During August 1924 a small delegation of American diplomats attending the London Conference on reparations played an important role in gaining French acceptance of the Dawes report which provided a temporary settlement to one of the most difficult economic controversies in the postwar period. One of the American negotiators was James A. Logan, Jr. of Philadelphia, a former aide to Herbert Hoover in the American Relief Administration and most recently an unofficial observer on the Reparation Commission. The notoriety and press coverage which Logan received at the London Conference surprised the Philadelphian as well as many of his friends who had followed his diplomatic career since the Armistice. In mid-October, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Eliot Wadsworth wrote to his friend Logan, commenting on the latter’s brief moment in the limelight. “I have lost all track of you entirely since you entirely displaced Babe Ruth and Jack Dempsey in the headlines during the London Conference. No doubt,” Wadsworth teased, “like a ground hog you crawled back into your hole as quickly as possible.” The reason for Wadsworth’s jest was that Logan had been serving in the State Department as an unofficial diplomat since the conclusion of the war. In that position, Logan was a quasi-member of the diplomatic corps who represented the views of the United States in a semiofficial and sometimes secretive capacity. American unofficial diplomats played an important role in shaping and carrying out United States European policy in the postwar decade, but seldom received the recognition that they deserved.

1. Wadsworth to Logan, 16 October 1924, Box 4, Personal Correspondence, James A. Logan Papers, Hoover Institution On War, Peace, and Revolution, Stanford, California.
because they worked behind the scenes and outside the normal
diplomatic channels. Logan was one of the important new style diplo-
mats of the 1920s who dealt with the many economic and political
problems resulting from the war.

The eldest son of a prominent financier and politician, Logan was
born in 1879 in Philadelphia where he attended the best schools before
entering Haverford College. After one year at Haverford, Logan quit
to join the Pennsylvania Volunteers, then preparing to fight in the
Spanish-American War. He served in the Philippines during 1899-
1900 with the Pennsylvania unit before entering the regular army as a
captain. After returning to America, Logan attended the Army War
College, and upon graduation in 1912 was sent to France where he
became chief of the military mission at the American Embassy
in Paris. At the outset of the First World War, Logan served as a
military observer on the western front and later readied ports of debar-
kation and worked as a liaison officer to coordinate Franco-
American military efforts.

Shortly after the Armistice, Logan made the transition from
military affairs to the problems of peacemaking which eventually
led him into the diplomatic service. Herbert Hoover, who had come to
Europe as an economic adviser and who later headed the American
Relief Administration, recognized Logan's talents for organization
and appointed him as his principal assistant in charge of American
technical advisers to the newly created nations of central and
southeast Europe. Under the leadership of Hoover and Logan, the
American Relief Administration distributed nine million tons of food,
clothing, and other supplies, valued at $3.5 billion, to the needy people
of war torn Europe. In addition to his relief activities, Logan
faced many diplomatic and political problems during his brief
career with the relief organization. In the summer of 1919, for
example, one of Logan's major concerns was the Hungarian bolshevik
leader, Bela Kun, who had nearly closed the vital river traffic on
the Danube in an effort to consolidate his political position in central
Europe. Despite Bela Kun's blockade of the Danube, Logan success-
fully negotiated and maneuvered until he was able to deliver food
and supplies to all sections of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire.

2. Who Was Who In America, 1897-1942 (Chicago, 1942), p. 741.
5. Logan to Leland Harrison, 30 June 1919, Box 1, Personal Papers of James Logan,
Logan Papers.
After Hoover resigned from the American Relief Administration in September 1919 to return to America, he appointed Logan to head the organization. Before leaving Europe, Hoover paid tribute to Logan's skill as a relief coordinator when he wrote to the Pennsylvanian that "without your power of organization and ability in direction and negotiation I do not see how we could have pulled through. If the time ever comes when we want to try to rehabilitate the world again and if I have anything to do with it, I want the right to call for your association." Logan held "the Chief" in equally high regard. About a month after taking charge of the American Relief Administration, he reported to Hoover that "everything looks a little wobbly." The critical time in Europe, Logan continued, should be sometime next February and "I think you are about the only man I know who would have a good fighting chance to save it, and I would personally like to see you back in the situation sometime shortly after Christmas." Hoover did not return to Europe, however, partly because political conditions had changed rapidly in America during the fall of 1919.

After the first rejection of the Treaty of Versailles by the Senate, Congress refused to authorize any additional appropriations for European relief, forcing the American Relief Administration to drastically cut back its services. Logan remained as the head of the organization, but he found it increasingly difficult to provide adequate relief to the countries of Europe. In the fall of 1919, he was transferred to the American Commission to Negotiate Peace where he served in the dual capacity of relief coordinator and economic expert until the relief agency was phased out in 1920. He began his service with the Peace Commission working on the problem of German reparations which was to occupy much of his time during the next five years. Logan joined Albert Rathbone, Roland Boyden, John Foster Dulles, and other advisers who were attempting to shape an American economic policy to deal with postwar problems. In March 1920, Logan became the assistant observer on the Reparation Commission after Rathbone resigned from the organization to return

6. Logan to A. L. Picard, 28 April 1920, Box 1, Personal Correspondence, Logan Papers.
7. Hoover to Logan, 3 September 1919, Box 1, Personal Papers of James Logan, Logan Papers.
8. Logan to Hoover, 15 November 1919, Box 1, Personal Papers of James Logan, Logan Papers.
home. President Wilson also appointed Boyden, another former aide to Hoover, as the chief observer on the commission.\textsuperscript{9}

The appointment of unofficial diplomats in the postwar era came about as a result of the bitter struggle over American participation in the League of Nations. Shortly after the war, many Americans became disillusioned about the course of the peace negotiations, the political disturbances in Europe, and the failure of Wilson to make the world safe for democracy. A vocal group of anti-Wilsonians, led by the Irreconcilables in the Senate, demanded that the United States reject the Treaty of Versailles, remain out of the League of Nations, and not become entangled in European affairs.\textsuperscript{10} Another bloc in the Senate, the Reservationists, wanted substantial changes in the treaty before they would vote for it. When Wilson refused to compromise on any major points, the Senate rejected the treaty on two separate votes in 1919 and early 1920. After the defeat in Congress, Wilson suggested that the election of 1920 should be a "great and solemn referendum" on American membership in the League of Nations.\textsuperscript{11} Debated in this context, the league issue became a test of the extent to which American voters wanted to participate in European affairs. Warren Harding's overwhelming victory in the election of 1920 was widely interpreted to mean that the voters had chosen to turn their backs on Europe, and had decided that America should return to a policy of non-entanglement in Old World affairs.\textsuperscript{12} In view of the election results, many Republican congressmen were convinced that the United States not only should remain out of the world organization, but completely dissociate itself from the league and refuse to participate in any councils sponsored by that body.

The strategy of non-involvement in the league councils of Europe, although apparently popular at home, was impractical because America had emerged from the war as the leading economic power in the world. In that role, the United States needed to foster closer economic ties with Europe to aid in postwar recovery and to ensure

\textsuperscript{9} Norman Davis to Rathbone, 20 March 1920, in Department of State, \textit{Foreign Relations of the United States, 1920} (Washington, 1936), 2:348.
\textsuperscript{10} For the best study of the Irreconcilables see Ralph Stone, \textit{The Irreconcilables: The Fight Against the League of Nations} (Lexington, 1970).
\textsuperscript{12} This interpretation of the election of 1920 has been challenged in recent years. For the best study of the election see Wesley M. Bagby, \textit{The Road to Normalcy: The Presidential Campaign and Election of 1920} (Baltimore, 1962).
that Europe would remain as America's number one trading and investment partner. Many leaders in both parties realized that the United States was involved in European economic affairs and that it would be necessary to participate in discussions concerning European recovery, inter-governmental debts, and international trading practices in order to protect vital American interests. Many of these issues, however, came under the jurisdiction of league sponsored organizations such as the Conference of Ambassadors, the Supreme Economic Council, and the Reparation Commission. In 1919, Wilson had attempted to appoint American representatives to these bodies, but Senator Henry C. Lodge, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had refused to authorize official intercourse with any league organization unless or until the treaty was ratified by the Senate. To protect American interests during the extended debates on the treaty, Wilson had designated unofficial diplomats to


14. Wilson to Lodge, 18 July 1919 and Lodge to Wilson, 22 July 1919, in State Department Records, Record Group 59, File 462.00R29/2402, National Archives.
the various commissions in mid-1919 without having to obtain Senate approval.

When the Republicans took office in 1921, Harding continued to employ unofficial diplomats in order to preserve harmony within his badly divided party. Internationalist Republicans such as Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes and Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover shared Wilson's view that America must be represented on these councils where decisions would be made that might affect our interests. Within the same party, however, isolationist congressmen threatened to block the administration's legislative program if Harding became too closely involved with the League of Nations or European affairs. The appointment of unofficial diplomats, who did not require congressional approval, permitted Harding to avoid a showdown with the isolationist wing of the party, and at the same time provided a degree of representation in the important postwar councils of Europe. Thus, unofficial diplomats like Logan not only represented American interests, but also helped to maintain an active European foreign policy without causing a paralyzing division among Republicans at home.

With regard to European affairs, the Harding administration was particularly concerned about German reparations, a difficult problem which had not been completely settled at Versailles. Allied and American leaders had agreed in 1919 that Germany should pay for all war damages, including soldiers' pensions. It was left to the Reparation Commission, however, to determine the final amount due the Allies and the terms of payment.15 Hughes, Hoover, Logan, and other American policy makers believed that the Reparation Commission was one of the most powerful postwar organizations because its decisions on reparations and other matters would largely determine the speed and extent of European recovery.16 The United States had a great stake in a rapid postwar recovery for several


reasons. First, Europe, and especially Germany, was an important trading partner for America. Without a prosperous Europe, American trade, foreign investment, and eventually its entire economy was bound to suffer. Secondly, the economic breakdown of Europe and the accompanying social upheaval invited the spread of bolshevism in central and western Europe. As the leading capitalist nation, the United States opposed such a development for both ideological and strategic reasons. Finally, the Allies owed America $10 billion in war debts (excluding sizable private loans) and the prospects for repayment would increase with European recovery.

The major stumbling block to recovery was the huge reparations bill which the Allies imposed on Germany. This lien on German resources, which many observers believed could never be paid, discouraged American businessmen from sending the capital needed to begin reconstruction. The suspension of the flow of capital from America to Europe not only retarded recovery, but also posed a threat to the United States in the form of inflation and unemployment at home. France was the main obstacle blocking the reconstruction of Germany and central Europe. The French insisted upon the strict enforcement of the treaty and the collection of war damages to the last centime. By 1921, it was clear that France was attempting to use the reparations question to keep Germany weak, and thus ensure French security. The collection of reparations appeared to be only a secondary consideration in France's policy prior to 1923. In May 1921, for example, the French-chaired Reparation Commission set Germany's total bill at $33 billion, a figure which most experts believed was far in excess of Germany's capacity to pay. If Germany refused to meet the payment schedule, France threatened to use the powers of the treaty to occupy larger areas of Germany in order to exact payment. In response to the French ultimatum, Germany adamantly maintained that she could not meet the Allied demands. During 1920-21, France and Germany engaged in a diplomatic struggle which retarded European recovery, increased the danger of a worldwide depression, and threatened the peace of Europe.

Although the United States did not claim reparations for itself, the economic controversy in Europe adversely affected its interests and American leaders were concerned about the Franco-German stalemate in the reparation negotiations. Under both Wilson and Harding, America favored a moderate reparations settlement because it did not want Germany burdened to the point that the normal flow of American trade and investments to central Europe might be interrupted indefinitely. But Germany and Europe would not recover unless the United States or Britain could prevail upon France to moderate its reparation policy. It was for this reason that Hoover and Hughes deemed it imperative that an American sit on the Reparation Commission, where many important decisions would be made that would shape the course of Europe's economic and political future. In March 1921, Wilson attempted to embarrass the Republicans by exposing the division within their party when he withdrew all observers from league-sponsored councils including the Reparation Commission. Logan and Boyden maintained their staff at 18 Rue de Tilsitt throughout March and April "ostensibly closing out old business" while they awaited a decision on future representation from the incoming administration. Finally in May, Hughes informed the observers that in order to assure "the proper economic adjustments and the just settlement of matters of world wide importance," he was reassigning American unofficial members to the league organizations.

During the next five years, Logan became one of the most influential unofficial diplomats to serve in the State Department. His career with the Reparation Commission is an interesting case study of the Republican effort during the 1920s to find a middle course policy between the commitments to Europe advocated by Wilson and the withdrawal from Old World affairs urged by congressional isolationists. From 1921 to mid-1923, Boyden and Logan shared the duties of unofficial observer which included attending the meetings of the commission, reporting the views of European leaders on economic and political affairs to Washington, and making recommendations to the State Department on policy regarding reparations. Although Boyden initially headed the reparations mission, Logan was often the more influential of the two in European circles due

19. Norman Davis to Boyden, 15 December 1920, 462.00R29/419a and Boyden to Davis, 18 December 1920, 462.00R29/420; Hughes to Boyden, 9 March 1921, 462.00R29/500 and Logan to Hughes, 5 April 1921, 462.00R29/617.

to his wide contacts with leaders in both Europe and America. As a result of his military service in Europe, he knew most of the leaders in Britain and France on a personal basis, and used this advantage to gain interviews and promote American policy.

In addition, Logan contributed to the shaping of policy, at least indirectly, through the letters which he sent to his closest friends in high positions in the United States. Between 1921 and 1925, he sent regular unofficial letters, outside of State Department channels, briefing such important American officials as Herbert Hoover; Eliot Wadsworth; Leland Harrison, Assistant Secretary of State; Benjamin Strong, Governor of the Federal Reserve System; and J. P. Morgan, head of New York's most prestigious international banking firm. Many of the letters were duplicate copies or summaries of reports that Logan had already sent to the State Department, but some of the correspondence contained Logan's personal observations and speculation on the course of economic and political events in Europe. Hoover and Strong, who received the bulk of the reports, relied on the letters as an important source of information on the State Department's economic activities in Europe. In general, Logan, not restrained by the usual diplomatic protocol, won the confidence of European as well as American leaders through his forthright and candid reports and conversations.

During his tenure as an unofficial diplomat, Logan also attempted to take a direct hand in shaping American policy on the questions of reparations and war debts. By the fall of 1921, he was so concerned about the reparations controversy between France and Germany that he proposed a solution to the problem to the State Department. In a memorandum entitled "Comments on Treatment of Our Foreign War Loans in Connection with the German Reparation Settlement," Logan suggested that the United States play an important role in working out a settlement to the postwar indebtedness problem.

21. Letters and reports sent to Hoover, Strong, Wadsworth, Harrison, and Morgan can be found in Boxes 1–3, 5, Personal Correspondence, Logan Papers.

22. It is clear that Hoover relied on Logan's reports and opinions as a basis for decisions since Hughes threatened to shut off official reports of the State Department to him. See Hoover to Hughes, 6 December 1921; Hughes to Hoover, 16 December 1921; Hoover to Hughes, 15 December 1921; all in 462.00R29/2171 and /2172; Hoover to Logan, 13 April 1922, COF, Box 90, Herbert Hoover Papers, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.

23. For evidence of his contacts with European leaders, see Logan's letters concerning interviews with Walter Rathenau, Hugo Stinnes, John Bradbury, and Edouard Herriot in volumes VII–IX, Secret Letters of James A. Logan, Jr., Logan Papers.

pointed out to the State Department that France intended to occupy more German territory if Germany failed to make the substantial monthly installments on the reparations account. Logan advised Hughes that Germany could not continue to meet the obligation, and that the uncertainty surrounding future reparations was causing economic chaos in the Weimar Republic and was partially responsible for the worldwide recession which adversely affected American trade. By taking a direct interest in German reparations, he argued, America might have an ameliorating influence on Allied and particularly French reparation policy. The assistant observer proposed that Washington accept reparation bonds in lieu of cash payment from the Allies to settle fifty percent of the outstanding war debts owed to America. In this way, the United States might be able to force France to moderate her reparation demands on Germany by reducing the French war-related indebtedness, and as Logan put it, break "the vicious financial and economic cycle from which both America and Europe suffer." The United States might further benefit from a reparations-war debt settlement in that major world currencies could be stabilized, Europe might fully recover from the war, and American trade and investments might flow into Europe in large quantities.

The problem with Logan's proposal, as he recognized, was that the United States had refused to admit any connection between war debts and reparations since 1919. America simply wanted the loans repaid. Congressional leaders, who had fought against American membership in the League, would certainly attack such a plan as a plot to further entangle the United States in European affairs. Logan admitted in his memorandum that the chief disadvantage to his plan was that "the exchange of our demand notes for Reparation bonds is unpopular at home." As expected, the Administration rejected the proposal. Under Secretary of State Henry Fletcher wrote Logan explaining the decision and warning the assistant observer about being too outspoken in his criticism of the present reparations scheme. The Harding administration preferred to keep reparations and war debts separate and urged the Allies and

Logan's proposal was a modified version of a plan suggested by British economist John M. Keynes in 1919. See Keynes, Economic Consequences, pp. 218–22.


27. Ibid.
Germany to work out a settlement on a businesslike basis. By the term businesslike basis, Fletcher meant that Washington favored a reparations agreement based on what Germany could reasonably pay without economic aid from the United States or political interference from the Allies. Until a “business solution” to the problem could be arranged, America would encourage private American bankers to withhold capital for European reconstruction.

In retrospect, Logan's plan was economically sounder than the "business solution" which the Harding-Coolidge administrations supported and helped to implement beginning with the Dawes Plan of 1924. It is possible that the American intervention in the reparations controversy in 1921–22, along the lines suggested by Logan, would have prevented the Ruhr occupation in 1923 and the subsequent disastrous inflation—events which German nationalist leaders exploited a decade later in an effort to gain political power in the Weimar Republic. The United States, however, collected only a fraction of the European war debts which it had refused to reduce in exchange for a similar diminution in reparations during the 1920s. While one can only speculate that events would have been dramatically different in the next decade had Logan’s plan been adopted by the State Department, the memorandum showed that Logan understood the economic problems facing Europe and the world, and that he was willing to take the initiative in suggesting solutions to them.

Despite his personal misgivings concerning the official State Department policy of attempting to bring about a businesslike settlement to the reparations question, Logan played a leading role in the effort to implement the American policy. In June 1922, he helped to organize an independent bankers committee headed by J. P. Morgan which met in Paris to study the reparations problem and make suggestions for a solution based on business principles. Although this attempt to force a French reduction in reparation demands failed, Logan believed that the bankers' meeting had served a useful purpose. After the conference broke up, he wrote opti-

28. Fletcher to Logan, 22 October 1921, Box 7, Leland Harrison Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.
29. During the 1920s, the United States unilaterally reduced Allied debts by about one third through debt funding agreements. See Combined Annual Reports of the World War Debt Commission: With Additional Information Regarding Foreign Debts Due the United States... (Washington, 1927).
mistically to Hughes that the French were at odds with their allies on the subject of reparations and that although France might do a lot of talking and even some sabre rattling, ultimately they must bow to the inevitable—a commission of bankers and businessmen to study the problem. When a second American initiative to set up an expert committee failed in the fall of 1922, however, Logan and other American diplomats in Europe were more pessimistic about a business settlement in the near future, and warned the State Department that France might soon take aggressive action to secure German payments guaranteed under the treaty.

Under the leadership of Raymond Poincaré, France took military action against Germany in January 1923. French troops entered the Ruhr in an effort to collect the reparations which the Weimar Republic was either unable or unwilling to pay. The Germans responded to the occupation with a strategy of passive resistance which effectively reduced the already small payments being sent to France. The spring and summer of 1923 was a frustrating period for Logan because he knew that the possibility of negotiating a reparations settlement acceptable to the United States was slight as long as France and Germany were engaged in an undeclared war in the Ruhr. In June, Logan assumed additional diplomatic duties when he became the chief American observer on the Reparation Commission upon the retirement of Boyden. Soon after his promotion, he resigned his commission in the army in order to devote his full attention to diplomatic affairs. But Logan could do little more than attend the reparation meetings and report to the State Department on the continuing economic-military struggle in the Ruhr. By the end of the summer, Logan was even more pessimistic concerning a "business settlement" as the French occupation began to cause more serious political and economic upheaval within Germany.

In September 1923, the deadlock in the Ruhr ended when Germany ordered a cessation of passive resistance and asked the Allies for a revision of the reparations settlement of 1921. Although France had apparently won a victory in the Ruhr, its economy had been weakened by the curtailment of reparations to such a degree that Paris was

31. Logan to Hughes, 9 June 1922, 462.00R29/1790.
32. For a brief account of the ill-fated fall meeting between Morgan and French Premier Raymond Poincaré see Carl Bergmann, The History of Reparations (Boston, 1927), pp. 155-56.
JAMES A. LOGAN, JR.

anxious for some kind of settlement that would start regular payments again. The British took the lead by suggesting to France and America that negotiations begin in the Reparation Commission to set up a new business conference to study the question of what Germany could reasonably pay. America had lost some of its enthusiasm for the undertaking because of the two previous failures and because of the approaching presidential election. Hughes and Calvin Coolidge were not eager to involve the United States too deeply in European affairs at that critical time unless the prospects for success were excellent. When Louis Barthou, the French member of the Reparation Commission, insisted that any appointed expert committee could not reduce the total amount of reparations set in 1921, the State Department cooled to the idea of supporting a committee with such a limited approach to the problem. Hughes argued that the experts must be given a free hand to study all facets of the problem, including the $33 billion figure, and make recommendations based on the facts. After a report had been completed, Hughes maintained, France would be free to approve or reject the findings.

Franco-American negotiations concerning the appointment of the experts were soon broken off when neither side would back down from its position. It was at this point that Logan almost single-handedly worked out a compromise which cleared the way for the establishment of an independent reparations committee.

In early November, after the State Department had given up hope that a compromise might be reached with the French, Logan suggested to Barthou that the Frenchman write a letter outlining the French stipulations for the organization of an expert committee which he would forward to Washington. Barthou opposed the idea, but at Logan’s insistence he finally consented. After Logan rejected Barthou’s first two draft letters for “being too nebulous,” the French commissioner reluctantly agreed to attempt one final letter.

When Logan also returned that draft with further criticisms, the exasperated Barthou threw up his hands and told Logan, “You write the kind of letter you want and I’ll sign it.” Logan did just that.

In his letter, Logan attempted to satisfy both the American and French governments by proposing on the one hand that the expert committee be free to study the entire reparations question, while tacitly agreeing on the other hand that the experts should devise a temporary year by year reparations schedule without revising the $33 billion figure which France insisted upon under the treaty. During a mid-November session of the Reparation Commission, Logan further increased the chances of successfully assembling an independent commission by convincing the French delegate to propose the motion for the appointment of a team of reparation experts. It proved to be a sagacious move by Logan because it won over many Frenchmen who might have otherwise opposed the expert scheme had another nation proposed it.\textsuperscript{38} The French initiative also relieved Washington from the potentially embarrassing position of having to advocate sending Americans to Europe to settle European problems. With France sponsoring the expert plan, the Americans could go to Europe at the invitation of the French-chaired Reparation Commission. After some further objections from Hughes concerning French stipulations on the scope of the expert committees, Logan convinced him that the Reparation Commission's provisions were within the framework of American policy and the Secretary of State finally consented to United States participation on the committees.\textsuperscript{38} Sometime later, the American Ambassador to France, Myron Herrick, stated candidly that "it was Colonel Logan who was in the largest measure responsible for the origin of the Experts' Committee."\textsuperscript{40}

The Dawes Committee, named for its American chairman Charles G. Dawes, met in Paris in early January with the tasks of studying Germany's capacity to pay reparations, balancing the German budget, and recommending a new quota of payments in the coming years.\textsuperscript{41} A secondary committee, chaired by Josiah Stamp of Britain, was formed to study the problem of the flight of German capital abroad. Logan worked closely with the American experts Owen Young, Henry Robinson, and Dawes to familiarize them with European political and economic conditions, and to advise them of State

\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Logan to Hughes, 28 November and 6 December 1923, \textit{Foreign Relations, 1923}, 2:98–104; Hughes to Logan, 11 December 1923, ibid., 105. Two expert committees were appointed to study the reparations problem under the compromise.
\textsuperscript{40} Herrick to Hughes, 30 June 1924, Box 59, Charles E. Hughes Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.
Department policy. By April, the first committee had completed its report which followed the general outline of the businesslike settlement which the United States had been promoting since 1920. The experts recommended that reparation payments be reduced for an indefinite number of years to within Germany's capacity to pay, which they set at $625,000,000 for a normal year. The amount of reparations France could expect to receive in the future was effectively reduced from the quotas established in 1921. For its part, the United States would urge its private bankers to help raise a substantial loan to balance the German budget, stabilize the currency, and facilitate the continuation of reparation payments. The one remaining problem was to get the French government, which was divided on the issue of reparation reductions, to approve the Dawes Plan.

In August 1924, Logan and United States Ambassador to Britain, Frank Kellogg, headed the unofficial American delegation which attended the London Conference on the ratification of the Dawes Plan. Serving once again as an unofficial diplomat, Logan warned the French representatives that this would be America's final attempt to help work out a reparations settlement, and that if France rejected this proposal, the United States would not participate in any future negotiations. After many hours of discussions, the American delegates, with the support of Belgium and Britain, prevailed upon Premier Edouard Herriot of France to sign the Dawes Committee report. It was a triumph for American foreign policy and a personal victory for Logan who had worked tirelessly since becoming an unofficial observer to work out a solution to the most serious economic problem in the immediate postwar years.

Shortly after the conclusion of the London Conference, Under Secretary of State William Phillips wired Logan that the Belgian premier had come to have a very high regard for the observer's diplomatic skill. Phillips added that Logan and Kellogg deserved all the honors for the successful outcome at London. But Logan received

42. For an example of Logan's role in the making of the Dawes Report see Hughes to Logan, 8 March 1924, 462.00R296/205: Logan to Hughes, 14 March 1924, 462.00R296/213.
44. Phillips to Logan, 23 August 1924, Box 4, Personal Correspondence, Logan Papers; Hughes authorized Logan to take a strong stand against the French. See Henry C. Beerits, "The London Trip, 1924," Box 173, Hughes Papers.
45. Phillips to Logan, 23 August 1924, ibid.; Owen Young stated that without
little public recognition or official praise for his efforts in helping to work out a satisfactory reparations settlement. Due to congressional and public pressures demanding nonentanglement in European affairs, the State Department could not risk drawing too much attention to the diplomatic achievements of James A. Logan, Jr. Yet it was Logan, and unofficial diplomats like him, who made it possible for the United States to carry out a constructive foreign policy of involvement in European affairs during the 1920s. Logan concluded his distinguished, though unheralded, diplomatic career as an observer on the Reparation Commission in mid-1925, after which he returned to his native Philadelphia to pursue a career in business.

Logan and Kellogg “the Conference could not have been a success.” Young Speech, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York City, 11 December 1924, Owen Young Papers, Van Hornesville, New York.

HUNTERS ATTEND!!!

As the wolves have been very troublesome in destroying the sheep of persons living near the mountains in this county; it is proposed that three parties set out on the last Friday of this month, (if a good day) if not to set out on the first Friday of April to hunt wolves; one party to set out from Hayden town, one party from Moses Nixon's, and a third party from Job Little's mill. It is proposed that every person take provisions for himself and horse for two days: the intention is to start early on Friday morning and hunt through the mountains as far as Sandy creek, and to encamp that night at the house or cabbin of Mr. Jacob Downard on the waters of sandy creek; and to hunt on Saturday on their way into the settlement. It is expected any person having Hounds or other good dogs will take them along.

[The Genius of Liberty (Uniontown), 18 March 1809.]
CONTRIBUTED BY SCHUYLER C. MARSHALL, CALIFORNIA STATE COLLEGE.