Few students of Puritanism have ever been wholly satisfied with what other students before them have said about it. Constant change is the only constant, in Puritanism as in all history. The same can be said of the historiography of Puritans and Puritanism. It is nearly always revisionist. Mr. Rutman's study of Boston, a Puritan town, is avowedly so.

Mr. Rutman's revisionism is both narrow and broad. On the narrow road he drives at the question of what motivated the 1630 migration to New England, and here he challenges the soundness of Perry Miller's historical method, particularly in the latter's *Orthodoxy in Massachusetts, 1620-1630*. Miller erred, according to Rutman, in failing to examine the early years more closely and in his insistence throughout his study "that a ministerial pamphlet or tract of 1645 or 1655 was an adequate mirror of the ideas of 1630." Mr. Rutman's own analysis of the ideas of 1630 leads him to a restatement of the assumption derived from Miller "that the emigrants of 1630 arrived fully committed to a non-separating congregational way." Not so, says Mr. Rutman. This is too simple a conclusion and not warranted by the evidence. Mr. Rutman argues that the new arrivals in 1630 had only "a vague and imprecise leaning toward congregationalism" and that at best one can only conclude that "the main reason for their leaving England [in the 1630 migration] was not necessarily to effect congregationalism but a broad desire to live a godly life." Mr. Rutman's narrative documents this argument in great and convincing detail; the argument itself is expanded upon in a special appendix.

The second direction his revisionism takes, broader in its sweep, is of the sort whose logic invites us ultimately to reject "Puritanism" altogether as a meaningful term in history. Too much has been written of Puritanism in America "as though somehow it had injected a constant factor into the moving stream of history," Mr. Rutman writes—by implication deploiring this tendency. Actually, he says, as he judges it from the vantage point of Boston, "in the beginning . . . there was no Puritan way, no constant to be injected, merely action, reaction, interactions." Historians may have written that out of the succession of actions and counteractions in early Massachusetts had emerged a "peculiar Puritan state," "a Bible commonwealth," or an "oligarchy," but these terms are "meaningless." "They neither fit the facts that one finds in Winthrop's Boston nor establish a basis upon which to proceed through American history." The adjective "Puritan" is,
in fact, "inapplicable to Boston in any meaningful way," and applicable to
Winthrop himself "only in the most limited of senses," as when Puritanism
is spoken of as an "unbelievable intensity" of longing "for personal encounter
and direct communion with God." This sounds like a religious commitment,
yet Mr. Rutman will not even concede that Winthrop's "errand to the New
World" was religious "in but the simplest sense of the word," and so,
presumably, not Puritan either, in any remaining sense of that slippery word.

Mr. Rutman advances these conclusions "unvarnished and without apology," as
he says, "for their deviation from what have become . . . standard inter-
pretations," and I have selected only the language of his conclusions as set
down in his preface, first chapter, and his epilogue. The tightly woven text
in between presents a convincing narrative to support his conclusions.

Mr. Rutman's method is an interesting one. His first chapter is given
over to an analysis of John Winthrop's utopian dream of the city of God
which he hoped to found in the New World. His analysis is largely drawn
from the expression of that dream in Winthrop's lay sermon, "A Modell
of Christian Charity," delivered on board the Arbello en route to America,
and "summed up," as Mr. Rutman says, in Winthrop's oft-quoted phrase,
"Wee shall be as a Citty upon a Hill" (I wish Mr. Rutman had given more
attention to the full context in which that phrase appears, for it has always
seemed to me that the image is used less as a summing up than as a warning).

The narrative in the following eight chapters traces the evolution of
Boston town through the next two decades, from choosing the site, the
formation of town government ("an accomplished fact" by 1635, with statute
catching up after the fact), the disposition of lands, the emergence of church
organization ("Indeed, there was initially no orthodoxy in Massachusetts
Bay"), the "diversity and division" wrought by the swelling population, the
quickening commercial activity in Boston, to the increase and changes in
the organs of town government, and a final excellent chapter summing up
the accumulations of two decades that had converted Winthrop's vision of
a City on a Hill to "The City by the Water." The burden of each of these
chapters is to demonstrate the steady "crumbling of the Winthroprian ideal,"
evident in the first decade of settlement but even more so in the second.
The process began, in fact, Mr. Rutman argues, at almost the instant of
landing, for instead of the one centralized community Winthrop had hoped
for, the settlers immediately scattered into seven different towns; only a
fortuitous selection of the site for Boston assured its future centrality, but
for reasons far from Winthrop's ideal.

Winthrop’s dream failed, and Mr. Rutman judges that failure a tragedy,
expressing the sense of it in this eloquent rhetorical passage:

And what of Winthrop? Faced with a proliferating materialism
and individualism, fragmentation and dispute, the necessity of
accepting, even abetting, what was happening, of resorting to law
and bolstering the church in the hope of tempering man’s nature,
of acquiescing in banishments and imprisonments to preserve the
safety and unity of the commonwealth, did he sense the crumbling
ideal which was all about him in Boston? Did he sometime during
his last years stroll down to Town Dock at dusk on an evening
This is an important book. It serves as a healthy check on those of us who may commit the generalizations Mr. Rutman deplores. Hereafter, with his example before us, we must say of what particular place, of what particular time we are speaking, especially when we speak of Puritanism. For Mr. Rutman has reminded us again that history is a record of change. He has reminded us that we must study many finite particulars before we can with justification generalize about a larger unit. All this is to the good, made palatable, moreover, in Mr. Rutman's book, by a vigorous narrative style and a strong commitment to a definite point of view.

Yet, in his laudable desire to take us to a more precise understanding of Puritanism, he has not altogether skirted the Slough of Contradictions that often lies in the path. He insists that we keep our eye on actions and reactions, etc., yet his method of demonstrating the crumbling of Winthrop's ideal requires him to posit a fixed ideal. If it is not sound historical method to take a tract of 1655 as a mirror of the ideas of 1630, is it any more sound (for an historian) to judge the Boston of 1649 a tragic failure by the ideals of 1630? Would it not be "sounder" to measure changing actuality against changing ideality—to observe how actions and reactions lead to changes in both? (It seems to me Mr. Rutman gives himself away somewhat when he says, after the rhetorical passage quoted above, that he suspects Winthrop "was not fully aware of the extent of the failure" and that "in the end, he was more than likely content.") If there was "no Puritan way" in the beginning, in Boston, then why subtitle his book "A Portrait of a Puritan Town"? When did it become Puritan? If, noting the Bostonian's concern for his soul, "the easiest way to heaven for the Bostonian of the seventeenth century was essentially the way of Franklin in the eighteenth," if there was no change in essence in the morality of salvation from one century to another, then what do we do about the admonition against seeing Puritanism or whatever-it-is as a constant factor?

I repeat, this is an important book, raising important questions. Not least of these is whether the empirical methods of analyzing institutional developments are adequate for understanding a contradictory, complex, and viscous experience like "Puritanism"; or, since Puritanism seems to have "a great deal more to do with the clouds overhead than with any portion of the actual soil" of, say, New England, whether it isn't handled more adequately by the methods of a Hawthorne.

Lafayette College

J. R. Vitelli
Richer than Spices; How a Royal Bride's Dowry Introduced Cane, Lacquer, Cottons, Tea, and Porcelain to England, and So Revolutionized Taste, Manners, Craftsmanship, and History in both England and America.


A recent New Yorker cartoon, showing a couple in a theater ticket agency, has the following dialogue: “Would you have two in the orchestra for ‘The Persecution and Assassination of Marat as Performed by the Inmates of the Asylum of Charenton Under the Direction of the Marquis de Sade’?” “Oh, Mac, have we two in the orchestra for ‘The Persecution and Assassination of Marat as Performed by the Inmates of the Asylum of Charenton Under the Direction of the Marquis de Sade’?” I forebear to repeat the even longer and less informative title of Mrs. Thomas's book. Although boldly set in handsome type, as only one of Mr. Knopf’s designers is likely to do, it conceals rather than reveals the nature of the text that follows.

The bride in question is Catherine of Braganza, Infanta of Portugal, who, on marrying Charles II in 1662, brought with her to England a promised dowry not only of half a million pounds in cash or pledges, but trading rights for English ships in Brazil and the Portuguese East Indies, as well as the cession to English sovereignty of Tangier and Bombay. The bridegroom, after years of poverty in exile, was understandably chiefly interested in the cash, but Mrs. Thomas sets out to prove that the less glittering items in Catherine's dowry had a more lasting effect on taste and life, not only in England but in her North American colonies.

Mrs. Thomas is a lover of the furniture and decorative arts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who has read widely in search of historical and literary references to the objects that attract her. Not being content simply to catalogue and record a single specialty, she has sought some unifying principle that might tie her enthusiasms together and has hit upon the dowry of Catherine of Braganza as a rallying point. Her argument in brief is that the memory of the exotic and luxurious products of the Far East had inspired Renaissance exploration, in which Portugal had taken a conspicuous part; that Catherine brought such tastes to England; that the acquisition of Bombay gave new impetus to the already existing East India Company; and that, in consequence, “a politer way of living,” which, in the words of John Evelyn, “passed to luxury and intolerable expense,” became common in England and filtered through to the North American colonies.

This, like some of Sacheverell Sitwell's books, is a personal and impressionistic one, in which a great deal of cream is skimmed off a large surface. Many normally unrelated bits of information are tied together through associations in the author’s mind. Some of the ideas and transitions are provocative; the illustrations are attractive, and statements are documented in footnotes at the end.

Successive chapters deal with cottons from India, the caning of furniture, lacquer-ware, the use of tea as a social amenity rather than a medicine, the development of porcelain, the Chinese taste in decoration. In each of
these Mrs. Thomas moves from the Restoration introduction into England, through eighteenth-century developments that leave Catherine of Braganza far behind, on to the colonies. Chapter four, for example, tells us how Catherine at first persisted in wearing her farthingale "for the dignity of Portugal"; how wool—long the staple of English economy—found favor in India chiefly for elephant saddles, while the painted calicoes of India took England so much by storm during the reign of Charles II that "entrenched wool interests screamed for legislative protection." Mrs. Thomas comments on the technique of printing calicoes, on the tree-of-life motif, on the seizure of Mrs. David Garrick's Indian bed curtains, on John Kay's "fly-shuttle," Richard Arkwright's spinning mill, and Samuel Slater's transmission of Arkwright's plans to this country. At the end of the book the new United States is about to complete the circle by embarking on its own direct trade with the oriental sources of such elegances.

This is an amusing book, once the reader gets the hang of it and divines what the author is trying to do. Some of its broad generalizations will raise the hackles of specialists, but even those who are not specialists will be surprised to find King Charles I being hanged on page 40, and may question the need of footnotes identifying John Evelyn, Samuel Pepys, or the banqueting hall of Whitehall palace, which, we are told, "still stands in London." Now and then the style gets under foot, as in the concluding paragraph of chapter four: "These were exciting times of national experiment and growth. Yet in many ways they echoed the revolution and expansion of Britain at the turn of the preceding century, when the impact of Catherine's dowry was turning the last vestiges of the Middle Ages into modern times." Nevertheless the book is full of ideas, and is pleasant reading.

Boston Athenaeum

WALTER MUIR WHITEHILL


In this monograph Professor Sosin continues his interest in the formation of British colonial policy which he first explored in Whitehall in the Wilderness. Rejecting the idea that British policy was conceived within a rigid mercantilist framework, Sosin addresses himself to the process of decision making. He seeks to explain the relationship between successive ministries and two lobbying groups which often acted in concert, the British merchants and colonial agents.

He finds that on some issues (e.g., Currency and Quartering Acts) the lobby managed to secure important amendments. He asserts that the pressure of merchants and agents was more effective than the colonial Non-importation Agreements in causing the Stamp Act and Townshend duties to be repealed. The reviewer does not find this argument compelling, because it does not explain why British merchants would join the agents in protesting revenue acts if the merchants did not fear economic retaliation by Americans.

The lobby seems to have been successful only under the Rockingham
Ministry. Sosin suggests that the Rockingham Whigs, lacking experience with colonial administration, readily listened to the lobby in lieu of other sources of information. One wonders if the riots in American seaports were not more persuasive. The problem with his treatment of both the Stamp Act and the Townshend duties is one of evidence; Sosin has simply not demonstrated that members of Parliament voted as they did because they were convinced by the lobbyists. Nor is it clear that the ministers and administrators who formulated British policy did so as a result of pressures brought to bear by the agents and merchants.

Professor Sosin's most valuable point is that the colonial agency was incapable of negotiating issues where sovereignty was at stake. The facts that agents tended to represent factions within colonial governments, that the British merchants were unwilling to countenance a challenge to Parliamentary sovereignty over the Empire, and that the Continental Congress restricted agents to presenting petitions rather than negotiating, all led to the ineffectiveness of the agency as an instrument of political control.

Thus, Sosin arrives at two unremarkable conclusions. The agents were successful only when the ministry supported them, which is a way of saying that they were successful when they succeeded. Secondly, the imperial crisis was not economic, but constitutional, a result of "the colonial challenge to the authority of the mother country."

In this exhaustively researched and clearly written study two issues are not fully resolved. The precise role of the agents and merchants in influencing British policy cannot be divorced, as Mr. Sosin attempts, from the impact in England of actions on the American side of the ocean. Secondly, the influence on the leaders of the American resistance of the reports sent to the colonies by the agents receives sketchy treatment. These reports played an important part in shaping the colonial conviction that the British government was engaged in a plot to undermine American liberties.

One may question Professor Sosin's comments on the sources of colonial opposition, which he locates in a desire of social arrivistes to "achieve power and status," and his distinction between "legal abstractions" and specific laws. Every law proceeds from a legal abstraction, and the process of questioning laws led naturally to a consideration of the legal structure on which they were based. Still, Sosin's book is a useful complement to the institutional aspects of the colonial agency emphasized in M. G. Kammen's article in the William and Mary Quarterly (April, 1965).

Upsala College

THOMAS M. BROWN


This work is a preliminary effort to describe in detail the class structure of America between 1763 and 1788. It asks of colonial society the kind of questions sociologists raise about the present age. The purpose is to provide a point of comparison for modern studies as "a first step toward a history of American society." On the way, the author hopes to stimulate a thorough analysis of all existing local records from which alone will come a definite
answer to the debate over the economic and social basis of the American Revolution. The conclusions are tentative, because despite the mountain of material he has worked through, Professor Main repeatedly warns that there is much more to master. He especially shies away from any comment on the Revolution itself except for the hesitant observation that the effects "seem, on the whole, to have been less than I had expected."

The results of Professor Main's research will not be surprising to students of the period. His findings complement the recent studies of Robert Brown and others emphasizing the relatively equalitarian nature of colonial society. The vast bulk of the white population lay in a middle class composed of small farmers, artisans, and small businessmen, among whom there was a high degree of economic opportunity and social mobility. This fluidity was more prevalent toward the frontier than in the older areas, and more in the North than in the South. On the other hand, a tendency toward social stratification was apparent in the existence of the permanent poor, who comprised perhaps five percent of the white population, and in the fact that in areas of large commercial farms such as the Virginia Tidewater admission to the very rich was almost entirely hereditary.

The importance of Professor Main's work is to demonstrate that within these broad categories there were numerous subdivisions that must be carefully distinguished in order to understand the rich variety of colonial society and to probe the political and cultural implications. In the North he found four levels of social development: the frontier; areas of small, more-or-less self-sufficient farms; areas of larger commercial farms; and finally the cities and towns. In the South only two of these stages usually existed, for the richer soil and the availability of a cash crop hastened the transition from the pioneer to the commercial farm, and of course, urban growth was notoriously slow. At the same time, he cautions that the "southern states were less similar to one another than were the northern." North Carolina in particular stood apart from its neighbors on either side.

Everywhere local conditions made for significant variations. Though the counties of Bedford and Washington in Pennsylvania resembled frontier counties elsewhere in the economic equality of their residents, Bedford had a higher percentage of absentee ownership and landless laborers in the 1780's because land speculators were more active in its settlement. Small farms in Pennsylvania were on the average larger than in New England, and the state had a greater proportion of landless citizens. Farm income, too, was probably higher, though not as high as in areas farther south.

In several provocative chapters Professor Main sketches the relationship between class structure and other aspects of culture, such as standards of living, the prestige of various groups and occupations among contemporaries, and patterns of book ownership, education, and theater attendance. In these areas he is doubly careful to emphasize the suggestive nature of his remarks. Of great value for the further study he seeks to encourage is an excellent appendix on the use of tax and probate records and the areas of research that remain to be done.

Colonial Williamsburg

JOHN E. SELBY

The contents of Mr. Grant's book are arranged geographically; there is a section for each of the fifty states, which, Alaska and Hawaii excepted, are arranged in eight regional groups. There are also a five-page glossary, a two-page selected bibliography, and a fifteen-page index. The book is attractively made, and favorable mention is appropriate for Lorence F. Bjorklund's drawings, one hundred of which decorate the pages.

The Pennsylvania section of the text covers about eight pages; and its value is fairly indicated by what is said of Fort Pitt, the most historic fortification in the state. On page 84 the reader is informed that Fort Pitt was erected by Colonel Henry Bouquet in 1764; on the following page he is told that only Fort Pitt and Fort Ligonier held out in Pontiac's War of 1763; on page 362, in the glossary, he learns that a redoubt was "Usually an outlying fortification or breastwork. Fort Pitt, Pennsylvania, was a typical American redoubt."

Other illuminations pale in comparison. The misspelling Fort Vernaongo is consistent (pages 59, 83, 379); Fort Duchesne (for Duquesne) appears only on the map, page 59; Jeannette is misspelled on page 85. Fort Augusta, it is said, was built by the English in 1755 (page 84; more precisely, by provincials in 1756); James Smith seized Fort Bedford in 1759 (page 85; actually in 1769); James Burd built a post at Redstone Old Fort in 1758 (page 86; correctly, in 1759). One learns, unexpectedly, that Fort Henry's "stone walls formed the shape of a half moon" (it was wooden and roughly rectangular, but remarkable for the tile roofs of its buildings); that Colonel Bouquet defeated Pontiac, who had besieged Fort Pitt; that the Pennamite War was fought between "original Pennsylvania settlers and the newly arrived Connecticut Yankees"; that "Conestoga wagons" crossed the western plains (page 308; a common inaccuracy). The statement that the site of Fort Ligonier has been marked "with a small monument" shows complete unawareness of the fine program of exploration, reconstruction, and interpretation carried on there in recent years. The bibliography lists nothing relating specifically to Pennsylvania.

Mr. Grant is credited with authorship of thirty-five books, on a wide variety of subjects, including The Adventures of Robin Hood, Cowboy Encyclopedia, Leather Braiding, and Tong War! A History of the Chinese Tongs in America. According to the publisher's blurb, the present volume is "a definitive account of the more than 1,200 forts built in America."

Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission William A. Hunter


Professor Morris has written a number of fine, scholarly books, but The Peacemakers is undoubtedly the crowning work of his career. It is a masterpiece based upon extensive research in published sources and in manuscripts housed in the archives of London, Madrid, Paris, Vienna, and Washington.
It delves more deeply into the negotiations which preceded the signing of the Peace of Paris, of September, 1783, than does any earlier work. *The Diplomacy of the Revolution*, written by Samuel Flagg Bemis, is an excellent book, but it gives less attention to the peace negotiations than Professor Morris has done in *The Peacemakers*.

The Americans who participated in the negotiations were amateurs who were sent to deal with skilled professionals. They were a match for the professionals, however, because they were shrewd observers of men and events. Benjamin Franklin had had long experience in dealing with the "Great Men" who held governmental offices in Great Britain, and he was not over-awed by the King of France or by the nobles who served as his ministers. John Jay had had to learn his lessons under distressing circumstances; he had been sent to Spain to obtain recognition of the United States at a time when the Court of Madrid was unwilling to grant recognition. The Spaniards had kept Jay waiting for a long time, and the latter had learned that Spain's leaders were suspicious of, and even hostile to, the aspirations of the newly independent Americans.

It was fortunate for the United States that its diplomats were shrewd and perceptive men. Jay and Franklin discovered that they had to be on their guard against the intrigues of the French as well as against the wiles of the British. Jacques Necker, France's finance minister, tried in 1780 to find a way in which France could withdraw from the war without losing face. He wanted to escape from the necessity of floating huge war loans, and he was more concerned about France's financial difficulties than he was with her treaty obligations to the United States. He fell from power in May, 1781, and his peace policies fell with him. The crisis in France's public finances continued after his fall, however, and war weariness gripped the French Court as the fighting dragged on in a stalemate. Necker's rival, the Comte de Vergennes, who was King Louis XVI's foreign minister, began to give serious consideration in 1781 to the idea of accepting the mediation of Austria and Russia. Mediation could have had serious consequences for America because the would-be mediators had proposed a long-term truce on the basis of *uti possidetis*—which would have left the British in possession of New York City, Long Island, Charleston, and Savannah.

The Franco-American victory at Yorktown put an end to *uti possidetis* proposals, but it was followed by prolonged and complicated negotiations with the British. Professor Morris has described and analyzed the negotiations in detail, and he has written with sympathy and understanding of the way the diplomats, British and American, reacted to the problems, difficulties, and frustrations of the negotiations. The British had to salvage as much as they could of their empire after their armed forces had suffered defeat. The Americans, on the other hand, had to convince the British that they must grant the United States its independence and cede to it the western lands between the Appalachian Mountains and the Mississippi River. The negotiations between the British and the Americans would have been difficult in any case, but they were made even more difficult when the French, acting in behalf of the Spanish, attempted to persuade the British to retain
most of the trans-Appalachian lands which the United States needed for its future expansion. Jay and Franklin found it necessary to keep their negotiations with the British secret in order to prevent the French from interfering in their efforts to extend their country's boundaries to the Mississippi.

John Adams was absent from Paris while Jay and Franklin were contending for America's independence and for a boundary on the banks of the Mississippi. Adams joined the peacemakers in time to fight a dramatic battle for fishing rights for his countrymen in the coastal waters of Newfoundland. Adams did not win all the concessions for which he contended, but he won fairly satisfactory terms for the Yankee subjects of "King Cod."

The Peacemakers is far more than the story of British-American negotiations. Its author has dealt with the Spanish, French, and Dutch, and even with the would-be mediators at the Courts of Vienna and St. Petersburg. He has described at length the personalities and the diplomacy of a number of European statesmen including the Comte de Vergennes. He has shown how Vergennes tried, and failed, to promote some cooperation between Spain and the United States. The interests of the two countries conflicted, and Vergennes found himself caught in a cross-fire of clashing Spanish and American national and imperial aspirations. Moreover, the Spanish Court created difficulties for Vergennes by trying to prolong the war, with the hope of conquering Gibraltar, at a time when France was in financial difficulties and her leaders were eager for peace.

Professor Morris has given us a painstaking analysis of the negotiations and has shown how the pressures of national interests made Jay, Franklin, Vergennes, or the Earl of Shelburne make or reject certain demands during the negotiations. He has shown us what kind of men the peacemakers were, and he has shown that they were conscientious public servants who were trying to win peace for the world as well as favorable terms for their own countries. The peacemakers finally succeeded in restoring peace, but some of them received little praise for their efforts. The peacemakers are blessed only when they win all the terms their countrymen can possibly hope for—and none of the statesmen of 1783 was in position to obtain terms which would be entirely satisfactory to his countrymen.

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Northern Arizona University

George W. Kyte


The editing of historical documents is rapidly becoming a separate profession among American historians. Inspired by the meticulous scholarship of Julian Boyd, who published the first of his elaborately annotated volumes of the writings of Thomas Jefferson in 1950, other historians are devoting a substantial part of their professional careers to turning out equally elaborate editions of the writings of other distinguished Americans. No document which they wrote, however insignificant, goes unmentioned; no letter from any correspondent, however obscure, is neglected; no person
mentioned in the text, however unimportant, goes unidentified; and no event, however inconsequential, is left unexplained.

Many of those historians who write books rather than footnotes have lavishly praised this new breed of editors, but a smaller number have chided them for usurping both the role of the biographer and the monograph writer. Because *The Papers of James Madison* is the most thoroughly annotated of the current crop of writings of famous Americans—a list that includes the Adamses, Franklin, Hamilton, and Clay, among others—it has borne the brunt of such criticism. How valid is it?

The latest volume of Madison's papers covers his career from January 1, 1782, through July 31, 1782. During these months Madison, as a delegate from Virginia to the Continental Congress, played a leading role in the important issues of war and peace which confronted the infant republic. The military operations of the American Revolution had come to a close with the decisive victory of the Americans at Yorktown in October, 1781, but the peace was not assured. The fight for American independence was transferred to the conference table in Paris, where the American commissioners were faced with the wily efforts of Lord North and the Marquis of Rockingham to undermine the Franco-American alliance. Would the British, defeated in battle, now grant the Americans independence and the prerequisites of sovereignty to which a free nation was entitled? During the first seven months of 1782, it was by no means certain, and Madison, for one, believed that the British were engaged in an "insidious" policy of delay, economic coercion, maritime intimidation, and domestic subversion.

Perhaps no American in 1782 was a more ardent nationalist than Madison, and the writings published in this volume eloquently portray the skill and prescience with which he sought to enhance the prestige and powers of the union. His observations on states' rights and the national interest, and on the powers of Congress in the areas reserved to it, as well as on the extent of its implied powers, constitute the most astute political analysis written at that time.

This volume of the Madison papers maintains the high standards which its editors established with the publication of the first volume in 1962. The annotation is, as previously, thorough, so comprehensive, indeed, that only the most indefatigable searcher could find an allusion, an obscure fact, a person, a place, or a vague statement that is left unexplained. If there is a flaw in this volume, it is the effort of the editors to prove Madison consistent and to square what he wrote in 1782 with what he later said. Is it the task of historical editors to explain, much less to justify, the seeming inconsistencies of their subjects? In view of Irving Brant's seven-volume defense of Madison, the answer in the latter's case must be a "No."

Despite this minor objection, I think that the criticisms which have been made of the Madison Papers on the score of over-annotation are invalid. To object to explanatory footnotes, of whatever length, is to argue that it is possible to acquire too much information. A little learning may be a dangerous thing, but vast learning, by the same token, is surely not a censur-
able thing. For historians to complain of too much research is surprising to anyone who has spent tedious hours in the drudgery of fact-searching. With the publication of this volume, as well as its companions, historians of early American history are presented with a rich gift. Supplied with such abundant historical material, they are exempt from the exacting labors of historical research and free for the no less demanding task of reflecting anew on the significance not only of James Madison but of his era.

This edition of the Madison Papers is a massive contribution of scholarship and a fitting monument to one of America’s most notable philosopher-statesmen.

Lafayette College

JACOB E. COOKE


One of the by-products of the current civil rights movement is a broad reassessment of the abolitionist movement prior to the end of the Civil War. Until fairly recently the reputation of the abolitionists (as distinct from the non-extensionists) has not been good. Wide acceptance was given to the interpretation of them, collectively, as being vindictive, self-seeking extremists, persons who acted from motives other than genuine concern for either their country or the slave, and who were, in a major way, responsible for the Civil War. The essays collected here take strong issue with this view.

According to the editor, Martin Duberman, professor of history and author of the powerful documentary play In White America, his purpose in assembling and presenting the essays in the book was “to excavate and encourage the recent tendency toward a more sympathetic appraisal of the movement”; he wanted to indicate that, even if it is too early for a new synthesis of abolitionist history, there is sufficient new material and new insights to show that one “is both possible and necessary.” In my opinion, he has succeeded admirably.

The book consists of seventeen essays by seventeen different authors, most of whose contributions were written expressly for this volume. There is a surprising unanimity of view, given the editorial freedom enjoyed by the contributors and the editor’s desire to include “all scholarly points of views.” The contributors, however, are mainly from the “younger generation” of historians, and most are enthusiastic defenders of the abolitionists. There is also a high quality to the essays, although they vary widely in length and style. They are thoughtful and thought-provoking; each, ranging from David B. Davis’s study of the ambivalent attitude toward slavery in biblical and classical literature through Howard Zinn’s defense of the tactics of the “new abolitionists” of today—the sit-inners, the boycotters, the Freedom Riders, is full of arresting insights.

In many of the essays the authors are traversing ground they have gone over before in monographs. Robert F. Durden writes again on James S. Pike and the Republican party’s ill-concealed Negrophobia; Benjamin Quarles, the biographer of Frederick Douglass, brilliantly summarizes his
views on abolition's "different drummer"; Irving H. Bartlett again describes the eloquent oratory and social reform theories of Wendell Phillips; and Willie Lee Rose recounts anew the significance of the Port Royal experiment as a "rehearsal for Reconstruction." These and other contributions represent more, however, than a summary of previous publications, and most readers will be happy to have the reflections and conclusions of so many students in the field of abolition history collected between the covers of a single work.

Of particular value for the historian is the article by psychologist Silvan S. Tomkins, author of a four-volume study on human motivation. In his essay on "The Psychology of Commitment," he describes and then applies his theories to the study of four leading abolitionists (Garrison, Phillips, Weld, Birney), examining the successive stages by which their commitment to abolitionism was made and intensified, and the way in which "the same dynamic violence and suffering . . . was also responsible for engaging the commitment of others. . . ." The Northerner would have preferred to ignore slavery, but this was "precisely what the abolitionists made more and more difficult."

If Tomkins analyzed why some men became abolitionists, Duberman in his essay explains why most did not. Rather than embracing "extremist" solutions, Americans adopted the theory of non-extension and gradualism; too often, however, the gradualist argument was used as a "technique of evasion," not as a "tool for change." In other essays on the role and significance of the abolitionists, Larry Gara and Fawn M. Brodie ask for a careful and precise definition and use of the term "abolitionist"; James M. McPherson praises the abolitionists' belief in racial equality, despite the fact that "popular belief and scientific learning overwhelmingly proclaimed the Negro's absolute inferiority"; and Bartlett and Zinn defend the function of the agitator in society. "In all ages," writes Zinn, "it has been first the radical, and only later the moderator, who has held out a hand to men knocked to the ground by the social order."

Using a comparative approach, Robin W. Winks has important things to say in analyzing United States and Canadian abolitionism; in the latter case the crusade united neither the whites nor the Negroes, and it had no "successful" climax. The "myths" about Canada as a haven for fugitive slaves, moreover, have obscured the need for subsequent civil rights legislation. Similarly, Howard R. Temperley's comparison of British and American abolitionists is interesting and useful. Elsewhere, of special interest to students of Pennsylvania history, the "building-up" labors of Pennsylvania abolitionist James Miller McKim among the freedmen of South Carolina are treated in Mrs. Rose's article, and the work of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 is re-examined by Staughton Lynd in the light of the "abolitionist critique" of its work. He concludes, I think properly, that slavery was indeed a basic factor in the deliberations at Philadelphia.

The weaknesses of the book are relatively minor ones: there is insufficient editorial comment and control; some of the articles, designed to be interpretative, bring in much too much extraneous material; there is
a lack of uniformity in documentation. Nevertheless, the essays exhibit an extraordinary range and depth of coverage and will serve as the beginning point for future laborers in the field. The occasional conflict in interpretation (compare, for example, Leon F. Litwack and McPherson on racism among the abolitionists, or Brodie and Zinn on the views of Lincoln) merely indicates some of the places where more work is needed. Certainly the abolitionist movement is a complex one well deserving of the re-examination on which this collection is predicated.

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RALPH D. GRAY


Professor Gillette has written of the efforts of the Congress and of state governments to solve the problem of Negro suffrage after the Civil War. He devotes one chapter to the various suffrage proposals in Congress; another to the phrasing and passage of the Fifteenth Amendment; and six chapters to the struggles for ratification in the South, the Border states, the Middle Atlantic states, the Middle West, New England and the Far West.

After Congress decided to embed Negro suffrage not in statute but in a constitutional amendment, discussion narrowed to two basic proposals: one, that impartial or universal manhood suffrage should form the conceptual base upon which Negro voting would rest; the other, that the states should continue to regulate suffrage, but should be forbidden to deny suffrage on the ground of race. The first proposal would have been the stronger, for it emphasized the right of all citizens to vote, relegating the question of race to secondary status. But the second plan, by passing the decision to the states, would enable the Republican party to maintain control by enlisting Negro support, where locally acceptable, without sacrificing Republican states which rejected Negro suffrage. The second plan, which was ultimately adopted, permitted states to deny suffrage to Negroes by local devices such as literacy tests, but at the same time it gave unmistakable federal sanction to Negro suffrage and anticipated the modern movement to achieve it nationally.

The New Englanders and Reconstruction governments in the South quickly ratified the Fifteenth Amendment. The Border states opposed it, as did the Far West. Oregon ratified in 1959; California in 1962. The Middle Western and Middle Atlantic states staged furious battles over ratification. Pennsylvanians and New Yorkers will be disappointed by the treatment given their stories. In this chapter, Gillette devotes twelve pages to Connecticut, three to New Jersey, two to New York, and a few scattered sentences to Pennsylvania.

He uses W. J. Niven’s doctoral dissertation on Connecticut during Reconstruction as the basis of this lengthy section. With equal ease he could have consulted William W. Hummel’s dissertation on Senator Charles R.
Buckalew of Pennsylvania, and Erwin Bradley's *Triumph of Militant Republicanism* to construct the Pennsylvania story, but he mentions neither of these. The omission is harder to understand when we read in the conclusion that "the primary object of the Amendment was to get the Negro vote in the North, not, as other writers have insisted, to keep Negro suffrage in the South, which was a secondary objective." In a number of excellent statistical charts, Gillette shows that Republican control in many Northern states rested on margins so narrow that the Negro vote could alter the outcome. Since he represents the Fifteenth Amendment as a pragmatic, *ad hoc* plan of Republicans to retain their national ascendancy, the reviewer thinks that the close contests in big states like New York and Pennsylvania deserve more extensive examination than they have received.

Newspaper accounts have provided the main source material for this volume. The author discovered, as have many before him, that manuscript collections from politicians contain little information to illuminate the motives and private objectives of the main actors in so touchy a drama as race relations.

On the whole the book adds to our detailed knowledge of Reconstruction and to our comprehension of the terrible difficulty of achieving political answers to deep-rooted social problems. The story brings to focus many of the best and the worst features of popular government. The effort of Congress to steer a precarious course between the "extremism of those who wanted to do nothing, and the radicalism of those who wanted to do everything" illustrates de Tocqueville's observation that the laws of democracies have better objectives than those of any other form of government; but that the laws themselves, in terms of administrative feasibility, are generally the worst in the world.

*The Pennsylvania State University*  

**Philip S. Klein**


Like most Americans, historians have been fascinated by speculative business activity. Their attitudes toward this phenomenon combine, in the usual ambivalent manner, a sternly puritanical disapproval of entrepreneurs who seemed to get something for nothing with a grudging admiration for those who successfully pitted their cunning against market forces. These predilections appear in the many studies of land speculation and in the continuing debate over the holdings of government securities by the Founding Fathers. Oddly enough, however, there is relatively little discussion in our general historical literature about the development and functions of organized speculation on futures markets and stock exchanges. By the late nineteenth century, they had grown into extremely complex institutions, and the leading traders had become national figures. Yet most of us, in our history courses, probably ignore the uproar over futures trading when we deal with the Populist Revolt, and pay attention to the stock market only when we get to the "Great Crash" of 1929.
The avowed purpose of this book is to give a broader dimension to our understanding of the 1929 debacle by examining the long public controversy over exchange speculation from the ill-fated Hatch Anti-Options Bill of 1892 to the New Deal reforms of 1934 to 1936. It is not a social history of speculation, whatever that might be, although it does discuss the nature and extent of public participation in the speculative markets. Rather, it focuses on the "dominant ideas" about these institutions as revealed in the leading newspapers, magazines, and books of the day, as well as the various Congressional hearings and debates. Cowing's main concern is with the changing nature of the controversy and the legislative successes and failures of the political critics.

Even within these limits, it is an important subject. The book makes it abundantly clear that such reforms as the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission did not come simply from a fit of remorse about the frenzied and sometimes fraudulent practices of the late 1920's. They were rooted in demands that were persistent since the turn of the century. The outcry was sometimes muted by other concerns, the debate over means often divided the most ardent champions of government action, but the groundswell was always there.

Most of the book is devoted to the 1920's. The first two chapters deal with the emergence of two distinct groups of critics: the "agrarians" who advocated outright prohibition of speculation and clung to extreme solutions into the 1930's, and the "progressive" reformers who, with some important allies in the financial community itself, pressed for regulation rather than abolition. When these groups combined forces in the '20's they achieved some notable successes, as in the passage of the Grain Futures Act of 1922 and the "blue sky" laws that provided some legal weapons against the peddlers of phony stocks. They remained divided most of the time, however. The "populistic" Congressmen proved to be more correct in their assessment of the speculative orgy at the end of the decade, but their numbers were too small and their influence too weak even after their predictions of disaster came true. When the reforms did go through, they represented a triumph for the forces of compromise and regulation.

There is much in this book, therefore, that is fresh and of compelling interest, yet it is curiously disappointing. The narrative bogs down frequently into a string of paraphrased and summarized arguments. At times it is difficult to distinguish between these capsule versions of a publicist's or politician's stand and the author's own judgments. It also seems to me that Cowing has been too willing to accept Richard Hofstadter's sharp distinction between Populists and Progressives. Whatever general applicability these labels may have, they are not very useful when applied to the advocates of either prohibition or regulation of exchange speculation. Nor do the efforts to analyze Congressional voting patterns by regional groupings seem convincing.

The greatest weakness is in relating the long debate over speculation, which Cowing has so carefully and painstakingly reconstructed, to economic realities. There is no adequate explanation of the origins and conduct of
futures trading. How many general readers will know the meaning of such a term as “fungible”? The attacks on speculation did not necessarily originate in the West, nor did they reach national attention for the first time under Populist sponsorship. There was a much-publicized investigation in New York as early as 1883. Nor did the attack subside with the return of farm prosperity in 1897, as the Industrial Commission reports in the following years amply prove. There is a brief mention of the fictional speculator protagonists in Frank Norris’s *The Pit* and Theodore Dreiser’s *The Financier*. Oddly enough, the author, an intellectual historian, does not identify them as based on two real-life operators, Joseph Leiter and Charles Yerkes, whose exploits made headlines between 1897 and 1907.

The effort to sum up complicated economic relationships with colorful phrases often leads to distortion, as in the simplistic assertions about the causes of increased speculation or the reasons for the Great Depression. The worst, and perhaps unfair, example of such gaits is the inexplicable statement that Robert LaFollette pushed for physical evaluation of railroads “in order to determine how much excess capital the public was being required to pay dividends on.” Historians will be surprised to read that financial reformers were “on the defensive after the 1907 panic.” There is no mention of the National Monetary Commission or the Commission on Corporations, nor any meaningful references to the vast body of technical knowledge about speculation in the 1920’s. When confined to popular and political reactions to organized speculation the study has real merit, although marred by faults of conception and execution. It is a pity that the product of so much worthwhile labor could not have been more firmly placed in its appropriate context.

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*MORTON ROTHSTEIN*


American denominational colleges, whether established before or after our Civil War, have much in common. Accordingly, Lebanon Valley College, founded in 1866 by the United Brethren, a denomination which then was divided on the issue of collegiate education, has a history which seems in no way novel to persons acquainted with the development of other American church-related colleges in the nineteenth century. This college, however, is fortunate in having as its centennial historian an able scholar and an accomplished author, a man who served Lebanon Valley College as professor of English from 1925 to 1949. The history which he has written is well-balanced, well-illustrated, and very readable. It will be welcomed not only by all persons concerned about the accomplishments of Lebanon Valley College, but also by all persons interested in American collegiate education. It is the story of a dream of success coming true in a small college of liberal arts.

Like other comparable institutions, Lebanon Valley College kept up through long years a running fight with poverty. Again and again it needed
students, and again and again it lacked money. And it had other burdens to bear. Not only was it plagued by internal dissensions, but, in its youthful years, it was obliged to grope its way in an era of conflict between the “old education” and the “new education.” It chose the path of moderation, paying respectful attention to the long-established classical program, but making way for a three-year (later a four-year) scientific program. Moreover, it pioneered courageously and successfully in applying the “elective principle” and in keeping its doors open to women; and from its beginning it encouraged the study of music.

In still other and various ways we recognize the kinship of Lebanon Valley College in its early years with other American church-related colleges—in its literary societies, in its paternalistic government of its students, in its meager equipment, in its lack of an adequate library, and in its practice of granting the master’s degree to the holders of the bachelor’s degree who, after behaving themselves for three years, had five dollars to spare for such a luxury. Oddly, moreover, from our standpoint—but not from that of numerous other American colleges in the latter part of the nineteenth century—Lebanon Valley College toyed with the “big-time” idea of offering postgraduate courses leading to the degree of doctor of philosophy; and, mirabile dictu, it conferred this degree upon six persons between 1892 and 1898. But thereafter, in the words of its historian, “the College was to do itself credit by dropping the graduate work.”

The era of transition of Lebanon Valley College from uncertain times to better times came during the presidency of George Daniel Goddard, 1912-1932, when this college “entered a new world: that of a comfortably-endowed, fully-accredited modern American college of Liberal Arts.” Accreditation came in 1922, and substantial endowment came during and after the First World War. In the two decades of this administration, its curriculum was modernized, its faculty was enlarged, and its instruction was improved.

During the next three decades, Lebanon Valley College achieved its maturity. President Clyde A. Lynch (1932-1950) saw it through the troubled years of the Great Depression and of the Second World War, and also through the exciting years of the G.I. “explosion.” Since 1950, under the presidency of Dr. Frederic Keiper Miller, it has achieved the fulfillment of the dream of its founders by becoming “an institution of learning of high grade.” It has become a college good in the quality of its faculty, in the quality of its library, in the quality of its curriculum, in the quality of its instruction, in the quality of its students, and in the quality of its accommodations. No longer an institution with a parochial outlook, it is seeking in its centennial year to keep itself abreast of the times by constantly looking both inward and outward.

Salem, Oregon

J. ORIN OLIPHANT