Gifford Pinchot and the Decline of Pennsylvania Progressivism

By Martin L. Fausold*

Gifford Pinchot, who was twice Governor of Pennsylvania (1923-27 and 1931-35), is still well remembered for “getting the farmers out of the mud.” Even today asphalt highways in this state are sometimes referred to as “Pinchot Roads.”

Mention of the Pinchot-Ballinger affair of 1910 may also kindle a recollection. At that time, Pinchot, Chief Forester of the United States, vigorously criticized President Taft’s Secretary of the Interior, Richard Ballinger, for not conserving natural resources with Rooseveltian enthusiasm. As a result, Pinchot was “fired” by Taft. The dismissal precipitated a highly publicized Congressional investigation, which was followed by the formation of a national organization of insurgent Republicans. Known as the Progressive League of the Republican Party, it ultimately became in 1912 a third political party, the Progressive Party.

The formation of the Progressive Party, it must be understood, was a significant element of the Progressive Movement, which lasted from 1901 to 1917. The movement was marked by a series of progressive actions which began during Theodore Roosevelt’s presidency and ended with the coming of the first World War. Political leaders who fought for Progressive measures, ranging from conservation of natural resources and the inspection of meat to the control of railroads, were known as insurgents. Many such insurgents became active in the new third party.

Perhaps the most significant contribution of Gifford Pinchot’s long public life was the active role he played in the Progressive Party. He became a leader of its radical element. His opposition to the conservative George W. Perkins, President of the International Harvester Corporation and financial godfather of the Party, is well known. Also important, but relatively unknown, was

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Pinchot's continued activity on behalf of the Progressive Party after the election of 1912. While he continued to oppose Perkins in the national organization, his efforts were then devoted primarily to the local scene in Pennsylvania. The factional dispute in the state organization was not unlike the Pinchot-Perkins schism. Perkins' counterpart was William Flinn, western Pennsylvanian, and, to a lesser degree, E. H. Van Valkenburg, of eastern Pennsylvania. Flinn, a former state senator, was a "boss" in Pittsburgh, and Van Valkenburg was editor of the Philadelphia North American, a Progressive newspaper. The thesis might well be advanced that in his struggle to keep the Progressive Party intact, Pinchot was among the last in the country to maintain a fervency for the Party. This article is an analysis of his relationship with Progressivism after 1912, and particularly with the Progressive organization in Pennsylvania, known as the Washington Party.¹

In 1913, upon his return to Pennsylvania from Washington, where he had spent most of the previous decade, Pinchot recognized William Flinn of Pittsburgh as the Progressive leader most responsible for carrying the state for the Progressives in the previous year. Such recognition, however, was soon alloyed with suspicion by suggestions on the part of Flinn and others that the Washington Party should work with and eventually return to one of the major parties, particularly the Republican Party. (This concept was frequently referred to as "fusion.") Soon after the defeat of the party in 1912, Flinn apparently concluded that he could not carry the Pittsburgh mayoralty race without the old, and rather unsavory, Flinn-Magee Republican organization which had

¹ George F. Holms, ed., The Story of the Progressive Movement in Pennsylvania, issued by the Council of the Progressive League of Pennsylvania, April, 1913, Box 2008, Pinchot MSS, in the Library of Congress, 18. (Boxes cited hereafter are from the same source.) The following passage from the pamphlet explains how the Progressive Party in Pennsylvania got the name of the Washington Party: "Foreseeing the split in the Republican party, the Penrose machine agents had preempted every conceivable sort of party title in which the words "Progressive" or "Roosevelt" could be utilized. The real Progressives were therefore barred from using any name of this description. For if the party had used the title "Progressive" in the State, then in every district gang candidates could have been placed on the ticket and have had the advantage of the vote cast for the Roosevelt electors. So it was necessary for the leaders to adopt a title which had not occurred to the machine and to do it so quietly that the machine agents could not know it. Also it was necessary to have the preemptions filed at Harrisburg for every district in the State simultaneously. This was a tremendous task, but the leaders of the new movements succeeded in accomplishing it. The title selected was that now used—the Washington party. . . ."
ruthlessly ruled the city for years. Such a renewal of the “unholy alliance” at the seat of the state’s Progressive power was almost too much for independent voters. Western Pennsylvania Progressives also complained to Pinchot about Flinn’s consultations with William A. Magee, in relation to the 1914 Senate fight against the state Republican leader, Boies Penrose.4

Fervent state Progressives further reported to Pinchot their concern over conferences between the Flinn-Magee combination and Van Valkenburg. “We understand,” wrote a Progressive friend, “that a deal is now being made by Flinn, Van Valkenburg, and Magee, all of whom have gone East looking to a local politician for United States Senator and a Democrat for Governor.”5 With the failure of such fusion attempts, however, Van Valkenburg informed Pinchot of his decision to aid in maintaining the state Progressive organization. He also reported his submission to the vehement wishes of many grass-roots Party leaders that Pinchot should represent the Party in confronting Penrose in the 1914 Senatorial race. Furthermore, Van Valkenburg assured Pinchot that he would present this point of view to Flinn.6

Although devoted to Progressivism and recognizing a grass-roots preference for his nomination, Pinchot had reservations about making the senatorial campaign. He not only feared that Flinn might oppose his nomination, but he also felt committed to the candidacy of William Draper Lewis, an active state Progressive, and Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School. He knew, too, that in such a campaign his stand on the control of trusts might result in an intra-Party conflict at the national level. Also, there was a question concerning his residence qualifications in Pennsylvania. However, the most significant reason for his hesitation was a confidential report predicting a Republican victory in the state in 1914. This report was a pessimistic interpretation of the political situation by T. R. Shipp, one of his former

For description of the Flinn-Magee machine see Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities, Sagamore Press, Inc., N. Y., 1957, 106-107. The Magee referred to in the Steffens work was Christopher Magee. The Magee that Flinn occasionally worked with during the period covered by this article, 1912-1917, was William A. Magee, a nephew of Christopher, who had died in 1901.  
5 H. W. D. English to Pinchot, Dec. 16, 1913, Box 162.  
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid.  
8 Van Valkenburg to Pinchot, Dec. 1913, Box 169.
associates. According to this report, the Republicans would use the “hard times” in Pennsylvania, which they attributed to the low Underwood Tariff, as an issue, implying that the Republicans were the party of the high tariff and prosperity. Moreover, the electorate would be confused by the association of the crusading Gifford Pinchot with the epitome of “bossism” in the state, William Flinn.⁷

These reservations, however, were soon dissipated when Flinn and Lewis urged his candidacy. At this point an ideological break with Roosevelt on the trust issue still seemed unlikely. He believed that his association with the Pennsylvania state organization made him independent of the national organization. Pinchot was aware of the soundness of the Shipp Report, but apparently felt that the removal of the other reservations made it possible to assume this risk.

Thus, Pinchot jumped into the Spring primary campaign of 1914 as if he had serious opposition for the Progressive nomination. Such vigorous action was influenced by the encouragement of state and national Progressive leaders, a feeling of responsibility to the state organization, and the knowledge that Roosevelt would campaign for him in the November election. In the primary Pinchot criticized the Democrats for the low tariff, the Panama Canal tolls bills, and their weak policy on conservation. He considered the Republicans hopelessly dominated by the corrupt Penrose leadership.

Pinchot’s radicalism made it difficult for him to write a platform. Although he eventually acceded to the desires of his “practical” managers, he was initially determined that the campaign would afford an opportunity for an unrestrained advocacy of radicalism. He believed in the dissolution of trusts and in government ownership of certain industries, and he seriously considered campaigning for public ownership of coal mines and railroads as a means of breaking the existing monopolies in these fields. Pinchot felt that such a program, if carried out, would eliminate most of the abuses which originated with such monopolies. At the same time he would

be going one better than the Democrats who were trying to curb abuses through regulation. At one point, he even suggested public ownership of the production of iron, copper, lead, timber and water. Such recommendations, however, did not meet with the approval of the state leadership. Bowing to their signs of disapproval, Pinchot rationalized that public ownership was really a poor form of trust control because it necessitated purchasing corporations at inflated values. In other words, the government would be paying for the cost of monopolization.

Ignoring Gifford’s suggestion, Amos Pinchot advised that he settle down “to quiet and unhurried study of the situation” and further stated that neither of them had contemplated taking over railroads at an inflated price. “What we want to do,” he wrote, “is to get one road into government ownership and use it as a club to make other roads come and ask to be bought at the government’s terms . . . .” Amos impressed upon his brother the importance of the issue. Aside from the need to aid exploited peoples, he affirmed that his brother’s stand on public ownership was needed as a reply to Woodrow Wilson, and as a means of smashing the Roosevelt-Perkins element within the Progressive Party.

Although impressed with these arguments, Gifford Pinchot advocated in his platform, not government ownership or dissolution, but regulation of corporations.

Generally speaking, Amos and the liberals were satisfied, temporarily. Not all of them, of course, concurred with Pinchot’s argument that a high tariff would help industrial laborers by protecting their employers from foreign competition. Pinchot felt that the Democratic advocacy of the low tariff accrued to his advantage, for it left him as the only “respectable” high tariff advocate. On the tax issue, as on the regulation of trusts, a few critics might have felt that he should have taken a more radical stand. He believed that “unearned increment [land] should go to the public and not to private individuals,” yet he concluded that “. . . it is useless to talk the single tax just now.” Generalizing about the tax structure, Pinchot advocated a graduated income tax for the

Pinchot to H. D. W. English, Jan. 21, 1914, Box 173.
Pinchot to E. W. Scripps, Jan. 31, 1914, Box 180.
Gifford Pinchot to Amos Pinchot, Feb. 2, 1914, Box 179.
Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Feb. 3, 1914, Box 179.
nation and a revised taxing system for Pennsylvania. On the issue of labor, he called for the recognition of unions, a workman's insurance law, a workman's compensation law, minimum safety and health standards, and child labor legislation. He also took a vigorous position on the conservation of natural resources, equal suffrage for men and women, and increased aid for public education and agriculture.

Although concurring in the platform, with the exception of the plank on the regulation of trusts, Amos again became discouraged because his brother decided against publishing a statement in the Saturday Evening Post which was to give the radical and anti-Perkins viewpoint on the national Party. Distressed by Perkins' conservative leadership, Amos said that such an article would force Roosevelt into Gifford's camp, would show that the Party was a small man's Party, and would show that "we" meant business in fighting the monied elements within the Party. "I do not agree with you," replied Gifford, "that now is the time to begin a fight on Perkins... I would rather see the Progressive Party win with Mr. Perkins still a member of it, next November, than to see it lose with Mr. Perkins outside of it." Agreement with Gifford's decision by Van Valkenburg, Nevin Detrich, Secretary of the State Central Committee, and William Flinn, increased rather than lessened Amos' wrath. "I think," he retorted, "the trouble about the whole situation is that everybody is afraid: they all seem to think the Party is a mere shell."

While Amos' objections to the elimination of the public ownership plank and of the Saturday Evening Post article only annoyed those around Gifford, real concern was expressed when Amos considered running for the Senatorial nomination in New York. "If I should..." conjectured Amos to Gifford, "I don't see how I can make this issue very well without accomplishing the harm which you fear the present [Saturday Evening Post] publication would effect, that is to say, without making some kind of a split in the party. But," Amos continued, "it looks as if I might drop it. I certainly must drop it, unless I can come out and fight hard and savagely against the steel trust influence in the party."

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23 Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, March 3, 1914, Box 179.
24 Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, April 11, 1914, ibid.
25 Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, April 17, 1914, ibid.
Needless to say, most Pennsylvania Progressives agreed with Amos that he ought to drop the New York Senatorial candidacy. "To state it bluntly," concluded State Chairman Detrich, "I feel . . . that there are numerous reasons why your candidacy at this time would be a serious handicap to the candidacy of Gifford Pinchot in Pennsylvania and if my advice is worth anything—and I trust you will take it for exactly what it is worth—it would be, that you refrain from being a candidate and assist us . . . in putting Gifford across." Perhaps such pressure as Detrich's explains Amos' withdrawal.

But Amos was unhappy about being restrained, and did not acquiesce quietly. In a confidential letter to Senator Joseph M. Dixon, copies of which he sent to every member of the National Committee of the Progressive Party, Amos accused Perkins of having acted contrary to the original purpose of the Party. He charged that Perkins was a friend of the "trusts" and a foe of unorganized labor. "To talk against monopoly," Amos continued, "... to place the words 'social and industrial justice' on our banner, and then to hand over this banner to a man who has been monopoly's ardent supporter and one of the most distinguished opponents of social industrial justice . . . is, in my opinion, a handicap to the party, and a fraud on the public." Amos concluded that for the good of the Party "Perkins' resignation was necessary."

Unfortunately, although the letter was confidential, Amos' criticism leaked to the press. Progressives everywhere, including Albert Beveridge, Medill McCormick, and James Garfield, were disturbed by the public admission of a Party split on the eve of the election. They rather heatedly sought explanations from Gifford. Although privately concerned that Amos' letter had become public, Gifford publicly defended his brother, concurring in his judgment of Perkins, but stating that Pennsylvanians would not be affected by the issue, that they "appear to take little interest in Perkins." Certainly the ideological impact of Pinchot's campaign was spoiled by his differences with his managers, which he

A. Nevin Detrich to Amos Pinchot, April 20, 1914, ibid.
generally resolved in their favor, and his differences with Amos, generally not resolved.

When he began the campaign, Pinchot had two formidable opponents: the incumbent, Republican Boies Penrose, and the Democrat, A. Mitchell Palmer. But advice volunteered to him was bountiful. "Take two automobiles," wrote Governor Bird of Massachusetts, "one to carry the literature, the American flag and a first class bugler." Other well-wishers suggested covering only fifty miles a day and arranging routes so as to hit mills and factories at noon or evening. That Pinchot followed these and other suggestions was evidenced by the vigor and the ingenuity of the campaign.

Although it is difficult to understand Pinchot's enthusiasm for so hopeless a campaign, explanations do exist. He was encouraged by the fact that Roosevelt and the Progressives had carried the state in 1912, and that Penroseism epitomized the element that Progressives everywhere opposed. It cannot be too much emphasized that Pinchot felt that Boies Penrose, the successor of Simon Cameron and Matthew Quay as undisputed leader of the Republican machine, represented the worst tradition of American politics. Also, Pinchot sensed that he himself was a national figure—the very manifestation of what the great bulk of the nation's Progressives represented. Indeed, many Americans viewed this campaign as not unlike the Roosevelt-Taft campaign of 1912—this being the 1914 version of Insurgent vs. Standpatter.

One would think, however, that in the 1914 campaign Pinchot would have been discouraged by the splitting of the opposition to the Republicans into two parties. Certainly, he must have understood that the Democrats also had a claim to progressivism. An amateur politician pleaded, "Cannot a combination be formed dropping one candidate for senator and one candidate for governor in each of the two parties named, and make success certain?" Although Pinchot's running mate, William Draper Lewis, Progressive gubernatorial candidate, withdrew his own candidacy in favor of the Democratic candidate, Vance McCormick, Pinchot refused to consider fusion. With Lewis' withdrawal, of course, he sensed an obligation on the part of the Democratic organization.

19 Charles S. Bird to Pinchot, May 11, 1914, Box 413.
20 "Suggestions for Automobile Trip," Box 413A.
21 A. M. Christy to Pinchot, August 3, 1914, Box 173.
"There is a good deal of feeling, even among the Democrats, that Lewis' action ought to be met by a corresponding withdrawal on the Democratic ticket, and Palmer's refusal to withdraw [as Democratic Senatorial Candidate] will lead a good many of them, I think, to vote for me."  

In a public statement, he gave his reasons for remaining in the race as follows: "... In protectionist Pennsylvania the surest way to elect Penrose would be for the other protectionist candidate to withdraw. Pennsylvania must have a Senator at Washington who stands not only against Penrose and the kind of government Penrose represents, but who stands also for the protective tariff principle on which the prosperity of our great State is based..." Also "the Washington Party is the majority party in Pennsylvania..." Further, "the temperance and moral forces of the state in representative conventions have given to me, and not to Mr. Palmer, their powerful support..." Finally, "Colonel Roosevelt, the national leader of my party is coming into Pennsylvania while President Wilson has made public announcement that he will not come to Pennsylvania during this campaign..."

On the eve of the election Pinchot's enthusiasm was still high. At this late hour he felt that the moral issues and Roosevelt's three-day swing in the state were especially advantageous to him. Last-minute county reports confirmed this estimate. Perhaps Pinchot was whistling to keep up his courage. Certainly, some friends had indicated a truer picture—reporting that Penrose's emphasis on good business conditions was overcoming Pinchot's moral crusade, and the objective New York Times, which saw strong Pinchot support in western Pennsylvania, predicted that Penrose would generally be supported on the overriding issues of prosperity and the tariff.

The observers who predicted a Penrose victory proved to be correct. Pinchot did have the satisfaction of running second, carrying the counties of Bradford, Cambria, Clearfield, Jefferson, McKean, Potter, Somerset, Tioga, Warren and Wayne. Although explanations of defeat were manifold, the prosperity issue was
foremost. Other significant reasons were opposition on the part of Democrats to leadership of Flinn and Perkins, and the lack of newspaper support. To these Pinchot disconsolately and emphatically added another: "... the church people threw us down."

Above all, Pinchot was disturbed about the Party's ideological direction. "I hasten to say," he wrote to William Allan White, "that in my judgment the Progressive party ought to go straight ahead but that in order to do so we must absolutely have issues that will differentiate us more than has been the case in the past from the progressive Democrats and progressive Republicans." Indeed, the point that Pinchot raised was as old as the Party. And again Amos's influence was felt. "Amos believes strongly that government ownership of the railroads is this issue," continued Pinchot, "and I am inclined to agree with him. ... I see nothing to be gained by abandoning our organization and much to be lost by failing to keep up the fight for our principles." He concluded that Progressives, from the time the 1912 platform was written, had not gone far enough in attacking privilege. And he said that he looked forward to taking his fight to the national organization of the Party. In actuality his defeat was a reflection of the fact that there was considerably less enthusiasm for Progressivism than in 1912. Indeed, Progressivism was declining.

Although Pinchot came out of the 1914 senatorial campaign convinced that only a radical stand could result in success for Progressivism, circumstances drew him ever closer to an increasingly conservative Roosevelt. While demanding foreign policy changes, Roosevelt appeared to become proportionately more conservative in domestic politics. The close association of Roosevelt and Pinchot at this juncture is in part explained by their complete agreement on the necessity for a strong anti-German position, and by their disapproval of Wilson's neutrality. Pinchot's attitude was felt by some to be explained by the marriage of his sister into the British nobility. Another factor was the deprivation experienced by the French people in those areas of France in which Pinchot had received much of his early forestry education. So deeply interested was Pinchot in foreign affairs that, during the

— Pinchot to Lady Johnston, Holland, Nov. 9, 1914, Box 176.
— Pinchot to William A. Allen, Nov. 9, 1914, Box 183.
early months of 1915, he personally aided his sister in her British hospital activities, and, more important, served as a member of the American commission for relief in Belgium.

Unlike Roosevelt, however, Pinchot was not ready to scuttle the Party. This was manifested by his valiant effort to maintain the Washington Party in Pennsylvania. Indeed, 1915 was not unlike 1913 in Pennsylvania. Again Pinchot fought the fusion tactics of Flinn and Van Valkenburg. Now the fight was doubly difficult for Pinchot because he recognized that the preparedness issue might eventually compel him to support the Republicans in order to defeat Wilson. But Pinchot supported Progressivism as vehemently now as in 1913.

On one occasion, while Pinchot was in Europe, William Draper Lewis suggested that he cable Pennsylvania’s Progressive leaders requesting that no action on fusion be taken until his return. The request was made and respected, probably because both Flinn and Van Valkenburg needed time to determine how they should get back into the old Party. Unfortunately, respect for the request was not accompanied by revitalization of the Washington Party organization. On the contrary, the apathy of the leadership disturbed Pinchot to a point where, upon his return, he and Lewis felt compelled to issue an independent statement. In essence Lewis and Pinchot reaffirmed their belief that the Republican Party was reactionary, that the Democratic Party had failed to reduce the cost of living or to secure the safety of the people, that Republican Governor Brumbaugh’s record, while commendable, could not rescue the Republican Party from Penrose-McNichol-Vare control.

Van Valkenburg accepted the statement. As in 1913, he preceded Flinn in giving up fusion ideas. For the moment, Flinn not only refused to accept the statement, but continued to refuse to call a state Progressive organizational meeting, whereupon Pinchot and Lewis threatened to call it. At this juncture, Flinn gave up the idea of fusion with Brumbaugh. Like Van Valkenburg, he was disturbed by the Governor’s connection with the Vares and the “spoils crowd” in Philadelphia. Although Flinn’s action temporarily healed the breach between Flinn and Pinchot, the latter continued to be skeptical about Flinn’s behavior. Subsequent action confirmed his doubts. Flinn again attempted fusion, this

\(^{27}\) Van Valkenburg to Pinchot, Sept. 11, 1915, Box 190.
time with anti-Penrose Republicans, by proposing the organization of a “dry league,” which he thought would break the Penrose machine’s hold on some 100,000 to 200,000 votes. Failing here, Flinn next tried fusion through the establishment of a “Progressive Republican” organization. The purpose of this organization was supposedly to support such measures as prohibition, local option, and governmental economies.

Although Pinchot was annoyed by these attempts at fusion, he eventually came to realize that independent Progressive action in the 1916 election would be fruitless. Still, he hoped to maintain the Progressive Party as long as feasible, fusing only from a position of strength. When he threatened the Flinn leadership in order to keep the Washington Party intact, Flinn backed down, so far as maintaining the organization was concerned, replying “. . . there is nothing for you to attack. . . . I must be like the captain of the ship, the last to leave.” It was Pinchot, however, who was generally regarded as the last stay of Progressivism. The Philadelphia Public Ledger editorialized:

... Mr. Pinchot represents a type of insurgent against the old regime in state and national politics that is still a formidable factor to be reckoned with. Extreme though he may be in his insurgency, his attitude will be that of many others, even among voters who since 1912 have nominally returned to the ranks of the old party. If a nation-wide union of the forces opposed to the Wilson administration is to be brought about; if the battle for preparedness, the maintenance of the national honor, and the adoption of a sound economic policy as the basis of permanent national prosperity is to be won, and if the voice of Pennsylvania is to have weight in the councils of national Republicanism, the Pinchot forces must be recognized.

The Ledger misjudged his strength. That the Pinchot forces were rapidly descending from any position of power which they might have held was increasingly clear. George Perkins was now rushing the Progressive convention into simultaneous session with

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28 E. A. Hempstead to Pinchot, Sept. 20, 1915, Box 186.
29 E. A. Hempstead to Pinchot, Oct. 9, 1915, ibid.
30 William Flinn to Pinchot, Dec. 23, 1915, Box 185.
31 Philadelphia Ledger, June 20, 1916. (Phila. Public Ledger.)
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that of the Republicans. The way it was done, Pinchot said, it was like seeing "a sign, 'Price 99 cents' . . ." on the Progressive chest. Pinchot wanted it clearly understood that not only should the Progressive organization be maintained beyond the convention, but that the Progressives should establish a separate platform from that of the Republicans. On this score he also lost, and was ultimately willing to sacrifice a radical platform in order to secure a joint Republican-Progressive nomination for Roosevelt. Even at that the sacrifice was in vain, for Roosevelt was unacceptable to the Republicans. When Pinchot suggested that the Republican candidate, Charles E. Hughes, could only be accepted if he "makes a proper declaration of Progressive Principles," he was again unheeded. No such declaration was forthcoming.

The Progressives stood firm long enough to nominate Theodore Roosevelt for the presidency—only to be dumbfounded by his non-acceptance. When subsequently the national committee of the Progressive Party threw its support to Hughes, those around Pinchot were grasping at straws. Not content to let the Party die, Harold Ickes and others suggested a national Progressive League with state and local organization. "If Hughes," he concluded, "should not be elected, the League could then set to work actively . . . to try to get control of the Republican organization and drive the old guard out of control of that organization." Pinchot went along with Ickes, laying the groundwork for such a league in Pennsylvania—simultaneously with the expiration of the Washington Party. In the meantime he reluctantly supported Hughes for the Presidency.

In November of 1916 Hughes was defeated. Such defeat re-

28 Pinchot to E. A. Hempstead, Feb. 1916, Box 194.
29 Pinchot to E. A. Hempstead, March 5, 1916, ibid.
30 Pinchot to Roosevelt, June 4, 1916, Box 196.
32 Ickes to Pinchot, July 8, 1916, Box 194.
34 Hughes's defeat is frequently explained by the apathy of Progressives in the campaign, especially in California. Pinchot's apathy was perhaps illustrative: "Hughes of course, leaves much to be desired. His limitations of outlook are perfectly obvious. . . ." Pinchot to Amos Pinchot, Sept. 4, 1916, Box 176.
inforced the contention of those around Pinchot that their brand of Progressivism was required for political success. They proposed to capitalize on this defeat by calling a national conference of Progressives and progressive Republicans "to take steps toward reformatory progressive principles as applied to present needs."

But initial support from several quarters soon waned. The war, the interference with the conference by George W. Perkins and other conservative Progressives, and the coolness of even certain progressive Republicans proved too much for the Progressive enthusiasts. On April 21, 1917, they gave up, and committed themselves to "support with all our hearts and all our powers the war plans of government." Still, to the end they talked like Progressives, demanding that the administration adopt a series of reform measures, extending from agricultural supports to labor guarantees.

No one can question Pinchot's tenacity in his fight for the Party and the movement. His support of the Washington Party and continued opposition to fusion, in addition to his career on the national scene, were ample testimonials to his steadfastness. That Pennsylvania was cognizant of his contribution to Progressivism was shown by his subsequent election to the governorship as a Progressive Republican. Although he was almost uniquely fortunate in returning to the Republican fold, he remained a significant symbol of the Progressive Movement.

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