
This slender volume, a study of the economic policies of the Dutch West India Company, contains eight, tightly-packed chapters, two appendices, a bibliography, and an index. The first chapter deals with the way the fur trade with the Indians was conducted by the Voorcompagnieën (Dutch firms trading in New Netherland), prior to the formation of the West India Company. Given an extensive trade monopoly for 24 years, the West India Company vacillated in its policies between fur trading and agriculture, leading to dissension among the directors; thus the title. The initial decision to colonize resulted in Walloon families being sent to the Hudson and Delaware in 1624 to raise cattle and grain to provision the traders bartering with the Indians, and to cut timber, make wine, find minerals, and grow crops for export to Holland. The colonists, who never became self-sufficient, proved to be a drain on the Company's finances, and the directors rejected the policy of agricultural colonization and concentrated on the Indian fur trade. In 1628, the Assembly of XIX permitted individual members, or patroons, to establish their own private colonies, while the company retained the fur-trading rights, and this stirred up controversies among stockholders and officers.

Since only a small portion of the West India Company's records has survived, the author's task has been a difficult one, but he has combed Netherland sources with amazing thoroughness. His knowledge of the Dutch language has enabled him to draw on manuscript and printed material which has not been translated. The book is abundantly documented, with footnotes where they belong in a scholarly work, namely at the foot of each page.

The Preface includes a reference to the decline of Dutch culture in America, followed by a statement that "the American descendant of the New Netherland pioneers is comfortably assimilated into the much maligned 'wasp' segment of our population and shows little disposition to remember and honor his Dutch forbears. . . ." Members of the Holland Society of New York, descendants in the male line of residents of the Dutch colonies prior to 1675, may be expected to disagree with this observation. In their quarterly, de Halve-Maen, which is not listed in the author's lengthy bibliography, are to be found splendid articles by Simon Hart, Richard H. Amerman, Frederick W. Bogert, Kenneth Scott, and others relating to Dutch settlement and colonization. The October 1965 issue contained an essay by this reviewer, "Who Survived the Indian Massacre at Swanen-
dael?" and another appeared in October 1968, "Did Minuit Buy Manhattan Island From the Indians?" both of which interpret two events introduced in Mr. Bachman's text.

The bibliography in Peltries or Plantations does not include Dutch Explorers, Traders and Settlers in the Delaware Valley, 1609-1664, written by this reviewer in collaboration with Professor A. R. Dunlap (University of Penna. Press, 1961; second printing, 1965). I trust I will not be accused of immodesty when I say that the author has walked down some of the same, long furrows that we plowed. We suggested that Catalino Trico did not come to America on the Nieu Nederlandt, as he and others before him stated, but that she may have been a passenger on the Falling Nut-Tree, or one of two other vessels lying at anchor in the Hudson when the Nieu Nederlandt arrived in May 1624. Furthermore, in his discussion of the colonists sent on Den Oranjeboom in 1625 under command of Willem van der Hulst, the author is evidently unaware that we identified High Island, the place of van der Hulst's designated abode, as Burlington Island. He is also apparently unaware that we concluded the directors of the West India Company intended to make their agricultural colony on the Delaware River the seat of New Netherland before circumstances caused the colonists to be brought together on Manhattan Island. The abandonment of the rich soil and the natural resources of the Delaware Valley may have contributed to the failure of the colonists to support themselves, thus resulting in this change of policy by the directors.

In discussing Samuel Blommaert's double-dealing in helping form a commercial company in Sweden, the author overlooks Amandus Johnson's authoritative Swedish Settlements On the Delaware in which a full chapter is devoted to the roles played by Blommaert and Munuit in helping to organize the Swedish company.

Despite these bibliographic omissions, the book is a worthy contribution to American colonial history.

Brandywine College

C. A. WESLAGER


Despite C. M. Andrews' lifelong attempts to convince American colonial historians that the "colonial period of our history is not American only but Anglo-American," his efforts were not particularly rewarding, for most scholars continued to concentrate on the rather sterile topics of British mercantile restrictions, constitutional struggles between colonial governors and assemblies, and British conflicts with the French for mastery of the North American continent. During the past two decades, however, a new generation of historians has revived and enlarged Andrews' goals and promoted the study of Anglo-American politics. The present volume of essays, though it is not a Festschrift to C. M. Andrews, is, nevertheless, both a
personal tribute to Andrews' stature as a colonial historian and a product of the new interest and the new generation.

This collection of eleven essays is the outgrowth of the Twentieth Conference on Early American History held at Rutgers University in October, 1966, from revised papers presented by R. S. Dunn, S. N. Katz, D. A. Williams and M. G. Kammen. To round out the treatment of the subject, additional articles were solicited from T. C. Barrow, John Shy, D. S. Lovejoy, J. E. Illick and A. G. Olson. The articles are concise reports of investigations by distinguished historians, and all make a significant contribution to our grasp of Anglo-American political relations before the Revolution. Taken together they provide a single overall theme: that the Anglo-colonial community was an empty formality long before the Stamp Act controversy dramatically revealed the dissolution on both sides of the Atlantic. Pushed to their natural conclusion, the essays suggest a new dating in colonial history, for if the Anglo-American political system was the cement that held the British Empire together, it began its irrevocable crack in the 1730's, when self-consciously English and American interest groups had begun to develop, and when English ad hoc decisions had begun to crystallize into a fixed policy.

A. G. Olson's introductory essay is a tribute to Andrews' influence both in marking out the field of Anglo-American history and in dictating the lines along which the field should be developed: Anglo-American economic interests rather than English economic repression; fiscal alternatives open to Britain rather than comparisons of the English and American ideas on imperialist taxation; the character of the military governors and the power of the British army in imperial policies, rather than the struggle between England and France for control of the new world. R. H. Brown follows with a brief Namierite analysis of the structure of the political system and of the “brokers” and “fixers,” the Anglo-American politicians who made the delicately geared system function so well for a half century. He illustrates how the increasing aggressiveness of the evolving imperial system after 1763 quickly eroded the autonomy of the colonies until it collapsed into revolution.

The eight succeeding chapters examine specific issues which elaborate the book's overall theme: D. S. Lovejoy's examination of the alternative governing policies considered by the English during the Restoration; R. S. Dunn's comparative analysis of the imperial policies in Massachusetts and in Jamaica between 1675-1700; D. A. Williams' study of Anglo-Virginia politics between 1690-1735; S. N. Katz's examination of the power held by James DeLancey in New York during the early part of the eighteenth century; A. G. Olson's study of the influential powers of the commissionaires of the Bishop of London in colonial politics; T. C. Barrow's examination of the old colonial system through British eyes; M. G. Kammen's analysis of British imperial interests; and John Shy's attempt to relate British politics to the origins of the Revolution by considering the policies and careers of colonial governors Henry Ellis of Georgia and Thomas Pownall of Massachusetts. The book concludes with an excellent bibliographical essay by J. E. Illick, who catalogues the
recent literature on Anglo-American politics and suggests areas for future concentration. This book is certainly a significant addition to the ever-widening scope of colonial history and is particularly valuable in enlarging the traditional American interpretation of the Revolution by setting England and Anglo-American politics in the center of the stage. The essays are voluminously documented and the editorial treatment is excellent. Though the essays raise more questions than they solve, the book will be instrumental in stimulating new approaches to the perplexing problem of the elusive origins of the American Revolution.

Lamar State College

WILLIAM W. MCDONALD


Mr. Daniels portrays the clayey tracks and cross-tracks of conspicuous figures in our early national history. In-fighting, backbiting, scandalous rumor fill these pages. The reader may wonder how persons so absorbed in intrigue had time to make a living, let alone contribute disinterestedly to American public policy. Jefferson appears more detached than Hamilton and Burr, maybe because his man John Beckley ran spiteful errands for the master of Monticello. "I was reared," says the author, "in the worship of Thomas Jefferson.... In my instruction Burr and even Hamilton were villains in the American story chiefly useful to demonstrate the Jeffersonian triumph of good over evil. Certainly in terms of the principles of our heritage, we owe much to Jefferson, less to Hamilton, little to Burr."

The sophisticated Mr. Daniels has not remained in childhood leading strings, but some bias lingers. Jefferson is often the philosopher, while his antagonists are at best politicians who easily prove themselves philanderers. Not that Jefferson isn't, now and then, in the gutter with them, though the reports of his moral lapses are less credible. The present reviewer, like Mr. Daniels, in tender years was shown the image of the author of the Declaration of Independence, a white marble statue in the elegant Richmond hotel named for him. The icon stood—doubtless still does—above a shallow pool in which crawled baby alligators and other creeping creatures. If this was symbolism the lesson was not impressed; it was not explained for innocent eyes and ears, that Hamilton and Burr were represented in the slime at the idol's feet. Rather, in visits to the stately Valentine house, elders remarked that there Justice John Marshall, presiding at Burr's treason trial, had dined with the defendant and his counsel Wickham. President Jefferson regarded this as more than impropriety, but to a boy in Richmond sixty years ago John Marshall was not to be lightly maligned.

Mr. Daniels has thrown his net widely to collect the particulars of frictions among his three principals, not to speak of a host of lesser gentry who entered their persevering controversies. He industriously presents each scene in the complicated triangular drama. Since he is not writing for the historical specialist, he supplies much of the excitement from
second-hand sources. This is understandable, but his account would profit from more evidence of familiarity with the studies of Hamilton. Mr. Daniels laments that Dumas Malone’s multivolume life of Jefferson is not yet finished, pays homage to Julian Boyd’s Papers of Thomas Jefferson, and he has explored the published writings of Burr. But the Papers of Alexander Hamilton, authoritatively edited by Syrett and Cooke, and the older collections of Henry Cabot Lodge and John C. Hamilton, plus recent extended biographies, appear to be neglected. In consequence, Hamilton’s position in a number of the conflicts of opinion and action is given conventional treatment without benefit of closer scrutiny.

The quarrels of the three protagonists, floodlighted by eager gossip, if wilful and unworthy, were also natural in the formative years of the American nation. Burr lacks the dignity of passion, however misguided, for he was a sportive marplot, now on one side, now another, and occasionally in both camps at once. Also he spun off to himself in extravagant schemes. Perhaps he was more in the mix than truly of it.

The real rub was between Jefferson and Hamilton. This difference, in a lighthearted book, Mr. Daniels has not chosen to define. For the record it is noted that Jefferson’s bent was centrifugal, Hamilton’s centripetal. Jefferson’s prescription, until he modified it later, was for liberty of the individual in a dispersed agricultural society. Hamilton recommended welfare of the citizen, his freedom included, by means of closer association in a varied economy of agriculture, industry, commerce, and public finance. Jefferson’s point of departure was passive authority; Hamilton’s was positive government.

In hindsight it was Hamilton’s program which in fact developed. Jefferson’s projection began to fall short, say in the eighteen-thirties, when the Industrial Revolution leaped the Atlantic to America, and corporate effort took hold. Today it is Congress which receives the cries of localities in distress, Congress which must concern itself with employment, social security, education, and, be it noted, civil rights. Self-sufficiency of the individual has faded, along with competence of town, county, and state to promote the good life. Jefferson’s ideal of democracy must be realized in terms which Hamilton envisioned.

University of Rhode Island


Famous and long-lived, a man whose career moved first to the foreign service, then to the Cabinet as Secretary of State, then to the Presidency, and finally for eighteen years to the House of Representatives, John Quincy Adams attracted several generations of painters and sculptors. Former colonials such as John Singleton Copley, Gilbert Stuart, and Charles Willson Peale painted him or his attractive wife, Louisa Catherine Adams. Later, men like Asher Brown Durand, Caleb Bingham, and even Mathew Brady sought him as a subject. Whether they were established or only beginners,
talented or only modestly endowed, Adams readily granted them sittings as though he did not have a demanding public life. Only a week before arguing the important *Armistad* case in the Supreme Court, Andrew Oliver notes “Adams managed to sit for his portrait on four occasions to the painter James Reid Lambdin.” John Quincy Adams was faithful to the end in his public duty, but apparently he construed part of that duty to be an obligation to grant posterity still another likeness of that very remarkable man.

A companion piece to Oliver’s earlier volume in the *Adams Papers, Portraits of John and Abigail Adams*, this volume has the same attractive format. Essentially the book is a history of the portraits of John Quincy Adams and his wife and of those concerned with these works of art. Chapters parallel the stages of Adams’ political career which is briefly summarized at the beginning of each chapter. The body of each chapter introduces the succession of artists encountered by Adams in this particular period of his life—over sixty in his lifetime—and describes the work each produced. The response to the work, when it is known, of Adams, his family, or friends, together with an occasional judgment of the author, follows the description of the work. Some 144 plates reproduce the paintings, busts, engravings, and silhouettes which have survived. Oliver concludes the account of the surviving works with a brief description of their descent to their present holder.

Oliver’s scholarship and sound esthetic judgments deserve praise, as does the careful editing by the Harvard University Press. Despite the parade of artists who produced literally hundreds of portraits of Adams, the author’s lively account does not read at all like an encyclopedic catalog. Furthermore, as a biographer Oliver preserves a nice balance in dealing with his impressive subject. Commenting on a portrait of John Quincy Adams and of Louisa Catherine by the painter Charles Robert Leslie, Oliver calls them “... a handsome, if perhaps a slightly pompous, pair. ...” Similarly, Copley, whose works win deserved praise from American critics, painted a flattering portrait of a nineteen-year-old Adams which Oliver dismisses as one “... in Copley’s English style ... [which] lacks the brilliance of his American Portraits.”

The strength and delight of the book is the unmistakable way the personality of John Quincy Adams pervades the text. When Adams and his family or friends give their opinions of a painting, Adams makes the most striking comments. “Her portrait of me ... is hideous. It were well if she knew that the word applicable to all her work is not paint, but daub.” Though the author shows all of the expected testiness, caution, scruple, and diffidence which Adams displayed toward people in the world of art, he also reveals fascinating contradictions in “Old Man Eloquent.” Oliver points to his kindness and generosity to struggling artists and acknowledges the ability of the “cold” Mr. Adams to enliven social gatherings with his warmth and intelligence. A mixed impression also comes from the more successful portraits which show the gravity of a man who took himself quite seriously and knew the faults of the world,
yet from whose eyes escapes a twinkle which belies the grim lips. This is a useful and delightful book.

Hofstra University

ROBERT A. DAVISON


This valuable addition to the growing literature on banking during the Jacksonian era focuses on the state level in the years after the Panic of 1837. Professor Sharp's thesis is that "the bank issue became the crucible of the Democratic party. It . . . became the mold from which the party was shaped." Moreover, "it was the hard-money men . . . who set the tone, style, and appeal of the Democratic party . . . [and] were remarkably successful in imposing restraints upon the banking system."

After two introductory chapters which trace the banking issue to 1837, Sharp sets out to prove his thesis by an intensive study of three representative states: Mississippi in the Southwest, Ohio in the Northwest, and Virginia in the Southeast. One chapter each deals with Democratic talk and action (especially in the legislatures) in these three states. Another chapter for each state seeks to determine the constituencies, the "grass roots support" of Democratic "hards" and "softs," and the Whig opposition. Here Sharp uses statistics to indicate rank-difference correlations.

For the Northeast, the fourth section, there is a less intensive discussion of Pennsylvania and New York "because the banking controversy there was milder and more short-lived than in the nation as a whole, and also because other historians have centered their attention on the Northeast to the exclusion of the other sections." There is a summary chapter for each section dealing with the other states to show how they resembled and differed from the representative states.

The bulk of the volume, then, deals with Mississippi, Ohio, and Virginia, and here is where its enduring interest and value lies. The view that emerges is one of great complexity and diversity. In Mississippi the bank issue centered on the repudiation of state bonds floated to assist the banks. In Ohio a mature and diversified economy made the bank issue especially long and virulent. In Virginia it was more closely tied to national politics and the Independent Treasury System than elsewhere, and it became a more divisive issue there than in any other state.

One is never sure why Sharp chose the three states he did as representative. Why not Louisiana, Illinois, and South Carolina instead? Nor does the attempt to separate the single strand of banking from other issues entirely succeed. (Quite properly, for example, the internal improvements question keeps intruding.) Except for Virginia, state developments are not related to the national scene.

Sharp succeeds, on the whole, in what he sets out to do. The diversity, he explains, was the result of the extent to which a state had entangled its own development with its banking system, so that the Panic had very different effects in different places. In Mississippi, Alabama, Arkansas,
Illinois, and Michigan the depression was so devastating to the system that “the Democrats moved to put the broken banks out of business.” Even in the more economically mature state of Louisiana the hard money Democrats by constitutional amendment prohibited the creation of new banks, and in Ohio the Democratic hard money Democrats passed banking laws so harsh that the bankers refused to accept them. In the West there was “a dramatic reduction in the amount of bank capital” resulting from the onslaught of the hard money Democrats. In the East the hard money Democrats tried to reform instead of eliminate the banks, and they succeeded to varying degrees in curbing a mature banking system less affected by the Panic.

The three chapters on constituencies, with excellent maps and statistical appendices, reinforce the more traditional, pre-Benson views of the Democratic and Whig parties. In Mississippi, Ohio, and Virginia Sharp finds “a significant correlation between the wealthier constituencies and the Whigs, and the poorer ones and the Democrats . . . , more striking in the less developed and underpopulated areas. . . .” The strength of Democratic hard money was in “areas outside the market economy and ones of declining wealth, power, and prestige; northeastern cities (which had long contained pockets of radicalism); and from constituencies heavily populated by persons of German descent. Citizens in all had in common feelings of envy, fear, and disapproval toward banks, which symbolized privilege and uncontrolled power.”

Finally, Sharp makes a good case, disagreeing with Bray Hammond, that the battle against the banks in the states was “an important factor in making the banks more sensitive and responsible to public needs,” especially by insisting upon specie “as a kind of internal regulating device in the American banking system. The relatively stable and more responsible conduct of the country’s banks from the early 1840s to the Civil War was due in large part to Democratic sponsored bank reforms and the vigorous hard money critique.”

The publisher is to be commended for making this book as handsome as it is valuable. The extensive documentation is properly at the foot of the page; the bibliography and index are usable; and the maps and two statistical appendices are valuable.

Hobart and Wm. Smith Colleges

JAMES L. CROUTHAMEL


No full-length biography of Martin Van Buren exists which reflects the scholarship of the past quarter-century. The most recent study, a sharply critical one by Holmes Alexander, appeared in 1935, while Edward M. Shepard’s Van Buren, perhaps the best of those presently available, is a venerable eighty-one years of age. Contemporary students of the era, with the exception of Robert Remini who, in 1959, published an account of Van Buren’s early career, have been content to relegate their analyses of Van Buren to the latter chapters of studies spanning the Jacksonian
era and to view him less as a distinct personality than as a compliant tail on the Jacksonian kite. James C. Curtis rejects that tradition. He depicts "The Little Magician" as his own man, formulating policy according to his own lights and relatively uninfluenced by an increasingly remote voice from The Hermitage.

Despite comparatively long introductory chapters on Van Buren's pre-presidential career and on Jackson's administrations, Curtis' study is aptly sub-titled. It is essentially an evaluation of the Van Buren leadership within the specific context of the presidency as it existed in the third decade of the nineteenth century. Curtis clearly believes that presidential programs and policies of earlier eras have been evaluated, too often, according to standards derived from twentieth century presidential practice.

Van Buren, as Curtis portrays him, was a cautious, canny president, but one whose political calculations were shaped by a deep commitment to the principles of states rights and limited government. This commitment led him, as a party leader, to conceive of the Democracy as an inter-sectional union of Jeffersonians and to promote the Albany-Richmond alliance as a concrete expression of that union. In both capacities, that of president and that of party leader, the author frequently compares Van Buren's conduct to that of Jackson, usually to Van Buren's advantage. Indeed, Curtis' portrayal of Jackson is surprisingly critical, and his treatment of Van Buren usually sympathetic. He depicts Van Buren's policies as generally wise, his setbacks (in the special session, for example) as relatively minor, and his achievements (especially in the diplomatic realm) as significant. The effectiveness of enemies such as Nicholas Biddle and Henry Clay in frustrating Van Buren's plans, and of allies such as Calhoun in shaping them, is minimized.

Under Van Buren, however, the popularity of the Democracy steadily declined. The party suffered major reverses in New York, Virginia and elsewhere in 1838 and a crushing defeat nationally in 1840. Curtis assigns responsibility for these reverses rather evenhandedly to the system and to the man who headed it. On the one hand, the Panic of 1837 forced Van Buren, despite his party's longstanding commitment to principles of decentralization, to assert an increasingly vigorous leadership role. In times which demanded centralized leadership, Van Buren attempted to provide it, but violated deeply cherished traditions, offended state leaders, and demoralized state organizations. On the other hand, he failed to recognize in the log cabin and cider campaign a practical response to the problem of moving a mass electorate. Thus, as his party confronted its most serious challenge he urged upon it the outmoded tactics of an earlier day. For his leadership as president and his lack of it as party leader, the Democracy paid dearly in 1840.

Curtis has organized his story logically and he relates it clearly and succinctly. One wishes, on occasion, that he had expanded a little more, as, for example, in his discussion of Democratic factional quarrels in New York, or in his allusions to Congressional behavior throughout the Van Buren presidency. His sympathy for his subject and his approval of the southern strategy of the Democrats is evident but usually restrained. This
reviewer would question Van Buren's alleged commitment to party regularity, for he began his state career as a renegade Republican and his national career as an administration critic, and, in 1848, ran again for the presidency on the Free Soil ticket.

Students of the Jacksonian era will find The Fox at Bay both useful and provocative. Students of Pennsylvania history will note the major leadership role assigned to Buchanan and the occasional references to Thad Stevens, Charles Ogle and other Pennsylvanians. They will value the work, however, for its analysis of the Van Buren presidency and for its explication of national issues at that time.

Saint Francis College

JOHN F. COLEMAN


In what he has styled "an historical exercise in the realms of public finance," Clifton K. Yearley coins the term "money machines" to embrace the "political arrangement by which America's most important political establishments—Northern state and local governments and the political parties which created them—raised revenues, spent, and borrowed" during the period between 1860 and 1920. The geographical bounds of his study are equally broad; "the increasingly industrial iron rectangle of states extending from Massachusetts and Maryland on the East westward to the North Central Plains." The author does add two qualifications; we are told that "the familiar economic crises and industrial advances which precipitated the dangers to local money machines" during this period figure in his study "only as background," and that the "selective approach" he has employed has been "made more feasible by fresh historical writing touching upon a fair range of economic, political, and social change in American life" during these years.

Within this context, Professor Yearley sets out "to document the crude initial shifts away from fiscal theories and social assumptions derived from the Physiocrats, from classical economists, and Utilitarians toward the less individualistic assumptions underlying twentieth century economic welfare and its altered balance of public and private authority." He devotes five chapters to the "breakdown" of the "dual fiscal systems" of the North as he defines them, and five chapters to their "reform and reconstruction," with the last of these reasserting and summarizing his initial thesis. Some forty-three pages of notes follow the text. The work includes an extensive selected bibliography, featuring a long list of published documents, reports and proceedings of federal, state, and local governmental bodies, and a sparse index with a minimum of subject entries.

As a study of the philosophy and operation of public tax systems in selected Northern states in the last half of the nineteenth century, the book, in the opinion of this reviewer, makes a valuable contribution to our knowledge and understanding of particular problems in certain states and cities at specific times. It is strongest in its documentation for New
York City and Boston, and for New York State and Massachusetts, but of relatively little value for Pennsylvania and most of the other states in the so-called iron rectangle. Even admitting the need for selectivity, the use of isolated quotations and statistics from four reports dated between 1889 and 1893 is scarcely adequate to both document and explain the development of public finances in relation to the general property tax in Pennsylvania between 1860 and 1920. For other states no evidence of any kind is presented to support the author's thesis. With regard to the financing of political parties, the author's account is incomplete at best, and of questionable value to the extent that it generalizes upon highly selective evidence. In Pennsylvania, for example, singling out graft and macing while making no mention of fees from county offices, particularly in Philadelphia and Allegheny counties; the division of income from the deposit and investment of state funds; and the sale of legislation, is simply to misrepresent the operation of political parties in the Commonwealth.

The dust jacket on this study announces that it "advances the provocative thesis that the mechanisms for financing state and local governments in the Northern United States from 1860 to 1920 were deeply enmeshed with those financing the extralegal—often illegal—activities of the major political parties, complicating reform or change mandated by the post-Civil War breakdown of the North's legal fiscal machinery." By carefully drawing quotations and statistics from the great mass of published and unpublished documentary material for this sixty-year period, the author also succeeds in illustrating selected aspects of his basic thesis at certain periods in particular states. The richness of the total record, however, and the extent to which he has ignored data regarding the situation in Pennsylvania that does not fit his thesis, suggests that the thesis has hardly been conclusively documented.


From 1870 to 1900 aid to the poor from private and public charities in the United States underwent significant reform and change. Traditional practices became outmoded as immigration, industrialization, and old neighborhoods caught in a state of change increased relief loads and demanded new approaches. The enormous growth of the cities forced relief agencies toward greater bureaucracy and specialization in dealing with the urban poor; by World War I, a "science of charity" would direct those involved in relief in a number of American cities.

Professor Huggins has found Boston to be representative of this process of change. This excellent volume complements Arthur Mann's broader study, *Yankee Reformers in the Urban Age: Social Reform in Boston, 1880-1900.* (Boston must be as well researched a city as any in the country.)
Huggins selected Boston for several reasons: the city had experienced urban growth and maturity before the Civil War; city leaders, imbued with a strong sense of civic tradition, found charity reform essential to community order and stability; and Boston had a solid reputation for social reform, as Mann has shown. The author calls Boston a “model of reform,” whose charity leaders such as Annie Adams Fields, Robert Treat, and Zilpha Smith, among others, not only supported charity reformers in other cities, but frequently provided the National Conference on Charities and Corrections with new techniques and training skills for dealing with the urban poor.

Huggins’ research reveals that Boston’s post-Civil War charity reform had deeper roots than some writers have suggested. He argues that the movement toward reform in the 1870s and 1880s in Boston drew heavily from the work of Joseph Tuckerman, a Unitarian minister and leader in charity reform during the 1830s. Tuckerman himself espoused the idea of the Scottish common-sense theologian Thomas Chalmers who, as rector of a parish in Glasgow from 1819 to 1823, had provided the parish indigent with improved care at lower costs. Tuckerman succeeded in bringing together delegates from Boston’s Protestant relief agencies in 1834 to plan a more efficient means of dispensing charity. The Association of Delegates from the Benevolent Societies of Boston proposed a set of principles which would not only constitute guidelines for the charity reform movement of the late nineteenth century, but “anticipated what was to be called the science of charity by almost half a century.” These principles emphasized “science over sympathy,” a concept embracing the collection of data; the city-wide organization of charity; and personal visitations to the poor. Later, these concepts would include the retention of the volunteer worker under the direction of the “professional” social worker, who, before the development of schools of social work, was merely a paid worker with references.

This book is as much about social thought as social action. From a rich variety of sources Huggins has succeeded in revealing the spirit and philosophies of important social workers. And it is here in the realm of social thought that the author finds the real failure of the charity reform movement. The idealized town that the reformers wanted Boston to remain, the “community of their dreams,” was no longer there. Yet, “proper Bostonians” of the charity movement, so protective of class and property, followed the old (and still lingering) assumption that poverty was a fault of character, and that it was necessary to distinguish between the deserving and the undeserving poor. They revealed little sympathy for general reform that might have eliminated some of the conditions that made so many poor. As Huggins and others have observed, the reformers’ ethics, their preoccupation with political and social control, and their attitudes toward poverty and pauperism tended to obscure one major fact: “the problem with the poor is that they have no money.” Huggins, therefore, judges harshly the failure of these charity reformers to support methods of distributing “society’s wealth so that humanity would not be dishonored by inequity. That is the citadel any successful war on poverty must control.”

This volume is a welcome addition to the histories of poor relief and
social work by Roy Lubove, Robert Bremner, Allen F. Davis, Frank J. Bruno, and others. It is not only a useful and well-written account of charity reform in the past, but a lesson for those concerned with society's inequities today.

*California State College, California, Pa.*

**Thomas H. Coode**


The muckrakers provide historians with a good deal of "color" for the progressive period, uncovering scandal and inveighing against evil, supplying the arsenal of facts from which reformers drew so liberally. Beyond that, they have not received very serious attention. But the muckrakers, as Harold S. Wilson points out, were also reflectors and purveyors of some of the deeper currents in American life: "literary realism, pragmatic philosophy, institutional economics, the cult of efficiency, sociological jurisprudence, and experimental psychology." All these phenomena were related to the development of a new, coherent ethical system in urban-industrial America, and no group worked harder than these journalists to devise such an "order and higher law in a society fragmenting into special interest groups." The *McClure's* group, in particular, dedicated itself to exposing "lawlessness" and promoting "uplift." Its celebrated members, whether Ida Tarbell or Lincoln Steffens, believed in a world of moral imperatives, the effects of which could be measured by the number and quality of specific deviations. This righteous, Victorian conception can be traced back to the antebellum enthusiasms that spread from the "burned-over district" to the Northwest and finally culminated in the abolitionist crusade.

In brief, that is Wilson's argument. It is informative and useful, unobjectionable in fact, but marred by an attempt to do too much within his chosen framework and the ascription of too much to his chosen subjects. The first half of the book deals with *McClure's* as an episode in American journalism, the second with *McClure's* as a study in American reform. The two are not successfully handled in this consecutive way. McClure, for instance, is central in the first part but gradually disappears in the second. He at once "makes" the magazine but does not form it. No clearcut impression of the man emerges, even if allowance is made for McClure's varied interests, protean energies, and endless projects. He is sometimes the inheritor of a stern midwestern moralism, sometimes a wild, unpredictable adventurer, and still other times, as Ida Tarbell put it, "an uncivilized, immoral, untutored natural man with enough canniness to keep himself out of jails and asylums." The final effect is disconcerting.

Wilson is also too inclined to make overly sweeping statements about progressivism on the basis of his examination of *McClure's* staff, and to freight that staff with more intellectual baggage than it can carry. Were they "the vanguard of a revolution in thinking"? Were they more interested in good leadership than in democracy? (It depends on which progressives you choose.) Did they formulate the "final aims" of progressivism,
or adopt the socialist analysis of capitalism? (They believed in egalitarianism, of course, but not in class warfare or materialism.) In all this, Wilson seems to be straining toward a revisionist stance, with Hofstadter as the favorite whipping boy, which is unfortunate because his book is the most interesting reading on the muckrakers I know.

Wayne State University

STANLEY SHAPIRO


This book is a survey of economic history over the last two centuries. From an excellent description of the early Industrial Revolution in England the author takes us through the history of world-wide economic developments and concludes with a look at the European Common Market. Although Professor Hughes refers to himself as an optimist, he notes that most of mankind still lives in poverty and his last paragraph warns us about pollution. Professor Hughes is described as being both an economist and an historian. From the evidence presented in his book it would appear that he is somewhat more at home when dealing with the complex statistical data that is the raw material of the economist than in placing it in an historical perspective. However, Hughes’ mastery over his abundant statistics is always evident, and while some might object to frequent colloquialisms, his style is lucid and forthright.

The book has abundant detail on the period from the eighteenth century to World War I (which he correctly believes to have had an even more devastating long-range impact than World War II), but it is rather tentative afterwards. Hughes is well versed in several areas of economic history and is able to use secondary authorities to advantage in others. The picture which he presents of the development of the United States in the nineteenth century seems particularly good. Also, although he is no admirer of imperialism, he generously acknowledges that, “No new overseas nations grew up into economic affluence except in the British cultural mold.” His comparison of industrial with non-industrial societies is firm and unsentimental.

Industrialization and Economic History, which offers many rewards to the reader, has some disadvantages. Surprisingly, despite his obvious familiarity with the course of British economic history, Hughes has made several mistakes in that area. The Ten Hours Act of 1847 did not apply to men as he asserts. The repeal of the income tax in 1816 was intended to benefit the middle class rather than those whom he refers to as “parliamentary grandees.” Hughes has also been led astray by literature which was written by members of the Fabian Society into considerably overestimating the influence of that body. On the subject of imperialism, Hughes is full of currently fashionable guilt feelings but he does not cite the recent work of Nicholas Mansergh or Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher and Alice Denny, preferring instead the outmoded theories of Hobson and Schumpeter, or even the faddish Frantz Fanon. Perhaps an economist finds it
difficult to acknowledge that, as Mansergh states in *The Coming of the First World War*, "The Rulers of Europe thought primarily in terms of political, not economic advantage and it was on the struggle for power in Europe that their eyes were always fixed. . . ." To most of the best scholars of imperialism colonial affairs after 1870 were a reflection of European developments; the economic or psychological theories are out of date.

Two other faults of the book present themselves. Both are inherent in a wide-ranging study which, like this one, is based on a series of classroom lectures. In the first place, the organization could have been improved, especially in part four where the various topics do not relate particularly well to each other. Also, the secondary sources intrude too much; page after page is used to summarize the thesis of some other person, and there are too many quotations with too little analysis.

Despite these flaws, this is a stimulating book which will reward the non-specialist in economic history. It will also serve to give a broader perspective to an American economic historian. The author is right in claiming that the existing structure of society has been changed to accommodate the consequences of industrialization. Since we live at a time when some of the by-products of industrial civilization (air and water pollution, most conspicuously) have caused doubts to arise as to whether the Industrial Revolution was worthwhile, Professor Hughes' assessment of societies which have not gone through this process offers comfort to those who believe in a version of the old-fashioned view of progress. An annotated bibliography at the end of the book reveals both the extent and limitations of the author's research.

*Rutgers University* 

JOHN W. O'BORENE

*The First Henry Ford: A Study in Personality and Business Leadership.*


Most scholars whose research has dealt with the life of Henry Ford I (1863-1947) or with Ford Motors, have sensed the failure of conventional tools of thought to "explain" the known facts. We have realized that one of the keys to that tremendous story was missing. Who, really, was old Henry Ford, and what did he want, and why? Since a man's grasp goes as far as his reach, and Ford's was of enormous historical dimensions, a large and crucial piece of American industrial history has remained an enigma, clouded by the ignorance of platoons of biographers who have written of Henry Ford.

Dr. Jardim now comes forward to fill the gap with psycho-analysis. I find her arguments compelling (although I speak strictly as a layman). They appear to explain Ford, *Fordismus*, and the wild goings-on that reached both the limits of benign idealism and abandoned sadism. It is an intriguing story Dr. Jardim tells, and I recommend this book to the interested reader in highest terms. I also hope it is only the beginning of the use of applied psycho-analysis in historical studies, of all sorts. We can gain enormously from this kind of information. To give a simple ex-
ample: we would have fewer tortured “economic analyses” of the acts of madmen—in peace and in war.

Dr. Jardim ought to sue MIT Press for this appalling job of editing and production, the worst I have seen in years. It shows all the signs of mindless and ruthless editorial cutting, so that names of persons appear without identification, discussions are truncated needlessly, etc. The chapter heads are at bottoms of pages without chapter numbers and footnotes are set at the end of the book with only the chapter numbers, no titles. As a result the reader spends needless hours flipping pages back and forth trying to find who said what, etc. The book at times becomes almost inaccessible to the reader, which is a great shame, as this is an important contribution to our knowledge of American history.

Northwestern University

J. R. T. HUGHES


Few topics are more complex than British investment in nineteenth century American railways. From the first United States railroads in the 1830s to the end of the century the British stake was substantial and grew steadily until it amounted to more than £300 million in 1896. The exact amount of British investment will never be known. Even an examination of the thousands of railway company stock and bond registry books (were they available) would not produce an accurate picture because many securities, especially bonds, were negotiable by the bearer and hence no records were kept of transfers from one owner to another. Nor would an examination of the books of the major British and American stock brokerage and investment banking firms (were such documents available, which many are not) produce an accurate figure because a large number of transfers were of a private nature. And even if the exact number of securities held were known, this would not tell us how much was paid for them, since British investors, like their American counterparts, often acquired bonds and stocks much below or above their face values. And for one attempting to determine the net flow of British capital into the United States a list of securities owned by citizens of the United Kingdom would not be sufficient because many owners purchased their investments with dividends or capital gains made on previous American investments.

Despite these complexities, Dorothy Adler gives a broad picture and provides many details about the amount and kind of British investment in American rails from 1834 to 1898. Her sources are primarily the rich contemporary newspapers and periodicals, especially the Economist and the Times (of London), the American Railroad Journal, and the Commercial and Financial Chronicle, together with important British records such as the letter books of the Dowlais Iron Works and the files of the English Association of American Bond and Shareholders.

Mrs. Adler divides British investment into roughly three periods. The
first, that between 1830 and the start of the Civil War was dominated by a conservative British attitude. The importation of capital was vital to American railroads because almost all iron laid down in the United States came from Britain. By the same token, American railroads were the most important export market for British iron, consuming in normal pre-Civil War years between one-third and two-thirds of all railroad iron exported from the United Kingdom. Mrs. Adler’s book traces the complex flow of British capital during the pre-1860 period. British ironmasters, reluctant to take the securities of American companies, depended upon London houses such as the Barings to finance the iron transactions. English investors preferred railroad bonds (often underwritten by individual American states) to common stock. The Barings and other London houses pioneered the sale of American railroad bonds to the English public. This provided the capital to pay for iron purchases and prepared the way for a later expansion of British participation in American railroad financing.

The second period, that between 1860 and 1880, saw the nature of British investment change. The importation of iron slowed and almost stopped as American mills began to fill the total national requirements for rails. British investment changed to two different types. Some English investors became aggressive speculators, anxious for capital gains, and they purchased equity stock in expanding systems such as the Atlantic and Great Western, Erie, and the Illinois Central. In some lines, such as the Reading, British capital became dominant, and London selected the management of the roads. Other English investors were more cautious. These preferred the bonds or shares of gilt-edged railroads like the Pennsylvania or the New York Central.

During Mrs. Adler’s third period (1880-1898) there was a massive increase in British interest both in “growth” type stocks and “income” securities. British involvement in rails also spilled over into allied industries such as iron manufacturing, coal mining and grain elevators.

Mrs. Adler’s manuscript at all times focuses on the British investor himself and the institutions that grew up to manage the flow of capital, especially investment trusts, investment bankers, stock brokerage firms, and associations of English bond and share holders. Her study is what might be called a running start on a massive topic. She had intended to cover British interest down to its liquidation during the First World War. Beyond this she planned to do some detailed studies on both sides of the Atlantic stressing individual investors, investment houses and British managers. In this book she raises some important questions about nineteenth century railroad history. She asserts that British-owned and managed American railroads were influenced very little in their day-to-day administration by their owners. But she demonstrates that the British investor used every power he had to curtail rate wars and cutthroat competition. Although London failed initially, the author saw the House of Morgan acting decisively at London’s demand to end competition between the Pennsylvania and New York Central in the famous Corsair agreement of 1885.

Unfortunately her untimely death in 1963 prevented Mrs. Adler from carrying on her contemplated research ambitions. Indeed, the present
book was not quite ready for publication. Fortunately Muriel Hidy, herself an expert in American business history, read Mrs. Adler's manuscript and agreed to prepare it for publication. Mrs. Hidy's editing is superb. Her additions are in all cases carefully marked by brackets, and they serve to clarify the author's thoughts, but they do not change her meaning or organization. In addition, Mrs. Hidy has added to the footnotes and bibliography references to much later scholarship. Her editing has produced a volume that should be the starting point for all scholars interested in British investment in American railroads. Although Mrs. Adler may not have exhausted her topic, all who follow her will profit enormously from the excellent start she made.

University of Delaware  

STEPHEN SALSURY


Historians during the last few years have begun to take note of the fact that the New Deal, rather than weakening and destroying the big city political machines, often strengthened existing organizations or facilitated the rise of new ones. Lyle Dorsett commented on this phenomena in his study of the Pendergast machine in Kansas City and now Bruce Stave has further elaborated the theme in his work on the rise of Pittsburgh's Democratic machine. In Stave's words, "Roosevelt's welfare state did not undermine the bosses; instead it facilitated the transfer of urban political power from Republicans to Democrats."

Stave begins his book by reviewing the various interpretations that historians and political scientists have offered to explain the rise and persistence of political machines and then proceeds to examine the development of the Pittsburgh version. He offers a detailed analysis of the political infighting that characterized "Steel City" politics during the 1930's, as well as illuminating the process by which boss David L. Lawrence built the Pittsburgh machine through the instrumentality of New Deal programs such as the CWA, the PWA, and the HOLC. Lawrence, who himself later became mayor of the city and governor of Pennsylvania, and who played a key role in forwarding Pittsburgh's Renaissance, made a bad error of judgment in choosing William N. McNair as Democratic mayoralty candidate in 1933. McNair, who believed in limited government and opposed New Deal welfare measures, broke with Lawrence and refused to aid the Democratic organization. After Lawrence had made an unsuccessful attempt to secure state legislation to "rip" the mayor from office in 1935, McNair finally resigned, and from that time on there were few impediments to the growth of ties between the city government and the Democratic organization. Throughout the New Deal years, and up until 1962, Stave demonstrates, the percentage of Pittsburgh Democratic committeemen on the public payroll constantly increased.

Underlying Stave's analysis and interpretations is a comprehensive demographic and statistical study of Pittsburgh's social composition and
voting patterns. This quantitative technique, which is increasingly being used by historians, enables us to see more clearly the relationships between elections and areas of support for candidates, as well as between voting patterns and ethnic and economic variables. Thus Stave is able to convincingly demonstrate that it was the La Follette candidacy of 1924 which first set the electoral pattern of lower-class and foreign-born support that characterized both the Smith vote in 1928 and the Roosevelt votes of the New Deal years. The author’s section on the “demography of machine building” offers us a clear picture of the continued dependence of the Democratic organization on the largely lower-class and foreign-born wards.

While Stave’s book is a useful addition to the literature on political machines, it leaves a number of questions, especially those not susceptible to quantitative explanation, unanswered. How, for instance, did the machine relate to the value structures and mores of social groups within the city? What of the personality of Lawrence and his own conception of his role? The governmental and institutional structure of the city and its relationship to politics is also neglected by Stave, as is the possible influence of Pittsburgh corporate interests. Was there any foreshadowing during the 1930s of the unique corporate-political partnership that brought about the Renaissance of the 1940s and 50s? And finally, this reviewer would reject as simplistic Stave’s assertion that since bosses and machines brought “order from chaos” in late-nineteenth century cities, a similar mechanism could today “reestablish the relationship between traditional politics and the urban disadvantaged and bring social, if not environmental, order once again to America’s cities.” The forces of demographic and economic change that today are impoverishing the central city, as well as its declining political power, would appear to be beyond the ability of the traditional machine to cope with.

Carnegie-Mellon University

JOEL A. TARR


John Beverley Riggs, curator of manuscripts at the Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, has added impressively to the lengthening list of published guides, handbooks, and catalogues that describe the specific manuscript and/or archival holdings of an individual repository. Such additions are welcome indeed for, although the National Union Catalog of Manuscript Collections (NUCMC) will eventually become the national inventory of manuscript collections, its entries must, perforce, be brief. Also, it will always be most agreeable to have information on the holdings of an individual repository gathered conveniently between two covers, rather than dispersed among the pages of a multi-volume set, however well indexed.

The Eleutherian Mills Historical Library formally came to be on October 7, 1961, the product of the merger of the Longwood Library,
Kennett Square, Pennsylvania, with the library of the Hagley Museum. Located near Greenville, Delaware, the new, consolidated library is a part of the Eleutherian Mills–Hagley Foundation. The Guide describing the manuscript collections of this library runs to 1,000 closely packed double-column pages. The index alone accounts for an additional 200 pages, with three columns to the page. Clearly there is a wealth of information here on "the contributions of the Middle Atlantic states to American economic, business, industrial, and technological history," which is the "broad spectrum of research materials" sought by the library. As should be expected, descriptions of papers of various members of the du Pont family, and of records of E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., dominate the Guide.

Dr. Riggs, in his "Introduction," discusses the evolution of the major collections, provides a summary view of them, and sets forth editorial policy, including an illuminating statement on the spelling of the surname du Pont. The materials described amount to more than 2,580,000 manuscripts that were acquired through 1965. Occupying nearly a mile of shelving, they fall into six basic divisions, or collections, and are described accordingly. They are: the Longwood Manuscripts, the Henry Francis du Pont Collection of Winterthur Manuscripts, Records of E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (1801-1902), the P. S. du Pont Office Collection, the Eleuthera Bradford du Pont Collection, and an Alphabetical Listing of Accessions Received through the Year 1965. The Longwood and Winterthur Manuscripts are further divided, each consisting of ten groups, and the "Alphabetical Listing . . ." actually goes far beyond that, being a description, often very detailed, of individual accessions not accounted for in the other five collections.

The format of the Guide, is a workable one, although somewhat awkward upon first exposure to it. It is essential, therefore, that the user read carefully all of the front matter, as well as appropriate explanatory material within the body of the Guide. The "Papers of Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours (1739-1817) and his two wives, 1757-1836" may be used as an instance. Thus, they are a part—Group 2—of the Henry Francis du Pont Collection of Winterthur Manuscripts. These Winterthur Manuscripts are discussed broadly on pages 146-148, in terms of overall number of items, date span, provenance, arrangement, and biographical and documentary publications based on the collection. The availability of more extensive inventories is also indicated and parallel or collateral collections in the library are identified. Proceeding to the point, on page 150, where the analysis of Group 2 begins, there is a cross reference to a detailed chronology and bibliographical note relating to Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours appearing earlier in the Guide (where another, smaller group of his papers, part of the Longwood Manuscripts, had been described.) Also on page 150, it is noted that Group 2 is divided into seven series, A-G, comprised of such elements as correspondence, business papers, papers of his two wives, etc. This note is followed by an overview and evaluation of Series A—the "Correspondence of du Pont de Nemours." Finally, the letters in Series A written by du Pont de Nemours are listed
alphabetically by recipient, with date span and number of letters in each case, followed by a similar alphabetical listing of letters he received. The description of Series A occupies 18 pages in the Guide, while Group 2 in its entirety, i.e., Series A-G, fills nearly 75 pages. In spite of complexities, the rewards for perseverance are great because there is an abundance of information here, which makes clear that the manuscript collections in the Eleutherian Mills Historical Library are extraordinarily rich. One of the aims of the Guide is “to attract an ever-widening circle of graduate and postgraduate researchers to use [the library’s] resources.” It should be readily fulfilled.

A genealogical chart keyed in some way to members of the du Pont family represented by collections in the library might have proved useful. For convenience, biographical data might also have been grouped in dictionary form at one place in the volume. A more elaborate form of typographical emphasis than typewritten camera copy allows would surely have assisted in guiding the user through some of the more intricately divided and subdivided collections. But these are reservations only, not objections, and while making appreciative use of the Guide, we may look forward to the supplements that we are promised will appear from time to time.

Library of Congress

JOHN McDONOUGH