
Korte Historiael, ende Journaels Aenteyckeninge van verscheyden Voyagiens in de vier deelen des Wereldts-Ronde, als Europa, Africa, Asia, ende Amerika gedaen ("Short Historical and Journal-Notes of various Voyages performed in the Four Quarters of the Globe, viz., Europe, Africa, Asia and America") published at Alckmaar, Holland, in 1655, describes six voyages made by the author, David Pietersz De Vries. The first three voyages were made to the Arctic, the Mediterranean, the Monsoon Seas, and elsewhere; and the last three, starting in 1630, were made to the New World. Included in these voyages are the accounts of two visits to the Delaware River, as well as the author's experiences at Manhattan, Staten Island, and along the Hudson River.

In 1911, H. T. Colenbrander edited and republished the journal in modern Dutch, under the auspices of the Linschoten Society of The Hague, and it is this edition on which Mr. Parr has based his present book, which he describes as "interpretative as well as biographical." The latter part of the De Vries journal dealing with the New World voyages has had a number of English translations, in whole or part, and Mr. Parr cites some of these translations, but not all, in his Introduction. He does not, for example, make reference to A. J. F. Van Laer's important revisions of Henry C. Murphy's 1853 translation of those sections pertaining to Delaware Bay and River, published in 1912 in A. C. Myers's well-known Narratives of Early Pennsylvania, etc., 1630-1707.

That part of the De Vries journal dealing with the three earlier voyages to other continents has never been published in English translation. In view of this lacuna in the literature, and recognizing that the New World voyages have been lifted out of their broad context in the published translations, one wishes that Mr. Parr would have seized the opportunity of making a notable historical contribution by translating, annotating, and publishing the complete journal. He has chosen instead the role of a paraphrast, spinning for his readers a highly interesting yarn in the third person that we would like to hear De Vries himself relate in the first person.

The Dutch commis at Swanendael responsible for the Indian massacre is rendered by Colenbrander in the 1911 edition as Gilles Oset or Osset, and his name is recorded in a June 3, 1631, patent as Gillis Hosset. Mr. Parr calls this leading character in the Swanendael tragedy Gilles Honset, but neglects to inform his readers why he felt it necessary to make the change. Similarly, previous records refer to 28 Dutch colonists seated at
Swanendael, confirmed by one of the patroons of the colony, Kiliaen Van Rensselaer in his memorial of November 25, 1633. Mr. Parr says (p. 113), that there were 33 settlers and they were Huguenots, but he fails to tell us why we should disbelieve Van Rensselaer.

Mr. Parr also says that the fort at Swanendael was called Fort Oplandt, a mistranslation of Colenbrander's "... die buyten het Fort waren op Landt om haer werck te doen" ("who were outside the Fort working the Land"). A. R. Dunlap laid this error to rest in his Dutch and Swedish Place-Names in Delaware, 1956.

Mr. Parr states (p. 133) that the Dutch West India Company persuaded "King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden-Finland to set up, in 1637, a worldwide Swedish trading Company patterned after the W.I.C." Gustavus Adolphus was killed at Lützen in 1632. Mr. Parr also tells us that (p. 238), Henry Hudson "explored the [Delaware] river in the He'f Moon in 1609." It is clear from Robert Juet's journal that Hudson anchored in the mouth of Delaware Bay, but sailed away without ever entering the river.

The volume has a splendid index and an excellent twelve-page pictorial insert. Probably out of deference to the popular reader for whom the book seems to be primarily intended, there is no documentation other than an impressive bibliography. Of these book titles, the author says that, "He has made footnotes on numerous pages regarding the trends and happenings recorded in the Korte Historiael of David De Vries, but for reasons of space these citations have been withheld as well as part of the De Vries text itself." The books in question have been generously donated to the Goldfarb Library of Brandeis University and the Carlson Library of Bridgeport, which might cause the serious reader some difficulties in locating the incipient footnotes. But even without these notes, the casual, uncritical reader should find enjoyment reading about the adventures of a Dutch sea captain and fighter of unusual talents during a period when men took to the high seas and unsettled lands for romance, excitement, and to seek their fortunes.

Brandywine College, Wilmington, Del. C. A. WESLAGER


This is a book to relax with. Mr. Weslager treats no contemporary dilemma nor a weighty matter in historical scholarship. He describes and analyzes in smoothly flowing prose the development of the log cabin in America as essentially an indigenous response to our frontier environment and the needs of a success-oriented society.

The log cabin, transported primarily by Finns from old to New Sweden, accompanied émigrés on their westward trek from the lower Delaware River area in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Germans and subsequently the Scotch-Irish, some of whom had been familiar back home with log and rough hewn timber houses, quickly adopted the log cabin and
carried it into Pennsylvania. From there it moved across the continent wherever there were forests. By the nineteenth century, even as it began to fail in competition with more broadly serviceable building materials and fall into disuse as a form of housing in the older settlements, it had attained a symbolic place in popular thought.

It had become the most fitting starting point for the self-made man. Not only the Whigs, in the remarkable election of 1840, but also political parties in most campaigns down into the present century attempted to identify their chief candidates with rustic one- or two-room cabins of logs notched at the corners. More recently urbanization and congestion, as well as plastics and prefabrication, have forced the log cabin as artifact and symbol into the dimmer recesses of the public consciousness. Such vitality as it seems to retain may be found in the 1965 Post Office Department issue of the 4c black Lincoln stamp featuring a cabin in the background, and in the current rage for antiques which values the log cabin as a novelty and investment.

As the log cabin approaches meaninglessness in today's culture Mr. Weslager's The Log Cabin in America appropriately recalls for us its fundamental social contributions. It cost little to build and maintain and still was sturdy enough to serve as a fortress. It adapted easily to nearly every cultural crosscurrent and expanded readily to meet the needs of new (or more) occupants and environments. Because the log cabin proved to be eminently practical for the frontiersman, it became a stimulant to the expansion of settlement into the interior of the continent. Nevertheless, its basic flaws as a permanent home, not the least of which was aesthetic, prevented sentiment and style from resisting rapid adoption of improved structural materials and design. And because it was easy to recognize, found almost everywhere, "American" in its crudeness and transience, and quite fortuitously the birthplace of several generations of Mid-Americans from whose numbers came prominent political figures, the log cabin slipped irrepressibly into the mythology and symbolism of the nation.

Its political exploitation could be expected, although the importance of ascribing birth or upbringing in log cabins to presidential aspirants from Andrew Jackson to Theodore Roosevelt—including James Buchanan—is far from established by Mr. Weslager, except, of course, for the maneuver of 1840. When, in a manner of speaking, "everybody is doing it," there is room to doubt that nineteenth century assertions of log cabin beginnings really contributed much to political success. The place the cabin continues to hold in America's usable memory is likewise cloudy. Mr. Weslager obviously is a devotee of cabin location and restoration; the best continuous segment of his writing excitedly narrates several highlights of his archeological work. His enthusiasm, however, does not fix in our minds its lasting cultural qualities. He does suggest that current sentimentalism toward rural isolation, goaded by invasions and losses of privacy, is important in keeping alive a general, if maybe only a passing, interest in the log cabin. Agreed.

To these observations could be added several annoyances and a few cavils. Historians will not think highly of his elementary introductions to
eras, peoples, and persons or of his frequent "correction" of long discarded errors. Notwithstanding such distractions, this volume is welcomed. The reviewer does not expect to become a log cabin "buff," but seldom has he enjoyed a scholarly presentation more. Mr. Weslager tells his story well, even the oft-told parts. Although there are limits to the analysis, he modestly sets forth and proceeds well enough to substantiate a number of thoughtful observations about cabin origin, function, and transit. There are plenty of clear photographs and informative sketches and diagrams. For Pennsylvanians the concentration of Mr. Weslager upon the Commonwealth, along with his native Delaware, cannot help but heighten interest. As remarked at the outset, this humbly offered contribution is a book to relax with.

Bloomburg State College

CRAIG A. NEWTON


Reviewing the papers of Benjamin Franklin is a humbling experience. The reader cannot help feeling that he is involved in the careers of many men: scientist, philosopher, diplomat, politician, and critic. Franklin led all these lives and lived them simultaneously.

This volume covers the calendar year of 1766. It was a critical year for the American colonies. The repeal of the Stamp Act was followed immediately by the passage of the Declaratory Act. For Benjamin Franklin, age sixty and living in London, it was the year he became the premier spokesman for colonial interests. His famous testimony before the House of Commons in February was instrumental in procuring the removal of the noxious stamps. The balance of the year was relatively quiet. Franklin developed a close association with Joseph Priestley with whom the American scientist shared his own experiments in electricity. On a summer sojourn to Hanover, Franklin was elected a member of its Royal Society of Sciences.

As Pennsylvania's colonial agent, Franklin kept abreast of events at home. Informants were his political allies Joseph Galloway, James Parker, and Thomas Wharton, as well as his son William Franklin, Governor of New Jersey. Despite the Privy Council rebuff during the previous year, the effort was continued by the "Assembly Party" with Franklin's aid to win the king's approval to change Pennsylvania from a Proprietary to a Royal Colony.

Franklin's land speculating activities kept him occupied. In addition to his interest in Nova Scotia, Franklin became the lobbyist in a move to acquire land from the Crown in the Illinois Country. Franklin was instructed by his American partners, among them his son and Galloway, to choose one or two men in England to join the venture. Such a choice posed a problem for the astute manipulator. "I wish you had allowed me to name more, as there will be in the proposed country, by my reckoning, near sixty-three millions of acres, and therefore enough to content a great number of reasonable people, and by numbers we might increase the weight
of interest here." Ever the optimist, Franklin added, "But perhaps we shall do without." The opposition of Colonial Secretary Hillsborough and the intervention of the Revolutionary War eventually undermined the ambitious scheme.

Wit and satire were common characteristics of Franklin's observations. On a proposal to pave Chancery-lane, he wrote in the press, "I hope and pray they may not agree to it. Chancery lane is in every respect so like a Chancery suit; it is so very long a lane, so subject to obstructions and delays, one is so unwilling to enter into it, so uneasy and unsafe all the while one is going through it, and so glad to get out of it, that the very reflection on this similarity has often, to my great advantage, deterred me from law, and inclined me rather to end a dispute by arbitration."

Students of Franklin will relish his appearance before the Commons in regard to the repeal of the Stamp Act. Parrying questions from both supporters and adversaries, Franklin was especially artful in relating the detrimental effect of the tax upon colonial attitudes toward the mother country. Before 1763, stated Franklin, the temper of the American colonies was "the best in the world. . . . They were led by a thread. They had not only a respect, but an affection, for Great Britain, for its laws, its customs and its manners, and even a fondness for its fashions, that greatly increased the commerce." "And what is their temper now?" "O, very much altered," was the simple, obvious, but effective reply.

Franklin was careful to complement the repeal campaign of the London merchants. An apparently staged question asked about the population increase in America. The response hit at the heart of mercantilist England. "I think the inhabitants of all the provinces together, taken at a medium, double in about twenty-five years. But their demand for British manufactures increases much faster, as the consumption is not merely in proportion to their numbers, but grows with the growing abilities of the same numbers to pay for them. In 1723, the whole importation from Britain to Pennsylvania, was but about 15,000 Pounds Sterling; it is now near Half a Million." What is also evident from this volume is that Franklin's testimony was only one part of his campaign to nullify the Stamp Tax. In addition to his Parliamentary appearance, Franklin had a number of personal meetings with members of Parliament and published several newspaper articles over a number of pseudonyms defending colonial opposition to the tax and arguing for its abolition.

No review of any of these volumes may pass without some comment upon the superb editorial work. It is as awe-inspiring as the main character. Every possible need and question which the reader might express has been anticipated, but never are these matters allowed to interfere with the volume's main purpose, the career of Benjamin Franklin. Professor Labaree and his associates are involved in a labor of love and their efforts reflect it. All students will be forever grateful.

California State College, Long Beach

DAVID BERNSTEIN
Although Timothy Pickering is not a figure of major historical importance, his long and varied career illustrates several major aspects of American history from the Revolution to the War of 1812. His business career (notably as a land speculator) illustrates a significant phase of economic development; his effective service as a Federal emissary to the Northeastern and Northwestern Indians tells much about U.S.-Indian relations; his performance as a capable and dedicated civil servant (Adjutant General, Quartermaster General, and member of the Board of War during the Revolution, Postmaster General of the United States, 1791-1794, Secretary of War, 1794-1795) constitutes an important chapter in the country’s early administrative history. His conduct of the Department of State from 1795-1800 is essential to an understanding of diplomatic history during the Federalist decade, and his congressional career in the years after 1800 personifies the history of an important wing of the Federalist party during the Jeffersonian era. Yet he is still mainly remembered (if recalled at all) as the irascible, inflexible symbol of Federalist extremism. It is hoped that the recent microfilm edition of his voluminous papers (some 69 reels) will encourage new monographs on aspects of his crowded career and eventually a modern biography.

Professor Clarfield’s survey of Pickering’s tenure as Secretary of State from 1795-1800 is an important first step. His book, however, is not so much a reappraisal as it is a detailed and well-written repetition of the familiar interpretation of Pickering imbedded in American history books by generations of Jeffersonian historians. To Clarfield, Pickering was a fiercely independent Secretary of State who had an important but unfortunate impact on the course of American diplomacy. The clues to his diplomacy, Clarfield believes, were his implacable hostility toward France, his ardent Anglophilia and his deep concern for the security of American commerce. His conduct of the country’s foreign affairs, the argument continues, clearly demonstrates his “refusal to accept the principle of political nonentanglement upon which America’s foreign policy was in large part based.” Thus, the chief objectives of his diplomacy were “to maximize differences between France and the United States while simultaneously eliminating frictions with Great Britain.” To achieve these goals, Clarfield asserts, he tried to deceive Washington by withholding important information from him and sought to thwart President Adams’s diplomatic policies by following “a generally obstructionist course.”

With some points in this interpretation there can be no disagreement. Pickering undeniably was an Anglophile and was consistently dedicated to the protection of American commerce. With other points, however, a vigorous dissent is justified. Professor Clarfield often appears so intent on demonstrating Pickering’s shortcomings, grave as they may have been, that he slights his accomplishments, which were, as Clarfield at times admits, considerable. Indeed, the author occasionally presents evidence that
clearly suggests an alternative to his own thesis. Take, for example, the allegation that "in order to influence the course of events," Pickering "sometimes withheld important information from Washington." Clarfield adduces in evidence the fact that during a good part of 1796 the Secretary of State not only failed to reply to letters from Pierre Adet, French minister to the United States, but that he deliberately withheld Adet's protests from the President. "It is not unlikely," Clarfield writes, that Pickering's deception was "a calculated one since he was at odds with the conciliatory approach Hamilton and Washington were taking toward the French."

Pickering's own justification of his behavior, however, was presumably sincere and is plausible. Some of Adet's protests were neither answered nor forwarded to the President, the Secretary explained, because they were "indecent charges" and "offensive expressions" and because they merely repeated charges to which Pickering had replied "over and over again." Clarfield also overlooks facts that explain, even though they do not justify, the Secretary's seeming resentment of presidential authority and unwillingness to carry out administration policies. In some major instances, notably John Adams's appointment of a second peace mission to France in 1799, Pickering was, as Clarfield observes, an obstructionist. For the most part, however, his apparent determination to pursue an independent foreign policy from 1797 to 1800 was owing as much to the surrender of presidential leadership as to his own stubbornness.

More importantly, one may readily concede that Pickering was a Francophobe, but still question the conclusion that he "presided with devastating effect over the conduct of Franco-American relations." The situation is analogous to U. S.-Soviet relations in the decade of the 1950's. John Foster Dulles may have been implacably hostile to Russia but the "Spirit of Camp David" and the subsequent détente were owing more to developments inside Russia than to his intransigence or inflexibility. Similarly, the rapprochement with France in 1800 (and it was brief) was made possible by the determined effort of the Directory to achieve it. Presumably Professor Clarfield would agree. "Whatever Adams or Pickering thought of the diplomatic situation," he writes, "they had no means to influence the course of events. The internal political situation in France was central in the crisis, and time was the principal factor in resolving it." In sum, had Professor Clarfield accepted the conclusion to which his own evidence so often inescapably leads, the long overdue reappraisal of Timothy Pickering would be well under way.

Lafayette College

JACOB E. COOKE


For nearly twenty years students of the Early National period have anticipated the publication of this scholarly Columbia University doctoral dissertation. Professor Stewart's account should deservedly take its place among the growing number of outstanding studies recently published on
the development of the “First American Party System.” The version of party growth presented here is one-sided, namely, as seen by Republican editors and correspondents. The study’s immense value to scholars is in Stewart’s exposition of the mental attitudes held and of the propaganda methods used by rank and file Democratic-Republicans. It is admittedly hard to tell whether Republican printers actually believed what they wrote; yet Stewart concludes they expected “their readers to accept them [political editorials].”

The principal question posed in this study is how the Jeffersonians “were able to fashion, in so brief a period and out of apparent nothingness, a party that soon became dominant, and that has ever since remained a potent political force.” Stewart is not the first historian to explore the sources of Republican party success, yet few scholars have attributed so much credit as he has to the skillful use of propaganda in promoting the “Jeffersonian Revolution” of 1800. Stewart boldly asserts that the Republican editors more than any other group within the party hastened the decline of the Federalist party. Also, he reminds us that “with all their gifts for leadership, and all the popular topics that arose, Madison, Jefferson, and their companions could not possibly have worked this miracle without the aid of the newspapers.” Stewart’s interpretation agrees with Noble Cunningham, Joseph Charles, Paul Goodman, and Harry M. Tinkcom that the parties of the 1790’s were new formations arising out of conflicts in Congress. Thus, contrary to Alfred F. Young, he regards local and state politics as the tail to the national political kite. In addition, he accepts the traditional view that party divisions were first precipitated by Hamiltonian finance and then solidified by issues over foreign policy. Also, in the large supporting role assigned to newspaper editors in the formation of the Jeffersonian movement, Stewart helps further to distribute the credit of party leadership, as did Irving Brant.

This book is the result of prodigious research. Professor Stewart examined around 550 newspapers and his 220 pages of notes at the back of the book testify to extensive, painstaking research. Every issue of significance generally associated with the highly controversial Federalist-Republican decade, both in domestic and foreign affairs, is treated. Besides, there are separate chapters dealing with special subjects, such as the nature of Republican society and government, political strategy, and electioneering tactics. This massive monograph is actually more a political history of the entire period from 1789 to 1801 than the story about the peaceful rise of a “loyal opposition” to power.

Republicans levelled three major charges against their opponents. They accused the Federalists of being aristocrats and inclined toward monarchy; of fostering high government costs; and of being dominated by British interests. Every other minor political contention directed at the Washington and Adams administrations is made to revolve around these charges. Stewart also rightly points out that “some presses were more valuable than others in forging the Jeffersonian party.” In order of importance, Stewart rates Bache’s General Advertiser or Aurora, Freneau’s short-lived
National Gazette, both of Philadelphia, and Thomas Adams’s Independent Chronicle of Boston, as the country’s foremost Republican journals. We are also told that most gazettes during the period “were almost invariably violently one-sided;” that prior to 1796 the opposition presses were handicapped in that they “had no universally acknowledged standard bearer,” and lastly, that by the end of the decade journalistic odds against Jefferson had declined to two to one.

Stewart’s account is the best study yet on the role of the Republican press as a powerful and indispensable instrument of politics. It is well written, organized, and has a good bibliography and index. But it does have some shortcomings. First, Stewart fails to adequately compare the press to other agents or party operations at work in Jefferson’s elevation to the Presidency. For this reason he frequently tends to exaggerate the importance of the Fourth Estate. How could he arrive at any other conclusion based on the materials he investigated? Secondly, he fails to draw the necessary distinctions between the Republican party and its press. Thirdly, he fails to appreciate fully the existence of an urban wing in the Democratic-Republican party, and as a result, accepts at face value appeals made in the urban newsheets to the common people. Fourthly, Stewart’s descriptive approach has led to piling quotation upon quotation, thus making the book at times odious and still bearing the marks of a doctoral dissertation. Lastly, much of what he says about the politics of the period follows more traditional Beardian lines than the interpretations of more recent studies. Much of the material in this book is focused on Philadelphia and is of particular value to those persons interested in Pennsylvania history. But, most of all, this book is recommended to specialists of the Federalist era and of newspaper history.

Pennsylvania State University

ROLAND M. BAUMANN


The revival of James K. Polk’s reputation in this century has resulted in Charles Sellers’s brilliant biography of the eleventh President and now a project sponsored by Vanderbilt University, the National Historical Publications Commission, and the Tennessee Historical Commission, to publish a letterpress edition of Polk’s correspondence. This project under the direction of Herbert Weaver with Paul H. Bergeron as associate editor promises to bring together all extant Polk materials in from ten to twelve volumes.

The first volume covers fifteen years in which Polk was elected to the House of Representatives, played a crucial role in the opposition to John Quincy Adams, helped elect his friend Andrew Jackson, and became a work horse of the Jacksonian coalition. Only ninety-six of the six hundred and sixty-four letters printed here are by Polk himself, but most of these, as well as the other letters printed in full, deal with politics. Aside from the
correspondence with Andrew Jackson, that with Archibald Yell is most interesting and useful for the student of the period. Only two letters, one each from T. Hartley Crawford and Henry Horn deal specifically with Pennsylvania politics. Most of the letters in this volume have either been published elsewhere or are available on the recently issued microfilms of the Polk manuscripts at the Library of Congress. However, bringing these and some new materials together in this attractive, readable format make the project significant.

Several things struck the reviewer when reading over these letters. Polk's hostility to Adams, his distrust of Clay, and his genuine fear that Jackson might be assassinated before his inauguration emphasize the importance of personal and emotional elements in Jacksonian politics. Questions such as Indian removal and land legislation, and, to a lesser extent, the matter of Sunday mails, assume a much larger importance in Jackson's first administration than generally conceded by most historians. Finally, there is little or no mention of democracy or a Democratic party—there is not even such a listing in the index. It is true that following the election of Adams, Polk advocated popular election of the President; for the most part "reform" meant little more than throwing the rascals out and returning the country to pure republican forms. Polk's brother even wrote disparagingly of "That Hydra Democracy" which would "devour all order" if the people were allowed to elect all state officers.

In general the editors and publisher have done a good job, but the reviewer must suggest a few demurrers. The index is adequate for names, but should include many more subject listings than it does—for example there is no listing of "banks and banking" although the subject is mentioned in many letters. The editorial notations come at the end of each letter rather than the bottom of each page. This is a common format, but bothersome, particularly on long letters. These notations are usually extremely brief, but they do include valuable cross references to other letters in the volume. The printing is clear and easily read; the binding sound and attractive.

This reviewer looks forward to the subsequent volumes and hopes that the project may lead as well to a new edition of Polk's long out-of-print diary.

Lehigh University

WILLIAM G. SHADE


The author of this first volume of the projected series carefully limited the scope of her investigations to the period during which the scholarly, reformist, and highly emotional dictates of the Cambridge Camden Society (later the Ecclesiological Society) in Great Britain were being felt most directly in Anglican and architectural circles on this continent. The overt influence of The Ecclesiologist is examined in scrupulously unbiased terms by Professor Stanton. She explores the English socio-theological antecedents
of the Gothic Revival in North America in terms of the parish church revival with its predominantly 14th-century models and the major exponents of this solution to the increasing demand for an appropriate ecclesiastical style. An introductory chapter guides the reader toward an understanding of the Oxford and Cambridge movements and the ceremonial connections rapidly developed by adherents between the Gothic manifestation and new concepts of liturgy and symbolic expression advocated for the Church of England.

Extraordinarily "partisan" architectural missionary activities carried on through the medium of The Ecclesiologist, first published in November, 1841, were tempered by an intervening ocean and lack of religious "tension" here. Stylistic influences expressed in church building in the United States and Canada are based upon the tenets of the Society. Professor Stanton explicates the expanding role of architects such as Richard Upjohn in the construction of these Gothic Revival structures: e.g., St. Mary's, Burlington, completed for Bishop Doane of New Jersey and termed the "first attempt to follow a specific English medieval example." The author has enhanced the reputation of the art historian as detective with evidence presented in Chapter III for the profound influence of St. James the Less, Philadelphia, on the "mature parish church revival." Readers of Pennsylvania History will note that both the early exemplar of the "rural parish church," St. James the Less, and that of the "town church," St. Mark's, were built in Philadelphia.

Further descriptions of the influential churches supervised by Frank Wills under the auspices of Bishop Medley in Fredericton, New Brunswick, set the stage for the foundation, in 1848, of the New York Ecclesiological Society, with Wills as its official architect, and the New York Ecclesiologist as its instrument for the proliferation of independent and sometimes original concepts of the application of Gothic Revival doctrine. Discussion of the New York group is used as the context for documentation of the growing familiarity among interested Americans with general architectural criticism in England and on the Continent. Bibliographical guidance is offered to the critical and analytical reviews of writers such as Greenough and Gilman. This material establishes the growth of a taste for correctness in architectural exposition among both critics and their readers and a willingness to depart from "orthodoxy" by mid-century.

Professor Stanton has managed, in a very few chapters, to convey the Victorian spirit of concern for the "good" and the correct as applied to Protestant Episcopal church building in England and North America in the middle years of the nineteenth century. No architectural historian would fail to acknowledge the need for work of similar quality in related areas of study. Many will feel that the earnest scholarship represented here could only encourage the submission of manuscripts to the editor of this series.

Footnotes, which accompany the text, are so extensive that the author has chosen to omit a formal bibliography. Juxtaposition of pictorial materials with appropriate portions of the text proves a great convenience to the reader. It is unfortunate that uneven quality and the reproduction process...
tend to detract from the appearance, though not the informational value, of the numerous illustrations. This is a minor cavil, however, in a work which, because of its arrangement, provides as much good reading for the interested general reader as for the specialist.

Eleutherian Mills Historical Library


Forging a Majority is a well-documented quantitative study of political behavior in Pittsburgh from 1848 to 1860, centering on the political upheaval in the 1850's. The integration of empirical methodology with a wide range of impressionistic material provides a systematic analysis of the relationship between the political structure and other sources of society, and examines the linkages between politics and other types of social conflict.

Holt offers a bold and imaginative interpretation of American political behavior during the 1850's. He rejects the idea that either the demand for a protective tariff or moral antipathy toward slavery explains the rise of the Republican party and suggests instead that local issues are often more important in determining popular support for parties. By employing quantitative techniques to the appeal, leadership, and constituency of parties in Pittsburgh, and by describing the year-by-year political developments, the author concludes that the rise of the Republican party resulted from factors quite independent of the dispute over slavery. Throughout the book, the author emphasizes two points: first, that ethnic and religious antagonisms more often determined political allegiance than broad national issues; and secondly, that traditional political loyalties played an important role in determining popular political behavior. In Pittsburgh in 1856, for instance, the Republican party made its basic appeal to the voters one of hostility to the South, yet the party vote cannot be solely attributed to this single issue. With a preponderance of empirical data as to the composition of the leadership and constituency of the party, Holt demonstrates that the transition from Whig to Republican party "could never have succeeded without the open bargain with Know-Nothings through which they could combine antislavery and anti-Catholic elements."

The most challenging aspect of the book is the analysis of the composition of the Whig and Republican party locally. The abundance of material here clearly shows the differences between the two parties and demonstrates that the notion of the Republican party being the heir of the Whigs is meaningless. This same material also shows that the transition from Whig to Republican majority was very complex and that it produced significant changes in the social bases of party leadership. We see, for example, the city's elite, who dominated the Whig party, replaced by men from varying backgrounds.

A word of caution may be appropriate, both for the initiated and the uninitiated in the use of quantitative techniques. Before reading the book one
should read the author's essay in the appendix on methods and sources; it will help clarify the evidence on which this study is based and better enable the reader to evaluate that evidence. The restraint of the author from making broad generalizations, which are not pertinent or not fully warranted by his material demonstrates his awareness of the limitations and accuracy of the quantitative technique.

Pennsylvania State University, Beaver Campus

JOSEPH T. MAKAREWICZ


Replying to an invitation from leading citizens of Philadelphia to a dinner in his honor, Rear Admiral S. F. Du Pont wrote of “my friends of Philadelphia, among whom my first services in this war at a serious crisis began, and with whom, though not a resident of the city, I have been brought into near relations during no small portion of my life. . . .” Thus readers of Pennsylvania History will find Du Pont’s career, like those of so many citizens of the former Lower Counties, frequently touching the history of Pennsylvania.

Through about the first half of 1861, Du Pont was commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, a witness to the troubled political life of the city during the secession winter, and a coadjutor of President Samuel M. Felton of the Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Railroad in arranging water transportation for troops to Washington after the Baltimore riots closed the land route. Du Pont’s presence at the Philadelphia Navy Yard was no mere coincidence, since he had said its proximity to his home made it the only shore assignment he would accept in peacetime. After her husband returned to sea, Mrs. Du Pont stayed from time to time in Philadelphia, and their correspondence affords further glimpses of Philadelphia life. More coincidentally, a remarkably high proportion of Du Pont’s captains in his exploit at Port Royal were Pennsylvanians; and his flagship in his attack on Charleston—though he did not much like the ship—was the Philadelphia-built New Ironsides. On a visit to Philadelphia, Du Pont died in the La Pierre Hotel on Broad Street below Chestnut on June 23, 1865.

In the larger context of United States history, the editor, Admiral Hayes, suggests three subjects which the student will find especially illuminated by this selection from Du Pont’s papers and the letters of his correspondents, mainly from the Eleutherian Mills Historical Library: the history of the Civil War; the history of the Navy, especially of its administration and logistics; and the character of Du Pont himself, in Hayes’s view an important figure not only as a participant in history but also as an observer and recorder of it, whose letters “may have been his greatest achievement.” Such an estimate of the value of the letters and of Du Pont as an observer may be extravagant, but the reader will indeed find striking comments upon many of the events, institutions, and people of Du Pont’s time.
Du Pont's reaction to slavery is worth particular notice. As an Old Whig of conservative inclinations, the admiral frequently apologized for the peculiar institution during the prewar years. His observation of slavery and its effects at first hand while commanding the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, however, led him to accept the judgments of its harshest critics: "there are no swine in Massachusetts not better cared for" than slaves who reputedly served most considerate masters. The Negroes he found often capable and self-reliant, as pilots and guides for the Union forces and in the remarkable exploit of a black crew's running a steamer out from Charleston to present it to the Union blockaders. Du Pont watched with sympathy the experiment in educating black men and making them self-supporting farmers on the sea islands. "No danger deters them and they encounter shooting with perfect composure."

The heart of the letters concerns, of course, Du Pont's command of his blockading squadron. On November 7, 1861, flying his flag in the steam frigate Wabash, Du Pont led his squadron in attacking and capturing the forts guarding the harbor of Port Royal, South Carolina. He exploited skilfully the new mobility which steam gave ships attacking forts. His victory, one of the first Union successes of the war, gave his squadron an ample protected anchorage from which to attempt its task of closing the Confederate Atlantic coast south of the border between the Carolinas. From Port Royal Du Pont worked his vessels into the network of interior waterways until Charleston alone had to be guarded only by the precarious and uncertain method of an exterior blockade with ships standing off the coast.

But Charleston ultimately broke his career. Embarrassing numbers of ships ran his blockade of the city, and his sympathetic editor believes Du Pont was at fault for not exercising more vigorous personal leadership of the Charleston patrol. At length the Lincoln administration and the Navy Department impatiently prodded Du Pont into an attack against the Charleston defenses though the admiral had no confidence in its success. The Navy Department counted on the supposed invulnerability of the new ironclad monitors; Du Pont disliked the cul-de-sac of Charleston harbor, where his ships could not keep in motion as they had at Port Royal, and he feared that the monitors' inadequate firepower offset their defensive strength. The attack of April 7, 1863, confirmed his fears.

Beyond their value as historical sources, the letters develop dramatic tension as they move toward the foredoomed assault on Charleston. Afterward, unfortunately, they descend into querulousness and needless repetitions, as Du Pont, relieved of his command and unjustly maligned by a Navy Department infatuated with the monitors, responded by nourishing a persecution complex until he sadly lost perspective and balance of judgment.

Temple University

RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY

In recent years a number of important studies have challenged the legends and stereotypes long associated with the Gilded Age. Displaying a welcome tendency to give serious attention to the problems and accomplishments of these decades, scholars have profitably reexamined the period's economic, diplomatic, and cultural developments and have discovered that the Gilded Age constituted more than an unfortunate wasteland between Reconstruction and Progressivism. With the exception of several perceptive local studies, however, historians have failed to accord the same thorough research and understanding treatment to the era's political life. Thus, while much of the Gilded Age legend has been discarded, interpretations of late nineteenth century politics have continued to reflect traditional and simplistic stereotypes rather than fresh and detailed investigation.

In this thoughtful and provocative book, Professor H. Wayne Morgan has remedied this deficiency. Drawing on extensive research in newspapers, manuscript collections, and other sources, Morgan skillfully traces the manner in which the political parties responded to the changing American society of the last third of the century. He is tart with the Democrats, sympathetic to the Republicans, and bases both approaches on convincing grounds. The Democratic party, representing “little more than a collective grievance,” earns Morgan's scorn for its inability to govern effectively, its inferior leadership, and its unwillingness to confront new conditions in the nation. The search for Democratic presidential candidates, he correctly observes, “often savored of archeological digging.”

The book consequently focuses on the Republicans, analyzing their transition from the tired, fragmented organization of the 1870's to the triumphant, tariff-centered coalition of the 1890's. In the intervening years, Morgan argues persuasively, the Republican party gradually rejected the older, personal style of politics, symbolized in the career of Senator Roscoe Conkling, and adopted a unified national outlook that attracted an urban-industrial constituency of labor, business, diversified agriculture, and the professional middle class. While the Democrats remained mired in localism, the Republican party came to embody the nationalizing tendency in American life and thus established itself as the country's majority party during the mid-1890's.

Morgan offers compelling interpretations of the men and issues of the Gilded Age. His discussion of the tariff, the period's central issue, avoids the usual cant and notes the political effectiveness of a doctrine that promised material rewards to diverse groups, satisfied nationalistic emotions, and furnished the foundation for the emerging Republican coalition. He makes no attempt to conceal political corruption, but contends that it played a relatively small role in the era's party battles and probably amounted to no more than in any other period of American history. In an age when voters avidly followed politics, elections turned on information and organization rather than bribery, and most party leaders were intelligent and well-
meaning men who dealt with significant questions and tried to solve important problems. That they sometimes failed owed less to corruption than to the magnitude and newness of the problems they faced. The author's deft character sketches buttress this contention and outline the policies of such figures as the moderate Rutherford B. Hayes, the shrewd and serious James A. Garfield, the reserved Benjamin Harrison, and the able William McKinley.

Morgan also demolishes the unfounded legends surrounding Grover Cleveland. His analysis confirms the growing impression of Cleveland as a president whose carefully nurtured reputation for independence masked a reliance on skilled political managers, whose vaunted courage did not prevent frequent retreats on major issues, and whose rigid self-righteousness brought division and disaster to his party. Equally refreshing is the author's treatment of James G. Blaine. Unlike most of his predecessors, Morgan wisely recognizes that the historian must explain, not simply dismiss, this talented political leader whose ideas, energy, and immense popularity created legions of "Blainiacs" across the country and helped remold the Republican party. A proponent of constructive nationalism, Blaine "symbolized change, embodied success, spoke for vitality." Together with William McKinley and others, he formulated the policies that won the confidence of a majority of the nation's voters after 1894.

This is an outstanding book in every respect. While maintaining his political focus, the author has included informed commentary on related aspects of life in the Gilded Age, including a perceptive chapter on the agrarian unrest of the 1880's and 1890's. Morgan writes superbly, with clarity and wit; numerous anecdotes, used to illustrate points, enliven the narrative and should entertain the casual reader. Historians will welcome the study as a major contribution to the current reevaluation of the Gilded Age. There will undoubtedly be disagreement with some of Morgan's conclusions, but hopefully this excellent book will bury old stereotypes and stimulate further serious study of American politics in the late nineteenth century.

Yale University

R. HAL WILLIAMS

THE JACKSONIAN ERA: AN ESSAY REVIEW

By Herbert Eshkowitz


With the staggering amount of material that has recently become available as a consequence of the publication revolution it becomes increasingly impossible to master even as small a period of American history as the
New Perspectives on Jacksonian Parties and Politics, a collection of material first printed in other sources, provides a useful guide to the Jacksonian Era. Although the articles represent quite a range of viewpoints, most of the writers see the era from one of two perspectives. The “electoral party thesis” states that the Democratic and Whig parties were organized only to advance candidates for office and were not dedicated to a set of principles. Both parties drew their leadership from the same upper strata of society while the electorate voted for one party or the other, but not because of class or economic reasons. Those opposed to this view contend that there were real differences in party ideologies, in leadership, and in sources of their voting strength.

The “electoral party thesis,” which tends to dominate recent writings on the Jackson Era, is well represented in this volume, especially by Richard P. McCormick, its foremost advocate. In this selection from the concluding chapter of his The Second American Party System, McCormick writes, “Between 1824 and 1840, the ‘presidential question’ rather than doctrinal disputes was the axis around which politics revolved.” He goes on to argue that the parties of the era should be studied from the perspective of both their internal structure and the structures of government around which they were shaped. By concentrating on party structure and on factional fights between political bosses, McCormick overstates his case, leaving too stark a portrait of the pragmatic politician without ideals.

This thesis is also presented in selections by Robert Remini, Lee Benson, Grady McWhiney, Glyndon G. Van Deusen, and Sidney Aronson. In the selection from his book on the election of 1828, Remini demonstrates how Democratic leaders John Calhoun, Martin Van Buren, and Duff Green, etc., put together in an unscrupulous way an organization which prevailed in electing Jackson president. Unfortunately, this piece is not characteristic of Remini’s work as a whole. In his work on Van Buren and Jackson, he advocates the thesis that the Democratic party was organized by men who believed in the simple agrarian, anti-business, anti-urban views of Jefferson.

A similar complaint might be made about Pessen’s selection from Lee Benson’s study of New York politics. In this piece, Benson analyzes the social backgrounds of the leaders of the Whig and Democratic parties and finds very few differences between them. Both groups were drawn from the economic elite. Although in his The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy: New York a Test Case, Benson repudiates the narrow economic and class interpretation which marks Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.’s The Age of Jackson, he does see differences between the political parties based on conflicting views of society.

In other articles McWhiney finds that the Whig and Democratic leaders in Alabama had similar election districts. Van Deusen, although finding
some differences between Whig and Democratic rhetoric, concludes that, "The divergencies that existed . . . were more over means than over ultimate ends." This argument is somewhat marred by the fact that the author presents more than enough evidence to reach the opposite conclusion. Finally, in one of the most convincing articles in this volume, Aronson contends that the men appointed by Jackson to the upper level civil service were chosen from the same upper class from which Jefferson and Adams drew their appointees.

Major L. Wilson, Lynn Marshall, Charles Sellers, Frank Gatell, Carl Degler, and Richard Brown propose an opposing point of view. Wilson sees the two parties approaching the politics of the era from two very different philosophical points of view. Analyzing the Whigs as the party which looked to the future, seeking to improve the quality of democratic institutions, he argues that the Democrats looked more to the past and sought through Manifest Destiny to increase the amount of territory open to democratic institutions. Marshall, agreeing with Wilson that the two parties stood for different philosophies, sees, however, the Democrats as the innovators, for they created a modern bureaucratic state through their innovations in public administration.

Sellers and Gatell deal with different problems and in their conclusions differ quite sharply with McWhiney and Benson. In answer to the question, "Who were the Southern Whigs?" Sellers concludes that they, like their northern counterparts, were persons who were favorable to banks and to commerce and wanted the United States government to advance commerce and business. Gatell, attacking Benson directly by using the same sources, argues that although he agrees that the political leaders of both parties were from the upper class, the rich men of New York City in overwhelming numbers supported the Whig party. Thus, Gatell accepts class as a strong determinant in party politics.

Richard Brown also focuses on the principles of the Democratic party, contending that it was organized after the debate over the admission of Missouri into the Union as a means of protecting the slave interests of the South. The anti-Democratic bias in this very provocative article is not something that the advocates of principle-oriented politics, especially Sellers, Marshall, and Wilson, could agree to.

Pessen's orientation in Jacksonian America: Society, Personality, and Politics is closest to that of the "electoral party thesis" school. He sees the two parties as quite similar, "for all the differences in their political rhetoric, they were more alike than unlike, not least in the extent to which their basic structure and apparatus were controlled by unusually wealthy men." Implicit throughout this volume is a denunciation of the Schlesinger premise that the Democrat party was the party of the urban worker and the farmer against the Whig party as the representative of big business.

Although rejecting both parties of the period as instruments for maintaining the status quo, Pessen is much harder on the Democrats than on
the Whigs. In fact one of the chief flaws in an otherwise noteworthy enterprise is its anti-Jackson bias. As the “New Left” historians have evidenced a great distaste for liberals like Franklin D. Roosevelt, who failed to change an otherwise oppressive system, so Pessen reserves his greatest hostility for the party which claimed to be the champion of the underprivileged, but which did nothing for them.

Jackson is condemned on other grounds. Making use of the many recent studies of the Bank of the United States, Pessen argues that the inflation which began after the government withdrew its deposits from the “Chestnut Street Monster” and the subsequent Panic of 1837 were the direct consequence of the president’s conduct. The individuals hurt most by these economic fluctuations were the farmers and laborers about whom Jackson professed so much concern.

Some of Pessen’s most provocative sections are on American society during the Jacksonian Era. It is here that he goes far beyond the advocates of the “electoral party thesis.” Rejecting the notion suggested by John Ward and Lee Benson that this was the Era of the Common Man, he proposes that it be called, “an age of materialism and opportunism, reckless speculation and erratic growth, unabashed vulgarity, and a politic, seeming deference to the common man by the uncommon man who actually ran things.” He argues that a “strong case can be made . . . that not equality but disparity of condition was the rule.”

This discrepancy in wealth increased during the period rather than decreased. This trend was most apparent in the American cities where immigrants, Negroes, and native workingmen were squeezed together in tenements while the wealthy built elaborate housing for themselves in segregated neighborhoods. But similar conditions existed in rural areas where the wages of farm laborers declined consistently during the period.

Pessen’s volume, drawing as it does on a comprehensive reading of published and unpublished monographic literature on the Jackson Era, as well as on a wide reading of the source materials, must be considered the outstanding synthesis since Schlesinger’s Age of Jackson.

Because of his excellent grasp of all aspects of American life, Pessen has written a volume that is certain to be the standard account of the period for some time to come. A major criticism is his unwillingness to admit that any differences existed between the parties. It is just as erroneous to contend that the Democratic party of Jackson and the Whig party of Clay were the same as it is to argue that no measurable differences exist between the Democratic party of John F. Kennedy and the Republican party of Richard M. Nixon. Some regret must also be expressed that although this volume contains a comprehensive and invaluable bibliography, it lacks citations.

In opposition to the views taken by Pessen on the financial policies of the Democratic party is Peter Temin’s The Jacksonian Economy. Using the tools of the new economic history, Temin attempts to discover the relationship between Jacksonian financial policies and the resulting depression.
He raises two major questions: Did Jackson's withdrawal of the government's deposits from the Bank of the United States in 1834 and subsequent deposit of these funds in state banks around the country precipitate the inflation of the 1834-1837 period? Did Jackson's Specie Circular of 1836 prick the inflationary bubble and lead to the Panic of 1837? Temin answers no to both questions.

Examining both the internal flow of money and the international exchange of specie, Temin concludes that the United States' financial relations with England, Mexico, and China had a greater effect on the domestic situation than Jackson's fiscal policies. Noting that the reserve of specie maintained by American banks in ratio to the total currency issued remained stable during the era, Temin attributes the post-1834 inflation to an increase in the amount of specie circulating in the United States. This specie came from two sources—a switch in the specie demands of China which diverted Mexican silver to the United States, and an increased purchase by England of American cotton. The distribution of governmental deposits did not thus increase the amount of money in the country. The ensuing Panics of 1837 and 1838 were likewise caused by external forces, especially the action taken by the Bank of England in stemming the excessive flow from Britain through the imposition of tightened foreign exchange regulations. An oversupply of cotton, a drop in its price, along with restrictive Bank of England regulations, contributed to the American collapse. Temin downgrades both the excessive sale of governmental lands after 1834 and the Specie Circular as causes of the collapse because land sales were not directly involved in either the production or consumption, they had a neutral effect on the economy. Moreover, the MIT economist argues that a strong Bank of the United States would have had little effect in retarding these influences.

Temin notes that the depression following the Panic of 1837 was not as severe as is usually pictured. He concludes that the Gross National Product continued to grow at a fairly consistent rate during this period, a characteristic not usually associated with an economic depression.

Several reservations must be raised about Temin's approach. He rejects contemporary views of the Bank War and the Panic of 1837 as irrelevant because of their inability to view the whole picture and their failure to use the sophisticated economic tools available today. As a consequence, he loses material as essential to the understanding of economic trends as the movement of specie. Especially important in this connection is the psychological factor. Loss of confidence in the policies of the government may have been more important in causing a panic than the concrete movement of specie. The use of letters, diaries, and newspapers from this period indicates just such a trend. A second area to be questioned is in his use of statistics. Temin admits the unreliability of his data on specie flow. These errors cannot be eliminated as Temin seems to believe by putting great quantities of such data together. There is no magic in numbers.

Although Temin does not discuss the central issues in political history, by his pro-Jackson stance he tends to balance out Pessen and such neo-
Whigs as McCormick. This volume and the writing of some of the younger historians such as Lynn Marshall and Frank Gatell who have shifted away from the "electoral party thesis" indicate that a new generation re-writing history in the 1970's may have swung back toward a favorable view of Jackson and his party.

Temple University

Herbert Ershkowitz
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