with a Marxist theory of knowledge.\(^10\) Moreover, although his personal politics were not always as clearly Marxist in flag, it can more assuredly be said that Freire did not chart a career that was classically anarchist. Indeed, during the beginning of Freire’s political life he even promoted forms of liberal social democracy, and then later worked for Brazil’s Workers’ Party as a supervisor of state state-sponsored schooling in Sao Paulo, as well as an officer for global bureaucracies such as the World Council of Churches and the United Nations, all the while

---


\(^{6}\) Ibid, 640.

\(^{7}\) Ibid, 640.

\(^{8}\) Paula Allman, *Revolutionary Social Transformation: Democratic Hopes, Political Possibilities and Critical Education* (Westport, CT: Bergin & Garvey, 1999).
espousing a version of radically participatory left theory. Therefore, Freire’s politics were ultimately eclectic. Taxonomically, they might be classified as something akin to revolutionary non-sectarian Marxist democratic socialism, not anarchism.

Regardless, the ideological ambiguity surrounding Freire’s libertarian politics has only served to assist his becoming undeniably the most curricularly visible of all the liberatory educators today. In this essay, then, I would like to explore a liberatory path less traveled by most contemporary educational theorists\(^1\)—that of the anarchistic pedagogy of Freire’s friend *cum* critic, the renegade and apophatic theological philosopher, Ivan Illich.\(^2\) Playing a sort of Bakunin and Tolstoy to Freire’s Marx,\(^3\) Illich in fact helped to free Freire from prison in the 1960s, provided him with safe shelter at the Center for Intercultural Documentation,\(^4\) and translated some of Freire’s first works. However, Illich spoke not for the “pedagogy of the oppressed” but initially for the social disestablishment of schools and then later of the dehumanizing aspects of social institutions and systems generally. Against the common sense defense of education as (at least potentially) a public good to be conserved, Illich counseled that people have always “known many things” without curricula and called for vernacular values and convivial tools that could meet people’s needs without becoming ends in themselves, as he felt contemporary public education systems had done.\(^5\)

Illich’s greatest counsel, though, was in hailing the need for a return of Epimethean individuals—anarchists who would be wedded to the earth and its sustainable limits, support matriarchal principles of gifting and caring, and who would represent a political culture founded on a more holistic relationship to Reason than had previously been produced by post-Enlightenment intellectuals. Interestingly, despite Illich’s obvious genius, fame, and continued importance for an age of social and ecological crisis, until very recently his work has been curiously absent from academic debates about the politics of education.\(^6\) But even of that work which has emerged, almost none remarks upon Illich’s attempt to develop an anarchistic morality called “Epimetheanism”—a fact that Illich himself addressed, reflecting that the idea of

---

\(^1\) A notable exception is offered by Madhu Suri Prakash and Gustavo Esteva in their *Escaping Education: Living as Learning in Grassroots Cultures* (2nd Ed.) (New York: Peter Lang, 1998).


\(^3\) It should be pointed out that both Illich and Freire espoused forms of liberation theology, but Illich’s anarchism more closely resembled that of Dorothy Day’s Catholic Worker Movement that was based in attempts to ground apostolic kindness, while Freire’s ecumenicism-from-below was more congruent with the work of Gustavo Gutiérrez such as his *A Theology of Liberation: History, Politics, and Salvation* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1971).

\(^4\) Drawing in part upon funds from the Catholic Church, in 1961 Illich established cross-cultural and language immersion centers in Cuernavaca, Mexico and Petropolis, Brazil. These ultimately took the name of *Centro Intercultural de Documentación* (CIDOC). Ostensibly, CIDOC’s primary mission was to prepare Catholic missionaries for work in Latin America but it quickly turned into an anarchist educational institution that functioned with an Epimethean ethos.


Epimetheanism was to his mind the most important element of *Deschooling Society* and interestingly the one that was least discussed during his tenure as a public intellectual.17

**Beyond Prometheanism**

For those not accustomed to thinking about their lives in terms of Ancient Greek mythology, some additional context will prove useful for understanding Illich’s idea of an epimethean cultural turn. Prior to Illich, and definitely known to him, the critical theorist Herbert Marcuse attempted to provide imaginative epistemological and hermeneutical “conceptual mythologies”18, which he thought would allow one to read the world in novel ways and provide openings for alternative modes of being. In *Eros and Civilization*, for instance, Marcuse offers the archetypal images of Orpheus and Narcissus as possible liberating “culture-heroes”19 for the politics and counterculture of what he termed “the Great Refusal”20 of the dominant social order’s psychic prometheanism in all of its repressive aspects.21

In Greek mythology, Prometheus was the Greek titan (whose name means “forethought”) who unapologetically stole the element of fire from the gods to give to humankind. According to the myth, he did so because his brother Epimetheus (or “after-thought”) was required to gift traits to all the beings of the earth but, lacking forethought, gave all he had away before reaching humanity. As a result of Prometheus’s theft of the divine fire, he was condemned to eternal bondage on a mountaintop where an eagle would perch to feed upon his liver in perpetuity. The figure of Prometheus has thus historically come to symbolize humanity’s prophetic, educative, and justice-seeking aspects, and in this way Prometheus also became the favorite classical mythological figure of Karl Marx. Via the Marxist reading, Prometheus is particularly emblematic of the human potential for daring political deeds, technological ingenuity, and general rebellion against the powers that be to improve social life, and it is in this sense that Freirian critical pedagogy can be described as a quintessentially promethean pedagogical movement for social change.

However, Prometheus is also representative of the industrial strivings of modernity to produce technical solutions to what are perceived to be the given problems of natural scarcity and worldly imperfection through the ideology of progress. It was in this sense that Marcuse sought liberation from the modern figure of Prometheus—whom he understood as representing “toil, productivity, and progress through repression…the trickster and (suffering) rebel against..."

21 Many commentators, including Kellner, have been puzzled by Marcuse’s choice of these personages as offering emancipatory forms of identity (See Douglas Kellner’s *Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). However, it seems clear to me that Marcuse here anticipated the “flower power” youth of the late 1960s in which Illich’s own ideas of epimetheanism were also clearly anchored. Notably, Orpheus was a sort of shamanic figure who is often pictured as singing in nature and surrounded by pacified animals, while Narcissus portrays the dialectic of humanity gazing into nature and seeing the beautiful reflection of itself on new terms. Marcuse’s Great Refusal, then, must be thought as intending a post–anthropocentric form of cultural work in which nature and the nonhuman are profoundly humanized, meaning that they are revealed as subjects in their own right. As Marcuse writes, through the Great Refusal, “flowers and springs and animals appear as what they are—beautiful, not only for those who regard them, but for themselves.” Herbert Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 166.
the gods, who creates culture at the price of perpetual pain.”22 The reconstruction of promethean society might be accomplished, he surmised, not by placing artificial regulatory limits upon that same society, but rather through an inward and outward cultural transvaluation of social values made possible via the work of counterhegemonic social movements. The final writing of Marcuse’s life, “Children of Prometheus: 25 Theses on Technology and Society,” concludes hopefully:

This advance towards the new is emerging today in the women’s movement against patriarchal domination, which came of age socially only under capitalism; in the protests against the nuclear power industry and the destruction of nature as an ecological space that cut across all fixed class boundaries; and—in the student movement, which despite being declared dead, still lives on in struggles against the degradation of teaching and learning into activities that reproduce the system.23

Illich undoubtedly followed Marcuse in searching for an antidote to unbridled social prometheanism, which he perceived at work both in the shadowy future of supposed technopolis and as in the distributive social justice and environmentalist zeal of so-called modern progressives. Illich thus revisits the Prometheus story as the mythic origin of patriarchy and homo faber, or “man the maker.” In this way, Illich crucially highlights the important role of the feminine in the myth, portrayed by the figure of Pandora (the infamous keeper of the box containing all of the worldly evils, along with one good—hope).

In popular Ancient Greek accounts of the myth, Prometheus counsels his brother Epimetheus not to marry Pandora, as he foresees that she constitutes a form of Olympian punishment upon humanity for its reception of the Prometheus’s theft. Pandora is resultantantly pictured as little more than a curious, seductive, and destructive influence upon the world. Alternately a mixture of Eve and Lot’s wife from the Book of Genesis, patriarchal society has since tended to represent Pandora as a root of human travails—it is she who, as a woman, brought evil and misfortune to life through the opening of her box and the unleashing of all of its negative contents.24 By contrast, in Illich’s exegesis of the myth, Pandora was an ancient fertility goddess whose name meant “All Giver,” and in marrying her Epimetheus thereby became wedded to the Earth and all its gifts. Rather than identify her as the carrier of sin, Illich emphasizes that Pandora was the keeper of hope and he thus interprets Pandora’s box as a sort of Ark of sanctuary. Hence, for Illich, Epimetheus was not the dull-witted brother of Prometheus-the-savior but rather the ancient cultural archetype of those who freely give and recognize gifts, care for and treasure life (especially during times of catastrophe), and attend to the conservation of seeds of hope in the world for future others.

To Prometheans, Epimeteans are well-meaning simpletons who have not seen or responded to the future peril which is the context for their present deeds and, in fact, this has arguably been the enduring reception of Illich’s own legacy as a political theorist of anarchism. But from the reverse perspective offered by Illich, it is Epimetheus who remains freely convivial

22 Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 161.
24 The sexual symbolism is obviously directly intended.
with the world as given while the progenitor of a new world, Prometheus, remains bound and chained by his own creative deed. Though Greek myth appears to portray Prometheus as humanity’s benefactor, from a counter-perspective perhaps the failure of Epimetheus to present humankind an additional trait was itself a type of important gift—a non-act that attempted to deliver the message to conserve hope in the face of growing expectations. Therefore, epimethean anarchism provides a collaborative standpoint to revolutionary promethean humanism, offering stoic hindsight on the utopian dream of human progress and justice, as it attempts to offer faith in humanity that is based, not in ideology—the epimethean world is in a sense after-thought, but in empathetic understandings of nature as inherently decent and complete.

A Pedagogy for Convivial Relations

As outlined by Illich, epimetheanism broadly represents a counter-pedagogy to both contemporary technocratic forms of institutional social reproduction and the versions of critical pedagogy that oppose technocratic education on behalf of an ethic of social justice that is conceived as the equitable distribution of modern life’s benefits. Through his adoption of an anarchistic ethos that questioned both the “progress” of industrial society and the social progressivism of its promethean emancipators, Illich became undoubtedly one of the most perceptive and radical theorists of the hidden curriculum to date.25 For his work not only interrogated the overt curricular material of educational institutions in relationship to that which is systematically avoided therein, but he extended this analysis to the deepest cosmological level of society through the revelation of the overt global costs of a prometheanism that methodically avoids epimethean practices and values.

Having initially realized that society’s hidden curriculum manufactures schools in order to introject forces of domination into student bodies (akin to Freire’s idea of “banking pedagogy”), Illich went on in his later work to insist that, in a highly professionalized and commoditized media culture, all aspects of life either promote themselves as educative or increasingly demand some element of training as a cost of unchecked consumption. Under such conditions, the being possessing wisdom—homo sapiens—becomes reduced to homo educandus, the being in need of education.26 Then, in an age when the computer becomes the “root metaphor”27 of existence, this reduction then becomes further processed and networked into the cybernetic reality of homo programmandus.28

Illich therefore became increasingly concerned that contemporary education had become synonymous with a demand for globally systemic fascism, such that it was unthinkable from the perspective of institutional experts that a person or persons could manage to live decently, even amidst conditions of wealth and plenty, when left to dwell according to their own autonomous devices and needs. As a result, he came to propose a negative definition of education as the heteronomous formula: “learning under the assumption of scarcity.”29 By contrast, he held that even in the face of chronic hardship the practice of cultural autonomy necessarily tends towards

a dignified epistemological awareness of life’s natural abundance and human security within the worldly order of things. In a manner quite congruent with Illich, Marx wrote in *Capital*:

In handicrafts and manufacture, the worker makes use of a tool; in the factory, the machine makes use of him. There the movements of the instrument of labor proceed from him, here it is the movements of the machine that he must follow. In manufacture the workers are the parts of a living mechanism. In the factory we have a lifeless mechanism which is independent of the workers, who are incorporated into it as its living appendages.⁶⁰

But for Marx, the alienation of the worker’s productivity as it is subsumed within the industrial system through rationalized exploitation is not only inhumane but also an obstacle to the historical growth of human productive forces.³¹ Hence, in response, Marxist prometheanism attempts to organize politically around normative demands for a more humane future that can only be realized, in part, through the liberated development of society’s technical productivity. Illich’s epimethean response to the inhumane industrial social system, by contrast, is closer to Audrey Lorde’s in the sense that “the master’s tools will never demolish the master’s house.”³²

It is in this respect that Illich generally chose to speak of “tools,” and not technology or machines, both because it was a “simple word”³³ and because it was broad enough to subsume into one category all rationally designed devices, be they artifacts or rules, codes or operators, and...distinguish all these planned and engineered instrumentalities from other things such as food or implements, which in a given culture are not deemed to be subject to rationalization.³⁴

An Illichian “tool” accordingly includes not only machines but any “means to an end which people plan and engineer”³⁵, such as industries and institutions. Whichever, a defining characteristic of such tools is that they originate and belong to a human-scale of production and function.

It should be noted, though, that Illich’s anarchism did not seek to demonize large-scale technologies tout court in the manner that has taken place amongst extreme sects of anarcho-primitivism, such as in *The Unabomber Manifesto*. Illich himself was “neither a romantic, nor a luddite” and he believed “the past was a foreign country” not worth endorsing.³⁶ Neither a technophobe, nor anti-civilization, Illich’s views were instead wedded to a kind of impractical practicality. In this way he remained committed to a hope for “postindustrial” conditions and spent much of his life defending appropriate forms of “convivial tools” that represent the obverse

---

³⁶ Ibid, 188.
of rampant technocracy and the globalization of corporate development. By definition, Illich’s “tools for conviviality” promote learning, sociality, community, “autonomous and creative intercourse among persons, and the intercourse of persons with their environment.” These tools work to produce a more democratic and sustainable society that is “simple in means and rich in ends” and in which individuals can freely communicate, debate, and participate throughout all manner of a cultural and political life that respects the unique “balance among stability, change and tradition.” Through the idea of conviviality, then, Illich proposed positive norms to critique existing systems and construct sustainable options using values such as “survival, justice, and self-defined work.”

Tools do become counterproductive for Illich when they become systematically industrialized so as to additionally produce “new possibilities and new expectations” that “impede the possibility of achieving the wanted end” for which they were made. When this occurs, he argued, tools turn from being “means to ends” into the ends themselves, and they thus alter the social, natural and psychological environments in which they arise. Remarkably that “Highly capitalized tools require highly capitalized men”, Illich implied that it is necessary that people struggle to master their tools, lest they be mastered by them. For when people uncritically operate tools that amplify human behavior and needs beyond the limits of natural and human scales, tools move from being reasonably productive and rational to paradoxically counterproductive and irrational. For instance, we see examples of this in the present development of the global communications network, in which members of society are subjected to the Moore’s law version of “keeping up with the Joneses.” You have a webpage, but do you blog? You blog, but do you Facebook? You Facebook, but do you tweet? At each step of the process failing to remain technologically contemporary veritably excludes one from partaking of and communicating with the dominant trends in social life generally. From an epimethean perspective, ironically, this may be exactly the way out of the present problem.

Illich’s critique of counterproductive tools is thus related to Max Weber’s concept of “instrumental rationalization,” as well as variant formulations proposed by Frankfurt School members like Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse. For Weber, the process

---

38 Ibid, 27. Illich loved bicycles as convivial tools appropriate for transportation needs. Anarchist projects like community bike programs (http://www.infoshop.org/wiki/White_bicycles) represent, then, something like an Epimethean political and cultural alternative to mass transit systems. Similarly, Illich would have championed much of the D.I.Y. (Do It Yourself) movement in response to the hegemony of commodity culture.
41 Ibid, 13.
43 Ibid, 66; 22.
44 Ivan Illich, Gender (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982), 15.
45 Another way of putting the problem: Initially, being able to speak on the phone with a friend long-distance or to email a correspondent provides an increase in fraternity and personal liberty calculated as a growth in one’s leisure time. However, as information-communication technologies (ICTs) have moved from being means to systemic social ends, people’s lives have become commodified by peripherals, and further, emailing, texting, and other forms of digital communication now dominate the large part of many people’s days. In short, the result of people living their lives ever-more online is that local intimacy between persons and individual leisure time have become increasingly uncommon.
46 DOI 10.4198.116
of instrumental rationalization resulted in the bureaucratization and disenchantment of existence, a sort of mechanized nullity brought about by “specialists without spirit.”\textsuperscript{47} Likewise, Horkheimer and Adorno sought to critique the irrationalism produced by culture industries bent on reifying the rational in the form of fetishized commodities.\textsuperscript{48} Lastly, Marcuse, in his notion of a “one-dimensional” world in which modern technology and capitalist instruments organize a society of domination in which any possible opposition becomes rationally foreclosed by it, posited the Frankenstein’s monster of promethean technologization in a manner quite comparable with Illich.\textsuperscript{49}

Again, it is important to consider that anarchists and other leftist political radicals respond differently to the problems outlined above. One avenue for political response would be to work to critically name the social system’s various aspects and to march through its institutions, or to otherwise act transformatively at its margins, in such a way as to attempt to turn the potentials of the social mechanism towards the greater good. This “Dare to struggle, dare to win!” philosophy is quintessentially promethean in character. For his part, Illich looked upon the growth of contemporary industrial system horrors, such as planned nuclear terror\textsuperscript{50} or the ubiquitous Network society-styled “Techno-Moloch”\textsuperscript{51} reality in which people more and more come to fashion their obedient lives, as the necessarily catastrophic outcomes of a modernity that has moved those who renounce it to a political position that is beyond words. As Adorno wrote, “To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric”, and Illich similarly believed that the most moral response we might now make in the face of unprecedented socio-ecological crisis is to silently refuse to engage in debate about it as we hate it with all our being.\textsuperscript{52}

For the promethean progressive, this can be seen as amounting to a cynical answer (maybe even Schopenhauerian pessimism!) and, as such, would be a likely buttress to the “culture of silence” favored by the hegemony.\textsuperscript{53} However, to the epimethean anarchist, it is a direct attempt to be the change that one wants from the world and Illich counseled that for those who feel impotent in the face of grave structural power (which today is no doubt a great many), such voluntary renunciation is a way back to a life of freedom and to the recognition that one always maintains some degree of agency that transcends the system.\textsuperscript{54} Therefore, it may be concluded that promethean and epimethean activists maintain different orders of love for the world. The promethean impulse is towards loving the world enough to want to sacrifice our individual interests in the name of a collective fight for the global betterment of others’ suffering. However, epimethean love is conserved specifically to the domain of our individual convivial interests in as much as they emerge in relation to our own singular awareness of the excessive

\textsuperscript{49} Herbert Marcuse, \textit{One-Dimensional Man} (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).
\textsuperscript{50} Ivan Illich, \textit{In the Mirror of the Past: Lectures and Addresses 1978-1990} (New York: Marion Boyars, 1992), 32-33.
pain which limits and wounds friendship. Epimetheans, then, actively love the world through careful attendance to existential suffering and the immediate social conditions that provide for it.

In Hindsight, Another Way to Teach the Gift of Love

Even a casual reader of the work of Paulo Freire will immediately recognize that one of his primary themes is love. Like Freire, Illich’s pedagogy too is informed by meditations upon love, but it is necessary to understand the key difference between Freire and Illich on this point even as we recognize their similarity. Freire maintained a sensual love for people’s culture and an ethical love for people’s freedom based doubly in the teachings of both Marx and Jesus. As regards the latter, Peter Roberts notes, “Freire never wavered in his support for Christ’s call to ‘love one’s neighbour as oneself’.”55 Yet, tolerance for one’s enemy was always put in dialectical relationship with a position informed by Guevara, who wrote, “Let me tell you at the risk of appearing ridiculous, that the genuine revolutionary is animated by feelings of love. It is impossible to imagine an authentic revolutionary without this quality.”56 In this way, for Freire love is the precondition of a dialogical promethean pedagogy at work in the world:

Dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of a profound love for the world and for people. The naming of the world, which is an act of creation and recreation, is not possible if it is not infused with love….No matter where the oppressed are found, the act of love is commitment to their cause—the cause of liberation. And this commitment, because it is loving, is dialogical. As an act of bravery, love cannot be sentimental; as an act of freedom it must not serve as a pretext for manipulation. It must generate other acts of freedom; otherwise, it is not love. Only by abolishing the situation of oppression is it possible to restore the love which that situation made impossible. If I do not love the world—if I do not love life—if I do not love people—I cannot enter into dialogue.57

Thus, love is the progenitor of thought, politics, and the generative naming of the world as part of the empowerment project that is a Freirian critical pedagogy’s “cultural action for freedom.”58

Conversely, as an epimethean anarchist, Illich’s notion of love comes closer to being the free expression of self-renunciation from the quest to manage power, whether equitably or not. This is not a statement on his part about the ontological quality of love, but rather a deeply personal moral response to the historical awareness that something fundamentally terrible has occurred in the world that has an anthropogenic cause. As such, love does not aim in the direction of organized conscientization strategies or the development of social movements’ cognitive praxis for Illich, but rather it attempts to—by turns either in silence or through polemical denunciation—demonstrate a commitment to a solitary future, one guided by an ethical sensibility that freedom means the ability to opt out politically of a society predicated on

the Big Lie. Or to put it another way: Illichian love is philia (i.e., friendly attendance) upon the subsistence of the Other amidst a global corporate regime bent on annihilating differences it cannot control. In this, Illich finds hope that wisdom may emerge through foolish acts that seek to renounce and renege from the discordant climate of perpetual war and so prefigure a peaceful alternative. Anarchistic epimetheanism is therefore convivially philosophical. As Illich reflected: “I remain certain the quest for truth cannot thrive outside the nourishment of mutual trust flowering into a commitment to friendship.”

In musing on love and friendship, the later Illich repeatedly returned to the Christian parable of the Good Samaritan as the paramount teaching on the corruption of care under modern industrial capitalism. In this story related in the Gospel of Luke, a traveling Jew is robbed, beaten and left for dead by the side of road. In his miserable state, priestly castes of Jews look upon him and choose to pass him by. However, the suffering Jew is also seen by a traveling Samaritan (then an arch-enemy of the Jewish people), who instead shows the Jew great mercy, gives him hospice, and takes personal responsibility for him. Interestingly, Illich interprets this parable as being not about the gift of active, charitable love by the Samaritan but rather about the “gift” made paramount by the fact of the Jew’s despair. By focusing on the peculiarities of Illich’s response, we can begin to tease out, however tentatively, the foundational differences between promethean and epimethean forms of liberation theology. As critical pedagogy is intimately connected to the tradition of liberation theology, gaining clarity on these differences should prove fruitful for imagining what an Illichian turn in critical pedagogy may mean in analogous contexts.

According to Illich’s interpretation of the Good Samaritan parable, the Jew’s immediate wretchedness provoked disease (dis-ease) in the Samaritan (i.e., it made him sick to his stomach) and this feeling was thus in some sense the Jew’s gift of the possibility of love and towards another way of life. By attending to this feeling, so as to abate it, the Samaritan was led to renounce the assurance of their respective identities—as both Jew and Samaritan—within the context of the larger society and to forge a new human relationship built out of their suffering together. Hence, for Illich, this foolish act of renunciation on the part of the Samaritan became the precondition for his acceptance of a common gift of freedom made imminent through his act of caring reciprocity.

Epimethean “care” is therefore far removed from liberal care. According to Illich, it is not to be confused with the gratuitous charity of the rich. Neither should it be mistaken for the commodity that is managed health care produced by professional experts who define the difference between the able and disabled, on the one hand, and the normal and abnormal, on the other. Epimethean care is also not an intellectual position in which one “thinks” one cares enough to want to transform the world in the name of abstract understandings of oppression in society—a potentially promethean gesture, or at least a possibly problematical outcome of

---


promethean pedagogy generally. Quoting John McKnight, Illich described all of these forms of care specifically as “the ugly mask of love.”

Once queried as to his feelings about media reports concerning rampant starvation and illness in African children, Illich responded emphatically:

My immediate reaction is, I will do everything I can to eliminate from my heart any sense of care for them. I want to experience horror. I want to really taste this reality about which you report to me. I do not want to escape my sense of helplessness and fall into a pretence that I care and that I do or have done all that is possible of me. I want to live with the inescapable horror of these children, of these persons, in my heart and know that I cannot actively, really, love them. Because to love them—at least the way I am built, after having read the story of the Samaritan—means to leave aside everything which I’m doing at this moment and pick up that person… I consider it impossible. Why pretend that I care?

The existential pointedness of Illich’s final question—and its demand that we radically renounce our dreams for a better world to the degree that these dreams are not our own but rather the cultivated nightmares of various orders of political machinery—most likely takes us far a-field of much of the dominant discourse of education today.

Freire repeatedly asked that we dream “the possible dream.” But, today, what dreams are in fact possible? We might rephrase this to ask: Can critical pedagogy receive the friendship offered by a collaborative pedagogy of anarchic epimetheanism? Or conversely: Is an Illichian pedagogy a possible source for gratuitous acts of kindness made by Good Samaritan critical pedagogues? The present re-gathering of anarchism as an important social movement that is working to challenge dominant paradigms in philosophy, politics, and pedagogy perhaps allows us to intone such questions with real seriousness for the first time in decades. Forever on the margins of academic life, the particular form of anarchist pedagogy articulated by Illich has been veritably ignored by major trends in educational theory and practice since the 1970s. This has been due in part to the epimethean practice of voluntary renunciation of the very professional posts and terms by which anarchist practitioners could have obtained institutional legitimacy and power.

The challenge now is not simply to restore Illich’s thought to intellectual/academic primacy and have him taught and taken seriously alongside Freire in schools of education and beyond—itself a promethean venture. Rather, the hope now at hand may lie in our scholarly capacity to opt-out of the excited drive to reconstruct education once again in the hope of a better world and to recognize the programmatic suffering of our institutionalized existence as students and teachers. In this manner, we may begin again to speak with one another quite simply and directly as friends born of the request and deliverance of epimethean aid; and in this way we may all realize the kind of dignity in our pain that asks not for more, but less. Terribly, those who know how to subsist well amidst horrible conditions may be the greatest teachers we can learn from in the 21st century. As we look to the coming decades, social and ecological catastrophe seems more and more totally unavoidable.

---

Author’s Bio

Richard Kahn is an Assistant Professor of Educational Foundations & Research at the University of North Dakota. A critical theorist of education who is internationally recognized as one of the leading architects of today’s ecopedagogy movement, he is the Editor of Green Theory & Praxis: The Journal of Ecopedagogy (ISSN 1941-0948), and the author of Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, and Planetary Crisis: The Ecopedagogy Movement (Peter Lang; available January 2010); as well as of the forthcoming titles, Ecopedagogy: Educating for Sustainability in Schools and Society (Routledge) and Education Out of Bounds: Cultural Studies for a Posthuman Age (Palgrave Macmillan, co-authored with Tyson Lewis). His work has been collected in a wide variety of books and journals, including The Critical Pedagogy Reader (2nd edition), The Blackwell Companion to Globalization, Media and Cultural Studies: Keyworks, Theory & Event, and The Canadian Journal of Environmental Education. Additional information about him, including many of his essays, can be obtained at: http://richardkahn.org.