THE William L. Clements Library at Ann Arbor, Michigan, contains collections of manuscripts which are invaluable to students of the War for American Independence. The Gage Papers, the Shelburne Papers, and the papers of Sir Henry Clinton are of particular importance to scholars who wish to investigate the political and military events which took place in America from 1775 to 1783. A study of the papers of Lord George Germain, who was secretary of state for the colonies from 1775 to 1782, is especially rewarding to the researcher in many respects. For one thing, the contents of the papers reveal to us some of the weaknesses in thinking and planning on the part of Lord George which helped to make it possible for the Americans to gain their independence. For another, an examination of the Germain Papers brings to our attention some interesting plans for the suppression of the revolutionary forces and for the establishment of Loyalist strongholds in certain areas.

It is particularly interesting to students of the history of the Middle Colonies to discover among the Germain Papers various memoranda suggesting that the Philadelphia area, or the peninsula of eastern Maryland, or the area between the Delaware and the Potomac, should be reconquered and held as part of a Loyalist armed camp in America. Some of the memorialists who drew up plans for a stronghold in the Middle Colonies were prominent loyalists like Joseph Galloway, one-time friend of Benjamin Franklin. Others were people of humble circumstances, often junior officers in provincial (Loyalist) militia units. Whether prominent or unknown, the men who dreamed of and schemed for the formation of a Loyalist citadel in the Middle Colonies were con-

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vinced that their plans, if adopted, would prove to be perfectly feasible. They believed that there was a very high proportion of Tories in the population of the area under consideration, and they counted on the possibility of raising ten thousand, twelve thousand, or even as many as fifteen thousand men to form provincial militia units to defend the proposed strongholds. They may have overestimated the number of men who would have been willing to rally to their standard, but the studies of a number of fine scholars have confirmed their belief that there was a large proportion of Loyalists in the population of the Middle Colonies.¹

At the beginning of the war in North America, Lord Germain underestimated the strength and determination of the revolutionary forces. Because of his initial miscalculation, he was confident of quick and easy victory. Even after two campaigns, his optimism had not been blunted completely, for he expected final victory in the campaign of 1777.² His overconfidence was shared, during the early years of the war, by a considerable number of his subordinates. Many British and Loyalist officers and leaders united in predicting victory as soon as the Continental army could be forced to fight a pitched battle. Their viewpoint was expressed by one gentleman who wrote to Lord Germain that one good “drubbing” of General Washington’s army would bring the war to an end.³ Another writer went so far as to assert that the war could be won, without the use of any troops, by a tight naval blockade and by the burning of a few seaports.⁴


² Lord George Germain to Lord Richard Howe, October 18, 1776, Sackville-Germain Papers, volume V. The papers are arranged in chronological order in twenty-two large volumes and several supplementary volumes. (Henceforth the Germain Papers will be designated by the letters G.P.)

³ Jonathan Boucher to Lord George Germain, November 27, 1775, G.P., IV. Boucher was a clergyman who lived in Annapolis, Maryland.

⁴ John McColme, broadside entitled “American Queries,” December 1, 1775, G.P., IV.
While thoughts of quick and easy victory were uppermost in their minds, British authorities made little effort to raise any considerable forces of Loyalists. They had full confidence in the ability of their regular troops to defeat the enemy’s armies and to pacify the countryside. They raised and equipped Loyalist units only when they could do so without a very special effort. They did not, however, take full advantage of the possibility of obtaining the support of Tory manpower during the first three campaigns of the war.\(^5\)

British officers were not only negligent in utilizing Loyalist manpower, but they were also guilty of mistakes, or carelessness, which caused them to abandon some of the Loyalist units which did rally to their standards. A few examples will suffice to illustrate the point. In 1775, British authorities in London promised support to the Loyalists of North Carolina.\(^6\) A fleet was sent to North Carolina, with an army on board, but it was delayed for some time in leaving the British Isles, and it failed to accomplish anything when it reached Cape Fear in May, 1776. Meanwhile, many Loyalists had taken the field, but they were suppressed with heavy losses by the time the British fleet had arrived.\(^7\) After their defeat, the North Carolinians who favored the King's cause were reluctant to arise again unless a British army had landed, or marched into, their province. Nevertheless, a number of desperate men remained in the field and carried on a prolonged guerrilla resistance.

Another instance of abandonment of Loyalist forces occurred in the campaign of 1777. Some Loyalists accompanied General John Burgoyne's army as it marched toward Albany in that year, and others arose in the Mohawk Valley to rally to the British standard. Support for the New York Tories collapsed, however, when General Burgoyne's army was surrounded and captured.\(^8\) The surrender of the British regulars at Saratoga left the Loyalists in a hopeless situation, and some of them were killed and cap-

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\(^7\) Ibid., pp. 92-96, 107.

\(^8\) Wilbur H. Siebert, "The Dispersion of the American Tories," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, I (September, 1914), 186.
tured, while others fled to Canada, leaving their homes and property in the hands of the victorious Continentals.9

One of the most serious disasters suffered by Loyalists during the course of the war was that which took place when the British army evacuated Philadelphia in 1778. Many people in Philadelphia and in nearby counties in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland had welcomed the British, or had joined forces with them, when they had occupied the Quaker City in the previous year. Naturally, the evacuation of the city was a tremendous disaster for the Tories who had welcomed and co-operated with the British. They were forced to abandon their homes and property in order to escape to New York before the re-occupation of Philadelphia by the Continentals. Some persons who were suspected of being Loyalists (including a number of Quakers who had entertained British officers in their homes) remained behind to protect their property; a number of them were arrested and interned in camps located in the interior of Virginia.10

Joseph Galloway, a prominent and well-to-do Loyalist, had served as Sir William Howe’s civil affairs administrator during the British occupation of Philadelphia.11 He had been instrumental in furnishing British authorities with military, political, and economic intelligence during the campaign of 1777 and the occupation of the city. He had taken a census of the population of the city and its suburbs, and had supervised the disarming of all persons who were not active Loyalists.12 He had attempted to promote various schemes for the arming of Loyalists in and around Philadelphia; at one time, he had asserted that 10,000 Loy-

9 The term “Continentals” is used throughout the paper to represent the militia as well as the regular troops in the revolutionary forces. The term “Americans” can’t be used because the Loyalists were Americans, too. The British called the revolutionary forces “Rebels,” while some American historians have liked to refer to them as “Patriots,” a term which seems a bit stilted; besides, there was patriotism on both sides. Hence, to avoid the use of the terms “Rebel” or “Patriot,” it has seemed to the author to be wise to refer to all the revolutionary forces as “Continentals.”
10 For an interesting discussion of some aspects of the position of the Quakers during the American Revolution, read Robert P. Falk, “Thomas Paine and the Attitude of the Quakers to the American Revolution,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXIII (July, 1939), 302-310.
alist militia could be raised in Philadelphia and in some twenty-
two counties in nearby portions of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Delaware.\textsuperscript{18} Whether his Loyalist friends could have raised that many men for service in provincial militia units poses a question which cannot be answered. Galloway may have overestimated the number and determination of his followers. At all events, his proposal was made in good faith, and it is possible that he and his friends could have raised 10,000 fighting men if Generals Howe and Clinton had given them support in terms of arms, ammunition, equipment, and official encouragement of their plans.

To the bitter disappointment of Joseph Galloway and his friends, the commanders of the British army made no real effort to arm the Loyalists of the Middle Colonies during the occupation of Philadelphia. Galloway complained that they had not even made a serious effort to raise and arm the Loyalists of the Quaker City itself (although he conceded that many of the young men of Philadelphia were pacifists who would not bear arms or participate in military activities in any case).\textsuperscript{14} He complained further that the British had issued "protections" to New Jersey and Philadelphia Loyalists, but that the possession of such documents had not prevented British and Hessian soldiers from plundering their homes and confiscating their property.\textsuperscript{15} His testimony concerning the failure of British officers to protect or utilize the Loyalists of the Middle Colonies is damning, but allowance must be made because of his animosity toward Sir William Howe whose military abilities he considered to be contemptible.

The hopes and plans of Galloway and his friends suffered a death blow when Sir Henry Clinton decided to evacuate Philadelphia. Galloway advised against the evacuation, but Sir Henry, who had to make the final decision, came to the conclusion that it was necessary for him to abandon the Quaker City. Lord George Germain had authorized him to take such a step, if it seemed necessary, but had urged him to retain Philadelphia as long as he had sufficient troops to do so without weakening his field force

\textsuperscript{18} Joseph Galloway, "Proposal for covering and reducing the Country as the British Army shall pass through it," in Benjamin F. Stevens's Facsimiles of Manuscripts in European Archives Relating to America, 1773-1783 (24 vols., London, 1889-95), XXIV, no. 2097. See also no. 2096 in \textit{ibid.}

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{The Examination of Joseph Galloway}, pp. 24, 32.

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 43-45.
or his garrisons elsewhere. Germain had explained to Sir Henry that the entry of France and the possible entry of Spain into the war had altered the military situation markedly. Large numbers of troops who might otherwise have been available for service with General Clinton's army would be required for garrison duty in Canada, Nova Scotia, and the West Indies. Under the circumstances, offensive operations in North America would have to be curtailed in order to secure the defenses of New York, Halifax, and other fortified bases.

After considering the military situation very carefully, General Clinton had decided to evacuate Philadelphia in order to concentrate his forces at New York. Accordingly, he carried out the retreat which brought so much misfortune upon his Loyalist followers. His plans for an offensive to capture Savannah and Charleston were hampered by the operations of a French fleet and an Anglo-American army which threatened to capture the garrison of Newport, Rhode Island. Admiral Lord Richard Howe finally succeeded in rescuing the Newport garrison, but not until the British had faced a situation which gave them something of a preview of the disaster which was later to overtake one of their armies at Yorktown. The Newport operations prevented the prompt execution of the offensive operations which were supposed to smash resistance in the Southern Colonies. Savannah was captured by British forces in December, 1778, but the surrender of Charleston did not take place until May, 1780.

The suffering which was caused among the Loyalists by the evacuation of Philadelphia was not soon forgotten. They became very cautious in their actions, and, even after the arrival of a British army in a particular province, there was reluctance among the local Tories to rally to the King's standard. They feared, of course, that the army might march away again, abandoning them to the mercy of their most bitter enemies. Thus, when Lord Charles Cornwallis attempted to raise the Loyalists of North Carolina to support him in 1781, he complained of their caution and lack of enthusiasm. He reported to Sir Henry Clinton that, after his victory at Guildford, on March 15, 1781, the Loyalists in the vicinity

16 Germain to Clinton, “most secret” instructions, March 8, 1778, G.P., VII; a copy of the instructions appears in Stevens's Facsimiles, XI, no. 1062.
did no more than ride into camp to congratulate him upon his victory. After that, they rode back home again! Lord Cornwallis thought they were cowards, but they had arisen in force in 1776 and 1780, only to be crushed by superior force in a series of savage and bloody skirmishes.

The temporary loss of initiative by the British forces in North America was due mainly to French participation in the war. The escape of the French Mediterranean fleet into the Atlantic in 1778 created immense difficulties and dangers for the British until such time as they could overtake and destroy it. Meanwhile, British leaders were forced to re-evaluate their plans for the prosecution of the war. They began to consider the idea of a piecemeal reconquest of the colonies. Certain colonies appeared to be almost totally “disaffected,” but there were others which were known to be inhabited by many Loyalists. Maryland, New Jersey, Delaware, and parts of Pennsylvania and New York were included in the latter category. It seemed reasonable to suppose that some of the above-mentioned colonies, together with Georgia and the Carolinas, could be reconquered one by one, with the help of the local Tories. As we have already seen, one of the reasons which caused General Clinton to evacuate Philadelphia was the need to disengage his field forces in order to be able to send them to reconquer Georgia and the Carolinas.

Loyal Americans, including Joseph Galloway, were strongly convinced of the feasibility of winning at least partial victory in North America through piecemeal reconquest. Galloway favored immediate reconquest of the Middle Colonies, however, while British planners gave top priority to the restoration of the “King’s peace” in the South. Had Galloway’s recommendations been followed, it is probable that the Middle Colonies, and especially the Philadelphia area, would have suffered from several years of bloody civil war. As it turned out, however, the Middle Colonies were spared from becoming a battleground after 1778, while the soil of Virginia and the Carolinas was destined to become the scene of desperate fighting in 1780 and 1781.

18 Cornwallis to Clinton, April 10, 1781, Cornwallis Papers, G.D. 11, bundle 5, in Public Record Office. See also Sir Henry Clinton, Observations on Some Parts of the Answers of Earl Cornwallis to Sir Henry Clinton’s Narrative (London, 1783), pp. 9-10.

19 Germain to Clinton, March 8, 1778, G.P., VII.
Projects for the re-establishment of loyal provinces in North America had been submitted to the British ministry as early as October, 1775. One of many such projects called for the reconquest of the Penobscot region, where a buffer colony could be maintained to defend Nova Scotia. A somewhat similar plan called for the re-establishment of royal authority in Georgia and the Carolinas. One scheme provided for the establishment of a Loyalist citadel, to be defended by frontiersmen of Scottish extraction, in the vicinity of Lake Champlain. Scores of similar plans were submitted to British officials at one time or another, and a large proportion of them were concerned with the founding of Loyalist strongholds in the Middle Colonies.

One interesting proposal called for the withdrawal of the British armies, save only for garrisons which were to be maintained in small but powerful fortresses located on islands and peninsulas near every important seaport; the island-fortresses were to be used as bases for warships which were to maintain, for years, if necessary, a tight blockade of the coastline between Nova Scotia and Florida. Another plan, somewhat similar in purpose, proposed that the colonists should be deprived of the rights of British citizens and that commerce with them should be prohibited or strictly limited for a period of several years. Evidently, the authors of both plans hoped that the colonists would eventually find blockade or boycott to be economically intolerable, and would, therefore, voluntarily apply for readmission into the imperial connection with Great Britain.

Lord George Germain, on the other hand, was disinclined to believe in the possibility of winning the war through blockade or boycott. He felt that vigorous military measures would be necessary. However, in a memorandum which he wrote in January, 1779, he expressed pessimism because of the lack of troops available to prosecute the war in North America. He explained that

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21 Anonymous, "Reasons humbly suggested to show . . . that the Kings Forces should take possession of either Charles Town or Savannah. . . ." [early 1778?], G.P., II, Supplementary.
22 Anonymous to Germain [early 1776?], G.P., I, Supplementary.
23 Walter Patterson to [Germain?], [1778?], G.P., VIII.
24 James Ramsey to [Germain?], [1778?], ibid.
25 Germain to Lord North, January 11, 1779, G.P., IX.
it would be impossible to send a sufficient number of reinforce-
ments to North America because of commitments in the West
Indies and elsewhere. He complained about the uncertainty raised
by the presence of French warships in American waters; so long
as they remained there the British naval blockade could be broken
periodically, and operations on land would be jeopardized by the
possibility of a joint Franco-American attack similar to that
which had been made at Newport in 1778. Finally, he speculated
upon the possibility of cutting the enemy’s lines of communica-
tions by occupying, with Loyalist help, the area lying between the
Hudson and Connecticut rivers.26 He evidently expected that such
a move would embarrass the Continentals considerably, although
he did not delude himself into thinking that the proposed opera-
tions would bring about decisive results.

Two months after Lord George had drawn up his project for
a campaign along the Hudson, Joseph Galloway submitted to him
a carefully worked out “Plan for Establishing a permanent Uni-
ion between Great Britain and America.”27 His “Plan” has al-
ready been the subject of careful and scholarly investigation; it
would be futile for us to describe it in detail when the reader can
so easily turn to the pages of Julian Boyd’s fine book, Anglo-
American Union: Joseph Galloway’s Plans to Preserve the Brit-
ish Empire, 1774-1788.28 Galloway insisted that the revolutionary
forces were war-weary, and that they were disposed to listen to
reasonable terms. He proposed that Parliament should promise
them a restoration of civil government, a constitution in which
their civil liberties would be clearly stated, and a parliament of
their own or representation in that of Great Britain. He seemed
to think that the colonies could be reconquered one by one, with
the help of Loyalists, and he believed that reconquest would be
followed by a peace settlement if only such terms as he had pro-
posed were offered to the Americans.

Another plan, proposed by one of Galloway’s acquaintances,
was so sound, and so well thought out, that it might have spelled
victory for the British if it had been made available to them early

26 Ibid.
27 Galloway to [Germain], March 18, 1779, G.P., IX, and enclosed “Plans
...”; ibid., III, Supplementary.
28 Galloway’s projects of March 18, 1779, are carefully analyzed in Julian
Boyd, op. cit., pp. 84-94.
in the war. It advised them to operate in force in the Chesapeake, using their naval power to support a series of amphibious attacks in Virginia, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. A field force of 12,000 picked men was to liberate the Loyalists in the above-mentioned provinces and in the Jersies. The best fighting men among the Loyalists were then to be armed and equipped, to the number of 8,000, and were to be relied upon to defend the reconquered area. Reinforcements were to be brought to the fighting front by sea, in order to maintain the offensive army at a constant strength of 12,000 men. The army was to live off the land, in order to reduce its baggage train, and was to carry only light artillery with it, so that it could obtain a maximum of mobility. It was to pursue General Washington's army relentlessly, in order to bring it to battle or to wear it down by harassing it. As soon as the Continentals had been driven from the Middle Colonies, assistance was to be given to the Loyalists in New York until they, in their turn, had been liberated and had raised 8,000 militiamen for local defense. Virginia and the Carolinas were to be conquered and held in the same manner. Finally, since there were thought to be very few "well-affected" people in New England, it was proposed that the colonies which retained the hardest core of resistance should be stormed and laid waste with fire and sword. Civil government was not to be restored in New England for a period of years; instead, an example was to be made of the disaffected provinces, and they were to be subjected to military government "with a rod of iron" for several years.

Of all the plans for reconquest which were submitted to General Clinton and Lord Germain, the one outlined above was probably the most feasible. Unfortunately for the British cause, it was submitted in 1780, when French and Spanish participation in the war threatened British naval supremacy and made it necessary for the government at London to divert to the West Indies and Gibraltar reinforcements which were badly needed in North America. Had the plan been available to the Howe brothers in 1776-1777, however, it might have enabled them to win the war.

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29] John Smyth, "Sketch of a System by which the rebellious Colonies in America might be reduced to Obedience in two Campaigns," dated March 8, 1780, G.P., XII. Smyth was a Loyalist refugee who was residing in London. He submitted a copy of his "System" to Joseph Galloway as well as one to Lord Germain.

30] Ibid.
Whether it could have succeeded had it been attempted will never be known, but one wonders if the Continental forces could have held out for long against the tactics described above.

A number of plans similar to but less well thought out than the one just discussed were submitted to British authorities during the course of the war. They called for the reconquest of the Middle Colonies, with the aid of Loyalist militia, and they relied upon the Loyalists to maintain order in the reconquered areas while the British regulars pursued General Washington's army. Some of the plans were quite sound and might have worked had they been submitted early in the war, and if, of course, the British authorities had accepted them. One of the plans, submitted in 1781 by a New York Loyalist, estimated that there were 15,000 men in New York and in the Jersies who would be willing to bear arms as soon as the British army had driven the Continentals from the area in which they lived. The author proposed that the British army should march into the area in question, and should arm and equip the Loyalists, who would then disarm their disaffected neighbors, cut the line of communications between the enemy's forces in New England and the Southern Colonies, and make destructive raids on towns and settlements held by the enemy.\(^{31}\) The plan contained the rather melodramatic suggestion that the Loyalists would be willing to put the torch to their own homes and fields, if necessary, in order to deprive the Continentals of provisions in such parts of the New York-New Jersey area as they might succeed in occupying. The whole scheme sounds a bit fantastic, but things even more fantastic have taken place in wartime in very recent years.

Another plan, which was submitted to British authorities in 1779 or 1780, called for an expedition to reconquer the peninsula or "Eastern Shore" of Maryland.\(^ {32}\) The writer claimed that the troops who were to conquer the Maryland peninsula would be able to obtain an ample supply of provisions upon the spot. He also claimed that the population of the peninsula was made up almost entirely of Loyalists, and that there was room enough and food enough in the area to enable large numbers of Loyalists from

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\(^{31}\) C. N. Godfrey Jadus, "Intelligence from an American Gentleman from New York," January 16, 1781, G.P., XIV.

\(^{32}\) Anonymous to [Germain?], "Remarks on the Peninsula or Eastern Shore of Maryland" [1779 or 1780?], G.P., XVII.
surrounding colonies to settle there. The peninsula could be defended quite easily by a few thousand troops and militia, and naval forces operating from its harbors and inlets could harass and blockade Philadelphia, Baltimore, and other ports on the Chesapeake. The Continentals, if they remained in the Middle Colonies, would be cut off from foreign supplies, and would be subject to the danger of utter destruction if the British army should make a sudden amphibious attack followed by a rapid inland march. Sooner or later, the Continentals would suffer defeat, or be forced to retreat, and then the Middle Colonies could be pacified, civil governments could be restored, and large forces of militia could be raised to maintain order throughout the reconquered area.

One Major Charles Cochrane submitted to his superiors, some time in late 1780, a project for the reconquest of the colonies south of the Delaware River. He advocated the bold step of evacuating New York and of concentrating all British forces in bases which were to be seized along the coasts of Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas. The Loyalists in these provinces were then to be raised and armed, and operations were to proceed until the colonies south of the Delaware had been reconquered piecemeal. Meanwhile, the enemy was to be denied the use of New York harbor by a force of 600 picked men who were to be posted in a powerful fortress which was to be established on Sandy Hook. Once the pacification of the colonies south of the Delaware had been completed, a force of 15,000 men was to hold the line of the Delaware against all comers. Loyalist militia were to maintain order in the reconquered provinces, while the field force was to harass the enemy by making a series of forays to the northward. Such Loyalists as should come from the northern provinces were to be allowed to settle on confiscated estates in the Southern and Middle Colonies. Disaffected members of the population were to be forced to emigrate to the territories still held by the Continentals, except that men of military age who might take arms with the Continental forces were to be imprisoned. Head of Elk in Maryland, a post on the James River in Virginia, Beaufort in North Carolina, and Charles-

33 Major Charles Cochrane to [Sir Henry Clinton?], "Thoughts relative to the present State of our Affairs in America with remarks on the advantages which may be derived to Great Britain, from giving up the Northern Colonies and drawing the line of our present possessions by the River Delaware" [December, 1780?], G.P., II, Supplementary.
ton in South Carolina, were to be the principal British bases for the reconquest of the provinces south of the Delaware. Each base was to be fortified as soon as possible after its capture in order to provide the reconquered and pacified provinces with a number of permanent defense posts from which they could be administered.

Fortunately for the Continentals, some of the most feasible of the plans of reconquest discussed above were never put into operation. Perhaps they would not have succeeded. Perhaps they were based upon a gross over-estimate of the number of Loyalists who would have been willing to bear arms in order to assist in maintaining order in certain areas. At all events, the most feasible of the projects for reconquest were not tried, or else they were tried after the French had entered the war. Methodical reconquest, with the aid of local Loyalists, might have succeeded in 1776-77. It was much less likely to have succeeded after 1778, when a French fleet had appeared off the coast of North America. Until that fleet could be destroyed, all British operations in North America were in constant danger of being interrupted or countered by Franco-American joint action. In addition to the threat from the French fleet, the British cause was further weakened by demoralization among American Loyalists. The Loyalists never forgot the evacuation of Philadelphia in 1778. Nevertheless, there were still many men in the various colonies who were willing to arise in favor of the British when opportunity to do so presented itself.

The British could have taken advantage of the presence of numerous Loyalists in the Middle Colonies to launch a major offensive in that area. However, they turned their backs upon various plans of reconquest of the Middle Colonies in order to retake the South. A preliminary blow was struck in December, 1778, when Savannah, Georgia, was captured by British forces. The main blow fell in May, 1780, when General Clinton himself led the British army which captured Charleston, South Carolina. General Clinton then returned to his headquarters at New York, while Lord Charles Cornwallis pursued the remnants of the Continental forces. From South Carolina, he pressed on and on, until he had marched through North Carolina into a deadly trap at Yorktown,

35 Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot to Germain, May 2, 1780, and Sir Henry Clinton to Germain, June 4, 1780, both in *G.P.*, XII.
Virginia. He had won pyrrhic victories and had achieved hollow conquests, but the whole structure of his achievements, real or imaginary, came to a painful end when he was forced to surrender his entire army to the Franco-American combined forces, in October, 1781.\textsuperscript{36} During the course of the fighting, large parts of the Carolinas and Virginia were devastated by the rival armies and by the civil war between Loyalist and revolutionary militia forces. Even South Carolina, which had appeared to be pacified by the British in 1780, suffered from civil strife in 1781.

The people of the Middle Colonies were fortunate to have been spared the horrors and the destructiveness of the closing campaigns of the War for American Independence. They would have suffered, as the North Carolinians had suffered in 1781, if British statesmen and generals had accepted the plans of Joseph Galloway and his friends who had advocated a major effort to reconquer all or part of Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware. Perhaps, if Lord Cornwallis had not been forced to surrender at Yorktown, the campaign of 1782 would have taken place in the vicinity of Baltimore and Philadelphia. As it happened, however, the loss of a British army in the campaign of 1781 brought the fighting in North America to a close. The Middle colonies were spared from further bloodshed and the Loyalists who might have played a major part in the fighting were soon forced to turn to the constructive task of settling various parts of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Upper Canada (now Ontario).\textsuperscript{37}

\textsuperscript{36} See William B. Willcox, “The British Road to Yorktown: A Study in Divided Command,” \textit{American Historical Review}, LII (October, 1946), 1-35.

\textsuperscript{37} It is not our purpose to list any of the vast body of literature concerning the settlement of the Loyalists in Canada. There is, however, one general account of the resettlement of the Loyalists which deserves special mention here: Wilbur H. Siebert, “The Dispersion of the American Tories,” \textit{Mississippi Valley Historical Review}, I (September, 1914), 185-197.