ON JUNE 12, 1863, the people of Pennsylvania read a proclamation from Governor Andrew G. Curtin, officially confirming the truth of rumors that the state was in danger of invasion by a “large rebel force,” and calling upon the men to enlist for the defense of their “own homes, firesides, and property.”¹ In the past when the federal government had needed soldiers in a hurry, it had depended upon the states to furnish militia. This time Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, who had little faith in the efficiency of these troops, decided to supplant them with a similar organization maintained and controlled by the national government. They would in effect be a permanent reserve force of home guards who would serve only in case of great emergency.²

As reports about the enemy threat became more ominous, the War Department finally decided during the first week of June that the moment had arrived to institute its new system of federal militia. It made formal announcement of its plan on June 10. At the same time it created two new military departments and appointed their commanding generals. The Department of the Monongahela was to be under Major General W. T. H. Brooks with headquarters in Pittsburgh. It embraced all of Pennsylvania.

¹The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington, 1880-1901), Ser. I, Vol. XXVII, pt. 3, pp. 79-80. (Cited hereafter as O. R.; unless otherwise indicated the citations are from Ser. I.) The proclamation seemed to lack the fiery appeal one would expect in that age. In view of the disagreement which developed between Curtin and Stanton, perhaps the Governor was not too convinced of the soundness of the measures adopted by the federal government to cope with the emergency.

²Ibid., XXV, pt. 2, pp. 514, 542.
west of Johnstown and Laurel Hill, as well as some northern counties of West Virginia and certain eastern ones in Ohio. More important in the history of the Gettysburg campaign, however, was the Department of the Susquehanna, which had its base of operations in Harrisburg and included all the rest of Pennsylvania not under General Brooks. For the position of commander Stanton fortunately had at his disposal the able and level-headed Major General Darius N. Couch, who after distinguishing himself at Chancellorsville had given up his command of the Second Corps rather than having to serve any longer under Major General Joe Hooker. Stanton planned to create within each department a large corps of volunteers between the ages of eighteen and sixty to serve during the "pleasure of the President or the continuance of the war." They would go on active duty, however, only during an emergency and could return home after it was over.

Several features of this plan were unique and anticipated the development of the National Guard in the twentieth century. So that the corps might have greater permanence, men both younger and older than those of draft age could volunteer. They would be trained, equipped, and controlled by federal authorities, and would be kept on a standby basis, thus avoiding the delays and confusion usually attendant upon calling out the state militia. The indefinite term of service was another new idea. Until then all volunteers had entered the army with the understanding that they could leave at the end of a stated period of time regardless of the military situation, but bitter experience had taught the federal government the necessity of abolishing this feature of the recruitment program. The only limitation under the new plan was geographical; presumably the volunteers would not be expected to go outside the confines of their own department.

Although Stanton on June 14 expressed gratification over the "cordial support and cooperation evinced by the State officials," they and the departmental commanders found men reluctant to enlist in the new corps. There were many objections to the conditions of service. First of all, volunteers would receive no bounty

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4 The draft ages were between twenty and forty-five years. See Ibid., Ser. III, Vol. III, p. 88.
3 Ibid., XVII, pt. 3, p. 111.
Federal officials had reasoned that since members of the corps would not serve in any of the field armies but would be used mainly for the defense of their own states, they were not entitled to a bounty. Even more upsetting, the volunteers feared they would not be paid until Congress got around to appropriating funds the next time it met. (For some reason it had not earmarked money for a federal reserve force of this type.) In spite of these reservations the War Department and state officials might have succeeded in recruiting two corps of respectable size if they had had enough time. The Confederates, however, did not cooperate, and by appearing suddenly at Winchester and Martinsburg, Virginia, on June 13 they forced Union authorities to adopt another arrangement for raising troops.

As Curtin's personal emissary, Colonel Thomas A. Scott, a powerful political figure in the state, made a hurried trip to Washington on June 14. He appeared in Stanton's office in the dead of night to present the Governor's proposal for the immediate enlistment of 50,000 men. After conferring for an hour and a half with the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, and the Solicitor of the War Department, Scott agreed to a new scheme which, though not exactly in accord with Curtin's ideas, he nevertheless felt might expedite the mobilization of emergency troops. According to the plan the President would immediately issue a proclamation calling for 100,000 volunteer militia from Pennsylvania, Ohio, Maryland, and West Virginia. Pennsylvania's quota would be 50,000. The terms of enlistment would be more specific than under the previous scheme. The men would enter the federal militia without receiving a bounty and would serve for a maximum of six months. Should the emergency end before that time, they would be discharged. Furthermore, there would be no problem of paying them, for troops enlisted under Presidential proclamation were entitled to money already appropriated by Congress.

The President issued his proclamation early on June 15, and Curtin followed with one later in the day, even though he was...
then having second thoughts about the terms of enlistment." He wondered whether it would not be better if he appealed to the people "to meet the emergency without regard to time of service."

Stanton soon found that the same reluctance to enlist in the federal service for six months prevailed in other states as well as in Pennsylvania. On June 16 he sent messages to all Northern governors about the need for emergency troops. He wanted to know how many volunteers they could get to serve for a maximum of six months without the inducement of a bounty. Any troops they could furnish would be credited to their quotas in the draft. Replies were not encouraging except from New York and Rhode Island. With the military situation becoming ever more critical, Stanton, Couch, and Curtin were forced to improvise. After another conference with Colonel Scott, who represented Curtin in such matters, Stanton authorized Couch on June 25 to furnish arms, ammunition, subsistence, transportation, and all needful supplies to any troops which might be placed under his command whether sworn into the service of the United States or that of a state. As long as Couch commanded the emergency troops, the United States government would assume the cost of maintaining them regardless of their status.

The way was now clear for the adoption of what seemed to Curtin and Couch the only practical means of raising a large force quickly enough to resist the invaders: an independent call for troops to serve with the state. Before making the appeal, however, Curtin sought Lincoln's approval. The President gave his consent, and on June 26 Curtin issued his third and most stirring proclamation. He called for 60,000 men to come "promptly forward" to defend the state for ninety days. He promised to

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"Ibid., pp. 136, 145.
"Ibid., p. 144.
"Ibid., pp. 137-144, 163-167, 206.
"Ibid., pp. 264, 329-330, 343.
"A. G. Curtin to Kate Curtin [No date, but filed in folder of June 25, 1863], Dispatches, Records of Pennsylvania Department of Military Affairs, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Division of Public Records. (Cited hereafter as PDPR.) Internal evidence suggests that Curtin wrote the letter on June 25, for he mentioned the enemy advance on Carlisle. Couch reported to Major General Henry W. Halleck late on June 25 that enemy cavalry were within five miles of the town. O. R., XXVII, pt. 3, p. 328.
PENNSYLVANIA PREPARES FOR INVASION

This appeal met with a more favorable response than the previous ones for a variety of reasons. In the first place men were to be mustered into state, not federal service, thus removing from their suspicious minds the fear of being placed in one of the national armies in the field by way of the back door, so to speak. In addition, the state-rightists of the more die-hard variety would be willing to enlist in state forces when they would not consider entering the Union army. The contract to serve only ninety days was an advantage to the man on the street who saw affairs through the eyes of a private. Should the Governor break his promise to keep them only as long as the emergency lasted, he would be forced to let them go at the end of the stated period.

Thus the reluctance of civilians to accept any radically new system forced Curtin, Stanton, and Lincoln as practical Americans to devise an ingenious compromise between Stanton’s plan for a force of home guards and the old state militia. Pennsylvania lacked the money and the equipment to organize its own state forces, so during the crisis of the Gettysburg campaign the national government agreed to foot the bill if it exercised command over the troops. Here was an early manifestation of the modern practice of federal subsidies for various educational, highway, and social service programs sponsored by the states.

Stanton undoubtedly established the command post for the Department of the Susquehanna at Harrisburg because of the city’s strategic importance as a political and communications center. It was located at the crossroads of the Cumberland and Susquehanna Valleys on the natural invasion route to the heart of Pennsylvania and the cities of the Northeast. Widespread rail connections furnished Couch with excellent facilities for gathering news and organizing an army. He also had at his disposal the machinery and personnel of the state government to help him in his activ-

15 Ibid., pp. 347-348. Curtin had carefully discussed the matter of another proclamation and its contents with his advisers and General Couch, who accepted the proposal as a wise one. Ibid., pp. 342-343. Not having a good opinion of Stanton, Curtin had worried about the reaction of the War Department and the President to his proposal to call for state militia. Apparently Scott had no trouble in getting approval in Washington. See ibid., pt. 2, p. 213; Thomas A. Scott to Governor Curtin, June 25, 1863, Dispatches, Records of the Pennsylvania Department of Military Affairs, PDPR.
ities. The features which gave Harrisburg importance to the North of course made it an attractive military object to the invading Confederates, and Couch was well aware of the danger.

So long as men responded feebly to the calls to arms he could do little to protect the state should the enemy get there ahead of the Army of the Potomac. A newspaper reporter who visited Pennsylvania at this time considered the people to be "strangely apathetic." He said that in 1862 when Lee had crossed the Potomac they had rushed to arms and cried: "'Drive the enemy from our soil!'" but now they seemed to have lost the will to resist, and their cry had become one of "'Where shall we hide our goods?'" Though somewhat exaggerated, this indictment was essentially just, for during the year many people had grown weary of the war and distrustful of the Lincoln administration. The Democratic majority in the Pennsylvania General Assembly reflected the strong peace sentiment throughout the state when in the spring it passed a series of resolutions condemning Lincoln's prosecution of the war and calling for a constitutional convention as a way of restoring the Union. Many Democrats pretended to believe that the report of an invasion was so much Republican propaganda, possibly dreamed up as a way to get men into the service so they could not vote in the coming elections. If there was some basis of fact to the rumor of an invasion, the Democrats confidently predicted that it would turn out to be nothing more than a cavalry raid, and no large force would therefore be needed to cope with it.

Many Pennsylvanians who professed ardent support of the war had no better records during the emergency than the Peace Democrats and Copperheads. Most of them were farmers, and they greatly disliked committing themselves to serve, especially at a season of the year when every able hand was needed to harvest the maturing crops. There were other less understandable reasons

16 C. C. Coffin, The Boys of '61, or Four Years of Fighting ... (Boston, 1883), pp. 258-259.
for their reluctance to join. When the people in the Gettysburg area heard that military authorities in Harrisburg wanted to do the obvious and sensible thing and draw the main defensive line along the Susquehanna River, thus leaving the border region unprotected, many of them refused to enlist. They excused themselves on the grounds of wanting to stay home with their families in the hour of danger instead of going off to defend less exposed places. Even after state authorities succumbed to popular pressure and restored the old time militia system with its limit of three months' service, many citizens still refused to join. If they fought at all, it must be on their own terms. At Johnstown a German artillery company refused to be mustered in unless the Governor promised not to have them taken out of the state. More than once arms were requested for groups of minutemen who had no legal or formal organization, and the state Adjutant General had to send a reminder that weapons would go only to the regular militia. When some state official made the mistake of allowing nearly all the men in Mercer and Crawford Counties to enlist for only sixty days, it proved impossible to get any but a few of them to agree to a ninety-day term of service. The Assistant Adjutant General in Pittsburgh asked Curtin helplessly: "What shall I do?"

The idea of bushwhacking, or guerrilla warfare, appealed to some people who were romantically inclined and just wanted to engage in the dangerous but exciting sport of taking pot shots at the enemy. One writer proposed that the government send 2,000 troops to the Cumberland Valley (where it would get them he did not say) and call on the local men to rise up and join in the fun. He guaranteed that nearly every man who could carry a gun would turn out, for "all they want is the chance to act and the government to lead." Another correspondent asked Curtin if he would accept one hundred or more good men for the purpose of "bushwacking," as he called it, and harrying the rebels. He felt sure he could get them if they were wanted.

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20 A. Kopelin to Curtin, June 27, 1863; A. L. Russell to Geo. W. McConnell, June 30, 1863; Thos. M. Howe to Curtin, June 2, 1863, Dispatches, Records of the Pennsylvania Department of Military Affairs, PDPR.
21 H. M. Johnson to Col. Jno. A. Wright, June 25, 1863, *ibid.*
Another claimed that whereas Curtin could not find ten men to enlist in regular militia companies, he would have no trouble getting 1,000 to fight as bushwhackers. Each would use his own rifle and fight without pay. With such a force, he said, the Governor could defy the whole rebel army and clear out the state in three weeks. Without asking for official permission some Pennsylvanians did in fact engage in bushwhacking. They were civilians armed with their own rifles, and they would hide in bushes or behind rocks and waylay Confederate detachments. It was risky business because there was a question of whether they would be protected by the rules of war if they were captured. Most of them, perhaps as many as 5,000, gathered in the counties of the Juniata River Valley, west of the Cumberland Valley, where under the command of ex-officers they guarded the mountain passes leading to their homes. Bushwhackers appeared in other parts of the state, although in fewer numbers. Some hid in the recesses of South Mountain near Greenwood, which was on the route taken by the invading army, and made it dangerous for Confederates to travel in small groups. Southern reaction to the activities of these guerrillas was surprisingly mild. Because the bushwhackers were not well organized or expertly led, they accomplished little of military value.

To defend the state the authorities in Harrisburg depended upon groups organized and trained according to traditional practices, but because of the lethargy of the Pennsylvanians they were slow to materialize. If New York had not had a large number of militia ready and willing to serve in the Department of the Susquehanna, General Couch would have been without any kind of force on June 22 when Lee stood poised to cross the Potomac with the main body of his army. Couch had under his immediate control near Harrisburg at the very outside 11,500 men, of whom a little over 8,000 were from the state of New

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22 A. Sutton to State Adjutant General [Russell], July 1, 1863; F. Johnston to Curtin, June 4, 1863, General Correspondence, January-August, 1863, Records of Pennsylvania Department of Military Affairs, PDPR.
Reinforcements for his small army arrived in driblets. On June 29, at the time of the greatest threat to Harrisburg, Couch estimated his whole organized force to be perhaps 16,000. As for their quality, he stated that "five thousand regulars will whip them all to pieces in an open field."  

The appearance on Pennsylvania soil of the entire Army of Northern Virginia, not just a part of it, convinced even the most sceptical that the Confederates meant business. Indifference changed to alarm, and the great rush to the colors began. In Philadelphia, where apathy had been particularly noticeable, the people became thoroughly aroused and eagerly sought to cooperate with military authorities. Couch had appointed to command the city's emergency troops a major general of the Army of the Potomac who was still recovering from a wound at Antietam. He had the wonderful name of Napoleon Jackson Tecumseh Dana, surely formidable enough to stop any enemy army. The City Council at a special meeting voted $500,000 to recruit, equip, and pay volunteers. A military organization known as the Blue and Gray Reserves became activated, while the police formed a company from their own force. To stimulate recruiting, which appropriately was being carried on in Independence Square, the mayor made a stirring appeal in the "name of duty and of manhood." With the rebels at the "gates" of the capital, he urged the men to close their factories, workshops, and stores and assemble for organization and drill for the protection of their homes.  

21 Ibid., XXVII, pt. 2, pp. 215, 219. The total number of New York troops is based upon the strength given for each regiment in the Annual Report of the Adjutant General of the State of New York. His figures were usually much higher than those given in the regimental reports. On June 27 Couch reported that he had 2,075 New York troops mustered into the United States service, and 5,131 not mustered, making a total of 7,206. See ibid., pt. 3, p. 363.  
23 Ibid., XXVII, pt. 3, p. 347.  
Similar scenes took place in other Pennsylvania cities, and almost 24,000 men volunteered for service within a period of three weeks. To try to recruit, muster in, equip, and send to the front such numbers in a short time caused boundless confusion. Neither Couch nor Curtin had a large enough staff of administrators trained in military affairs to keep matters from getting into a tangle. A constant stream of dispatches swamped Curtin with demands to straighten out all sorts of difficulties. Everyone was impatient and could hardly wait for a reply. One particularly irascible recruiter wired Curtin: "Why in hell don't you answer. Will you or will you not accept us ready to leave tonight." After waiting so long for any volunteers the Governor was not ready for the rush, but he and Couch tried valiantly to handle problems as they arose.

To get the volunteers quickly to Reading, the rendezvous for the area east of Harrisburg, Couch instructed the railroads to carry regiments, companies, and squads to their destination, even though they had no regular orders for transportation, and to charge the fares to the United States government. The railroads cooperated, but where the conductors knew a man was an impostor getting a free ride by saying he was going to join the militia, they refused him passage. One man boasted that he went to Harrisburg three or four times without paying for the trips. When the recruits got to Reading they found things in sad confusion. On July 1, 5,000 men were without tents or camp equipment of any kind. There were no kettles, plates or cups to feed the swarms of volunteers. The commandant of the camp wired Harrisburg for arms so that his guards could enforce discipline in camp and prevent trouble in town. A similar situation existed at Huntingdon, where seven full companies and several squads had gathered and were without tents and cooking utensils. The civilians had done what they could, but they were unable to take care of

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20 J. Sillman to Curtin, June 29, 1863, Dispatches, Records of the Pennsylvania Department of Military Affairs, PDPR. Many people wired they had groups all ready and waiting for instructions and transportation.
22 Major J. S. Hoyer to Adjutant General A. L. Russell, July 1, 2, 1863; Colonel Chas. Albright to id., July 2, 1863, ibid.
any more men and the quartermaster was not to be found. Unfortunately the same shortages persisted when the emergency troops went on active duty and marched out looking for the enemy. One private in the 43rd Pennsylvania Militia, who like many was thoroughly disillusioned with the realities of campaigning, plaintively asked Curtin for permission to go home, for he had "not received but half rations" during the whole period of his service.

While military and civilian authorities were busy organizing a force of militia, they were inventing at the same time ways to obstruct the invaders and slow them down until the Union army could overtake them. Couch had barely arrived in Harrisburg when he received word of Lieutenant General Richard S. Ewell's attacks on Winchester and Martinsburg and the retreat of Brigadier General Robert H. Milroy's army to Maryland Heights. The Cumberland Valley and Pennsylvania were thus open to invasion. The first barrier to the Confederate advance was the Susquehanna River, and though it was not a very formidable stream Couch decided to establish his main line of defense along its banks from its confluence with the Juniata River fifteen miles north of Harrisburg down to the Maryland border. Later he extended the line to the Conowingo bridge eight miles farther south. In spite of the low level of the water, Couch expressed confidence in his ability to put up a good defense at the few bridges and fords along the river and prevent the rebels from crossing.

The weakest and most accessible point in Couch's defensive line was at Harrisburg. It was connected with the southwest bank of the Susquehanna by the Cumberland Valley Railroad bridge and

1) John Scott to Colonel Jno. A. Wright [July 2, 1863], ibid.
2) Wm. H. Ely to Curtin, July 26, 1863, General Correspondence, ibid. For the difficulties emergency troops had in getting supplies, see also O. R., XXVII, pt. 2, pp. 238, 242, 246-247, 256, 262-264.
3) Ibid., pt. 3, pp. 95, 113, 129.
4) Either Couch was whistling to keep up his courage or he was unduly optimistic about the river as a barrier against the Confederate invasion. The water level of the river was so low at this time that Union military authorities estimated that a force of 3,000 men could have forced passage "at any moment," Cyphered dispatch signed Optic for Pardon Cola, July 4, 1863, Dispatches, July 1-8, 1863, Pennsylvania Department of Military Affairs, PDPD. Major General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General in the War Department, pronounced the city a "difficult place to defend." O. R., XXVII, pt. 3, p. 478.
the Theodore Burr bridge for vehicular and pedestrian traffic. Couch placed guards at these bridges and arranged to have them burned should the rebels threaten to seize them. As further protection he enlisted citizens and soldiers to build rather elaborate fortifications on the west bank of the river directly opposite the city. Here they dug trenches, threw up earthworks, and prepared artillery positions. As the militia trickled into Harrisburg, Couch sent them to man the forts under the command of General William F. Smith, a veteran officer of great ability. 20

While these defensive measures were for the most part warranted, there was less justification for the hysterical actions of people in several of the large cities. To be sure, throughout the ages the tried and true method of preparing for an enemy attack has been to get the inhabitants to erect fortifications, whether needed or not. If nothing more, the exercise relieves their anxieties and frustrations. So it was now in Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, where the people suddenly became panicky and felt they must do something—anything—to meet the danger. These cities were well removed from the possibility of attack, each being about 135 miles from Chambersburg where Lee first concentrated his army in Pennsylvania. Nevertheless the citizens in both places acted as if they were already in the line of fire. In Pittsburgh thousands of people fell to work constructing forts which had been staked out by engineers. Although the Philadelphians were slower to awake to their danger, when they did they put on quite a show of patriotic effort. Among their various projects was a system of earthworks and trenches for which they paid $51,537.37 for labor and materials. With the retreat of the Confederates they regained their sense of humor and felt free to laugh at their "pretty little redoubts." 21

20 Ibid., pp. 80, 129, 163, 223, 264, 330, 385, 401, 403, 478; Pennypacker, "Six Weeks in Uniform," Historical and Biographical Sketches, 354, 357, 362; [J. T. Trowbridge], "The Field of Gettysburg," Atlantic Monthly, XVI, 616; Kamm, Civil War Career of Thomas A. Scott, 157. In addition to the bridges at Harrisburg there were two railroad bridges nine miles north of the city at Dauphin. Information about the bridges at or near Harrisburg in 1863 furnished by Mr. William Work of the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission. 21 O. R., XXVII, pt. 3, p. 204; Bates, Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania, 171; MacKay, "Philadelphia during the Civil War," Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, LXX, 32-33; Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War (New Haven, Conn., 1878), III, 55. While the
During all these frantic preparations to meet the invasion an unusual and ironic development occurred among civilian leaders. In an effort to shake the people out of their lethargy, to force their active participation in the defense of the state, and to control subversive elements, prominent citizens made strong appeals to the President and the Governor to declare martial law in their respective cities. In answer to inquiries from Lincoln, both General Brooks in Pittsburgh and General Dana in Philadelphia, contrary to the stereotype of the military mind, opposed its imposition. Brooks said that although many “nervous” men were constantly besetting him to declare martial law, he considered the idea “unwise, unnecessary, and not to be thought of for an instant.” Dana saw no more reason to declare it in Philadelphia than any other place in the state, and he would recommend it only if the enemy should immediately threaten the city.

Excitement was by no means confined to the large cities, and people in the rural areas of Pennsylvania also took measures to protect their property if and when the rebels should come their way. As early as June 15 Couch had warned the residents of the Cumberland Valley of the possibility of a Confederate advance, and he advised the farmers to run off their horses to places of safety. Many banded together and sent hundreds of their best animals to the mountains or across the Susquehanna. Others hid them in obscure nooks on their property. In desperation one farmer sought to save his big gray from seizure by putting him in the basement of his house. Other livestock, food supplies, harness, wagons, and similar items were secreted in lofts and haystacks, for everyone feared the rebels would appropriate all they saw.

people in Pittsburgh were perfectly willing to build fortifications, they responded poorly to calls to enlist, even the Governor’s call made on June 26. See Thomas M. Howe, Pittsburgh, to Curtin, June 28, 1863 [Part of letter sent in code], Dispatches, Records of the Pennsylvania Department of Military Affairs, PDR.

O., XXVII, pt. 3, pp. 188, 204, 366; William Dashington, West Chester, to Curtin, June 28, 1863; Isaac P. Walter, C. Burgess [sic], Tyrone, to Curtin, June 29, 1863, Dispatches, Records of the Pennsylvania Department of Military Affairs, PDR. The petitioner in the dispatch of June 29 did not ask for martial law per se, but wanted powers that were tantamount to it. He requested authority of the Governor to close stores and stop all kinds of business in his borough. In this way he hoped to counteract the influence of “many rebel sympathizers who reside here and will not go themselves or encourage others to go.”

O., XXVII, pt. 3, pp. 95, 113, 129-130.
for their own use, and what they could not use they would destroy. Shopkeepers in the small towns, equally worried about what the Confederates would do, began to ship their most valuable merchandise to Harrisburg and other cities farther east.  

Before the people living near the Maryland border could heed Couch’s warning, the invasion had begun. Milroy’s wagon train suddenly appeared near Chambersburg fleeing wildly before Jenkins’s Confederate cavalry. The teamsters were greatly frightened; their fright proved contagious, and soon panic spread throughout the valley. Everyone wanted to leave at once, not realizing that by abandoning their homes they were exposing them to the depredations of friend and foe alike. An army of refugees, both Negro and white, streamed into the road and formed an endless column behind the heavy four-horse army wagons. In clouds of dust which could be seen for miles the procession approached Harrisburg.  

When it entered the great covered bridge there arose a “deep tremulous, rumbling sound, as of the voice of many waters.” Then came the farmers of the Cumberland Valley with their household goods piled high on their wagons, “bedding, tables, chairs, their wives and children perched on the top; kettles and pails dangling beneath.” Bringing up the rear were their sons driving cattle and horses. Their arrival in Harrisburg increased the pitch of excitement there. Men, women, and children filled the railroad station. “With trunks, boxes, bundles; packages tied up in bed-blankets and quilts; mountains of baggage,” they tumbled into the cars, “rushing here and there in a frantic manner; shout-
ing, screaming, as if the Rebels were about to dash into the town and lay it in ashes."\textsuperscript{42}

The panic subsided somewhat with the retirement of Jenkins's cavalry down the valley, only to revive about ten days later when two large columns of Ewell's corps drove north, one toward Wrightsville by way of Gettysburg and York, the other toward Harrisburg through Carlisle.\textsuperscript{44} News of the appearance of the Confederates before York and the surrender of the town filled the people with dismay. At Wrightsville the rush of farmers, burgers, teamsters, and railroadmen to get themselves and their property across the multi-purpose bridge presented a scene of great confusion. Despite the need for haste, the keepers of the bridge increased the traffic jam and slowed passage to a trickle by demanding payment of the regular toll. Fortunately an aide of General Couch who was nearby persuaded the president of the company to waive all charges during the crisis.\textsuperscript{45} In Carlisle the situation was hardly less frantic. One of the first Confederates to arrive on the scene, Brigadier General Stephen D. Ramseur, wrote: "So hurried was the flight of the Yanks that many household ornaments & luxuries were left behind. This morning I breakfasted on salmon left in ice."\textsuperscript{46} In Harrisburg hundreds of people continued to flee, and Colonel Scott offered free transportation to women and children on the Pennsylvania Central. One of the most pitiful sights was "thousands" of free Negroes from the Cumberland Valley swarming through the city. They feared that if they were caught they would be returned to slavery in the South, and they were desperately seeking any refuge they could find.\textsuperscript{47}

\textsuperscript{42} Coffin, The Boys of '61, p. 259. Coffin was a reporter for the Boston Morning Journal and entered Harrisburg on June 15. For further information on the flight see New York Tribune, July 14, 1863. Refugees passed through Harrisburg on their return in great numbers on July 8.

\textsuperscript{44} O. R., XXVII, pt. 2, pp. 443, 466. Brigadier General George H. Steuart's brigade of Major General Edward Johnson's division took a detour to McConnellsburg on its way to Carlisle from Greencastle.

\textsuperscript{45} Ramseur to [Nellie], June 28, 1863, Stephen D. Ramseur Papers, UNCL.

\textsuperscript{46} Dispatch from Thomas Maguire, Harrisburg, July 1, in Boston Morning Journal, July 4, 1863; Thomas A. Scott to W. F. L., Columbia [No date, in folder of June 27, 1863], Dispatches, Records of Pennsylvania Department of Military Affairs, PDPR. To set the number of fleeing Negroes in the "thousands" seems like an exaggeration. The Census of 1860, however,
With the approach of the Confederates toward Carlisle state officials made hurried preparations to move the seat of government farther east. Men in their shirtsleeves worked all night at the State House packing records and papers, as well as 28,000 volumes of the State Library and fine old portraits of the governors. Everything was ordered sent to Patterson's Warehouse in Philadelphia. The Philadelphians at the same moment were getting ready to ship their specie and valuables east of the Hudson River.45

The rumor of a Confederate shelling of Harrisburg reached Philadelphia the evening of June 28 and packed Chestnut and Market Streets with people milling about aimlessly wondering what to do.46 Next day two prominent citizens solemnly declared to Stanton that the rebels were marching on Philadelphia in large numbers and they were threatening the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad. It behooved him therefore to get fifty pieces of artillery and 20,000 veterans onto the railroad and to the city as soon as possible; 10,000 must move at once.47 Just how in their unbounded wisdom they arrived at these precise figures and how they thought Stanton could get that number of veteran troops by the snap of his fingers, they failed to make clear. This ill-advised and ill-considered message meant one thing: Those who wrote it were thoroughly frightened men. Perhaps if they and others had given more active support to earlier recruitment efforts, the Army of the Potomac would have been stronger and they would have had fewer worries.

In the reckoning that followed the crisis of the invasion Penn-
sylvanians had little cause either to congratulate themselves or indulge in bitter recriminations for the part they had played. During this time a total of 36,727 men gathered around the state and national emblems. Of the 12,920 who entered the federal service only 5,459 agreed to serve for six months; the rest enlisted only for the duration of the emergency. The vast bulk of these troops were not mustered in until after the Army of the Potomac had already forced Lee to retreat, and they became a form of insurance against possible serious reverses to Meade's army. To that extent and for other minor contributions to the success of the campaign, they deserve some recognition.

This record, however, did not still the critics of Pennsylvania, who were numerous and widespread. They pointed out that but for the prompt cooperation of Governor Horatio Seymour of New York, Couch would have had practically no troops with which to oppose the vanguard of the Confederate army from June 27 to June 29. They also complained loudly of the treatment accorded the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac by citizens of the state. Of course experiences of individuals and groups varied; they depended upon who met whom and when. Nevertheless there is no doubt that all too many people watched with indifference as the regiments filed past in the sultry heat. Few offered them food or drink, and those who did often demanded excessive payment. In contrast the people of Maryland went out of their way to demonstrate their loyalty to the Union and welcome the tired and thirsty men of Meade's army as they trudged sturdily toward their rendezvous at Gettysburg.


The emergency also demonstrated that in the realm of high command American leaders, whether national or state officials, showed a remarkable freedom from political dogma in coping with a difficult situation. Their differences over methods of raising troops and their failure to receive overwhelming popular support might be considered another manifestation of the fundamental cleavage between the state rights and national schools of political thought. This explanation seems adequate, but it is a little too glib. No doubt Stanton was a nationalist and upheld national authority whenever possible, but his willingness to make substantial concessions to get troops of any kind suggests that his nationalism was more practical than theoretical. At the beginning of the campaign he proposed a uniform system of mobilizing troops under federal auspices. Before it ended there were four different types of recruits: those who enlisted in the federal service for the emergency, for thirty days, and for six months; and those who volunteered for the state militia for ninety days. As for Governors Curtin and Seymour, they proved to be not quite orthodox in their state rights doctrines. Curtin questioned Stanton’s plan to raise troops for practical reasons, not because it seemed to be an invasion of the state’s power. As a state-rightist he revealed a strange reluctance to organize his own emergency force because he feared it might interfere with federal recruitment and draft programs.52 With Seymour it was not a question of opposing Stanton’s plan on theoretical grounds, but one of offering instead the New York State Militia, a force already in being. Traditionally known as an


52 Curtin wrote: “In my judgment an independent call by me would have a most dangerous if not fatal effect. It would stop the conscription and I fear any further contributions of men to the national armies.” Curtin to Kate Curtin [No date, in folder of June 25, 1863], Dispatches, Records of the Pennsylvania Department of Military Affairs, PDPR.
arch opponent of the national draft, Seymour nevertheless raised no objections to mustering his militia into federal service for thirty days and placing it under federal commanders.  

What hampered the political leaders was not a controversy over the nature of the federal union, but a massive reluctance of the people to volunteer for any kind of military service. This revelation was the most disillusioning of all. Contrary to the fears of some Confederate strategists and Southern sympathizers, the invasion of Pennsylvania failed to spur the people of the North to new heights of patriotic devotion and sacrifice. Their response to the challenge was barely adequate and certainly uninspiring.

For the interpretation that the breakdown of the federal recruitment policies during the invasion was due to a resurgence of state-rights feeling and that controversies between state-rightists and nationalists hampered mobilization of emergency troops, see William B. Hesseltine, Lincoln and the War Governors (New York: Knopf, 1948), pp. 295-297.