BOOK REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTES

Edited by Norman B. Wilkinson


Scholars attempting to understand the political history of eighteenth-century Pennsylvania face a difficult task. Compared to the nicely discernible patterns of development in most other colonies, Pennsylvania politics is something of a jungle. Charles L. Lincoln, Robert L. Brunhouse, and Theodore Thayer have made valiant efforts to cut through the complexity of political parties, local and imperial issues, and religious and national allegiances that shaped the colony's history. Utilizing the conceptual framework that Carl Becker employed to illuminate New York history, they provided suggestive studies which, however, did not give an entirely satisfactory picture of the revolution in Pennsylvania.

The complexity of this colony's history is well illustrated by Benjamin Franklin. Entering politics as an associate of William Allen and a recipient of proprietary patronage, he became a principal leader of the anti-proprietary party. One of his own political proteges was Joseph Galloway, with whom he remained on good terms until war made one a Loyalist and the other a Patriot. In *Benjamin Franklin and Pennsylvania Politics,* William S. Hanna makes a new attempt to analyze the political factions and issues in Pennsylvania between 1748 and 1776. Unable to discover a new conceptual framework, he modifies but does not entirely discard that of Lincoln. As he sees pre-Revolutionary politics, there is little of a democratic movement from an under-represented west and there is no sympathy for such a movement on the part of any political faction. Rather, political power rests in the eastern counties, and the aristocratic leadership there—whether of the Governor's Party or the Quaker factions—believes that that is where it should remain.

Franklin appears in scarcely half of Dr. Hanna's book, and if anyone can be said to emerge as a hero it is Thomas Penn. Franklin is depicted as a vain, mildly rapacious, and decidedly selfish political boss, who lacked political realism and understanding of both the Pennsylvania and English political scene. Dr. Hanna has conducted a thorough investigation of the sources, but his portrait of Franklin and many of his most important conclusions do not seem to flow from his evidence so much as from his common-sense ideas of what motivates politicians. And one man's common sense is not necessarily another's. Thus, he sees colonial Pennsylvanians as "less interested in principles and theories than in power and advantage—hence probably no better or worse than politicians in any age." That politicians are about the same in every age is questionable, and to say that all of them are more interested in power than principle is to make
Dr. Hanna's study is not unique in its conclusion that there is "little evidence of any inner direction in provincial politics that responded to fundamental principles." The notion that the factional feuding that is found in several colonies was a naked struggle for place and power with no substantive issues dividing parties has appeared in the writings of several young historians. Unfortunately, this too often appears to be an interpretation assumed by default, because of our current difficulty in discovering satisfactory analytical tools for studying the pre-Revolutionary parties and disputes. It may not be entirely fantastic to suggest that our disillusionment with older, discredited interpretations has subconsciously led some historians to anti-interpretations and the writing of anti-histories similar to the anti-heroes and anti-novels of modern fiction.

If Dr. Hanna's study does not provide the clear picture of Pennsylvania politics that one still hopes for, it does contribute to it. He examines quarrels over paper money, proprietary lands, military appropriations, and the establishment of a royal government, in intricate detail. His comments on Thomas Penn and on Franklin's mission to England are interesting, and he provides a useful analysis of the roles played by Allen, Pemberton, Norris, and the governors. Of the conflict between the proprietor and the Quaker Assembly, the author writes that Thomas Penn was often legally right and frequently acted more responsibly than the legislative body. Dr. Hanna does not see the Assembly's struggle for power as necessarily a step on the road to democracy or representative institutions, or even evidence of growing political maturity and sophistication. Unfortunately the thought of some of his most interesting conclusions is lost in his difficult prose style. One hopes that in a more finished and matured study he will provide us with the full dress analysis that is still needed for an understanding of this colony's political anatomy.

Lehigh University

John Cary


Ebenezer Kinnersley played a secondary role in eighteenth-century American religion, science, and education. Materials on his life are somewhat skimpy, but Mr. Lemay has utilized them to the fullest possible extent and has produced a creditable monograph. The three chapters might conceivably have been published in the form of articles, but the University of Pennsylvania Press has turned them into a nice little book.

Kinnersley was born in England in 1711 but was brought to Pennsylvania as a small child. Little is known of his education or early professional life. Becoming active in Philadelphia's Baptist Church, he first won prominence in 1740 when, from the pulpit of this church, he attacked the emotional excesses associated with the Great Awakening. Soon he was writing tracts and newspaper articles on behalf of religious liberalism.
Kinnersley's chief importance was as Franklin's principal collaborator in the latter's electrical experiments and as a popular lecturer on electricity throughout the colonies. He became active in this work about 1749 and continued it for twenty-five years. Lemay has carefully searched out references to it in several colonial newspapers. He has also supplied quite a bit of general background on the early history of electrical research and demonstrations in America. Kinnersley himself made some contributions to the progress of this science, but perhaps his chief service was in popularizing the usefulness of the lightning rod.

The third phase of his historical achievement was as the first Professor of English and Oratory at the University of Pennsylvania. His duties and services in this connection, however, were somewhat less grandiose than the title would suggest, and he was permitted to continue his work with electricity. He died in 1778.

The book has several appendices, excellent footnotes, a full bibliography, and a good index. It originated as a master's thesis at the University of Maryland directed by Professor Alfred Owen Aldridge.

The Pennsylvania State University

IRA V. BROWN


Here is a first-rate history of a second-rate family, a fine example of genealogical writing. It is also the history of Irvine, a small settlement in western Pennsylvania with a population today of three hundred. The story began in 1763 when Dr. William Irvine (1741-1804) emigrated to Pennsylvania. Like most of the Scotch-Irish settlers in the colonies, Irvine joined the Revolutionary cause, in which he earned the rank of brigadier general in the Continental Army. After the war he served in several official posts including the federal Congress and as commander of Pennsylvania's militia which ended the Whiskey Rebellion of 1794. General Irvine helped to lay out several towns in western Pennsylvania and acquired land of his own along Brokenstraw Creek which later became the site of Irvine.

General William Irvine's oldest son, Callender (1775-1841), lived in Philadelphia but took an active interest in his father's western lands. He leased Brokenstraw Farm to various tenant farmers and added both lands and improvements to the holdings which he inherited in 1804. Twenty years later he built a Greek Revival house and three large barns on the family property. In order to profit from a thriving lumber trade, Callender Irvine also opened a store to serve the area.

The Irvine lands of western Pennsylvania next went to Callender's only son, Dr. William A. Irvine (1803-1886) who made them his home in 1825. The greater part of this short volume is concerned with Dr. Irvine and his determination to make Irvine an important center of industry and commerce. His wife, Sarah Jane Duncan Irvine (1814-1839) did much to encourage gracious living and to beautify the estate before her premature death at the age of twenty-five. Besides extensive farming operations, Wil-
lial Irvine became involved in numerous business ventures including mills, a tavern, a general store, and railroad promotion. He added many buildings to his property and enlarged and beautified the house his father had constructed. Besides operating a woolen factory he purchased timberland for speculation. Irvine overexpanded his activity and became so deeply involved in debt that his entire estate was seized and sold in 1855 to satisfy his largest creditor, Dr. Stephen Duncan, who was also his father-in-law.

Dr. Irvine persuaded Duncan to consider the sale money an advance on his granddaughters' inheritances and thus kept the Irvine property in the hands of the family. He was never able to make the property pay, however, and he became hopelessly entangled in speculative schemes involving oil lands. Meanwhile he kept alive his interest in scholarly pursuits, especially history, and acted as custodian for the valuable papers of his grandfather. After his death in 1886 the Irvine estate was used as a summer home by his daughters. Finally, in 1963, the property was sold and the connection between Irvine and the family from which it took its name came to an end.

Mr. Wainwright recorded the Irvine story at the request of one of the descendants of General William Irvine. He diligently examined thousands of manuscripts in the process. Yet by its nature the final product is of limited interest to the scholar or the general reader. Its major contribution is in providing so excellent a model for local and family history.

Wilmington College, Ohio

Larry Gara


In his preface Professor Mayer states: "It is unlikely that a definitive history of the Republican party will ever be written unless the project is undertaken by a team of scholars." In the meantime he offers *The Republican Party, 1854-1964* as a stop-gap solution.

There is little question that this work was broadly conceived and from the outset represented a monumental undertaking. Indeed, one is staggered by the dimensions of the organizational and research problem confronting Professor Mayer. Yet, even a cursory perusal of the book will convince the reader that the author applied himself diligently to his task, amassed an astounding fund of information, was indefatigable in his search for materials, and produced a highly creditable product. The framework is primarily chronological with the narrative proceeding through every Presidential and Congressional election in which the Republican party was involved.

The author's descriptions of party leaders are often gems, and his ability to illuminate the political scene with deft characterizations is remarkable. In general, he is able to maintain a proper detachment, although in covering the period since the 1890's he sometimes allows his own biases to peek through. Few scholars will take exception to his basic conclusions which are sound and are backed by ample historical evidence.

Still, it has to be admitted that the work leaves the discerning reader
with some sense of disappointment. True, there is some superficiality which is inevitable in covering 110 years of American political life; there are some errors in fact, occasioned no doubt by trying to compress too much material in too brief a compass. Too often the book becomes little more than a catalogue of events, especially as the narrative moves into the contemporary period. These shortcomings are to be expected in a project of this scope.

But what is more serious is the fact the party does not come alive in these pages. While Professor Mayer’s handling of individuals is outstanding, his treatment of issues is less skilled. He does not impart to the reader any feeling for the organization and its existence as a living entity. The party simply becomes the sum total of all the campaigns and all the politicians who participated in those campaigns. It does not possess an identity of its own, which at times was unquestionably more significant than the mere sum of its parts. Republicanism as a concept, or an ideal, is not analyzed or evaluated in any depth. It is at this point that the author could have been aided by recent studies in sociology and psychology, especially those relating to group formation, group stability, and group dynamics.

In any event, Professor Mayer is to be complimented for having achieved a high degree of success in an almost impossible job. Few would envy the task he set for himself, and few, probably, could have produced better results. Until that team of scholars is assembled, Professor Mayer’s work will remain an important addition to American political history.

*The Pennsylvania State University*  
ROBERT K. MURRAY

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Historians have long had occasion to use the celebrated Civil War diaries of Count Adam Gurowski which the Count himself published in three lengthy volumes. They were noteworthy for their snarling and often brutal criticisms of the federal government’s prosecution of the war. In this study Professor Fischer removes any doubts historians might have had about the diarist’s background, motives, and political loyalties. Though not a full length biography, the book furnishes enough information about Gurowski’s life in Europe and America before the outbreak of the war to bring his work in Washington as an observer, commentator, and agitator into proper perspective.

The eldest son of a nobleman, Gurowski was brought up in the traditions of Polish nationalism and the liberating ideals of the French Revolution. The five years he spent in various German universities further influenced his thinking and developed his penchant for scholarly pursuits. In 1825, at the age of twenty, he returned home to manage the family estates and enjoy domesticity with his wife. This idyllic existence ended with his exile in Paris following the collapse of the November Insurrection against Russian authority in 1831 and the death of his wife in 1832. For the next
eighteen years he wandered about Europe in search of a new physical and spiritual home. Because of an almost psychopathic inability to get along with others and a fundamental change in his loyalties, he broke with his revolutionary associates and abandoned the cause of Polish independence.

Convinced that Poland's future lay in identifying herself with the Pan-Slav movement under Russian leadership, he made his peace with his former enemies and sought to advance his new cause in their pay. With the Russians never fully trusting him and the Poles forever damning him as a traitor, he became a man without a country. Although he was frustrated at every turn, he nevertheless managed to produce an impressive list of writings, including the first volume of a history of Pan-Slavism. An unsuccessful attempt at university teaching and the failures of the Revolutions of 1848-1849, which he observed with sympathetic interest, induced him to join the exodus of European intellectuals and liberals to the United States.

Shortly after his arrival in New York he moved to Cambridge in the hope of securing a professorship at Harvard. In his anxiety to get the position he became unnecessarily embroiled in controversy, which won him publicity but not the appointment. Returning to New York in 1851, he found employment with the Tribune, where his writings earned him a reputation as an expert in European politics. American literary lights, educators, and reformers in New York and Cambridge readily admitted him into their circles, but because of his inconsiderate and often rude behavior he lost friends almost as fast as he made them. Despite financial worries and ill health, Gurowski found spiritual peace in his adopted land, for he saw in its growth 'the solution to the age-old question of authority versus liberty.' The only threat to America's future he felt was slavery, which he hated with violent intensity.

Sensing the imminence of war with the secession of South Carolina, Gurowski moved to Washington to be in the center of events and take up the cudgels in defense of the Union and freedom. He pugnaciously employed his talents as a publicist and propagandist in support of the Radical Republicans, while heaping scorn upon the Lincoln administration for its timidity and vacillation. His pet hate was William H. Seward, his favorite Edwin M. Stanton. It is questionable, however, whether Gurowski should be called Lincoln's gadfly, for the two men were never closely associated. Furthermore, as Fischer admits, it cannot be established that Lincoln paid particular heed to the Count's admonitions on how to run the war. Fischer makes the poorly substantiated claim that Gurowski was the one man who Lincoln feared might in a fit of rage assassinate him. Even if true, the story serves no real purpose other than perhaps to highlight Gurowski's eccentric and violent personality, because Lincoln's purported fright had no earth-shaking consequences.

Generally Fischer allows Gurowski to speak for himself through his diaries and his letters, revealing the uncompromising and intolerant attitude of the Radical mind which would brook no opposition to a program designed to crush the South ruthlessly and uproot slavery at the very outset of the war. However, Fischer is not always consistent in his restraint; now and then he interposes his own comments to correct the Count when he mis-
judged events and people, and in so doing he unfortunately gives the un-
intentional impression that the rest of Gurowski's appraisals of Lincoln
and his administration were essentially sound. Although Gurowski spoke
as a Radical, the extent of his influence in shaping the policies of his
compatriots still remains uncertain.

As a result of his meticulous and exhaustive research Fischer has drawn
a clear picture of a strange but brilliant man who perceived the revolu-
tionary character of the Civil War and did what he could to aid in the
struggle for human liberty. For that reason alone, if for no other, Fischer
deserved to win the $5,000 Literary Award of the Military Order of the
Loyal Legion of the United States and its Pennsylvania Commandery,
which he received at Gettysburg, July 1, 1963.

Lafayette College

Lincoln and the Gettysburg Address. Commemorative Papers. Edited by
$2.95.)

Professor Allan Nevins indicates very aptly in his introduction some of
the trends in the prewar and war periods which influenced the thinking of
President Lincoln and which form the basis of the six fine interpretations
of the Gettysburg Address published here. Sponsored by the United States
Civil War Centennial Commission, these commemorative papers by qualified
spokesmen emphasize major attributes of Lincoln's life. Noting that the
Civil War is a subject of tremendous scope as well as compelling power,
Professor Nevins observes among Lincoln's finest attributes his understand-
ing of "the larger meaning of the conflict between Union and disunion,
between freedom and slavery—his realization that the war was a desperate
test on a world stage of the question whether a democracy of continental
dimensions and idealistic commitments could triumphantly survive, or ignobly
collapse."

Arthur Lehman Goodhart, eminent Anglo-American authority on the his-
tory of law, examines Lincoln's interpretation of liberty and equality. In
his Philadelphia address, Goodhart observes, Lincoln stated that the
Declaration of Independence had given "liberty not alone to the people
of this country, but hope to all the world... It was that which gave
promise that in due time the weights would be lifted from the shoulders
of all men, and that all should have an equal chance." This definition of
democracy states eloquently the real meaning of the equality of mankind
as Lincoln used it in his address at Gettysburg. This meaning of freedom
was America's contribution to the future of the world. Observing the
growth of democracy in England, so much of it developing to a head over
the American issue, the American historian John L. Motley wrote from
London during a dark period of the Union: "The real secret of the exulta-
tion... in the Times... over our troubles and disasters, is their hatred,
not to America so much as to democracy in England."

Lincoln's religious thinking was seldom associated with the church. The
emphasis was on moral law, and the precepts upon which he relied were basically Biblical. Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, discussing the religion of Lincoln, states that his religious tenets were based upon a sense of providence, "an inclination which he shared with most of the world's statesmen." Lincoln strongly believed, with Jefferson, that the new American nation had a special mission. At Gettysburg, Dr. Niebuhr notes, he defined this mission in the words: "Four score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth upon this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal." Lincoln evidently believed that the whole democratic cause was being tested in the destiny of this nation.

Senator Paul H. Douglas, speaking on the Significance of Gettysburg, applies the Tolstoyan theory of the inevitability of battle result upon which the force of leadership has no determining effect and finds there was nothing inevitable about the outcome at Gettysburg. It was "the courage and resourcefulness of apparently humble men" which were the determining factors. Free men fight best, but they must know that at their side others who believe in the same purpose are willing to sacrifice for the common good. Emphasizing the liberation of the slave class as a major result of the war, Senator Douglas reviews at some length the varying fortunes of the Negro people in the struggle for equality. Spearheaded by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the Civil Rights statutes of 1873 and 1875, and in more recent years through the efforts of the NAACP in bringing the issue before the Supreme Court, the movement to achieve citizen status for the Negro was eventually successful.

David C. Mearns in his paper, "Unknown At This Address," carefully reexamines the sources relating to Lincoln and Gettysburg. Referring to early reminiscences as well as the growing list of books on the subject of Lincoln's visit to Gettysburg, Mearns finds much of the data presented as "mistaken, unfounded, distorted, perjured... untested by even the most elementary rules of evidence." Dr. Mearns raises the question, for example, whether Lincoln received a printed invitation to attend the dedicatory services at the Soldiers' National Cemetery at Gettysburg November 19, 1863. What may be said with assurance, Mearns writes, is that there is no record to support the supposition that one was sent to Lincoln. The President's first knowledge of the ceremony, Mearns believes, was the invitation from David Wills on November 2 to participate, and "to set apart these grounds to their sacred use." The account by Mary Raymond Shipman Andrews in "The Perfect Tribute," written in 1906, gave broad currency to the idea that Lincoln wrote the Gettysburg Address en route to Gettysburg. Mrs. Andrews, Dr. Mearns states, "got the story from her son, Paul Shipman Andrews, who got it from Walter Burlingame, who got it from Anson Burlingame, who got it from Edward Everett." The story seems to have passed through so many hands, wrote a correspondent of Dr. Mearns, including those of "my imaginative Uncle Walter," that he feared historical inaccuracies were inevitable. "For my own part," the correspondent adds, "I have read most of Mrs. Andrews' extremely saccharine fiction... She was a darling person and it is a pity she insisted on writing."

John Dos Passos, writing on the subject of "Lincoln and His Almost
“Chosen People,” presents an interesting narrative of Lincoln’s early life, self-education and political life in Illinois, and a commentary on the circumstances of Lincoln’s sojourn at Gettysburg. An error of no real importance relates to the talk by Lincoln from the second-story balcony of the Wills House. There was no balcony on the Wills House. Robert Lowell emphasizes in his few lines entitled, “On the Gettysburg Address,” that Lincoln gave the field of battle a symbolic significance that it had lacked. For us and our country, he said, “he left Jefferson ideals of freedom and equality joined to the Christian sacrificial act of death and rebirth.”

Gettysburg


While this volume cannot be described as political history at its best, it does provide a useful survey of Pennsylvania politics during the Civil War and Reconstruction eras.

Bradley traces the careers of numerous Pennsylvania politicos—Andrew G. Curtin, John White Geary, Edgar Cowan, Charles Buckalew, John Scott, John W. Forney, David Wilmot, Alexander K. McClure, “Honest John” Covode, William Bigler—and a host of other greater and lesser lights—but quite clearly, Simon Cameron, the “Great Winnebago Chieftain,” occupies center stage in Bradley’s narrative. And this is exactly where Bradley is at his best: in pursuing the wily and elusive Cameron down the circuitous road leading to political preference and power.

As was to be expected, the pursuit was not always successful; but Bradley makes it quite plain that neither Cameron nor most of his political rivals were searching for the “Holy Grail”; and even among the few who were (possibly Governor Curtin, and perhaps Governor Geary late in his career), none had the political acumen and organizational talents required to conduct the search. Men, not measures; power, not principles; and special privilege, corruption, graft, character assassination—these were the major expedients which constituted the game of politics in the Keystone State during this period. Clearly, Simon Cameron was no more unscrupulous than most of his rivals. He was, rather, a shrewder judge of men and events than most, and an unrivaled master of manipulation, organization and deceit.

However, most of this has been said before; and Bradley, unfortunately, does not (perhaps no one can in this particular instance) provide an analysis in depth of Cameronian methods, tactics, and organizational strength which enabled the Cameron machine to gain a stranglehold on its opposition. More fundamental, although it is in one sense an expansion of the previous criticism, Bradley makes no attempt to examine the basis of political loyalties and party strength (Democratic, “Copperhead,” Republican, and Liberal Republican) along economic, social, ethnic, ideological, or even geographic lines. One suspects, in fact, that Bradley views the political arena as little
more than a circus where party chieftains vie with each other for the privilege of hoodwinking and exploiting a gullible electorate. While there is an element of truth in this approach, as Bradley effectively demonstrates, it obscures the larger picture.

Ergo, we learn in great detail what happened, where, and to whom; but rarely are we given any extensive analysis indicating why. As a result, we come away knowing little more about the Copperhead movement in Pennsylvania, the controversial and little investigated National Union movement, the Liberal Republican movement, and the role played by the Pennsylvania Railroad in Keystone State politics, than we knew already. Still, Bradley's book has its uses—in part as a catalog of men and events, but primarily, in the opinion of this reviewer, as background for scholars who would probe further and deeper.

University of Connecticut

RICHARD O. CURRY


To be the most famous soldier in the United States was Colonel Emory Upton's goal. His elusive quest for this fame and his over-riding aim to bring about sweeping military reforms comprise the heart of this slender volume. The suicide of Colonel Upton in 1881 shocked many people. Why had it happened? Had he not already achieved sufficient acclaim?

Upton had been the soldier's soldier, a true professional in every sense. Perhaps he was too much a professional, for in his drive for success he had disregarded all elements of the Anglo-American military tradition. His diagnosis of the ills of the military system was that there had been too much authority exercised by civilians on both the national and state levels. Sweeping aside tradition, he sought to establish a new system based upon the domination of all things military by the professionals. When Upton's report on a personal survey of foreign military systems, The Armies of Europe and Asia, failed to stimulate reform, he next launched a frontal assault on the American military.

The continual failure of reform, even when sponsored by its friends within the army and Congress, finally convinced Upton that he was waging a futile battle. Rather than have his ideas repudiated or entirely rejected, he delayed completion of his Military Policy of the United States. He preferred to play the role of the much-maligned military prophet than admit complete failure as a military reformer.

Upton's success as a tactician had initially encouraged him. His Tactics went through two revisions and at the time of his death he was deeply involved in a third. His basic scheme of infantry tactics, which adapted the lineal system to the characteristics of the rapid firing rifle, was widely accepted and had largely been validated by the Franco-Prussian War. During his last few years, however, Upton lost his optimism when all his efforts seemed to be ending in failure. Even his tactical plans appeared to be on the verge of collapse as he attempted to revise them. Upton's problems were also personal: he had never really adjusted to the death of his wife, Emily.
he suffered from a severe sinus condition; and he experienced extremely painful headaches, probably caused by a brain tumor. The last few years of his life were marked by frequent periods of mental depression and an increasing fear of failure. Losing faith in himself, Upton saw no other alternative and committed suicide.

Upton "symbolized and helped preserve the best in the Army." His Military Policy of the United States was posthumously published in 1904 at the urging of Elihu Root, and was used as a handbook for army reform. The entrance of the United States into the first World War with a reformed military system can be attributed to Upton's Military Policy. Much can be found in the present military system of the United States which can be traced to Upton. In the end he was not a failure, but fame took more time than he could allow.

Besides being well written from a host of primary and secondary sources, this book contains several bonuses. There is an excellent non-technical discussion of Civil War infantry tactics and the corresponding evolution of Upton's tactics. The annotated bibliography provides a good introduction to works in American and European tactical and military history.

Professor Ambrose has been too easy with his criticisms of Upton's failings. Although this is only a brief study of Upton, perhaps the author, typical of many biographers, has gotten too close to his subject. This is a very significant book and should be read by all interested in the American military tradition and the problems of military reform in America.

Temple University

SAMUEL R. BRIGHT, JR.


Professor Unger's study of the "Greenback Era" is both more—and less—than its subtitle indicates. "This is primarily a political, not a financial history," the author informs us, but it is a political history remarkably silent on political considerations and even regarding politicians.

An excellent opening chapter explores the "Roots of Conflict" of the problem of Reconstruction finance, roots that included Calvinism, Agrarianism, Mercantilism, and the Classical Economics, as well as the events of the Civil War. "Men not only mouthed the rhetoric of these systems," observes Professor Unger, "they believed it." But this same generation also mouthed and believed the rhetoric of the Bloody Shirt and Protectionism, and any analysis of political campaigns and elections, of political motivation and public policy, that ignores this fact is of but limited validity.

Two chapters probe the "Soft Money Interest." Valuable summaries are given of the currency and banking views of "promoters" such as George Francis Train, Jay Cooke, and Richard Shell; of the "American School" of political economy of Henry C. Carey and his followers; of Marcus Mills "Brick" Pomeroy, Washington McLean, George H. Pendleton, Edward Kellogg, and Alexander Campbell. "It is always difficult to establish the connection between ideas and action," the author reminds us. His analysis
of "three well-defined soft money currents" in the early postwar years is very useful; he succeeds in relating these currents to the economic interests of the period, but their connections with political leaders of the two major parties and with broader political issues remain obscure.

Professor Unger then plumbs the "Hard Money Interest," an interest unified by "a single-minded devotion to specie payments," and follows with a summary of the period of "Equipoise" (1869-1873) between the conflicting interests, and of the relationship between Grangerism and Greenbackism between the end of the war and the Panic of 1873. The temptation to examine "rural anti-bankism" for anti-Semitism the author finds irresistible, but the influence of anti-Semitism upon public financial policy is neither explained nor even suggested.

The study then proceeds within a basic chronological framework through the Panic of 1873, the demand for inflation, the passage and trial of the Resumption Act, the Election of 1876, "Sherman and Silver (1877-1879)," and a concluding chapter on "Resumption Accomplished (1878-1879)." Factual and typographical errors are relatively few, but a date like "18737" in the initial paragraph of a chapter (p. 195), and "Gowen" and "Gowens" on the same page (p. 296), do tend to strike the eye of the reader. Eight appendices summarize statistical data on Congressional votes relating to currency measures during the period, and the study concludes with an extensive bibliography that attests to the thoroughness of the author's research.

In his final paragraph Professor Unger likens his study to an "historical test boring." This depth—and the resulting lack of breadth—is the basic defect in a study that would serve as both a "social and political" history of the Greenback Era. Additional "test borings" in Pennsylvania, for example, should certainly reveal the role of Wharton Barker and the Penn Monthly in influencing the financial views of the business community, as well as the financial views of William Bigler, Samuel J. Randall, William Wallace, Frank Hughes, Victor Piollett, and Hendrick B. Wright among Democratic leaders, and of John Scott and particularly of Simon Cameron, who broke his celebrated silence on the floor of the Senate in debating the currency and banking issue, among Republican leaders. These political leaders, the men who wrote party platforms, made the campaign speeches, and voted on critical issues, are referred to only in passing. The Simon Cameron Papers in the Library of Congress, as well as Erwin Bradley's and this reviewer's studies of the period, are omitted from the author's bibliography. Students of Pennsylvania history during the Reconstruction years will learn little that is new, but will find numerous gaps in Professor Unger's study.

National Historical Publications Commission

Frank B. Evans


At last we have the book long awaited by all students of the Molly Maguires. Some twenty years ago, when the reviewer attempted his own
investigation of the subject, he tried to locate the reports prepared by Detective James McParlan, but his request was rebuffed by the Pinkertons and evaded at the Reading Company offices. After his book was published, the Reading Company finally did admit the existence of the reports and opened them to scholars, only to lock them up again hastily. In 1958, when Mr. Broehl was considering another investigation of the Mollies, the reviewer told him of his own experience and wished him luck. As it turns out, the Dartmouth professor was able to get his hands not only on the McParlan reports but also on the Pinkerton letterbooks, as well as the long lost manuscript records of the court trials and even a few Franklin B. Gowen letters which had eluded this reviewer.

The first question the reader naturally asks is: What was the Reading Company trying to conceal all these years? Was McParlan actually an agent provocateur, as his critics had charged? The answer, not too surprising to anyone accustomed to the old-fashioned business corporation policy of secrecy on general principles, is that the Reading had nothing to hide. McParlan’s reports, so far as they survive, add some interesting details, but they do not contradict any of the testimony he gave at the trials and even agree fairly well with the imaginative account in Allan Pinkerton’s *The Molly Maguires and the Detectives*. The worst charge Mr. Broehl makes against the detective is that he failed to warn Gomer James of the plot against him, and this accusation is based on mere suspicion, since the reports for this particular period are still missing. It is still possible to attack the accuracy of the reports, of course, since McParlan could have been deceiving his employers, but to this reviewer, at least, the detective’s honesty is established beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Pinkerton records, however, do throw some new light on the story. They clear up, for example, the question of why Gowen called in the Pinkertons to investigate the Molly Maguires early in October, 1873, as the Pinkerton book says he did, at a time when there had been no Molly activity for several years. Apparently, it was Pinkerton himself, driven by financial need to an urgent search for new business, who took the initiative. Although Mr. Broehl does not attempt to untangle the story, he gives enough of the evidence to make it clear. In May, 1873, Pinkerton told Reading Company Superintendent George Bangs to “Suggest some things to Mr. Gowan”; late in September, Pinkerton operatives in the coal regions apparently first heard of the Mollies, known to Gowen for many years; on October 8 Pinkerton asked McParlan for a report on Irish secret societies; on October 9 Pinkerton’s reports to Gowen mentioned the Mollies for the first time; and by October 29 Gowen had agreed to the investigation. It seems likely that it was Pinkerton who implanted in Gowen’s mind the concept of the Molly Maguires as a dangerous conspiracy which he used so dramatically in the later trials.

The agency records also reveal that Pinkerton, impatient at his failure to bring any of the Mollies to justice, instructed Superintendent Bangs to set up vigilante committees to lynch the uncaught murderers. For this purpose a handbill was printed, listing the names and addresses of men suspected
of murder. Sometime later a mob broke into a Wiggans Patch home and shot one of the men on the list, as well as the wife of another. Although Mr. Broehl cautiously refuses to conclude that the Pinkerton agency was responsible for this “massacre,” he does tell us that McParlan thought it was.

As background for his study the author crossed the ocean to spend a year in Ireland looking up the story of the Irish secret societies, which makes up the first three chapters in the book. Finding some material on the Pinkerton agents whom Gowen used to infiltrate the miners’ union, he also decided to incorporate an account of the activities of the union, even though the Mollies had only a tenuous connection with the labor movement.

Grateful as we are for these addenda, we might have appreciated more a deeper investigation of the American background of the Mollies. For example, we should like to know more about the alleged appearance of the organization in Boston in the 1850’s and its activities outside Schuylkill County. Most of all we should have appreciated the use of historical imagination to give clarity and meaning to the story. As it is, even an expert in the field gets confused in spite of the index of characters in the back, and one of the greatest real-life detective stories becomes an enigma which requires a detective to solve it. Nevertheless, for anyone willing to dig for the facts, here is what will probably be the last word on the Molly Maguires.

Longwood College, Farmville, Va. Marvin W. Schlegel

Progressivism in Ohio, 1897-1917. By Hoyt L. Warner. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1964. Pp. 556. $10.00.)

This work is one of a number now appearing which attempts to re-evaluate the Progressive Era in the light of local circumstances and specific geographic areas. Moreover, this particular book, as the author clearly states in his preface, strives to apply the “status revolution” theory of Professor Richard Hofstadter to Ohio progressivism in much the same way George Mowry did in the California Progressives (1951).

The result is a lengthy narrative which does not alter what we already knew (or suspected), but it does certainly provide the political details relating to the Ohio situation. Indeed if it involves political activity in Ohio during the period covered, it is here. Taking over 500 pages, Professor Warner traces the Ohio story from the “reform awakening” in Toledo (1897) through its various statewide manifestations to 1917. He concentrates on such subjects as the reform beginnings in Toledo, the fight to clean up Cleveland and Columbus, the drive for tax reforms and municipal home rule, Johnson’s state campaign of 1902-03, Governor Harmon’s administrations, the struggle for the new state constitution of 1912, the state and national election of 1912, and Governor Cox’s legislative and administrative record.

The overall effect is more encyclopedic than profound. The work is long on description, short on interpretation. While the research is wide, the
author relies too heavily on newspapers for concrete information. Although
he clearly appreciates the religious roots of much Ohio progressive think-
ing, he does not examine critically the specific economic, social, and ethnic
changes in Ohio which furthered progressive thought and action.

The book is well-organized, written in a competent and straightforward
style, and possesses an excellent bibliography and index. In its technical
aspects the work is a model of its kind. If anything, it is over-documented.
Many of the footnotes are exceedingly long and repetitive. Almost every
footnote is explanatory, and some are of marginal value. In a sample
chapter (IX), for example, the word count of the footnotes equals one-
half the total narrative. They could have been cut fifty percent, thereby
reducing not only the size of the book but permitting it to be sold for
one-third less.

Perhaps the major drawback in the work is involved in its inception.
It is a re-worked doctoral dissertation which was originally designed to
“prove” or “disprove” a general theory. This aspect lingers on into the
final book form. One might quarrel, for example, with the questionable
assertion that “progressivism began in a period of general prosperity” (as
Hofstadter also claimed in his Age of Reform), that the movement’s be-
inning date was 1897, or that American society was so neatly divided be-
tween the “captains of industry” and all others (laborers, white collar
workers, the “displaced classes,” etc.). The polarities of such an argument
blur historical judgment and encourage inaccurate definitions. A reformer
was not just anyone who was “against” big business in Ohio or elsewhere;
the established order was not necessarily always “bad” or “corrupt”; the
“good guys” were not actually so good, nor the “bad guys” so immoral. It
is a gross simplification to imply that monopoly, taxation inequities, and
corrupt and inefficient city government were all caused by “the Republican
Party in alliance with big business.”

With such lapses in historical sophistication Professor Warner does not
succeed in proving (or disproving) the Hofstadter thesis. The author did
select a time period of Ohio politics and a geographic area where the
Hofstadter thesis could be applied fairly effectively. Yet there is a marked
difference between proof and mere application. The proof is still to come—
hopefully in briefer compass.

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