BOOK REVIEWS AND BOOK NOTES

EDITED BY NORMAN B. WILKINSON


It is no easy task to present 138 years of history in 116 pages, but S. K. Stevens has done a very creditable survey of the history of Pennsylvania from the first European settlement in 1638 down to the signing of the Declaration of Independence in 1776. In addition he provides an initial chapter that gives a general description of the social and economic life of the Indians who were living in Pennsylvania when Europeans first arrived.

This is followed by a discussion of Dutch and Swedish exploration and settlement on the Delaware, Dutch conquest of the Swedish colony, and English conquest of New Netherland. The next three chapters deal with the religious background of English settlement in Pennsylvania, with emphasis on the Quakers; the settlement of Pennsylvania by William Penn, with emphasis on the development of a governmental system; the early settlers—Germans, Scotch-Irish, English—who gave the colony its distinctive social flavor. The remaining chapters deal with the frontier, urban and rural life in Pennsylvania, the city of Philadelphia, and the struggle for independence from Great Britain.

The organization of these materials takes the form of a skillful blend of the chronological and the topical. The book is intended for younger readers, and Dr. Stevens skillfully associates three important historical phenomena with colorful and familiar individuals—Daniel Boone with the frontier, George Washington with the French and Indian War, Benjamin Franklin with Philadelphia and cultural developments in general. This is especially successful in the case of Boone, whose family typified a particular group of frontiersmen; less successful, perhaps, in the case of Washington, whose role in the French and Indian War was relatively brief.

Dr. Stevens also includes three appendixes: A selective bibliography of books and leaflets of probable interest to secondary school students; a list of important dates; and a comprehensive list of places to visit, including museums and historic sites. An index is also included.

As must be expected, considering its prospective audience, the book is a narrative with relatively little analysis. This raises no questions except in the case of the chapter on Washington and the French and Indian War. The chapter contains thirteen pages (compared to fourteen for the chapter on events preceding the Declaration of Independence), and one might expect the author to explain to his young readers why the conflict is worth such emphasis. This could have been done in a brief concluding para-
graph dealing with the significance of the British victory and considering the effect of a decisive French victory upon the subsequent history of Pennsylvania and the other colonies. For that matter, the volume itself could have used a brief concluding chapter to summarize and emphasize the major points of the narrative.

But these are minor, and subjective, reservations. On the whole, the book is a clearly written, well organized presentation that offers young readers an excellent introduction to Pennsylvania's colonial history.

The New York State Historical Association

WENDELL TRIPP


"New Jersey's early history is not easy to tell." Wesley Frank Craven's opening statement in the third volume of The New Jersey Historical Series is a masterpiece of understatement. And yet, thanks to the New Jersey Tercentenary Commission, that state's early—and later—history is being brought within the purview of the neophyte Jersey scholar.

Professor McCormick's fine little book is the appropriate lead-off work to the now thirty-one volumes of the series. "Although I have sought to maintain the proper degree of scholarly objectivity," he states, "I must confess that I have written it as one who thinks of himself as a Jerseyman for others who accept the same designation." Professor McCormick, however, needs no apologia. Particularly in the latter section of the book, his story of the foundation of "a new society" is a fascinating narrative, perhaps even the more so for the uninitiated, that is, for the non-Jerseyite.

The necessities of condensation make the book's early chapters somewhat less successful than those dealing with the post-1763 period. The labyrinthine intricacies of the proprietary era are unwound in fifty-eight pages, no mean trick. (Further clarification of this murky story may be found in John Pomfret's volume in this series, The New Jersey Proprietors and their Lands [Princeton, 1964]). There follows a chapter on royal government from 1703 to 1763 organized chronologically by governors' terms. Next is a relatively fulsome chapter on "The Colonial Scene." The reader may be disappointed that in these chapters the author follows the usual format for colonial history. Yet if he had integrated his political and social themes, one might with equal justice have criticized him for lack of chronological precision. Such are the pitfalls of historical surveys.

With Chapter 6, "The Movement for Independence," this book, like the scene it describes, catches fire. This chapter and the final two, "Fighting for Freedom," and "Experiment in Independence," are, in a word, brilliant. The first of these shows how Jerseyites went from general agreement against England's "unconstitutional" acts during the Stamp and Townshend Acts crises, to bitter fratricidal struggle as the road to war and independence shortened. Although the Revolution brought with it no demand for an overthrow of New Jersey's fundamental societal institu-
tions, Professor McCormick believes that the "sum effect of the change" from royal colony to autonomous republic "was to produce a highly democratic government," the constitution of which "was not based on the theory of separation of powers." The discussion of Jersey's tories, including many of her previous leaders, is a highlight of this excellent chapter, as is the telling of the military story in the next. Finally, there is the movement toward the Constitution in which the eagerness of New Jersey, squeezed between the giants New York and Pennsylvania, is thoroughly explained. "Republican government," McCormick concludes, "the equality of all men, the denial of inherited preeminence, the concept of a nation of united states—these were to be the revolutionary products of what had begun as a war for independence."

As a Jerseyite, Professor McCormick may be pardoned for his laudatory tone. His early chapters, a result of the book's brevity, smack overmuch of the textbook, while the same cause results in a few unanswered questions. We are not told, for example, that Salem's legislative representation, mentioned in the text, was later included in that of Hunterdon County. McCormick rightly stressed that "interdependence—rather than independence—characterized the relationship of each man with his fellows," but unfortunately he falls into a more conventional rhetoric when he writes that, "by stressing individual enterprise and political responsibility," colonial society "promised a greater freedom for all men than any previous society in history." There also appears to be a problem with regard to General Charles Lee, who on page 137 is a prisoner of war and ten pages later is assisting Washington in the field. A parenthetical explanation of his exchange for British General Prescott would have clarified the mystery.

Following the format of the other volumes in the series, New Jersey from Colony to State, though lacking annotation, contains a select bibliography, a detailed index, several illustrations, and the end papers feature detailed maps of colonial and present-day New Jersey. There is also a chronology, though the 1677 Concessions and Agreements of West Jersey, a landmark document celebrated in the text, is unhappily missing.

Finally, even in this short book, one delightedly comes upon these sudden penetrating truths that are the hallmark of thoughtful historical writing. Writes Professor McCormick of the transition from proprietary to royal rule, "Political experimentation of an extreme sort was succeeded by a type of constitutional stability that in time came to be regarded as excessively restrictive." The comment applies not only to colonial New Jersey but to our present condition as well.

San Jose State College

THOMAS WENDEL


Professor Brown, having severely damaged, maybe destroyed, the proposition of Charles A. Beard that our Constitutional fathers were pocketbook patriots, now assails the thesis of Carl Becker that the American Revolu-
tion was in good part an internal class struggle. The objects of Brown's frowns are different. Beard tarnished the fame of men well credited in American history, while Becker was in the stream of democracy in asserting the vigor of working class protest. This may have something to do with the reception of the present attack by less rigorous readers. Further, while Beard advanced his notion confessedly on the basis of incomplete inquiry, and later only modified it, Becker in time recanted his emphasis on domestic struggle.

Brown has two counts against Becker, the second being that the Cornell master was subjective in twisting the evidence to bear out his favorite purpose. Here again, however, the accuser is bound to agree that in his later years Becker swung back to objective examination and report. No matter, Brown will root out error though the wanderer from the path finally returns to the straight road of scholarship. True, the critic pleads that Becker's engaging fallacies continue to have their partisans. Brown is less justified in questioning the integrity of Becker, who, he charges, "had to have an undemocratic New York society or he had no thesis, and . . . he created the impression of having used original documentation when, in fact, that documentation annihilated his thesis."

To differ with conclusions is one thing, to indict the honesty of a well reputed investigator is another. Perhaps Brown may be forgiven this thrust because he is so earnest in his cleanup. For example, he says that Frederick Jackson Turner, Becker's major professor, was remiss in passing his pupil's dissertation without checking the evidence relied upon. Turner, at the time, was absorbed in his own researches, but nevertheless Brown asks for an uncommon assiduity in a mentor. In the give and take of a graduate seminar a doubtful doctrine may be queried, and further examination of the sources may be proposed. But to expect a professor to retrace the steps of a student in a dissertation long in preparation is a counsel of perfection.

This reviewer, with far less right to speak, is impressed by Brown's main contentions. The Revolution was primarily a quarrel between mother country and colonies, in which the common people had a voice. Also, it is the office of the historian to discover and abide by the evidence, irrespective of his own penchant in interpretation. In the latter pursuit literary style, often judged to be freer if the writer is less objective, need not suffer. At the same time, charity suggests that if the scholar is to generalize at all, allowances be made. The truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth is difficult to be arrived at. We may resurrect from the past (or define in the present, for that matter) only a fraction of what the diverse members of a society do and think, so the report must be only hopefully representative. Likely mistakes in the verdict rendered by a competent, well-intentioned judge will come to light on appeal, as Brown's work demonstrates.

Far from wishing cessation of the labors of Kipling's "youngest critic," we may still remember the poet's l'envoi, that
"... each, in his separate star,
Shall draw the Thing as he sees It for
the God of Things as They Are!"

The bibliography is exceedingly full, bearing witness, as the author suggests, to the cooperation of graduate students over the years. As this is a book of punctilio, the reader may query the spelling of consensus as concensus.

New York City


Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation is a "biographical companion" to the author's The Jefferson Image in the American Mind, published in 1960, and is based on "a line of inquiry commenced some twenty years ago." The former work dealt with the posthumous influence of the author of the Declaration of Independence. The present work gives the substance of the man's life, and explains the immediate effect of his public career on the new institutions which he did so much to create.

"More than any of his great contemporaries he had given form to the ideas, the values, even the dilemmas of the new nation, and thus involved himself with its destiny," Peterson writes. Jefferson indeed set standards for the new democracy, and presided over the nation's destiny as President with an even tighter control than had been imposed by George Washington--whose Federalist principles were to be comparatively short lived. If Jefferson fell short, therefore, either in realizing his own ideals or in formulating principles that could be accepted universally, his failures merely illustrated the dilemmas of the new society that were to become all too clear by the middle of the nineteenth century, and again in our own day.

Peterson's interpretation is balanced, judicious, and on the whole fair. It is a work of impeccable scholarship, which gives the traditional apologia as well as it can be stated, but inevitably it raises questions. How can Americans read about Jefferson's (and their own) twists and turns without asking questions? Peterson's ready acceptance of his subject's values, like Jefferson's early confidence in the sturdy virtues of a democratic society, is a trifle too optimistic. Jefferson himself became disillusioned when the French Revolution (which he observed as ambassador) failed to follow the prescribed pattern, and later when American sectionalism took an ugly turn. Peterson describes with brilliant insight the shadows that fell over Jefferson's old age, but he is less candid—or perhaps less perceptive—in analyzing the reasons for those shadows. He cheerfully explains them away, until suddenly they become overwhelming.

One wonders, for example, why the slavery issue should be muted at the time of the Revolution, only to sound forth "like a fireball in the night" at the time of the Missouri Compromise. The author's rationalization is plausible: "All of Jefferson's values and goals dictated the externi-
nation of slavery. This was as self-evident as the principles of 1776 themselves. But the Revolutionary generation could not be brought up to the mark. The Virginians of that day, Jefferson reflected, daily nursed and educated in the habits of slavery, had no more doubted the legitimacy of this species of property than of horses and cattle."

Undoubtedly, many would agree, and would accept the corollary that Jefferson should not "waste his influence in the advocacy of an untimely cause." He was a politician as well as a prophet, and had to limit himself to goals that were attainable. But there were opponents of slavery in that generation (such as George Bryan, who introduced gradual emancipation in Pennsylvania), and Jefferson had clearly outlined the nature and scope of the problem in his Notes on Virginia. Apparently it was wise and statesmanlike for him to prevent the expansion of slavery into the Northwest Territory, but necessary and proper to permit it in Louisiana. He is praised for his services in the cause of freedom in one breath, and exonerated from working for it consistently in the next.

This sort of ambivalence was characteristic of Jefferson's thinking on several subjects, and on the slavery question in particular it was a basic fact of the American experience. Peterson cannot be held responsible for it. More to the point is the question whether a writer in 1970 should be forgiven such a parochial description of the coming of the Revolution as the following: "Virginia was secure. The pesky Dunmore, with his motley crew of Tories and blacks, dropped the royal standard and fled during the summer." Similar language is used in another passage which refers to "Dunmore's paltry contingent of redcoats, loyalists, and blacks pillaging and plundering and the aid of several men-of-war in the vicinity of Norfolk." Surely these are bits of traditional jingoism, which will be rejected by an increasing number of readers today—white and black. It was significant that the blacks and the British were supporting each other. We should take heed—the firebell was already ringing.

Again, it is traditional for American historians to accept the practical advantages of the Louisiana Purchase, and to ignore the legal and moral difficulties. Peterson hastens to assure us that the administration's action was "all considered, an unprecedented achievement. The nation incorporated a foreign dominion and committed it to the status of equality in a union of free men. Freedom followed the flag in Louisiana . . . [Jefferson] did not make any big mistakes, and whatever the faults of his improvisation, it was vindicated in its working over the longer run of history." One detects a note of special pleading. And the more one investigates the details of the "improvisation" the more one finds unanswered questions. As John Adams bitterly noted in 1821, "It gives despotic power over territories purchased. . . . It introduces whole systems of legislation abhorrent to the spirit and character of our institutions, and all this done by an administration which came in blowing a trumpet against implied power."

How can the principles of 1776 be reconciled with the re-introduction of taxation without representation, the domination of the government by the executive, and the discarding of an independent judiciary? Why
worry about the Missouri Compromise in 1820 if you are prepared to annex a vast new empire in 1803, a large portion of it destined to be slave territory? And if expansion is to be accepted whenever it seems like a bargain, what are the limits? The arguments that apply to Louisiana might also be used to justify the incorporation of Texas, California, the Philippine Islands, or Southeast Asia. The Jeffersonian tradition, it would seem, leads on to hubris. Who is to say, "Beware," if Jefferson and his biographers are silent?

Perhaps I am overstating my case. The book is brilliantly successful at presenting each incident as it must have appeared to Thomas Jefferson, and it is written with a grace and felicity that do not clash with the scintillating passages of Jeffersonian prose, which adorn the work throughout. My objection is to the moral confusion that comes from sliding back and forth, from idealism to political practicality—a weakness of Jefferson's which is consistently, one might almost say endlessly, explained and defended by Peterson.

The book has 1,009 pages of text, and if the Select Bibliography and Index are added it has 1,072. There are no footnotes because, as the author states, "Complete notation would be very burdensome indeed to the general reader and a partial notation merely an annoyance to the interested scholar."

Lafayette College


With the construction of the world's most extensive system of coast defenses from 1794 to the end of the second World War, the United States' contribution to the science of military architecture and the design of heavy ordnance is very significant. The story of these efforts is told by Emanuel R. Lewis in Seacoast Fortifications of the United States: An Introductory History.

Many of the fortifications comprised a number of systems. The author covers the field from the first set of works to the railroad artillery and the sixteen-inch rifles of the two World Wars. The disappearing guns and the mortar pits of the Endicott and Taft periods also receive treatment, as well as the defenses of the overseas possessions. A substantial number of these defenses have survived and are now maintained as state parks or national monuments. This slender volume serves as an excellent guide to the basic history of these systems, and contains pictures and drawings of many of the defenses. Not only a history of fortifications and ordnance, this work also covers the development of coast defense tactics and strategy and touches on United States naval policy and seacoast protection.

A major criticism of this study would be its brevity. Realizing that this is only an introductory history, the reader has to bear in mind that the total impact of the coast defense policy cannot be adequately assessed. Besides having been written from a host of primary and secondary sources,
indicating Dr. Lewis' mastery of the field, this work also provides the reader with reference appendices covering the location of all of the defenses, the types of fortifications and armament, and the extent of the construction of the various systems. In all, it is an important contribution to the history of American military architecture and fills a badly neglected vacuum in this field. Along with the author, the Smithsonian Institution must be commended for its publication of this handsome volume.

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SAMUEL R. BRIGHT, JR.


There is no consensus among historians concerning the priorities that should be assigned to the various issues that brought on war in 1812. Land hunger, British intrigue with the Indians, economic depression, maritime grievances, and national and party honor all contributed to the American declaration to fight, but no agreement on the primary motivation has been reached.

Victor Sapio has identified the advocates of these various emphases and in a highly constructive way has tested Pennsylvania's strong anti-British bias against each of these theses. Using the state as a microcosm, he shows conclusively that only certain of the issues are at all relevant to Pennsylvania. Although he does not conclude that it is pointless to search for a hierarchy of causes equally applicable across the nation, his research implies the futility of such a task.

The author's analysis covers primarily the period from the Embargo Act in 1807 to the coming of war in 1812, with a lesser emphasis on the years of conflict that followed. His volume effectively relates the conduct of an individual state to the stream of national development. He demonstrates that only maritime grievances and national and party honor aroused the ire of Pennsylvanians. The other causes were readily dismissed in the author's treatment: (a) the limited fear of Indians that prevailed, he discovered, was not associated with British intrigue, only with Indians being Indians; (b) since Canada was the only means by which the United States could strike Britain by land, the conquest of Canada was interpreted by Pennsylvanians as a strategy, not as a cause; and (c) since the state did not experience the economic hardship that befell some other states and sections as a result of the nonimportation-nonexportation legislation, depression was foreign to the state in these years.

Sentiment in Pennsylvania viewed the British attack on the Chesapeake in the summer of 1807 as "a premeditated hostile act" designed to embarrass the United States. This conviction prompted the state to give more votes than any other congressional delegation for the enactment of the Embargo which to Republicans was an honorable, but definitely temporary, alternative. In time, according to opinion in the Keystone State, such legislation would have to give way either to a full recognition of
America's neutral rights by the British, or to a war to prevent re-colonization by the former mother country.

This latter possibility, that Britain was scheming to force a return to the imperial fold, is one that the author generally ignores, but from the Treaty of 1783 ending the first phase of the American struggle for independence, there was a general feeling in Europe that the new nation could not survive and would either revert to England or fall under the rule of another European power. Although this may help explain why Britain followed the maritime policy that she did, it is less apparent than the issues considered by the author.

Reluctant to declare war when the Embargo failed to elicit a satisfactory response from Britain, the Madison Administration explored nonintercourse legislation. This also failed, but Pennsylvania Republicans, although they preferred to fight, supported the action because it was a party measure. Support also came from the state's Federalists who considered the Embargo less than honorable, but recognized that its non-importation character had a gratuitous advantage that they could endorse; the state's budding industries could flourish without foreign competition. Since Pennsylvania was already leading the nation in the quantity and diversity of manufactured goods by 1810, this virtual monopoly spelled even greater success for her industries.

In spite of this economic prosperity in Pennsylvania, the Republican administration in Washington felt compelled to go to war when Britain steadfastly refused to recognize the nation's neutral rights on the sea. This action was taken, according to the author, because the party feared that it would lose its hold on the American people if it failed to pursue an effective course to protect their rights. The declaration of war was enthusiastically received across Pennsylvania where later in the year Madison's re-election was endorsed in a similar spirit. The state cooperated with federal authorities in the prosecution of the conflict by contributing men and money as requested; in fact, Pennsylvania supplied more militia-men to the federal service than any other state, but the ineffectiveness of the state's units in battle proved that what was lacking in quality was rendered in quantity.

This informative monograph is unfortunately marred by more than a few factual and careless errors for which the publisher, as well as the author, must bear the onus: Nazareth is not a county in Pennsylvania (p. 174); the reference on page 35 should not be to the History of Bradford and Somerset Counties, but to Bedford and Somerset Counties, and the authors of this work are E. Howard Blackburn and William H. Welflley, not William H. Koontz who was the editorial supervisor; the editor of the American Daily Advertiser was Zachariah Poulson, not Paulson (pp. 29, 50, and 200); Andrew Gregg was interested in nonimportation legislation, not nonimportant legislation (p. 53); and additional misspellings on pages 18, 19, 65, 76, 136, 200, and 202 extend the list of technical errors, most of which should have been eliminated by careful editing.

University of Pittsburgh

JAMES A. KEHL

This handsome volume in effect contains two books—a long critical essay on Domingo Faustino Sarmiento's career and tour through the United States and a translation of the record of his trip in 1847, a long overdue addition to the list of mid-nineteenth century travelers' accounts.

Unfortunately, Sarmiento is scarcely known to North Americans. Considered by his countrymen as one of the greatest literary and political figures in South America and as the Horace Mann of Argentina, Domingo Sarmiento was both a thinker and a doer. A self-educated writer and politician, Sarmiento laid the foundations for Latin American public education, wrote over fifty volumes, started newspapers and journals, became a revolutionary figure, general, cabinet official and eventually president of Argentina. He made two important trips to the United States, the second of which was as ambassador in the 1860's. The first, a two-month journey in the United States in 1847 was the culmination of a two-and-one-half year trip to gather information about educational systems in Europe and the United States.

He was an admirer of Horace Mann, conducted a long correspondence with his widow, Mary Mann, developed a friendship with Elizabeth Peabody, had meetings with Emerson, Longfellow and Henry Barnard, and was awarded an honorary degree by the University of Michigan in 1868. Probably his greatest achievement was the establishment of a system of normal schools throughout Argentina. As Rockland points out, it is largely to his credit that Argentina today has the best educational system in South America.

Rockland's main thesis is that Sarmiento's *Travels* is one of the most significant books written on the United States by a foreign visitor. He defends this assertion by analyzing Sarmiento's comments on American traits and by pointing out that he had the benefit of a South American perspective (rather than a European one) and hence was in a better position to judge Yankee strengths and deficiencies.

In his concise essay Rockland supplies sufficient information about Sarmiento's life and career. He also provides a good critique of *Travels*, indicating when Sarmiento leaned too far in his adulation of North America. Rockland briefly compares Sarmiento's views with those of Tocqueville. Comparison in depth might also have been made with the writings of Alexander Mackay and Walter Colton, who were travelling in the United States at about the same time, or with the views of Dickens, Joseph Sturge and Mrs. Trollope.

The two hundred pages comprising the translation of Sarmiento's *Travels* are a joy to read. His impressions of Boston, New York, Niagara Falls, Philadelphia, Washington, Pittsburgh and New Orleans range from the trivial to the profound. Although handicapped by the language barrier, he communicated well and learned much. He marveled at our hotels, our rage to travel, our blossoming technology. He commented on Yankee
Sarmiento's main weakness was his idealization of North Americans. It was his opinion that Americans took the elements of their European civilization and improved upon them in their new land. He admired the American genius for building and growing and applying scientific developments to economic activities. He considered our political system nearly perfect. He thought Yankees were the only really cultivated people in the world, and criticized those English writers whom he had read who exaggerated the coarseness and crudities of Americans. He gave only passing attention to slavery which he considered a question without a solution.

His account, however, is valuable as an antidote for the overly critical accounts of other travellers during this period. His impressions of Horace Mann, of the Lowell working girls, of the American enterprising spirit, are among the high points in his tour. He shares with the reader his distress at being stranded without money in Chambersburg and his excitement floating down the busy Mississippi. The book contains a diary of expenses that reveals more about Sarmiento's tastes than it does about the American economy in 1847. Sarmiento enjoyed peaches and cigars, occasionally newspapers and apples. He frequently bought books, sometimes "wicked ones." And he thought it remarkable that he had to spend $1.80 for one night in a Washington hotel.

This book will be especially useful to those interested in social history but the general reader will find it informative and entertaining. Thanks to Michael Rockland's efforts, North Americans can now learn about Sarmiento and his travels.
of the collection accessible, the selections contained in his volume are those which have never been previously published in their entirety. Each selection is a complete narrative so that the focus is on "the individual former slave as well as upon the collective experience."

In making his selections Yetman chose the narratives comprising at least three typewritten pages of recollections of ex-slaves who were a minimum of thirteen years of age by the time of Emancipation. From the three hundred which conformed to his criteria, he chose for publication those which met the following standards: readability and interest, detail of content, continuity of narrative, and prominence of personal experience as contrasted with simple descriptive treatment of slave life.

Until after World War II few historians made use of the massive resources of ante-Bellum slave testimonies or ex-slave recollections. They stood with U. B. Phillips who doubted their authenticity. In recent years, however, Kenneth Stampp, Willie Lee Rose, Charles H. Nicolas, Jr., and others have found rich insights to an understanding of the institution of slavery by following the lead of a fugitive slave who in 1855 informed the journalist, Benjamin Drew: "Tisn't he who has stood and looked on, that can tell you what slavery is,—'tis he who has endured."

The value of *Life Under the "Peculiar Institution"* is primarily that of a folk history of slavery. As the historian turns more to the psyche of the enslaved the material will assume new significance. At times the narratives appear repetitious in their content. However, each account contains an eye-witness recollection of involvement in the personal reality of slavery which gives insight into the institution.

In a sense the narratives are childhood recollections of slavery, as well as folk traditions of the institution. They are, however, largely the memories of slave life under a wartime economy since few were old enough to recall the pre-Civil War days. The degree of self-sufficiency of the plantation economy as related in the narratives, for example, was greater during the war than a decade earlier.

As unemployed white-collar workers, the interviewers who collected the material were amateur sociologists. They were untrained in the techniques of collecting information and interviewing, and their lack of knowledge and their prejudice is sometimes reflected in the uneven quality of the selections.

The informant himself was sometimes guilty of flattery and exaggeration and often appeared to tell what he thought the interviewer wanted to hear. The fact that some expressed the opinion that the Negro was better off under the system of slavery than as a freeman indicates the immense weight of tradition and the influence of romanticism in the Negro's common stock of tradition as well as in Southern white society.

The interviewers were almost entirely southern whites, a characteristic which is also reflected in Yetman's selections since twenty-two of his narratives were written by white interviewers, eight by black, and seventy-two could not be identified. It was recognized while the Federal Writers project was under way that black interviewers were "able to gain in-
sight” that whites could not achieve, and the narratives secured by blacks were “less tinged with glamour” than those secured by whites.

In comparison with other similar collections, *Life Under the “Peculiar Institution”* gives a milder and less cruel picture of slavery than Benjamin Drew’s *The Refugee: A North-side View of Slavery* (1855), an abolitionist project in which one-hundred and thirteen fugitive slaves were interviewed in Canada. Yetman’s selections also depict slavery as more romantic and glamorous than *Unwritten History of Slavery: Autobiographical Accounts of Negro Ex-Slaves*, the Fisk University project directed by Charles S. Johnson and Ophelia Settle Egypt in 1929-1930. Since the Johnson-Egypt project was not handicapped by a color bar, their study also revealed considerably more evidence of racial mixtures on the plantation than is evident in Yetman’s selections.

Yetman has rendered an important service to the student and scholar by making available these unique accounts of a most significant era.

*Morehead State University*

**Victor B. Howard**


A generation ago, in his presidential address to the American Historical Association, Ulrich B. Phillips argued that the central theme in Southern history has been the maintenance of white supremacy. Slavery, he claimed, was not merely a labor system but also a system of racial adjustment and social order. When slavery was attacked, it was defended not only as a vested interest but as a guarantee of white supremacy and civilization. It was the fear that a Republican victory in the election of 1860 would threaten to destroy this bulwark of white supremacy and civilization that led to the secession of South Carolina and her sister states in the Deep South.

Steven A. Channing has provided an impressive support for this thesis. His book is an exhaustive study of the attitudes of South Carolinians toward the developing crisis over slavery in the year preceding Fort Sumter. Channing argues that Carolinians had come to believe that slavery was essential to maintain white control over blacks, and that such control was essential to Southern civilization. Any tampering with slavery would bring racial war and the economic and social ruin of the South. Any hint of abolitionist activity in the South was bound to cause hysterical fear of slave insurrection. The “crisis of fear” was touched off by John Brown’s raid, which Carolinians interpreted as the beginning of a Northern abolitionist onslaught against Southern civilization. What made Brown’s raid so ominous was the belief that it was the natural consequence of the domination of the North by abolitionism and the belief that the rising Republican Party was the political instrument for an abolitionist attack on Southern civilization.

As they faced the events of 1860, South Carolinians had little doubt that a Republican victory would result in national action for the abolition of slavery. Most had lost confidence in the Union as a protection of slavery,
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The only question was how best to defend the South from the prospect of a Republican victory. Unionists like James L. Orr still hoped to work through the Democratic Party to prevent a Republican victory. Moderates like Christopher Memminger hoped to promote some kind of cooperation among the slave states for the defense of Southern rights. Radicals like Robert Barnwell Rhett and Congressman William P. Miles hoped openly for secession. The events of the year, the split in the Democratic party and the election of Lincoln, played into the hands of the radicals. By December most South Carolinians had decided that perpetuation of the Union meant the steady and irresistible destruction of slavery, the only conceivable pattern of race control. "Secession was a revolution of passion," Channing concludes, "and the passion was fear."

The fear was exaggerated, of course. Northern opinion was not nearly so united on the slavery issue as Southerners assumed, and the Republican Party did not adhere to a strict abolitionist position. But within the context of Southern racial fears and fantasies, there was no doubt that the threat was imminent. A Republican victory meant erosion of white control over the Negro and the destruction of slavery. Channing concludes, "Secession was the product of logical reasoning within a framework of irrational perception."

*Crisis of Fear* was awarded the Allan Nevins History Prize by the Society of American Historians. In several ways it is an impressive work of historical scholarship. The book is based on exhaustive research in the manuscripts of South Carolina leaders and in newspapers from throughout the state. It is a good example of the way in which local history can illuminate national history. Whether South Carolina was typical of Southern opinion or in the vanguard of extremism on the race question, the state certainly played the central role in the events that brought on the Civil War. An understanding of the fears that motivated South Carolinians can help us to understand the origins of the Civil War.

This is the most important contribution of Channing's study. He has attempted to analyze the state of mind of the people of South Carolina as they reacted to events taking place during the crisis of the Union. While their perception of these events was distorted, we have been reminded by another historian of the South that truth in history is not only what happened, but what men thought happened, because it is on the basis of their thoughts that they act. Channing has made it clear that the people of South Carolina believed that slavery was doomed within the Union after the Republican victory, and that ultimately the question of slavery was a question of race.

*Florida Presbytery College*  
WILLIAM F. MCKEE


At the time of the withdrawal of southern states from the Union following the election of Abraham Lincoln the fundamental question of how
the rights of the states were merged into the federal government extended far beyond the single issue of secession. Based on the equivocal division of sovereignty written into the constitution and on "long and religiously pursued" programs of passive federal policy, the concept of national power was limited to a surprisingly few activities and services. In that year the Republican platform emphasized this condition with the words: "the Rights of the States. . . . must and shall be preserved" and "the maintenance inviolate of the rights of the States, and especially the right of each State to order and control its own domestic institutions according to its own judgment exclusively is essential to that balance of powers in which the perfection and endurance of our political fabric depends."

The war years changed all this as it was soon discernible, but only laboriously realized, that strong central government was essential to victory. The sluggish exercise of central authority had not kept pace with the tremendous growth and fluidity of the country's economic development, but the dissolution of the union required that revolutionary steps be taken to reverse both policy and tradition. Under Lincoln's management nationalism won over localism, centralization flouted the states rights both South and North, and the "twilight of the states" set in.

William B. Hesseltine in his volume, *Lincoln and the War Governors* (1948), dramatically describes this change in the federal union in his description of Lincoln's funeral. "Officers of the nation," he wrote, "senators and representatives bore the pall between ranks of the nation's generals and admirals. They were followed by cabinet members and bureau chiefs. Far back in the crowd, mere spectators, were the governors of the once important states."

*Sovereignty and an Empty Purse* just as vividly deals with one of the most fundamental areas of this new trend—financing the war, which included currency and banking reforms. The war forced the federal government not only to raise a huge army but also to enter the markets for purchases of enormous volume. According to Senator John Sherman, the government had far less credit in the market than most of the states and was in a desperate and humiliating condition. The independent Treasury system which had ultimately replaced the Second National Bank after Jackson's war on the latter institution was an impractical anachronism under the circumstances of the 60's. Furthermore, as the author states, "Federal inexperience with internal taxes and the absence of any organization to collect them made the north no better prepared with its purse than it was with its sword."

The late Bray Hammond was thoroughly equipped to do the demanding research and distill his findings on this basic economic study which is made complex by its deep association with politics, public opinion—not always well informed—and vested interests. Teacher, businessman, and former Assistant Secretary of the Federal Reserve Board, Hammond wrote numerous articles and in 1957 won the Pulitzer Prize for his book, *Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War*. This volume with its emphasis on Jacksonian banking replaced all previous accounts
on the scholar's bookshelf by taking issue with many long accepted theories. Richard B. Morris termed it a "major landmark in the writing on our early national history."

The volume under review will, likewise, earn the respect of the student of American economic and political history as well as the Civil War buff. It is crowded with interesting personalities, is technically competent, and is rich in interpretative views. Some may find Hammond has a tendency to overstate his case in spots but none will argue that his conclusions are not provocative.

Whether the issue was borrowing, taxing, enacting an income tax law, creating greenbacks, or developing a national banking system and currency reform, the urgency of financing the war effort could not be separated from the larger issue of national power at the expense of the states. On each subject the author quotes generously from leaders of Congress, newspaper editors, and established bankers. The new Republican party, united on slavery and secession, had no unifying position on fiscal and monetary matters. At the center, of course, was the Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase.

Historians have found it difficult to appraise the role of this cabinet member. Most agree, as does Hammond, that he was honest and energetic and that he was a political appointee whose experience was that of a constitutional lawyer and not that of a financier or economist. Some recent writers give him a higher success score as they measure his role in relation to World War II with its complex regulatory program to curb inflation. Hammond tends to skirt the inflation issue while depicting the Secretary as a stubborn man of "lofty manner" who was delusive in his actions, without imaginative leadership, and incapable of grasping the magnitude of the problems that came across his desk. Chase refused to suspend the specie requirements of the independent Treasury Act and therefore brought on the crisis of suspension of specie payment; he first abhorred and then reluctantly accepted the greenback, and he impaired the immediate fiscal situation with his focus on basic banking reform. Hammond in one place puts the matter this way: "Had Chase been a competent financier instead of a constitutional lawyer, he would not have impeded his immediate and proper task—financing—with an attempt at reform which aroused in his own party, to say nothing of the other, more opposition than any other administration measure had to face during Lincoln's presidency."

University of Tennessee at Chattanooga

JAMES W. LIVINGOOD


Throughout its history, the United States has been preoccupied with business enterprise. Although it has produced more great entrepreneurs, bankers and industrialists than any other society, its scholars have turned out remarkably few good biographies of these magnates. Happily, Joseph F. Wall has added a fine biography of Andrew Carnegie to the list.
It can be argued that Wall had much more to work with than biographers of other businessmen. Industrial leaders have tended to be secretive, overly busy and sometimes inarticulate men who kept few papers and published little except profit-and-loss statements. By contrast Carnegie was open. He spent much time at leisure and wrote a good deal. Once established, he divided his time about evenly between New York and Scotland—making nearly as many trips to the Continent as to his steel mills in Pittsburgh. Nevertheless, he closely supervised his enterprises by mail. Consequently floods of instructions, reports, minutes of meetings and the like accumulated in his files. Fancying himself a literateur, Carnegie wrote scores of magazine articles, several books, and an autobiography. He also generously shared his views on statecraft with public figures at home and abroad. Given his contributions to political causes, they usually responded promptly and at length.

Carnegie was probably more interesting to write about than most businessmen because of the challenges he presents to a biographer. Charming and expansive, he had a mean and petty streak; seemingly transparent and simple, he was in fact cunning and complex; a businessman from first to last, business absorbed but a part of his energies.

Wall benefited from earlier studies—including Burton Hendrick's admiring two-volume *Life of Andrew Carnegie*, John Winkler's *Incredible Carnegie*, and James H. Bridge's critical *Inside History of the Carnegie Company*. More important, valuable new sources were opened to him—Carnegie letter books now held by United States Steel, the papers of his secretary, Robert Franks, and Carnegie's correspondence with his wife. Extensive research in Scotland and England contributed yet another dimension to Wall's understanding of Carnegie. Admitting all of these advantages, it was still Wall's careful digesting, integrating and evaluating of the immense body of data over the course of a decade that produced the excellent biography under consideration.

Wall begins with the Chartist movement in which the Carnegie in Scotland played a prominent part. Chartism—not Calvinism—shaped young Carnegie's philosophy. In "flitting" to America the boy-immigrant carried with him fanatical republicanism, a hatred of inherited privilege, and a belief in both enfranchisement of workingmen and equality of opportunity. Carnegie's rise from bobbin boy to steelmaster was accomplished quickly and with almost unbelievable ease. If it proved anything, it seems that being Scottish, having charm (with a dash of audacity), keeping alert to one's own best interests and acquiring influential friends who could open the right doors at critical junctures, contributed more to success than mere hard work, thrift, and the other Horatio Alger virtues. Overall, the chapters on Carnegie's business career are a first-rate account not only of his enterprises, but of the iron and steel industry and related fields as well.

In the final portion of the book, Wall discusses Carnegie's philanthropic ventures. As the industrialist said, giving away his money wisely and usefully proved harder than acquiring it. Beset by reformers, college presi-
dents, and assorted cranks, all salivating for a slice of his fortune, Carnegie sought to dispense charity scientifically. He was not wholly successful. Given his own idiosyncrasies, he frittered away money on such causes as medals for heroes, the costly Peace Palace in the Hague, and an artificial boating pond at Princeton (to wean young Tigers away from football). On the other hand, much of his fortune went to pensions—for former employees, retired professors and other deserving persons—to libraries, and to the endowment of scholarly research and the quest for peace.

Wall puts to rest a number of myths—including some originated by Carnegie himself. It was, for example, a loan from his benefactor, Tom Scott—not a mortgage against his mother’s home—that supplied the cash for his first purchase of stock. Carnegie did not “betray” Scott by refusing to sign notes to save his friend’s collapsing financial empire. To have thrown his money and that of his associates away in an attempt to save Scott’s overly speculative scheme would have been gallant but futile. Wall also dispenses of two oft-quoted Carnegie aphorisms—“Pioneering don’t pay” and “Put all your eggs in one basket and then watch the basket”—by demonstrating that Carnegie consistently practiced neither.

In handling the major Carnegie problems—Was he a robber baron? Did he exploit labor? Was he or Henry Clay Frick responsible for the catastrophe at Homestead? Which was at fault when the two severed relations? And, was Carnegie, who championed free trade in Britain and a protective tariff at home, a hypocrite?—Wall evaluates the arguments judiciously. In the end, however, though recognizing Carnegie’s faults and shortcomings, he usually comes down on the side of his hero. Yes, Carnegie was a robber baron, but not in the sense of robbing the nation. Making steel available for one cent a pound benefited growing industrial America greatly. True, Carnegie sweated his fortune from the lives of his employees: while workmen slaved twelve hours a day, seven days a week, his managers fought to reduce “labor costs” (i.e., wages) to the barest minimum. In 1898 alone, the company realized $10 million in profits—a return of almost fifty percent on total capitalization. Even so, Wall assures us, Carnegie was a kindly employer who wouldn’t hire strike-breakers or dishonor contracts with his men.

Wall concedes that Carnegie was as determined as Frick to smash the union at Homestead. But it was Frick’s attempt to operate with scabs, protected by Pinkertons, that caused the violence. Again, Carnegie did try to cheat Frick out of his rightful share of the wealth he had helped to amass by forcing him to sell his stock at book rather than market value. On the other hand, Frick earlier had tried to clear several millions on the sly in a speculative scheme to buy up Carnegie’s interest. As for his stand on the tariff, Carnegie, so long as he was actively in business, accepted the infant industry argument. When criticized by English industrialists he observed that thanks to the tariff steel rails which Englishmen had once sold for $100 per ton now sold for $30.

Wall’s excellent use of humor throughout the work should be noted. Each reader will find his own favorite episodes, but surely among the best
is his account of Herbert Spencer's American tour. Pittsburgh horrified him and in his address to leading businessmen, clergy and intellectuals, the chief apostle of competition, "struggle for existence" and "survival of the fittest," urged his listeners to slow down, relax, and learn to enjoy life. Another was the account of Carnegie's attempt to establish lasting world peace through a meeting of two of his heroes, Kaiser Wilhelm and Theodore Roosevelt. When, at great expense and effort, Carnegie brought the two together in 1910, they discussed peace problems only briefly. Then, to relieve the tension, they spent five hours reviewing troops. This is not to suggest that Wall fails to treat his subject seriously. Rather, among his many other qualities as a writer, is a sensitivity to the ironies which surround even the most serious of human endeavors.

The Pennsylvania State University  
Gerald G. Eggert


I find it a bit difficult to review this book for an historical journal. Professor Derber is a labor economist on the faculty of the Institute of Labor and Industrial Relations at the University of Illinois. Although he is a very competent practitioner in his own area, he is not an historian—his terms of reference are different and his book is not the historian's history. My review is an attempt to interpret the scholarship of another discipline to historians; it is more "historical" than the book.

Professor Derber starts this book—as no historian would—with a "framework" in which he describes his conception of the term "industrial democracy." His description, and the interpolations he makes in his text, include nine elements. These are my transliterations:

1. Representation: Exercise by employees of the right to organize and to determine, by majority vote, representatives who would speak for their organization.

2. Participation: Exercise by employees of a voice in determining the rules relating to their terms and conditions of employment—and, perhaps, even in determining production policies which affect terms and conditions of employment.

3. Equal rights: The amount of discrimination exercised by employers in hiring, promoting, and firing—and by unions within their own operations—because of race, religion, nationality, sex, or other personal characteristics. (No consideration is given to "age.")

4. Right to dissent: Exercise by employees of the right to disagree with "bosses"—and with union leaders. (The right of employers to dissent is circumvented.)

5. Due process: Exercise by employees of the right to complain about treatment on the job and the adjudication of those complaints.

6. Responsibility: Fulfillment of contractual obligations by employers and employees.

7. Minimum standards: Establishment of basic and socially acceptable terms of employment.
8. Information: Amount of factual information made available to unions in dealing with management. (The reverse process is ignored.)

9. Personal dignity: Employers' recognition of the dignity and worth of employees. (Reverse recognition is ignored.)

With these elements in close forethought Professor Derber traces the development of "industrial democracy" through five periods of American history since 1865. In each, he analyzes the major forces affecting industrial democracy. His analyses are well done.

In the period from 1865 to 1897 he describes the "search for the model" of industrial democracy from profit sharing and stock ownership through collective bargaining and the Knights of Labor producers' cooperatives to a vaguely defined socialism. (He does not clarify the various forms of socialism or anarcho-syndicalism.) In the second period, 1898-1920—"the burgeoning of the idea of industrial democracy"—he emphasizes the formulation of collective bargaining as the basic procedure upon which industrial democracy was to be built. In the period of the 1920's he emphasizes the corporate alternative—welfare capitalism—to labor's concept of industrial democracy. It was an attractive alternative.

In the fourth period, 1933-1945—logically the longest part of the book—he analyzes the impact of the New Deal and the Second World War upon the relations of labor and management. He emphasizes that a national system of industrial government emerged in this period; that that system was fundamentally one which labor had long advanced; that the Federal government became an integral part of the system; that trade unions gave up some, though not all, of their voluntarist traditions; and that the system, which was "legalized" during the early Roosevelt years, was fastened—apparently permanently—upon the nation by wartime pressures and experiences.

In the fifth period, which he ends at about 1965, he emphasizes the effect upon labor management relations of the full employment policy; of technological advances, urbanization, education, and the black problem; of the unsympathetic attitude of the public toward unions; and of the attitudes of post-war administrations toward unions. He concludes that in the main "the collective bargaining model of industrial democracy" reached its highest level during this period.

In all these analyses Professor Derber has been careful to include theories of industrial democracy advanced by many people, ranging from men such as Abram S. Hewitt through members of various industrial commissions and the usual trade union figures and old standbys such as Edward A. Filene and John R. Commons to contemporaries such as Joseph Scanlon, Malcolm L. Denise, Elton Mayo, and critics of collective bargaining such as Solomon Barkin and Paul Jacobs.

He has also carefully detailed—in a highly structured pattern and in very straightforward writing—the effect of the various forces which I have noted above upon the nine elements in his description of industrial democracy. It is in this part of the book, in the fate and fortune of the nine elements through one hundred years, that Professor Derber is ful-
filling the promise of his title. In this account one factor deserves special mention. Professor Derber has given far more attention to the meaning of employee representation systems, or company unions, than is usual.

My major criticism concerns the title of the book and Professor Derber’s description of the term “industrial democracy.” I believe that he has used the title as an attraction; I also believe that the elements which he includes within his description of the word “democracy” are modern ideas of what is desirable in a system of industrial “government,” but they are not definitions or descriptions of the word “democracy” as applied to industry in the nineteenth century or today. I believe that Professor Derber recognizes this factor: as he gets deeper into the twentieth century his use of the word “democracy” decreases to almost nothing and his use of the word “government” increases. Actually, what he has done is to describe the evolution of labor-management relations over the past century under nine headings. He has done this job very well.

Devotees of labor history and students of labor-management relations, particularly, will find this book very useful.

Temple University

JOSEPH G. RAYBACK


Black Labor in America is a collection of seven articles originally published in the summer 1969 issue of Labor History. Recognizing the paucity of recent research on the black worker, Labor History engaged a few well established and several not so well established scholars to prepare studies generating new directions in black labor history. The studies are limited chronologically to black labor history since 1865, but they lack any unifying theme other than race. As Herbert Gutman admits in his brief introduction, the articles are most valuable for their newness and their treatment of forces affecting the behavior of black workers.

The first two articles reconsider the role of the freedmen in postbellum America. In one of the collections’ most perceptive essays Thomas Wagstaff suggests that a new group of Southern political leaders came briefly to power under Andrew Johnson. Enraptured by the vision of an industrialized South they welcomed slavery’s demise and looked upon the freedmen as a tractable work force. These Southerners, concludes Wagstaff, acted to preserve not slavery, but the traditional class divisions which separated master and laborer.

Some blacks, explains Kenneth W. Porter in the second article, sought their fortunes on the ranges of the American West. Porter disputes the “lily-white,” “Gunsmoke” picture of the old West. Unfortunately, Porter’s own evidence convicts him of overcelebrating his subject. His encomiums cannot couch his own reminder that black cowboys very rarely held positions of authority, were usually forbidden to carry guns, and in order to survive depended on “good behavior” rather than the “fast draw.”

In following articles Paul B. Worthman and William M. Tuttle both
focus on black labor in the city. In an excellent selection Worthman obliterates two myths of the post-bellum South: black labor in the South was neither exclusively agrarian nor particularly non-union. According to Worthman black workers in Birmingham, Alabama, inherited a tradition of labor unionism from both the Knights of Labor and the United Mine Workers. Worthman concludes that at the turn of the century Alabama's UMW-dominated State Federation of Labor overcame redneck opposition to black unionism; thereupon black workers in Birmingham flocked to the American Federation of Labor's black locals. Until the short-lived movement was crushed in 1908 Birmingham's black and white unionists marched together in what was for both labor management and race relations an "era of good feeling."

Tuttle's description of black labor in Chicago contrasts sharply with Worthman's picture of Birmingham. Taking exception to Professor Allan Spear who treats the 1919 Chicago race riot as only in part a labor conflict, Tuttle proposes—perhaps too strongly—that the riot climaxd a long standing feud between white and black laborers. Since 1894, contends Tuttle, black workers had joined in breaking Chicago strikes, and by 1905 black skin was already the indelible mark of a scab. Therefore, racial violence was the inexorable concomitant of the packinghouse strike of 1919.

The last three contributors examine the fate of Negro labor in two periods of national crisis. Jane and Harry Scheiber find that the war mobilization of 1917-1919 posed a threat to black disaffection, forcing the Wilson administration to soften its Jim Crow policies and make job concessions to blacks. The authors deny any residual effect; wartime employment gains vanished with demobilization, and Washington remained hush-mouthed in the face of post-war racial violence.

Raymond Wolters questions the extent of the New Deal's solicitude for black America. He finds the guarantee of collective bargaining in Section 7A of the NIRA, while a boon to the racially exclusionist AFL, for the same reason was a catastrophe for unorganized, unskilled blacks. Wolters pictures the black leadership helpless to make the Wagner Act non-discriminatory. Not until the rise of the CIO after 1936, maintains James Olsen in the final selection, did blacks have an organization that honestly championed their cause.

Clearly the articles offer fresh grist for the scholarly mill. Wagstaff's article, for example, raises important new questions about post-bellum Southern attitudes toward race and class. Then too, Worthman's article not only carries forward Herbert Gutman's findings on the importance of the Negro in the United Mine Workers, but indicates the rich rewards of studying black history at the local level.

All of these authors demonstrate the insights to be gained from probing the dusty corners of black labor history. Although none of the authors, with the possible exception of Wagstaff, reaches any significant new conclusions, each prods us to further study. For example, Wolter's trip through the racially tinged maze of section 7A suggests a closer look at
similarly provocative legislation, namely the Wagner-Steagall Housing Act. As a volume whose aim is to provoke a fresh look into the history of black labor in America the book succeeds.

California State College

JOHN F. BAUMAN


Harold T. Pinkett's concise monograph serves as a timely reminder that recent concerns with ecology, like so many other efforts to deal with the problems of modern society, have roots deep in the Progressive Era of late nineteenth and early twentieth century America. Pinkett, Deputy Director of the Record Appraisal Division of the National Archives, developed an interest in Gifford Pinchot's contributions to professional forestry while inventorying U. S. Forest Service records. He traces the contributions that Gifford Pinchot (1865-1946), the first American-born professional forester, made both to private enterprise and public service. Pinkett demonstrates that Pinchot brought scientific management to private and public forests, dynamic leadership to the conservation movement and, through publicity and education, a new public awareness of the causes he espoused.

Late in the nineteenth century some Americans began to realize that our natural resources were not unlimited. In this period we find the beginnings of the preservation and management of forests. Gifford Pinchot, eldest son of a prominent and wealthy manufacturing family, decided, on the recommendation of his father, to enter this new field. Following graduation from Yale, he studied for a year in Europe where the science of forest management was well advanced. He then became involved in private forest management in Pennsylvania and North Carolina. He did surveys of forests in nine states and examined them in thirty-one others. Some of his efforts expended in the private sector eventually benefited the public when part of the George W. Vanderbilt forests he had managed in North Carolina was acquired by the U. S. government. A private consulting practice in New York City provided many important contacts, including Theodore Roosevelt, and afforded Pinchot the opportunity to contribute to the scientific management of New York state forests. An 1896 appointment as secretary to the National Forest Commission furnished an introduction to Washington politics.

In 1898 Pinchot was appointed head of the Division of Forestry in the Department of Agriculture. Since all U. S. forests were under the Interior Department and outside his jurisdiction, Pinchot concentrated on establishing a vital program of scientific management services for private land and forest owners. He also influenced the development of forestry in the Philippines.

After Theodore Roosevelt became President in 1901 Pinchot reached the zenith of his national influence. In 1905 the national forests were transferred to what soon became the Forest Service in the Department of
Agriculture. Under Pinchot's direction highly successful programs of scientific management, conservation, multiple use and fire control were inaugurated.

During Roosevelt's presidency, Pinchot became one of the most important figures in the conservation movement. He played a key role in the work of the Public Lands Commission, the Inland Waterways Commission, and the National Conservation Commission, which he headed. Pinchot's service to the national government ended in 1910 as a result of the famous Ballinger-Pinchot controversy.

While Pinchot devoted much of his subsequent career to politics, including two four-year terms as governor of Pennsylvania, he continued to make contributions to forestry and conservation. He founded the National Conservation Association, influenced Franklin D. Roosevelt's views on conservation, and in 1920 began a two-year term as Pennsylvania's State Commissioner of Forestry where he displayed the same kind of professional leadership he had nationally.

Throughout his career Pinchot argued for public regulation and control of natural resources. Forests were his primary concern but he also gave considerable attention to water resources. He was an early advocate of public regulation of hydroelectric power. He advocated a broad interpretation of the Constitution, particularly executive authority, in the public interest. He was an able administrator, brilliant publicist, and creator of forestry education and research programs. He also made many enemies who opposed his philosophy of government, theories of forestry management, and his hard driving administrative and political tactics.

Pinkett's study of the Pinchot career as forester has many merits, but also some limitations. He achieves his stated purpose of recounting only the professional career of Pinchot and leaves the biographical and political to M. Nelson Geary in Gifford Pinchot, Forester-Politician (1960), and Martin Fusold, Gifford Pinchot, Bull Moose Progressive (1961). As a consequence, the one-dimensional nature of the study severely reduces its value at some points. Only occasionally, as in the chapter on "Pinchotism," do the dynamic personal characteristics of the man appear. While Pinkett uses the Pinchot, Roosevelt and Forest Service manuscripts, more extensive use of contemporary manuscripts might have given additional insight. Although the book is a valuable contribution to the growing literature on the professional reformer in the Progressive Era, Pinkett makes almost no effort to place Pinchot in this broader perspective. However, the monograph is objective, well organized and written and, within the limits established by the author, makes a valuable contribution.

Otterbein College

THOMAS J. KERR IV


This book is a straightforward narrative genealogy of the Mitchell family and its connections, and as such not designed for the general public.
Like any good narrative genealogy, it has its juicy moments for the curious, and its drab plain facts for the pure genealogist. It will be a help to those doing research into the backgrounds of S. Wier Mitchell, Fanny Kemble, Owen Wistar, Henry Lea and some other well-known figures.

The major criticism could be that the narratives of the various families are so very different in quality and style, depending obviously, and perhaps too much so, on Mr. Massey's sources. One feels he might have exercised a bit more editorial imagination and editorial authority without injuring his facts. The accounts of the various Mitchells and Butlers are rich in detail; some of the lesser branches, like the Burroughs, get short shrift. Understandable, but still rather disconcerting to anyone who might happen to be looking at the work as a complete book. More consistency of style throughout, and more depth of research in the blank spaces would make a more solid impression and unified effect.

The principle delights are the family stories inserted where perhaps a more timid compiler might have balked. This would be a great loss. Maybe the story of Dr. John K. Mitchell, the actor Junius Brutus and the great thespian's "army" of nude ladies may be a bit fictional. But what a pity to have excluded it; what a pleasure to find it here! The story about Pierce Butler Sr. stealing his wife's slaves is also nice. I particularly relished the saga of Julius Stern, "strongest man in Philadelphia" and progenitor of the well-known publisher. One could only wish there were more items of this sort, and less of bare bones. But if nothing but bones is left, what is one to do? As a lay reader, interested in these families but not professionally in genealogy, I found much to entertain and instruct me. The book should take its place on the shelves of all reputable genealogical and historical societies.

Princeton

NATHANIEL BURT