

JOSEPH GALLOWAY: A REASSESSMENT OF THE MOTIVATIONS OF A PENNSYLVANIA LOYALIST

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HISTORIANS have been nearly unanimous in their disapprobation of the motives of Joseph Galloway. A loyalist who endeavored to prevent the Revolution by seeking a closer Anglo-American relationship, Galloway has been depicted as seeking reconciliation with Great Britain principally as a means to "immortalize him[self] as a statesman."¹ A recent study concluded that Galloway conceived of his solution to the colonial crisis "as an instrument for his own vindication," and as an attempt to obstruct "resistance against British policy [which could] upset the delicate balance of power within Pennsylvania politics and jeopardize his own power."² One historian ascribed his loyalism to a "conservatism natural to wealth,"³ while another scholar concluded that Galloway was the victim of "the conservative mind" which rendered him incapable of meeting "a challenge to the existing order . . . by . . . placid logic."⁴ It has been suggested that Galloway, to an extraordinary extent, sought an accord with Great Britain in order to curtail the influence of his provincial rival John Dickinson.⁵ Even the most sympathetic assessment concluded that Galloway's toryism stemmed from his belief that he could remain in power only through "the efficient functioning of the conservative political machine, whose hold on the province was becoming . . . more

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¹ William Nelson, *The American Tory* (Oxford, England, 1961), 48.

² Robert M. Calhoon, "I have deduced your rights," Joseph Galloway's Concept of his Role," *Pennsylvania History*, XXXV (1968), 357, 368.

³ Oliver Kuntzleman, *Joseph Galloway: Loyalist* (Philadelphia, 1941), 168.

⁴ Julian P. Boyd, *Anglo-American Union: Joseph Galloway's Plans to Preserve the British Empire* (Philadelphia, 1941), 5-6, 16-17.

⁵ David Jacobson, *John Dickinson and the Revolution in Pennsylvania* (Los Angeles and Berkeley, 1965), 58, 66.

precarious" each day that agitation against the parent state continued.⁶

These conclusions have contributed to a misunderstanding of Galloway. While it has been ably demonstrated that Galloway was a prudent and sagacious politician who sensed private advantages in the course he pursued, historians have been inattentive to other influences which prompted his loyalism. The reaction of Galloway to the imperial crisis was also the result of philosophical conclusions he had reached long before the occurrence of a colonial rebellion. A fervent Anglo-American nationalist, Galloway hoped to save the empire and, at the same time, to realize imperial reforms he and his provincial allies had indefatigably championed. Furthermore, his solution for the preservation of the empire issued from the political philosophy he had embraced since entering politics.

Born in Maryland in 1731, Galloway moved to Pennsylvania as a young man. A thriving law practice, an abundant inheritance, and marriage to Grace Growden—the daughter of a wealthy former Speaker of the Assembly, Lawrence Growden—made Galloway one of the more affluent young men of Philadelphia. Following the resignation of several pacifist Friends during the French-Indian War, Galloway was elected to the Pennsylvania Assembly in 1756 as a member of the Quaker Party. He quickly became a protégé of Benjamin Franklin, the party's leader, and served in the Assembly for all but one term until 1775. Shortly after Franklin became the agent for Pennsylvania in London in 1764, Galloway became the leader of the party and Speaker of the Assembly.⁷

As a young politician Galloway became an ardent Anglo-American nationalist. English writers from Raleigh and Hakluyt in the sixteenth century to Defoe and Viscount Bolingbroke in the eighteenth century had attempted to foster nationalistic emotions by demonstrating the virtues of the British empire. By Galloway's generation nationalistic sentiments were beginning to prosper everywhere in the west as the concept of the nation-

⁶ Raymond Werner, "Joseph Galloway, Politician and Imperial Statesman," *University of Iowa Studies in the Social Sciences*, X (1934), 66.

⁷ The best biographical sketches of Galloway can be found in Boyd, *Anglo-American Union*; Kuntzleman, *Joseph Galloway*; and Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, ed., *Dictionary of American Biography* (20 vols., New York, 1928-1937), VII, 116-117.

state grew. Patriotic emotions for eighteenth century Americans were complex phenomena involving love for both America and Great Britain. The quintessence of imperial nationalism for colonists was the notion that as citizens of the British state they enjoyed greater liberty than any inhabitants of the globe. In addition, many colonists cherished a belief in the potential glory of America. Augmented by fear for the safety of British-America during the long era of colonial rivalries, these colonists dreamt of the swelling frontiers and aggrandizement of the New World polity.⁸

The works of Galloway abound with references to "my country"—England and America—and with such nationalistic exhortations as "We must . . . *like Englishmen*, exert our power." Like most Anglo-American patriots, he was convinced that Great Britain possessed the world's most enlightened government. To "be a subject of Great Britain," he observed, "is to be the freest subject of any civil community anywhere to be found on earth."⁹ When his friend Franklin wrote from London regarding "the extreme corruption prevalent among all orders of man in this old, rotten state," Galloway turned a deaf ear. Galloway preferred to believe that it was because of the empire that Americans were enabled to "participate . . . into all the *rights, liberties and freedom, of the most free state upon earth*."¹⁰

Galloway was convinced that the interests of England and America could never be separated "upon any Principal of Policy or Good to either." He concluded that "their Happiness,

⁸ Max Savelle, "Nationalism and other Loyalties in the American Revolution," *American Historical Review*, LXVII (1962), 901-902; Savelle, *The Seeds of Liberty* (Seattle, 1965), 553-582; Richard Van Alstyne, *The Rising American Empire* (Oxford, England, 1960), 1-27; Van Alstyne, *Empire and Independence: The International History of the American Revolution* (New York, 1967), 1-53.

⁹ Galloway to Richard Jackson, August 10, 1774, Jack P. Greene, ed., *Colonies to Nation, 1763-1789* (New York, 1967), 240; Joseph Galloway, *Fabricus, or Letters to the People of Great Britain; on the Absurdity and Mischiefs of Defensive Operations only in the American War; and on the Failure in the Southern Operations* (London, 1782), 65; Galloway, *Plain Truth: or, A Letter to the Author of Dispassionate Thoughts on the American War, in which the Principles and Arguments of that Author are refuted, and the Necessity of carrying on that War clearly demonstrated* (London, 1780), 2-3.

¹⁰ Benjamin Franklin to Galloway, February 25, 1775, Jared Sparks, ed., *The Works of Benjamin Franklin* (10 vols., Boston, 1856), VIII, 146; Joseph Galloway, *A Reply to an Address, to the Author of a Pamphlet, entitled, 'A Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great Britain and her Colonies, etc.* (New York, 1775), 9.

their Dignity and Reputation among other Nations with their common Safety, depend upon a solid political Union. . . ." Because of the great similarity in "their Laws and Language, Trade and Commerce and, above all . . . the Protestant Religion," he questioned whether it was "possible for one to subsist without the other."¹¹ Until America grew strong British protection was essential both in forestalling foreign threats and in preventing a lapse into an American civil war. The colonies, he reasoned, in an "infant state, and independent of each other, [are] in a particular manner dependent" upon British power. Without British arms, Galloway wrote, the colonies "must have fallen" to some European power during the colonial struggle for America.¹² By 1775, through the beneficence and security provided by Britain, America had become a land

where agriculture . . . philosophy, and all the liberal arts and sciences have been nourished and ripened to a degree of perfection, astonishing to mankind; where wisdom and sound policy have even sustained their due authority, kept the licentious in awe, and rendered them subservient to their own, and the public welfare; and where freedom, peace and order, have always triumphed. . . .¹³

The empire was not only a benefit to America, but, in Galloway's opinion, its existence was essential to the well-being of Great Britain. Should America be lost to the empire British "power will be greatly diminished, while those of her enemies are constantly increasing; the fatal consequences of which are too obvious to be mentioned." The colonies were the "nursery" of the empire's seamen and producer of its raw materials, especially naval stores. Galloway conceded that commerce between

¹¹ Galloway to Richard Jackson, August 10, 1774, Greene, *Colonies to Nation*, 240; Galloway to Samuel Verplanck, August 17, 1775, "Some Letters of Joseph Galloway, 1774-1775," *Pa. Mag. of Hist. and Biog.*, XXI (1897), 484; *Pennsylvania Chronicle*, July 25, 1768; Joseph Galloway, *Historical and Political Reflections on the Rise and Progress of the American Rebellion, in which the Causes of that Rebellion are pointed out, and the Policy and Necessity of offering to the Americans a System of Government founded in the Principles of the British Constitution, are clearly demonstrated* (London, 1780), 4.

¹² *Pennsylvania Journal*, August 29, 1765.

¹³ Joseph Galloway, *A Candid Examination of the Mutual Claims of Great Britain And the Colonies: With a Plan of Accommodation on Constitutional Principles* (New York, 1775), 1.

England and America would continue even if the colonists attained independence, but he insisted that imperial intercourse was much less difficult to arrange than trade between two sovereign nations. In the empire, he asserted, trade "depends not on the changes or caprice of foreign councils, not upon the intrigues of our enemies, nor upon the alteration of the circumstances of a country. It is *our own*. . . ." In short, as Galloway the patriot declared, "one *grand and illustrious Empire*" would ensure "the *best of all political securities against the future*."¹⁴

Although Galloway cherished the empire, he perceived weaknesses in the structure of the federation which he sought to eradicate. In fact, few colonists labored more diligently before the outbreak of colonial disturbances to bring change to the empire. Galloway was disturbed because many of the colonial governments did not "harmonize with the system to which they belong." Every distinction between governments in America and the mother country "must be offensive and odious and cannot fail to create uneasiness and jealousies," he warned.¹⁵ Galloway did not doubt that the corporate colonies possessed the most unsavory of colonial governments because they constituted "perfect democracies . . . in their inferior Societies." Such colonies were "the most ungovernable and licentious, and too often the scene of groundless discontent, faction and tumult."¹⁶

Before the Revolution, however, Galloway confined his attention to Pennsylvania, where he and Franklin endeavored to replace proprietary rule with royal government. Galloway argued that "*no such Absurdity and Inconveniency* [as proprietary government] was ever allowed" under the British constitution. In Galloway's estimation several evils resulted from this kind of polity. The proprietors were not only too powerful, he insisted, but "*Indigence, Avarice or Ambition* is usually their Motive for

¹⁴ Joseph Galloway, *Cool Thoughts on the Consequences to Great Britain of American Independence. On the Expence of Great Britain in the Settlement and Defence of the American Colonies. On the Value and Importance of the American Colonies and the West Indies to the British Empire* (London, 1780), 17; *A Reply to an Address*, 7.

¹⁵ Joseph Galloway, *Political Reflections on the Late Colonial Governments: in which Their original Constitutional Defects are pointed out, and shown to have naturally produced the Rebellion, which has unfortunately terminated in the Dismemberment of the British Empire* (London, 1783), 26, 30-31, 50, 70, 104; *A Candid Examination*, 42.

¹⁶ Galloway to Charles Jenkinson, Ca., 1780, Boyd, *Anglo-American Union*, 144-152; Galloway, *Political Reflections*, 60.

accepting the Government, and their principal Design [is] to make a Fortune. . . ."¹⁷ In addition, Galloway who was far from egalitarian, complained that proprietary rule perpetuated an unfair tax structure for the colony. Exemption from taxation gave the proprietors a right which even the monarch did not possess. Furthermore, the judiciary as an independent branch of government was destroyed because court officials served at the discretion of the proprietors. History taught, Galloway warned, that a judiciary dependent on its benefactors is the first step toward arbitrary executive rule. Instead of the "indifferent Arbitrators" essential to settle differences between "Power and Property," Pennsylvania's courts were manned by "Sons of Oppression." The cumulative effect of these weaknesses was to make the executive branch "free, full, and absolute" in proprietary colonies.¹⁸

Galloway believed the greatest weakness of proprietary government was its failure to provide security for its subjects. The proprietors, he charged, were responsible for Pennsylvania's failure to provide sufficient military appropriations during the last intercolonial war, and they were equally accountable for failing to "relieve the distresses of our poor bleeding Frontier." The government's unpopularity, furthermore, made it incapable of preserving domestic tranquillity. Galloway laid the blame for the upheavals of the Paxton Boys and the riotous conditions which accompanied the Stamp Act at the feet of proprietary officials. In fact, he added, patriotism had waned and restlessness and rebellion had grown as a result of the "injustice, ambition and oppression" of the proprietors.¹⁹

Galloway believed royal government was the most desirable style for the colonists. Royalized colonies normally featured a crown-appointed governor, an elected council—which acted as both a cabinet for the executive and as the upper house of the

¹⁷ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 8th Ser. (8 vols., Harrisburg, 1931-1935), VII, 5590-5595; Joseph Galloway, *A True and Impartial State of the Province of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia, 1759), 23; Galloway to Franklin, October 17, 1768, John Bigelow, ed., *The Works of Benjamin Franklin* (12 vols., New York, 1904), V, 43.

¹⁸ Joseph Galloway, *A Letter to the People of Pennsylvania, occasioned by the Assembly's passing that Important Act for Constituting the Judges* (Philadelphia, 1760), 30-33; *Political Reflections*, 97.

¹⁹ Joseph Galloway, *Tit for Tat, or the Score Wip'd Off* (New York, 1758), 3; Galloway to Franklin, February 27, 1765, Sparks, *Works of Franklin*, VII, 285; Galloway to Franklin, March 10, 1768, *ibid.*, VII, 387-388.

Assembly—and an elected legislative branch. Such a formula, by blending monarchist, aristocratic and democratic rule in one polity, more nearly resembled the government of the parent state than any other prescription. Galloway thought it essential for the colonists and mother country to share the same form of government so that “a similarity of Laws, Customs, Habits, Manners and Principles are universally dispersed, the national Attachment fixt, and the Order and Uniformity of the Society maintained.” The great weakness, in Galloway’s opinion, of royal governments—at least as such governments were constructed before the Revolution—was that both the governor and his council were elected. In such an inadequately balanced polity Galloway believed that the people would inevitably “become attached to democracy, and averse to a mixed monarchy; and that their extensive powers would create a desire of absolute independence.” Galloway thought a Crown-appointed executive and a titled aristocracy, seated in the council, would remedy the defect.²⁰

Galloway’s reforming sentiments transcended purely local matters. Long before the Revolution he sought to alter imperial trade and economic policies. As early as 1758, for example, he advocated a relaxation of mercantile ordinances in order that Americans might export grain to those countries which were clearly not enemies of Britain. Later he advocated “taking off every incumbrance on the trade” with Spain, and still later he contended that colonial merchants should “enjoy the same right to trade to every port and place, where, by treaty, the merchants in Britain may trade. . . .” In the estimation of Galloway, trade restrictions simply gave the dishonest man an opportunity to enrich himself “while the honest man alone remains a Sufferer.”²¹

Before the occurrence of hostilities in 1775 Galloway insisted that American manufacturers should be at liberty to produce what they desired. In addition, he and his friend Franklin endeavored to persuade Britain that the development of an Amer-

²⁰ Galloway to Jenkinson, Ca. 1780, Boyd, *Anglo-American Union*, 150; Galloway, *Political Reflections*, 57-58, 206.

²¹ Galloway to Franklin, June 16, 1758, Leonard Labaree, et al., ed., *The Papers of Benjamin Franklin* (13 vols., New Haven, 1959-), VIII, 106; Galloway to Franklin, June 16, 1766, Sparks, *Works of Franklin*, VII, 321; Galloway, *A Reply to an Address*, 7.

ican currency was in the best interests of the empire. The scarcity of money in the colonies, they argued, prevented the purchase of British-produced items. Galloway strangely believed that an accumulation of money would enhance the agrarian way of life while it retarded manufacturing. "Let us have Money and we shall never think of Manufacturing, or if we do, we shall never be able to perfect it to any Degree," he reasoned.²²

That Galloway should have hoped for imperial reform was not eccentric. By the time his ideas reached fruition a large Anglo-American literature on the subject had developed. Beginning late in the seventeenth century public debate on the commercial relationship of colonists and Great Britain had begun in the mother country. The colonial wars of the eighteenth century further stimulated the debate, and broadened its dimensions to include discussion of imperial security. At the heart of much of the literature was the concept of the similarity of interest of American inhabitants and residents of England.²³ Some writers advocated the reconstruction of the empire so that natural similitudes would be reflected and institutionalized in the imperial political structure. The authors of much of the latter literature—many of whom were British administrators assigned to America or colonists serving in London—made, as Richard Koebner wrote, "the British Empire a symbol of their belief in the future of British America" and accepted the "notion of the British Empire . . . [as] a symbol of the new possibilities to which they looked forward."²⁴

It is not possible to determine what amount of the literature of imperial reform Galloway assimilated, but it seems likely that as a learned, well-read individual—and certainly as a person

²² Galloway, *A Reply to an Address*, 7; Galloway to Franklin, November 16-28, Labaree, *Papers of Franklin*, XII, 375; Galloway to Franklin, January 13, 1766, *ibid.*, XIII, 36-37; Galloway to Franklin, June 21, 1770, Sparks, *Works of Franklin*, VII, 482; Galloway to Franklin, August 8, 1767, Bigelow, *Works of Franklin*, IV, 308.

²³ The literature on imperial thought originating on both sides of the Atlantic in the late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century is extensive. Perhaps the best brief discussion of these concepts can be found in the introduction to Louis B. Wright, ed., *An Essay Upon the Government of the English Plantations on the Continent of America* (San Marino, Cal., 1954), 1-16, and in Van Alstyne, *The Rising American Empire*, 1-27. For a guide to much of the literature see Jack P. Greene, "Martin Blander's Blueprint for a Colonial Union," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Ser., XVII (1960), 516 n.

²⁴ Richard Koebner, *Empire* (Cambridge, England, 1961), 89.

deeply interested in the topic—he would have been acquainted with much of the material. It is doubtful that any politician in cosmopolitan Philadelphia could have avoided the discussion of these concepts in the city's college, press, coffee-houses, clubs, libraries and learned societies. Sufficient similarity exists, moreover, so that it can be reasonably assumed that Galloway read the pamphlets of Thomas Pownall and Francis Bernard, two governors of Massachusetts who posited on imperial problems before and during the Anglo-American upheaval. There can be no question that Galloway was deeply influenced on this subject by his friend Benjamin Franklin.

Both Governor Pownall and Governor Bernard believed that America had matured, and that with maturation a greater measure of autonomy should be extended to the colonists. However, while both administrators advocated seating colonists in the House of Commons, both continued to regard America as a subordinate entity. Bernard insisted that the American British union could continue "no otherwise than by a subordination of the former as *Dependent* states, to the latter as the *Imperial* sovereign. *Imperium in imperio* is a monster in politics which cannot subsist." Pownall wished to see America and Britain "united into a one *imperium* in a one center, where the seat of government is," but he insisted that the colonists must "depend upon the government of the whole, and upon Great Britain as the center." Aside from a similar solution to the thorny problem of imperial sovereignty, the two officials disagreed on the necessary correctives for empire. By the middle-1760's Pownall had come to believe that the best hope of continued union was through a commercial federation—"A GRAND MARITIME UNION," as he referred to it. American unity—and perhaps independence—would, Pownall thought, accompany the growth of American commercial interests. The best opportunity for preservation of the empire lay in interweaving those "nascent powers" in the colonies with the "same interests which actuate" the government of the parent state. To accomplish his goal, Pownall recommended a revision in mercantile legislation, including conceding to the colonists the right to print their own currency. Bernard, on the other hand, thought it essential that the colonial charters be "altered for the better." The "most perfect form of Government for a *dependent* province [is that]

which approaches the nearest to that of the sovereign state, and differs from it as little as possible." Consequently, Bernard proposed royalization of all colonies and the establishment of a titled nobility to sit in the provincial councils. Such reforms, he predicted, would provide "a real and distinct third Legislative power mediating between the *King* and the *People*."²⁵

It was natural that, of the writers of his own generation, Franklin should have exerted the greatest influence upon Galloway. At the heart of the ideology of Franklin were considerations of America's security and expansion, twin goals which until the late 1760's he felt could only be realized through close ties with Britain. He thought Britain would provide arms to shield the colonists from other expansionists and at the same time act as an umpire in intra-colonial disputes. Only British arms, Franklin taught, could acquire the trans-Appalachian belt, a region essential to the welfare of the colonists since it could act as living-space for the burgeoning American population. Franklin suggested that in a century the American population would be greater than that of England and, he concluded, "What an accession of power to the British empire by sea as well as land! What increase of trade and navigation! What numbers of ships and seamen!"²⁶ He believed the colonists could strengthen their security by forming an American union, but, before imperial relations soured, it was the Anglo-American union which most interested Franklin. Britain, he assured a member of the Quaker Party, "is the Safety as well as [the] Honour of the Colonies." He hoped "that by such a union, the people of Great Britain, and the people of the colonies, would learn to consider themselves, as not belonging to different interests, but to one community with one interest; which I imagine would contribute to strengthen the whole. . . ."²⁷

In a far more subtle way Franklin may have influenced Galloway. As imperial troubles mounted after 1765, Franklin—

²⁵ Thomas Pownall, *The Administration of the Colonies* (London, 1768), 5-10, 66-288; Francis Bernard, *Select Letters on the Trade and Government of America, and the Principles of Law and Polity Applied to the American Colonies* (London, 1774), vi, 77-83.

²⁶ Sparks, *Works of Franklin*, II, 319; Gerald Stourzh, *Benjamin Franklin and American Foreign Policy* (Chicago, 1954), 40-120.

²⁷ Franklin to John Hughes, August 9, 1765, Labaree, *Papers of Franklin*, XII, 234; Franklin to James Parker, March 20, 1751, *ibid.*, IV, 119; Franklin to William Shirley, December 22, 1754, *ibid.*, V, 449-450.

from London—often advised Galloway that the British desired some solution to the ills of the empire. Franklin reported the “favorable symptoms of the present disposition of Parliament towards America” and told Galloway of the “disposition to compose all differences with America.” Once he lamented from England that “Of late a Cry begins to arise, Can no body propose a Plan of Conciliation?” When Galloway told Franklin in 1765 of a plan he had concocted which might reconcile America to Great Britain, Franklin promised to support any proposal his friend submitted. Franklin insisted that “nobody here caring for the Trouble of thinking on’t,” the door was ajar for Galloway to offer his proposal. He advised Galloway that he “would try anything . . . rather than engage in a war” with Britain. The old sage told Galloway not to hesitate to champion unpopular policies. “Dirt thrown on a Mud-Wall may stick and incorporate,” Franklin counseled, but it will “not long adhere to polish’d Marble.” Franklin also instructed his young colleague that the “people do not indeed always see their friends in the same favourable light; they are sometimes mistaken, and sometimes misled; but sooner or later they come right again, and redouble their former affections.”²⁸

In addition, Franklin frequently suggested that reform of government in Pennsylvania would be attained only if the colony remained calm during imperial crises. He thought his faction would “lighten or get clear of our Burden” if the conduct of the colony remained “within the Bounds of Prudence and Moderation.” He wrote Galloway that “it might by Government be thought good Policy to show Favour where there had been Obedience. . . . That a good Act obtain’d by Pensilvania, might another year . . . be made use of as a Precedent for the rest. . . .”²⁹ Franklin often complained to Galloway that American unrest might cause British governments to collapse. Such occurrences,

²⁸ Franklin to Galloway, December 1, 1767, Sparks, *Works of Franklin*, VII, 370; Franklin to Galloway, November 3, 1773, *ibid.*, VIII, 96; Franklin to Galloway, January 9, 1769, Carl Van Doren, ed., *Benjamin Franklin's Autobiographical Writings* (New York, 1945), 188; Verner Crane, *Benjamin Franklin: Englishman and American* (Baltimore, 1936), 135-136; Franklin to Galloway, November 8, 1766, Labaree, *Papers of Franklin*, XII, 488; Galloway to Franklin, July 18, 1765, *ibid.*, XII, 218-219; Franklin to Galloway, January 6, 1777, Bigelow, *Works of Franklin*, VI, 64.

²⁹ Franklin to Hughes, August 9, 1765, Labaree, *Papers of Franklin*, XII, 235; Franklin to Galloway, June 3, 1767, *ibid.*, XIV, 182.

he suggested, not only prevented the alteration of Pennsylvania's proprietary government, but frustrated the achievements of close Anglo-American union.³⁰

The political ideology espoused by Galloway was not uncommon for someone of his milieu. Nor was it strange that his response to the Revolution—and his scheme for avoiding that upheaval—was a logical outgrowth of those political sentiments. Like most who embraced the concepts of English Whiggery, Galloway contended that government was the product of man's desire to replace the chaos and treachery of the primeval state of nature with an ordered society. In the "original contract" governors promised to "ever consult and promote the public good and safety" while the governed—as part of their "reciprocal duties"—consented to abide by the laws of the state. Once constituted, he continued, government could be effective only if the "Union of its parts" was secured and if all citizens were "bound to pay to one supreme will and direction" their sole allegiance.³¹ It is a sovereignty "only which diffuses a similarity of Customs Habits and Manners, which fixes the National attachment and establishes an uniformity of Principle and Conduct." If the sovereign polity was at the top of society, he reasoned, the remainder of the social structure must be composed of entities "subordinate to [the] supreme will."³²

Galloway realized that the surrender of individual natural rights in order to establish government was not without risk. Governments improperly conceived could be as dangerous as the state of nature. He perceived that government must rest on either "fear or art" and that to be truly efficacious a ruler must command "fear and respect." If a despotic ruler gained power the result must inevitably be "incessant Contentions . . . until the Spirit of Liberty is worn out. . . ." A weakling government incapable of providing the protection sought by the gov-

³⁰ Franklin to Galloway, May 20, 1767, Labaree, *Papers of Franklin*, XIV, 164; Franklin to Galloway, December 1, 1767, *ibid.*, 333; Franklin to Galloway, July 2, 1768, Bigelow, *Works of Franklin*, V, 23.

³¹ Galloway to Jenkinson, Ca., 1780, Boyd, *Anglo-American Union*, 133-136; Galloway, *A Candid Examination*, 23, 34-36; *Political Reflections*, 2; *Cool Thoughts*, 4-8; *A Letter*, 3; *The Speech of Joseph Galloway, Esq., One of the Members for Philadelphia County, in Answer to the Speech of John Dickinson, Esq. (Philadelphia, 1764)*, 10.

³² Galloway, *Historical and Political Reflections*, 75-76; *A Reply to an Address*, 13-15.

erned was, in Galloway's estimation, as dangerous as despotism. Power entrusted to "feeble hands," he counseled, results unavoidably in "disrespect [which will] soon ripen into contempt; the consequence whereof . . . is, we have the name of government, but no safety or protection under it." Soon "our persons and estates are every hour liable to the ravages of the licentious and lawless, without any hope of defence against them."³³

The best hope of instituting a safe polity, according to Galloway, was through the establishment of a government of equilibrium. Galloway acknowledged that the "supreme will" could be embodied in a monarchic, aristocratic or democratic form of government, but each form, he warned, when not balanced by some other system, contained baleful defects. An unchecked monarchy could easily become tyrannical, aristocracy could degenerate into despotism, and democracy was "ever tumultuous, seditious and weak." However, if these styles could be brought together in a "mixt form," or a balanced government, the danger from each would be muted through a system of safeguards and restraints. With pride Galloway announced that only England had established a balanced government.³⁴ The British government, he wrote in 1775, is

of a mixt form, composed partly of the principles of a monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy; and yet cannot with propriety be described, by the name of either of them. Its supreme legislative head is *lodged* in the King, Lords and Commons. To their authority every other power of the state is subordinate, and every member must yield full and perfect obedience. Those three branches constituting but one supreme politic head, their power is equal and concurrent; their joint assent being necessary to the validity of every act of legislation.³⁵

Not surprisingly Galloway was alarmed at the growth of republican sentiments which he believed would lead to the antithesis of balanced government. Republicanism was the "miserable sophistry and jargon of designing men." Those who espoused

³³ Galloway, *Historical and Political Reflections*, 124; *Political Reflections*, 109; *The Speech of Joseph Galloway*, 27; Galloway to Franklin, March 10, 1768, Bigelow, *Works of Franklin*, IV, 406-407.

³⁴ Galloway, *A Candid Examination*, 7.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

the philosophy, he thought, encouraged "disorder and confusion." It was a natural law of government that a republican state was incapable either of preserving domestic tranquillity or maintaining an adequate defense posture. The frequent elections which characterized republican rule rendered the government "factious, weak, and confused, and subverted the security of the natural rights of man." Only a "mixt Polity . . . can suppress democratical Intemperance, and reduce popular Influence," he advised.³⁶

When the Revolutionary crisis erupted Galloway reacted in a fashion not unexpected for someone of his persuasion. His response to the emergency reflected his desire to see the empire reconstructed, his imperial-nationalism, and his fancy for instituting a system of government consistent with his political ideology. Galloway believed, for example, that the Stamp Act furor offered an opportunity to alter imperial policies to which Britain had long been committed, and to rearrange the relationship between the colonies and the parent state. He proposed that in return for American acquiescence in the Stamp Act, Britain should reform imperial trade. Rather than violently protesting the assessment, the colonists should

Reveal to them [the Ministry] the poverty of our circumstances, and rectify the false representations which they have received of our wealth. Show them our incapacity to pay the impositions which they have laid upon us, without more freedom of commerce and a circulating medium to carry on that commerce. Tell them . . . we cannot give them what we have not. . . . And tell them our incapacity to pay the debt already due to the British merchants; our inability to take off their future manufactures; and the impossibility of our contributing to the wealth, power and glory of our mother country, unless she will relax her present measures, which so essentially affect her own as well as our welfare.³⁷

Similarly, Galloway believed the crisis produced by the Townshend Duties of 1767 could be a vehicle for imperial reform. Although he regarded the tax as "unjust" because it "subjected

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 63; *Political Reflections*, 14; Galloway to Franklin, November 16-28, 1765, Labaree, *Papers of Franklin*, XII, 376; Galloway to Jenkinson, Ca., 1780, Boyd, *Anglo-American Union*, 133-136.

³⁷ *Pennsylvania Journal*, August 29, 1765.

the people of America to a double duty," Galloway thought the act might be turned to the advantage of the anti-proprietary faction in Pennsylvania. He argued that since the salary received by proprietary appointees would henceforth be raised by the new public levy, the people would "*be more unhappy*" with proprietary rule. Furthermore, he could not believe the Crown would long tolerate a polity which permitted privately appointed officials to draw a public salary. If the colonists did nothing to anger the mother country, Galloway maintained, the government of Pennsylvania would shortly be royalized.³⁸

In addition, the upheaval offered an opportunity to devise a union of American states, an ideal Galloway had championed since Franklin proposed a colonial bond at Albany in 1754. Galloway did not oppose the Stamp Act Congress in 1765, and in 1774 he agreed to attend the First Continental Congress.³⁹

Galloway warned that unless imperial reform was forthcoming additional colonial upheaval was inevitable. He suggested that many Americans were losing confidence in a British government that refused to recognize the necessity of change. It "is truly discouraging to a people," he lamented, "who . . . by their dutiful behaviour during these times of American confusion have recommended themselves to the crown," to have "honorable and beneficial" requests for reform "so much neglected." Without reform ambitious sorts in America might be alienated from the parent state. "A Strange Government this," he grumbled, "in which Loyalty and Affection to the Sovereign is made Criminal, while a Servile Submission and Implicit Obedience to the Unjust and Oppressive Measures of a private Subject is the only path to promotion."⁴⁰ After the Stamp Act furor, Galloway believed only reform could preserve the Anglo-American union. He cautioned that the earliest settlers of America came "possessed of the highest Ideas of Liberty" and their descendants "have been educated in the same Notions." Furthermore, the distance of America from the mother country would ultimately

³⁸ Jacobson, *John Dickinson*, 59-60; James Hutson, "The Campaign to Make Pennsylvania a Royal Province," *PMHB*, XCV (1971), 40-41.

³⁹ *Pennsylvania Journal*, August 29, 1765; Galloway to Franklin, October 8-14, 1765, Labaree, *Papers of Franklin*, XII, 304-305.

⁴⁰ Galloway to Franklin, October 17, 1768, Bigelow, *Works of Franklin*, V, 43; Galloway to Franklin, November 23, 1764, Labaree, *Papers of Franklin*, XI, 468.

weaken national affections and prompt the colonists to question the strength of Britain. When the colonists awakened to these sentiments, he admonished, they would promptly "throw off their Subordination."⁴¹

While Galloway believed the imperial crisis might provide the catalyst for reform, he was fearful that continued American upheaval might prevent imperial reconstruction. He admitted that he was "not a little alarmed" at "this fatal conduct" of rebellion against the parent state. Galloway feared that because of the "Violent Measures" which accompanied the Stamp Act, the colonists might have "forfieted all favor that might be expected" from the Ministry. He mourned that agitation elsewhere in America might result in "the royal ear being shut against . . . the most dutiful and loyal" subjects. In addition, following a respite in imperial disputes, Galloway acknowledged that tranquillity normally resulted in the election to the Assembly of moderate men who "are warm for the Change of our [proprietary] Government."⁴²

By 1774 the crisis had reached such alarming proportions that the empire, in the opinion of Galloway, was threatened by republicans who sought "to rush into the blackest rebellion, and all the horrors of an unnatural civil war" in order to achieve "the ill-shapen, diminutive brat, INDEPENDENCY." Although Galloway refused to countenance a revolt against Britain, he agreed with the colonial radicals that, as constituted, the British Empire inevitably resulted in injury to the colonists. He believed the government of the empire violated those essentials of sound polity which he had long embraced. Because the colonists no longer shared all the rights of British citizens—a concept essential to Galloway's nationalism—imperial rule had grown "absolute and despotic." While the colonies were in an "infant stage" the old imperial constitution was sound, but when America attained a "degree of opulence"—as he believed it had by 1774—a revision of the imperial government was indispensable. Galloway believed

⁴¹ Galloway to Franklin, November 16-28, 1765, Labaree, *Papers of Franklin*, XII, 376.

⁴² Galloway to Franklin, February 27, 1765, Sparks, *Works of Franklin*, VII, 285; Galloway to Franklin, November 16-28, 1765, Labaree, *Papers of Franklin*, XII, 376-377; Galloway to Franklin, November 14, 1765, *ibid.*, XII, 373; Galloway to Franklin, October 9, 1767, Franklin Papers, American Philosophical Society Library, II, 98.

two reforms were necessary. The governments of America and Great Britain must be made as nearly uniform as possible and, he thought, the empire must be reconstructed so as to encompass "the policy of uniting the two countries together, upon principles of English liberty."⁴³

Beginning with the First Continental Congress Galloway presented a series of plans to reconstruct the Anglo-American empire. A consistent ideological strain—reflecting his nationalism and political philosophy, as well as his long attachment to the notion of imperial reformation—existed throughout the plans.⁴⁴ Although Galloway hoped to reform the empire by providing for greater American autonomy, he had no intention of recommending an end to the subordinate status of the colonies. As there must be a sovereignty in nation-states, Galloway was convinced that there must be some central direction—some "supreme will"—within an empire. Every polity must contain a central authority which is

equally supreme over all its members. That to divide this supremacy, by allowing it to exist in some cases, and not in all, over a part of the members, and not the whole, is to weaken and confound the operations of the system and to subvert the very end and purpose for which it was formed, in as much as the vigour and strength of every machine, whether mechanical or political, must depend upon the consistency of its parts, and their corresponding obedience to the supreme *acting power*. . . .⁴⁵

⁴³ Galloway, *A Reply to an Address*, 5; *A Candid Examination*, 2, 31, 40-41. Although Galloway believed the colonies had attained political maturity by 1775, he thought America was still in economic infancy. Contrast his position above in *A Candid Examination* with his arguments under the pseudonym "Americanus" in the *Pennsylvania Journal*, August 29, 1765.

⁴⁴ The plan Galloway presented to the First Continental Congress was published shortly thereafter in *A Candid Examination*, 53-54. A letter from Galloway to Charles Jenkinson, a member of the House of Commons and a secretary at war under Lord North, contained his plan of 1780; the letter is in the Manuscript Division, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. The plan Galloway devised in 1785 can be found in the Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. These plans—and one additional scheme which Galloway promulgated about 1788—have been published in Boyd, *Anglo-American Union*, 105-145. Because of the more general availability of the printed sources, all citations of Galloway's plans in this essay will refer to Professor Boyd's collection.

⁴⁵ Galloway, *A Candid Examination*, 6.

Consequently, the colonies must either be part of the empire or independent states. If Parliament was not sovereign in all matters of imperial policy, Galloway told the Continental Congress, the "Law of Great Britain dont bind us in any Case whatsoever." To erect "inferior communities with rights, powers, and privileges independent of the State," he continued, is "to establish an *imperium in imperio*, a State within a State, the greatest of all political MONSTERS!" A colony, according to Galloway, is "supreme [only] within its own circle," and like inferior corporations in Britain, is empowered to make laws which do not contravene those of the imperial sovereign.⁴⁶

To protect the natural rights of Americans and to provide for their greater autonomy, Galloway recommended an increased voice for the colonists in imperial councils. Like Pownall and Bernard, Galloway would have preferred to solve the dilemma by simply seating colonists in the House of Commons.⁴⁷ Realizing that such a solution was unsatisfactory to many colonists, Galloway devised a more intricate scheme of accommodation. He thought it necessary to create an American Congress which would serve as a new house of Parliament for imperial matters. He called this the "fourth branch of the British legislature"—the other three branches being the King, Lords and Commons—or simply the "New Branch." At times he referred to the proposed imperial parliament as "a British and American legislature." The "New Branch" was to consist of both executive and legislative officials, and the decisions reached by these dignitaries would constitute the American position on imperial matters. His "New Branch" would occupy an equal position with the existing branches of Parliament insofar as imperial matters were concerned. In fact, he stressed, the "assent of both [the Parliament and the New Branch] shall be requisite to the validity of all . . . general acts or statutes" pertaining to American affairs. The reconstructed imperial Parliament would constitute "one supreme legislative power, animated by one Will," except in time of war when the old Parliament could, in effect, suspend the American

⁴⁶ Lyman Butterfield, ed., *Diary and Autobiography of John Adams* (4 vols., Cambridge, Mass., 1961), II, 142; Galloway, *A Candid Examination*, 25; *Political Reflections*, 30-31; *A Reply to an Address*, 15-16.

⁴⁷ Galloway, *Historical and Political Reflections*, 125; Labaree, *Papers of Franklin*, XII, 376 n.

branch. He even urged the repeal of all existing Parliamentary acts "inconsistent with the Principles of this Union."⁴⁸ He stressed that the "New Branch" was to be "an inferior and distinct Branch of the British legislature," and that the proposed branch was to be powerless in the domestic affairs of Britain.⁴⁹

In each proposed plan Galloway advocated an American executive—whom he sometimes titled the "President General" and at other times the "Lord Lieutenant"—appointed by the Crown and serving at royal pleasure. With each proposal Galloway was more elaborate in his description of executive powers, but in general he envisioned an executive with the power to assent to and enforce all acts of the American congress, to advise colonial governors and remove provincial officials for "mal-conduct," and to command the militia when confronted by a "popular insurrection." He believed the American president, as well as the governors of the various colonies, should be granted fixed salaries in order to assure firm "opposition to popular claims."⁵⁰

Galloway first proposed the establishment of a unicameral American legislature, but in every subsequent plan he suggested that the assembly be bicameral.⁵¹ He thought the upper house should be appointed by the Crown—and its members invested with an aristocratic title, perhaps that of "Baron"—while the members of the lower house were to be elected. Elections for the lower house should be held every three years, he suggested, because annual contests "often occasion cabals and disorders." Infrequent elections, he continued, would "render the members independent . . . of the people; and consequently induce them to act with more freedom and firmness in due support of government." Only property-owners should be considered eligible to vote, but he cautioned that the requirements "must not be large, as the inhabitants of that country in general can not be

⁴⁸ Galloway to Jenkinson, Ca., 1780, Boyd, *Anglo-American Union*, 133-142; Galloway Plan of Union, 1788, *ibid.*, 174.

⁴⁹ Galloway, *A Candid Examination*, 53-54; Galloway to Jenkinson, Ca., 1780, Boyd, *Anglo-American Union*, 139.

⁵⁰ Boyd, *Anglo-American Union*, 105-145; Galloway, *Political Reflections*, 54-55.

⁵¹ The change from a unicameral to a bicameral congress is the only major structural difference in Galloway's several plans. This change of mind perhaps resulted from Governor William Franklin's criticism of Galloway's first plan. See Galloway to William Franklin, March 26, 1775, *New Jersey Archives*, 1st Ser. (12 vols., Newark, 1886), X, 585.

proprieters of real property of much value.”⁵² He advocated a small assembly in order to curtail expenses as well as the number of “fools and knaves often too abundant in such assemblies.” Finally, since he doubted that frontier areas were likely either to produce worthy candidates or many qualified voters, Galloway hoped the assemblymen would be elected at-large rather than from separate districts.⁵³

Only in its commercial and manufacturing aspects was the reconstructed empire envisaged by Galloway to witness a nearly equal Anglo-American relationship. He recommended that the American trade “shall be subject to the same regulations and restrictions, and liable to the same imposts and duties on every Article of foreign growth, produce and manufacture” as the commerce of Great Britain. The colonies, furthermore, would be permitted to export to foreign countries all raw materials except those necessary for British manufacturing. Finally, Galloway proposed that the colonists be permitted to manufacture what they pleased, but he would have permitted the sale of English products in any market while colonial goods would have been marketable only in America.⁵⁴

With the exception of his first plan each of Galloway’s proposals recommended royalization of all American colonies. He proposed that the colonial governor and his council, as well as all judicial and military officials, be appointed by the Crown. Such reform in the governance of the colonies, he was convinced, would eradicate the seeds of disaffection.⁵⁵ Another source of “much evil” in Galloway’s estimation were town meetings, and he advocated that such assemblages be permitted only when the proposed agenda was submitted beforehand to the authorities.⁵⁶

Galloway realized that in the final analysis the stability of the empire depended not only on a sound constitutional foundation, but also on the loyalty of the American masses. In a world quickening to the stirrings of nationalism he apprehended that

⁵² Galloway Plan of Union, 1785, Boyd, *Anglo-American Union*, 163; Plan of Union, 1788, *ibid.*, 173.

⁵³ Galloway to Jenkinson, Ca., 1780, Boyd, *Anglo-American Union*, 163-164.

⁵⁴ Galloway to Jenkinson, Ca., 1780, Boyd, *Anglo-American Union*, 152; Galloway Plan of Union, 1788, *ibid.*, 175.

⁵⁵ Boyd, *Anglo-American Union*, 143, 159, 173.

⁵⁶ Galloway Plan of Union, 1785, Boyd, *Anglo-American Union*, 169-170; Plan of Union, 1788, *ibid.*, 176.

imperial patriotism would be difficult to maintain. His solution to the problem was to propose a rigorous dose of imperial indoctrination. He began with the assumption that it "is education alone which forms and fixes human habits, manners, attachments, and aversions. . . . So men, educated in the principles of one form of government, will ever esteem and prefer it." If both English and Americans live under the same form of government, and both are taught to revere that form, the "national attachment in England and America would be the same . . . and . . . would have but one object." When laws are uniform throughout the empire they will be "lessons of instruction, by which every subject is daily taught his duty and mode of obedience to the State."⁵⁷ In short, Galloway argued

Train them up, when in their infancy, in those principles, which will teach them to love the Parent State; give them the same constitutional subordination; govern them by the same measure of power; and let them enjoy the same measure of liberty as the citizens and other subjects enjoy; and they will not, because they can have no motive to, depart from the obedience. Do this and they will ever love and respect the Parent State, whose protection never ceases, and from which they are daily receiving every blessing. Do this, and their particular and local "pride and violence" will be changed into national attachment; and their impatience of restraint be only a visionary notion, because that restraint will be imposed by their own consents, and become their own act, to which they will readily submit. I say, do this, and the American Colonies . . . will, as the Roman colonies did . . . adhere to the State, attend her faithfully in all her wars and distresses, *fight her battles, and expire with her*.⁵⁸

To be safe, Galloway advocated loyalty oaths for all imperial military officers as well as for all teachers, students and lawyers in the colonies. These would be oaths pledging "faithful obedience to the british parliament, and such laws, as they shall from time to time make *expressly* relative to the british colonies in America."⁵⁹

⁵⁷ Galloway, *Political Reflections*, 8-9, 56-57; *Historical and Political Reflections*, 45-46; *Plain Truth*, 48-49.

⁵⁸ Galloway, *Plain Truth*, 48-49.

⁵⁹ Galloway Plan of Union, 1785, Boyd, *Anglo-American Union*, 170-171.

The response of Galloway to imperial dislocation, as many historians have observed and as was evinced at the outset of this essay, had an opportunistic side. He lost political support as a result of the disquietude in Pennsylvania and, after 1770, was forced to seek annual re-election from Bucks County in lieu of more radical Philadelphia. Galloway feared that class unrest—he fancied scenes of the “unthinking, ignorant multitude,” of “armed, but undisciplined men . . . travelling over your estates, entering your houses”—would accompany a prolonged upheaval in imperial affairs.⁶⁰ The stabilization of imperial relationships which Galloway sought would not have harmed his career or economic well-being, and, perhaps, a *denouement* would have assisted in the fulfillment of his aspirations. For example, it was rumored in pre-revolutionary Philadelphia that if proprietary government collapsed, Franklin would be appointed the first royal governor of Pennsylvania and Galloway would become the colony’s new chief-justice.⁶¹

That Galloway might have hoped for political advancement as a result of his activities is hardly surprising. It would have been remarkable for a politician of twenty years, and a Speaker of an Assembly at that, to attend the Continental Congress free of political ambition. He believed that defenders of the empire attained enhanced reputations among British officials. Perhaps hoping to be further elevated in British esteem he carefully let officials in London know that he stood “here almost alone” against the colonial radicals. Following the Congress he untruthfully claimed to have “stood single and unsupported” in defense of the Anglo-American union.⁶² The political motivations of Galloway were probably no greater than those of his fellow delegates to the Congress, many of whom capitalized on their opposition to Ministerial policy to capture colonial offices and, following independence, state and national positions.

Accordingly, Galloway did act during the imperial crisis as a politically ambitious provincial leader. What historians have usually overlooked, however—and what this essay has attempted

⁶⁰ Galloway, *A Candid Examination*, 32-33.

⁶¹ William A. Williams, *The Contours of American History* (New York, 1961), 92-93.

⁶² Galloway to Jackson, Greene, *Colonies to Nation*, 240-241; Galloway to William Franklin, March 26, 1775, *New Jersey Archives*, 1st Ser., X, 579; Galloway to William Franklin, February 28, 1775, *ibid.*, X, 572.

to accentuate—is that Galloway's actions were also the result of the philosophy he had acquired before imperial relations soured. Long before the Ministry conceived of a new colonial policy Galloway had become an imperial patriot—a British and American nationalist. Raised at the outset of the era of rising national aspirations, and advancing politically under the tutelage of nationalistic Benjamin Franklin in cosmopolitan Philadelphia, Galloway had grown to cherish his British citizenship. Like most Anglo-American nationalists, he had come to believe that the natural rights of man were nowhere more secure than in the British Empire. He believed that in addition to commerce being mutually profitable and easily regulated in an empire, the British-American union offered the colonists both immediate protection and the prospect of future territorial aggrandizement and security. His affection for the union notwithstanding, Galloway realized that the empire was in need of reconstruction and could be perpetuated only through reform. Whether for empire or national state, he believed the ideal polity was the one best able to preserve order. Without the respect of the governed no polity could provide security. Furthermore, tranquillity, Galloway thought, was most likely to be achieved through a government with a sharply delineated sovereignty which embodied the "supreme will" of society. The British government provided an attractive model for both the empire and the colonies. Hence, in seeking to identify and institutionalize the source of supreme power within the Anglo-American union, Galloway proposed the establishment of a balanced federation on an imperial scale. He not only hoped to impede and counter-balance the capability of officials to wield power, but, in recognition of the growth in maturity of the colonies, to more realistically apportion authority between Great Britain and America. His recommendations indicated his zeal for the capability of Americans to share fully in the rights of Englishmen. He proposed that Americans, like Englishmen, be guaranteed the full measure of the natural rights of man, including the right to exercise as generous an assessment of autonomous power as was consistent with a subordinate entity. Galloway's proposals also manifested his cherished concept that inferior polities should be molded in the image of the sovereign jurisdiction. He, therefore, advocated abolition of proprietary and corporate provincial governments

and the establishment of royal rule in all British colonies. The recommendations made by the Tory—preservation of the empire, balanced government for the sovereign and colonial polities, greater autonomy for America—predated the outbreak of imperial hostilities. In short, although Galloway acted opportunistically during the imperial crisis, his actions also reflected his milieu and the philosophy he had come to embrace before 1765.