
This exhaustive and impressive study presents the formative years of Pennsylvania history under the Proprietary government of the Penns, with emphasis upon the Quaker conflict between religion and politics as reflected in changes in the doctrine of authority and the Peace Testimony. The repetitive character of the material tends to make the reading somewhat uninteresting at times, but the fault does not lie with the writer. The problem of the Quakers is portrayed objectively and lucidly. Wellenreuther takes the reader through their controversies and crises, be it a split in their ranks, a question about the rights of the more powerful Council and the Assembly, the London mother church’s assumption of a position rejected by Pennsylvania’s followers of the Inner Light as a breach of the Peace Testimony, a period of war (the Seven Years War, a declaration of war with the Delaware Indians), or the slave problem. He also deals with the disputes between the governor and the Assembly on military defense, paper money, taxation of the Proprietary estates, the Stamp Act of 1765, and the Townshend Acts of 1767.

Wellenreuther comments, “In the history of the Quaker hierarchy since its founding, reform movements and the formulation of new theological positions were often released or hastened by external events [all translations by the reviewer].” The entire book is witness to the fact. The Seven Years War was, “however paradoxical it may sound, together with Pennsylvania’s internal political development the mightiest ally of the reform movement. It was the starting point of the new movement and the concrete impetus for the formulation of the expanded Peace Testimony concept. Simultaneously, viewed as God’s chastisement, it motivated the program of the movement, especially the reform of church discipline: The church, so demanded the preachers, would again have to return to God, as in the past . . . .”

The contradiction between the doctrine of authority and the Peace Testimony constantly raised the question of Quaker political activity. The heterogeneous middle group in the Friendly Association could not see eye to eye on the Peace Testimony concept nor on the extent of engagement in politics. Some insisted that their brothers in the faith withdraw from the Assembly and boycott the elections, whereas others saw no need for such abdication. At the end of 1757 some demands of the reform movement were cast aside, even by the Meeting for Sufferings, with the resulting embitterment of the Quaker preachers. The Yearly Meeting of 1758 supported those Quakers of the reform movement who wanted to direct energies released by temporary withdrawal from politics to two social problems: the
slavery question and the improvement and increase of educational measures. At the Yearly Meeting of 1759 "the Quaker church was like a gathering of feuding brothers who assured themselves of Christian charity with drawn daggers." The reviewer selected three successive years to show the unstable state of affairs among the Quakers.

The question of engagement in politics was a continual source of contention between the Quaker preachers and politicians, and "only the singularly strong thrust of events during the American Revolution enabled the reform movement to lead the church successfully out of worldly pursuits." When the middle group lost its significance and completely disappeared in 1759, only two camps remained in the Quaker church—with opposite opinions on the right relationship of church to state. The conflict sharpened. But events and positions lost the battle for the Quaker politicians, and finally the latter took the same point of view and made the same demands as the Quaker preachers.

In the early decades of the Province, however, the Quaker politicians had learned "the political techniques with which they could reconcile the contradiction between their concept of authority and their Peace Testimony and also between their religious tenets and the demand of political reality, without at the same time risking the far too intense wrath of the English Crown."

*Rückblick* (In Retrospect) presents a good review. In fact, Wellenreuther gives summaries throughout the book, making valuable observations and conclusions. He does not hesitate to point out flimsy reasoning or excuses on the part of the Quakers—as well as inconsistencies. Merely looking at the table of contents convinces one that the presentation is chronological and *lückenos* (void of gaps). Letters, journals, and minutes of various types of Meetings in England and Pennsylvania are among Wellenreuther's primary sources. He makes comparisons and evaluations; he sees motives behind the actions. The reader who overlooks the elaborate and frequent footnotes will miss much of value. There Wellenreuther makes helpful comments about the attitude or incorrectness of different writers in the field.

In the reviewer's own *Rückblick* he now realizes that he failed to make an important point earlier, one which Wellenreuther stresses: the reform movement did not succeed because of faults in the Quaker organizational structure. Too often a small group could exert influence and control in the upper Meetings without relationship to its followers in the Quaker church. The authority of the Yearly Meeting needed strengthening; it had to be recognized as the highest authority by the Monthly Meetings in order to establish the unity of the church.

All in all, Wellenreuther has made a fine contribution to Quaker history in Pennsylvania. This short review fails to do him justice, for it leaves too many gaps and denies even a quick reference to the many areas of his research. The inclusion of religious, political, social, and economic aspects makes it a total picture. Of the twelve chapters in the book, two—or even more—serve somewhat as background and introduction. Eine ausgezeichnete Arbeit!

*Susquehanna University*  
*Russell W. Gilbert*

Many twentieth-century historians have discussed the economic history of colonial America. Stuart Bruchey, Lawrence Harper, and Curtis Nettles, to name a few, have contributed to our knowledge of the economic development of this period. Yet in most instances, while using the existing data, they supported most of their conclusions with keen observations and careful analysis.

Now two historians, James F. Shepherd and Gary M. Walton, have used the new techniques of quantitative data to enhance our knowledge of colonial economic history. In the truest sense, they benefitted from those who went before. Yet by using the quantitative paraphernalia, the two authors probe the existing data more deeply than ever before.

While focusing on the colonial maritime trade, aspects of shipping, and distribution costs, their analysis covers a broad spectrum of ideas. Shepherd and Walton start with the premise that “economic growth in the colonies was strongly affected by the development of trade and a market sector, especially with regard to overseas trade and markets.” The topics discussed include international migration, patterns of settlements, resource allocation, regional specialization, product flow, and distributional problems as patterns of economic activities.

The discussion is developed with models, graphs, and tables. Such an accumulation of raw data alone is valuable. Much of this material is presented in several appendices. Contained in this section is information on the value of international trade, the utilization of ships, the quantities of products shipped, and the number of ships constructed in the colonies.

From this considerable accumulation of data and the careful analysis of it, the two authors support some older suppositions concerning economic development in the colonies, and further expand our knowledge by new hypotheses which replace older conclusions. They conclude that the old idea of the triangular trade is not supported by their data. Rather, colonial shippers usually followed a “shuttle-voyage” pattern going to places where they knew that their cargo was merchantable. Colonial shippers increased their profit by more efficient use of their knowledge of ports, trade items, and port time. This knowledge of development and reduction of distribution costs was more important than technological change. Further, it is emphasized that English shippers rather than colonials monopolized the African slave trade and thus the African market was not too valuable for the colonists. Finally, it is demonstrated that the imbalance in trade was not as bad as other authors have indicated. These new ideas make this study quite thought provoking.

Embarking on new approaches to old problems, the authors, who blend their thoughts and writing styles well, do not push their ideas dogmatically. They even seem to lack an assertiveness when they state their conclusions. My impression is that the research is as valuable as they had hoped, but they were hesitant to make such a claim. Certainly they have shown the way for others to follow.
Unfortunately, the quantitative approach will cause many readers to avoid a direct confrontation with the conclusions. Historians untrained in the authors’ methodology will struggle to comprehend the arguments. Yet this is a book that warrants the consideration of every colonial historian. Our traditional views of colonial economic history simply are no longer adequate explanations in view of this new stimulating research. The book is a challenge; we owe it to ourselves and to our students to consult this study and carefully consider the novel conclusions it sets forth.

University of Georgia

JAMES L. ANDERSON


If neglect can be salutary in colonial affairs, attention may be distinctly unsettling, especially if it is that of the Duke of Newcastle intent on a patronage appointment. Although Mr. Henretta’s study originated as an investigation of the Duke’s use of colonial offices as a source of political influence in England, he describes the completed volume as neither a biography nor a study of “Anglo-American patronage and politics.” Rather he sees his work as providing “an analytical framework which elucidates the often tenuous connection between domestic politics and imperial programs and patronage” from 1721 to c. 1754. He consciously focuses on the conduct of colonial administrators in England, warning his reader not to seek in this volume the “colonial side of the story.” That demurrer is well warranted for the author is fully occupied describing two orders of development. First, and in terms of bulk, the greatest attention focuses on the use of colonial patronage as an incidental tool of English politics. Second, the volume seeks to explain both why the era of “salutary neglect” occurred and why it ended.

Six of the seven chapters interpret key phases in the long tenure of Thomas Pelham-Holles, Duke of Newcastle, as secretary of state. From 1724 to 1748 he was secretary for the Southern Department which was traditionally the post most responsible for colonial affairs. From 1748 to 1754 he held the more powerful position of secretary for the Northern Department from which he continued to influence colonial appointments. In 1754 he succeeded his brother as First Lord of the Treasury, but the study does not follow him into that appointment. His years as Secretary of State coincided with the period of “salutary neglect.”

Henretta’s interpretation of English politics is firmly Namierist. As portrayed here, English politics of this period were founded on individual self-interest, faction, and opportunism. Newcastle is credited with using appointments in the colonies consciously, and to an extent not previously developed: to reward followers of cooperative members of the governing coalition, to buy support for Newcastle favorites in contested elections, or, in rare instances, to smooth acceptance of changes in the ministry’s colonial policies. Throughout his tenure the duke’s financial exigencies re-enforced his almost pathological necessity to retain his offices and restricted both his
freedom to pursue an independent colonial policy and his political alternatives. The former contributed to neglect of policy making even as it heightened his interest in personnel decisions. Comprehension of these factors deepens our understanding of the anomaly of neglect coinciding with heightened attention to details of colonial administration and the expansion of the number of posts subject to royal appointment. Because of its proprietary government, Pennsylvania was not a field for Newcastle's placement; therefore it was distinctly less affected in internal affairs than Virginia, New York, and Massachusetts.

The final chapter of the book shifts in focus from Newcastle to an institutional explanation of the epoch of "salutary neglect." Although well stated, none of the points are inherently original nor are they shown to be a consequence of special characteristics of the Newcastle years. The reasons advanced by Henretta to account for the period of "salutary neglect" include: constitutional hesitation after 1688 over whether Crown or Commons possessed final authority in colonial policy; political weakness of the Walpole-Pelham-Newcastle coalition which precluded support of policies which might become controversial; expanding aspirations of the colonial legislatures; and the latent threat to central authority in plans for colonial union. The priorities of war with France coincided with initiatives of the Earl of Halifax at the Board of Trade to force reassessment and fundamental restructuring of colonial policy in the 1750s. Either development might have been sufficient to end an epoch; in conjunction they produced a sharp change.

This book adds detail to our perceptions of the operational aspects of English politics in these years. It contributes fewer insights than might be expected on particular colonial appointments, even though the author reviewed the origins and consideration of each appointment in the colonial service looking for the political implications as seen by Newcastle. Henretta's findings of correlations between political advantages for the secretary and his friends and their interest in controlling appointments hold no surprises. Nor does the devolution of selection to subordinates or agencies such as the Board of Trade, when political considerations were not at stake, run counter to our understanding of human motivations. At times what the volume seems to demonstrate most forcefully is not neglect per se but rather the low priority American affairs held for the London government. These are separate phenomena.

Dickinson College

Warren J. Gates


In the most detailed and painstaking study yet to appear about the Howe brothers, Ira Gruber here sets forth a challenging and somewhat convincing account of the fascinating and elusive role these two men, Lord Richard and Sir William, played in the Revolution. The number of pages is misleading,
for enough footnotes in small type are included at the bottom of each page to make a separate volume in themselves.

The author readily admits that there is no certain answer to why the Howes failed in their double mission of trying to conciliate the American colonies, or, if this did not work, subdue them. Yet the handsome book leaves no doubt that a stand is definitely taken in a strenuous effort to bring a conclusion out of doubtful evidence. One can even get the impression at times that these two officers carried the whole weight of the war on their military shoulders—which indeed they virtually did from 1776 through 1778.

The documentation is so impressive that it tends to bury the human side of the brothers. One could wish that more had been presented about the personal side of William, at least. Was he, for instance, under a trauma as a result of his bloody victory at Bunker Hill? Did his mistress, the storied Mrs. Loring, undermine his efforts to the extent that he dallied and thus delayed crushing the Continental army when he certainly could have done so? Perhaps these are minor points compared with the relationship with the British government. Yet something made William Howe fail to tick at the right time.

Touched upon here is the interesting connection between the Howe brothers and King George III. They had a special role in the prosecution of the war, not only because of their distinguished record on land and sea, but because they were members of a prominent family and personal friends of the king. Through Lord North, who is not quite given his due in this work, the king was much more patient with the Howes than he would ordinarily have been, because, this reviewer believes, of their special status. Otherwise, he would not have endured their varying attitudes toward conciliation and forcefulness.

The main theme of this book is the complex relationship between the Howes and the ministry in Whitehall Street. The endless detail of correspondence, recommendations, and orders which were handled so warily by Lord North, Lord George Germain, and the Earl of Sandwich in communication with the Howe brothers is set forth in brilliant array by the author, based obviously upon splendid research. He endeavors to show that it was just this ambiguity and skillful parrying by both sides, which slowed down the British effort and thereby lost the war. The thesis is reasonably convincing.

Many times the Howes were understandably confused. For as the book points out, "Confident in the ability of Britain to conquer America, a majority of the ministry felt no compulsion to reach a peaceful settlement, to suffer more patiently the challenges to its imperial pride, and to resist the temptation of punishing the colonists." If the ministry were divided, how could the Howes be sure of what to do in America?

In time the ministry and the Howes came to have different views of how to settle the American problem. Still both sides parried. Finally after the failure of Sir William to crush the American army, sparked by the disaster at Trenton, sustained by the lack of success in Pennsylvania, especially in the lack of Loyalist support which he had hoped for, the conflict came into the
open soon after the defeat of Burgoyne at Saratoga. From that time on it was
a matter of only when the two brothers would resign and return to England.

Lord Howe was an able commander at sea, but he showed little of this in
America. The book contains expert if at times tedious accounts of the
technical maneuvering of his vessels. Not so colorful, he was far more stable
than his brother. But neither finished with a high score. And there were
reasons beyond that of their ability to cope with the situation. Obviously the
huge task of settling the colonial question was beyond their ability. But they
were faced with choices, whether to mollify or fight, whether to go too far
and inexorably offend the colonists, or to bring peace with moderate action
and thus bring upon themselves the coveted honor of a satisfactory set-
tlement and a triumphal return to England.

The book commendably includes the return of the Howes to England and
their subsequent defense of themselves against a hostile ministry and others
who charged that they could have won the war with aggressive measures if
these had been taken before France entered the conflict. Here again is
shown the complexity of British politics at that time, some of which would
make a Watergate seem tame.

The author concludes that, "The Howes failed primarily because they and
a majority of the ministry were working in separate and mutually destruc-
tive ways toward the restoration of British government in America." There
is much sound basis for this conclusion, and this volume is a distinguished
addition to the historical literature of the American Revolution.

New York University

Essays on the American Revolution. Edited by Stephen G. Kurtz and James
H. Hutson. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press and
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., for the Institute of Early American

In March, 1971, a number of distinguished scholars held a symposium at
Williamsburg, Virginia, to re-examine old ideas about the American Rev-
olution and to discuss some new ones of their own. This collection of eight
original essays is the result and represents the happiest event yet in the cele-
bration of the upcoming bicentennial of the Revolution.

Bernard Bailyn opens the volume with an eloquent statement of the major
themes in the history of the Revolution and an outline of areas that require
greater study. He argues that the rebellion did not result from rising eco-
nomic misery or from social strain as much as from an inflamed fear that the
British planned to exercise arbitrary power over Americans. Bailyn has em-
phasized this before. Here he suggests that this distrust of power, so im-
portant in the ideological origins of the Revolution, has been a factor
throughout American history and is an element that links the Revolution to
a central theme in contemporary America.

Jack P. Greene's analysis of the fragile relationship between England and
the American colonies stresses the emergence of socio-political elites which
transformed the colonies into competent, self-determining entities. For
decades the British had respected the sanctity of colonial political au-
tonomy. Then in the late 1740s, prompted largely by the increasing economic importance of the colonies, the British authorities attempted rigid controls. This reversal from a permissive to a restrictive posture of imperial direction ultimately caused the Revolution. Although this view is not new (Charles M. Andrews reached similar conclusions two generations ago), it is a superb, succinct statement that considers both the American and British positions. In addition, Greene places the change in British imperial policy at an earlier date than is usually recognized.

Richard Maxwell Brown presents a searching summary of civil violence and popular uprisings in early America, which he compares to the English tradition of resistance. He concludes that civil violence is an important part of the revolutionary legacy. The War for Independence therefore serves as a lasting justification for Americans to take the law into their own hands for a good cause. There can be little doubt that the roots of civil violence run deep in the Anglo-American heritage, and Brown's essay is a first-rate investigation into an area too little studied. His provocative conclusion, however, requires a dubious leap from violence in the era of the War for Independence to violence in the industrial-urban society of the twentieth century.

More convincing in its link between the era of the Revolution and the present is John Shy's suggestion that the recent United States experience with the war of rebellion in Indo-China can give the historian empathetic insight on the American rebellion. Like Americans in the past decade, the British experienced repeated frustrations as they tried to develop a strategy for quelling the colonial rebellion. The British tried escalating forces, tried to win over neutral civilians, and tried pacification through formation of local self-defense forces. They also had to cope with chronic criticism of foreign policy on the home front. In his incisive exploration Shy asks more questions than he answers, but they are questions that deserve more study. One in particular is that the Revolution may have been more revolutionary in a social sense than recent historians have allowed because large-scale popular involvement in military organization may have served to politicize and nationalize the population.

Based upon quantitative analysis of roll call votes in the Continental Congress, H. James Henderson finds the traditional interpretation of a struggle in the Congress between nationalists and states' rightists inadequate. Instead he sees a sectional division between North and South in the shifting factional struggles in Congress, which created a major problem in constructing a viable nation after the Revolution. Somewhat less firmly established is that the regional cleavages carried ideological counterparts.

William G. McLoughlin traces the ways the Revolutionary mood and experience hastened separation of church and state and brought the dissenting sects into the mainstream of American life. Initially religious liberty was only for Protestants, who did provide the cultural cement to bind the new nation after the Revolution. This Protestant bias prevailed until after the Civil War when the commitment to religious equality gradually produced increasing tolerance for Catholics and Jews.
Assuming that the revolutionary atmosphere encouraged certain social forces and suppressed others, Rowland Berthoff and John M. Murrin see the Revolution as a decisive turning point in the development of the American social structure. The Revolution encouraged a system built on equality among exalted yeomen, they argue, and inhibited an eighteenth-century feudal revival. That the shift in social values away from hierarchy toward equality was accelerated by the Revolution is a more convincing assertion than that there was a strong feudal revival which was stemmed by the rebellion.

Edmund S. Morgan closes with one of the most provocative essays of all, an assessment of conflict and consensus in the Revolution. He finds that among those who supported the Revolution there was little class hostility, largely because of the extraordinary social mobility in eighteenth-century America. The one clear division was between slaves and freemen. Indeed, Morgan believes that slavery was one of the keys to consensus prevailing in colonial America, for black slavery eliminated the possibility of a dangerous, armed lower white class that might resist when ruthlessly exploited. Hence revolutionary Americans were able to find consensus in the theory of equality by denying equality to others—black Americans.

To date preparations for the celebration of the two-hundredth anniversary of the American Revolution have been something of a disappointment. This volume is not. It combines scholarship and imagination and relates the Revolution to all of American history. Hopefully these excellent essays will encourage similar works.

California State University
San Diego


As we approach the bicentennial of American Independence, popular interest in "The Founding Fathers" increases. James Thomas Flexner recently completed a four-volume biography of George Washington. This book is the second in a series on some of the men who led America's revolutionary movement. Benjamin Franklin was the subject of the first volume.

The perennial problems facing historians who write about George Washington have been the cultural mythology which hides his real life and Washington's ability to write without revealing himself. Seymour Lipset has suggested that part of the process of establishing the hegemony of the national government in post-revolutionary America involved the idolizing of Washington. His charisma was essential in establishing the legitimacy of national political order and stability. Paul Svinin, the European traveler, commented in 1815: "Every American considers it his sacred duty to have a likeness of Washington in his home, just as we have the images of God's saints." Historians who try to understand Washington seem to be unable to separate the symbols of the nation from the history of the man.
Nevertheless, Ralph Andrist’s stated purpose in this book is to reveal Washington as man instead of myth. His method is to let Washington speak for himself through his own writing about life in colonial Virginia, the American Revolution, and the development of national politics. Andrist compiles Washington’s words with brief editorial comments which function as transitional information. Interesting illustrations are found on every page. Modern printing techniques helped in the preparation of this beautifully organized book, but the method of printing extensive quotations from Washington’s letters is a return to a biographical method common during the nineteenth century.

The editorial technique has the over-all effect of revealing interesting aspects of Washington’s personal life but leaving the reader in the dark about important political developments. Andrist explains that Washington accepted “the enslavement of black human beings as part of the normal order of things” on his plantation. He had a domineering mother and his own sexual life seemed to be frustrated. Washington admitted his deep love for Sally Fairfax even after he proposed to Martha Custis. Further, his letters reflect a self-centered person who “constantly complained that he did not receive the proper military distinctions due to him.” Most of his life, moreover, was dedicated to an “insatiable desire to acquire land.”

Washington, however, tended to avoid political issues in his letters. Thus, the method used in this book prevents the reader from understanding Washington’s role in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 or his ideas about politics and government during the 1780s and 1790s. Many of Washington’s letters disclose a man who claimed that he did not like politics and who wished to return to Mount Vernon. It is unfortunate, but Washington’s writings contribute to the myth of a man above politics. Understanding Washington’s personal life does not help the reader who wishes to understand him as a public figure. Thus, the book succeeds in achieving only half of its objective. It fails to penetrate or explain Washington’s public political life.

Andrist has edited a number of pictorial histories for American Heritage. This volume represents the high level of pictorial editing for which American Heritage has become known. The book contains interesting and useful reproductions of eighteenth-century prints, maps, artifacts, and paintings. The editing of this material is imaginative. The Washington myth, however, is a myth of the collective American mind. As long as Washington is used to symbolize the birth of the United States, historians will not correct but perpetuate the myth.

Temple University

HOWARD A. OHLINE


Two past presidents of the Pennsylvania Historical Association have noted the need for more historical writing on the Commonwealth’s post-Civil War decades. Following their recommendation, Mr. Aurand wrote his doctoral
dissertation on life and labor in the anthracite region from 1869 to 1897. His title reflects a trend in applying sociological theory in order to better understand past problems.

Mr. Aurand sees the two basic forces at work in the industry as over capitalization and low profitability. As a consequence, the anthracite industry was a sick industry in these decades. Labor responded to this condition in various ways. Each of the chapters deals with one form of response or the tactics of labor in a particular decade. Thus, worker mobility, the formation and collapse of several unions, mine safety, and welfare receive attention.

This book is a synthesis of three different sources: previous scholarly works, a sampling of the manuscript sources, and the attitudes toward labor in the anthracite region held by the present generation. Anyone who has read the books of Wayne Broehl on the Molly Maguires, Victor Greene on the Slavic community, Eliot Jones on the anthracite coal combinations, Marvin Schlegel on Cowen, Alexander Trachtenberg on anthracite labor legislation, and C. K. Yearly on the Schuylkill industry will realize that Aurand has added little which is new. After all this literature, does a new labor history of anthracite in the late nineteenth century need to be written? Any historian who attempts such a task must go beyond the simple synthesis which this book presents and spend long hours with the manuscript sources. He will also have to go beyond the present-day assumptions about labor in the anthracite region.

This reviewer is struck by two assumptions which pervade the work and dominate the analysis. The first is that anthracite was a sick industry throughout the late nineteenth century. This is true for the twentieth century. But I doubt if it is true for the years 1869-1897, decades in which production went from fifteen million tons in 1870 to fifty-seven million tons in 1900, European immigrants flooded the region, and major urban centers developed. Nor can the testimony of two coal barons to state investigation committees about the industry’s profitability be taken at face value; particularly when it is known that such men often kept two or three separate and completely different sets of records about their business, and that the committees were investigating monopoly in the industry. Under such circumstances one is led to believe they would say that their enterprise produced little profit.

Secondly, the narrative is structured so that labor unions are good guys and coal companies are bad guys. The middle class, of course, sided with the good guys. Any labor sympathizer in the region today will confirm this statement. This may be all right for labor polemics, but I doubt if it will pass for careful scholarship. A much more accurate picture is needed of just which companies took advantage of their workers and which companies tried to help their labor by alleviating the harsh conditions of industrial society. The same type of analysis should also be applied to the unions and their leadership.

Like most doctoral dissertations, this work should never have appeared in print. Unfortunately, it adds little to current knowledge of the anthracite industry.

Bloomsburg State College

H. Benjamin Powell

This book must have been a hard one to write. It is certainly a hard one to review. The extreme disparity of views among various Baptist leaders and journals, the practice of congregational autonomy, and the lack of any authoritative voice of the denomination make it very difficult to generalize about their views on social issues. The study is limited to Northern Baptist views on immigration during the period 1880 to 1925. The Southern Baptists are omitted on the grounds that they paid relatively little attention to public policy.

The book relies to a considerable extent on the record of stands taken by the American Baptist Home Mission Society. The Northern Baptist Convention was not created until 1907. The pronouncements of either of these organizations cannot be taken as definitive statements of the denomination as a whole. A large part of Davis’s material comes from church periodicals, of which there were half a dozen, and they often disagreed with each other. The author does his best to determine the prevailing trends and tendencies, but the results are not very satisfactory. One can find quotations to prove almost anything one wants to prove about the attitude of Northern Baptists toward immigration in the period covered.

The first issue taken up is the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Some Northern Baptists favored it and some opposed it. Generally speaking, West Coast Baptists, under the leadership of Granville S. Abbott, favored closing the door to the Chinese, while in the East Baptist clergymen and journals professed to maintain the traditional policy of unrestricted immigration. The American Baptist Home Mission Society supported the liberal position. In the early eighties, according to the author, the prevailing view in Baptist circles was that the immigrant hordes, even the Orientals and the “new” immigration from southern and eastern Europe, offered a God-given opportunity for evangelization and Americanization. The church was seen as having a divine mission to convert the immigrants to Protestantism and democracy. After the Haymarket Riot, however, opinion changed, and Baptists, like most other Americans, saw the foreigners as in too many cases being radicals and subversives who constituted a serious danger to American institutions. Exceptional was the Home Mission Society pronouncement that the answer to such civil disorders was to be found in more effective missionary work among the immigrants.

During the nineties the traditional antipathy of Baptists for Roman Catholicism asserted itself, and many Northern Baptists joined with the American Protective Association in calling for immigration restriction. Catholicism was seen as a dangerous threat to Protestant supremacy and American democratic institutions. Combined with this was an increasing conviction that the Anglo-Saxon and northern European peoples were superior to the so-called “new” immigration. Italians were pictured as “peanut vendors and organ grinders,” to use a phrase the author is fond of repeating. There were exceptions, however, such as Walter Rauschenbush, who believed that America should still be open to all. Successful Baptist evangelism among immigrant groups helped preserve the liberal view. But theological liberals,
the author emphasizes, were not always liberal on the immigration issue. Some who favored unrestricted immigration became fundamentalists. Nor were all Social Gospel advocates friendly to the immigrants.

During World War I Baptists, like other Americans, were swayed to some extent by anti-German feeling, but they refused to ostracize their German-American congregations. There was considerable disagreement over the restrictive legislation of the 1920s, but the Northern Baptist Convention in 1925 passed a resolution deplored the quota system and the exclusion of Orientals embodied in the National Origins Act of the preceding year. Despite all his xenophobic quotations from narrow-minded preachers and editors, the author concludes that on balance Northern Baptists accepted the majority of immigrants as "potential Christians and brothers who deserved fair treatment in the best of the American tradition." Whether the story of this one small denomination, with all its conflicting views, tells us much about "the Protestant Mind in America" is open to question. It was an overwhelmingly Protestant Congress which passed the restrictive legislation.

More biographical data and character sketches of some of the many individuals mentioned in the text would have provided extra reader interest. Pennsylvanians, for example, might like to know more about Henry C. Gleiss and Dan L. Schultz of Pittsburgh, who conducted missionary work among immigrants.

The book originated as a doctoral dissertation at the University of Rochester. It is well written and well documented.

The Pennsylvania State University

IRA V. BROWN


The period encompassed by this volume witnessed one of Wilson's greatest personal losses and one of his most momentous institutional successes. His father was dead by January of 1903. But the death was slow in coming and especially trying as his dutiful son had brought the dying parent to live with his family at Princeton. The final months were a wearying chronicle with the elder Wilson "having one of his attacks today, one with the long, savage, wearing pain." At one point even Wilson's wife meekly complained that "It is simply harrowing . . . I wish the children had not to see and hear so much of it; it is so bad for their nerves." When the end came there was the burial in the South and a passing casually noted. Perhaps because the loss was so deeply felt, little of its personal impact on Wilson can be inferred from the letters.

But there had been a triumph before this—Wilson's inauguration in October of 1902 as president of the university. One enthusiastic supporter remarked that "the Augustan age is opening for Princeton." Whether the era was indeed silver or gold, the fact remained that the new president succinctly stated the problem of his administration of the school as its being "insufficiently capitalized for its business." And he quickly busied himself
to do something immediately about that most pressing of all problems. Calling for a campaign to raise twelve and a half million dollars, Wilson rode the alumni circuit, refusing invitations to speak at more academically oriented exercises. The new Princeton president traveled the country, rousing, exhorting, and rallying his Princeton Tigers to come to the financial assistance of their alma mater.

His stratagems were always well laid. His intelligence about the prospective donor always sure and steady: "they are horribly rich and are interested in Princeton, and know the new President, and are to send their son here." The editors note that Henry Clay Frick's donation of twenty thousand dollars for a new gymnasium was "the first of many substantial donations to the university by the steel manufacturer." And if Frick was entering the charitable lists for Princeton, could Andrew Carnegie be far behind? Wilson went out of his way to adapt every tactic he could to entice the wily old Scotsman to come to the aid of the expanding institution. There was the obvious ethnic affinities. Wilson commented for the steel magnate's behalf that Princeton was "largely made by Scotsmen—being myself of pure Scots blood, it heartens me to emphasize the fact." And he added quickly by way of fillip that "we must attempt nothing less than her re-endowment." And like academics in other eras and other places, Wilson maintained the necessity for a critical liberal education. "It does not seem to me that a university is a place to give a man a business education." All the while he painted his potential business contributors in terms that can only be described as heroic.

In speeches far and wide Wilson reiterated his belief in the arts and sciences as a base, but the resulting product was expected to be successful enough to help the new president meet the financial needs of his plans. Wilson commented at one banquet that "the most statesmanlike occupation is commerce" because "it is a trader's business, in short, to know the world." He even cited Orin G. Libby's new work on the Constitution—one shadowing much of what Charles Beard would later write—to remind the business stalwarts in his audience that it was "the commercial class of this country more than any others who were dominantly influential in the adoption of the Constitution of the United States." After such heady tributes, what patriotic Princeton mogul would refuse his purse—or better, portfolio—to this academic who seemed especially sensitive to their self-esteem. He would even throw in a joke or two about his fellow academics just to relieve the tension. Remember his spoof about the sociologists: "... the fellows who call themselves—I have forgotten what they call themselves—the men who go around and live in penitentiaries and try to get the point of view of the convict." It was good humor like that which made these sons of Old Nassau feel Wilson was just the right chap for the right job.

And he had plans—many of them. He wanted a library, a school of jurisprudence—"I do not call it a law school"—, a school of electrical engineering, and a museum of natural history. But the "most obvious need" was the graduate school. And his comments on that graduate school on his inaugural day presage the bitter quarrels its construction would intrude on Wilson's career in the academic life. That school would not be built apart,
"but as near as may be at the very heart, the geographic heart of the university." And why the new plans for Princeton? Why this sudden surge in energy? Wilson gave his answer in a few words. It was that "in planning for Princeton . . . we are planning for the country." The role the university performed was no longer "private but public." Because the nation had emerged with its affairs grown "more and more complex and its interests begin to touch the ends of the earth," there was a necessity for the "efficient and enlightened men" Wilson assumed Princeton graduated. J. P. Morgan, Mark Twain, and Booker T. Washington were among those invited to witness Wilson's accession to the presidency. Morgan was noticed standing apart, unattired in academic regalia. Washington's name is conspicuously absent among those invited to the luncheon at Prospect after the swearing-in ceremonies. And only an accident prevented President Theodore Roosevelt himself from attending. The last entries on academic matters in this volume deal with a report on the eating clubs and the position of the contemplated graduate school, shades of great battles approaching.

There are other stray items that fit a pattern in these pages. While conceding the patriotism of the anti-imperialists, Wilson argued before a St. Louis audience that "the recent expansion in the Philippines and Puerto Rico was really due to the same adventurous impulse which created English America in the first place." There are reviews of his _A History of the American People_. Charles M. Andrews found "nothing pessimistic or chicken-hearted here, and if there be anti-imperialists still abroad, they will find nothing in this history to support their warnings of evil to come." Wilson admitted that one of his chief reasons for writing the study was "to do justice to the region which I love." Most reviewers were especially commendatory though George Louis Beer entered a dissenting critical vote. Finally, Wilson's wit and humor before alumni audiences do not always sit well with a modern reader. When President Roosevelt was embroiled in the raging controversy to appoint blacks to the positions of customs collector of Charleston, South Carolina, and the postmastership of Indianola, Mississippi, Wilson took advantage of his predicament. A newspaper report of a speech he made at Baltimore in February, 1903, noted Wilson "started a hurrah by asking the company if they had heard why the ground hog went back into his hole this year." Woodrow Wilson answered by saying that the ground hog "was afraid the President of the United States would put a 'coon' in." But, of course, who would ever accuse the President of Princeton of racism, vulgarity, or poor taste?

The *University of Connecticut*  
VINCENT A. CARRAFIELLO


_Winterthur Portfolio_ has become to this reviewer an annual event eagerly anticipated. Although at times unhappy over editions of heterogenous content (this not in a derogatory sense), this time he wishes to compliment editor Quimby for presenting in _Portfolio_ 8 a central theme.

While a book review for _Pennsylvania History_ should confine itself largely
to contributions of Pennsylvania interest, specifically those of Frederick S. Weiser and Charles Morse Stotz, I should like to be permitted to comment on another article which, in my opinion, should finally lay at rest the romantic legend which has obfuscated the readers of E. D. and F. Andrews's book, *Religion In Wood*. Mary Lyn Ray's "A Reappraisal Of Shaker Furniture and Society" leaves no doubts that the substitution of "business" for "religion" in the first mentioned title would have been entirely factual, albeit less romantic. While this review is not concerned with an assessment of Shaker faith or Shaker history as a way of life, it must take cognizance of Ms. Ray's contribution. To interpret both faith and history as the prime movers for the design and construction of Shaker furniture is to disregard the desires or non-desires of a celibate society. Never could such a society have used or absorbed all the furniture its craftsmen produced, and produced, as Ms. Ray points out, in adaption of more secular styles. It was business on a grand scale with weekly shipments to New York and other places after the 1860s. Thanks to Mary Lyn Ray, one does not have to genuflect any longer before a wall-hung side chair.

Nancy Halverson Schless's "Peter Harrison; The Touro Synagogue and The Wren City Church" is a beautiful excursion into architectural comparisons. She establishes irrefutable proof of an architectural relationship between churches and synagogues built by English designers and builders in English-speaking countries. Such relationships existed in almost every country where Jewish houses of worship could be found. A typical synagogical architecture did not and does not exist.

For many oppressive and legally restrictive reasons, Jews in the Diaspora could not design nor build their own houses of worship. Centuries of exile had taught them that an inconspicuous life was a prudent way of life and that a building outwardly conforming to the locality where they lived was inconspicuous, and that its exterior did not influence the religious services conducted within as long as the interior could be arranged along a west-east axis. What was later, after their emancipation, considered synagogical architecture was a pseudo Mauresque-Byzantine hodgepodge which proved, if nothing else, an adherence to the prevailing architectural follies of the particular period. The architectural similarities of the Touro and Bevis Marks synagogues and Christ Church prove only one thing, as Ms. Schless probably intended them to, that eighteenth-century architecture by and large conformed and that its designers and builders had access to and used identical architectural design books.

"Threshold of The Golden Kingdom: The Village Economy and Its Restoration," by Charles Morse Stotz, is the most concise and illuminating story of an American sectarian society that this reviewer has had the pleasure to read. Stotz's long and total immersion in the records of life and culture of individual sectarians and of the Harmony Society as a whole produced the factual and impeccable restoration of Old Economy Village. Plaudits also must be given to the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission for
following religiously Stotz’s recommendations, avoiding thereby the trap of glamorization. To say more would be redundant. Stotz’s contribution must be read by architects and historians as well. Lovers of Pennsylvania’s history will find his contribution too short.

One could wish to be as laudatory over Frederick S. Weiser’s “Piety and Protocol in Folk Art: Pennsylvania German Fraktur Birth and Baptismal Certificates.” This article is well researched and equally well footnoted, as one would expect from such a highly qualified minister and historian. The translations of the often difficult to read archaic German cannot be faulted.

In this heathen reviewer’s opinion, Weiser’s article indicates an imbalance between the historian Weiser and the theologian Weiser, the latter tipping the scales. Therefore one should not be greatly disturbed by his favoring the devotional against the secular aspects of the documents. He sloughs in a few sentences the raison d’être of the birth and baptismal certificates, their being legal documents, but in an accompanying footnote he disproves his own assertion.

Craft and other trade guilds in German linguistic areas of Europe had for centuries a strong impact upon life and pursuit of happiness. One of their inflexible rules was the required proof of legitimate birth and proof of adherence to the Christian faith for gainful and, frequently, other employment. Their written documentation were the admission tickets to the economic kingdom. Other secular agencies soon requested similar documents also. Any supplicant knew that no governing authority could be approached for even a minor request without such documents. In these rules are we to seek the origin of Pennsylvania’s Paten-Geburts and Taufscheine? Centuries of being stamped, sealed, and certified left their behavioral marks upon people; immigrants being such people did not readily discard this tradition, as is evident by the discoveries in our own National Archives.

One should therefore assign the devotional and “spreading of beauty” aspects of these documents to secondary and tertiary ranks, not necessarily in that order. The “spreading of beauty” with its inherent, often pre-Christian, symbols and the predilection of the Pennsylvania Germans for astrology in the execution of their birth and baptismal certificates are glossed over or not mentioned by the author. May one point out also that the open book (Bible?) which the author found absent on the certificates can be found on many of the printed frakturs since about 1800.

If these remarks are considered to be too critical of Weiser’s contribution, they are based on the reviewer’s long and extensive research in this particular field and, last but not least, in his own, iconoclastic convictions about folk art. Yet, all in all, Weiser has made a respectable contribution to the folklore and folk art of the Pennsylvania Germans.

As for Winterthur Portfolios 1—8, an index of their contents would meet with great acclaim.

Pennsylvania Historical and
Museum Commission

ERIC DE JONGE

This book is misnamed—almost. Its profiles are drawn mainly from the Harrisburg vicinity with a number of passing references to nearby Cumberland and Perry counties. Nevertheless, as a collection of biographical sketches, local legends, human interest anecdotes, a delineation of the idiosyncrasies and enthusiasms of some central Pennsylvanians, and, as the title page announces, "past and present vignettes of its people, times, and towns," it is an effective venture into local history.

A scholarly work Profiles from the Susquehanna Valley is not, and it was not the author's intent to make it so. Readers of this entertaining collection of fact and fiction will not be distracted by footnotes and bibliography, nor for that matter, an index. It is not a reference book. Since 1961 the "Reporter at Large" columnist for Harrisburg's Evening News, Mr. Beers employs the literate yet informal prose style suitable to that medium. He has organized his material into four main sections. The first looks "Around the Neighborhood" at the contemporary scene, followed by a survey of "Local Enthusiasms." Then come "The Politicians," and finally "The Notorious and Illustrious." From his accounts it would seem that of the last two named central Pennsylvania had an abundance of personages who achieved regional if not state or national fame of a sort.

Beers treats his subjects with undisguised affection, even those whose mild peccadillos dispose him to insert gentle tut tuts. No deep-dyed villains appear (if one excepts Simon Girty who, in Beers's words, "must be the nastiest character to ever come out of Central Pennsylvania"). But neither are there outstanding heroes. The region's public personages, from John Harris the Elder to the present day, never made it on the national scene. Simon Cameron came nearest, but the author notes that Cameron's most lasting achievement was to build the Pennsylvania Republican Party.

The elder Cameron thus established a course followed faithfully by his son, J. Donald Cameron, and those who afterwards controlled the party machinery. Don Cameron "gave unstintingly of his time, his talent, and his money to the Republican organization," but he gave little else. It may be poetic justice that his Lochiel farm "is now the site of the Harrisburg disposal plant." Matthew Stanley Quay, born in nearby Dillsburg, continued in the Cameron tradition, and Republican boss Boies Penrose, who enjoyed the distinction of serving in the United States Senate longer than any Pennsylvanian in history, compiled a public service record described by Beers as "nil." More recently, M. Harvey Taylor controlled local politics for years from his seat in the state Senate, but, as Beers notes, he is not prominently identified with any legislative crusade or important legislation. The most that can be said for Senator George N. Wade, a contemporary power in Harrisburg area politics, is that "in tactical politics, Wade was as good as they come."

No doubt this dreary record, as Beers implies, is explained by the post-Civil War dominance of the Republican party in the Susquehanna Valley. Beers thinks that central Pennsylvanians after the Revolutionary War exchanged "their delight in exciting politics for the security of supine
politics . . . in accord with their pleasant environment and Germanic temperament." The environment is pleasing enough, but much of central Pennsylvania's population is made up not of phlegmatic Germans but of volatile Scotch-Irish. Local politics in the area saw many an exciting and sometimes deadly partisan conflict. To say, as Beers does, that "from Gettysburg to Hershey, among the rural and urbane [urban?], the educated and uneducated, the preoccupation became, not politics, but business and the contentments of 'kinder, kuche, und kirche,'" borders on exaggeration if not libel.

Nevertheless, Beers is perceptive in noting that "one-party politics has had a deadening effect on Central Pennsylvania public life [where] Republicanism has been more than politics; it has been a way of life." Only occasionally has an opponent such as Vance McCormick, the Harrisburg newspaper publisher, Wilsonian progressive, and yet anti-New Deal Democrat, been able to crack the hard shell of Republican obstructionism, and that but temporarily. Contented if not openly corrupt, Harrisburgers have long been "more self-satisfied than disturbed by social inadequacies," taking a dim view of reform and opting for "sameness, stability, and rectitude in public life." The result, in Beer's opinion, is that the region is characterized by "the most pervasive conservatism of any metropolitan area in Pennsylvania."

Beers recognizes, however, that central Pennsylvania also includes among its inhabitants those who have refused to submerge their individuality. Non-conformists, even anti-establishmentarians, have appeared from time to time to challenge the comfortable and complacent. Among the earliest were the renegade Simon Girty and that local Robin Hood, "Lewis the Robber." Daniel Drawbaugh is remembered as "the tinkerer of Eberly's Mills" who should get credit for inventing the telephone. Silas Comfort Swallow, the Methodist divine and inveterate temperance crusader, was the only Pennsylvanian to run both for the governorship and the presidency. And Beers writes appreciatively of John O'Hara, whose fictionalized portrayals of the life and culture "from Carlisle to Carbondale," make him a Pennsylvania Chaucer.

This is an absorbing book. Its success stems from Beers's effective use of local history, an intelligent blending of antiquarianism with perceptive observation of the contemporary scene.

Gettysburg College

ROBERT L. BLOOM
In 1919 George Sutherland, former United States Senator from Utah and future Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, wrote a book in which he discussed the relation of the American Constitution to foreign affairs.\(^1\) In it he distinguished internal and external authority. The government, he wrote, derived the former authority from the Constitution, while the latter had an extra-constitutional source: external power was inherent in every sovereign. Appointed to the United States Supreme Court in 1922, Justice Sutherland waited fourteen years for the opportunity to write his theory into law. The vehicle finally came in the form of the Curtiss-Wright case.\(^2\)

"The investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty" antedated the Constitution, Sutherland wrote for the court in Curtiss-Wright. They "did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution." For even "if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, [these powers] would have been vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality." So, concluded Sutherland, foreign affairs power is extraconstitutional. Then his opinion turned to who is to exercise this power. Reflecting Blackstone's view that the monarch (that is, the executive power of the state) has "the sole prerogative of making war and peace," Sutherland concluded that "In the vast external realm . . . the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation." And his authority is not dependent on delegation from the legislature—it is "plenary and exclusive."

\(^1\) George Sutherland, *Constitutional Power and World Affairs* (New York, 1919).

The executive branch was not blind to the implications of the court's statements. Taken at his word, Justice Sutherland was saying that the government, specifically the president, possessed "a secret reservoir of unaccountable power" in diplomatic affairs, the limits to which were undetermined. Both Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson had already acted to focus public attention on the president. Now Sutherland's opinion gave judicial blessing to a tendency toward enlargement of the presidency which by the mid-thirties was already well underway. Presidents apparently could set the course of the nation's foreign policy without the legal necessity of consulting the legislature; nor could the court be expected to serve as a brake on the executive in such matters.

Sutherland's opinion came at a time when international intercourse had a special claim to importance. In the late thirties the survival of the nation in the world arena certainly depended upon the adroitness and luck of America's foreign policy. A discordant note unwittingly sounded by the judicial branch might unnecessarily complicate relations abroad, or might set off a reaction that the president, the state department, or American diplomats had carefully labored to avoid.

In 1937 Hitler was in the Rhineland, Italy in Ethiopia, Japan in China, and Spain in civil war. That same year on the heels of the Curtiss-Wright decision the Court considered the legal consequences of Roosevelt's executive agreement recognizing Soviet Russia. Once more Justice Sutherland wrote the opinion. And once more he turned the decision into a brief lecture on external and internal powers. "Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusively in the national government," he wrote. "And in respect to [this] the Executive has authority to speak as the sole organ of that government," without the advice or consent of the Senate.

Writing The American Presidency in 1940, English observer Harold J. Laski catalogued the immense presidential power to shape and conduct foreign policy. In no other area, observed Laski, had the concept of separation of powers counted for so little. So long as the president was able to sustain general public support for his diplomatic program, Laski believed, there was little impediment to his initiative in this area. Louis W. Koenig in The Presidency and the Crisis (1944) agreed that neither constitutional nor congressional restraints had inhibited FDR's conduct of foreign affairs from the time of the Nazi invasion of Poland in 1939 to Pearl Harbor. In Roosevelt's hands presidential powers had certainly been full enough and flexible enough to meet the challenges of the late 1930s and early 1940s.

Most liberals—whether scholars or politicians—applauded these developments. More concerned about "getting things done" than about the maintenance of negative restraints on power, they called for an abandonment of many constitutional checks on the president. These liberal realists placed their trust in the character of the man in charge, believing that rules and institutions in themselves counted for little. And while some

more conservative scholars, such as Edward S. Corwin writing in *Total War and the Constitution* (1944), did express their worry over this magnification of presidential authority, they grudgingly had to admit that no other branch of government could rival the executive’s claim to particular competence in foreign policy. "By virtue of being a single individual and always Johnny-on-the-spot," wrote Corwin, "by virtue of the constantly recurrent pressures of crises that could not admit of delay, by virtue of certain theories of executive power . . . added to the creative power of aggressive personalities . . . the President has come to claim, and has often been able to make the claim good, a quite indefinite prerogative in the sphere of foreign relations."

By the end of World War II there seemed to be little alternative to presidential dominance. The postwar crisis conditions—that is, a cold war and the American intervention in Korea—both of which made for increased concern over executive embarrassment—further magnified the president’s power. In such an environment few could be found to challenge Harry S. Truman’s sweeping assertion of executive exclusiveness when he said, "I make foreign policy."

In the atmosphere of the Cold War, writers mirrored the political and popular concern that the president’s confidential sources of information not be exposed, that his talents for speedy and decisive action not be compromised. In his book *Constitutional Dictatorship*, (1948), Clinton Rossiter argued that even a democracy needed some form of executive autocracy in times of crisis. While urging the institutionalization of a "constitutional" dictatorship, Rossiter noted that in fact an extraconstitutional crisis dictatorship was already a reality in the United States. Faced with growing national emergencies, Americans had already pragmatically accepted the reality that, in Rossiter’s words, "no sacrifice is too great for our democracy, least of all the temporary sacrifice of democracy itself."

Certainly Congress, since the late thirties, had been hesitant to act as a brake on the "crisis" president. The executive branch now made it clear that it viewed even exceptional congressional forays (such as the debates over the deployment of NATO forces or the extent of American involvement in the Chinese civil war) as dangerous meddling, having a detrimental effect upon presidential flexibility and upon the conduct of America’s delicate diplomatic relations. The internationalists in Congress agreed, taking the view that rather than sniping at the president, Congress should encourage him and bolster his power for the sake of the nation’s crusades against international communism. Indeed, argued Senator William Fulbright, we "must give the Executive a measure of power in the conduct of foreign affairs that we have hitherto jealously withheld."

Many scholars noted that Congress’s occasional venture into the field of diplomacy often left behind a shambles—making the president’s job even more difficult once Congress retired to its domestic pastures. Political scientists Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland agreed that the priority of the early 1950s was not the institution of checks upon the president’s powers. Rather, they noted, in *American Foreign Policy and the Separation of Powers* (1952), that the need was for greater executive efficiency to over-
come the "reactionary" attitudes of too many members of Congress. The
goal of the fifties must be a smoother functioning presidential branch
replacing an earlier "pattern of fumbling."

So by mid-century the court had ruled itself out of the foreign affairs for-
mula. And it seemed to many that Congress was ill suited (either because it
was too "inflexible" or too "reactionary" or too "differential") to serve as a
reliable brake on presidential prerogatives in foreign affairs. Few sensed any
constitutional crisis in this situation. After all, America was fighting a cold
war throughout the world and was engaged in a hot war in Korea. Why
would anyone wish to deny the president and commander-in-chief the
fullest discretion in pulling the nation through this international crisis? And
to those who still had their fears that the president was wholly unrestrained
in the sphere of foreign policy, the election of 1952 served as a balm.
Indeed, Eisenhower's deference went too far in the minds of some com-
mentators. They perceived that popular checks were probably having a
negative effect on the conduct of American diplomacy. Was the inhibiting
influence of uninformed public opinion salutary? No, answered Clinton
Rossiter. In his book The American Presidency (1950) he urged Americans
to let the president alone in the conduct of foreign policy.

Some few did not share Rossiter's view. Edward Corwin, in a new edition
of his classic The President: Office and Powers (1957 ed.), again voiced his
continuing concern over the enlarged presidency. He expressed particular
fear that even under Eisenhower, presidential power, now increasingly per-
sonalized, stood outside all institutional and popular checks. Corwin warned
that, unsupervised, the president could create situations in which neither
the legislature nor the people could stay his hand. But Corwin's views were
singular. In general, liberals and conservatives alike supported the idea of
concentrating prerogatives concerning foreign affairs in the hands of the
president.

The Whiggery of the Eisenhower years proved to be but a recess. Scholarly enthusiasm over the Kennedy style focused on the exercise of
power rather than its limitation. Both Rexford G. Tugwell in The
Enlargement of the Presidency (1960) and Richard Neustadt, Presidential
Power: The Politics of Leadership (1960), noted that leadership and de-
cision making in foreign affairs must center in the president. Accepting this
reality, Tugwell placed his reliance for any check in this vast power on the
merits of the man himself—the president's self-discipline. Neustadt also
found that the leader's ability, his will, his sense of power, and its uses were
the best guarantees against abuse. This sounded dangerously like a
government of men rather than a government of laws. J. Malcolm Smith
and Cornelius P. Cotter summed it up this way in Powers of the President
During National Crisis (1959), "... we must repose a certain amount of
faith in the basic integrity and wisdom of the Chief Executive ... ." Louis
Koenig's The Chief Executive (1964) echoed these conclusions. The
president, Koenig wrote, needed even greater ability to pursue unhindered
his own creative diplomacy even when it did not immediately win popular
approval or congressional support. Presidential self-confidence was, to
Koenig, the important ingredient in the conduct of foreign policy. James
McGregor Burns, writing *Presidential Government* in 1966, continued the refrain. He observed that the president was best equipped to formulate national purpose, to overcome both the cumbersome machinery and domestic political obstacles which might "inhibit daring, idealistic, generous" foreign programs. Americans in the mid-sixties needed inspired leadership, which, wrote Burns, could only come from the president. The conduct of Kennedy's, Johnson's, and Nixon's foreign policy mirrored such expansive scholarly views.

The Bay of Pigs invasion, the dispatch of troops to the Dominican Republic, the talk of intervention in the Congo, the escalation of American involvement in Vietnam, the involvements in Cambodia and Laos, the mining of Haiphong Harbor, and the bombing of Hanoi all made it clear that theoretical constitutional checks certainly need not stay the hand of a president determined to act boldly in the field of foreign affairs.

This reality coupled with the agony of the Vietnamese war unleashed new currents of scholarly investigation in the mid-1960s. Doubts about the propriety of such presidentially directed foreign ventures now gave rise to expressions of concern over the maintenance of constitutionalism. This criticism came not so much from traditional conservatives as from the left, including many of those who regarded themselves not as radicals but as liberals (embarrassingly often the same persons who since FDR had been the most consistent defenders of vast unfettered executive power.)

Alfred de Grazia in *Republic in Crisis* (1965) saw executive force creating a society of "order" at the expense of "liberty." The president's control or ability to dominate the newspaper headlines—and the media generally—was but one example of the instruments that he could use for creating a sense of crisis. To de Grazia, it was critical that Congress strengthen its role to offset presidential manipulation and control of force. Bruce Ladd's *Crisis in Credibility* (1968) also emphasized the president's ability to manipulate the public through the control and curtailment of information. The people, ill-informed or misinformed, were in the end forced to accept presidential leadership on faith. Unfortunately, noted Ladd, neither Congress nor the media was playing its proper role as watchdog. In a new edition of the *Chief Executive* (1968), even Louis Koenig reassessed some of his earlier conclusions in light of Lyndon Johnson's presidency. Koenig noted that neither the people nor Congress seemed to have much choice except to ratify what the president had already done in foreign affairs. Although Koenig believed that sufficient checks on the "crisis" president still remained, he rather gloomily concluded that the final restraints vaguely depend on the people themselves—for "[h]istory has never been inclined to give a people a better government than it wants."

By the end of the sixties two more important books had emerged from the popular and academic debate over America's undeclared war in Indochina. Both reflected the current scholarly view that the scales had tipped too far in the direction of expansive presidential power. Both called for a reassertion of political and constitutional limitations. Both expressed particular concern over the almost complete erosion of real congressional authority in the area of foreign affairs.
Hugh Gregory Gallagher’s *Advise and Obstruct* (1969) examines the history of the Senate’s role as an anchor to presidential diplomatic assertiveness from President Washington’s problems with the French Republic through President Johnson’s build up of forces in Vietnam. Gallagher finds that that anchor is today too weak to hold back the modern president. The fault, he finds, is that the Senate is so concerned with the direction of the current domestic political winds that it ignores the long term impact of presidential actions on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. The author cites Lyndon Johnson’s statement to the effect that in foreign policy questions Congress “may talk, and argue, and fight, and criticize,” but from a president’s vantage in the end “they’ll vote overwhelmingly the right way.”

Merlo J. Pusey in *The Way We Go to War* (1969) catalogued the contemporary American habit of drifting into war without any deliberative legislative decision on the matter. Certainly, concludes Pusey, the power to declare war has been of little relevance since 1941. And until recently Congress has remained unconcerned with this reality. What Pusey finds today is uninhibited executive adventurism. What is essential for the republic, writes Pusey, is the return of the war power to Congress. This, along with the development of a lusty and critical public opinion, he hopes, will restore an alternative to extraconstitutional executive leadership—and help to overcome the cult of the strong president, which he outspokenly opposes.

While de Grazia, Ladd, Gallagher, and Pusey describe the potential executive threat to the nation’s constitutional liberties, George Reedy, former adviser to President Lyndon Johnson, has examined a different dimension of the modern presidency: its growing impotency. Growingly insulated from the American people by the media, the president, according to Reedy in *The Twilight of the Presidency* (1970), has come to depend upon his official family for his view of America and the world. Isolated by his advisors and under pressures that are too great for any single man, the president is hardly a reliable repository for the vast extraconstitutional powers already described.

Today—in a constant atmosphere of crisis—uninhibited executive powers, which in the past were only important during temporary periods of emergency, now seem to be permanent. In this environment, certainly, the Supreme Court is not prepared to challenge the president by overruling twenty-five years of precedent. Congress, though angered by presidential slights over the decade of the 1960s, is still reluctant to undercut a president once he has decisively committed the might of the United States to some overseas venture. Nor do “lusty” popular pressures seem possible in an age in which the president dominates the informational media in a manner unparalleled in history.

Over the past four decades authors have come down on one side or another of the central question of presidential power in foreign affairs: is the president to be allowed the optimum of freedom in initiating and executing America’s world relations, or is he to be more immediately responsible to the courts, Congress, or the people in the conduct of the nation’s diplomacy?
Put more precisely, are and should the traditional checks and balances be at work in the area of crisis and foreign affairs?

Two recent books highlight the disagreement here. The more traditional of these is Dale Vinyard's *The Presidency* (1971), which finds an erosion of some of the traditional checks on presidential initiative but rather optimistically concludes that significant limitations exist in congressional law-making, investigation, and appropriation powers. Congress can still criticize, block, amend, or add to presidential initiatives, concludes Vinyard. He also sees public opinion as an important factor but admits the difficulty Congress faces in dramatizing an issue in such a way as to get public support for an alternative policy originated on Capitol Hill. The tone of Vinyard's book leads one to believe that some readjustment of the balance between the president and Congress is essential but that with a few reforms the basic structure of American democracy can be made as sound as ever.

Anthony Austin's *The President's War* (1971) is more pessimistic—reflecting the view of those who have long warned about runaway presidential power in this whole area. Austin catalogues the executive branch's deception and manipulation of Congress at the time of the Tonkin Gulf resolution. Having prepared the resolution a good three months in advance of the alleged attack, Austin argues that the president and those around him awaited a propitious moment to stampede Congress into passing that resolution—amidst cries of crisis, cold war necessity, and patriotism. The public at large remained even more ignorant of the long planned secret war than the congressmen. If true, this certainly is an almost fatal weakness in the whole democratic process.

Some find hope for "a restoration" of a constitutional balance in the current congressional effort to regain some of its lost power. Proposals for the reorganization of Congress can be read as an attempt to restore the legislature as a limiting force on the exercise of presidential prerogatives. Even more obviously directed to this end are resolutions and bills which would stay the hand of the president in initiating a situation which is in fact equivalent to war. Some also see the coming of peace after a decade of protest as an example of lusty public opinion preventing the continuation of a presidential war in Southeast Asia. And it is possible to point to the growing number of books and articles discussing "runaway" presidential power as an indication of popular and scholarly concern over this trend. Yet current statements of Richard Nixon's indicate that as president he holds expansive views, similar to those of most of his predecessors. In foreign affairs he apparently feels little obligation to be responsive to congressional resolutions or popular pressures. As he put it, "Decision makers can't be affected by current opinion, by TV barking at you and commentators banging away with the idea that World War III is coming because of the mining of Haiphong. Nor can decisions be affected by the demonstrators outside."

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It is far too early to hazard a prediction concerning the outcome of this clash between a dedication to the notion of separation of powers and the centripetal thrust of crisis. Scholars and the public alike are taking a new look at basic questions: Can an internationally entangled constitutional democracy survive in an age of chronic emergency? Is the problem the product of the historical events of the last four decades or is it inherent in the language of the Constitution itself? Are the traditional checks upon the crisis executive still operative? Or are there today no restraints upon the president's conduct of foreign affairs except his own sense of right and wrong and the moral judgment of history?

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1 For a recent discussion of this aspect see, Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (Mineola, N.Y., 1972); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Congress and the Making of American Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy, 1 (October, 1972), 78-113.