THE NEW DEAL, THE LAST HURRAH, AND THE BUILDING OF AN URBAN POLITICAL MACHINE: PITTSBURGH COMMITTEEMEN, A CASE STUDY

By Bruce Martin Stave*

IT HAS been generally contended and readily accepted that the New Deal helped to accelerate the decline of the old-line urban political boss and his machine in the past thirty years. Propounded by historians, political scientists, and journalists, this view found clearest expression in the words of a novelist. The theme running through Edwin O'Connor's The Last Hurrah was best stated by a character who remarked: "He [F.D.R.] destroyed the old-time boss. He destroyed him by taking away his source of power. . . . No need now to depend on the boss for everything; the Federal government was getting into the act. Otherwise known as social revolution."

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It has also been generally conceded that, in the building of a political machine, control over the public payroll is of prime importance. This view holds that the workers of a political organization must be paid to be dependable and efficient, and that they look to public service for an "easy" livelihood. Concomitantly, the political party looks to the public payroll as a convenient source from which to draw necessary funds to pay its workers. For the party, performance in the payroll job is less important than achievement in precinct work. According to one observer of Philadelphia's Republican machine politics during the early 1930's: "Underlying all methods of vote control [was] the public payroll. By means of influence over the public payroll the organization can control the votes of the 'jobholders,' and those of their friends and relatives." He also noted that, in addition, the local government workers help finance political campaigns through the process of macing, i.e., paying assessments on their salaries as "contributions" to the party coffers.

For the party leader control of this patronage served as a form of social security. Explaining how he kept control of his party's machinery, New Deal Boss Ed Flynn remarked: "I always see to it that the key party workers have some sort of exempt positions, if they want them." He went on to state that their families are "taken care of" in some way, noting that "It is an exaggeration to say that this was the sole reason for which I had their support down through the years, but I cannot deny that it has been extremely important to my remaining as Leader."

Patronage acted as the chief lubricant for a well-oiled political machine. And, according to Flynn, "As with any machine it is the motor which keeps it going. The component parts of the


political machine are the active workers within the party. It is probably the least complicated of mechanisms, and its foundation is the election district [precinct] captains. These were the fabled people who supplied the needy with baskets at Christmas, got them jobs, interceded for their children with the truant officer, patched up family quarrels, taught them English, obtained their citizenship papers, and generally humanized the cold bureaucratic procedures of the law. To the recipient of the politician's largesse, the quid pro quo of vote for aid appeared more than equitable.

However, those who sound a deathknell for the urban political machine maintain that in the past thirty years the New Deal with its social legislation made the boss and his organization unnecessary, immigrant groups became assimilated into American society, World War II brought prosperity—and few needed the politician's help. No more Christmas baskets, no more citizenship papers, no more jobs—not even for the party worker. America allegedly grew fat. According to a recent study of Manhattan political workers, the grass-roots politician has become a middle class, ideologically oriented party worker, uninterested in the material rewards of politics.

Presenting statistical evidence which lends support to the "Last Hurrah" school, this study of New York County's Democratic, Liberal, and Republican committeemen found only five percent on the public payroll. Among their several conclusions, the authors held that: "The political activist views his party organization as an instrument for effectuating policies rather than as a source of personal gain." Generally they disagree with "the classic descriptions of urban politics [which] emphasize the boss-dominated 'machine,' concerned almost exclusively with getting out the vote, getting in the brother-in-law and maintaining itself in power." The authors, however, concede that Manhattan, because of its ethnic and religious composition, as well as its strong reform movement, is not the "typical American community." Cushioning this admission, they explain that "with regard to urbanization, political structure and processes Manhattan (as well as the greater New York area) is comparable to urban communities throughout the nation. The present findings, therefore, may well be applicable beyond the confines of Manhattan."
They are not applicable to Pittsburgh. What effect did the New Deal have on the party worker and the public payroll? Did Flynn's "motor" of the machine no longer require patronage to keep it running? Is the political activist more interested in effectuating policies than in personal gain? In Pittsburgh, the answer is a resounding no. The impact of the New Deal served as a catalyst to the building of a machine—different in party name, but not in substance, from its predecessor Republican organization.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

When, in 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt carried Pittsburgh by fifty-eight percent of the vote—in the face of his defeat in Pennsylvania—it marked an earthshaking reversal of the city's voting habits. A year later, the steel capital elected its first Democratic mayor since 1906, William Nissley McNair, giving him fifty-seven percent of the vote, along with an entire slate for City Council. The Democratic registration increased from a meager 5,200 out of 175,000 (3%) in 1929 to a more respectable 36,000 of 195,000 (18.5%) in September of 1933. Although still facing a registration deficit, the Democratic party, which a few short years before could not muster enough faithful to man the polls on election day, suddenly found itself in City Hall.

Two issues, machine politics and support of Franklin D. Roosevelt, loomed large during the campaign. Pittsburgh had long been in the grasp of a tightly controlled Republican organization, prompting the Pittsburgh Press to editorialize: "The Democratic campaign is, at one and the same time, an effort to save both Pittsburgh and the Republican Party from further domination by a shameful machine, which has worked against the real interests of both its own city and own party." However, not everyone saw the situation in this light.

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*Pennsylvania Manual*, 1933; Pittsburgh Press, Nov. 8, 1933, Nov. 9, 1933 (hereafter cited as *Press*). Although the mayor's fifty-seven percent and the President's fifty-eight percent may appear on the surface to indicate similar support within the city, a voting study by the author shows that their support lay with opposing ethnic and economic groups.

*Press*, Sept. 18, 1933; interview with David L. Lawrence, April 4, 1964. Lawrence told of his trouble in recruiting party workers in the years before 1932-1933.

During the primary campaign, McNair's anti-organization opponent, John M. Henry, repeated to audience after audience that McNair's bosses are Joseph Guffey and David L. Lawrence [then Democratic state and county leader, respectively]. They are the bosses of a Democratic machine that is just as indifferent to the rights of the people as the Republican machine. . . . If you vote for Guffey's man . . . you have voted to continue the rule of the same crowd of "money changers" that Franklin Roosevelt drove out of Washington. That isn't the New Deal. It's the same old deal dressed up in a new deck.¹

Rhetoric, perhaps, but Henry kept pushing the point that a victory for the revitalized Democratic organization would be a change in party control, and not a shift from the substance of machine politics.

Both the primary and general election witnessed a feature unique to Pittsburgh politics. The name Republican disappeared from all advertising. Apparently the G.O.P. grew jittery after the Roosevelt victory in 1932 and hoped to hide behind each candidate's personal following and attractiveness. The Democrats, on the contrary, capitalized on the Roosevelt name. Full-page advertisements asked that votes be cast for the "Roosevelt Democracy." Snuggling close to every photo of McNair was one of F.D.R. During one rally, Joseph F. Guffey told his listeners that the local election was in effect a referendum on the Roosevelt administration. The Republicans found the Roosevelt image difficult to combat, and when their county chairman attacked the National Recovery Administration, the G.O.P. candidate, incumbent John S. Herron, immediately declared his allegiance to Roosevelt's recovery program. Republican leaders believed the N.R.A. attack to be a major mistake of the campaign.²

Upon election to office, McNair promised the people "a New Deal at City Hall," and continued that Pittsburgh "stands squarely behind President Roosevelt in his program for national recovery."³

¹ Press, Aug. 31, 1933.
² Press, Aug. 27, 1933; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Sept. 4, 1933, Nov. 6, 1933; Pittsburgh Sun-Telegraph, Oct. 23, 1933; Press, Oct. 26, 1933; speeches of William H. Coleman, MSS and printed, Coleman Scrapbooks: Archives of Industrial Society, University of Pittsburgh.
³ Press, Nov. 8, 1933.
By the time he left office, under fire of his own and the opposition party for his erratic behavior, and before completing a full term, McNair had evolved into one of the most outspoken critics of Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal.

McNair, perennial candidate, born comedian, and single-taxer, gained nationwide coverage by his antics while in office. At home, he immediately broke with the Democratic organization. Although having threatened during the campaign to "clean every Republican out of City Hall," later changing this to "every political parasite," McNair broke with David Lawrence and the regular Democratic organization over Republican appointments to his cabinet and patronage in general. Under the influence of a select group of "blue stockings" who had supported him in his campaign, and who more often than not were Republicans, the mayor willingly appointed Republicans as well as Democrats, and hired and fired at machine-gun pace. Frustrated in its attempt to grab hold of the city payroll, Lawrence's regular organization, which many thought had slated McNair in the belief he was a stooge, attempted to enact legislation to rip the mayor from office by substituting a city commissioner in his place.

Although similar legislation had succeeded in Pittsburgh during a Republican squabble of 1901, the Democratic attempt in 1935 was aborted by a Republican-controlled state Senate. Thus, the Democratic organization still sought the goose that laid the golden egg. Until they were able to retrieve the elusive city payroll, other sources had to be explored. The county went Democratic in 1935, and New Deal work relief legislation suggested additional patronage opportunities.

McNair, among other things, made a reputation for himself as a "veto" mayor. While his predecessor vetoed three measures in the year prior to McNair's assuming office, and his successor did the same in the year following, the Democratic recalcitrant in

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12 Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Sept. 15, 1933, Oct. 19, 1933; Press, May 20, 1934; New York Times, Feb. 17, 1935, IV; Pennsylvania Legislative Manual, 131st Session of the General Assembly, XVIII, 417, 908-915, 4579, 5611-5612. Interview with a present-day Pittsburgh city official, who first began his political career during the early days of the New Deal. Any question that the written sources may have raised as to the motives behind the Ripper Bill was cleared away during this interview of Feb. 4, 1965. The respondent told how, as a young politician, he went to Harrisburg, the state capital, to lobby for the Ripper. At the request of David L. Lawrence, several influential Pittsburghers lobbied against McNair.
his three years as mayor took negative action against eighty-three measures, of which sixty-nine vetoes were overridden, six upheld, and eight tabled.\(^{12}\) Many of these vetoes related to relief legislation.

In July of 1934 the mayor said no to an ordinance authorizing a $500,000 bond issue to provide food, clothing, fuel, and shelter for Pittsburgh's needy. In September of the same year he refused to give his consent to a $24,000,000 Public Works Administration project for Pittsburgh. Six months later he designated President Roosevelt's $4,880,000,000 work relief program (Emergency Relief Appropriation Act) as "wholesale bribery of the electorate. He [F.D.R.] is paving the way to have himself re-elected in 1936 by spending tremendous sums of money and as long as he spends it, who is going against Santa Claus?"\(^{14}\)

When the City Council met to formulate a request for a sizable chunk of the federal Works Projects Administration appropriation, the mayor, along with his director of public works, appeared before the body and urged a delay in making the request for federal funds, because, in McNair's opinion, the city could do the same without federal aid by issuing private contracts. The pair reasoned that at almost any time the government might shut off its funds, and that by using federal money the city was forcing men on to relief because only those on the relief rolls qualified for W.P.A. assignments. One councilman, fearing that if word got out it would appear Pittsburgh did not want its slice of the pie, demanded a private conference to stifle any publicity which might give that impression.\(^{16}\)

McNair continued to throw obstacles into the path of W.P.A.'s development in Pittsburgh, and when the federal government cut off all direct financial aid to local areas, as the Works Progress Administration moved into full swing, the mayor's actions brought the city close to financial disaster. Pennsylvania's Democratic Governor, George Earle, elected in 1934, threatened to stop all

\(^{12}\) City of Pittsburgh, Municipal Record: Proceedings of the Council of the City of Pittsburgh, 1933-1937 (hereafter referred to as Municipal Record). A tally was made of the veto messages in the index of each year's Record, and then the history of each ordinance was followed to determine whether the veto stood or not.


\(^{15}\) Municipal Record, 1935, p. 267.
state aid to Pittsburgh's direct relief cases unless McNair cooperated with the federal work program. Only after the City Council pleaded with the Governor and circumvented the mayor's opposition, did Earle agree to continue state contributions. Finally, McNair backed down and gave the go-ahead to W.P.A. in Pittsburgh—but only halfheartedly.\textsuperscript{16}

The mayor's opposition to the New Deal brought him to conclude that Governor Eugene Talmadge of Georgia was "the man to rescue the Democratic Party from the Communistic tendencies of the Administration." He pledged to put the Georgian's name on the Pennsylvania primary ballot in 1936. The antagonism of both local and national Democratic headquarters toward McNair is understandable in light of his obstructionism. By March, 1935, a Pittsburgh follower of the mayor complained to Roosevelt that "it is commonly believed that the White House is lending active support to Lawrence and Guffey in an attempt to oust our outstanding incorruptible Democratic mayor." When McNair suddenly resigned in October of 1936, Lawrence, by then Secretary of the Commonwealth and state leader of the party, wired to Marvin McIntyre, the President's secretary: "Some more Roosevelt luck. Mayor McNair resigned and Cornelius D. Scully sworn in to fill the vacancy by City Council. Will you tell this to the Chief." Scully cooperated with the organization in all matters, including relief, and won election in 1937 and re-election in 1941.\textsuperscript{17}

The relief situation, which met with McNair's vehement wrath, played an important role in the consolidation of the Democratic organization in Pittsburgh. Charges of the local Republican organization's political use of relief resounded during the 1933 campaign, when both Democrat and Republican lambasted Mayor John S. Herron for waiting until the primary election neared to spend the proceeds of a relief bond issue approved a year before. Later, candidate McNair charged that Republican workers threatened destitute citizens of Pittsburgh's Negro Fifth Ward with being dropped from the relief rolls if they registered Demo-


cratic. "That's not only commercializing charity. It's prostituting charity," the candidate remarked.\textsuperscript{18}

With the Republicans in the State House until 1935, Democratic complaints about Republican control of the Civil Works Administration during the winter of 1933-1934 echoed along the Potomac. Senator Joseph Guffey warned Harry Hopkins, Federal Relief Administrator, that the Pittsburgh Civil Works Administration organization was not taking care of the unemployed but required a prospective job seeker to see his Republican ward chairman before being assigned a position. Guffey's sister, Emma Guffey Miller, Pennsylvania's national committeewoman, received dozens of letters from irate Democrats such as one expressing the hope that "some way may be found to put this Federal Relief in the hands of some real Americans in Pittsburgh instead of the hands of the Republican organization." Eventually, a way was found to give Pittsburgh's "real Americans" control.\textsuperscript{19}

One observer estimated that by October of 1934, Guffey had been instrumental in placing at least 500 Pennsylvanians in emergency Washington jobs, practically all exempt from civil service, and filling eight to ten times as many federal jobs in Pennsylvania itself. Foremost within the state were the rich offerings of 2,500 jobs with the Home Owners Loan Corporation. Then, too, the usual positions as United States marshals, attorneys, and internal revenue collectors, plus hundreds of postmasterships, made more grist for the patronage mill. Citizens expressed fear of the growth of a new political leviathan. One Pennsylvanian, writing to Louis McHenry Howe, F.D.R.'s personal secretary and adviser, complained: "The Republican State Organization is in a bad way. It is entirely possible that the voter . . . may again use the Democratic Party to administer another lesson to the Vare-Mellon-Grundy [Republican] machine. But this cannot be done by building up another machine, as Guffey is trying to do, with all the evil characteristics of the machine it is going to re-


\textsuperscript{19} Clipping, Guffey Papers, Washington and Jefferson College; D.N.C., Women's Division Correspondence, Pennsylvania, Emma Guffey Miller, 1933-1935; letter Dec. 20, 1933, William A. Shaw to Emma Guffey Miller, FDRL.
place. Guffeyism has become as odious to decent citizens as Varism.”

If the C.W.A. aided the Republicans in Pittsburgh, and Pennsylvania in general, then so did the W.P.A. bolster the Democrats. As it got under way in the late summer and early fall of 1935, Pennsylvanians had already elected Earle as Governor and Guffey as Senator a year before; no complaints could be expected from the Democrats now. The Republicans began the complaining, and reports back to Harry Hopkins and Roosevelt—by Democrats as well as Republicans—bore out their charges. Gifford Pinchot, who had been criticized by Guffey for his handling of C.W.A. while Governor, attacked the Democratic control of W.P.A. Noting generally that federal work relief in Pennsylvania “had been sold into political bondage,” Pinchot specifically cited Pittsburgh as an example. Using an article from the anti-New Deal Pittsburgh Post-Gazette as documentation, the former Governor told how the Pittsburgh district W.P.A. director, John F. Laboon, advised his foremen and supervisors: “I’ll tell you right now that any W.P.A. worker who is not in sympathy with the W.P.A. program and the Roosevelt Administration will be eliminated from the W.P.A. payrolls in the district as quickly as I can act. I want you to report all such cases to me without delay.” Subsequently claiming that he was misquoted—that the statement applied only to supervisors and not to workers—Laboon was hounded by his remark until he left office to assume a county job.

Not only did the Republicans blast the Pittsburgh relief setup, but as Lorena Hickok, Harry Hopkins’s W.P.A. trouble shooter, explained to her boss, the Pennsylvania Democratic leaders believed in the patronage system for W.P.A. workers. “Lord is it political!” she exclaimed. “Eddie Jones’ [the state administrator] friends tell me, ‘Oh, it’s plenty political right here in Pittsburgh. . . . Regular ward politics. But the Republicans would do the same thing if they had W.P.A., wouldn’t they?’


Pinchot to F.D.R., Dec. 21, 1935, President’s Personal Files 289, Pinchot, FDRL; Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Dec. 18, 20, 1935.

By April, 1936, David L. Lawrence could joyously report to Washington that for the first time since the Civil War the Pittsburgh Democrats led the Republicans in voter registration. Roosevelt carried Pittsburgh handily in 1936 with seventy percent of the vote and the state by twelve percent less. When time neared for the 1937 mayoralty election, the Democratic nomination was worth a hard-fought primary battle. During the primary, the Democratic organization purged the work relief rolls of all men who had been sponsored by County Commissioner John Kane, a supporter of the insurgent candidate for the mayoralty nomination. These men were replaced by "regulars."

Once the disputing factions reconciled after the primary, the W.P.A. weapon was aimed at the Republicans. During the months of October and November, hundreds of cases found their way from the direct relief rolls to the W.P.A. payroll. The manning of the city streets alone jumped by over 1,000 men. Republicans claimed that the county W.P.A. office received orders to suspend all projects on election day, the work to be made up at a future date, so that all W.P.A. appointees could work at the polls, vote, and take other relievers to cast their ballots for the Democracy. After the Democratic victory, one party worker wrote to James P. Kirk, the county leader, congratulating him and noting, "Owing to your generous interest for which I am deeply grateful, I am still employed by the W.P.A. assigned to the City Planning Commission." Thus, politics and payroll appeared to be closely connected in Pittsburgh during the New Deal years.23

**Methods and Findings**

However, the traditional evidence used to tell this story, the newspapers, manuscripts, and official documents, cannot always be taken at face value by the historian. Consider the evidence which can be compiled from newspapers during an election campaign. Invective bubbles over; cries of bossism are ubiquitous; the politicians have a field day with rhetoric and the newspaper

reporter, more often than not, reports it as he hears it. In an attempt to overcome this possible drawback, two procedures explained below have been used to gather evidence other and hopefully more reliable than the traditional.

For the past three decades the study of the precinct committee-man has been left to the political scientist and the sociologist. The historian has abdicated his right, and duty, to study this important grass-roots political figure. Such neglect has occurred probably for several reasons.

First, in the instance of the New Deal era, because of its proximity in time, the composition of a political party of the 1930's may not have seemed subject for historical investigation by many of the practitioners of Clio's art in the 1940's and 1950's. Secondly, whereas the political scientist or sociologist can go out, pencil and clipboard in hand, and talk to his subjects, the historian, unless he is dealing with a very recent period, cannot—and often by teaching and temperament cares little for such a method. In addition, the party rank and file are not those who get their names mentioned in newspapers; in fact they are not even noted in the press on their day of election to office. Nor do these people generally bequeath to history the yarn from which it is most often woven, manuscript material. Thus, the problem becomes one of discovering information regarding the committeemen. Who were they? What did they do? The present writer has conceptualized the problem in the following manner.

If, as some observers hold, the New Deal tended to weaken the old-line urban political machine, and if the control of the

public payroll in a city was an important method of controlling the area's vote, what effect did the advent of the New Deal have on the party's use of the payroll as a vote-controlling device? According to the majority view, the coming of the Roosevelt era should have meant the demise of the machine and concomitant decline of the proportion of party workers on the payroll. However, every mayor elected in previously staunchly Republican Pittsburgh since 1933 has been a Democrat, and its voters have chosen no other Republican city official since 1939. In light of these facts, it could be argued that instead of feeding the decline of an urban political machine, the coming of the New Deal, in Pittsburgh at least, served as a catalyst to the building of such a machine—different in party name but not in substance from its Republican predecessor. In this case, the proportion of Democratic committee- men on the public payroll should have increased over time.

This study was undertaken to ascertain which of these views is correct. The first method employed attempted to discover if there was a change from private to public employment by Pittsburgh's Democratic committeemen during the New Deal period, seeing such a possible shift as the logical test of whether a machine was being built or destroyed. In Pittsburgh, committeemen are elected every even-numbered year during the spring primary. Mimeographed lists of their names are compiled by the County Board of Elections. However, the lists are discarded every few years, and the only place where any formal list of these names can be found several decades later is in the original primary election book where the precinct vote is entered—if these books are kept by the election officials. Fortunately, in Pittsburgh, they have been. These records, however, provide no more information than the precinct, the candidates, and the vote. Having copied the names of those committeemen elected during the New Deal years of 1934, 1936, and 1938, a device was needed to obtain more information about them.

As Samuel P. Hays has noted in a recent plea for the use of new possibilities in the study of American political history, "... information is available in great abundance about tens and hundreds of thousands of political leaders at the state and local level. City directories indicate the occupation and address of every adult inhabitant; they reveal changes in both occupation and resi-
dence within and between generations and therefore demonstrate patterns of social mobility.22 The 1927, 1936, and 1940 R. L. Polk's City Directories for Pittsburgh were consulted to ascertain the occupation of each committeeman elected in 1934.23

The dates chosen provide the occupation of this specific group of party workers in a pre-depression year, at a midpoint of the New Deal, and at a time when Dr. New Deal was fast becoming Dr. Win-the-War. Although the Democratic committeemen stood as the prime target of the study, investigation of their Republican counterparts served as a control on the findings regarding the fast-growing party of Roosevelt. Since the city's thirty-two wards were composed of 408 districts in 1934, each directory, 1927, 1936, and 1940, was consulted 408 times for the occupations of the Democrats and 816 times for the Republicans.24 In addition, in order to determine the payroll situation in more recent years, the 1962 committeemen lists were compared to the 1962 Directory for 436 Democrats and 872 Republicans. Thus, in total, the directories were consulted approximately 5,000 times.

Comparing the 1934, 1936, and 1938 committeemen lists allows the sorting out of a "hard core" of political workers—i.e., those chosen in all three election years. This "hard core" was contrasted

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22 Samuel P. Hays, "New Possibilities For American Political History: The Social Analysis of Political Life," paper read at the American Historical Association Convention, Dec. 29, 1964, p. 39. The R. L. Polk Company, which since the nineteenth century has been publishing city directories, by 1940 issued listings for forty-five states and Hawaii, covering approximately 700 local areas in these communities. Among other information, these books provide an alphabetical list of names (with occupations), a street and avenue guide, ward boundaries, and city, county, state, and federal offices.

23 The study might also have been done by learning the occupations of those elected in 1928, in 1936, and in 1940, and then comparing the proportion on the payroll for each year. However, by using the 1934 list, one can see how the same people were affected over a period of time by the coming to power of the Democrats.

24 Although Pittsburgh elects committeemen and committeewomen in each district, this study concerns itself only with the male party workers. The Republican number is double the Democratic because the former party elects ward executive committeemen as well as county committeemen in each district. Their duties and functions are the same, but the ward executive committeemen can vote for the ward chairman, but not for the county chairman. The Democrats elect their county chairman in the primary, and not through vote of the committeemen. In an interview, a Republican party official explained that a major reason for the existence of the ward executive committee was to insure more workers to be active on election day than the Democrats had. See William G. Willis, The Pittsburgh Manual: A Guide to the Government of the City of Pittsburgh (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1950), p. 25.
to the total group of party workers. Comparing the 1934 Republican list with the 1938 Democratic one permitted the isolation of those Republicans who shifted party during the depression decade and ran for office on the Democratic ticket. Finally, the information regarding occupational change was tabulated for each year and percentaged to provide a quantitative measure of this change within the parties.\(^28\) As Donald R. Matthews has noted: "... the quantitative study of large aggregates of people can provide a degree of positive results which the more qualitative studies cannot. When hypotheses can be expressed in such a way as to be quantitatively tested, this type of research is highly desirable and useful."\(^29\)

The second method, interviewing committeemen who served during the 1930's (oral history), helps, for the purpose of this study, to clarify the connection among politics, committeemen, and W.P.A.\(^30\) One hundred and three Democratic committeemen (twenty-five percent of the total) were studied, the sample being scaled so that each ward was approximately represented by a number of party workers proportionate to the number of actual districts (408) in the city.

Of this group of committeemen one-third were on the work relief rolls at some point during the depression decade, and all but four of those served with the Works Progress Administration. More significant, however, is the fact that the majority of these were foremen and supervisors. As a Thirteenth Ward New Deal committeeman remarked: "I was laid off from my job as a printer. I got a job as a foreman on W.P.A. The ward chairman got you the good jobs. Anyone could be a laborer; politics was only needed in the key jobs."\(^31\)

The interviews aided in pinpointing the exact role politics played

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\(^28\) Where there was uncertainty regarding a committeeman's name as listed in the directory—often, several people had the same or similar name—the person chosen was the one who lived in the ward in question. Comparison of the name of a wife between directories also provided a check on whether the individual being investigated was the correct one. Unfortunately, the 1927 volume did not publish the spouse's name. The later ones did.


\(^30\) Much other material, demographic and recollections, was made available by the interviews. However, in this study, only the information regarding relief and W.P.A. concerns us.

\(^31\) Material from interviews with 103 committeemen or relatives of committeemen is in possession of the author.
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in the work relief operation. The Pittsburgh Democratic party workers won appointment to the prime positions such as foremen, supervisors, and timekeepers; they found ready acceptance if they had a truck to hire out to W.P.A.; they advanced their friends to the better positions on work relief through contacts with other supervisory personnel and ward chairmen. Moreover, for several of the committee men, employment with the work relief agency marked the first rung on a ladder of public employment, as it did for one Eighth Ward party worker. An impoverished church sexton during the early years of the depression, he received through politics an appointment as foreman on a W.P.A. project. By 1937 he joined the public payroll as a county deputy sheriff; four years later he went to work in the county treasurer's office, and four years after that joined the county clerk's office, where he now holds a high position.

Asked for their motivation in entering politics, the committee men frequently replied, as did a Third Ward precinct official: "I needed a job. The depression was on; I got a job. I started in politics in 1930 as a Republican, but switched when Roosevelt came in. The Democrats had emergency programs like C.W.A., W.P.A." Along with many other of the committee people interviewed, this individual still served on the public payroll more than thirty years after first entering politics.

Table 1 illustrates the impact of the use of the public payroll to build the Pittsburgh Democratic organization during the 1930's — and the continuance, to a much greater extent, of this practice during the early 1960's. Whereas comparison of the committee lists with the 1927 City Directory shows that only 7.2% of those committee men elected as Democrats in 1934 were on the public payroll in 1927, we learn from the 1936 Directory that this figure rises to 19.2% for the same people in that year. At this time, 1935-1936, the interviews relate that several of the committee men obtained their work relief positions and generally held them for a short duration prior to receiving a payroll job. The

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82 Of the city's thirty-two wards, the 29th and 30th were incorporated into Pittsburgh in 1927, while the 31st and 32nd joined in the years following 1929. Thus, it is unlikely that the individuals elected from these districts in 1934 were city residents prior to 1927. The City Directory at that time provided little information about non-city residents, except if they happened to work in Pittsburgh. Incorporation dates are from Willis, Pittsburgh Manual, p. xxvi.
anti-organization Mayor McNair, still serving during this period, placed a ceiling on the amount of patronage available to the "regulars." By 1940, the Democratic organization had consolidated its gains, and almost half of the same individuals elected to committee positions in 1934 occupied a government job.

The payroll had been conquered by the time the New Deal sighed its last breath. Twenty-two years later, at a time when the "Last Hurrah" for machine politics was considered to have been sounded throughout the nation's cities, 77.6% of the Democratic committeemen elected in 1962 held a job with city, county, state, or federal government.

### TABLE 1

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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Republican</th>
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<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>48.2%</td>
<td>19.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>77.6%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
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</table>

Even in the highest-income ward in the city, the Fourteenth, more than half of the Democratic committeemen were payrollers by 1962, and several of those who were not earned their living as lawyers—a profession often involved in seeking favors for clients and friends. Although not earning his living at the public trough, the lawyer often looks to municipal government for the "tangible rewards" of politics. During a factional dispute concerning the 1965 spring primary, the ward's chairman forced all committeemen who earned their livelihood as a city or county employee to swear a public loyalty oath to the organization’s slate of candidates.83

As can be seen in Table 2, by 1962 the bulk of Democratic government workers could be found on the city payroll, in contrast to the New Deal years when such jobs were more evenly distributed among the several levels of public service. This is another indication of consolidation of the Democratic organization within the city of Pittsburgh, where the city budget increased from $21,788,341 in 1935 to $65,708,738 in 1965. The assignment of

much of these funds to salaries and wages ballooned the organization's patronage powers.24

The Republicans, on the other hand, suffered. The proportion of Republican committeemen elected in 1934 and on the payroll during the period from 1927 through 1940 remained relatively stable. (See Table 1.) However, as the Democratic payroll figure skyrockets for those elected in 1962, the Republican dips to less than six percent.25 As shown in Table 3, with the decrease in the Republican proportion of payrollers, the ranks of professionals and managers begin to swell, while there is a smaller jump among

24Although policemen were barred from holding public or political office in 1950, firemen were not. (City of Pittsburgh, Civil Service Commission, Digest of General Ordinances, 1939-1960, Ordinance No. 128, March 25, 1950, p. 50.) An unusual number of firemen served as committeemen in 1962. Since they had been engaged in a salary hassle with City Hall, it would appear that, at the time of the study, they may have infiltrated the party organization in order to influence municipal budgetary policy; Municipal Record, 1934, p. 322; City of Pittsburgh, Ordinance No. 469, Dec. 28, 1964, mimeographed copy in possession of the author.

25In 1962 the Republicans won the State House for the first time since 1954. They took advantage of the patronage opportunities offered by Harrisburg. A breakdown of the patronage dispensed between Jan. 15, 1963, and March 1, 1964, showed that the Republican party chairman, Paul W. Hugus, processed 1,691 state jobs through his office. Pittsburgh's city wards benefited by 481 state jobs in 436 election districts while retaining 69 holdovers. Hugus rated this percentage as 1.26 jobs per district. The Fourteenth Ward received 44 new jobs and 2 holdovers; the Thirteenth Ward, 43 new jobs; the Fourth Ward, 28 new jobs and 2 holdovers; the Fifth Ward, 24 new jobs; the Seventh Ward, 20 new jobs and 5 holdovers; and the Tenth Ward, 15 new jobs and one holdover. No information was given as to how many of the jobs went to G.O.P. committeemen. Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Aug. 3, 1964.
the foremen-supervisor and real estate-insurance categories. This may indicate that a higher economic class of Republicans served in government in contrast to the Democratic laborers. One caveat must be noted. When comparing the 1962 groups with the 1934 groups, it should be remembered that they are not the same sample. The increase in the higher social status of Republicans in 1962 may merely indicate a change in Republican voters generally and not in the committeemen per se. It is logical that if the city was so overwhelmingly Republican prior to the New Deal, that party would have been comprised of a heterogeneous mass base. If the New Deal polarized politics along economic lines as is currently believed, then the 1962 sample of committeemen may well represent the generally higher-income Republican party.

Table 3 shows that laborers stand out as the occupational group which declined most among non-payroll Democratic committeemen from the depression decade through 1962. However, as noted in Table 4, twenty-five percent of all Democratic precinct workers who served the public did so in the capacity of laborers. Of the total number of Democratic committeemen, both privately and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations of Committeemen Elected in 1934 for the Years 1927, 1936, 1940, and of Committeemen Elected in 1962</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foremen-Supvsr.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salesman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real Est.-Insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managerial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other^</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All percentages are based on the total number of committeemen minus those names not listed, or for which occupations are not listed, in the City Directories. a—Laborer is a broad classification used in the City Directory. To this was added workmen such as carpenters, plumbers, etc. b—Other: includes some proprietors and those not classifiable in groups.

Table 3 shows that laborers stand out as the occupational group which declined most among non-payroll Democratic committeemen from the depression decade through 1962. However, as noted in Table 4, twenty-five percent of all Democratic precinct workers who served the public did so in the capacity of laborers. Of the total number of Democratic committeemen, both privately and
publicly employed, in 1962, twenty-six percent were laborers, not very much less than the thirty percent Democratic figure for 1940 and the twenty-eight percent figure for payroll and non-payroll Republican laborer-committeemen in 1962. Thus, as the organization strengthened its hold on the city, committeemen-laborers were absorbed into public work, often serving with agencies such as Pittsburgh’s Bureau of Bridges, Highways and Sewers. It was not difficult for a laborer to obtain a public job if he knew the “right” people. Laborers are exempt from the civil service law but are required to file a labor application. Their background is then investigated, and references from two Pittsburgh citizens are required to attest to their good character. Nothing says that the “citizens” cannot be local ward and precinct leaders. As one committeeman noted, they often are.\(^\text{19}\)

### Table 4

**Occupational Subdivisions of Public Payroll Jobs for Committeemen Elected in 1934 for the Years 1927, 1936, 1940 and for Committeemen Elected in 1962**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Republicans</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1962</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foremen-Suprvsr.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White Collar</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total(^b)</td>
<td>(18)</td>
<td>(59)</td>
<td>(129)</td>
<td>(294)</td>
<td>(94)</td>
<td>(102)</td>
<td>(101)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^a\)-White collar includes clerks, investigators, inspectors, draftsmen, etc.

\(^b\)-Figures do not always add up to 100% because some committeemen were listed only as government workers without additional information as to the type of job.

The relative stability of the G.O.P. committeemen on the public payroll during the 1930's may stem from the fact that until 1943 the Republicans controlled the County Prothonotary’s office (Clerk of Court of Common Pleas), which provided work for several of these precinct politicians. Perhaps an even more cogent reason for this stability is the fact that some of these Republican workers, who were politicians in 1934, may have shifted their party al-

legiance between 1934 and 1940 for ideological, or more likely, practical reasons, i.e., to remain on the payroll. The city somersaulted from a Republican to a Democratic stronghold during the depression decade, increasing the probability that some of these committeemen changed with the tide.

Although hard to pin down for all the Republicans in the 1934 sample, a comparison of the 1934 Republican and 1938 Democratic committee lists show that a little more than six percent of the 412 Democrats elected as committeemen in 1938 had been elected to the Republican committee in 1934. A comparison of the shifters to the total number of Republicans elected in 1934 shows that while 19.6% of the total had government jobs in 1940, forty-six percent of the shifters served the public during the same year, illustrating the practicality involved in changing one's party registration. In one ward, the Third, more than half the committeemen made this shift, indicating that control of the ward remained in the hands of the same individuals, although their party label had changed. The evidence, however, does not provide information regarding those Republicans who may have changed registration but did not win a committeeman's seat in 1938.

In comparing the 1934, 1936, and 1938 lists, 103 Democrats and 163 Republicans won election during each primary. These persons have been designated as the "hard core" of each party—those individuals who continued to serve throughout the depression. It might be expected that the "hard core" Democrats would do better in obtaining payroll positions than would the committeemen who served for a shorter duration. This is the case; Table 5 shows that while in 1927 and 1936 these individuals fared little better at the public trough than their brethren elected once or twice during the New Deal years, by 1940, with the consolidation of the Democratic grip on the city, the "hardcore" had seventy percent of its members on the payroll as contrasted to forty-eight percent of the total group. Those who continuously served, gained. However, those who remained Republican stalwarts during the era of Democratic growth did little better than the G.O.P.'s less persistent workers. In fact, the gap between the Republican "hard core" and the Republican total, small from the beginning, narrows as the decade ends.

The results of the study indicate that the coming of the New
TABLE 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Democratic (&quot;Hard Core&quot;)</th>
<th>Republican (&quot;Hard Core&quot;)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Hard Core&quot;</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>&quot;Hard Core&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>8.5% (59)</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>23.6% (106)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>24.1% (83)</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19.0% (121)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>70.2% (77)</td>
<td>48.2</td>
<td>20.0% (110)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The number upon which the percent is based is the total minus the number of committeemen not listed, or whose occupations are not listed, in the City Directories.

Deal brought to Pittsburgh, and its Democratic committeemen, more than Roosevelt’s program of recovery and reform. It brought, on the municipal level, the beginning of an unbroken Democratic voting tradition. It also furnished a healthy portion of the early patronage upon which the organization was built. If a Republican machine disintegrated as a result of the New Deal, a Democratic machine, like the Phoenix, rose from its ashes. The Pittsburgh evidence indicates that the chief weapon of the political organization, the public payroll, is still a potent weapon in the machine’s arsenal. If this be the case, what about its service function? Has the need for the machine to perform its welfare service passed?

I suggest, contrary to the “Last Hurrah” thesis, that it has not—especially in urban centers where a dependent economic class, the Negro, has replaced the formerly dependent immigrant as the target of the politician’s largess. For the Negro, the social welfare legislation of the New Deal brought less than a halfway revolution.

As the white population diminished and the Negro population virtually exploded in America’s cities, the local politician, during the years after World War II, found a new retainer. The Negro, unlike the Irish, for instance, did not price himself out of the market. Low-paying jobs were still appealing, and election-day work for pay drew many otherwise politically passive individuals into the ranks of party workers. In one Chicago Negro ward during the late 1950’s, 168 families received free clothing from the local machine before Christmas; about 5,000 children were enter-
tained at theater parties, and turkeys were distributed to a large number of needy householders.\textsuperscript{37}

The modern boss can extricate colored urban newcomers from entanglements with the law, direct them to the office dispensing unemployment relief, and aid them in finding an apartment in a low-cost urban housing project. Voting studies indicate that housing project occupants have been a prime source of strength for the political organizations in several cities. Instead of hurting, the institution of the welfare state arising out of the depression decade supplied new tools for the big city machines. More than twenty-five years after the New Deal, in Chicago, during the early months of Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” the neighborhood centers established to carry out the program were labeled “little City Halls” because of political ties to the Richard Daley machine.\textsuperscript{38}

In 1964, New York County’s Democratic organization (Tammany) proposed an ultimately abortive, but illuminating, plan to restore to its clubhouses some of the functions of the past by helping Harlem’s Negroes and Puerto Ricans find jobs and better housing. Under the plan a party employment expert would process job offers solicited by the party, and forward them to neighborhood clubhouses. The clubhouses would submit candidates to the headquarters expert, who would put them in touch with prospective employers. The process of material assistance, theoretically at least, had come full circle from Tammany to public welfare agencies and back to Tammany. The need for such a service was quite obviously present.\textsuperscript{39}

Not only does the need for such a service apparently remain, but the rhetorical label of “machine” has hardly faded from use. It is probably invoked in every municipal election worth winning, and has not been left out of national politics. For instance, in June, 1963, Senator Barry Goldwater told a meeting of Young Republicans that no Democrat could be elected to national office


\textsuperscript{38} For a voting study regarding housing projects see Lubell, \textit{White and Black: Test of A Nation}, pp. 129-130. The author has in his possession similar evidence for the city of Pittsburgh. See also James Ridgeway, “Poor Chicago,” \textit{New Republic}, May 15, 1965, p. 18.

who is “not under deep and unbreakable obligation to the corrupt big city machines.” Although definitely a candidate’s rhetoric—the type of evidence the historian of the future should judge most critically—the statement indicates the extent to which the term “machine” is put to use in American politics a quarter of a century after the demise of the New Deal.\(^{40}\)

Thus, the “boss” and the “machine” are still considered to be a potent political issue. Moreover, in a society where affluence has not filtered down to all of its members, the services the machine can provide have been untouched, at the least, and strengthened, at the most—rather than diluted by the welfare legislation of the 1930’s. Finally, the statistical evidence indicates that the payroll is still a potent weapon in the urban political machine’s arsenal. In Pittsburgh this arsenal was first stocked during the era of Franklin D. Roosevelt. As studies of other cities are completed, it will be interesting to compare these findings with the findings for Pittsburgh. At present, the evidence indicates that for the Republicans, the advent of the New Deal signified the “Last Hurrah.” For the Democrats and the building of their big city political organizations, it sounded the first Hallelujah.