THE PHILADELPHIA "AURORA" ON LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS

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The successful culmination of the struggle for independence waged by the thirteen colonies of North America was to have important repercussions for a long time and was to serve as one of the stimuli for both the French and Latin-American revolutions. The Latin-American revolutions which began in the form of uprisings in Caracas and Buenos Aires in 1810 were to spread rapidly to the rest of the Spanish-American empire. In a world already afflicted with the great military struggles of the Napoleonic period there was now added another symbol of the international anarchy that was characteristic of the times. Fortunate indeed were the insurgents that this international anarchy prevailed, for the mother country, like the rest of Europe, was deeply embroiled in the titanic battle which the legitimist powers were waging against France. This imbroglio in Europe necessitated a neglect by Spain of its American interests until the termination of the European war. With legitimacy once more in the saddle in Europe and Ferdinand VII restored to the throne of Spain, the question of the revolutions within the Spanish colonial empire assumed a paramount position as one of the most important international problems. For the major part of the next decade the diplomats of Spain, England, France, Russia and the United States were to be much concerned about the solution of this problem.

Before entering upon a discussion of the main theme of this paper, a few preliminary observations concerning the Aurora's editing of Latin-American news should be made. Firstly, information concerning the progress of the revolutions and the international complications that it created played a very prominent role in the news and editorial columns throughout the years 1817 to 1820. The sources of this information were numerous: abstracts from many prominent newspapers published in such widely di-
vergent cities as Boston, Buenos Aires, and Paris; information derived from private letters sent from both Latin America and Europe; reports made by ship captains arriving from Latin-American and European ports; documents such as the letters or proclamations issued by both the royalist and patriot leaders in the revolutionary struggle; and the diplomatic correspondence of the Department of State.

Since the sources of information were so varied and so frequently partisan, the task of interpreting available material correctly was a difficult one. Naturally the editor's bias—or should I say sound judgment—influenced his decision as to what was the truth and determined the views presented in his paper. Thus the Aurora's sympathy for the cause of independence caused it to suspect the truth of any information of a pro-royalist nature and caused it to be delighted when it could produce evidence contradicting such information.²

Spanish-American relations which had become so important by the end of Madison's presidency were to form the most important foreign problems of the Monroe administration. These relations were chiefly concerned with a continuation of negotiations pertaining to the Florida problem, the southwestern boundary of the United States, and the reciprocal claims of Spain and the United States against each other. After much diplomatic sparring, the above problems were amicably settled by the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819.³ Lurking behind and influencing the above negotiations were the problems relating to the Spanish colonial empire: neutrality and recognition in the main. All of the above problems received copious attention from the Aurora.

The first major problem handled by the Monroe administration was that of neutrality. This problem, like most of Monroe's foreign problems, was handed down to him by the previous administrations of Madison. Madison had issued a proclamation

² Papers such as the National Intelligencer, Boston Patriot, Gaceta de Buenos Aires, El Correo del Orinoco, the French Minerva, and the London Morning Chronicle supplied the Aurora with much valuable and interesting material.

³ Aurora, July 30, 1817, and July 31, 1817. These articles accuse Spanish agents with the circulation of much false information. "Like all the news of the royal fabrication, it contradicts or is contradicted by some former news."

³ Don Luis de Onis was the very able Spanish minister to the United States from 1809 to 1819.
tantamount to neutrality on September 1, 1815. But violations of neutrality still persisted and it became manifest that the basic neutrality law of 1794, which was still in effect had to be amended. Prodded by the many complaints of Onis in 1816, Madison finally recommended the enactment of a neutrality law which would remedy the evils complained of by prohibiting “American citizens from accepting commissions from a foreign prince or state for service outside the United States” and would “prevent a citizen of the United States from arming and equipping a vessel within the United States and then selling it to a foreigner to be used outside the United States contrary to law.” This neutrality law was not enacted, however, until March 17, 1817, shortly after Monroe became president.

It was on the policy of neutrality that the Aurora first differed strongly with the Monroe administration. William Duane, the editor, attacked the neutrality program for he felt it to be equivalent to a support of tyranny as represented by the rule of the Spanish monarchy over its colonies. Such a “pro-monarchical decision” was indicted for it would serve as a means of enabling royalism to prevail “against the unhappy and brave people of South America.” No reason could be seen to justify a policy of non-assistance to the revolutionists who were so courageously struggling to attain the rights of man which the despotic rule of Spain forbade them. The analogy between the Latin-American struggle for independence and that of the North American colonies at an earlier date was frequently presented. Thus Duane felt impelled to say that “the man must be as hollow a pretender to human justice as any disciple of Machiavel [sic], who could imprudently assert the rights and justice of either [the North or South American revolutions] and deny the right and justice of the other.”


*Duane had been editor of the Aurora since 1798. In this post he played an important role in helping effect Jefferson’s victory in 1800. After 1800 he was a prominent figure in state politics as he was one of the leaders in the “radical” opposition to Governor McKean.

*Aurora*, February 25, 1817. Although this reference is taken from an issue of the paper shortly before Monroe came to the presidency, it is fair to assume that it represents the newspaper’s opinion when the Neutrality Act was passed three weeks later.

for the North American revolution were seen to have their counterparts in Madriagor and Roscio. General Carrera, who did so much for the cause of Chilean independence, was visualized as the "Washington of the South." Just as France had given us vital support in our struggle for freedom, it was now evident that it was our duty to assist in the emancipation of a people also fighting for its freedom. After all, they were but continuing a movement for the independence of the New World from the domination of a reactionary Old World.

Duane realized that appeals to the altruism of the administration and the country at large would not yield very great results. It was improbable that our government would assume a policy of non-neutrality for idealistic reasons alone. Duane therefore stressed repeatedly the commercial advantages that the United States would derive from the success of the movement for independence. These advantages were pictured in a most alluring, although much exaggerated form. Thus the Aurora of May 19, 1820, stated "that for variety, quantity, and intrinsic value, South America possesses more than Europe, Asia, and Africa together." For a United States that was in the midst of a post-war depression caused partly by the overly keen competition of British manufacturers and partly by the loss of markets that had been acquired during the Napoleonic wars, it was hoped that arguments such as the following would be most welcome:

The merchants of the United States are deeply interested in the independence of South America. To perceive those interests in that light which alone can enable them to profit by them, they must think as Americans, and look with an undiverted eye to the prosperity of America. . . . If the government of the United States acts with the intelligence which the present crisis enables them to do; if the merchants and manufacturers of America know and act up to the interests which are opening to them; if the bank of the United States, makes use of the means which are within its grasp; the United States may before five years command the exchanges of the universe. . . . If a review be taken of what [we] already make and what they want and will hereafter want,

*Ibid., September 3, 1817.
* Ibid.
After painting such a roseate picture of the commercial advantages that the United States would derive from an independent Latin America, the *Aurora* felt that it was unquestionably to our interest to abandon our policy of neutrality and to assist the Latin-American insurgents. This was considered necessary for if Ferdinand defeated the defenders of the "rights of man," the United States would be barred from trading there since the policy of Spain was one of "Bigotry, monopoly, cruelty." Moreover, by such a policy of assistance, we could establish a claim to the friendship and gratitude of the patriots. By failing to adopt this liberal policy, English merchants would enable them to dispense with us, and provoke them to hate us.

While stressing our commercial opportunities in Latin America, Duane, long a bitter Anglophobe, continually railed against Great Britain's desire to obtain control of the Latin-American market. He saw in England's efforts to obtain these new markets another evidence of its "grasping commercial tendencies" that aimed at a monopoly of all the markets in the world. When the statement was made that we could not compete with the British in the Latin-American market, Duane indignantly ridiculed such an allegation on the ground that our proximity to Latin America assured us a substantial portion of the market that would develop there. The fact that we could not even compete with English manufacturers in the domestic market of the United States was very easily overlooked.

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15 According to Professor Rippy there need not have been any "rivalry for trade and investment opportunities" in Latin America because "the Yankees could not raise capital for investment abroad nor, with the exception of salt fish and household furniture, offer for sale large quantities of commodities which competed with anything that the British had to sell. Nor was the suspicion which each held of the grasping commercial tendencies of the other justified." Save in Brazil, where England obtained early advantages, "neither ever officially sought special trade concessions." Rippy feels that both England and the United States greatly overestimated the
Duane's Anglophobia was not content with a mere criticism of England's commercial designs in Latin America. He felt that the similarity of England's imperialistic methods in Asia and Latin America had to be exposed in order that the United States should be made aware of the dangers of our policy of neutrality. England had used its commercial contacts in India as an entering wedge in its successful effort to obtain both political and commercial domination of that country. It was now depicted as endeavoring to pursue a similar policy in making "another Hindustan" of Latin America. Thus Latin America would be made to serve as the scene of another "great drama like that which commenced with a warehouse of calicoes, and in 60 years subverted the Mogul empire."

With a session of Congress approaching, the Aurora, in October, 1817, began a vigorous drive to create sentiment in favor of a recognition of the independence of the Latin-American states. It did not differentiate between the various states struggling for independence but grouped them collectively under the term "South America." This drive for recognition began with a criticism by Duane of the delay of the United States in recognizing the independence of South America. He felt that we could have recognized its independence as early as 1810 without provoking a war and without violating our neutrality. By our failure to do so we had neglected an excellent opportunity to take advantage of the "peculiar and inappreciable commercial and political privileges" offered us in return for recognition. For the remainder of the Monroe administration the Aurora clamored at an ever increasing tempo for the recognition of the Latin-American states and severely indicted the administration's conservative policy of neutrality. This increase of pressure was largely due to the increasing number of successes by the patriot armies on the field of battle.

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In justifying its position in favor of recognition many of the arguments that had previously been presented in favor of the abandonment of neutrality were again presented. Thus the *Aurora* once more stressed the idea that the Latin-American cause merited the sympathies of the American people for they were struggling for self government, happiness, and the removal of oppressive grievances. The analogies between our revolution and that of Latin America were also pressed into service.

A number of other reasons for recognition were also presented. These reasons appeared during the discussion of a number of important questions that were influencing our policy of recognition:

1. Did a community of interest exist between North America and Latin America that warranted our recognition of the latter's independence?
2. Did conditions in Latin America merit our recognition of their independence?
3. Would recognition incur the hostility of the European powers? If recognition did incur the hostility of the European powers, what would the United States need to fear?

A study of the *Aurora*'s answers to these questions will enable the reader to understand clearly the reasons for the paper's advocacy of recognition and its criticism of the administration's policy.

The *Aurora*, anxious to justify its position in favor of the abandonment of our policy of neutrality and its advocacy of recognition, insistently presented the argument that a community of interest existed between North America and Latin America. This community of interest was found to be based upon political, commercial and social considerations. Duane, always an ardent advocate of republican institutions and just as ardent an opponent of monarchy, felt "that the best interests of the United States [were] . . . inseparable from the independence of the people who occupy the American continent, south of the United States."
He maintained that in helping the Latin Americans obtain their emancipation from European domination, the United States would be doing a great deal toward enabling the American continents to obtain their "independence of Europe." It was our duty to aid the insurgents who were opposing the despotic governments of Europe that were jealous of American liberty and anxious to see the New World restored to its colonial condition of servitude. Thus the issue was seen as one that made "the cause of North and South America ... a political unity, from the very necessity of their moral and political institutions being founded on the equal rights of the people, and alike adverse to the artificial evils of privileged orders. ... Alarmed for an empire founded on human degradation—on the miseries of millions—the emancipation of South America is contemplated as the progression of that chain of revolution, which is to encircle and overthrow the thrones and unnatural distinctions, which have been reared and sustained by the wretchedness of millions of the human species." So "Nature and necessity ... [made] a common interest and a common cause between the people of the new world for the governments of Europe are in holy alliance alike united among themselves and hostile to the new world, and to the rights of the people everywhere." Since the legitimist powers of Europe represented the interests of monarchy, Duane concluded, "that, for South America to be free and happy, it is essential that there should not be any European influence, much less a monarchy dependent on Europe, in any part of the Rio del Norde and Cape Horn."

The commercial unity of North America and Latin America was stressed as another reason for recognizing the insurgents. The administration was criticized for lending too attentive an ear to persons whose local interests caused them to depict the rise of Latin America as a danger to our prosperity. Duane conceded that our "Solomons in council" were correctly informed as to the fact that a free Latin America could produce cotton, tobacco, wheat and flour at a much smaller cost than the United

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Ibid., January 25, 1820.
Ibid., August 31, 1820.
Ibid.
Ibid., August 23, 1820.
Ibid., June 16, 1820.
States and that they might thereby drive us from the European market. But our "Solomons" were not told that European countries were secretly trying to monopolize the supply of South American tobacco in the hope of expelling us from the European market. Nor were our "Solomons" told that European ports were barring the entrance of our wheat and flour in the hope that they might thereby encourage domestic industry. So Duane concluded that it was "to our immediate interest to cultivate that commerce which is so contiguous to us; [for] unless we do cultivate it, [we] must suffer at once by our neglect" since England will engross it. To cultivate this commerce, he recommended that we endeavor to make our commercial relations with Latin America as nearly economically complementary as possible by producing more of the things that Latin America needs and less of the commodities in which we compete with Latin America. As a result of this endeavor to supply Latin-American needs, Duane predicted that a great increase in our commerce would result and that our carrying trade would increase as our boats would "be the convoys of the commerce of the whole new world." In a more optimistic vein, he even predicted that Latin America would become "the future market of [our] merchants, the vent of our industry, the nurse of our navy, the depot and citadel of our future greatness . . . and united with which . . . our country will become the entrepot of commerce and [our] exchanges [will] regulate those of the old world." If this vision of Duane's was fulfilled, he hoped to see "the sublime idea of a league of the new world, of the defensive kind [that] would give to the whole continent the strength and unity of a single nation—and each being necessary to the other, the effect . . . would be for the peace and happiness of mankind; to begin this generous and laudable career, let our first step be suitable to our character as the first nation of the new world that shook off despotism, let us be the first who shall recognize as independent, those who have so nobly followed our steps, and whose success is essential to the duration of our prosperity."

In his presentation of the above views as to the political and

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commercial unity of North America and Latin America, we must credit Duane with being one of the foremost Pan-Americans that the United States has seen and with having done much to prepare American public opinion for the reception of the Monroe Doctrine. In articles such as those of Duane it is evident that the rise of democratic nationalism in the United States was steadily leading this country to a position where it would soon demand that European countries refrain from further encroachments in the American continents.

A natural development from Duane's belief that there was a political and commercial unity of interest between North America and Latin America was his criticism and fear of British expansionist activities in Latin America. England's increasingly successful economic penetration into Latin America was attributed by Duane to the fact that British commercial agents were active there. In the case of Venezuela, Duane stressed the fact that England sent "arms and officers" to aid the patriots. Thus England, nominally "in a state of alliance with Spain [has treated] . . . the revolted colonies as independent states." Since England, an ally of Spain, treated the insurgent colonies as independent states, no reason could be seen for the administration's refusal to abandon our policy of neutrality and non-recognition of the patriots. Moreover, as the administration's conservative policy was enabling England to increase its power in Latin America while North American prestige was declining there, all the more reason existed for the administration to change its policy.

The question of the relationship between recognition and conditions in Latin America also received much attention from the Aurora. In arguing this issue Duane presented not only an account of the progress of military activities in Latin America but also a discussion of whether a successful patriot movement would establish institutions that would be similar to those of North America.

The year 1817 which had opened so dismally in its outlook

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"In Honor of the Patriot Don Manuel Torres, 1764-1822" (Washington, 1926), p. 20. The person to whom this pamphlet is dedicated did notable service in obtaining the recognition of Colombia by the United States. In this work there is much evidence of Torres' intimate friendship with Duane.

"Aurora, October 29, 1817.

"Ibid."
for the cause of Latin-American independence was to witness an upswing in the fortunes of the valiant patriots. Rebel successes were to animate the North American press, particularly the *Aurora*, to devote an ever increasing amount of space to their cause. General Carrera was visualized as the "Washington of the South" upon whom depended the hopes of Chile for independence. Without him, Duane felt that Chile would fall "an easy prey to despotism."

San Martín's great military maneuver in crossing the Andes and liberating Chile was heartily applauded by Duane as a feat in many ways "immeasurably more important and extraordinary" than that of Hannibal in crossing the Alps. Bolívar's successes in the region of the Orinoco were also noted. Although its information about the successful activities of San Martín and Bolívar was incomplete, the *Aurora* steadily became more confident that Spain could not succeed in regaining its dominions in Latin America, regardless of the amount of aid it might receive from the European powers. It therefore advocated that we cultivate the "confidence and friendship" of Latin America "from interest as well as sentiment."

It also noted that American public sentiment was strongly in favor of the success of the Latin-American revolutions.

The *Aurora* was much concerned with the conditions that prevailed in the United Provinces of South America which had its government at Buenos Aires. This government had very early in the revolutionary struggle secured its virtual independence from Spain, although it did not issue a formal declaration of independence until 1816. The Buenos Aires government, headed by Juan Martín de Pueyrredon, hoped for an early recognition of its independence by the United States. The Monroe administration realized, however, that it had to act cautiously on this subject for a close relation existed between recognition and the possibility of a successful termination of the negotiations with Spain for a settlement of the boundary problem. It therefore refused recognition at the time, for Spain would probably refuse to adjust the boundary problem if we showed this partiality to

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"Ibid., September 3, 1817. This article was copied from the Boston Patriot, a pro-patriot paper.

"Ibid., August 4, 1818.

"Ibid., November 11, 1817.

"Ibid., October 28, 1817."
the insurgents. The administration sent a commission of three men, Rodney, Graham, and Bland, to Buenos Aires “to explain and justify the neutral policy of the United States as best suited to the interests of the patriots.” The commission was to concentrate, though, upon the finding of facts. The reports of the commissioners to Monroe, however, indicated that their opinions differed widely as to what the facts were. Rodney’s report was most favorable and recommended that the independence of the Buenos Aires government be recognized. Graham’s report was less optimistic “and Bland was apparently fully conscious of the difficulties faced by the patriot governments: their lack of political experience, and the non-existence of democratic and representative institutions worthy of the name. The civil war between Buenos Aires and the forces led by Artigas, factional disputes and plots in the city itself, and the isolation of Paraguay from the rest of the old viceroyalty,” and the royalist occupation of a great deal of the interior were also known to them. The delay of the United States in recognizing the independence of Buenos Aires irritated the Pueyrredon government and finally caused it to adopt a position where it “leaned toward Europe rather than the United States.” Pueyrredon, a supporter of “the cause of independence from Spain,” felt that a monarchical form of government was preferable to a republican one. He “saw the difficulty of stable government in countries racially heterogeneous and lacking experience in self government, unless it were buttressed by the familiar external aspect of monarchy. The French government encouraged these hopes for the establishment of a South American monarchy” in 1818. These monarchical intrigues of the Pueyrredon government were to play an important part in causing the downfall of his administration in 1820, when the citizens of the United Provinces were informed of his plans.

The *Aurora* as early as November 3, 1818, published the fact that it was aware that Pueyrredon was “notoriously concerned in the project of placing an European monarch on a throne at Buenos

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*Charles C. Griffin, The United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire, 1810-1822* (New York, 1937), p. 142. This is an excellent monograph.

*Ibid.,* p. 248. The *Aurora* published all three reports in their entirety in the period from January to March, 1819.

Ayres.” It optimistically felt “that the people of La Plata . . . and of Chili, are resolved upon a representative government” and will not allow such machinations to be successful. Later events were to prove the truth of this forecast.

In 1819 there was published in Baltimore an account in two volumes of A Voyage to South America . . . in the Years 1817 and 1818 . . ., by H. M. Brackenridge who had served as secretary to the Rodney, Graham, and Bland commission. The views of this author were vigorously criticized in the Aurora from February to June, 1820, in the form of “Strictures on a Voyage to South America . . .”41 Brackenridge’s account was accused of having many “errors of fact, false logic, and mistaken opinions.”42 He was charged with having formulated his opinions after having been but six weeks in Buenos Aires and had spent that time “only among persons in power.” Brackenridge’s high opinion of Pueyrredon was the particular subject of reproach for it was Pueyrredon who was involved in “an anti-republican and monarchical conspiracy” in Buenos Aires.43 When the Pueyrredon government was overthrown, the writer of the Strictures indicted Brackenridge’s statement that Artigas, the leader of the anti-Buenos Airean faction, was under British influence.44 In fact, he said, it is very fortunate that a person such as Artigas exists “to expose the rottenness, and resist the dictation of the Buenos Ayrean party who combine all the essence of British, Portuguese, and native intrigue!”45

It is interesting to note that the Aurora admitted that it had long known of the “monarchical conspiracy” in Buenos Aires, but had preferred “to await events, than to sully the reputation of the cause of a people fighting for liberty, by revealing the character and conduct of the conspirators.”46 This illustrates how the editorial policy of the newspaper influenced its decision to minimize events or conditions that might diminish sympathy in the United States for the insurgent cause. However, with the overthrow of Pueyrredon and the exposé of his monarchical plans,

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41 Griffin believes that the anonymous writer of the Strictures was, in all probability, Baptis Irvine. Ibid., p. 249.
42 Ibid., February 28, 1820.
43 Ibid., June 1, 1820.
44 Ibid., June 15, 1820.
45 Ibid., June 17, 1820.
46 Ibid., February 28, 1820.
the *Aurora* publicized the alleged fact that the English minister, Lord Strangford, and the Portuguese princess, Carlotta, were closely connected to his plans. It was also asserted that Pueyrredon had not only negotiated with the French to place a Bourbon upon the throne, but had also negotiated with the king of Portugal to place Carlotta upon the throne of the United Provinces.\(^7\)

The work performed by Artigas in repulsing these monarchical intrigues was lauded as he had thereby defeated a major effort "to strangle liberty on the La Plata."\(^8\)

It seems possible that Duane, a shrewd propagandist for any cause that he espoused, shifted from a position of relative silence on European monarchical intrigues in Latin America to a publicizing of these intrigues in order to divert popular attention from the non-republican inclinations of certain insurgent factions. By this diversion, he may have hoped to offset the unfavorable effects which the publicity concerning monarchical sentiments in Latin America had produced upon the sympathies of the American people. Not only that, the public would be increasingly aware of the danger of European influence in the insurgent states.

Information as to the progress of the revolution in Venezuela and New Granada did not occupy much space until 1819. In that year and in 1820, Bolivar, the hitherto unsuccessful insurgent leader, met with much success. This turn in the wheel of fortune was to culminate in the fusion of Venezuela, New Granada and Quito to form the republic of Colombia. The *Aurora* was happy to observe that the royalist forces were being steadily forced back and that the Colombian government "has already turned . . . to . . . [the] restoration of its population and agriculture."\(^9\)

With this increasing evidence of stability in Colombia, the end of 1820 seemed to forecast a much brighter future for the Colombians.

The progress of the Chilean revolution also interested the *Aurora*. The work of General Carrera was lauded as Duane saw in him the basis of Chilean hopes for independence.\(^10\)

\(^7\) *Ibid.*, July 24, 1820. Actually these were two very different plans, one involving Carlotta and Brazil and likely to benefit England, and the other involving Pueyrredon and the United Provinces and likely to benefit France.

\(^8\) *Ibid.*, December 1, 1820.

\(^9\) *Ibid.*, October 23, 1820, and August 1, 1820.

feared, however, that the powerful pro-British faction at Buenos Aires would try to gain power in Chile where the British had already succeeded in obtaining much influence. He suspected that British influence would be directed to the establishment of a naval depot in Chile, from which the British would be able to obtain control of the region around the Isthmus of Panama.\textsuperscript{51} Duane's apprehensiveness diminished when he received a letter from Santiago stating that the following favorable conditions prevailed in Chile:

\begin{quote}
Political affairs at present bear a good aspect, things having assumed that character of order and consistency which guarantees durability. This state is completely free from Spain, essentially independent, and the government is in the full exercise of the prerogative of sovereignty. . . . The revolution will shortly travel into Peru, where the spirit exists. . . . Perfect harmony happily exists between this government and that of Buenos Ayres, and it is necessary to . . . great political results and efficient warlike combinations; for B. Ayres is on the other side of the Andes what Chili is on this; the sheet anchor of independence in S. America.
\end{quote}

Duane concluded from this letter that the movement for independence could not be stopped.\textsuperscript{52}

From reading the Aurora's articles on the progress of the Latin-American revolutions, one is impressed by the stress upon England as the ever constant menace to American aspirations for influence in Latin America. Duane's fear of British intentions, amounting almost to an obsession, made him even imagine that the British had created the rumor of Russian designs upon California in order to divert "attention from the designs of England upon Mexico and Panama. It is a part of her policy to make excuses if none present themselves; and nothing could afford England an excuse more to her purpose than if some expedition could be fitted out in Europe or in the U. States, to attack Cuba or Mexico—she would then take one or the other, or both of them under her protection as she took the emperor of Ceylon, and pay herself for their protection by retaining their dominions."\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., September 17, 1819.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., January 17, 1820.
\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., March 20, 1820.
As a result of the great increase of favorable news from Chile, Colombia, and the United Provinces in 1820, the *Aurora* became confident that royalist forces would soon be expelled from Latin America and stable governments would be established in the Latin-American states. In view, however, of the chaotic conditions that prevailed in Latin America throughout Monroe's first administration, the *Aurora* wisely refrained from stressing the argument that conditions in the Latin-American states were sufficiently stable to warrant their recognition by the United States. Duane realized that he must rely upon the altruistic, political, and commercial arguments for recognition as they were less assailable.

A major concern of the administration and a potent factor in inducing it to pursue a conservative policy of neutrality and recognition was its fear of incurring the hostility of Europe by a recognition of Latin-American independence. In testing the validity of this fear of the administration, the *Aurora* concentrated its attention upon the possible menaces from the Holy Alliance, Great Britain, France, and Spain.

The increasing success of the insurgent cause in 1817 caused the *Aurora* to not only feel more confident about the ultimate success of the rebels but to also feel that the danger of European intervention on behalf of Spain was small. In January, 1818, "Pelopidas," a correspondent of the *Aurora*, wrote that since the commercial interests of the European nations required that Latin America be independent, it was very unlikely that the Holy Alliance, which was then dominating continental Europe, would endeavor to restore Spanish power in America. He believed that Russia would not try to aid the Spanish cause because it lacked both the fleet to transport an army and also the money to finance such a movement. Nor did he consider the English menace a formidable one for the English had already suffered two military defeats in American wars. The need to fear a France that was in the process of post-war reconstruction was naturally minimized for she could not be expected to supply Spain with any substantial aid. From his study of the situation, "Pelopidas" concluded that "The nations of Europe were never in circumstances so little to be feared as they are at the present moment. There is not at

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this moment a nation in Europe that is competent to embark in war. Their systems are all disordered—their finances exhausted. ... The tactics of courts for at least ten years to come must be diplomatic. These views of "Pelopidas" represent the general views of the Aurora.

The possible effect that an abandonment of neutrality or a recognition of Latin-American independence might have upon Spain was a matter of much moment to the administration. This was not due to the fact that there was much to fear from Spain, but because the negotiations to settle North American differences with Spain might be terminated by the latter if the United States altered its policy of neutrality or non-recognition. Realizing that a peaceful solution of the Spanish-American problems on the North American continent depended upon the non-alienation of Spain, the administration determined to adhere to the policy of neutrality and non-recognition. Duane, always hostile to the institution of monarchy and also an expansionist, could see no reason why the administration should act so cautiously in its negotiations with feeble Spain. Moreover, charged Duane, by committing itself to a policy of neutrality and non-recognition, the administration was actually removing any reason for Spain to desire a settlement of the negotiations.

After long negotiation, Onis and John Quincy Adams, the American Secretary of State, made the Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819. The Spanish government, however, delayed its ratification of the treaty for two years. The Aurora blamed England for this delay, although it realized that Spain had certain traditional opponents of imperial territorial cessions and Florida land grant beneficiaries who were opposing the ratification of the treaty. The basis for Duane's belief that England was responsible for the delay in the ratification of the treaty was his surmise that England had absolute control over the Spanish government.

Upon the receipt of definite information, in October, 1819, of

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55 Ibid., January 16, 1818.
56 Ibid., December 10, 1817.
57 This treaty is also known as the Transcontinental Treaty. See Philip C. Brooks, Diplomacy and the Borderlands: Adams-Onis Treaty of 1819 (Berkeley, 1939), and Charles C. Griffin, United States and the Disruption of the Spanish Empire (New York, 1937).
58 Aurora, December 10, 1819.
59 Ibid., October 25, 1819.
Spain's refusal to ratify the Adams-Onis Treaty, the *Aurora* presented very clearly its views as to the possibility of war. The administration was berated for adhering too closely to the wishes of the European diplomats in formulating our Latin-American and Spanish-American policies. Duane declared that "The time is past, when war is to be apprehended—the will of European nations no longer decides any thing for any part of America—their common exhaustion, and their common fears, are, along with their immediate calls for internal safety, the guarantees of peace to us and to each other."\(^{a}\) The report that England would fight for Spain against the United States was said to be without foundation for:

1. England is not in a condition to make war upon us.
2. If she was, it would be contrary to her policy, her interests and safety.

In explaining the first point, Duane stated that England did not want war because her financial situation was precarious as a result of the many European wars in which she had been involved. The second argument required much more explanation. Duane stressed the fact that England was seeking new markets and that if Spain regained its Latin-American empire, the Spanish restrictive commercial policy would operate to the disadvantage of England. Therefore, England's commercial policy demanded that the revolutionary wars continue so that English agents might continue their intrigues to increase British political and commercial power in Latin America. Moreover, the fact that war with the United States would cause England to lose its lucrative North American market would deter England from warring upon us. Duane concluded that

The idea of her going to war with the United States, the only nation which she dreads, and the only nation that has a solid and eternal interest in South American independence is too absurd to be received for one moment. . . . To go to war with us, therefore, would be to decide at once not only upon an insurrection in England by the loss of our commerce, but the immediate and absolute independence of all South America, and to bind the two sections of the continent by ties which time would every day render more sacred, and solemn, and durable; it

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\(^{a}\) *Ibid.*, October 13, 1819.
would be to unite those between whom her policy has succeeded in producing a quarrel. ... There is therefore no cause, no necessity for war, no reason to apprehend it even were it to come—but it cannot come."

Concerning the possibility of war with the Holy Alliance, the *Aurora* stated that:

A statesman with as much brains as a mosquito, could have perceived in the political, physical, moral, and fiscal circumstances of the powers of Europe, an utter impossibility that they could, or any of them interfere, with an armed force in the concerns of South America. ... The experience of the revolution in North America, its 1,500 miles of sea coast, its frontier open to Canada and the Mississippi, and its population of *two millions* however it may be lost on our feeble minded statesmen, is not unfelt or disregarded by those of Europe.

In analyzing the administration’s Latin-American policy, the *Aurora* had to also consider and evaluate the influence of various personalities in determining our policy. The personalities upon whom Duane’s interest centered were John Quincy Adams, James Monroe, and Henry Clay.

Adams, Monroe’s Secretary of State, was the subject of much bitter criticism in the *Aurora*. Duane saw in him the evil genius that was misdirecting the policy of the administration. Duane believed that “The president has been misled by weak or wicked councils to act contrary to his own judgment, the evil counsellor we see in Mr. Adams, every man in the country sees it.” Not only that, “The South Americans one and all believe that the hostility to the cause of liberty in South America, has its source in that gentleman’s misanthropy, or his contempt for the liberties of mankind.”

Duane neglected to take into proper consideration the fact that an abandonment of neutrality or of non-recognition would end all hope of a peaceful settlement of Adams’ negotiations with Spain. He therefore unjustly accused Adams of being both “the enemy of republican liberty and South American independence.”

Monroe was criticized by Duane because he was known to be personally sympathetic to the patriots, and yet allowed his public policy as an official to differ from his views as a private person.\textsuperscript{66} The President's messages to Congress which repeatedly stated that the United States was trying to adhere to a policy of neutrality were vigorously denounced in the editorial columns of the paper. This was to be expected in view of the \textit{Aurora's} strong opposition to the administration's policy of neutrality. Monroe's cautious foreign policy in reference to Latin-American and Spanish-American problems was to be one of the major reasons for the \textit{Aurora's} opposition to his reelection in 1820.

Although Henry Clay's name did not appear very frequently in the columns of the \textit{Aurora}, he was always spoken of most favorably. Duane credited Clay with being a real statesman, in contrast to the persons who determined the policy of the administration.\textsuperscript{67} This favorable opinion was due largely to Clay's staunch advocacy of the Latin-American cause in the halls of Congress. Clay's opposition to the Neutrality Act of 1817 was heartily concurred in by Duane. When Clay proposed in Congress, in 1820, "That it is expedient to provide by law a suitable outfit and salary for such minister or ministers as the president, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, may send to any of the governments of South America which have established, and are maintaining their independence of Spain," the \textit{Aurora} supported the measure. Duane approved of this bill for it would remedy "an abuse of power which has grown up to a degree of enormity, that renders [the] written constitution nugatory, if not contemptible. The practice of sending secret agents is utterly incompatible with the principles of a republican government, and congenial only with absolute despotism."\textsuperscript{68} With the passage of such an act, the honor of the United States would not again be tarnished by the "illicit and flagitious smuggling of political missionaries" to Latin America.\textsuperscript{69}

It should be noted that in the above evaluations of Adams, Monroe, and Clay, Duane stressed the principles that these men

\textsuperscript{66} Ibid., November 5, 1819.  
\textsuperscript{67} Ibid., May 11, 1820.  
\textsuperscript{68} Ibid., April 8, 1820.  
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid. In this article Duane censured Monroe particularly for having sent the Rodney, Graham, and Bland mission to South America without having first obtained senatorial approval of the mission and its members.
stood for and not the personalities of the men. The *Aurora* always evaluated public personages in this manner.

As an influence upon the editorial policy of Duane, one should not overlook the importance of Don Manuel Torres, who in 1818 became an official agent for Venezuela in the United States and later served as Colombia's first minister to the United States. Torres, a resident of Philadelphia since 1796, had early become an intimate friend of Duane's and had done much to instill in Duane an enthusiasm for the Latin-American countries. "Long before his official duties began [Torres] had collaborated with him [Duane] as a propagandist for the patriots, translating Spanish news and pamphlets for the latter and occasionally putting Duane's effusions into Spanish for the use of the patriot gazettes."70 His pamphlet, "An Exposition of the Commerce of Spanish America," was highly favored by Duane because it depicted excellent commercial opportunities in Latin America.71 After becoming an official patriot agent in the United States, Torres worked not only for the recognition of Venezuela, but also for the acquisition of munitions. In both of these endeavors he was supported by Duane.72

In conclusion, it should be said that although the *Aurora* was no longer as influential as it had been at the end of the eighteenth century, its editorial policy was still as vigorous and forceful in its support of republicanism throughout the world. Nor should we forget that although Duane in his excessive zeal for the patriot cause over-estimated the political and commercial unity of the Americas, he did perform a notable service in preparing the public mind not only for the recognition of the Latin-American republics, but also for the favorable reception of the Monroe Doctrine and various Pan-American ideas of the future.

71 Ibid., p. 253.
72 Charles Francis Adams, ed., *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams* . . . (Philadelphia, 1857), IV, 507, 514-515, 520, 526-527, V, 45. In these pages Adams tells of the application and refusal of Duane's request for a position as agent for the United States in the sale of arms to Venezuela. Duane was also refused the post of Agent to Colombia. Adams told Colonel Johnson, who sought these posts for Duane, that as the *Aurora* "had for years been filled with imputations of the grossest kind both upon the capacity and integrity of the President and every member of the Administration [such an appointment] would be generally disgusting to the public, who would take it as a mere buying up of an enemy." In view of the truth of this statement, it seems astounding that Duane would even have the courage to apply for any position under the Monroe administration.