BY 1860, factionalism troubled both of Pennsylvania's major parties. Democratic politicians were deeply divided between the distinctly pro-southern state organization and the insurgent coalition in Philadelphia led by former gentleman-mayor Richard Vaux, Lewis C. Cassidy, perennial candidate for District Attorney in the Post-bellum period, and John W. Forney, editor of the influential Philadelphia Press. The split was precipitated by the decision of the state committee to authorize a vote for either Douglas or Breckinridge. After the 1860 convention at Charleston had chosen the former, the Vaux-Cassidy faction was provoked to set up a rival ticket pledged solely to Douglas. In the view of President Buchanan this dealt a death-blow to the local organization because the city's immigrant Catholic population was almost to a man for the "Little Giant." Forney, although publicly declaring himself for Douglas, soon entered secret negotiations with Republican Party leaders which resulted in his support of Andrew Gregg Curtin's nomination for the governorship, Philadelphia's loss of its most influential Democratic newspaper, and Forney's election as clerk of the national House of Representatives. This tactic of switching party loyalty gained for him and his followers the dubious title of "Forney-cators."

The Republican Party (known as the People's Party in Pennsylvania during the war and the Union Party in 1864), had

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2 Joseph Baker to Buchanan, September 7, 1860, Buchanan MSS, Historical Society of Pennsylvania hereinafter cited as HSP.

3 Erie Observer, April 23, 1859; Bedford Gazette, May 13, 1859.
been organized in the state in 1855 as a “disjointed union of Abolitionists, Americans, Free Soilers, and Old Whigs.” The effort to unite the various factions in 1858 under the People’s Party banner was the first time such a thorough organization had ever been attempted. But by 1860, they were still at loggerheads becoming polarized around Senator Simon Cameron, the state’s American Party nominee in 1855 who represented the manufacturing interests in his patronage, and the “radical” faction of the national party in his politics; and former Whigs Andrew Curtin and journalist Alexander K. McClure. Nativists, Forney Democrats, Republicans, and Constitutional Unionists all had to be conciliated under the People’s Party banner in the 1860 campaign, and this Herculean task was assigned to the loquacious McClure.

In Philadelphia, the Cameron faction was led by John P. Sanderson, editor of the Daily News, manufacturer and former Congressman Henry D. Moore who had unsuccessfully tried to unseat Vaux in 1856, and ironmaster James Milliken. Joining their ranks was Philadelphia’s most important “radical,” flour manufacturer William Thomas. The Curtin-McClure combine was dominated by the influential District Attorney William B. Mann. He had the backing of Morton McMichael’s North American renowned as “the recognized exponent of commercial interests in Philadelphia.” The Harrisburg Telegraph described its make-up: “Curtin was the ornamental figurehead and orator of the cabal; McClure its Oily Gammon and chief executive officer; and Mann the bully, or, as the theatrical paralance goes, the ‘Heavy villain’ of the combination.” Philadelphia businessmen, who viewed bankruptcy as a concomitant of secession, exerted powerful pressure on Curtin, McClure, and McMichael to conciliate

7 Harrisburg Telegraph, cited in Harrisburg Patriot, March 4, 1869.
the South. Side-stepping the all-important issue of the day, a possible civil war, their carefully censored speeches “declared unqualifiedly that every constitutional right of the South must be sacredly maintained. . . .” As a consequence, the old Whig remnants, interested mainly in the tariff, would not support any radical anti-slavery policy. Since they were out-numbered by the Knownoth or American elements, the harmonizing of interests laid to McClure was never to become a reality.

The Cameron organization is best described as a core or cadre from which a machine could be constructed. His numerous friends throughout the state were strong at the local level. Over the years, too, he had constructed a working relationship with many state newspapers and could generally rely on a “good press” for support. A former Democrat, Cameron could count on the support of some of his old colleagues. But most important, he had the backing of the Pennsylvania Railroad which reputedly controlled the state, and had been a champion of state protectionists and new industries since 1842. The reason for his tremendous power, according to one biographer, was extremely simple. “Here was a man who would make more personal exertions to oblige his ‘friends’ than perhaps any man who ever occupied a seat in the Senate of the United States.”

It was during the campaign of 1858 that United States Senator Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania was first presented as a presidential possibility for 1860. Although he said little about slavery, sectionalism, or war, he actively sought to make himself the state convention’s nominee for two reasons: “first, it would indicate his primacy in the state party, and second, he might just have a chance for that exalted post.” During the latter part of 1859, Cameron’s supporters conducted a silent but energetic contest for delegates to the Republican National Convention,

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9 McClure, Old Time Notes, I, 468-470.
10 Harrisburg Telegraph, February 14, 1867.
scheduled to meet in Chicago on May 16, 1860. The Cameron forces were most active in Illinois, and with good reason. For the presidential election would be decided by four states holding relatively conservative views on the slavery question—Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, and New Jersey. Each had been carried by the Democrats for Buchanan in 1856 against the Republican John C. Fremont, and Republican leaders were particularly cognizant of this.

“The Cameronians’ effort to court Illinois took the form of an offer to support Springfield’s popular citizen, Abraham Lincoln, for Vice-President, in return for which Illinois should aid Cameron for first place on the national Republican ticket in 1860.”

In October, 1859, the Cameron-inspired Lancaster Examiner printed a widely circulated editorial suggesting this ticket but Lincoln remained noncommittal regarding the overtures of the Cameron people. However, on November 1, 1859, he did answer one query from Pennsylvania:

Yours of the 24th ult. was forwarded to me from Chicago. It certainly is important to secure Pennsylvania for the Republicans in the next presidential contest, and not unimportant to also secure Illinois. As to the ticket you name, I shall be heartily for it after it shall have been fairly nominated by a Republican national convention; and I cannot be committed to it before. For my single self, I have enlisted for the permanent success of the Republican cause; and for this object I shall labor faithfully in the ranks, unless, as I think not probable, the judgment of the party shall assign me a different position.

Joseph J. Lewis, with an eye to the propensity of eastern Pennsylvanians for tariff protection, wrote in the Chester County

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12 A. Hay to Cameron, October 29, 1858, Cameron MSS, LC; Harrisburg Telegraph, June 11, 29, July 10, 1858; New York Herald, June 8, 28, 30, July 17, October 14, 1858.
15 Reprinted in the Harrisburg Telegraph, October 13, 1859; Chicago Press and Tribune, November 19, 1859.
That Lincoln had been a strong Whig leader, a friend of Henry Clay, and master of “the principles of political economy that underlie the tariff.”

Mr. Lincoln has been a consistent and earnest tariff man from the first hour of his entering public life. He is such from principle, and from a deeply rooted conviction of the wisdom of the protective policy; and whatever influence he may hereafter exert upon the government will be in favor of that policy.

A motion was carried through the Republican state convention held at Decatur on May 10 endorsing Lincoln as Illinois' first choice for the presidency. Some of Cameron's supporters persisted in their claim that Cameron was at least Illinois' second choice, but it was wishful thinking for Illinois was first, last and always for Lincoln.

Cameron's strategy was to keep himself in the public's eye by working energetically for the Morrill Tariff and the Homestead Bill thereby adding those who approved of his record to his personal coterie. Although somewhat successful, the party split with the old Whigs proved a barrier to his goal. Floor leader Morrow B. Lowry of Erie County did manage to maneuver his selection as the convention's first preference despite a gratuitous insult by Tom Marshall who sardonically quipped that if he entered "... a dark alley at midnight ... the first man I caught would make a better President than Simon Cameron." Despite the continued preaching of his apologists that he “is the only man that can carry Pennsylvania,” it soon became evident that he had little strength outside his own state. His stock in trade, the tariff, was important only in Pennsylvania and New Jersey and he far from represented the dominant opinion on the major issue of the day—the extension of slavery. In addition, "Old Winne-

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Chester County Times, February 11, 1860.
Ward H. Lamon, The Life of Abraham Lincoln (Boston, 1872), 445-446; Joshua G. Holland, The Life of Abraham Lincoln (Springfield, Massachusetts, 1866), 198; Simon Whitely to Cameron, May 10, 1860, Cameron MSS, LC.
bago" had a reputation, whether justified or not, for venality and sharp practices that made party leaders fear to nominate him. After a night of hectic maneuvering, the Whig faction succeeded in nominating his archrival Curtin for governor and also captured enough additional delegates to insure a divided delegation. "By the second day of the convention, Cameron's managers had all but given up hope." Curtin also felt that placement of the radical Seward at the head of the national ticket would have substantially damaged his chances of being elected governor in conservative Pennsylvania. To this effect, he worked closely with Henry S. Lane, the Republican gubernatorial candidate in Indiana, to apply the coup de grâce to Seward's efforts to secure the nomination in their respective states. The result of these consultations was that Indiana would support Lincoln as an "available candidate," while Pennsylvania, after hours of wrangling, gave the Springfield Republican a majority of six votes. It was agreed, however, that as a gesture of courtesy, Pennsylvania would vote for Cameron on the first ballot and Justice McLean on the second before swinging to Lincoln on the third. Since neither Cameron

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21 H. Kreismann to Washburne, May 13, 1860, Elihu B. Washburne MSS, LC. Charges by later muckrake reformers that Cameron defrauded the Winnebago Indians while commissioner of the Wisconsin Territory in 1838 remain unsubstantiated. Transcripts of the hearing found in John Fleming, Jr., Report on the Winnebago Claims Settlement, January, n.d., 1840, Prairie du Chien File F. 156, Record of the Interior Department, National Archives, clearly exonerate Cameron. See also Cameron to Thomas McNair, October 8, 1838, cited in James B. McNair, Simon Cameron's Adventure in Iron (Los Angeles, 1949), 86; Burton J. Hendrick, Lincoln's War Cabinet (Boston, 1946), 54; and F. Lee Crippen, Simon Cameron: Ante Bellum Years, 34-41, 254 n. 80.


23 Thurlow Weed, on Seward's behalf, attempted to bribe members of the Pennsylvania delegation, but neither Curtin or Cameron's followers were susceptible to this tactic. Weed to Cameron, May 7, 1860. Cameron MSS, LC; J. S. Pike, First Blows of the Civil War (New York, 1879), 520; Murat Halstead, Caucuses of 1860 (Columbus, Ohio, 1860), 142-143.
nor McLean now had any chance of being chosen, the third ballot was really the only one that mattered. 24

"The support of Pennsylvania was assured to Lincoln by a promise to place Simon Cameron at the President's council table." 25 On the first ballot Pennsylvania cast 47% votes for Cameron, 4 for Lincoln, 1% for Seward and 1 for McLean. The decisive break came on the second ballot when Pennsylvania was called and Cameron was dropped. On the third ballot Lincoln was nominated and it was Pennsylvania's action which had, more than any other, tipped the scales in his favor. Cameron emerged from the convention seriously weakened by his defeat. With his position as state party leader jeopardized by the selection of Curtin for governor, the feud inevitably carried over into the campaign.26

While McClure was chairman of the state committee, the majority of its members were Cameron men. The night before their first meeting a riotous frolic ensued and wine flowed freely. "The Curtinites had pledged themselves to remain sober but no such promise had been extracted from the Cameronians." The result was that a score or more of Cameron's supporters were absent, allowing the Curtin-McClure group to control the

24 Thomas H. Dudley, a New Jersey delegate to the convention stated that both the New Jersey and Pennsylvania delegations agreed to drop their favorite sons one day before the convention opened if a "stronger candidate" (viz. Lincoln), could be found. Therefore, the Pennsylvania-Indiana deal placed all four crucial states in the Lincoln column even before balloting began. Thomas H. Dudley, "Inside Facts of Lincoln's Nomination," Century, XL (1890), 477-478; Proceedings of the First Three Republican National Conventions 1856, 1860, 1864 (Minneapolis, 1893), 171-172.

25 Although Willard L. King, Lincoln's Manager, David Davis (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960), 140-141, states that "no deal" occurred, evidence to the contrary is found in H. D. Moore to Cameron, May 20, 1860, Samuel P. Purviance to Cameron, May 23, 1860; Russell Errett to Cameron, May 29, 1860, Cameron MSS, Dauphin County Historical Society, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, hereinafter cited as DCC. McClure, Old Time Notes, I, 406-407; Harry E. Pratt, "David Davis, 1815-1886" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1930), 77; Tracey E. Strevey, "Joseph Medill and the Chicago Tribune in the Nomination and Election of Lincoln," in Paul M. Angle, ed., Papers in Illinois History (Chicago, 1938), 58-59; agree with this conclusion. Thurlow W. Barnes, "Mr. Swett's Reminiscences," Life of Thurlow Weed II, Memoir (Boston, 1884), 292, even suggested that Cameron could have had the vice-presidency but that it would have appeared too much like a prearranged bargain. Both Lincoln and Cameron were innocent of this transaction.

26 Errett to Cameron, May 29, 1860, Cameron MSS, DCC; McClure to Cameron, June 6, 1860, Cameron MSS, LC.
meeting. Quickly they mapped their campaign strategy and adjourned *sine die*. They could meet again only at the call of the chairman, and for the remainder of the campaign, despite the vigorous protest of the Cameronians, McClure never called another meeting.²⁷

Late in July Cameron's partisans devised another plan for undermining McClure. Their instrument was the Philadelphia Republican Club which they planned to use to collect and disburse campaign funds throughout the state. Curtin agreed to the project but McClure objected, telling Cameron, "I could not but regard such a course as a personal reflection upon myself," and pointed out that utilization of the new organization would be a duplication of effort.²⁸ Lincoln soon learned of the friction in Pennsylvania from several sources in particular from Cameron's friends, Russell Errett of Pittsburgh's *Gazette* and Chicago *Tribune* editor Joseph Medill, who informed Lincoln that "confidence is lost in the state committee and the monied men of the party will not entrust it with money." Medill also accused McClure of pocketing $10,000 in campaign funds some of which was used to secure the election of his supporters in the April municipal elections in Philadelphia.²⁹

Judge David Davis, who had established friendships in the Cameron camp at Chicago, was dispatched to Philadelphia to investigate the situation in the state. He arrived on August 7 and attended a meeting which set up a second state committee to handle the campaign. Among the leaders in the movement were John P. Sanderson, Russell Errett, Joseph Casey, and several Philadelphia Republicans, but Cameron's Campaign Com-

²⁷ Errett to Cameron, June 23, 1860, Cameron MSS, LC; J. K. Moorehead to Cameron, July 14, 1860, Cameron MSS, DCC; Medill to Lincoln, Lincoln MSS, LC; McClure, *Old Time Notes*, I, 409-410.

²⁸ After initially agreeing in Curtin to Cameron, July 22, 1860, Cameron MSS, LC, they met in Philadelphia on July 26 and could not finalize plans to their mutual satisfaction. It was at this time, apparently, that Cameron added his "notation" to the July 22 letter which has led to the confusion regarding Curtin's position. See also McClure to Cameron, July 31, 1860; Cameron to McClure, August 1, 1860; McClure to Cameron, August 2, 1860; Cameron MSS, LC.

²⁹ Lincoln to Swett, July 16, 1860, in Roy P. Basler (ed.), *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New Brunswick, 1933-1953), IV, 83-84; Swett to Lincoln, July [?], 1860; Errett [to Medill], July 24, 1860; Medill to Lincoln, July 29, 1860, Lincoln MSS, LC.
mittee was to have little success in its fund raising efforts.\textsuperscript{30} Henry C. Carey, an implacable Cameron foe, claimed "they cannot obtain a single dollar . . . for the reason that our people have no confidence in such politicians."\textsuperscript{31} Each tried to prevent domination of the state committee by the other. Cameron, now fighting for his life against the rising Curtin tide finally acquiesced in the appointment of McClure as chairman, but assiduously opposed the appointment of fat, shifty-eyed Mann to the committee. He won this fight and in the last analysis the committee was evenly balanced. Curtin and McClure simply could not afford to have Cameron desert to the opposition.\textsuperscript{32} Both factions prepared themselves for the national contest by concentrating their heaviest artillery on the fight for governor. For it was psychologically desirable to win big in the October election and thereby take the credit for Lincoln's victory the following month.

The Buchanan and Douglas wings of the Democratic Party, after considerable haggling, agreed to support Henry D. Foster to oppose Curtin. In the face of a possible split in the People's Party, the Democrats had nominated a candidate acceptable to both the anti-Lecompton faction and the party regulars and hoped to capitalize on the opposition's loss of its more conservative element to the newly-formed Constitutional Union Party.\textsuperscript{33} To counter this move, the Republican National Committee sent its leading forensic talent into the state to campaign on Curtin's behalf while McClure himself took to the stump in Philadelphia delivering two major addresses in Sep-

\textsuperscript{30} William D. Kelley to Lincoln, August 7, 1860, Lincoln MSS, LC; McClure, \textit{Old Time Notes}, I, 415; King, \textit{Lincoln's Manager}, 152. It is clear that the politically astute Lincoln, while "legally" doing business with McClure, also gave his blessing to McClure's anti-pope Sanderson and the People's State Auxiliary Committee.


\textsuperscript{32} For the various disputes about the membership of the State Committee see McClure to Cameron, March 30, April 4, 12, 24, 1860, and Pollock to Cameron, June 13, 1860, Cameron MSS, LC. McClure wrote to Lincoln without mentioning Cameron's name, that because of the tariff issue and his strength in the eastern, southern, and central counties that his support was "... vital at all times . . .": McClure to Lincoln, June 16, 1860, Lincoln MSS, LC.

\textsuperscript{33} Philadelphia \textit{Public Ledger}, March 1, 2, 1860; Bedford \textit{Gazette}, March 9, 1860, cover Foster's nomination.
September. On the 17th, Foster answered McClure's attack defending his tariff record and the following night at the Philadelphia Wigwam, McClure replied. In mocking tones he pleaded guilty to "profound ignorance" of Foster's views on slavery and his choice for president as well. But he did articulate unequivocally that anti-tariff Democrats throughout the country were calling for Foster's triumph "in order to establish Free Trade as the fixed policy of this government." Rebuked by audience laughter when he referred to Democratic threats to the Union, he countered warning them, "There is not a disunionist in the South who does not demand the election of Foster, and the defeat of Lincoln."

Republicans, concerned that the loss of Pennsylvania in October could mean Lincoln's defeat in November, girded for a last minute attack. The Democratic press charged in October: "The Republican financial clubs of Boston, Providence and other New England cities, warned of the necessity, have been sending on their remittances to Philadelphia, by hundreds and thousands of dollars." "One Republican journal admitted that $5,000 was donated to Curtin's campaign, besides payment for 200,000 documents; that $100,000 more was sent into the Keystone state by the New York Republican Committee." Although McClure found it difficult to raise funds for the Curtin campaign particularly in Philadelphia due to the city's lucrative Southern trade and Lincoln's position on the slave question, there seems to be little if any foundation for his claim that he received no aid from the Republican National Committee. His cold reception from National Committee Chairman Governor Edwin D. Morgan of New York was attributable to resentment over the defeat of Seward at Chicago as well as a general distrust of his integrity stemming from charges that he had misused funds in the April municipal election. Cameron, disliking outside interference in his domain, also hampered fund raising efforts

85 New York Herald, October 2, 1860.
87 McClure, Old Time Notes, I, 417-419.
by assuring Lincoln that “We need no help here, of any kind, ... We will take care of Pennsylvania.”

It was ultimately protectionism and the split in the Democratic Party that proved to be the deciding factors in the gubernatorial contest in October as Curtin defeated Foster 262,396 to 230,312. In Philadelphia, however, the Democratic “candidate received 51 percent of the city’s vote about the same as Democratic nominees for state office four years earlier.” Outside Philadelphia, Pennsylvania Democrats were badly beaten, their vote falling from 49 percent of the total in 1856 to 46 percent. Curtin was elected in upstate Pennsylvania because, in contrast to Philadelphia, Democrats could not recapture the votes lost in 1858.

The Republicans secured eighteen out of twenty-five Congressmen and heavy majorities in both houses of the legislature, and in November Lincoln received a nearly 95,000 vote majority over the Democratic fusion vote which went to Breckinridge. Lincoln had received a larger share of the vote than Curtin and the results were as follows:

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31 The Bell vote in Philadelphia went to Foster, Philadelphia Public Ledger, September 28, October 8, 10, 13, 1860. While Lincoln won due to the tariff, Curtin’s Irish-Catholic father plus his past Know-Nothing proclivities, caused him to be denounced as a traitor to his ancestral heritage and faith. Boston Pilot cited in the Bellefonte Central Press, September 27, 1860. McClure attributed defeat to city businessmen’s fear that a Republican victory would mean dissolution of the Union. McClure to Lincoln, August 27, 1860, Lincoln MSS, LC. Russell Errett also attributed the Bell anti-Curtin vote to Curtin’s commitments to Lincoln. Errett to Medill, July 21, 1860, Lincoln MSS, LC.

32 As early as 1858, according to the Pennsylvanian, November 15, 1858, the great Democratic losses were not found in the five anti-slavery counties where they showed a net gain of 10,660 votes over 1856, but in the fifteen counties dominated by mining and manufacturing interests where they lost 29,616 votes. Further, due to the electoral system, even had there not occurred a split in the Democratic Party in 1860, Lincoln still would have been elected. Clearly, it was tariff that played the key role. Tribune Almanac and Register (New York, 1858-1868), 1861, pp. 50-75. C. Maxwell Myers, “The Influence of Western Pennsylvania in the Campaign of 1860,” The Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, XXIV (1941), 248; Thomas M. Pitkin, “The Tariff and the Early Republican Party” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Western Reserve University, 1935), 187-246.

33 Tribune Almanac, 1861, 50-75; Bradley, Triumph of Militant Republicanism, 95; Dusinberre, Civil War Issues in Philadelphia, 100-101.
Lincoln felt grateful to McClure and dealt with him on close terms thereafter which became his chief claim to fame, but it was Cameron, and his close personal ties with the state’s industrial interests, that had swung the state for the Republicans. Moreover, Cameron, divining Lincoln’s pressing personal need for funds, had cheerfully loaned him a few thousand dollars, and sent $800 out of his own pocket into Illinois’ weak counties to assist the “railsplitter’s” campaign. On the other hand, Curtin’s loss of Philadelphia to Foster signalled deep trouble for the Whigs and provided a fertile field for Cameron’s inroads into the city, but the issue of state control was still to be decided.

The next confrontation came over the appointment of Lincoln’s cabinet. Here, the Curtin men launched a blistering personal attack aimed at destroying Cameron. They were answered by a group of Philadelphia senators who informed Lincoln toward the end of November that Cameron was the most popular man in the metropolis and for that matter “the representative man of the party” in Pennsylvania. Cameron visited the president-elect at the Illinois capital in December, and received a letter stating that he would be offered the post of either Secretary of Treasury or Secretary of War. Before he had time to return to Pennsylvania, McClure was on a train bound for Springfield to block the appointment hitting Cameron at his most vulnerable point—his reputation for corruption. When Lincoln asked for proof, McClure failed to deliver stating later that he had not wanted to be “... an individual persecutor of Cameron ... [therefore Lincoln’s] request for the formulation

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4 Cameron to Lincoln, August 1, 29, September 21, 1860, Lincoln MSS, LC; Cameron to Davis, September 7, 1860, cited in King, Lincoln’s Manager, 155-156; Bradley, Triumph of Militant Republicanism, 94.

4 Philadelphia Senators to Lincoln, November 26, 1860, Cameron MSS, LC.

4 Lincoln to Cameron, December 31, 1860, Cameron MSS, LC.
of Cameron’s alleged political and personal delinquencies was not complied with." Nevertheless, McClure’s charges plus the deluge of criticism that descended on Lincoln as rumor of the appointment circulated, caused him to request in a brusquely worded letter that the senator permit him to withdraw the offer. Cameron, highly irritated, did not respond directly but informed the president through a friend that he would not accept any seat in his cabinet.

Meanwhile, McClure, unaware of his success, hurried back to Harrisburg for the senatorial election only to receive a major setback when a Cameron-cronie Edgar Cowan was easily elected. Again it appeared that the factions were deadlocked. Tom Scott, dynamic, thirty-eight-year-old vice-president of the Pennsylvania Railroad proposed a deal to stop the cabinet fight, but Cameron was neither impressed nor cooperative. He chose to play a waiting game as opposition to Salmon Chase for the treasury post grew throughout the Commonwealth. Due to Chase’s free trade antecedents, pressure mounted among the state’s industrial interests who became increasingly active on Cameron’s behalf. Cowan and Sanderson visited Lincoln while Milliken cajoled the state organization to drop its opposition. Curtin and McClure came under heavy fire from Scott who wrote to Cameron on February 17, “all is right—hostilities cease . . . be lenient and kind . . . stand entirely aloof and all will be well.”

That same month, Lincoln began his exhaustive zig-zag trip to Washington. When he reached the Quaker City, he confronted a host of state and municipal politicians almost to the man for Cameron. Milliken read a letter from Curtin and Mc-

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46 Lincoln to Cameron, January 3, 1861, cited in Basler, Works, IV, 169-170. Lincoln followed on January 13 with a milder apologetic note ante-dated to January 3 which Cameron chose to exhibit, and he promised no cabinet appointments from Pennsylvania without his approval. Cameron responded through Leonard Swett and suggested Thaddeus Stevens for the post. Swett to Lincoln, January 8, 1861; Stevens to Washburne, January 19, 1861, Lincoln MSS, LC.
47 Scott to Cameron, February 17, 1861; Milliken to Cameron, February 18, 1861, Cameron MSS, LC; McClure, Abraham Lincoln and Men of War Times, 143. See also H. I. Carman and Rheinhard Luthin, Lincoln and the Patronage (New York, 1943), 21-22; Harry E. Pratt, “Simon Cameron’s Fight for a Place in Lincoln’s Cabinet,” Abraham Lincoln Association Bulletin, XLIX (1937), 9-11.
Clure voicing their support and even Morton McMichael, who a few weeks earlier denounced Cameron as "the very incarnation of corruption," acquiesced in the appointment. Lincoln remained noncommittal but when he sent his list of nominees to the Senate on March 5, it included Cameron for the War Department and Chase for the Treasury. It may not have been exactly what he wanted, but Cameron had won a great victory. To have lost would have given Curtin control of the state; McClure was correct when he exclaimed "Cameron has more lives than a cat." Soon, however, cries of "public plunder" caused Cameron to be censured by the House, and the President found it expedient to appoint him as minister to Russia. The greatest criticism directed against him during his tenure in the War Office grew out of his selection of irresponsible or corrupt agents empowered to grant lucrative war contracts. Further, "as Secretary of War he chose his own Pennsylvania colonels and sent them to gather soldiers in Curtin's preserve." In August, the governor complained directly to the president that "many Cameron appointees were recruiting in Pennsylvania and that they went so far as to draw men out of legitimate organizations already formed, even breaking up companies that were ready to march." Of his resultant Siberian exile, Henry Adams jibed that he hoped Cameron would "vanish into the steppes of Russia and wander there for eternity." The Whig faction appeared destined to gain lasting control of the new party, but the rising Democratic tide in Pennsylvania, plus the threat of foreign

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48 Carey to Lincoln, January 7, 1861, Lincoln MSS, LC; Milliken to Cameron, February 22, 1860; Purviance to Cameron, February 23, 1860, Cameron MSS, LC.
intervention in the war, led party leaders to herald the return of their old war horse.\footnote{Bradley, \textit{Simon Cameron, Lincoln's Secretary of War}, 226.} Further, Lincoln's issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation changed Cameron's status from obnoxious "radical" to prophetic seer, for it was he who had suggested the idea while Secretary of War only to have it vetoed by the president.\footnote{Lincoln to Cameron, December 14, 1862, Cameron MSS, DCC, February 13, 1863, Cameron MSS, LC; Cameron to Lincoln, February 23, 1863, Lincoln MSS, LC.} Anxious to return home because of his wife's ill health and the approaching Russian winter, Cameron heeded the call of his party. With mixed emotions and uncertainty about his future, he wrote his friend Benjamin Harrison Brewster:

> Every sphere in which man can enter I have seen, and I shall feel prouder when I go home than ever and as a private citizen do all that man can do to make those around me happy and do what I can to aid my country as my example in its hour of need. If you wish to run the rounds, you shall have my help. For me, my course is run.\footnote{Cameron to Brewster, November 12, 1862, Cameron MSS, DCC; Eugene C. Savidge, \textit{Life of Benjamin Harrison Brewster} (Philadelphia, 1891), 99.}

Within a few months, he became the Union Party candidate for senator only to be defeated 67 to 65 by Democrat Charles Buckalew. Amidst charges of corruption in securing the senatorial nomination, his political instincts aroused, he set about the task of salvaging the rapidly deteriorating machine.\footnote{Pennsylvania, \textit{The Legislative Record}, 1863, 26-27; \textit{Journal of the Senate}, 1863, 50; "Report of the Committee on Frauds," 1863, Pennsylvania State Legislature.} For the next four years, he re-organized his forces with an eye toward the Senate seat to be filled by the legislature in January, 1867, although he held no public office during this period. His strategy was to secure the election of "his" men to positions of power in the state as a prelude to the confrontation of 1867 which would decide the issue of state control. Of strategic interest to him were the gubernatorial race of 1866, the office of Secretary of the Commonwealth, and the Speakership of the State House of Representatives. After suffering a few
initial setbacks in 1865 at the hands of Curtin and Thaddeus Stevens, his strategy soon began to reap results.\footnote{He had hoped to have members of his faction nominated for Attorney General and Chairman of the State Committee in 1865 but was blocked by a Curtin-Stevens coalition. McClure, *Old Time Notes*, II, 186-189.}

In the gubernatorial race, Curtin favored old Whig-lawyer W. W. Ketcham but did not make his wishes clear. He had the support of young Matt Quay who by 1869 would become a keystone in Cameron’s state organization. McClure, on the other hand, worked diligently for Frank Johnson. This confusion among Curtin followers aided the campaign of former Democrat John W. Geary who soon became Cameron’s candidate for the office. At the party convention held in Harrisburg on March 8, 1866, the Cameron-Geary forces easily won the temporary chairmanship of the convention when, speaker of the state senate, Louis W. Hall was elected over Mann by a vote of 57 to 30. Hall then appointed the committee which selected a Geary backer as permanent president of the convention. After tactfully drawing up a platform which avoided McClure’s “radical” position of openly impugning President Andrew Johnson, Geary secured the nomination on the first ballot and was elected governor. As a reward for his support, Cameron would secure the post of secretary of the Commonwealth for Francis Jordan, brother-in-law of the influential speaker Louis Hall.\footnote{Mann is here and indeed many others. With more money I really believe we can carry all but three nominations in Philadelphia.”}$^{50}$ Cameron, though rejuvenated by his success,
was not presumptuous of victory. He wrote Charles Dana that he still feared Curtin's power and thought that his election would be a tragedy for "he [Curtin] is ruthless, corrupt and mercenary without even faith to those who would buy him." Nor was Cameron's triumph the result of bribery and corruption which even his competitors used as efficaciously as he. Rather, it was due to his rare knowledge of men, his patience and persistence and a great sense of timing that enabled him to capitalize on his opponents ineptitude.

State party chairman McClure sprang into action on Curtin's behalf exerting pressure on Franklin County's newly elected representative F. S. Stambaugh. Stambaugh, however, played a Machiavellian game and was later a decisive figure in the House-Senate investigation of the 1867 campaign. For it was he who headed the investigating committee in the House, and whose resolution ultimately set in motion the machinery which cleared Cameron of the Stevens' instigated charges.

By mid-October, the outcome of the senatorial contest appeared to be still in doubt. Errett's Pittsburgh Gazette, perhaps to lull the Curtinites into complacency, reported that Cameron had only nineteen of the needed forty-two votes for the nomination and claimed Curtin had a clear majority. Stevens listed Cameron's count at sixteen. The important support of former Curtinite Isaac Wayne MacVeagh, latter Attorney General under President Garfield, came as a windfall. He had recently married Cameron's youngest daughter Virginia and perhaps as a wedding present his followers in the legislature voted for Cameron. The machine was now moving again, and with the Yuletide festivities in Harrisburg, Cameron appeared confident. He wrote his friend Ben Butler of Massachusetts as part of his Christmas greeting: "I expect and intend to win."

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60 Cameron to Dana, August 13, 1866, Cameron MSS, LC; Kelley, "The Senatorial Nomination of 1867," 375-376.
61 Russell, "A Biography of Alexander K. McClure," 247-278; Cameron to Isaac Wayne MacVeagh, October 21, 1866, MacVeagh MSS, HSP. Stevens to Stambaugh, January 6, 1867, Stevens MSS, LC.
62 Pittsburgh Gazette, October 15, 1866; Stevens to Joseph Shortlidge, June 25, 1867, Stevens MSS, LC; Don Cameron to MacVeagh, November 6, 1866, MacVeagh MSS, HSP; Thomas Robinson to Slifer, November 22, 1866, Slifer-Dill WSS, HSP.
63 Benjamin F. Butler, Private and Official Correspondence (Norwood, 1917), V, 717.
At this point Governor Geary rendered assistance by announcing his cabinet appointments, among them Cameron's well-known friend Benjamin Brewster. Coming just prior to the speakership race in the House, this came as a crushing blow to Thaddeus Stevens who had expected Geary to back him for the senatorial nomination. "Why," complained one Stevens supporter, "did he not hold up the appointment until after the contest for the Speakership. But it is done and we must fight it."64

The race now became a four-way struggle between Matthew Quay, John P. Glass, D. B. McCreary, and William B. Waddell. Quay, the Curtin candidate, remained in the race despite numerous maneuvers and threats from the Cameron forces.65 In discussing the matter with McCreary, Cameron got him to drop out of the race and told him he would "send for" Quay to ascertain his views. McCreary himself attempted unsuccessfully to induce Quay to withdraw while Don Cameron executed a brilliant coup.66 He persuaded the leaderless Stevens group that only a coalition of forces could checkmate the Curtin faction. Waddell, therefore, arriving late on the scene found that his friends had withdrawn his name. Quay, realizing the mounting opposition, offered to support Waddell if he would re-enter the race, but Don Cameron, in the velvet-fisted style of his father, solved the dilemma. In the late afternoon of December 31, he visited Waddell in his hotel room. As a result of this conference, and the moral sophistries of Don Cameron, the conscience-stricken Waddell felt honor bound to remain out of the race.67 The remnant of Stevens' comrades telegraphed Washington for instructions. Early that evening their answer came, "Defeat Quay. . . ."68

64 L. Kaufmann to Stevens, January 14, 1867, Stevens MSS, LC.
65 E. M. Davis to Quay, August 13, 1866, Quay MSS (private collection of James A. Kehl, University of Pittsburgh), cited in Kelley, "The Senatorial Nomination of 1867," 386. Dr. Kehl is currently completing a biography of Matthew Quay.
66 D. D. McCreary to Quay, November 5, 1866, Quay MSS. Quay and Cameron did meet for one of Quay's correspondents wrote: "How I should have liked to overhear the fracas between you and Cameron. Lord! it must have been a rich scene!" J. R. Kelley to Quay, December 19, 1866, ibid.
67 R. W. Shenke to Stevens, telegram, December 29, 1866, Edward Reilly to Stevens, December 31, 1866, Stevens MSS, LC.
68 Stevens to J. R. Sypher and Shenke, telegram, December 31, 1866, Stevens MSS, LC.
By the time the party caucus convened at 8:00 P.M. New Year’s Eve, all opposition to Glass had crumbled. “Cameron’s brilliant maneuvering had united all anti-Quay votes for Glass. In the face of this solid front, Quay, with the permission of Curtin, withdrew from the race.” Thaddeus Stevens clearly placed Curtin’s defeat in its proper perspective, “I believe the latter’s [Curtin’s] friends consider the game up for him.” As for Matthew Quay, he had learned a lesson and by 1869, with Cameron back in the Senate and Curtin in retirement, he finally broke with that faction of the party.

There was now no need for Cameron to use money to secure the senate nomination, if indeed he had ever done so, as is so often charged. For on the evening of the party caucus, January 10, 1867, he received forty-six votes to Curtin’s twenty-three, Stevens’ seven, and Galusha Grow’s five with none other than Matt Quay making the prearranged motion to declare the nomination unanimous. Five days later, Simon Cameron was elected to the Senate for the third time, defeating old friend, turned Republican renegade, Edgar Cowan by a straight party vote 81 to 47.

Defeated, Curtin packed his bags and headed for Europe. Ironically, history did repeat itself for within two years, Cameron would send him off to the Siberian exile (viz, the Russian mission), that he had endured in 1863. The dejected McClure sold his newspaper and went to Montana. Philadelphia, which McClure had largely ignored as a factor, had played a decisive role in his victory. It had long been a Whig stronghold under the leadership of Mann and yet 10 of its 15 representatives in the Republican caucus had supported Cameron. The reasons for this defection are difficult to assess but it was apparent long

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70 Reilly to Stevens, December 31, 1866, Stevens MSS, LC. Quay, too, agreed with this assessment as he reported some years later in his Beaver Argus, December 22, 1869.
72 Harrisburg Patriot, January 12, 18, 1867; Huntington, Globe, January 16, 1867.
before the caucus vote that Curtin faced the double problem of not only fighting the Cameron faction, but also retaining the "radicals" in his own following. Politicians of radical bent had been increasing in Philadelphia's wards as early as 1860 and were anxious to expand their horizons in the state legislature which, under Pennsylvania law, practically owned the city.

The fact that Curtin and McClure had lost Philadelphia did not conversely mean that Cameron had won it. Control was still largely in the hands of a "ring" of officeholders chief among whom were William C. Mann, William H. Kemble, William S. Stokley, and the increasingly influential James McManes. In fact, no one ever really controlled Philadelphia, they just had better or worse relations with it. Befitting her role in his triumph, Philadelphia would again emerge as focal point in the struggle with the embittered war-time governor and his vitriolic lieutenant. But this time, they were cast in the role of aliens no longer faithful to the Republican Party.

Nonetheless, during the course of events 1860-1867, the Great Winnebago Chieftain had laid the foundation for what became possibly the most powerful political machine in the nation's history. A. Howard Meneely, perhaps, best epitomized his achievements: "No politician of his generation understood the science of politics better than Simon Cameron; none enjoyed greater power; none had more success."

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73 Philadelphia Evening Telegraph, January 11, 1867. H. W. Watts informed Stevens of the Philadelphia defection on January 7, 1867, Stevens MSS, LC.
76 Bradley, Simon Cameron, Lincoln's Secretary of War, 285.
77 Meneely cited in ibid., 8.