THE DEMOCRATIC SPLIT DURING BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION

BY REINHARD H. LUTHIN
Columbia University

EVER since his election to the presidency of the United States on the Republican ticket in 1860 there has been speculation as to whether Abraham Lincoln could have won if the Democratic party had not been split in that year.\(^1\) It is of historical relevance to summarize the factors that led to this division.

Much of the Democratic dissension centered in the controversy between President James Buchanan, a Pennsylvanian, and United States Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois. The feud was of long standing. During the 1850's those closest to Buchanan, particularly Senator John Slidell of Louisiana, were personally antagonistic toward Douglas. At the Democratic national convention of 1856 Buchanan had defeated Douglas for the presidential nomination. The Illinois senator supported Buchanan against the Republicans. With Buchanan's elevation to the presidency differences between the two arose over the formation of the cabinet.\(^2\)

Douglas went to Washington expecting to secure from the President-elect cabinet appointments for his western friends William A. Richardson of Illinois and Samuel Treat of Missouri. But this hope was blocked by Senator Slidell and Senator Jesse D. Bright of Indiana, staunch supporters of Buchanan. Crestfallen,

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Douglas complained to a friend shortly before Buchanan's inaugural:

The patronage for the Northwest was disposed of before the nomination. Bright is the man who is to control it if they dare to carry out their designs. Slidell, Bright & Corcoran (the Banker) assume the right to dispose of all the patronage. If this purpose is carried out & I am the object of attack I shall fight all my enemies and neither ask nor give quarter. I do not decline to urge friends, provided the opportunity is presented to do so under any prospect of success. At present, I am an outsider. My advice is not invited nor will my wishes probably be regarded.

Douglas' fears were justified. Buchanan gave control of the patronage to Slidell and Bright, the latter distributing the federal jobs throughout Douglas' bailiwick, the Northwest. The Kansas question added fuel to the dissension.

In Kansas Territory, under a census which omitted almost half the counties, a constitutional convention was chosen by less than one-fourth of those entitled to vote; many "free state" elements refused to participate in a "proslavery" gathering. Meeting at Lecompton, the convention adopted a proslavery constitution which provided that the "right of property is . . . higher than any constitutional sanction, and the right of the owner of a slave . . . is . . . as inviolable as the right of the owner of any property whatever." The constitution was not submitted to an untrammeled popular vote: the people were permitted to vote merely for the "constitution with slavery" or for the "constitution with no slavery." In case of the latter (according to the voting formula) slavery was to exist "no longer" in the state "except that the right of property in slaves now in this Territory shall in no measure be interfered with." This meant that only the proslavery element—

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and only that part which favored the constitution—had a ballot. When the vote was taken in December, 1857, the official result showed over 6,000 votes for the “constitution with slavery” as against less than 600 for the “constitution with no slavery.” The free-state men had abstained from voting.

The Lecompton constitution created havoc among the Democrats and precipitated a permanent break between Buchanan and Douglas. The President urged Congress to admit Kansas into the Union under the Lecompton constitution. Douglas, incensed, had a showdown with Buchanan; he informed the latter that he would oppose the administration’s Lecompton policy. “Mr. Douglas,” the adamant President replied, “I desire you to remember that no Democrat ever yet differed from an administration of his own choice without being crushed.” Douglas, moved by a sense of honor, outraged at Buchanan’s failure to live up to the Cincinnati (Democratic national) platform of 1856, and concerned with reelection to the Senate in 1858, stood his ground. His former Senate colleague, Edward Everett of Massachusetts, declared:

Douglas’s re-election to the Senate was coming on and Illinois was very doubtful. She chose Judge [Lyman] Trumbull, a free soil Senator, two years ago, and unless some new issue could be made Judge D’s defeat was sure. The refusal of the Lecompton Convention to submit the whole Constitution fairly and frankly to the people gave him that issue, which he promptly embraced, and it must be owned he stands on substantial ground. This I think is the rationale of his movement.

Apparently there still rankled in Douglas’ heart intense bitterness over Buchanan’s refusal to consult with him in forming the cabinet. Senator George W. Jones of Iowa, who served with the Illinoisan on the Senate Committee on Territories, wrote: “I know, not only from conversations with Douglas himself—that he was opposed to Mr. Buchanan the moment he knew that Richardson

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*Everett to Mrs. Charles Eames (copy), Dec. 27, 1857, Edward Everett Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston.*
was not made a member of the Cabinet." On December 9, 1857, Douglas cast the die. For three hours on the Senate floor he denounced the Lecompton constitution.

Although the Senate finally approved the Lecompton constitution, the pro-Douglas Democrats and Republicans united to defeat it in the House. Congress then passed a measure introduced by Representative William H. English of Indiana which provided for a referendum on the whole constitution and promised the future state of Kansas over 5,000,000 acres of land if the instrument was ratified. In August, 1858, the Kansas voters rejected the English proposition. Henceforth the Democracy in nation and state was divided into two main factions—Buchanan’s "Lecomptonites" and Douglas' "Anti-Lecomptonites."

Closely linked with the Buchanan-Douglas animosity and the Kansas issue in splitting the Democratic party was the federal patronage. Douglas became convinced that Buchanan planned to take the heads of those officeholders favorable to him. He confided to a friend:

I fear there is no hope of an amicable adjustment of the Kansas Question. It has become apparent that the administration is more anxious for my destruction than they are for the harmony & unity of the Democratic Party. You have doubtless seen that they are removing all my friends from office & requiring pledges of hostility to me from all persons appointed to office. Of course my friends do not consider this course fair, honest, or Democratic, and will not be reconciled to the administration by this line of conduct. The administration is endeavoring to form an alliance with the Republicans of Ill. to beat me [for re-election to the Senate] with a Republican. While I can not say with certainty what the result will be, I am determined to stand firmly by my position and vindicate my principles and let the consequences take care of themselves. If the Party is divided by this course it will not be my fault.

After repudiating President Buchanan's leadership Douglas returned to Illinois to stand for reelection to the Senate. He found

20 George W. Jones to Breese, Sept. 7, 1858, Sidney Breese papers, Illinois State Historical Library, Springfield, Ill.
22 Randall, The Civil War and Reconstruction, pp. 159-160.
23 Douglas to Treat, Private, Feb. 28, 1858, Samuel Treat papers.
that the President's official axe had cut down many of his office-
holding friends. Despite the opposition of the pro-Buchanan 
officeholding group he was renominated as Democratic candidate 
for senator. By August Senator Slidell was recommending to 
Buchanan the removal of still more Douglas partisans from fed-
eral jobs in Illinois. In the senatorial campaign against his 
Republican opponent, Abraham Lincoln, Douglas succeeded in 
retaining his Senate seat. The Little Giant would remain in 
Washington for another six years to plague the Buchanan admin-
istration and widen the breach in the Democratic party.

The Democratic rupture was utilized for all it was worth by 
Illinois Republicans. Whenever Buchanan's organ, the Wash-
ington Union, blasted away at Douglas, the Republican press of 
Illinois reprinted the fulmination, often with crocodile tears that 
Douglas was assailed but always with the prediction that the 
Illinois senator's days were done.

The Buchanan-Douglas controversy over Kansas and patronage 
disrupted the Democrats not only in Illinois but also in Buchanan's 
own state. Pennsylvania, second only to New York in electoral 
votes, had been the pivotal state in turning the presidential elec-
tion of 1856 to Buchanan over his Republican opponent, John C. 
Frémont. In 1858 the Republicans and other heterogeneous 
anti-Democratic groups in populous Pennsylvania, organized un-
der the name "People's party," campaigned for a protective tariff 
and denounced the Lecompton "fraud," winning a great triumph.

Conspicuous in "stabbing" the President in his home state dur-
ding this contest was his erstwhile friend, John W. Forney, fore-

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14 Arthur C. Cole, The Era of the Civil War, 1848-1870 (vol. iii of The 
Centennial History of Illinois), (Springfield, Ill., 1919), pp. 157-180; 
Milton, The Eve of Conflict, ch. xx. For the removal of pro-Douglas fed-
eral officeholders in Illinois see Helen M. Cavanagh, "Anti-Slavery Sentiment and Politics in the Northwest, 1844-1860," unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, University of Chicago, 1938, p. 144.


16 Cavanagh, "Anti-Slavery Sentiment and Politics in the Northwest, 1844-

17 Allan Nevins, Frémont: Pathmarker of the West (New York and Lon-
don, 1939), pp. 452-455; James Ford Rhodes, History of the United States 
from the Compromise of 1850 (New York, 1893), vol. ii, pp. 226-235. The 
popular vote of the election of 1856 is in Tribune Almanac, 1857, pp. 44-64.

18 Malcolm R. Eiselen, The Rise of Pennsylvania Protectionism (Phila-
delphia, 1932), pp. 244-249; Reinhard H. Luthin, "Pennsylvania and Lin-
coln's Rise to the Presidency," The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and 
Biography (Jan., 1943), vol. lxvii, pp. 61-62.
most Democratic editor of Philadelphia. In 1856 Forney, having aided in electing Buchanan as Chief Executive, aspired to be editor of the administration organ, the Washington Union, and the recipient of the lucrative congressional printing contracts, as promised by Buchanan. His hopes, however, were thwarted by his enemies. His friends vigorously tried to get him into Buchanan’s cabinet but were stopped by southern opposition. Disgruntled, Forney turned against Buchanan. When the President and Douglas clashed over Kansas, Forney supported Douglas in his Philadelphia Press, which he had established in 1857 contrary to the President’s wishes. His opposition to the Lecomptonites was viewed as a contributing force to the Democrats’ defeat in Pennsylvania in 1858—and the Republicans did not forget the Philadelphia editor’s good deed. Horace Greeley advised a fellow-Republican leader: “I consider Forney entitled to the Clerkship [of the House of Representatives], no matter how he may behave hereafter. I go for paying debts as we go along.” In January, 1860, the Republican members of Congress formed a coalition with the anti-Lecompton Democrats to elect Forney clerk of the House of Representatives. Forney returned the favor by blasting Buchanan in his Philadelphia Press.

The Buchanan-Douglas rift, the conflict over the Lecompton constitution, and rivalry over the distribution of patronage—nourished partly by Republicans who were working behind the scenes—were manifest not alone in Illinois and Pennsylvania but also in less populated states. California was a case in point. Like Illinois and Pennsylvania, California was one of the five states which Buchanan had carried in 1856 but which Lincoln was destined to win in 1860.

21 Greeley to Colfax, Nov. 2, 1859, Greeley-Colfax papers, New York Public Library.
22 Congressional Globe, 36th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 662-663.
24 The five northern states which Buchanan carried over his Republican opponent, Frémont, in 1856 were Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois, and California.
California had been traditionally Democratic. Most Californians wanted no part of Republicanism, which meant radicalism; they were concerned more with acquiring subsidies from the federal government for a Pacific railroad than with the sectional issue over slavery.\textsuperscript{25} Besides, some Californians who were originally from southern states constituted a militant proslavery minority. Those of the large adventurous lawless element attracted to the West by the gold rush were in general not interested in antislavery crusades.\textsuperscript{26} Except for a brief dalliance with Know-Nothings\textsuperscript{27} the Golden State had been perennially Democratic.\textsuperscript{28} The state Republican party did not become organized until 1856, when it presented the Republican presidential candidate, Frémont, as the exponent of the Pacific railroad and muffled antislavery utterances.\textsuperscript{29} In the following year the Republican candidate for governor polled only 21,000 votes out of over 93,000 cast.\textsuperscript{30}

Suddenly the dominant California Democracy was rent in twain by a discordant medley of personalities, patronage, and Lecompton constitution. The fight centered about the rivalry of the state's two Democratic United States senators, David C. Broderick and William M. Gwin. Early in 1857 both of California's United States Senate seats were to be filled. Broderick, chieftain of the San Francisco Democratic machine, having been elected for the
six-year term, supported Gwin for the short-term Senate seat on condition that the latter agree that he (Broderick) should handle California's share of federal patronage. A fierce Broderick-Gwin feud soon broke out when Buchanan showered his attention—and most of the jobs—on Gwin. An anti-Broderick hireling was given the coveted collectorship of the Port of San Francisco. Broderick became a sworn opponent of the President, aligning himself with Douglas and the Republicans in the Senate fight against the Lecompton constitution. Broderick joined Douglas in opposing Buchanan's Kansas policy.31

The Republicans capitalized on the situation. The chief Republican spokesman in the Senate, William H. Seward of New York, instructed the Republican press to print words of praise for Broderick,32 and his directions were carried out.33

In 1858 in California the Broderick-Douglas "anti-Lecompton" Democrats and the Gwin-Buchanan "Lecompton" Democrats nominated different candidates for Supreme Court justice. The Republicans (numbering only a small minority in the state) endorsed the "anti-Lecompton" entry.34 The rift within the California Democracy widened when Broderick's faction fused with the Republicans on a single candidate for Congress.35 The jubilant Republicans did not question the sincerity of Broderick's anti-slavery convictions. One Republican leader observed frankly:

Gwin . . . turned the tables on Broderick by wriggling into Buchanan's favor and monopolizing the whole of the Executive patronage, not leaving his colleague a single crumb. From this act dates Broderick's hostility to the Administration. We will not say how far his opposition to the Lecompton swindle was predicated upon this prior enmity to Mr. Buchanan. We accept the fact that he did ably and consistently battle against the slavedriving schemes of the dominant power.36

33 New York Daily Tribune, Apr. 20, 1858.
Broderick aided the Republicans further by getting himself killed in a duel with David S. Terry of San Francisco, a native southerner, over an exchange of insults. With his death, Broderick’s unsavory reputation was forgotten. The Californian was exalted by his friends—and particularly by the Republicans—as a victim of the “Slave Power”; Buchanan’s opponents alleged that the senator’s last statement was that he had been wounded because of his opposition to the “corrupt, southern-dominated” administration at Washington. The chief organizer of the California Republican party, Colonel Edward D. Baker, who “fairly rivalled Cicero himself in persuasive eloquence,” delivered the oration at Broderick’s last rites, making the most of his death at the hands of a southerner. Morbidly loquacious, he mesmerized the assembled mourners with the grim words:

What was his public crime? The answer is in his own words: “I die because I was opposed to a corrupt administration, and the extension of slavery.” Fellow-citizens, they are remarkable words, uttered at a very remarkable moment; they involve the history of his senatorial career, and of its sad and bloody termination.

The Republican press throughout the nation, eager to accept Baker’s interpretation, preached that Broderick had been hunted to his death because he dared resist the Slave Power.

The party, in anticipation of 1860, did not relax its efforts to widen the rift within the Democracy, as evidenced in the inauguration of the “Covode committee.” In March, 1860, Representative John Covode, Pennsylvania Republican, sponsored in Congress a resolution to inquire “whether the President of the United States, or any other officer of the Government, has, by money, patronage, or other improper means, sought to influence the action of Con-

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37 Lynch, A Senator of the Fifties, pp. 201-224. For the lawless and rowdy elements associated with Broderick’s San Francisco organization see John T. Knox to Douglas, Sept. 21, 1860, Stephen A. Douglas papers, University of Chicago Library.
38 Memoirs of Cornelius Cole, p. 112.
gress” for or against the passage of any law. His pretext was the charge by two members of Congress that the President had attempted to bribe and coerce them into voting for the Lecompton constitution. Buchanan sent to the House a protest against this investigation so far as it related to himself. The Republican-controlled House of Representatives under Covode’s chairmanship proceeded with the investigation. Voluminous testimony was taken. “In all probability,” writes Professor Robert S. Cotterill, “the investigation was meant to produce nothing more serious than ammunition to be used by the Republicans in the presidential campaign of 1860; Covode was a member of the Republican Executive Congressional Committee for this campaign.”

At least two of the major witnesses before the Covode committee, John W. Forney and Cornelius Wendell, bore grievances against President Buchanan. Forney, who had been elected clerk of Congress by a Republican-anti-Lecompton coalition after his rift with Buchanan, testified that he was offered post-office printing on condition that he come out editorially in favor of the Chief Executive’s Kansas policy. He also portrayed Buchanan as a man of rank ingratitude. Particularly damaging to the President was the testimony of Wendell, who declared that with Buchanan’s approval he had in an attempt to pass the Lecompton constitution in Congress expended “from $30,000 to $40,000,” secured through government contracts and federal patronage. The pro-Buchanan press charged that such accusations had not been heard “while Mr. Wendell had the free run of the printing spoils and could squander large sums of public money.”

The split between the Buchanan-dominated Lecomptonites and the Douglas-led anti-Lecomptonites was fast disintegrating the national Democratic party. The bad blood existing between the two factions was graphically expressed in 1858 by Bu-

42 Congressional Globe, 36th Cong., 1st sess., p. 997.
43 Ibid., p. 1017.
44 James D. Richardson (ed.), Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897 (Washington, 1897), vol. v, p. 618.
48 New York Herald, Apr. 18, 1860.
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Buchanan’s chief northwestern patronage dispenser, Senator Bright of Indiana:

I have not, nor shall I ever regard a set of men in this Country who call themselves “anti-Lecompton Democrats,” in any other light than Abolitionists, and most of them rotten in every sense of the term.

I court and defy the opposition of every one of them, from their lying hypocritical Demagogical master Douglas, down to the scurviest puppy in the kennel.

Not only were the Democrats split on the personalities of Buchanan and Douglas, on the sectional issue of Kansas, and on rivalry over federal appointments; in addition, the party was at odds over interpretations regarding the measure of protection which the United States Constitution gave to the institution of Negro slavery. In particular the decision in the Dred Scott case, handed down by the Supreme Court in 1857, precipitated additional wrangling among the Democrats.

The Douglas Democrats could not accept the Dred Scott decision because it was incompatible with their leader’s doctrine of popular sovereignty, which decreed that the people of the territories had the right either to permit or to reject slavery in their respective regions. And popular sovereignty was the Douglasites’ political capital. The “Southern rights” Democrats, on the other hand, would not surrender to Douglas, since popular sovereignty was viewed by them as quite as deadly to the institution of slavery as the Republican creed of congressional prohibition of slavery in the territories. Douglas’ lieutenants labored to establish a working basis for the restoration of party harmony, but without avail.

“Southern rights” had come to mean racial security and self-determination by the whites in or out of the Union. A program had been framed to utilize state sovereignty whether to safeguard the South as a minority within the Union or to legitimate its exit into national independence. Legal sanction for the spread of slaveholding became the touchstone of southern rights. The meteoric rise of the Republican party, which denied this sanction,

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gave a driving force to this intense prosouthern feeling. Many extreme southern leaders had been primed for action in 1856 in case the Republicans should succeed in electing Frémont president. Although Buchanan defeated the Pathfinder, the revealed Republican strength increased the zeal of “South-savers” during the several years following.51

The “southern rights” movement attracted its strongest support in South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi.

Militant state-rights sentiment in South Carolina dated from Andrew Jackson’s day, when the state rebelled against the tariff of 1832. During the late 1840’s it led to protests against the North’s attempted prohibition of slavery in the territory acquired by the Mexican War. Under Calhoun’s leadership it became an effort to unite the South in a demand for equality of the slave interests with the “free” states, otherwise the southern states should seek protection of their interests outside the Union. The other southern states’ refusal to follow her out of the Union in 1850-1852 prevented the Palmetto state’s secession then.52 When Calhoun died in 1850, leadership passed to the more radical Robert Barnwell Rhett, editor of the Charleston Mercury, under whose direction the secession-minded faction of South Carolina Democrats went into the ascendancy. John Brown’s Harper’s Ferry raid, moreover, had convinced even the antisecession Democrats that there was little safety in their state’s remaining in the Union.53 Rhett found a staunch ally in William L. Yancey of Alabama. By 1858 both men, encouraged by other disunionist leaders such as Edmund Ruffin of Virginia, were determined that the issue must be faced in the presidential campaign of 1860, even if the result was the destruction of the national Democratic party. To this end Yancey worked in Alabama as did Rhett in South Carolina.54

The southern-rights movement in Alabama, led by Yancey, had dated from the days of the Wilmot Proviso, which in the 1840’s

52 Philip M. Hamer, The Secession Movement in South Carolina, 1847-1852 (Allentown, Pa., 1918), chs. i-vii.
54 Laura A. White, Robert Barnwell Rhett: Father of Secession (New York, 1931), pp. 96, 111, 111 n., 113, 144, 146-149. For an excellent study of Ruffin see Avery O. Craven, Edmund Ruffin, Southerner (New York, 1932).
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had sought to commit Congress to the policy of excluding slavery from the territory acquired from Mexico. Underneath this Yancey-led movement was the sectional controversy, which was quite as old as the Union itself. Often Democratic and Whig leaders in Alabama compromised their proslavery principles for the sake of party orthodoxy and devotion to the Union. Not so Yancey, who had resigned his seat in Congress in 1846 because he believed that loyalty to the Democratic party and cooperation with the North in Congress were not protecting the South's vital interests. "If this foul spell of party which binds and divides and distracts the South can be broken," he concluded in 1847, "hail to him who shall break it." In 1848 in answer to the Wilmot Proviso Yancey had offered to the state Democratic convention at Montgomery the so-called "Alabama platform," a statement of abstract principles presenting the southern demands for the protection of slavery in the territories. He had carried it also into the Democratic national convention of 1848, with no success. During the next decade the Alabaman agitated for the radical prosouthern cause. The union of all southern men in a sectional party could be realized only with disintegration of the Democratic party as a national organization.

When Douglas in reply to Lincoln's famous question set forth his "Freeport doctrine" of unfriendly legislation, Buchanan's faction below Mason and Dixon's line, led by Jefferson Davis and Slidell, seized the opportunity of crushing the Illinois senator nationally by destroying his southern support. "Buchaneers" below the Potomac demanded that the Democratic party formally repudiate the Douglas doctrine of popular sovereignty and that Congress accept responsibility for the protection of slavery in the territories. Born of the Buchanan-Douglas factional fight rather than of any strong southern demand, the territorial issue was seized on by Yancey and Rhett in order to unite the South and split the Democratic party. Yancey journeyed to South

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66 For the text of the "Alabama Platform," see ibid., pp. 159, 160.  
Carolina to lend support to Rhett, who was preaching the radical southern gospel in his Charleston Mercury. At Columbia in July, 1859, the fiery Alabaman presented a definite program: state-rights men should go to the Democratic national convention in April, 1860; but if the convention did not uphold the South’s rights in the territories, they should leave and organize a new convention. If the Republicans won the presidency in the November election, the southern states should secede from the Union before the inauguration. In alarm a moderate southerner wrote: "We must be guarded and warned of the impracticable, radical, visionary and provincial partisanship of such schemers and ambitious demagogues as Rhett, Yancey and Co., or the country will drift into either ruin or disgrace or both." Soon the fanatic John Brown made his raid at Harper’s Ferry, thus forcing more pro-Union men into the state-righters’ ranks.

Yancey, although by no means a party man, largely dominated the Democratic party in Alabama. His was the viewpoint of the majority of Alabamans who desired to free themselves from economic dependence on the North. Nonslaveholders, who constituted the bulk of the state’s white population, feared the social consequences of the abolition of the Negroes.

When the time came for Alabama to select delegates to the Democratic national convention at Charleston in 1860, the state was chiefly under the influence of Yancey’s radical prosouthern faction. The Whig party, usually a conservative and nationalizing influence, was almost completely destroyed. Yancey, the guiding force at the state Democratic convention at Montgomery in January, resurrected his “Alabama platform” of 1848. Resolutions were adopted which declared that the United States Constitution was a compact between sovereign and coequal states; that citizens of every state were entitled to entry into the territories

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90 White, Robert Barnwell Rhett, pp. 154-155.
91 Ibid., p. 156 n.
93 Denman, The Secession Movement in Alabama, pp. 65-72.
94 Ibid., p. vii; Lewy Dorman, Party Politics in Alabama from 1850 through 1860 (Publication of the Alabama State Department of History and Archives, Historical and Patriotic Series, No. 13), Preface.
with their property (slaves included) and to protection by the federal government; that neither Congress nor its creature, a territorial legislature, could abolish slavery in a territory; that the people of a territory held no constitutional power to do so until they framed a state constitution preparatory to entry into the Union. The tenth resolution directed the Alabama delegates to secede from the Democratic national convention if these resolutions were not substantially accepted.⁶⁴

In Alabama's neighboring state Mississippi the "southern rights" faction was in control of the Democratic party in 1860. Fremont's huge northern vote in 1856 had persuaded Missisipians that the United States Constitution was not adequate in safeguarding slavery and other southern institutions; that the North, expressing itself through the Republican party, would attempt to bring about the dreaded equality of whites and Negroes. By 1858 the Democratic press in Mississippi was shrieking for disunion and serving notice that the election of a "Black" Republican to the presidency two years hence would be the "overt act" for secession.⁶⁵

Besides the radical prosouthern feeling another factor in brewing secessionism and splitting the Democratic party in Mississippi was Douglas himself, who had alienated much of his support by his warfare against the Buchanan administration over the Lecompton constitution.⁶⁶ Senator Albert Gallatin Brown of Mississippi wrote Douglas late in 1859: "The South will demand at Charleston a platform explicitly declaring that slave property is entitled in the Territories and on the high seas to the same protection that is given to any other and every other species of property and failing to get it she will retire from the Convention."⁶⁷ Douglas, in response to an inquiry as to whether he would permit his name to be presented for the presidency, said that he would accept the Democratic nomination if the national platform embodied the principles of the Compromise of 1850; but if the party adopted "such new issues as the revival of the African slave trade, or a Congressional slave code for the terri-

⁶⁷ Rainwater, Mississippi: Storm Center of Secession, 1856-1861, p. 109.
tories—it is due to candor to say, that, in such an event, I cannot accept the nomination if tendered to me." Mississippi turned unalterably against the Little Giant. The Democratic party machinery was now in the hands of those who would disrupt the party rather than have him nominated.

Although the "southern rights" movement was strongest in South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi, it became powerful in other southern states—Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas, all of which sent strongly prosouthern and consequently anti-Douglas delegations to the Charleston convention. Professor Dwight L. Dumond concludes: "South Carolina, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, and Arkansas endorsed the Alabama Platform and, rallying behind Yancey, went into the Charleston convention determined to force the issue to a conclusion."

In addition to the "constitutional" opposition of Yancey and his southern-rights associates toward the Douglasites' popular-sovereignty doctrine, a striking feature of the Democratic schism on the eve of the Charleston convention was the personal element: the Buchanan faction's hatred of Douglas. This was apparent from the delegation sent to Charleston by the President's own state of Pennsylvania, among whom were included such Buchanan-appointed federal officeholders as the collector and the naval officer of the Port of Philadelphia, the postmaster of Philadelphia, the postmaster of Lancaster, and the collector of customs and the postmaster of Pittsburgh.

The selection of a partially "packed" anti-Douglas delegation and the personal factor were apparent also in Louisiana, home state of Buchanan's friend and ally, Senator Slidell. "The faction of the Democrats in Louisiana," writes one southern historian, "which . . . was allied with the Buchanan or radical element in

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68 Quoted in Natchez Free Trader, June 29, 1859, in ibid., p. 111 n.
69 Rainwater, Mississippi: Storm Center of Secession, 1856-1861, pp. 111-113.
71 Dumond, The Secession Movement, 1860-1861, p. 35.
the national party was the conservative wing headed by Slidell; while the group which followed Stephen A. Douglas and other northern conservatives was in Louisiana the ultrasouthern faction of Pierre Soulé. This indicates, perhaps, that the personal element counted for quite as much if not more than fundamental principles.” Slidell’s New Orleans organization, controlling federal patronage, prevailed over Soulé’s pro-Douglas group in the state Democratic convention at Baton Rouge in March, 1860. Delegates loyal to the Buchanan administration were chosen to go to Charleston. Slidell was endorsed for the presidency. An anti-Slidell journal caustically commented of the convention: “The doctrine ‘to the victors belong the spoils’ is again settled on a permanent basis! . . . We of the rank and file in the country would like to know in how far federal office-holders of New Orleans represent the people of the state or city; they were all here [in Baton Rouge] again in full feather with abundance of pliant material; and carried to their liking all their measures.” Slidell himself went to Charleston to work for Douglas’ defeat.

As the national convention assembled at Charleston in April, 1860, one observer reported: “The Hon. Stephen A. Douglas was the pivot individual of the Charleston Convention. Every delegate was for or against him.” The bad blood between Buchanan and Douglas—a feeling naturally reflected among their respective supporters—increased the bitterness of the conflict over constitutional opinions. Buchanan was out to destroy Douglas. Word had come from Washington: “The city is full of federal office-holders, whom Mr. Buchanan is rallying around him to defeat Douglas. He has brought them here from every part of the country, and insists that they shall all go to Charleston, whether they are delegates or not.”

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76 Halstead, Caucuses of 1860, pp. 7, 13.

77 Ibid., p. 1.

78 Philadelphia Press, Apr. 12, 1860.
found "by actual count" 507 United States government job holders on the scene. Slidell arrived early to direct the Buchanan forces. One correspondent wrote: "His [Slidell's] appearance here means war to the knife. It means also, that the Administration is uneasy on the Douglas question—and feel constrained to exert every influence against the Squatty Giant of Illinois, whose nomination would be perdition to Buchanan, Slidell & Co." Yancey was there—"the prince of fire-eaters . . . who proposes according to common report to precipitate the cotton States into a revolution, dissolve the Union and build up a Southern empire." The anti-Douglas delegates comprised a formidable bloc: the Buchanan administration leaders who opposed Douglas both because of personal hatred and because of their knowledge that with his success their sun would set; the southern political oligarchy, which similarly realized that Douglas in the White House would bring into power in the South a new group which would take over the federal patronage there; and the "southern rights" doctrinaires, for the most part sincere if shortsighted men of the lower South who convinced themselves that their section's interests required the full protection for slavery.

The Douglasites were equally primed for battle, controlling many northern delegations and having minority support in the South. Douglas had seemingly denounced all who differed with him as traitors to the party principles. His followers had journeyed to Charleston determined to support no man except him.

The selection of Charleston as the site of the national convention was not a judicious one. But the anti-Douglas Democratic national committee had chosen that secession-minded city because it would be less propitious for the Douglasites to accomplish his nomination. One effect was to draw northern and southern delegates even farther apart; the haughty social leaders of Charles-

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80 Halstead, Caucuses of 1860, p. 7.
81 Ibid., p. 5.
83 Rainwater, Mississippi: Storm Center of Secession, 1856-1861, p. 111 n.
84 James Guthrie to ———, copy, May 21, 1860, Samuel J. Tilden papers, New York Public Library (Box No. 20).
ton practically ignored the Northerners while entertaining the Southerners lavishly.\textsuperscript{87}

New York proved to be the first disrupting force of the Charleston committee. The party was divided. Tammany Hall, controlling the Democratic machinery in the metropolis, had elected Fernando Wood as mayor. In dispensing the municipal patronage Mayor Wood neglected the Tammany leaders, for which the latter ousted him from Tammany and defeated him for reelection. Thereupon he organized his personal following as “Mozart Hall,” which secured his third election in 1859.

Now, in April, 1860, the ambitious mayor of New York, on friendly terms with President Buchanan and certain southern leaders, turned up at Charleston with a delegation of his own, recruited from his Mozart Hall hirelings and a few upstate allies. He insisted that his group represented the true Democracy of the Empire State. Contesting Wood’s claims at Charleston was the regular or “Albany Regency” faction, which comprised Tammany Hall and most of the upstate factions. The “Regency” chieftain, Dean Richmond, demanded that Wood’s delegation be refused recognition. Before the opening of the convention Wood had sought to insure admission by assiduous wooing of the southern anti-Douglas delegations—with the natural result of throwing many of Richmond’s delegation nominally into the Douglas camp.\textsuperscript{88} News came from Charleston: “The Southern delegations are standing together for the Wood delegation.”\textsuperscript{89} Finally the Wood-Richmond struggle after much uproar was referred to the committee on credentials.\textsuperscript{90} It was reported that “unless the Wood delegates are admitted, and the whole of the Richmond delegates rejected, the delegations of several Southern States will take this opportunity of seceding and forming a separate Convention with the Wood delegates and those of some other Southern States.”\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{87} Mrs. Roger A. Pryor, \textit{Reminiscences of Peace and War} (New York, 1905), pp. 95, 96.
\textsuperscript{89} \textit{New York Herald}, Apr. 24, 1860.
\textsuperscript{90} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{91} \textit{Ibid.}, Apr. 25, 1860.
The third day of the convention produced no harmony, for the committee on credentials brought in a majority report recommending that Dean Richmond's delegation be recognized in the casting of New York's huge bloc of thirty-five votes. A minority report was submitted—signed by committeeemen from the South—which recommended that the two contesting delegations (Richmond's and Wood's) each select thirty-five delegates to cast seventeen votes, the odd vote to be cast alternately. The sitting (Richmond's) delegates, consisting of a majority of Douglas men, were to cast their votes first, which under the unit rule would mean the casting of New York's entire thirty-five votes for the Illinois senator as against the South. Wood's rival delegation was almost solidly against Douglas. Although the Woodites were staunchly defended by the "southern rights" men, the convention voted to reject the minority report. Richmond was in, and Wood was out. The "southern rights" men became more furious than ever.\(^9\)

The importance of the Wood-Richmond contest subsequently became apparent in the vote on the platform. And it was controversy over the platform that wrecked the convention. Yancey and his "southern rights" ultras demanded that the platform be adopted before the balloting for President and Vice President. "The platform issue was the Ultras' last chance to blow up the convention,"\(^9\) concludes one historian. What disturbed Yancey most was the possibility of a southerner being nominated, which would make the platform seem less vital and prevent any "bolt" in Yancey's wake. But the Douglas men played into Yancey's hands when they too for their own reasons voted, contrary to the usual procedure, to adopt the platform before making the nominations. Having a majority but not the necessary two-thirds for a nomination, Douglas' supporters welcomed the platform struggle in order to bring about the withdrawal of a few "ultras."\(^9\)

Senator Robert Toombs of Georgia, not unfriendly to Douglas, maintained: "Douglas's men made a great mistake in voting to go to the platform before nominating a Prest. A rupture then became inevitable; but he and his friends expected to profit by the secession of two or three states and therefore urged it in common

with the various elements of combustion in the So. West."\(^9\) One who attended the convention recorded:

The determination of the New York contest, and the adoption of a rule allowing individual delegates from uninstructed States to vote as they pleased, gave the friends of Mr. Douglas a majority in the Convention. They proceeded to use that majority, for the purpose of making sure of their game. They joined the ultra-Southern States in demanding the test fight upon the platform. . . .

The Douglas men had discovered, that whereas they had just about a majority, it would be impossible for them to obtain a two-thirds vote in a full Convention. They were willing, therefore, that a few ultra-Southern States might go out, and allow them to nominate their man. All at once they became very cheerful on the subject of a disruption of the Convention. They could go North and get two votes (electoral) for their nominee, for every Southern vote that would leave the Convention. Their game then was, to have three or four States, at most, go out. They wanted a little eruption, but not a great one.\(^{96}\)

Thus, by agreement of both the Douglasites and the "southern rights" ultras, the platform was to be adopted before the balloting for the presidential candidate. The lines upon which the Douglas and anti-Douglas factions were at bitter odds had been sharply drawn by a series of resolutions presented to the United States Senate by Jefferson Davis the previous February; the right of either Congress or a territorial legislature to impair the constitutional right of property in slaves was denied. In case of unfriendly legislation it was declared to be the duty of Congress to provide adequate protection to slave property. Douglas' doctrine of popular sovereignty was completely discarded by the assertion that the people of a territory might pass upon the question of slavery only when they formed a state constitution. What the southerners demanded above all else was congressional protection.


\(^{96}\) Halstead, Caucuses of 1860, pp. 68-69.
of slavery in the territories—and they insisted that this principle be written into the Democratic platform. Some believed that Davis introduced his resolutions “merely to have the political effect of killing off the great non-interventionist, Douglas, before the Charleston Convention.”

The Democratic factional and sectional struggle at Charleston focused on the wording of the platform. Two platforms were submitted, which may be conveniently designated as the “Yancey platform” and the “Douglas platform.” The former, approved by a majority of the platform committee, vigorously asserted that the federal government must protect slavery in the territories; the latter reaffirmed the Cincinnati platform, evaded the issue as to positive maintenance of slavery in the territories, and vaguely declared that the Democratic party would abide by the decisions of the Supreme Court. When the convention adopted the Douglas “non-intervention” platform, Yancey delivered an impassioned speech against northern aggression. The Alabama firebrand presented an ultimatum: either the platform of the lower South must be accepted or the delegates from that section would withdraw. The Douglas forces, constituting a majority of the delegates, would not accept any platform inconsistent with self-government in the territories. The break came. The convention adopted the Douglas platform. Yancey led the Alabama delegation out of the hall. The other “cotton-state” delegations, with few exceptions, followed. The Charleston convention was disrupted. Unable to choose a presidential candidate—for the Douglasites would take no other candidate than their idol—the convention adjourned and made arrangements to meet in Baltimore in June.

In the reassembled convention at Baltimore on June 18 the seceding element reappeared, whereupon a fierce contest was precipitated between the Douglasites and the “seceders” over the seating of rival delegations. As a result another secession of southern members occurred, after which the fragment of the convention nominated Douglas for the presidency. Later conventions of southern “bolters” were held at Baltimore and Richmond. A “southern” Democratic ticket was nominated—John C.

Breckinridge of Kentucky for the presidency and Senator Joseph Lane of Oregon for the vice presidency.\footnote{100}

An examination of the popular votes cast by each state of the Union in the campaign of 1860 indicates that even if the Democratic party had not put into the field two separate candidates, Douglas and Breckinridge, the Republicans, by virtue of the peculiar "electoral college" system, would still have elected Abraham Lincoln. This is true despite the fact that Lincoln received a minority of the popular vote as compared with the total number cast for Douglas, Breckinridge, and the conservative Constitutional Unionist candidate, John Bell.\footnote{101} Nevertheless, it may well be that the election figures do not tell the whole story. The foregoing details suggest that the Republican party was able to grow and become a formidable national organization by virtue of the Democratic split and the Republican leaders' adroit work of capitalizing on the division within the Democracy.

\footnote{100}Ibid., p. 176.  
\footnote{101}For a table of votes cast in the presidential election of 1860, see Tribune Almanac and Political Register, 1861, pp. 50-75.