WHEN General R. E. Lee crossed the Mason and Dixon Line into Pennsylvania on June 27, 1863, for the first time in his distinguished military career he played the part of the commander of a conquering army. The year before he had entered Maryland as the savior of the state from the oppressor's heel, but in his second venture north of the Potomac he reversed himself and emerged as the bold, proud aggressor. In the general context of his life, however, this role does not become him. Although one of the greatest warriors of all time, he was pre-eminently a man of honor, iron self-discipline, and deep piety who adhered to a concept of limited war. In contrast to other famous conquerors he believed in crushing the opposing forces only by the most direct and honorable methods, and in sparing women, children, and the aged from unnecessary suffering. This attitude ruled out any attempts to break the will of the enemy by deliberately attacking defenseless civilians. Even to some of his contemporaries such ideas seemed unduly chivalrous and unrealistic; to today's proponents of total warfare they appear wholly quixotic.

The people of Pennsylvania were fortunate that it was Lee and not someone like General Jubal A. Early who led the invaders. Early's concepts of war were perhaps not unlike Lee's, but there was acid in his makeup and he felt impelled to resort to harsh retaliatory measures to repay the hated Yankees for their alleged acts of vandalism. While Lee refrained from a deliberate program of terror, he adopted and carried out policies which, in gaining for the occupying forces legitimate military advantages, at the same time caused hardships among the conquered people. Nevertheless the whole experience for them could have been much worse, and

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it was a good deal less terrifying than they had imagined it would be. The Confederate officers and privates were justly proud of their conduct as invaders, but many of them overstated their case. One such was General John B. Gordon, who years after the war wrote: "The citizens...will bear me out in the assertion that we marched into that delightful region, and then marched out of it, without leaving any scars to mar its beauty or lessen its value." He reluctantly admitted two exceptions: the wholesale appropriation of fence railings for campfires, and the seizure of Pennsylvania horses for transportation purposes. As a Georgian he naturally went to extremes to show the difference between the wide smoky swath of destruction wrought by Sherman's men in their famous march to the sea and the comparatively slight damage done to permanent structures by Lee's army.

In spite of what Gordon and others might say, some scars did remain in the paths taken by the Confederates, and their actions along the way decreased the value of private property, according to conservative estimates, by almost two million dollars. This damage was largely unintentional, though it was almost bound to occur because in reality Lee's whole army was on a huge raid to get supplies for its immediate and future needs. Since Lee did not know how long he would be able to stay in enemy territory, he had his columns cover as wide an area as possible. He concentrated the bulk of his forces in Franklin and Adams Counties, while detachments ranged through York, Cumberland, Fulton, Bedford, and Somerset Counties. Most of his loot, however, came from an area roughly one hundred miles east and west by forty miles north and south.

1. John B. Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War (New York: Scribner's, 1903), 144-145. General Early made the astounding statement in his memoirs that "not even a rail had been taken from the fences for firewood." See Jubal A. Early, Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War between the States; with Notes by R. H. Early... (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1912), 264 (cited hereafter as Narrative of the War).

2. Report of the Auditor General on the Finances of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for the Year Ending November 30, 1880 (Harrisburg, 1881), 14. This figure at best is a rough approximation of the financial loss the Confederates caused the people of Pennsylvania in 1863. A state board of commissioners adjudicated all claims for actual physical damage during the war and allowed only those which could be established by judicial rules of evidence. Many bona fide claims which could not pass the test were not considered valid. There was also no attempt by any one to estimate indirect losses, such as those suffered by farmers when they could not harvest their crops on time for want of draft animals.
Preparatory to the movement of his main forces across the Potomac Lee issued General Orders No. 72 for the twofold purpose of prohibiting damage or destruction of private property and authorizing only certain officers to seize it. The orders gave detailed instructions to the chiefs of the commissary, quartermaster's, ordnance, and medical departments on procedures for acquiring supplies from enemy civil officers and private citizens. Lee empowered them to make requisitions upon "local authorities or inhabitants" and to pay the market price for whatever they took. Should the people in a locality refuse to honor these requisitions or fail to meet their quotas, the chiefs could seize necessary supplies from the nearest inhabitants without payment of cash. In such cases they would give the owners a receipt specifying the kind, amount, and market price of the property taken. The supply officers had the power to use the same procedures with anyone who concealed his property.  

Although these regulations were designed to prevent lawless confiscation of property, they naturally gave civilians no real choice in the matter of seizures. Whether articles were for sale or not, Lee's supply officers could force owners to dispose of them at prices they decided were the prevailing ones in the markets. The orders did not indicate which markets, but presumably they referred to the local ones. For compensation the officers were to offer payment in Confederate paper currency, which was greatly depreciated in the South and nearly worthless in the North, or as an alternative, a claim on the Confederate government to be honored in the future. For the farmer or merchant such unprofitable transactions were to be avoided by all means; hence their anxiety to hide their valuables. The only difference between illegal and legal confiscation was that the latter gave civilians the possibility of recovering some of their losses should the Confederacy win the war.

Under the circumstances the citizens of Pennsylvania could not have had a fairer arrangement to compensate them, but the primary purpose of these regulations was not a humanitarian one.

Lee wanted to make sure that seizure of the region's movable wealth was done efficiently and for the benefit of the whole army. He also knew that wanton and indiscriminate pillaging and destruction of property by individual soldiers would break down discipline and reduce the effectiveness of the army. For this reason his general officers cooperated in enforcing his orders, and not because they were kindly disposed toward the inhabitants. Lee's regulations were perhaps designed to encourage the Northern peace movement by inducing respect for Southerners instead of hatred. If so, this objective was never stated, and it appeared to be incidental at best to his real purposes and principles. Lee's primary task was a military one, but if in the process of carrying it out the behavior of his men promoted a political end, so much the better.

Basically the regulations demanded the impossible, since they resulted from certain questionable assumptions in their formulation. A correspondent of the Richmond Sentinel saw some of their inherent difficulties when he said that "the doctrine of not using or destroying some of the private property of an enemy while in his country is a pure abstraction. You cannot possibly introduce an army for one hour into an enemy's country without damaging private property, and in a way often in which compensation cannot be made. . . . Yet if a man takes an onion, or climbs a cherry tree, he is, by this order, to be punished." He might have said also that any large body of men, such as an army on the move, can un-

4 In referring to the invasion of the enemy's soil General James Longstreet remarked that "although it might be fair, in just retaliation, to apply the torch, yet doing so would demoralize the army and ruin its now excellent discipline. Private property is to be therefore rigidly protected." Lt. Col. J. A. L. Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States: April-June, 1863 (New York, 1864), 237-238. See also Longstreet's instructions to his division commanders, June 26, 1863, in O. R., LI, pt. 2, pp. 727-728. Col. John S. Mosby, who was pretty much the hard-headed realist, maintained that Lee's order was issued not from any feeling of tenderness toward the Pennsylvanians, but to preserve the morale and discipline of his army. He did not want it to "degenerate into a band of marauders and stragglers." Mosby to H. C. Jordan, August 23, 1909, John S. Mosby Papers, Duke University Library (cited hereafter as DUL).

5 Freeman takes the position that Lee had the peace movement in mind when he drafted the regulations, but offers no supporting evidence for his view. Douglas Southall Freeman, R. E. Lee, A Biography (New York, Scribner's, 1935), III, 57.

intentionally cause great damage. General E. P. Alexander recalled that in the march of the First Corps on June 30 from Chambersburg toward Gettysburg rain had made the roads very muddy. "The infantry would seldom use them & generally marched in the fields along side where they would trample broad paths in the wheat, now nearly ripe. It was a clear hot day, and, about noon, seeing a house with a pump in the front porch, I rode up to see if we could get a drink. The dutch owner was in the porch when I came up & was in a state of abject despair. The infantry ahead of us had not only made a path along the edge of his wheatfield, but in trying to pump their canteens full of water at his well had pumped the well dry, & the porch very wet & very muddy." "

Another difficulty was that a literal interpretation of the regulations prohibited the supply chiefs from delegating authority in the matter of seizures. They themselves could not cover an area large enough to secure all they needed, yet when underlings took over the job there were many more opportunities for abuse of power and unwarranted confiscations of property. Such instances occurred."

When General Lee warned his men to be on their good behavior and act as invited guests in an enemy land, he gave them no inkling of the rich and strange country they were about to enter. They had never seen anything like it before. General William D. Pender summed up their feelings when he wrote: "This is a most magnificent country to look at; but the most miserable people. I have yet to see a nice looking lady. . . . And such barns I never dreamt of. Their dwelling houses are large & comfortable looking . . . but such louts that live in them." Reflecting their own provincialism and the great differences in culture in various parts of the United States, he and other Southerners from all ranks could not get over the fact that women went barefoot,
worked in the fields, and did all their own cooking, washing, and household chores. One highly illiterate soldier wrote indignantly: "Sister I will give you a description of the girls in pinsylvania. They are nothing but Dutch and Irish and the dirty and . . . menest looking creatures that I ever saw for to call themselves white girls. See them go Bare footed and no Bonnet on in the corn field weding corn and in the harvest field picking up wheat them is the girls that is writing to their husbands and sweethearts and brothers to fight on and restore the union again and then they will make our Southern girls maids for them and our men butlers for them and then have their large farms and every thing to suit them and I say evry Southern man wil not fight on them terms they ought to be shot on the spot."¹⁰

Though contemptuous of their Pennsylvania hosts, the Southerners entered the country in a spirit of high adventure and good humor. These feelings acted as a release and helped to counteract the desire to avenge the depredations they claimed the Yankees had committed in their homeland. As was to be expected, the people were often sullen and looked glum and sour, particularly so in Greencastle and Chambersburg where some of them made unfavorable comments on the ragged appearance of the Confederates. Such unfriendly manifestations only amused the soldiers, and as they marched gaily past to the tune of Dixie they retorted by reminding their critics of Yankee defeats and inquiring about distances to Philadelphia, Baltimore, and other cities.¹¹ General John B. Hood's men, who were "a queer lot to look at," answered the taunts of the Chambersburg women with cheers and laughter. A story went the rounds concerning a woman who stood looking defiantly at the Texans as they streamed past the door of her

¹⁰ Chandler to his sister, July 17, 1863, John J. Chandler Papers, Virginia State Library. Better expressed is the comment of William Calder: "They live in real Yankee style wife & daughters & a help doing all the work. It makes me more than ever devoted to our own Southern institutions & customs." William Calder to his mother, June 26, 1863, William Calder Papers, UNCL.

¹¹ J. B. Clifton Diary, North Carolina State Department of Archives and History; Pettit to his wife, June 28, 1863, W. B. Pettit Papers, UNCL; Thomas L. Ware Diary, Typescript, UNCL; Hotchkiss to his wife, June 28, 1863, Jedediah Hotchkiss Papers, Library of Congress (cited hereafter as LC); Fitzgerald Ross, A Visit to the Cities and Camps of the Confederate States, Richard R. Harwell, ed. (Urbana, Ill., 1958), 36, 38-39; Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States, 238-239.
She had a huge American flag pinned to her "ample" bosom. One of the men with a straight face called out, "Take care, madam, for Hood's boys are great at storming breastworks when the Yankee colors is on them." It was not the defiance of some people which impressed the Confederates so much as the more prevailing attitude of submissiveness. Many Pennsylvanians had conjured up all sorts of horrible thoughts about what the Confederates would do to them. When they found that the invaders did not burn their houses and barns, they willingly cooperated with the requests of polite officers to furnish food, horses, wagons, leather, saddles, and similar articles. One old man more stubborn than most steadfastly refused to surrender his horses. When the requisitioning party insisted, he grabbed a gun and succeeded in killing five of them before they could shoot him. But such occurrences were rare, and for the most part supplies were obtained without incident. One officer said: "It was one of the most amusing sights I ever saw to see the broad-clothed gentry coming in and bringing saddles, bridles, etc., and making a pile of them in the square for use of the Rebels. . . ." Another Confederate wished that his sister could have seen the "Dutch people in York Co. turning out with water and milk and bread and butter and 'apple-butter' for the 'rugged rebels.'" Amused at their naivete, he observed that the people "generally seemed not to know exactly what to expect and I don't think would have been at all astonished if every building had been set on fire by us as we reached it, nor would a great many have been surprised if we had concluded the business by massacring the women and children. I stopped at a house near Petersburg in Adams Co. and almost the first question addressed me by the daughter of the house, a girl of eighteen or twenty . . . , was whether our men would molest the women. I told her not. . . . It was this same girl who told me in all seriousness that she had heard, and believed it, that the Southern women all wore revolvers."
Some of the farmers made mysterious signs with their hands as the Confederates marched by their property. A slick huckster had instructed them—for a price—in this hocus-pocus as a way of warding off any evil the invaders might bring them. Less humorous was the refusal of citizens to furnish Union commanders information about Confederate movements out of fear of enemy reprisals. General John Buford on his way toward Gettysburg on June 29 snorted with disgust when he learned that he had lost a chance near Fairfield to gobble up two detached Mississippi regiments which the farmers knew about but did not report.

Although the Confederates were pleased that the people in the Cumberland Valley, except for a few bushwhackers, offered little open resistance, they noticed certain ways in which they were quietly opposed. When General Gordon tried to put out the fire on the Wrightsville bridge which Union forces had set, he appealed to the residents for buckets and pails. None were to be found. Flames from the burning bridge finally jumped to the lumberyard and then to some buildings, whereupon buckets, tubs, pails, and pans without number suddenly appeared on the scene. They were used by Confederate soldiers who labored far into the night to put out the raging fire which threatened the whole community. The Confederates also found that upon their arrival the towns assumed a deserted look; streets were empty, shops remained closed, and people stayed at home. To their annoyance they learned that the “rascals” had taken the precaution to “run off most of their stock & goods.”

But the Southerners really had nothing to complain about, be-

“The people [around York] all treated us very kindly ... though I think that their kindness was more through fear than anything else.” A. G. Cleek to his father, July 19, 1863, John Cleek Papers, DUL. See also Fitzgerald Ross, A Visit to the Cities and Camps of the Confederate States (Edinburgh and London, 1865), 38-39; Spencer G. Welch, A Confederate Surgeon's Letter to his Wife (Marietta, Ga.: Continental Book Co., 1954), 62-63.

16 Early, Narrative of the War, 265.
17 O. R., XXVII, pt. 1, p. 926.
18 Gordon, Reminiscences of the Civil War, 147-148. About the lack of open resistance see also Calder to his mother, June 26, 1863, William Calder Papers, UNCL.
19 Pender to his wife, June 28, 1863, William D. Pender Papers, UNCL; Walter Harrison, Pickett's Men, A Fragment of War History (New York: 1870), 86-87; Ross, Cities and Camps of the Confederate States, 35; Francis Milton Kennedy Diary, entry for July 6, 1863, Microfilm of Typescript, UNCL.
cause for the first time in many months they were living off the fat of the land. They had an abundance of everything good to eat: milk, butter, eggs, beef, fresh pork, bacon, chicken, and New Orleans syrup, as they called molasses. General Richard S. Ewell remarked that if this kept up they would all get fat. In Carlisle General Robert E. Rodes and some members of his staff found that Pennsylvania lager beer was good but strong. They plied themselves liberally with the brew in honor of a Confederate flag raising ceremony, with the result that one member of Rodes's staff became incoherent and had to be pulled down twice from the speakers' platform and finally put to bed. Another officer said it was the strongest beer he had ever tasted, and then he added knowingly that it was “probably mixed with whiskey.”

What delighted the Confederates as much as anything was the chance to buy goods which had long disappeared from the shelves of most stores in the South. The merchants in Chambersburg had sent away their more valuable articles, but what they had left was to Confederate eyes “something superb.” They bought calicos, bleached cotton, ginghams, woolens, hoops, gloves, thread, china buttons, flavoring essences and the like, all of which would be greatly appreciated by their wives, sweethearts, and mothers. One officer wrote with feeling: “[Our] army likes this country very well,—and O! what a relief it will be to our country to be rid of our army for some time. I hope we may keep away for some time and so relieve the calls for supplies that have been so long made upon our people.”

The Confederate army at first came to Pennsylvania in driblets; the stream broadened, and then came the flood. The initial movement had the appearance of a small and cautious group of ants sent ahead as a task force to make a survey and if conditions proved propitious, to wave the others on. The advance also depended upon what General Joseph Hooker would do, for Lee hesitated to cross the Potomac until he became convinced that the

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20 Calder to his mother, June 20, 26, 1863, William Calder Papers, UNCL; Hotchkiss to his wife, June 25, 1863, Jedediah Hotchkiss Papers, LC.
22 Ibid.; Hotchkiss to his wife, June 25, 1863, Jedediah Hotchkiss Papers, LC.
23 Ibid.
Union army would not attack him in Virginia. The effects of a piecemeal invasion were to increase the hardships for Pennsylvanians living in the path of the main stream, because each contingent made its own demands upon the wealth of the community. The town hit hardest of all was Chambersburg; it was visited by successive waves of Rebels, and finally it became the headquarters for Lee's mighty hosts. Mercersburg too was heavily raided many times, but its economy did not get the full impact of being visited by the main body of the Confederate army. Chambersburg had the additional dubious honor of being the first and most important testing place for Lee's occupation policies in a territory that the Confederates considered as completely alien. Their feelings about Maryland were mixed; she was still regarded in 1863, only less so than in 1862, as an erring sister who somehow had become compromised into making an unhappy marriage. If some of the Southerners had hopes of bringing her back into the fold, they had no illusions about Pennsylvania. The people there were going to pay and many times over if possible for their loyalty to the Union.

The first elements to appear in Chambersburg were Jenkins's cavalry. General Albert G. Jenkins had obviously been properly instructed by Lee, for he set the pattern, if not quite the elevated tone for Confederate occupation of the town and the surrounding countryside. His first visit was rather a short one, but it was amazing what he accomplished in stripping the people of their first layer of wealth without being unduly offensive about it. Arriving late on the night of June 15 he disposed his forces on a hill four miles north of town, which commanded the approaches in that direction. The next morning while some detachments scoured the country for supplies and horses, Jenkins and his staff came into Chambersburg and set up headquarters at the Montgomery House. One of his first acts was to order private citizens to surrender all arms in their possession within two hours; otherwise their homes would be searched and plundered. Enough of the citizens obeyed the order to satisfy the general's demand. The next day he ordered all stores and shops to be opened for two hours to enable his men to purchase articles they personally

\[\text{Mercersburg received six visitations; the last occurred July 1 and was the worst. Dr. Philip Schaff, "The Gettysburg Week," Scribner's Magazine, XVI, 26.}\]
needed. He insisted that the soldiers pay for what they got but was not particular about what they used for money. As a result the men offered not only Confederate currency but worthless “shin-plasters” issued by the city of Richmond and other Southern corporations. Although the accounts are not entirely clear, Jenkins apparently forced the people to feed his troops. He also requisitioned goods from storekeepers, especially drugs, for which he paid generously in Confederate money. The merchants appreciated the fact that he did not stop to haggle but told them to guess at the value of the goods taken. Reports that a large force of Yankees was coming suddenly interrupted this thriving business, and the Confederates took to their horses. Before leaving, Jenkins’s rear guard for some reason set fire to a large warehouse on the north side of town, but the citizens speedily put out the blaze. The attempt to burn this building and the destruction of the Scotland railroad bridge were the only acts of vandalism committed in town at this time.

More reprehensible than any destruction of property was the search for Negroes in both towns and country districts by Jenkins and other semi-independent cavalry commands. Any that were found were seized and sent south into slavery. It was a cruel and terrifying experience for these people, and under no circumstances could the Confederates justify the hunt on grounds of military necessity. They carried on this practice in many sections of the state, but particularly around Mercersburg, where they took free Negroes who had been born and raised in Pennsylvania. Jenkins captured “quite a number” and started them south. Fortunately many escaped, and one group was released by some people in Greencastle who captured their guards and let them go free.


[26] Hoke, Great Invasion, 111. Someone broke into two vacant houses just outside of Chambersburg and plundered them of clothing, kettles, and other articles. Presumably some of Jenkins’s men were guilty of this act, but no one really knew. Chambersburg Repository in Rebellion Record, Documents, VII, 197. In Chambersburg panic-stricken inhabitants fleeing the town left clothes and household utensils scattered in the streets. Jenkins detailed a company of men to gather up the goods and put them in the houses of their probable owners. “Diary of Lieut. Schuricht,” S. H. S. P., XXIV, 340.
According to one account at least fifty Negroes were sent into slavery in this way.\textsuperscript{27}

Jenkins's withdrawal on June 17 gave Chambersburg a slight respite, but the rest of lower Franklin County and parts of Fulton and Adams Counties were not so fortunate. Retiring to the vicinity of Greencastle for the next five days, Jenkins continued the practice of sending out detachments from his main body to raid the countryside and the communities of Greencastle, Waynesboro, Welsh Run, and Fairfield. About 200 of his men under Colonel M. J. Ferguson went to Mercersburg on their way to Cove Mountain and McConnellsburg. They were a fierce and hard-bitten lot of warriors who rode with pointed pistols and drawn sabers, looking and hoping for trouble. During the week of his operations in this part of Pennsylvania, Jenkins succeeded in taking from farmers large numbers of horses and cattle without compensation. Before his arrival many had sent their horses, flocks, and herds to the mountains or across the Susquehanna; otherwise their losses would have been heavier. Taking every road and byway, the Confederates were very adept at ferreting out livestock and horses hidden in obscure corners of the farm or some valley not too deep in the mountains. Jenkins turned the results of his searches over to General Rodes at Williamsport and later at Hagerstown. The value of the property he took on this extensive raid was estimated to have been between $100,000 and $250,000. The direct financial loss in the seizure of valuable horses and stock was compounded by its timing. With the season for the harvest just days away, farmers deprived of their draft animals faced the ruin of their crops for want of the means to reap them. Some of them whose wealth consisted entirely of livestock went bankrupt.\textsuperscript{28}

\textsuperscript{27} Chambersburg Repository in Rebellion Record, Documents, VII, 197; Schaff, "Gettysburg Week," Scribner's Magazine, XVI, 22-25. Jenkins's men took only two or three Negro boys from Mercersburg, but a band of Confederate guerrillas on June 26 and 27 conducted a regular slave hunt. After searching suspicious houses the enemy captured twenty-one Negroes, many of them fugitive slaves, but Schaff personally knew that some had been born and raised in the vicinity of Mercersburg.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid., 22-23; Chambersburg Repository in Rebellion Record, Documents, VII, 196-198; M. Jacobs, Notes on the Rebel Invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania and the Battle of Gettysburg, July 1st, 2nd and 3d, 1863 (Philadelphia, 1864), 8-9, 11; Samuel P. Bates, Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1875), 173-174; Hoke, Great Invasion, 111-113. According to the Chambersburg Repository, horses seemed to be considered by Jenkins as "contraband of war, and were taken without the pretense of compensation:
By June 22 the raid had ended, after the various detachments reported to the main body of Jenkins's cavalry then stationed between Greencastle and Hagerstown. On that day Rodes's division of infantry moved up to join Jenkins and begin the real invasion of Pennsylvania. His division on June 19 had started to march from Williamsport toward Hagerstown, when he received instructions to head in the direction of Boonsboro, as if he were threatening Harpers Ferry. He stayed two miles outside of Hagerstown for two days waiting for General Edward Johnson to cross the Potomac. On June 22 he resumed his march, and the head of his column reached Greencastle by mid-morning.

With the appearance of Rodes's infantry, Jenkins sent a scouting force on the road to Chambersburg. On their way they met Captain William H. Boyd's company of the First New York Cavalry, which after escorting Milroy's supply train safely to Harrisburg had returned to the valley to watch the enemy advance. Boyd, a bold and dashing leader, immediately attacked the Confederate detachment and pushed it back to within a mile of Greencastle, where Jenkins, slightly forewarned, had hastily established a battle line. Boyd prudently withdrew before this display of force, but not before a fusillade had caused two Union casualties, one killed and one wounded. In the meantime a force of raw Pennsylvania and New York militia had been sent to Chambersburg under General Joseph F. Knipe, a veteran who was still recovering from a wound received at Chancellorsville. When they heard of Rodes's approach, they hastily boarded a train for Harrisburg, thus abandoning the lower valley to the Confederates.

Immediately upon his arrival in Greencastle Rodes appointed Colonel Edward Willis of the 12th Georgia Regiment provost...
marshal and gave him a detachment of men to maintain order in the town. In so doing Rodes was carrying out general orders which Ewell had issued that day; they officially proclaimed the policies of his corps while occupying enemy territory. Ewell had anticipated Lee in this matter, but his purposes were no different from those of his commander. Although not so detailed and specific, in essence his orders were the same as Lee's.  

After getting his division comfortably ensconced in Greencastle, Rodes retraced his steps to Beaver Creek, located between Boonsboro and Hagerstown, to consult with Ewell and Early. By this time all three of Ewell's divisions were moving toward Chambersburg. Johnson had been at Sharpsburg and was behind Rodes near Greencastle. Early, having crossed the Potomac at Shepherdstown on June 22, had marched to a point three miles beyond Boonsboro on the Hagerstown road. After the conference Ewell accompanied Rodes to Greencastle and from there to Chambersburg. Before leaving Greencastle, Rodes's officers made heavy demands upon the people for fresh vegetables and sauerkraut, an item which the Southerners thought the "Dutch" would have in great supply even in summer. Their requisitions for durable goods such as saddles and bridles, pistols, lead, and leather were so excessive that the town council made no attempt to meet them. Being reasonable, the Confederates took what they could get without causing trouble.

Jenkins's cavalry preceded Rodes's division to Chambersburg by one day. Jenkins's chief of staff, a Captain Fitzhugh, promptly ordered the people to furnish large amounts of provisions for his command, which were to be brought to the front of the courthouse by a certain specified time. Should they refuse, he would institute a general search of the houses for food. The next morning, June 24, at nine o'clock, Rodes's division, preceded by a band playing The Bonnie Blue Flag, appeared on the brow of the hill near the Reformed Church. It was the beginning of a long and impressive column of infantry and artillery, accompanied by

\[\text{2}^{\text{2}}\text{ibid., 131; Copy of Order of Gen. Ewell, R. S. Ewell Papers, LC; O. R. XXVII, pt. 2, p. 551.}
\text{Ewell prohibited marauding and plundering and stipulated that anything taken for army use would be in obedience to "regulations to be established by the commanding-general, according to the rules of civilized warfare." Ewell evidently knew Lee intended to formulate and publish such regulations, but he had not as yet received them.} \]
PRELUDE TO GETTYSBURG

immense wagon trains, droves of cattle, and ambulances, which took all day to pass through the streets to a strong position on Shirks Hill north of town.

Preparing for an extended sojourn, Ewell took several important steps to provide for the comfort and safety of his troops. Colonel Willis again acted as provost marshal and established headquarters in the courthouse. Following Ewells orders, he set up a hospital in the public school and equipped it with mattresses and bed clothing obtained from several hotels. One measure which Ewell adopted perhaps benefited the town as much as the army. He prohibited the sale of intoxicating liquors without his permission and ordered a declaration of possession from everyone so that guards could be placed over all supplies against the thirst of the soldiers. Next he called a meeting of businessmen to place before them requisitions for enormous quantities of clothing, harness, horseshoes, lead, rope, leather, Neat's foot oil, grain, bread, salt, molasses, flour, beans, sauerkraut, potatoes, coffee, sugar, and many other things. It was an impossible demand, for many businessmen in fleeing from town had taken much of their movable property with them. Those who stayed behind had sent away large quantities of goods after Jenkins's first visit to Chambersburg on June 17. As a result the boots, hats, and other articles of apparel which Rodes expected to find for his men were to his annoyance not available. Nevertheless the Confederates did obtain large amounts of other goods they needed, for which they paid in their own money.\(^{33}\)

General Johnson, on his way to join Ewell and Rodes in Chambersburg, on June 23 ordered General George H. Steuart to leave the main column at Greencastle and take his infantry brigade of about 2,500 men, some 300 cavalry, and a battery of six guns on a huge horse and cattle raid to Mercersburg and McConnellsburg. Upon his arrival in Mercersburg the next day, Steuart called a meeting of the few leading citizens who had remained in town and read them Lee's proclamation about the treatment of property. He then ordered the merchants to open their stores so his men could buy what goods remained with Confederate money. There was no pillaging, and no one was hurt. Upon the whole the people were

“thankful that they behaved no worse,” but it was the third and most formidable visitation of the invaders within less than a week, and more were to come. The community had begun to feel pinched for food; no fresh meat was available, scarcely any flour or groceries, and no wood. The harvest was ripe for cutting, but there was no one to cut it. The loss to farmers in hay and grain which rotted in the fields was “incalculable.” Steuart went on to McConnellsburg and rejoined his division at Carlisle, bringing with him only a fair haul of horses, cattle, and supplies.

By sending Steuart to Mercersburg and McConnellsburg, Ewell had broadened the front of his advance by twenty or so miles. He widened it even more by ordering all of Early’s division east over South Mountain as far as York; one brigade was to go even farther by marching to Wrightsville on the Susquehanna River. York is fifty-two miles from Chambersburg by way of the main road through Gettysburg, and Wrightsville is another eleven miles beyond. In sending Early so far east Ewell temporarily created a wide gap between Early’s division and the forces in Chambersburg; but there was little danger in the move, since no units of the Army of the Potomac had as yet made an appearance. Furthermore, as Ewell moved down the valley toward Carlisle and Harrisburg, he took a northeasterly direction which drew him closer to Early.

While Rodes’s and Johnson’s divisions were moving on June 23 toward Chambersburg through Greencastle and Marion, Early was taking a parallel route eight to ten miles east, hugging the western face of South Mountain. Starting from a point three miles northeast of Boonsboro, in two days he went some thirty miles directly north through Cavetown, Smithsburg, Ringgold, Waynesboro, Quincy, and Altodale to Greenwood, which is on the turnpike between Chambersburg and Gettysburg. On June 25, while his division gathered supplies from the farmers in the area, Early rode over to Chambersburg to visit Ewell, who instructed him to march to York by way of Gettysburg. He was to cut the

35 O. R., XXVII, pt. 2, pp. 443, 503; Randolph H. McKim, A Soldier’s Recollections, Leaves from the Diary of a Young Confederate (London: Longmans, Green, 1910), 166. McKim recalled that Steuart’s expedition had not gathered nearly so many cattle as had been expected.
36 Greenwood is about three miles east of Fayetteville.
Northern Central Railroad connecting Baltimore with Harrisburg, and destroy if possible the Wrightsville-Columbia bridge across the Susquehanna, after which he would take the road through Dillsburg and rejoin Ewell at Carlisle.  

In preparing for this expedition Early stripped his column of unnecessary encumbrances and sent all his trains to Chambersburg except ambulances and a few medical, ordnance, and general utility wagons. He also took care to include fifteen empty wagons to carry supplies which he planned to garner along the way from civilians. For escort he had Colonel William H. French’s 17th Virginia Cavalry from Jenkins’s brigade and Colonel E. V. White’s 35th Virginia Cavalry Battalion of General “Grumble” Jones’s brigade.  

On his way over the mountain on the morning of June 26 Early stopped long enough to put to the torch all the buildings of the Caledonia Iron Works, an enterprise which belonged to Congressman Thaddeus H. Stevens, the famous Radical Republican. In this action Early revealed himself as a headstrong and independent leader who had the temerity to defy orders whenever he thought fit. He justified his act on two grounds: retaliation for the “various deeds of barbarity perpetrated by Federal troops in some of the southern states,” and repayment to Stevens for “a most vindictive spirit toward the people of the South.” Though the works had been profitable for the first time since their founding in 1837 and represented an investment of $65,000, Stevens took their destruction philosophically, saying that everyone must expect to suffer from this war. Perhaps the heaviest burden of loss fell on the more than 200 workers whose means of livelihood were destroyed. Early’s men and other Confederates at different times during the campaign ran off with forty horses and mules belonging to Stevens at Caledonia, seized about $10,000 worth of provisions and goods from the company stores, as well as large quantities of corn and grain in the mills, hauled away his bar iron

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3 Early to J. Fraise Richard, May 7, 1886, Jubal A. Early Correspondence, LC; Hoke, Great Invasion, 170-171. The works were at the base of South Mountain about two miles east of Greenwood.
valued at $4,000, destroyed all his fence rails, used up eighty tons of grass, and finally broke the windows of the houses of the workingmen. In an ironical vein Stevens commended them for doing such a thorough job in cleaning him out. In view of Lee's occupation policies so clearly spelled out in General Orders No. 72, Early's conduct in burning the furnace, sawmill, two forges, and a rolling mill at Caledonia was rank insubordination.

After this auspicious beginning Early continued his march to Gettysburg. Learning of the presence of an enemy force of indeterminate size near the town, he decided to split his division into two wings at a fork about a mile and a half from Cashtown. He sent Gordon's brigade with White's battalion on the main pike, and with the rest of his command he took the road to the left through Hiltown to Mummasburg. His purpose was to threaten the enemy's flank and rear, while Gordon kept him busy on his front. At Mummasburg Early discovered that Gordon and White had encountered the 26th Pennsylvania Militia numbering about 750 officers and men. They had just been mustered into the United States service four days earlier and were a splendid looking outfit, clothed, equipped, and armed according to regulations. The trouble was they had had no training and were "raw and undisciplined." Their commander, Colonel William W. Jennings, a friend of Governor Andrew Curtin and the manager of a factory at Harrisburg, evidently had had no previous military experience. One of his men later confessed that as a private he was so green he did not even know how to affix a bayonet to a gun. Undoubtedly others were just as ignorant. They had arrived in Gettysburg the night before and started out on the pike in the morning for the purpose of occupying Cashtown Gap. About three miles out of Gettysburg they saw Gordon's and White's men. One glance was enough, and they were off in the opposite direction. In his report Early cackled: "It was well that the regiment took to its heels so quickly, or some of its members might have been hurt, and all would have

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40 Current, Old Thad Stevens, 38, 177, 180-183. Lee was distressed to see the ruins of the buildings three days later. Both he and Stevens worried about the plight of the poor families of men who had lost their jobs. Lee's quartermaster told John Sweeney, the works manager, that needy families could draw upon him for supplies. See ibid., 179, 183.

been captured.”42 He was right; their retreat amounted to a rout, and there was utter confusion. “The officers were running around waving their swords, shouting and swearing, but no one dreamed of obeying them; the men . . . were separated from their companies, and each fellow did as he thought proper. . . . The commands from half crazy Captains and Lieutenants were often unintelligible, and perfectly contradictory. . . . Some [men] were falling in behind the fences, and others streaking off over the fields.”43 If they could not do anything else, they could run fast enough to escape Early's trap. He claimed to have taken 175 prisoners, only to parole them the next day.44 The affair affords another example of how the myth of the untrained minutemen rushing to the defense of his hearth and hurling back the invader can become a cruel joke.

Upon his arrival in Gettysburg Early requisitioned from the town fathers large amounts of provisions, 1,000 pairs of shoes, and 500 hats, or as an alternative $10,000 in cash. The authorities, pleading poverty and an inability to meet any of his demands, agreed to request merchants to open their stores and citizens to furnish provisions. Early searched the shops and found very few supplies for his commissary, but he did succeed in practically stripping the community of the horseshoes and nails usually kept on hand. Convinced of the town's inability to meet his demands and pressed for time, he did not try to force compliance. Some of his men robbed a few houses and took some articles that Gettysburg merchants had not sent away to Philadelphia.45 The officers issued rations of liquor found in taverns and warehouses46 with the result that all of General Harry T. Hays's brigade got drunk. One writer said, “I never saw such a set in my life.”47 Early dis-

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42 Early, Narrative of the War, 257-258.
45 Ibid., pt. 2, p. 465, pt. 3, p. 923; Michael Jacobs, Notes on the Rebel Invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania (Gettysburg, 1884), 16-18. According to Jacobs, Early's demand for provisions included the following items: 1,200 lbs. of sugar, 600 lbs. of coffee, 60 bbls. of flour, 1,000 lbs. of salt, 7,000 lbs. of bacon, 10 bbls. of onions, and 10 bbls. of whiskey.
46 Ibid., 17.
47 J. Warren [Jackson] to Lt. R. Stark Jackson, July 22, 1863, Typescript in possession of Prof. Merl E. Reed, Dept. of Social Science, Ball State Teachers College, Original in David F. Boyd Civil War Papers, 1863, Department of Archives, Louisiana State University.
covered about 2,000 food rations in a train of ten or twelve cars and after distributing them to Gordon's brigade proceeded to burn the cars and a small railroad bridge nearby. On the whole the "pickings" were pretty slim in Gettysburg.18

The next day, June 27, Early's division marched at a deliberate pace toward York, twenty-seven miles away. Gordon took the main road to the town, while Early marched on a parallel route to the north.19 He sent White on a special assignment to wreck the Northern Central Railroad from south of Hanover Junction to York, a distance of ten miles.20 Since Early and Gordon were somewhat uncertain as to whether or not Union forces were in York in large numbers, they halted and camped for the night a few miles away. While they were making their plans for the next day, a deputation from York led by the burgess appeared at Gordon's camp and surrendered the town, in the hope of obtaining special protection for their private property.

The 28th was the beginning of a busy and momentous two days for Early and his command. Colonel French with his cavalry rode to the mouth of the Conewago River to burn two railroad bridges at that point and all others between there and York, while the rest of Early's men with Gordon leading the way gradually moved into York. Early himself joined Gordon in town and, ignoring the surrender, immediately requisitioned large numbers of hats, shoes, and socks, enough supplies to last his division for three days, and $100,000 in cash. If the people complied he promised to protect private property; otherwise he would turn his men loose and allow them to sack the town. A committee of citizens appointed to obtain the articles and raise the money met all of Early's demands except those for shoes and cash. Instead of 2,000 pairs of shoes they could give him only 1,500, and of the $100,000 demanded they could turn over but $28,600. Convinced of their inability to get more money because the banks had sent their funds away for safekeeping, Early expressed his satisfaction with their efforts and considered the requisition as having been met. The shoes, hats,

19 The columns with Early were slowed down by mud nearly knee-deep, which caused hundreds of the men to straggle. See J. W. [Jackson] to R. S. Jackson, July 22, 1863, Typescript in possession of Prof. Merl E. Reed.
20 Hanover Junction was about three and a half miles due west of the present town of Loganville.
and socks were issued to the men, who stood very much in need of them. The commissary general used part of the money to buy beef cattle, because farmers he found were far more willing to part with their goods in exchange for United States paper money than Confederate receipts of purchase. The remainder of the money Early turned over to the quartermaster general of the army. In return for their compliance with most of his demands Early kept his word and respected private property. Nothing belonging to any citizen in town was touched, and guards protected hotels, stores, and other important buildings in the community against plunder. Upon request many stores opened to give soldiers and officers a chance to buy goods with Confederate money. People came and went freely within the limits of the town, but they had to get military passes should they want to go into the country. The farmers in the area did not fare so well as their neighbors in York, for Early’s promises about private property did not include them. He made no effort to prevent his troops from visiting farms and taking horses and mules, as well as various kinds of foods. Though some farmers received payment in United States money, probably greenbacks, and others saved droves of livestock by sending them across the river, many unhappily reported heavy losses.

Early had other important objectives in mind besides levying a tribute on York. Here again he showed his disposition to follow his own concepts of strategy without authority to do so. He ordered Gordon to take his brigade and some cavalry to Wrightsville to seize and hold the bridge across the Susquehanna, instead of burning it as Ewell had instructed. He had perceived the defenseless nature of the country and the feeble opposition offered by the militia, and he had therefore decided that there would be little

\[\text{23 Hoke, Great Invasion, 183-185; O. R., XXVII, pt. 2, pp. 465-466; Early, Narrative of the War, 262; “The Occupation of York, Pa.,” Rebellion Records, Documents, VII, 321, from the York Gazette, June 29, 1863; “Report of Dr. Douglas [United States Sanitary Commission],” ibid., 122. Town authorities collected the articles and money, for which they gave certificates or receipts to citizens making the contributions. Presumably these certificates could be used in the future as cash against the Confederate government. The requisitions for food were as follows: 165 bbls. flour or 28,000 lbs. baked bread; 3,500 lbs. sugar; 1,650 lbs. coffee; 300 gals. molasses; 1,200 lbs. salt; 12,000 lbs. fresh beef or 21,000 lbs. bacon or pork. Sugar, molasses, coffee, and salt were very scarce items in the Confederacy. In some areas they were not to be had at all.}

risk and many advantages should he take the bridge intact. He
would then cross the river with his whole division, cut the Penn-
sylvania Central Railroad, march upon Lancaster, exact a heavy
requisition there, and attack Harrisburg in the rear while the rest
of Ewell’s corps would threaten it from the front. Should he run
into unforeseen and formidable obstacles, he would corral the
immense number of horses that had been driven across the river
and mount all his men. Although he did not say how, in some
manner he would then recross to the west bank, destroying the
railroads and canals on the way. It was a boldly conceived scheme
which held promise of rich rewards for Confederate arms; and it
could very well have succeeded without endangering the rest of
Lee’s army, had it not been for the rapid advance of George G.
Meade’s forces into Pennsylvania. But Early’s dreams of conquest
went up with the smoke of the burning bridge, for the river at
that point was too wide and deep to be forded.\textsuperscript{53}

Whatever may have been the reasons for Gordon’s failure to
capture the bridge before its destruction, Early in no way blamed
him. The forces guarding the western approaches to the bridge
numbered around 1,000, mostly untrained and untested militia
who, although they were entrenched, had no artillery support.
They had to oppose Gordon’s veterans who were greater in num-
ber (how much greater is impossible to say) and had artillery.
The amount of resistance which the militia offered was later a
subject of dispute,\textsuperscript{54} but Early, who was given to the use of
hyperbole, claimed that because Gordon’s men had marched “a
little over 20 miles, on a very warm day, the enemy beat him
running.”\textsuperscript{55} Whatever their qualities as warriors, the militia gave
Colonel Jacob G. Frick enough time to set such a large fire on the
wooden structure that hundreds of Confederates could not put it
out. When the blaze got out of control and spread to Wrightsville,
\textsuperscript{53}O. R., XXVII, pt. 2, pp. 466-467; J. A. Early to Henry B. McClellan,
February 2, 1878, Henry B. McClellan Papers, Virginia Historical Society.
\textsuperscript{54}O. R., XXVII, pt. 2, pp. 277-279, 466, 491-492, 995-999. Gordon claimed
the Yankees had 1,200 men, a number “nearly equal” in strength to his
brigade. This figure was given him, he said, by the commanding officer who
had been captured. The commanding officer, Col. Jacob G. Frick, who was
not captured, gave no precise figures for the size of his force. From a careful
reading of his report it is doubtful whether he had altogether as many as
1,000 men. They were a hodgepodge of separate companies and detachments
from various regiments.
\textsuperscript{55}Ibid., p. 466.
to their everlasting credit Gordon's men worked feverishly and succeeded in saving the town from total ruin.56

Early confined his deliberate destruction of private property to railroads. His cavalry did an efficient job of burning bridges, railroad cars, and depots on the Northern Central Railroad from Hanover Junction almost to Harrisburg, while Gordon did similar work on the line running between Wrightsville and York. For reasons not entirely clear Early refrained from burning the railroad buildings and two railroad car manufacturing plants in York. When he left there on June 30 the physical appearance of the town was unaltered except for charred remains of railroad cars, torn up sections of track, and broken switches.57 Another reminder of his visitation was the presence of some stragglers, the debris of every Civil War army, who purposely stayed behind or were too drunk to go with their commands.58

Before Early began his junket to York, Ewell had already started the movement of the rest of his corps toward Carlisle. General Junius Daniel's brigade of Rodes's division got on the road about 1 a.m. on June 25, and four hours later they arrived at Shippensburg to reinforce Jenkins, who again had visions of an enemy attack. The next day the other brigades of the division joined Daniel, and the whole division reached Carlisle on June 27.59 Most of Johnson's division kept up with Rodes and arrived at Carlisle on the same day.60 Feeling fit and confident, Ewell's men marched jauntily into Carlisle singing "Dixie" at the top of their lungs. At Shippensburg and Carlisle Ewell made out requisitions for the people in those communities to fill. In Carlisle he obtained

57 Ibid.; O. R., XXVII, pt. 2, pp. 467, 492; J. A. Early to Henry B. McClellan, February 26, 1878, Henry B. McClellan Papers, Virginia Historical Society. In his battle report Early said he decided against burning the railroad car shops and other buildings for fear of destroying a large part of York. Later he told McClellan that the head of a mercantile firm offered him $50,000 if he would not burn them. Early hesitated to give his word because Stuart might go through York after he was gone. Should Stuart burn the buildings, the Confederates would then be charged with having committed a "breach of faith."
60 Ibid., pp. 443, 503.
$50,000 worth of medicines, and provisions in sufficient quantities to feed the two divisions, as well as to send large amounts back to Virginia. He also fell heir to a very large quantity of food supplies, uniforms, arms, saddles, bridles, and articles of every description which Couch's men had left behind in Carlisle. Ewell's troops, who were under strict orders to leave private dwellings untouched, nevertheless stripped the stores. They treated the civilians, especially the ladies, with great courtesy and politeness. On Sunday, June 28, Ewell sent word to the clergy to hold services as usual, for no one would disturb them. Some of the churches opened, and the "preachers, though nervous, prayed for their country in peril and their friends in danger;—they also prayed for the strangers that were among them; some of them prayed for peace." The Confederates took exceptional care of the campus of Dickinson College, since some of them said they or their fathers had graduated there. Even more surprising was the fact that Ewell, out of respect for the wishes of his commander, did not burn the Carlisle Barracks of the United States Army, which normally would have been marked for destruction. He even went so far as to stop the looting of abandoned army buildings by a mob of civilians.

As usual the farmers suffered most from the exactions which the Confederates levied upon the country around Carlisle. There were instances where Ewell's men paid the farmers in gold, but ordinarily they offered Confederate scrip. Some of the shrewder farmers got rid of part of this money by selling it to Yankee militia as mementos at the extraordinarily high rate of one United States dollar for two Confederate ones. Occasionally a farmer was so badly stripped of provisions by the forced purchases of Southerners that he had nothing left for his family.

Ewell, who did not believe in "houseburning or anything of that..."
softh," was thorough in his destruction of railroads. In the area of Carlisle he broke down a bridge and a 600-foot trestle of the Cumberland Valley Railroad, he warped the rails by heating them in the fire of burning ties, and he chopped down the poles and cut the wire of the telegraph line. The work of demolition for twenty-eight miles, from Scotland, Pennsylvania, to Hagerstown, Maryland, was so complete that the company hesitated about incurring the cost of rebuilding the line even as far as Chambersburg. What railroad property Ewell neglected to destroy in Chambersburg, General George E. Pickett effectively demolished a few days later. Thus, as one of the chief lieutenants of Lee, Ewell faithfully executed his commander's occupation policies, keeping true to the spirit as well as the letter of his instructions.

General A. P. Hill's men with the division of General Henry Heth in the lead entered Chambersburg on the morning of June 26, at almost the same time that Rodes's and Johnson's divisions were leaving it to march north on the Harrisburg road. Instead of going to the old camping ground of Ewell's corps on the north end of town, Hill's divisions one by one turned east in the diamond, or public square, tramped out on the Gettysburg pike, and stopped near Fayetteville. General James Longstreet's corps was almost a day's march behind Hill. Most of his men camped on the night of June 26 about four miles south of Greencastle, and next day marched to within a few miles of Chambersburg. On the 29th Longstreet's corps, except Pickett's division which remained behind to hold the town, moved out to Greenwood on the Gettysburg pike. Lee had preceded them, accompanying Hill's corps to the eastern edge of Chambersburg where he set up headquarters in Messersmith's Woods. Here he stayed for four days, until Tuesday morning, June 30.

Lee maintained tight control over the activities of his troops in

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66 Ewell to Lizzie [Ewell], June 24, 1863, R. S. Ewell Papers, LC.
67 I. A. Wilson to William Wilson, July 1, 1863; Thomas A. Scott to E. Lewis [July 1, 1863]; Thomas A. Scott to J. Edgar Thomson, July 5, 1863; Cypher signed Optic [Couch] to Austria Lucy [Halleck], July 7, 1863; Halleck to Couch [July 8, 1863], Dispatches, July 1-8, 1863, Pennsylvania Department of Military Affairs, PDPR.
the town. He placed sentries at the homes of all leading citizens and allowed no one to take up quarters in town or visit it without a permit from him. The residents felt free to come to him with complaints of wrongdoing. In some instances they trumped up charges as an excuse to visit headquarters and catch a glimpse of the great Lee or Longstreet. As a precaution against outbreaks of disorder on the part of his troops Lee had his men empty barrels of whiskey and bottles of rum and brandy into the streets, after the army doctors had first replenished their stocks for medicinal purposes. A German officer, a guest of the army, made the amazing statement that Lee had ordered this destruction “since the entire army had voluntarily abjured spirituous alcohol. . . .” If so, it was one of the most astounding conversions to the cold water brigade in history!

On June 27 Lee issued General Orders No. 73, congratulating his men upon their general good behavior and urging them to continue it. In this document he reiterated his adherence to a doctrine of war upon armed men only, and denounced “barbarous outrages upon the unarmed and defenceless, and the wanton destruction of private property, that have marked the course of the enemy in our own country.”

With Lee near at hand to supervise affairs, the gathering of supplies in Chambersburg proceeded in the orderly but determined fashion he had prescribed. Because officials of the borough had skipped town and were not available to fulfill requisitions against the people, the Rebels forcibly entered stores and warehouses to seize goods, for which they later paid with Confederate money. In spite of these draconian measures the haul was not rich, for most supplies had been taken by the vanguard of Lee’s army. By this time there was no longer enough food in town for all the people. When a prominent and courageous woman, Mrs. Ellen McLellan, came to Lee and told him of the needy condition of many families in Chambersburg, he agreed to furnish them with

31 Ibid.
some flour. Apparently other women successfully appealed to the gallantry of Confederate officers and saved their supplies from seizure. Though the levies of a huge army on a borough the size of Chambersburg caused severe financial hardship and inconvenience, prominent Union leaders privately admitted that there was no physical suffering and "little damage beyond the stealing," as they put it.

During Lee's occupation of Chambersburg General John D. Imboden and his command appeared on June 29 at Mercersburg, having come from Cumberland and Hancock, Maryland. They represented the fifth and in some respects the harshest visitation of the Rebels to this community. They cleaned out all the surrounding farmhouses and discovered most of the hiding places of the horses in the mountains, rounding up at least 400 of them. The next day Imboden demanded of the town 5,000 pounds of bacon, 35 barrels of flour, quantities of shoes, hats, and other articles of clothing to be furnished by 11 a.m. Failure to meet the requisition, he threatened, would result in having his soldiers quartered in private homes. The penalty was not imposed, because the citizens met most of his demands for provisions, for which he gave them a worthless "sort of receipt." Imboden frankly expressed regret at his lack of authority to burn every town and lay waste every farm in Pennsylvania. He justified his harsh manner toward the people and his desire to wreak destruction as retaliation for Yankee depredations.

This systematic and thorough levy on the wealth of the invaded areas permitted the Army of Northern Virginia to live well off the country, to clothe itself in better fashion, and to improve its means of transportation. The big disappointment was the failure to get replacements for worn-out cavalry mounts. According to

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24 A. K. McClure to William (?), McLellan, July 4, 1863, Dispatches, July 1-8, 1863, Pennsylvania Department of Military Affairs, PDPR. Part of the message read: "[Judge] Kimmell here [Harrisburg], all safe at home [Chambersburg]. . . . Mrs. McLellan entertained General Battle and had interview as to supplies. . . . Mrs. McClure saved everything but the sheep—had a fight over the corn and farm-wagon but saved both." Cullen A. Battle was a colonel at the time and did not become brigadier general until August 20, 1863. Mark M. Boatner, III, *The Civil War Dictionary* (New York: McKay, 1959), 50-51.
one disgusted Confederate the horses from Pennsylvania proved “utterly unserviceable, and seemingly have as little taste or talent for war as their fat Dutch proprietors.”

It is impossible to determine, however, how much surplus in raw materials, finished goods, drugs, provisions, vehicles, and draft horses Lee was able to accumulate for the future needs of the army. Official reports of the campaign give the impression that he was quite successful in this respect, but neither he nor anyone else offered overall figures. Ewell reported his corps as having collected 3,000 head of cattle, which were sent to the rear. He also said that at Chambersburg he loaded a wagon train with ordnance and medical stores for shipment presumably to Virginia, but he gave no idea of the size of the train. General Rodes vaguely mentioned large quantities of articles suitable for government use which he had obtained in Williamsport, Hagerstown, Chambersburg, and elsewhere. As for horses, he complained that almost all of them were seized by Jenkins’s cavalry and were “rarely accounted for.”

One foreign observer accompanying the army noted that beyond Williamsport the road was crowded with wagons, horses, and droves of cattle and sheep going south from Pennsylvania. He was amazed by the wagons and referred to them as of the “most extraordinary size, drawn by six or eight horses.”

Another foreign observer noted in his diary on June 27 that Ewell had already sent back “great quantities of horses, mules, wagons, beefs, and other necessaries;—he is now at or beyond Carlisle, laying the country under contribution, and making Pennsylvania support the war, instead of poor, used-up and worn-out Virginia.” Immediately after the battle on July 4 the same writer said that the booty in wagons and on the hoof made a train “so interminable” that it was winding its way along the Fairfield road all day, and for this reason he doubted whether the army could start its retreat till late at night.

The most definite and impressive figures about booty, however, were given by a soldier of Gordon’s brigade in his recollections written many years after the war. At a big horseshoe bend in the

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Ross, Cities and Camps of the Confederate States, 34.
Fremantle, Three Months in the Southern States, 242, 275.
Shenandoah River, near Mount Jackson, Virginia, he remembered seeing the two or three thousand acres of bottom land filled with cattle and sheep. Upon inquiry one of the herdsmen told him that approximately 26,000 head of cattle and 22,000 head of sheep taken in Maryland and Pennsylvania were gathered there. These numbers read like the exaggerations of an old soldier’s yarn; yet a remark made soon after the battle by a Confederate seems to substantiate them. He wrote: “We gathered up thousands of beeves in Pennsylvania—enough to feed our army until cold weather.”

Judging by all this evidence it would appear that the regulations in General Orders No. 72 as interpreted by Lee’s subordinates facilitated rather than obstructed the efficient collection of supplies, for they reduced the amount of indiscriminate seizures by unauthorized personnel. Because it was based upon orderly procedure rather than arbitrary acts, the confiscation of private property may have been less shocking to the victims, but the losses were just as real. To Greenwalt S. Barr, a miller of Franklin County, the visits of some Confederate officers meant that between June 24 and July 1 the following items were taken from his mill: 1,144 bushels of wheat, 400 bushels of “mills stuff,” 175 empty flour barrels, 100 bushels of corn, 100 bushels of oats, and 391 barrels of flour. After that clean sweep it is possible that Barr had nothing left with which to face his creditors and avoid bankruptcy. Another miller, Jacob Hargbroad, who was also a distiller, suffered even greater loss. He owned two mills and two warehouses, from which the Southerners took large quantities of flour, shelled corn, rye, and oats. They also poured into the gutters 3,010 gallons of his whiskey. An example of what happened to retailers was given by Eyster and Brothers, who ran a big dry goods and grocery store in Chambersburg. They claimed to have made “compulsory sales” of dry goods to different units of Lee’s army as they appeared in town, for which they received $6,300 in Confederate

G. W. Nichols, A Soldier’s Story of His Regiment (Kennesaw, Ga., 1901), 123.

Welch, Letters to His Wife, 60. This letter was written from near Bunker Hill, Va., on July 17, 1863. See also Ross, Cities and Camps of the Confederate States, 67-68. Ross said enough supplies had been obtained to sustain the army for several months. The Confederates also got wagons and horses in “incalculable numbers.” He also said that the army in order to give the men a daily ration of a pound and a half of beef butchered 300 head of cattle a day.
money. They sold this currency for $320, about five cents on the dollar. The Rebels, they said, also “stole” from them $1,200 worth of goods. Deducting the amount of United States money which they obtained in exchange for Confederate, their total loss was almost $7,200. Among the farmers a typical experience was that of Christian Bitner, whose farm in Franklin County stood directly in the path of the invaders. He reported that they took from him nineteen horses, two cows, a heifer and a bull, as well as quantities of feed, ten tons of straw, harnesses, and tools of all kinds. While camping on his property the Confederates also used 12,550 of his fence rails for firewood, tent poles, and other purposes. They also cut down 379 trees and saplings which would take years to replace. Some of the farmers who lived on or near the battlefield suffered even greater losses. There were instances where houses and barns were wantonly burned, although there was no military reason for their destruction.

There is still the question of how effective were Lee’s regulations in controlling the conduct of the Confederate soldier. For most men the command to avoid bullying and vandalism by a general as revered and respected as Lee was enough to discourage misbehavior. In spite of his efforts, however, some soldiers did go off limits and commit depredations. Even Lee admitted derelictions from good behavior when in General Orders No. 73 he observed that there had been “instances of forgetfulness.”

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52 Papers of the Board of Claims Under Act of April 16, 1862, Auditor General of State of Pennsylvania, Border Claims, Adjudicated Under Act of May 22, 1871, PAPR. These claims are illustrative of thousands of others, the papers of which have been preserved for years. It is not clear whether the monetary value of these claims was based upon the price level of commodities in 1863 or 1871 and later. For the sake of convenience probably market prices in 1871 or later, depending upon the time of the adjudication, were used as the standard to determine values. If so, claimants were allowed less in monetary compensation, since the dollar had greatly appreciated since the war. Therefore the following figures do not accurately reflect the losses of the claimants:

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<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Value of claim which was allowed</th>
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<tr>
<td>Barr</td>
<td>$5,190.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hargbroad</td>
<td>10,802.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eyster &amp; Brothers</td>
<td>7,553.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitner</td>
<td>4,167.40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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54 O. R., XXVII, pt. 3, p. 943.
uniform were blue or gray, was more impressed by stern discipline than exhortations. And strict control was not always possible.

Confederate officers policed the activities of their men effectively in town, but not so well in the country. The infantry, easier to restrain than the cavalry, were "kept close in ranks and marched slowly," and when camped near a town they could not get in without a pass. On the march the cavalry kept in front and on the flanks and thus had better opportunities for plunder of property and seizure of horses. Some of the troopers traveled in small detachments, scouring the byways and back roads and visiting isolated farms. Bands of independent and irregular horsemen rode through the country "taking what they wanted and wantonly destroying a good deal."

The worst malefactor, a disgrace to his uniform and flag and destroyer of his army's reputation, was the so-called straggler. A better name for him was skulker or bummer, because often there were legitimate stragglers, soldiers who because of illness or exhaustion had to "fall out" during a long, hard march. After a rest they would try to catch up with their commands as soon as possible. The skulker, on the other hand, never kept up with his comrades if he could avoid it. He was a professional shirker and troublemaker who represented the scum of both Civil War armies. In the Gettysburg campaign skulkers spread like a blight over the Maryland and Pennsylvania countryside. Although the majority wore the blue uniform, the Confederate gray was also much in evidence, in spite of better discipline in Lee's army.

The offenses of the Rebel soldier as a rule were committed

\[5\] John O. Casler, *Four Years in the Stonewall Brigade . . .* (Marietta, Ga., 1951), 168.
\[7\] Ibid., 24-26; Samuel C. Means [Capt. Va. Rangers] to Halleck, July 3, 1863, General Halleck Telegrams Received, Generals' Papers and Books, Office of Adjutant General, Army and Air Corps Branch, Reference Division, Office of Military Archives, National Archives.

against property rather than persons. In the vast literature of the campaign not once has a case of rape been mentioned. Other acts of violence against persons were rare, although one or two cases of murder did occur. Petty theft was widespread, and reports of it came from every corner of the invaded area. Observers noted that as the Confederates marched along roads lined with cherry trees they could not resist stripping them of their ripened fruit, but in this respect they were no worse than the Union troops. The Southern soldier was very adept, when an officer’s back was turned, at forcing an exchange of hats with a surprised native. At times he even got a better pair of boots that way.

Such incidents were more annoying than harmful, but horse stealing was in the category of a serious crime. Colonel James Fremantle of the British army for all his bias in favor of the South admitted that the “Confederate soldier, in spite of his many virtues, is as a rule, the most incorrigible horse stealer in the world.” Writing confidentially in their letters or diaries and later in memoirs, Southerners mentioned not only thefts of horses, but other kinds of property as well. In looking for food and fuel privates often ignored Lee’s orders and took fence rails, whiskey, chickens, and other kinds of food in large quantities. One soldier noted in his diary that nearly half the men in his regiment were out foraging, and they could get almost anything at their own price. And General W. D. Pender observed: “Until we crossed the Md. line our men behaved as well as troops could but here [in
Pennsylvania] it will be hard to restrain them for they have an
idea that they are to indulge in unlicensed plunder." Considering
the great scarcity of the necessities of life in the Confederacy,
such depredations by hungry and footsore soldiers were under-
standable. Less justifiable were forced sales of goods in stores
without any pretense of payment, as well as the appropriation from
private dwellings of household furnishings, clothing for men,
women and children, cooking utensils, tableware, watches and
jewelry, cash, and last but not least, sleigh bells. A chaplain of a
North Carolina regiment learned to his sorrow that the men “com-
mitted many depredations yesterday afternoon and last night, going
to houses and taking whatever they could lay their hands upon.”
Later a Yankee bugler charged that “large quantities of greenbacks
and gold and silver were found on the bodies of the Rebs after
the fight, gold and silver watches, etc.”

The amount of vandalism and robbery seemed to increase as the
campaign progressed, especially during the heat of battle and the
confusion of retreat when Confederate officers were preoccupied
with more pressing duties than the protection of civilian belong-
ings. Property left vacant and unprotected by terror-stricken own-
ers fleeing before the invaders was often thoroughly ransacked. The
more stout-hearted citizens who stayed at home usually stood to
lose only a part of their property in forced sales.

Pender to his wife, June 28, 1863, William D. Pender Papers, UNCL.
Claims of Benjamin Albert, Reading Twp., Adams Cty.; George Biese-
cker and Henry Biesecker, Franklin Twp., Adams Cty.; Berkley Buhrman,
Hamilton Twp., Adams Cty.; Joseph Culbertson, Hamilton Twp., Adams
Cty.; John S. Deardorff, Guilford Twp., Adams Cty.; James Brumbauck,
Washington Twp., Franklin Cty.; William Boadenhammer, Hanover Borough,
York Cty.; David Bricker, Butler Twp., Adams Cty.; Margaret Anderson,
Hamiltonian Twp., Adams Cty.; William M. Bigham, Freedom Twp., Adams
Cty.; Mary J. Baumgardner, Cumberland Twp., Adams Cty.; Papers of the
Board of Claims Under Act of April 16, 1862, Auditor General of State of
Pennsylvania, Border Claims, Adjudicated Under Act of May 22, 1871,
PDPR.
Entry for June 28, 1863, Francis Milton Kennedy Diary, Microfilm of
Typescript, UNCL.
Reed to his mother and sister, July 11, 1863, Charles W. Reed Letters,
Typescript, Princeton University Library.
Claims of William Comfort, Cumberland Twp., Adams Cty.; Adam
Forsom, Gettysburg, Adams Cty.; John Q. Allwelt, Cumberland Twp.,
Adams Cty.; David K. Beams, Cumberland Twp., Adams Cty.; Adam Bei-
;ecker, Franklin Twp., Adams Cty.; May J. Baumgardner, Cumberland Twp.,
Adams Cty.; Daniel Heintzelman, Franklin Twp., Adams Cty.; Samuel
Martin, Liberty Twp., Adams Cty.; Paxton & McCreary, Hamiltonian
Twp., Adams Cty.; Papers of the Board of Claims Under Act of April 16,
Although many a Rebel plundered and stole with great efficiency, the army as a whole never got out of hand. Although most Southern soldiers would have liked to indulge themselves at the expense of their rich and hated enemy, nevertheless they exercised restraint out of respect for their commander and the code of the times. Products of a more romantic age with its antiquated notions of chivalry and Christian ethics, General Lee, as well as most other Confederate and Union commanders, waged an old-fashioned kind of war with none of the refinements of the twentieth century—indiscriminate use of the torch, rape, mass murder, holding of hostages, and employment of fifth columns and Quislings. Yet the Confederate invasion left its mark. It was “heartrending” to observers to visit Pennsylvania at the end of the campaign, and they were appalled by the scenes of desolation that marked the footsteps of the armies: fences destroyed, ripe grain trodden and ground into the rain-soaked soil, no signs of life except for an occasional dilapidated wagon creeping along cautiously or a little caravan of refugees on its way home. Considering the accusations Southerners constantly hurled at Yankee “vandals,” it was ironic that soldiers of the Army of the Potomac in their turn “felt inclined to retaliate [for] the losses of Pennsylvania”; the Rebels they said had acted like a “set of demons . . . destroying and stealing property whenever they could lay their hands upon it . . . .” Because of the North’s greater wealth and more efficient transportation facilities the Army of the Potomac had not made it a practice to live off occupied territory, so that a systematic and thorough stripping of an area’s resources to support an army was a strange and horrifying experience to the Union soldier. His unsophisticated mind could see little if any difference between legal


293Howard to [his wife], July 22, 1863, O. O. Howard Papers, Correspondence, Series 1862-71, J. Bowdoin College Library.

294McIntosh to his wife, July 22, 1863, John B. McIntosh Correspondence, Brown University Library.
seizure of goods by duly constituted military authorities, who paid for their confiscations with worthless money, and brazen theft with no pretense of legality. For that matter, neither could the storekeepers and farmers in Pennsylvania.

Favorable comment on the humaneness of General Lee should not obscure the fact that the Confederates were waging war against the United States, and in June of 1863 they extended it to Pennsylvania. For many Pennsylvanians the war now attained the same dimensions of senseless cruelty as it had come to have for their former compatriots in Virginia.