EXPANSION AND ECONOMIC DEPRESSION AS FACTORS IN PENNSYLVANIA'S SUPPORT OF THE WAR OF 1812: AN APPLICATION OF THE PRATT AND TAYLOR THESES TO THE KEYSTONE STATE

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The publication of Henry Adams's History of the United States during the Administrations of Jefferson and Madison in 1890 suggested that the traditionally accepted maritime interpretations of the War of 1812 did not adequately explain the causes of that conflict. By 1902 the maritime interpretation had been sufficiently challenged to enable another historian to assert that the "grounds for war were singularly uncertain." This uncertainty led students to an intensive and as yet incomplete search for new and different explanations.¹

Aware of the fact that the leadership of the movement for war came from the West and the South, historians attempted to ascertain the factors which prompted these areas to favor war with Britain. Early explanations of Western motives stressed expansionist desire for Canada, fear of British intrigue among the Indians, and a highly developed sense of national honor among settlers on the frontier. When these explanations proved to be incomplete, other historians sought an answer in economic conditions. Thus, historians emphasizing different factors produced a variety of explanations for the war, and a major historiographical controversy developed among them.²

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The issues in this controversy were clearly drawn between those who argued, as did Louis Hacker, that desire for Canada was based on land hunger, and those who agreed with Julius Pratt that desire for Canada resulted from the Westerner's conviction that the British incited and supplied the renewed Indian uprisings on the frontier. The revival of Richard Hildreth's contention that the conquest of Canada was a method of carrying on the war, not a cause of it, further complicated the issue.3

The most detailed study of Western causes, Julius Pratt's *The Expansionists of 1812* temporarily settled the question of expansionist desire for Canada as a cause of the war, and won general acceptance for the contention that British intrigue among the Indians, not land hunger, was the primary motive in the West's desire for war. Pratt realized that the West did not have enough votes or influence to bring about a declaration of war, and he was forced to explain the South's equally strong support of it. He asserted, but never proved satisfactorily, that the South wanted Florida as much as the West wanted Canada, and for much the same reason: fear of Anglo-Spanish intrigue among the Indians. He then posited a Western-Southern alliance in which Congressmen from the two sections agreed to bring on a war through which each section could satisfy its ambitions. "There is," he asserted, "good evidence that before the declaration of war, northern and southern Republicans came to a definite understanding that the acquisition of Canada on the North was to be balanced by the acquisition of the Floridas on the South."4

Most historians who concern themselves with the Western causes of the war include western Pennsylvania as a part of the West, but say very little about Pennsylvania's role in the

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drive for war. No one has seriously suggested that Pennsylvania supported the war because of Indian troubles, expansionist ambitions, or economic depression, but neither has anyone attempted to deny that these motives were a factor in determining the state's attitude. Since Congressmen from Pennsylvania provided more votes in favor of the war than those from any other state, an understanding of the factors which motivated them is essential to an understanding of the causes of the war. The question of whether fear of the Indians, a drive for Canadian land, or acquiescence in a sectional bargain existed in Pennsylvania must be answered if the state's support for the war is to be understood.

Pratt's contention that among proponents of war there was no mention of a desire to annex Canada in order to add to agricultural acreage is substantiated by a study of Pennsylvania sources. Of a selection of Pennsylvania newspapers consulted by this writer, only two issues, appearing three years apart, mention annexation favorably. In January, 1809, the Pittsburgh Commonwealth reprinted an article from the Boston Sentinel which advocated the annexation of Canada in order to weaken England and "add to the power and revenue of the United States." Three years later the Commonwealth reported a toast at a Fourth of July celebration: "to Canada, may it soon be counted as another star in our political hemisphere." This toast was made after Madison had sent his war message and war sentiment had been aroused in Pennsylvania. However, no similar annexationist sentiments were expressed in twelve other celebrations of that Independence Day reported in the Pittsburgh newspapers. The same is true of other reports of Fourth of July celebrations in the Washington Reporter, the Carlisle Gazette, the Philadelphia Aurora, and the Pennsylvania Gazette. There was hardly a general advocacy of annexation.

There is, moreover, a great deal of evidence to the contrary. Some members of the Pennsylvania Congressional delegation specifically opposed annexation on the floor of the House, and none ever spoke in favor of it. John Smilie, the dean of the delegation in terms of age and years of service, announced that "we should be justified in carrying [a war] into the enemy's territory

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5 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, January 25, 1809.
6 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, July 17, 1812.
only in order to bring it to a speedy conclusion.” William Findley, a representative from western Pennsylvania, opposed taking any territory “unless it became necessary in our defence.” William Milnor, Adam Seybert of Philadelphia, and Joseph Lefever all spoke against annexation.  

If they mentioned the question at all, Pennsylvania newspapers also opposed annexation. In a widely reprinted article opposing naval expansion, the *Aurora* argued that a navy is an offensive weapon “calculated to extend territory,” and asked: “Do we want to extend our soil when we already have more than we can cultivate?” The Federalist *Pennsylvania Gazette* opposed annexation on the ground that republican governments have no business undertaking a war of “plunder and rapine,” and warned that any attempt to capture Canada would fail. 

Even after the declaration of war it is difficult to find annexationist sentiment. In June, 1812, the House passed a resolution authorizing the President to issue a proclamation assuring the citizens of Canada protection of their “lives, property, and religion” should it become necessary for the United States to invade their territory. The normally united Pennsylvania delegation opposed it, ten to six, with two members not voting. In the Senate, where the House resolution was defeated, both Pennsylvania Senators voted against it. 

Pratt’s belief that land hunger could not have been a cause for war because there was abundant unsettled land awaiting cultivation also proves true for Pennsylvania. There was a great deal of unsettled land available in the westernmost counties of the state. Erie, Butler, Venango, Warren, and Crawford Counties each had a population of less than nine thousand, and the average was less than four thousand five hundred. Much of the area of these counties was in the hands of speculators, but it was available to farmers. The reports of the state auditor and treasurer show that the state sold large amounts of land in the six years preceding the war. Significantly, these were sales of relatively small lots, at a price generally between 80 cents and $1.00 per

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2 Philadelphia: *Aurora*, October 11, 1811.
3 *The Pennsylvania Gazette* (Philadelphia), October 1, 1811.
5 *Pennsylvania Senate Journal*, 1810-1811, Appendix I.
acre, and never in excess of $1.25 per acre. The availability of land, combined with the profitability of small farms, made expansion unnecessary for Pennsylvania farmers.

The roll of inhabitants of Warren County demonstrates that farms were small. The average plot appears to have been between 100 and 150 acres, with a great majority of farms having less than 100 acres. Warren County was very sparsely settled, and in the counties to the south and east farms were still smaller.

While a study of Pennsylvania supports Pratt's contention that land hunger played no role in developing war sentiment in that state, it does not so conclusively support his statement that "preoccupation with the Indian danger... and the British hostility thought to be lurking behind it... explains" the West's desire for war with England.

At times some Pennsylvanians expressed fear of the Indians, but they did not always connect Indian uprisings with British intrigue. At other times Pennsylvanians expressed specific denials of any fear from the Indians.

The last Indian murder west of Pittsburgh of which there is any record occurred before 1800. The "Wyoming Massacre" of 1778 actually marked the end of any serious Indian problem in the state. Histories of the state, as well as histories of its counties, indicate that there was little concern with the Indian menace until the summer of 1807.

News of the Chesapeake incident did produce a host of reports of Indian murder. The Pittsburgh Commonwealth, which had supported a toast "to our Indian brethren" in its July fourth issue, began to carry reports of Indian depredations, noting murders in Fort Wayne, Detroit, and Florida—but none in Pennsylvania. Between the end of July, 1807, and the end of January, 1808, the Commonwealth carried more reports of Indian incidents than it had in the two previous years. The reports, however, do not blame the British for the incidents. The only indication that Benjamin Brown, the editor, even considered this possibility was

12 Income from the sale of state lands can be found on Table Two.
13 J. S. Schenck, ed., History of Warren County (Syracuse, 1887), 127-130.
14 Pratt, "Western War Aims," 50.
an article reprinted from the Philadelphia *Aurora* calling for the annexation of Canada in order to end Indian hostility.  

Other newspapers, which also increased their coverage of Indian affairs after the *Chesapeake* incident, did emphasize the connection between the Indians and the British. The Carlisle *Gazette* informed its readers that "a traveller just arrived from Detroit" reported "the prevailing opinion of the British settlements is that there will be war." He accused the British of "generously supplying" and "keeping in readiness" about 3,000 warriors, who "under the auspices of the British will undertake a general massacre" when war is declared. The *Aurora* published reports that the British were "pouring" men and arms into Canada. With every increase in the British force, there was a proportionate increase in Indian activity on both the Northern and Southern frontiers. This nation, the editor, William Duane, told his readers, would never be free of Indian wars until the British were driven from the continent.

Although such evidence partially supports an important aspect of Pratt's thesis, the evidence refuting it is even stronger. The number of incidents on the frontier did not in fact increase in the summer and fall of 1807, nor did British aid to the Indians increase in the period. The renewed interest in Indian affairs and the efforts to connect the British with Indian uprisings are more indicative of a rush of anti-British feeling resulting from the *Chesapeake* affair than of a growing fear of the Indians.

At the same time that the press became more concerned with the Indians, other evidence indicates a continuing lack of fear of the Indian menace. The debates in the state legislature exhibit no fear for the safety of the state's frontiers. The Senate did receive one petition from a militia division in the western part of the state praying for increased protection from the Indians. Significantly, neither the petition nor the Senate debate mentions any British influence among the Indians. The Senate did pass by

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16 Pittsburgh *Commonwealth*, September 16, 1807.  
17 *Pittsburgh Gazette*, August 4, October 13, December 5, 1807; *Washington Reporter*, August 16, September 9, 1807, January 4, 1808; Carlisle *Gazette*, August 9, 16, 1807.  
18 Carlisle *Gazette*, January 8, 1808.  
19 Philadelphia *Aurora*, July 1, 9, 1807.  
a very narrow margin a bill for the “defence of the northern and western frontier,” but the House did not even consider it.21

In the same session the Pennsylvania House denied a petition from the citizens of Erie County praying to be furnished with arms to defend themselves against the Indians, on the ground that the danger was “remote.” Again, neither the petition nor the House debate referred to an Anglo-Indian alliance.22

In every session after 1805 the Pennsylvania legislature passed resolutions approving of the conduct of foreign affairs by the national government. Every one of these resolutions lists grievances against England, but only the resolution passed in December, 1812, mentions aid to the Indians.23

In Washington, William Findley was the only representative from Pennsylvania who mentioned Indian troubles during the Tenth Congress. Arguing against postponing consideration of a bill to increase the military establishment, he stated that on the northwestern frontier “the alarm is considerable and the danger apparent.” As proof he cited the aforementioned bill passed by the state Senate. In this speech he did not try to implicate the British.24

By the end of February, 1808, when excitement over the Chesapeake incident abated, concern with the Indian problem subsided also. From the spring of 1808 until the summer of 1811 there were very few references to Indian hostilities in the Pennsylvania press. Most of these were simply reprints from Western and Southern newspapers.

As news of the Wabash confederation drifted eastward, interest in Indian affairs grew apace, surpassing the 1807 level by the summer of 1811. Republican newspapers made no effort to explain the renewed Indian hostility, concentrating instead on a review of the “friendly,” “just,” and “honorable” Indian policy of Jefferson and Madison.25 Federalist newspapers, which devoted much more space to Indian uprisings, made a very distinct effort to blame the administration for them. The Indians, the Federalist press contended, had not been treated fairly, and there was some

23 Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 1812-1813, 46.
24 Annals of Congress, 10 Cong., 1 Sess., 1521-1522.
25 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, August 7, 1811; Carlisle Gazette, July 29, 1811; Washington Reporter, July 23, 1811; Pittsburgh Mercury, July 23, 1811; Philadelphia Aurora, June 18, 23, July 22, 1811.
justification for their hostility. These papers also provided much more vivid pictures of the devastation and brutality of Indian warfare, strongly suggesting that things would get worse if the United States declared war against them or against Great Britain. Before the battle of Tippecanoe neither Republicans nor Federalists linked the British with the resurgent Indian uprisings during the summer and early fall of 1811.

After that battle the Republican press blamed the entire affair on the British and echoed the sentiment of the Aurora that there "can be no security against the savages" until the British are driven from Canada. The Federalist press attempted to explain away the evidence of British aid by arguing that British weapons had been planted among the Indians by Americans in order to create further excitement and agitation against Great Britain. Another explanation offered was that Indian hostilities had been incited by greedy land speculators who knew full well that the Indians would be defeated and driven from their land.

In Washington, William Findley explained that he would vote in favor of the increase in the military establishment proposed by the foreign relations committee because the situation on the frontier demanded it. Admitting that "we have at present no such explicit proof [as we had in 1794] that the Indians . . . are acting as British allies, yet we have as much proof as the nature of the case can afford." It should be noted, however, that of the six other Pennsylvania representatives who spoke in favor of the report, not one supported it on similar grounds. Findley himself said that "more has been said about taking Canada than was necessary," and that "threats of taking Canada [are] improper."

By the end of the year concern with the Indian problem again subsided, and there were few reports of Indian hostility until April of 1812. In that month the press began to devote considerable space to Indian massacres, the coverage growing more complete in May and early June. Still, there was no attempt to link the renewal of the Indian wars with the British in Canada.

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Pittsburgh Gazette, September 29, October 23, November 6, 1811; Pennsylvania Gazette, September 9, 23, October 17, November 16, 1811. 
Aurora, December 14, 1811. 
Pittsburgh Gazette, December 19, 1811, January 16, 23, July 24, 1812; Pennsylvania Gazette, January 15, 22, February 5, July 9, 1812. 
Pittsburgh Commonwealth, April 28, May 19, June 9, 23, 1812; Pittsburgh Gazette, March 20, April 17, June 12, 1812.
Apparently, the renewed Indian activity was considered a part of the intermittent frontier war, rather than the result of British aggression and intrigue.  

This was a period during which it could be expected that the British would have been blamed for the Indian war, even if no evidence existed to prove it. The fact that they were not indicates that Pennsylvanians were more concerned with the Indians than with any alleged Anglo-Indian alliance. Even the Governor of Pennsylvania reflected this attitude. In his general orders for the drafting and organization of the 14,000 militia which the President had ordered into federal service, the Governor devoted a great deal of attention to maritime grievances, but only one sentence to the Indian menace.  

The Washington *Reporter*, one of the few important newspapers between Pittsburgh and the Ohio border, provides a good index to shifting attitudes towards the Indians. More than other Pennsylvania newspapers, it reprinted articles reporting Indian incidents from Ohio and Indiana newspapers. However, it took little cognizance of these events in its own columns. The *Reporter* was a pro-war newspaper and missed few chances to list American grievances against England or to demand that the United States protect its rights, its honor, and its independence. Every catalogue of American grievances includes impressment, blockades, the orders-in-council, and specific maritime incidents. With the exception of a few issues after the *Chesapeake* affair, and again after the battle of Tippecanoe, neither the Anglo-Indian alliance nor Indian hostility is included in the *Reporter’s* lists of grievances from 1806 to June, 1812. It seems, then, that before the war concern with British intrigue among the Indians was not an overriding interest of Pennsylvanians.  

As soon as the war began, however, stories of past and present Indian atrocities became numerous, and a great deal of evidence was produced to prove that Indian hostilities had been instigated by the British. The Pittsburgh *Commonwealth*, commenting on the savagery with which the Indians waged war, insisted that "Every man . . . well remembers that for many months preceding the declaration of war our western border had witnessed similar

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32 *Pittsburgh Commonwealth*, May 2, 5, 1812.  
33 *Pennsylvania Archives*, 2 Series, XII, 557.
scenes [of destruction] and the fact was established that EVEN IN PEACE A PRICE WAS PAID FOR THESE MURDERS by the British. . . . Every schoolboy knows that the encouragement of these butcheries was one of the causes instead of being an effect of war.” It warned that only a “victorious conclusion of the war under the leadership of President Madison can bring peace to the frontier.” Those who demanded the election of DeWitt Clinton in the naive belief that the signing of a peace would end the atrocities had forgotten the past. Only by driving the British from Canada could peace on the frontier be assured.33

Richard Rush, comptroller general of the United States in the early part of the war, informed his friend Charles J. Ingersoll:

I would not make peace while a single vestige of impressment or the Indian question remained unsatisfied. . . . What a magnificent provocation and justification of war they present! What are the Nookta Sounds, the Falkland Island . . . the taxation without representation —aye even this—what the three pence a pound on tea, all the questions and entanglements about limits, ceremonies, navigations, trade[,] burning ships at sea, monopolies and all the other puny causes . . . compared with the naked enormity of these two.34

British use of Indian savages, Rush insisted, “superimposed a new question in the relationship between the two countries,” a question “on which there must be perfect understanding” before negotiations could be begun. “I mean the employment of the Indian force. . . . My language then would be to Britain disavow explicitly this act of your deputies in Canada and give us the most absolute guarantee that it will never be done in the future.” Until such a guarantee was received, “we would as a matter of future precaution be compelled to carry on the war.”35 Correspondents of Jonathan Roberts, another representative from Pennsylvania, and the Pennsylvania press expressed similar sentiments after the declaration of war.

33 Pittsburgh Commonwealth, October 6, 1812. See also the Philadelphia Aurora, November 11, 1812: Carlisle Gazette, December 2, 1812; Washington Reporter, October 11, 1812, for similar statements.
35 Rush to Ingersoll, November 15, 1812, Ingersoll Papers, HSP.
In fact, another reason for taking Canada was produced after hostilities began. Referring to the attempts of John Henry to foment civil war in New England, the Carlisle Gazette demanded "the severing of Canada from the British empire." If Canada was to be used as a base for sowing dissension among the states, it could not be allowed to remain under British rule. In a letter complaining of Congressional immobility, Edward Fox told Roberts that the Henry affair "has been a most fortunate discovery. The actual fixing of interference of the British government must put ours on a strong ground." Joseph Burke, who had "no other claim to your attention... than the simple circumstance of being one of your constituents," wrote Roberts concerning the Henry affair: "Until within a very few days I would not permit myself to believe that there was any danger of a war with England... at this time but I confess that my opinion is now verging to contrary side." Roberts himself felt "the papers communicated by Henry" were "ample proof of the consummate perfidy and iniquity" of the British government. The resolutions of the Pennsylvania legislature cite the attempt "to kindle dissatisfaction, discord, rebellion, and civil war" by use of "secret emissaries sent from Canada" as a cause for war. The Governor in his general orders to detached militia also alluded to the "discord sown amongst our people by an accredited agent of the British government." Neither the legislature nor the Governor had ever mentioned this incident in their pre-war pronouncements.

British intrigue among the Indians or desire to drive the British out of Canada for other reasons did not become a cause of the war until after it was declared. The Anglo-Indian connection and

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389 John Henry was alleged to be a British agent sent to New England by Canadian officials supposedly to persuade Federalists there to detach the area from the United States. Failing to do that, he sold his papers to the Republican administration under circumstances that are still mysterious. Madison then used the inconclusive information bought from Henry to attack the Federalists and referred to it in his war message. Henry Adams contended that this incident was not significant in the development of war sentiment, but the evidence indicates that, at least in Pennsylvania, the Henry disclosures aroused some indignation. See Adams, History, 17, 179-184.

39 Carlisle Gazette, March 20, 1812; Philadelphia Aurora, July 2, 1812; Fox to Roberts, March 18, 1812; Joseph Burke to Roberts, March 20, 1812; Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, March 14, 1812, Roberts Papers, HSP.

38 Pennsylvania Senate Journal, 1812-1813, 46; Pennsylvania Archives, 2 Ser., XII, 557.
British possession of Canada were used by the Republicans as political issues to discredit the Clintonians in the presidential campaign of 1812, and as an excuse for continuing the war after one of the avowed causes for declaring it, the orders-in-council, had been removed.

Pratt also suggests that British competition in the fur trade played a role in developing pro-war sentiment, the hope being that with the British expelled from Canada, American interests would gain complete control of the fur trade. The comments of some Western Congressmen support this contention, but none of these Congressmen were from Pennsylvania, and desire to win the fur trade played no role in developing war sentiment in the state.

Around the turn of the century Pittsburgh had been a major center of the fur trade. Colonel James O'Hara did a thriving business in furs, getting most of his pelts from the Indians. At that time complete control of the fur trade would have been welcome to the citizens of Pittsburgh. Joseph McFerron, one of his western factors, told O'Hara that he hoped "England might be driven from this trade."

As fur traders moved to more fruitful areas west of the Mississippi, Pittsburgh lost its position as a major center of the trade, and by 1810 furs ceased to play an important role in the city's economy. Neither Cranmer's Pittsburgh Almanac nor the Pittsburgh Directory listed it as an important business, and there was no mention of it in the press or the speeches of Pennsylvania Congressmen. Evidently the fur trade was no longer an important factor in the state's economy, and it was not a factor in determining attitudes toward war.

The evidence shows that desire to take Canada either because of greed for more land or out of fear of British intrigue among the Indians did not contribute significantly to the growth of pro-war sentiment in Pennsylvania.

Historians studying other sections or studying the development of American attitudes generally have also been dissatisfied with Pratt's explanation. They account for the prominent position Can-

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20 Pratt, Expansionists of 1812, 27, 188.
21 Joseph McFerron to Col. James O'Hara, June 20, 1802, Denny-O'Hara Papers, Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh.
22 McFerron to O'Hara, November 8, 1800, Denny-O'Hara Papers, HSWP.
23 Cranmer's Pittsburgh Almanac, 1811, also for 1812, 1813, 1814.
held in the correspondence, speeches, and newspapers of the
day by reviving Hildreth's suggestion that an attack on Canada
was to be a method of fighting the war, not an object of it.43

Many Pennsylvanians who had no desire for more land and no
fear of the Indians favored an attack on Canada as a tactical
objective. In the available correspondence of the period, this theme
is more prevalent than any other.

Soon after the Chesapeake incident, Jesse Higgins wrote Jonath-
athan Roberts that if Britain did not disavow the action and assure
American rights, the United States would have to fight. "The
principal means of annoyance in our power is the seizure of Canada
and sequestration of British debts."44 Findley's opposition to taking
Canada has already been noted. His speech on the subject con-
cludes, however, with the statement that the best way "to carry
on defensive war is by offensive operation." We had been at-
tacked from Canada before, he warned the House, and might well be
attacked from there again. If the appropriation for increasing the
militia and the regular force were not passed, "The President
could not employ the national force to prevent invasion" either
by "carrying the war into enemy territory, or pursuing him."45

Later in the session he returned to the same argument. After
being asked to explain a vote he had cast in 1794 in favor of naval
armaments in view of his present opposition to naval expansion,
Findley told the House that in 1794 he had favored expansion of
the navy and opposed expansion of the army because our most
likely enemy, France, could be attacked only at sea. Now the
situation was reversed. Our enemy, he claimed, was one whom we
could not match at sea, but to whom we could do great harm with
our army simply by marching across the Canadian border.46

Senator Andrew Gregg, who was at best only a lukewarm sup-
porter of war, wrote William Jones that he opposed war, but if
it must come, "I have considered Britain as the enemy of my
choice. . . . She was the first and greatest agressor . . . [and]
against her we have some power to retaliate” by attacking Canada and “harassing her commerce.”

In the winter and spring of 1812 demands for an attack on Canada increased, and they became even more insistent after war was declared. Arguing in favor of the report of the foreign relations committee, Jonathan Roberts supported an increase in the regular force because an attack on Canada would be a most effective operation. He was supported by constituents and friends in Pennsylvania. John Connelly, a Republican member of the Pennsylvania legislature, wrote that he approved of Roberts’s opposition to naval expansion because no matter how large a navy we constructed we would not match England. A large army, on the other hand, would be essential if we were to attack Great Britain where she was most vulnerable: in Canada. James Evans, a member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, informed Roberts that many legislators saw no way to fight the war except by an attack on Canada.

Discussing demands for a war against France as well as England, William Jones told Roberts that “Even if the aggrevations of the two powers were so equal that a feather would turn the scale, practical considerations would point to that foe whose commerce contiguity of territory and internal resources we can most effectively assail.” Only Great Britain “is extremely vulnerable on all these points.”

The Philadelphia *Aurora* summed up the opinion of the press when it told its readers that they should not “inquire or calculate how many millions the conquest of Canada will put into the treasury of the U. S.” Rather, they should ask “what injury this conquest will do our enemy . . . and what we may gain by a restoration . . . at the conclusion of a peace.”

Richard Rush wrote Ingersoll that the capture of Canada was “the path of safety, honor, popularity, [and] triumphs.” The vic-

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47 Andrew Gregg to William Jones, April 10, 1810, William Jones Papers, HSP.
49 Wm. Jones to Jonathan Roberts, May 27, 1812, Wm. Jones Papers, HSP.
50 *Philadelphia Aurora*, July 8, 1812.
tory of our arms in Canada would greatly retrieve "the honor lost in years of docile submission." The Pittsburgh Mercury announced that "the road to a lasting and honorable peace lies through Canada."

Defending his party against Federalist allegations that the Canadian campaign had turned the war from a defensive to an offensive one, Charles J. Ingersoll argued that a good offense had always been the best defense, and that the fact that we had undertaken offensive operations did not necessarily mean that we were engaged in offensive war. The object had not been territorial aggrandizement, but tactical and strategic advantage. The attack on Canada was the best way to "make our mighty foe sensible of American power."

While the evidence is not conclusive, it strongly suggests that that portion of Pratt's thesis which deals with Canada and the Indians does not apply to Pennsylvania. On the other hand, many Pennsylvanians who would not go to war to acquire Canada did believe that if a war had to be fought, an attack on Canada promised the best possibility of bringing it to a speedy and victorious conclusion.

Pratt's second major proposition, that Southern desire for Florida made possible a pro-war alliance between Southern and Western Congressmen, has been generally repudiated by recent students of the war. A close study of Pennsylvania sources substantiates this repudiation. There is simply no evidence that desire for Florida or acquiescence in a sectional bargain in any way prompted Pennsylvania's support for the war. During the war there was some sentiment for taking Florida to deny Britain a strategically important possession, but this was a tactical consideration, not a cause of the war. There was no mention of Florida in connection with war against Britain before the war.

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51 Richard Rush to C. J. Ingersoll, December 20, 1812, Ingersoll Papers, HSP.
52 Pittsburgh Mercury, January 21, 1813.
55 See Connelly to Roberts, April 25, May 21, 26, 1812, Fox to Roberts, April 19, 1812, Roberts Papers, HSP.
This assertion does not deny that Pennsylvanians felt a very real desire for Florida, but merely affirms that this desire was not a cause for war. Pennsylvania Congressmen strongly supported Madison’s occupation of West Florida in October of 1810, and later in the session voted in favor of legislation authorizing him to take East Florida under certain conditions. During a full-scale debate on Florida in the Eleventh Congress, fifteen of the state’s eighteen Congressmen invariably voted with the administration. In all, twenty-seven ballots were taken on the Florida question in a secret session, and on each one the delegation split fifteen to three. William Milnor, Robert Jenkins, and John Hiester, the last two the only Federalists in the delegation, always voted with the minority. When this debate was made public, the Republican press in Pennsylvania unanimously approved the decision of Congress and the votes of the state’s Republican representatives. This strong support for occupation and eventual annexation of the Spanish possession only reflects loyalty to a cherished Republican dream for possession of the Floridas and cannot be produced as evidence of a cause for the war. It was but another effort to take Florida which occurred concurrently with other factors which were bringing on war.

Briefly, then, it can be stated that neither desire for Canada or Florida nor fear of the Indians prompted Pennsylvania support for the war. The Pratt thesis does not apply to Pennsylvania.

Pratt’s analysis of the factors which prompted the West and the South to support the war left so many questions unanswered and created so many new problems that new approaches had to be found. The revisionist interpretation concentrated more on economic than political factors.

George R. Taylor broke new ground in two articles describing economic conditions on the frontier. He concluded that “Western agriculture suffered . . . a severe economic depression in the years just before the war, and this depression was an important factor in determining the support which the frontier gave first to the

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51 The House debate can be found in the *Annals of Congress*, 11 Cong., 3 Sess., 1117-1147.
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embargo and non-intercourse, and finally to war.\(^6^9\) Although he draws very little of his evidence from Pennsylvania sources, he includes the western part of the state in his frontier.\(^6^0\)

Taking her cue from Taylor, Margaret K. Latimer studied economic conditions in South Carolina and concluded that war sentiment in that state resulted from a disastrous depression in the price of cotton for which the planters blamed Britain's commercial restrictions. She strongly implied that her findings could be applied to the whole Cotton South. She further intimated that it was not a political alliance but the common bond of economic disaster that united Western and Southern Congressmen behind the administration's foreign policy and drove Madison to demand war.\(^6^1\)

This economic interpretation has received much better treatment at the hands of historians than the interpretations associated with Pratt; however, while it might satisfactorily explain Southern and Western support for the war, it does not explain that of Pennsylvania. Close study of economic conditions in Pennsylvania reveals that the state, including the western counties, did not suffer an economic depression between 1808 and 1812. On the contrary, most indications are that the period was one of increasing prosperity and that Pennsylvania's support of the war cannot be attributed to economic depression.\(^6^2\) An analysis of prices and advertisements found in the newspapers demonstrates that, in fact, there was no depression in Pennsylvania.

Hemp, barley, rye, shelled wheat, and corn sold at prices at or above their pre-Embargo level after the passage of that legislation, and showed significant increases in 1811 and, again, after the passage of the ninety-day embargo in April, 1812. There were fluctuations in the prices of each of these staples, but there is no relationship between price fluctuations and the passage of commercial legislation.\(^6^3\)

\(^6^0\) George R. Taylor, "Prices in the Mississippi Valley Preceding the War of 1812," 471.
\(^6^1\) Taylor, "Agrarian Discontent in the Mississippi Valley Preceding the War of 1812," 475, 481.
\(^6^2\) Latimer, "South Carolina—A Protagonist of the War of 1812," 914-930.
\(^6^4\) For the price of hemp, see Pittsburgh Gazette, April 14-28, 1807, December 7, 1808-April 12, 1809. For other quotations of the price of hemp, see Pittsburgh Commonwealth, June 18, 1807, January 23, 1808, July 13,
The prices of staples in western Pennsylvania remained high because there was an adequate domestic market for them. In 1815 Pittsburgh breweries alone consumed twenty to thirty thousand bushels of grain from the surrounding area. From the steady increase in the number of grist mills it can be assumed that production of flour and meal increased also. "Much whiskey was produced" in Pittsburgh, providing still another outlet for grain farmers. Bacon and ham were also produced "in large quantities." This would indicate that there were hogs raised in large number which absorbed some of the grain production in the area.

What could not be sold in Pittsburgh was easily disposed of in Ohio, Kentucky and Tennessee. Erasmus Wilson estimated that sales of manufactured and agricultural products in those states netted a profit of $1,000,000 to the Pittsburgh area. The account books and correspondence in the Denny-O'Hara collection show that firm to have been heavily involved in trade with the West. The firm retained at least three permanent agents in the area: one in Lexington, Kentucky, one in Memphis, Tennessee, and one in Cleveland, Ohio. Another Pittsburgh merchant, Isaac Craig, did a great deal of business in western Virginia, especially in agricultural produce.

Obviously, the farmers of western Pennsylvania were not ad-

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1810, January 21, 28, 1813; Washington Reporter, July 9, 1807, January 5, 1810, February 17, 1813. For barley, see Pittsburgh Gazette, August 26-November 4, 1806, August 18-November 17, 1808, January 12-April 12, 1808. Compare with September 14, 1808-March 22, 1809. For rye, ibid., December 20, 1810, November 23, 1811; Pittsburgh Commonwealth, January 21, 1812, for example. For shelled corn, see Pittsburgh Gazette, August 14, 1807, November 11, 1807, February 3, 1808, March 16, 1809, January 24-March 13, 1812, March 20 to June 5, 1812, September 11 to November 4, 1812; Pittsburgh Commonwealth, June 12, to August 18, September 1 to November 4, 1812. For shelled wheat, see Pittsburgh Gazette, August 14, 1807, November 11, 1807, January 23, 1808, October 19, 1810, February 1, 8, 15, 1811, January 24 to June 5, 1812, June 12 to July 31, August 8 to October 2, 1812; Pittsburgh Commonwealth, September 7, November 4, 1807, February 11, 1808, July 15, 1811, to June 9, 1812, September 1 to October 6, 1812.

64 See, e.g., Denny-O'Hara account books, January, 1809, May, 1810, February, 1811; O'Hara to Reed, July 16, 1810; O'Hara to McFerron, January 26, 1811; Denny-O'Hara Papers, HSWP; Neville Craig to Isaac Craig, April 14, 1809, May 6, 1811, April 29, 1812, Isaac Craig Papers, Carnegie Library, Pittsburgh.

65 Wilson, Pittsburgh, 152-159

66 Cramer's Pittsburgh Almanac, 1809, 34-38, 1810, 52-58; Erasmus Wilson, Standard History of Pittsburgh (Chicago, 1898), 148; J. M. Riddle, Pittsburgh Directory (Pittsburgh, 1815), 140.
versely affected by the commercial legislation of Jefferson and Madison.

The same seems to have been true of the rest of the state. An index of wholesale commodity prices in Philadelphia based on a study of twenty commodities provides interesting figures. The index fluctuated from a high of 125 in January of 1807 to a low of 115 in May, June, and July of that year, reaching 120 in the two months preceding the embargo. Wholesale commodity prices declined precipitously in the first half of 1808, reaching a low of 103 in August. They began to rise in that month and continued rising to a high of 142 in February of 1811. The index remained relatively high until after the declaration of war, when it began to soar, reaching 186 in December of 1813 and 200 a year later.

Other statistical studies substantiate these figures, which show that while there was a sharp decline in the price of the most common commodities sold in Philadelphia immediately after the enactment of the Embargo legislation, the economy adjusted quickly, reached or surpassed pre-Embargo levels within a year, and did not react adversely to subsequent commercial restrictions.

The less systematic compilation of Timothy Pitkin bears out this contention. Summarizing the information contained in his many charts, Pitkin asserts that prices for the most important products of the Middle Atlantic states actually increased after the embargo. Using Pitkin's figures and many that have come to light since, Norman Risjord shows that the value of these products "nearly doubled" in 1810 and 1811.

The account books in the Denny-O'Hara papers show that the volume of business grew constantly. From the fall of 1807 to the outbreak of the war, the number of sales and the variety of products sold increased steadily.

Especially interesting is the increasing volume in such items as cloth, gloves, stockings, ladies' gloves, silk, silk ribbons, and

buttons. This increase would imply that people in the Pittsburgh area had the money with which to buy these luxury items. The constantly rising volume of wood, nails, tools, and farm implements indicates that there was a growing amount of building and improvement. At the same time, prices remained relatively stable. Three pairs of plain gloves cost $3.37 ½ on April 8, 1810; one pair of gloves was sold for $1.15 in January of 1814. On July 7, 1810, one scrubbing bucket and one scrubbing brush cost $1.81. The price was the same in February, 1813. A scrubbing brush alone cost fifty cents in April, 1810; fifty-two cents in May of 1814. The price of cloth varied from a low of $.87 ½ for a quarter yard in April, 1810, to a high of $1.27 a quarter yard in June, 1811. But the entries in the account books do not indicate the type of cloth involved in these transactions, and the difference in prices probably indicates a difference in quality rather than higher prices for cloth. For example, the account of Peter Colt carries a sale of a quarter yard of cloth at $.91 on April 2, 1810, and a sale of one yard at $4.22 on April 13, 1810. Whiskey remained at a steady forty cents per gallon from 1807 to 1813.

The account books show that most transactions were in cash and that all accounts were usually paid in full. The managers made a few loans to cover purchases, but these were generally small loans to established customers, and were always paid promptly.70 The Day Book of Beeson’s Store in Pittsburgh also indicates a lively and profitable business. The very fact that the store opened and prospered after the passage of the Embargo is a strong indication that economic conditions could not have been too bad.71 Another general store prospered in Pittsburgh, but complete records are not available before 1813 and no generalizations can be made from it. It is known that it was in operation in 1808, and there is no reason to doubt that it was prosperous before the war.72

The newspapers of western Pennsylvania carry numerous advertisements of new stores opening and soliciting business. All promised to pay high prices and to sell at reasonable rates. In 1811 and 1812 many of these advertisements stated that the stores would sell only goods of domestic manufactures, thereby “satisfy-

70 Denny-O’Hara Account Book, 1807 to 1812, Denny-O’Hara Papers, HSWP.
71 Day Book of Beeson’s Store, Armour Collection, HSWP.
72 Dunbar Furnace Daybook, Armour Collection, HSWP.
ing the wishes of patriots" and "encouraging such manufactories by providing an outlet for their goods." The many notices of the opening of new iron foundries, nail manufactories, cotton mills, and fulling and carding mills show that domestic manufacturing did increase after 1810.78 The number of cotton spindles in Pittsburgh rose steadily from 160 in 1806 to 294 in 1810 and 822 in 1814.74

Cramer's Almanack announced in 1807 that Pittsburgh "is growing rapidly and prospering greatly," as could be seen in the erection of factories. "She has an extensive glass factory . . . a factory of cotton . . . an air furnace . . . several nail factories, two extensive breweries whose beer and porter is equal to that so much celebrated in London." To these "a large steam grist mill . . . the first in the county . . . to these copper and tin factories, a paper factory, two rope walks . . . and many other useful manufactories" were to be added.75

The next year Cramer promised that "we will see all heavy articles manufactured among ourselves. . . . There is at least $20,000 worth of hardware sold out of our stores which ought to be made on the spot." Other signs of growth to which he pointed with pride were building statistics. Last year "there were built 80 dwellings—this season, about 100 is on the way."76

These facts, though admittedly incomplete and therefore not conclusive, do not reflect depression conditions in western Pennsylvania. A similar conclusion can be reached from equally incomplete figures in central and eastern Pennsylvania.

Between 1800 and 1810 the area of cleared land in Somerset County grew from 27,756 to 48,874 acres. The number of cabins increased from 836 to 901, while the number of houses grew from 413 to 499. There was a marked increase in the number of grist mills, saw mills, and fulling and carding mills, as well as an increase in the amount of livestock.77 Figures for Bedford County

75 See, e.g., Washington Reporter, July 11, September 14, November 5, 12, December 10, 1811, January 27, 1812. Pittsburgh Commonwealth, February 7, 28, March 7, April 21, June 16, July 14, 1811, February 15, 1812.
76 J. N. Boucher, A Century and a Half of Pittsburgh and Her People (New York, 1908), 507-201.
77 Cramer's Pittsburgh Almanack, 1808, 57.
78 Ibid., 1809, 56-59.
indicate similar conditions. In Delaware County in eastern Pennsylvania farmers had many incentives "to improve their lands and thereby increase their products" in the pre-war period. "The people [of our county] were in a prosperous condition." Farmers found ready markets for their crops, and "many new mills were established and profited greatly by . . . the demands of the citizens in Philadelphia and other places." Other county histories provide similar examples of prosperity for farmers. The standard history of Philadelphia comments that "Everywhere in Philadelphia the germs of great industrial enterprise were taking root. . . . Philadelphia was becoming an industrial and commercial metropolis," providing the western part of the state with almost every necessity. Reporting on his visit to Philadelphia in 1806, John Melish was impressed with the importance of manufacturing in the city and its overall prosperous appearance. Returning in 1811 he was impressed by the rapid progress the city had made. "Many new important manufactures had been established flourished in an eminent degree." In 1811 he reported from Pittsburgh that manufactures were as well established as in the eastern parts of the state. He estimated the manufactures of Pittsburgh at "more than a million dollars annually." This, he calculated, resulted in "a capital accumulation of $700,000 annually to be invested [in] further expansion of manufacturing."

The economic posture and activity of the state government and the comments of political leaders provide more evidence which deny depression. Every year from 1805 to 1814 the state had a handsome surplus. (See Table One.) During this decade expenditures were rising annually, and the state's income was rising

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8 Ibid., 184-189.
9 George Smith, History of Delaware County, Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1862), 351-353.
10 See, e.g., I. H. M'Cauley, Historical Sketch of Franklin County, Pennsylvania (Chambersburg, 1878); Samuel E. Bates, History of Erie County (Chicago, 1884); Joseph Henderson Bausman, History of Beaver County, Pennsylvania (New York, 1904); Alfred Creigh, History of Washington County (Harrisburg, 1871); William H. Egle, History of the Counties of Dauphin and Lebanon in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1883).
12 John Melish, Travels through the United States of North America in the Years 1806 and 1807, and 1809, 1810 and 1811 (Philadelphia, 1815), I, 153; II, 3.
13 Ibid., II, 55-57.
more rapidly than its expenditures. By far the largest source of income was from sale of lands, not only indicating, as has been shown, that land was available, but that it was desirable.

The messages of the governors also paint pictures of prosperity. In December of 1805 Thomas McKean informed the legislature that “the prosperity of Pennsylvania conspicuously displays the industry . . . of her citizens” and “surpasses the most ardent expectations” of the government and the people. The following year he repeated this sentiment. The legislature expressed gratification at the picture of prosperity which the governor had painted, taking it as “proof . . . of the policies of the government . . . and the benefits of republican institutions.” The years after 1808 were also prosperous ones for the state.84 In his first annual message the newly elected Governor, Simon Snyder, congratulated the state on its prosperity. Remarking favorably on the increase in construction, the large increase in cleared acreage, and the progress being made in bridge and turnpike construction, he placed particular emphasis on the development of manufactures:

Our mills and furnaces are greatly multiplied; new beds of ore have been discovered, and the industry and enterprize of our citizens are turning them to the most useful purposes. Many new and highly valuable manufactories have been established, and we now make in Pennsylvania, various articles of domestic use, for which, two years since, we were wholly dependent upon foreign nations.

We have lately established in Philadelphia large shot manufactories; floor cloth manufactories; and queen's ware pottery upon an extensive scale. These are all in successful operation, independent of immense quantities of cotton and wool, flax and hemp, leather and iron, which are annually manufactured in our state. . . 85

In his next message, Snyder informed the legislature that the state “continued to prosper” despite the oppressive orders of Great Britain and France and the commercial restrictions of the federal government. He suggested to the legislature that dependence on Great Britain for manufactured goods lay at the root of the nation's problems, and he proposed “the necessity of pass-

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84 Higginbotham, Keystone, 221-222.
85 Pennsylvania Archives, 4 Series, IV, 677.
ing laws to encourage domestic manufactures." Every opening
message included similar statements congratulating the state on
its prosperity and on the care the legislature had taken to foster
manufacturing.86

In letters to his brother, Matthew, Jonathan Roberts, a member
of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, often expressed
satisfaction at the state's economic growth and surprise that the
commercial legislation passed by Congress did not hinder it. His
later letters indicate that he believed the Embargo had helped by
forcing the United States to build up its productive capacity.87
Thomas Rogers told Roberts that in spite of their defeat in the
Congressional elections, Federalist farmers were happy because
of the high price of wheat.88 William Findley received informa-
tion from Manual Eyre expressing satisfaction at his own and his
friends' prosperity. He hoped something could be done for the
commercial interests so they could share in the prosperity.89 On
the eve of the war Stephen Girard wrote to one of his captains:
"New Manufactures are establishing daily and making great
progress." If the trend continues "there will be little demand for
foreign merchandise."90

The number of manufacturing and internal improvement com-
panies chartered by the state gives another indication that money
was available and that people were willing to invest their capital
in commercial enterprises. Manufacturing did make rapid progress
in the state and created local centers of industry which consumed
virtually all the locally produced agricultural goods and manu-
factured not only the basic necessities, but even some luxuries.91

All of these facts indicate that, unlike the West and South,
Pennsylvania did not suffer an economic depression in the period

86 Pennsylvania House Journal, 1805-1806, 14-15, 1806-1807, 18, 1808-1809,
23-24; Pennsylvania Archives, 4 Series, IV, 671-673.
87 Jonathan Roberts to Matthew Roberts, March 7, 1808, May 19, 1808,
January 14, 1810, July 6, 1811, Roberts Papers, HSP.
88 Thomas Rogers to J. Roberts, October 1, 1821, Roberts Papers, HSP.
89 Manual Eyre to William Findley, January 12, 1812, Gallatin Papers, New
York Historical Society.
90 Stephen Girard's Letter Book No. 13, Letter No. 81, American Phil-
osophical Society, Philadelphia.
91 For the development of manufacturing in Pennsylvania see Victor Clark,
History of Manufacturing in the United States, 1807-1860 (Washington,
1916), 426; Belthasar Meyer, History of Transportation (Washington, 1917),
572; Adam Seybert, Statistical Annals of the United States, 320-322; Wilson,
Standard History of Pittsburg, 148; Cathrine Reiser, Pittsburgh's Com-
mercial Development (Harrisburg, 1952).
following the Embargo. However valid the Taylor-Latimer hypothesis may be for the Mississippi Valley and the South, it does not explain Pennsylvania’s support for the war. Indeed, “Pennsylvanians . . . can hardly have been following the dictates of economic interest” in their decision to support the war. 92 Clearly, neither the Pratt thesis nor the Taylor-Latimer thesis adequately explains Pennsylvania’s support for the War of 1812, and new explanations will have to be sought.

The sources examined for this study indicate that from 1808 to 1812, as economic coercion proved ineffective, many Pennsyl-

### Table One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of Companies Chartered</th>
<th>No. of Shares Chartered</th>
<th>No. of Shares Authorized</th>
<th>No. of Shares Sold</th>
<th>No. of Buyers</th>
<th>Value/Share</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1805</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>805</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>1806</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>47</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1807</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>613</td>
<td>182</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1808</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>3,997</td>
<td>1,502</td>
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<tr>
<td>1809</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>47</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1810</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,274</td>
<td>290</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1811</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>5,768</td>
<td>1,985</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1812</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3,100</td>
<td>3,093½</td>
<td>644</td>
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**Manufacturing Companies**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No of Companies</th>
<th>No of Shares</th>
<th>Value/Share</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1807</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1809</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<tr>
<td>1811</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1812</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3,400</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

93 Figures compiled from Pennsylvania Archives, 9 Series, IV, V, VI. In most cases buyers bought two or three shares. Twenty shares is the other most common figure. In one case there was buyer who bought seventy-one shares, and another one bought forty shares; these were the two largest single blocks sold. In every case in which an internal improvement company did not sell the number of shares it was authorized to sell, the state bought the unsold number at par value.
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vanians concluded that continued submission to British depredations was an intolerable insult to the national honor and a serious threat to the international image of republican institutions. The unanimity with which the state’s Republican congressmen supported all administration measures and the declaration of war indicates strong pressure for party regularity. Pennsylvania Republicans supported the war to uphold the nation’s honor and to protect the domestic image of the Republican party and the international reputation of republican institutions.⁴⁴

TABLE TWO
STATE INCOME AND EXPENDITURES 1805-1812⁶⁵

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Receipts</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Surplus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1805</td>
<td>369,522.61</td>
<td>229,582.30</td>
<td>139,940.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>1806</td>
<td>380,549.49</td>
<td>309,826.01</td>
<td>70,723.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1807</td>
<td>327,367.17</td>
<td>236,071.94</td>
<td>91,295.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808</td>
<td>341,735.95</td>
<td>295,495.39</td>
<td>46,239.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1809</td>
<td>594,190.05</td>
<td>312,139.95</td>
<td>282,050.10</td>
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<tr>
<td>1810</td>
<td>636,015.18</td>
<td>594,389.78</td>
<td>41,625.40</td>
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<td>1811</td>
<td>449,935.15</td>
<td>389,889.22</td>
<td>60,045.93</td>
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<td>1812</td>
<td>498,959.75</td>
<td>308,960.74</td>
<td>189,998.91</td>
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MAJOR SOURCES OF INCOME

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Land Sales</th>
<th>Tavern Licenses</th>
<th>Duties on Sales at Auction</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1808</td>
<td>63,712.46</td>
<td>21,003.60</td>
<td>18,349.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1806</td>
<td>66,140.02</td>
<td>21,645.72</td>
<td>26,689.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>1807</td>
<td>47,243.92</td>
<td>15,118.28</td>
<td>17,602.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808</td>
<td>40,009.26</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>29,882.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1809</td>
<td>318,129.40</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>33,635.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1810</td>
<td>93,644.42</td>
<td>29,373.49</td>
<td>53,706.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>1811</td>
<td>137,235.89</td>
<td>29,515.46</td>
<td>54,045.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>1812</td>
<td>125,125.28</td>
<td>26,417.76</td>
<td>55,713.91**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

⁴⁴ If this contention could be proved, it would substantiate the general thesis of Perkins, Prologue to War, and Brown, The Republic in Peril.
⁶⁵ These figures are compiled from the Annual Reports of the State Treasurer and State Auditor, which can be found as appendices to the Senate Journal for the appropriate year.
### Major Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>&quot;Expenses of Government&quot;</th>
<th>&quot;Militia, Arms and Ordnance&quot;</th>
<th>Special Appropriations***</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1805</td>
<td>141,066.62</td>
<td>13,348.74</td>
<td>14,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1806</td>
<td>140,530.34</td>
<td>14,497.75</td>
<td>124,401.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>1807</td>
<td>152,816.59</td>
<td>7,966.39</td>
<td>18,493.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1808</td>
<td>Figures are not available for this year—</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1809</td>
<td>149,282.02</td>
<td>11,883.60</td>
<td>82,544.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1810</td>
<td>130,774.15</td>
<td>8,916.62*</td>
<td>——</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1811</td>
<td>155,196.26</td>
<td>7,300.21*</td>
<td>164,171.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1812</td>
<td>162,646.32</td>
<td>10,223.84*</td>
<td>71,229.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Expenditures exclusively for militia.

**This surplus was pledged for building ships to be turned over to the national government.

***The special appropriation of 1809 was "for purchase of stock." There is no indication of what stock. The special appropriation for 1811 is for "improvements and purchase of stock." The special appropriation for 1812 is divided as follows: $38,461.00 for improvements, and $32,768.26 for "expenses consequent to the declaration of war."