BOOK REVIEWS


The Philadelphia Yearly Meeting lays claim to being the oldest, largest, and most influential body of Quakers in the New World. As such, it is important to know about its organization and authority as developed through three centuries of practical experience. This anthology tries to provide that information, using periodization congruent with both institutional change and American culture in general. Four chapters follow a sequence of establishment, division, separate coexistence, and finally reunion. Another four chapters highlight perennial themes: women’s equality, work among American Indians, missions in Japan, and contributions to the American Friends Service Committee. The subtitle is misleading because few authors mention anything after 1955, the year when Orthodox and Hicksite branches began meeting as one group again. This lack is particularly noticeable in the section specifically assigned to cover the modern period. All essays concern themselves with internal modifications of ecclesiastical structure, with means of regulating worship and orderly ways of handling mundane affairs. They record when important committees were formed, how they functioned, what problems they faced, and how procedural changes met new situations over the years. On this elemental level readers can profit from institutional data.

The editor’s introduction is one of the more valuable pieces in this collection because there he synthesizes points more than the discrete essays do. In fact taken as a whole, these chapters are rather pedestrian performances that serve up pertinent material with little insight. The exceptions are chapters 2 and 5, by J. W. Frost and M. H. Bacon, on the Hicksite Separation and the role of women respectively. Their work is stimulating and comprehensive, penetrating and well paced, thorough and vigorous in ways that make the other essays dull by comparison. Editor Moore also points out this volume’s lack of emphasis on intellectual factors. This admission underscores the fact that most chapters are weak on causation and explanatory discussion altogether. The primary focus is on organization and the discipline that made regulatory mechanisms effective among Friends. But readers will find little assessment of Quaker impact on cultural issues such as war, slavery, alcohol, and civil rights. We learn rather about which committees passed resolutions on those problems and what effect they had within the authority structure. The fact that Philadelphia Quakers passed a resolution against serving wine at table in 1877, for instance, tells us precious little about what effect this action had on the temperance movement.

This one-sided perspective can be defended, of course, and within limits it contributes positively by supplying necessary information. But there could have been so much more, of the quality provided by Frost and Bacon. In the main we find only paraphrases of minutes taken from yearly meetings; some authors draw so much from later studies, their work constitutes a tertiary source. Because of this constricted focus on internal development, many important
cultural matters are treated cursorily. For example, this book on one of America's leading peace churches and a traditional champion of civil rights hardly mentions Vietnam or blacks in the 1960s and 1970s. Dress codes, business ethics, and intermarriage may have dominated the denominational mind, but even these issues are not fully integrated into the authors' main interest. Most of the prose is unimaginative reporting of commonplace facts. Many categories are virtually unrelated to others except by chronological accident, and they cry out for additional comment. This catalogue of institutional metamorphosis assumes that committees are the linchpin of church action, and readers are left to themselves in seeking wider interpretations beyond that minimal coverage.

Rutgers University

HENRY WARNER BOWDEN


Two decades ago Leon Litwack authored a pathbreaking study of "The Negro in the Free States, 1790–1860." North of Slavery examined racial discrimination in the North and focused on black and white efforts to overcome this prejudice. Now Leonard Curry has approached that topic again, but this time with a narrower focus and a different emphasis. Whereas Litwack emphasized the efforts of blacks to escape racial prejudice through the formation of utopian societies or by escape, Curry stresses the importance of mutual aid as an instrument of socialization within the urban experience. In so doing he has made a valuable contribution to our knowledge of the urban as well as the black experience in the United States.

Curry focuses on the fifteen largest cities in the country (1850), although not all these cities held the largest concentrations of free blacks at that time, and he avoids discussion of the urban slave experience. In this respect he presents only one piece of a large and complex puzzle, since the free black experience rather than race, slavery, or the urban milieu remains at center stage. Nonetheless, his research is productive, and the concerns of free blacks in such widely dispersed cities as Philadelphia, Boston, New York, Baltimore, Charleston, Cincinnati, Louisville, Brooklyn, New Orleans, Albany, Buffalo, Providence, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, and Washington are strikingly parallel.

The urban free black population rose steadily in these years, although it actually declined as a proportion of the total urban population. The city offered them their best chance for freedom and safety, and they endured poor and deteriorating conditions in search of opportunity. Their occupations were the least profitable and the most laborious of those available, due in part to a pervasive and persistent racial discrimination that curtailed economic advancement. Curry discovered, perhaps surprisingly, that occupational opportunity was greatest in the Lower South, and poorest in New England and New York. Northern cities also offered the poorest housing facilities for free blacks, and Philadelphia's increasing racial residential segregation typified emerging slum conditions in the more densely populated urban areas.

Urban conditions, ethnic conflict, racial segregation, and the persistence of unstable social and economic conditions spawned varied responses from the
black and white communities. From 1837 to 1842 Philadelphia and Cincinnati witnessed almost annual race riots, as whites lashed out at their hated neighbors. Perhaps an antidote to increased abolitionist activity, these riots nonetheless demonstrated the precarious condition of the free black population. One response was an increased attention to agencies of community cohesion and self-help. Psychological trauma and overt oppression led urban blacks to establish aid societies and other associational bodies as a means of building community identification and launching attacks on the forces of discrimination. Blacks, like whites, pursued a dream; but, unlike whites, racial and institutional intransigence prevented them from attaining more than “the shadow of the dream” (p. 243).

A brief review cannot hope to explore the rich detail that Curry has unearthed, nor can it discuss all of his observations in such areas as crime, religion, mortality, education, and the growth of a community-consciousness among the free black population. This is a study that merits serious consideration from scholars of this period, and one that will probably suggest new approaches to America’s early urban complexes.

Franklin and Marshall College

JOHN A. ANDREW, III


Eschewing what he terms environmental determinism, Burton Folsom in his study of Urban Capitalists calls for a new appreciation of the efforts of entrepreneurs in shaping city growth. Disdainful of social scientists who minimize the significance of individuals, Folsom argues that business talent and luck of shrewd business leaders figured prominently in the particular development of urban centers and systems in Pennsylvania’s Lackawanna and Lehigh valleys. Entrepreneurs, individually and collectively, Folsom maintains, attempted to overcome problems of poor location and inadequate resources in order to build such manufacturing centers as Scranton.

Insisting on the need for regional analysis in order to explain America’s urban past, Folsom examines the economic foundations of the Lackawanna and Lehigh regions in order to understand the role of entrepreneurship in the development of industrial America. He describes the manufacturing bases and elites of such cities as Scranton, Carbondale, Easton, Bethlehem, Allentown, and Mauch Chunk. He also notes the influence of Wilkes-Barre and of such larger cities as New York and Philadelphia on the development and growth of the two valleys.

Folsom convincingly demonstrates that the study and comparison of local elites offer important insights into the process of urban competition and change. He is particularly successful in describing the business elite of Scranton, its changing composition over time, and the effects of those changes not only on the city itself but also on the entire region’s development. Unfortunately, however, he fails to describe precisely how the elites interacted. He mentions a few examples of cooperation and duly notes the religious and social affiliations of business leaders, yet their activities remain curiously vague. For a scholar
determined to vindicate the role of the individual, Folsom inexplicably writes with phrases like "as fate would have it" (p. 28). Throughout the study he refers to "splendid entrepreneurship" mastering impersonal forces yet the reader is never sure what constitutes shrewd business tactics or mysterious forces. A more thorough analysis of local newspapers would have provided some of the details omitted in the local histories from which Folsom largely constructs his study. Moreover, his work would have benefited from stronger analytical tools used by the social scientists he apparently dislikes.

Comparing elites in Scranton and Wilkes-Barre, Folsom attempts to demonstrate the decisive significance of the quality of business elites in determining city growth. He finds that the more aggressive and imaginative leaders of Scranton pushed their city ahead of Wilkes-Barre—a city dominated by conservative and cautious businessmen interested in retaining, not expanding, their economic and political power. Unfortunately in this analysis, Folsom loses sight of the full significance of the different ages of the two cities. In a more important chapter, Folsom attempts to underscore still further the role of entrepreneurship by comparing father-son mobility and finds that few sons followed their fathers' models, preferring instead to enjoy their inherited wealth. Downward mobility of the wealthy is a subject barely touched upon by Folsom but certainly worthy of fuller study.

*Urban Capitalists* generally reads like a booster pamphlet, calling for team spirit, rapid growth, and economic efficiency. Folsom, like a local chamber of commerce, rarely questions the darker side of entrepreneurial exploits and evaluates his business leaders solely in terms of their industrial success, even suggesting that the construction of the many churches and schools of the Lehigh valley "drained money that could have been used for economic development" (p. 131). For Folsom, ethnic diversity means "urban fragmentation" because each group attempts to build its own community, resulting in the unnecessary duplication of services. Only Scranton in its early efforts to minimize ethnic differences to achieve the common goal of industrial development receives Folsom's unqualified praise.

Although Folsom's comparative and regional framework is promising, his results are less satisfying. The volume is too slim as in his research, and his prose is riddled with clichés from red men and forked tongues (p. 69) to Nero fiddling while Rome burned (p. 111). His shrill contention that individuals have been largely ignored in our past is certainly exaggerated, making his conclusion "that cities need more than environmental advantages to become regional centers" (p. 146) hardly startling.

*Dickinson College*  
JO ANN E. ARGERSINGER


This is the first book-length study of John Edgar Thomson (1808–1874), president of the Pennsylvania Railroad from 1852 to 1874. Despite the dominant role that Thomson played in the early years of American railroad development, several obstructions lay in the path of potential biographers. For one, the task of writing a scholarly treatment of Thomson's life and career is
made immeasurably more difficult by the dearth of materials; the corpus of his papers is apparently not extant, requiring Ward to visit numerous archives in different sections of the country to ferret out his outgoing letters and other materials. Compounding the problem was Thomson's personality and life style. He was an extremely private man whose "existence revolved around the headquarters of the Pennsylvania Railroad" (p. 10).

Given these limitations, Ward elected to prepare an account almost totally devoted to his business life. In this, he is more than equal to the task. A professor of history at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, he had previously written on tangential subjects, including a biography of Herman Haupt, an early Thomson protégé. For this volume, Ward makes skillful use of a variety of sources, including correspondence and board minutes and reports, as well as other published materials.

Throughout his business career, Thomson was involved with railroading. Although he had little formal education, he received training as a surveyor and civil engineer from his father. Little is known of his formative years, but during his late teens and early twenties he was employed in several projects for locating railroads in southeastern Pennsylvania and contiguous states. His skills as a civil engineer developed rapidly, and in 1834 he assumed the position of chief engineer of the Georgia Railroad. For the next thirteen years, Thomson achieved great success in constructing and operating what was then the "longest railway in the world under one management" (p. 44).

In 1847, he reluctantly left the South to begin the grand adventure of his career, his association with the newly incorporated Pennsylvania Railroad. Following five years as chief engineer of the Pennsylvania, Thomson was elected the third president of the railroad in 1852, a position he held for almost a quarter of a century, until his death in 1874.

His presidential tenure was a period of tremendous expansion for the railroad. During this period, Thomson was, in the words of the subtitle, "Master of the Pennsylvania." As such he "created a personal fiefdom, a business empire he ruled with paternalistic devotion," at times having to oppose the "parochialism of stockholders, board members, state politicians, and Philadelphia businessmen" (pp. 91, 93). In recounting his activities as president, Ward discusses the development of an efficient line and staff managerial organization, the relationship between the board of directors as the stockholders' elected representatives and Thomson as professional manager, his efforts to stabilize competition by rate fixing, his intense interest in technological advances and in maintenance of the physical condition of the line, and his expansionary enthusiasm, including a strong interest in transcontinental routes. In addition, Ward deals with government-business relations and provides considerable detail on Thomson's personal involvement in numerous financial schemes, which in some instances were difficult to separate from his corporate interests.

All in all, this book provides significant additional information and interpretation to aid our understanding of this formative period of American railroading. Ward does a highly creditable job in providing a solid, balanced account of the career of this important entrepreneur.

The University of Akron  

JOHN V. MILLER, JR.
One can not help but respond to this book in an inconsistent fashion, because of its very nature. Fourteen essays, involving seventeen authors, representing five disciplines are bound to raise sometimes contradictory responses in any reader. That the essays are hung together on a framework impressed upon them rather than implicit in them increases the problem of generalizing about the book. Thus, the essays are not only of different quality, but are more or less related to the central theme set out by the editor.

The Philadelphia Social History Project burst upon the historical scene a decade ago, the brainchild of the gifted advocate of interdisciplinary cooperation and academic entrepreneur, Theodore Hershberg. His willingness to expand intellectual horizons and his chutzpah developed a federally supported project of proportions undreamed of by most historians allowing them to think about applying masses of data to important questions that had eluded even the most adventuresome. It is truly "an experiment in collaborative, multidisciplinary, and interdisciplinary research."

Many historians have watched this carefully as the foreboding of the possible redirection of the research strategy of history of the future. First the sciences and then the social sciences gave up the idea of the individual scholar toiling in the vineyards to embrace team research with well-organized economic support. Clearly, Hershberg is the most successful advocate of the latter approach among historians, and he insists that one of the major purposes of this book "is to make readers aware of the critical relationship that exists between how research is organized and the nature of the resulting knowledge."

Philadelphia is basically a report on how things have gone over the past decade. It is a collection of essays, most of which have been published elsewhere, that Hershberg believes illustrate the above principle and collectively provide a new perspective on the city in history summed up in his major concept "urban as process." What Hershberg seems to mean by this is that cities are not, in their most meaningful sense, sites or simply large aggregations of people, but are rather characterized by a process which involves a distinctive interrelationship between the variables cited in the subtitle.

It is easy to find fault with this book. Hershberg is incredibly arrogant concerning both the success of the experiment and the novelty of the findings of individual essays. This is a shame because when judged against Hershberg's claims, the essays leave too many unanswered questions. Both coverage and quality are uneven; the low level of methodological unity makes crucial comparisons difficult. There are too many cluttered tables giving the impression that technique is often valued above intellect. The writing is too often jargon-laden and at places painfully dense. Finally, the weaknesses of social scientists trying to do history are at times highlighted by their theoretically relevant, but ahistorical, language.

Two larger problems emerge. One is inconsistency. The essay "Immigrants and Industry" presents an excellent discussion of the problems of studying social mobility by relying on occupation. The final essay "A Tale of Three Cities," which is the best in the book, relies on classification of strata by occupation! The
second problem is with the book's central concept, "urban as process." It is ironic that a study denying "urban as site" is entitled using the name of a site. The analysis of a single city and, in fact, the total emphasis on that city militates against an understanding of "urban as process." Only one essay "The Irish Countryman Revisited" attempts comparison of Philadelphia and other cities. Most importantly, the study of a city cannot tell us what is the distinct urban dimension to subjects such as the "transition to adulthood" or the social mobility of certain ethnic groups. In all, the essays are not structured to support the editor's basic conceptual thrust.

Having said this and using criteria somewhat short of Hershberg's pie-in-the-sky, I would have to say that the Philadelphia Social History Project is the most important and most interesting experiment in the history profession. Once Hershberg includes political considerations this experiment could be at all of the major cutting edges of American history today. We need not expect quickie results. The funding agencies used to precise contracts and then cost overruns are not used to the quite different rhythms of historical research.

If assurance is what they want, Philadelphia is mixed bag. The essays are generally—I can think of only one exception—of extremely high quality. Those on blacks, all of which include Hershberg as a primary author, are superb. Hidden within Philadelphia is an iconoclastic book of major proportions on the black experience in an American city. The two essays by Hershberg, Model, and Furstenberg are major contributions to the history of the family as well. This is, in other words, a very good book that should be required reading for all historians of the nineteenth century as well as those in urban, labor, ethnic, and family history. Most of the writers, including the editor, show themselves to be first-rate social historians.

In the end, by my criteria, Philadelphia indicates that the experiment has been most successful. I simply had hoped for an even better book and worry that the faddishness that carries far too much weight in Washington might bury a truly important attempt at doing history in a different way.

Lehigh University

William G. Shade


To review Professor John Lukacs's latest book is no easy assignment. Although his best-known books, including The Last European War, 1939–1941, Historical Consciousness, and The Passing of the Modern Age, serve to prepare the reader for the tone of this unorthodox book on Philadelphia, it cannot, unlike his other works, be treated as a history in any conventional sense. It is neither traditional American urban history nor social history in the current style of delineating group patterns and assembling dynamic statistical aggregates.

Lukacs's Philadelphia consists mainly of seven vignettes of six of the city's liveliest men and one creative woman, who thrived in the first half of the twentieth century. These seven individuals constituted "a kind of prism, reflecting subtle and profound changes in the national history of the American Republic," according to Lukacs. The profiles are of political boss Boies Penrose; Ladies Home Journal publisher Edward W. Bok; essayist Agnes Repplier;
diplomat William C. Bullitt; lawyer and one-term United States Senator George Wharton Pepper; novelist Owen Wister, author of *The Virginian*; and Argyrol patent-medicine tycoon turned into art patron and gamecock didactician, Albert Coombs Barnes, or “the Methodist as aesthete.”

Unfortunately the book’s title is exaggerated. Its title page and its running heads atop each left-hand page proclaim that the book’s primary topic is Philadelphia, which it is not. Only the opening chapter succinctly surveying the Quaker City in 1900 and the much less satisfactory closing chapter for 1950 attempt to comprehend the city and its peoples as an entirety. Lukacs’s book is really about seven extraordinary Philadelphians. Each of them is quite independently delineated, with exceedingly few interrelationships developed from one to another, whether in time, place, or event. For example, Agnes Irwin, the founder of The Agnes Irwin School for girls, is introduced twice (cf. pp. 89–90 and p. 245) and belatedly also her unidentified sister, who is erroneously described as the school’s co-founder (Lukacs presumably means Sophy, who joined her older sister Agnes at the school succeeding her in time as headmistress, but most likely not the third Irwin sister). One is tempted to compare this book to a collection of magazine articles because of the self-contained quality of its subdivisions, more particularly so since abridged versions of the Penrose and Wister chapters have already appeared in *American Heritage* magazine.

The book’s best features are very good however. Lukacs’s treatment of Repplier, though excessively long, entices one to read her again or to discover her finely wrought literary craftsmanship for the first time. His sketch of Barnes, who too often is recalled only for his furiously vulgar attacks against Philadelphia’s elite institutions or their leaders, is sensibly sympathetic and informative, even if raggedly organized, and it ought to establish Barnes where he belongs in art history, not just as a boorish and opinionated collector of Renoir, Cezanne, Matisse and other great artists, but as an original thinker and tastemaker with insight and common sense enough to penetrate beyond the conventional wisdom of contemporary art criticism. By comparison the short pieces on Wister and Pepper are trivial. Pepper’s story ought not to have been included. He is made to appear as a first-class ass, whose peccadillos Lukacs seem to have felt compelled to conceal (p. 238).

Lukacs’ neatest essays are on Penrose, Bok, and Bullitt. Penrose by 1915 had become a Republican boss on the national scale, the last in a succession of United States Senators from Pennsylvania to wield great power in both Washington and Harrisburg. Lincoln Steffens notwithstanding, Penrose was neither personally corrupt nor contented, yet he emerges as a period piece “bloated and corpulent like the Republic,” with “the desperate solitary sadness of an unbelieving heart” behind his stoic countenance. Publisher Bok is brilliantly limned as “Franklin reincarnate,” which, as Lukacs himself makes patently clear, demeans Franklin to Bok’s level of advertising genius, who, in Bok’s case at least, “had no clear idea of separating what was private from what was public,” whose relentless self-promotion resembled Barnum’s, yet whose role in emancipating women from darkness was so important that it can scarcely be overestimated. William Christian Bullitt, “rebel Philadelphian,” ambassador, journalist, novelist, psychologist, idealist and realist, is likewise vividly portrayed. One is reminded that Bullitt’s full-length biography clamors to be written. Disavowed by Lloyd George and shunned by Woodrow Wilson at Versailles for the Bolshevik
propositions he brought from Lenin, Bullitt became convinced of the perfidious-

ness of the British and the character weakness of Wilson, which, among other
directions, led him to his misunderstood collaboration with Freud on their
psychological study of the wartime president. Bullitt became his country’s first
Ambassador to the Soviet Union and the last to France before the fall of the
Third Republic. He broke with Roosevelt over policy toward Russia, as earlier
he had with Wilson. Meanwhile he continued to scandalize staid Philadelphians
by his personal conduct, and he infuriated them beyond forgiveness by
incorporating some of them into his novel, It’s Not Done. Bullitt, in Lukacs’s
judgment was “unsteady, willful, rebellious, indiscreet; in sum: un-Philadel-
phian.”

The salient features of Lukacs’s Philadelphia are its highpoints and its
shortcomings, its unevenness in sum. Philadelphia deserves it. And better too!

Bryn Mawr College

Arthur P. Dudden

At the Point of Production: The Local History of the I. W. W. Edited by Joseph R.
$29.95.)

The Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) continue to fascinate scholars.
Evidence of this exists in a collection of essays edited by Joseph R. Conlin, whose
own work on the IWW is well known to labor historians. As Conlin notes in the
preface, these ten essays and an accompanying local sources guide are intended
for those already familiar with the IWW and are offered in the hope of
stimulating further research into IWW history. Like most collections, the
studies are uneven in quality and scope. Those most successful place their
research results within a general historical context.

Conlin’s excellent introduction is a judicious piece on IWW historiography. It
covers the main literature on the Wobblies grounding that literature firmly
within a specific historical framework. Surprisingly, however, Conlin fails to
employ his considerable analytical powers on the essays that follow. It would be
useful, for example, to learn what new insight he gleaned from these local IWW
episodes. Notwithstanding Conlin’s timidity, some common themes emerge from
these disparate studies.

While on the national level IWW leaders trumpeted a radical, Marxist
ideology, on the local scene the leadership frequently softpedaled ideology in
favor of more traditional bargaining issues. Three essays—Snyder on the 1912
textile strike in Little Falls, New York; Lynch on the 1913 Pittsburgh stogie
workers’ strike; and McMahon on the 1927 Colorado coal miners’ strike—
demonstrate this point convincingly. Added to this pragmatic accommodation were
strike tactics that were frequently adapted to local conditions, sometimes
innovative and flexible, and where possible, designed to elicit broad community
support. When the IWW was able to attract community sympathy, the chances
of victory increased significantly.

Furthermore, these essays show that success depended also on whether or not
the IWW was able to take advantage of or generate local leadership among the
workers. James F. Fickle’s study of the Southern lumber industry and Roy T.
Wortman’s analysis of the 1913 Akron rubber strike (a resounding defeat)
illustrate the importance of local leaders who struggled to build a tradition of
worker solidarity. Imported IWW figures were inadequate substitutes for homegrown leaders.

Finally, all the essays reveal a major flaw in the IWW's almost total reliance on economic action "at the point of production." Such a strategy ignored the crucial importance of the political system in deciding the fate of worker-capitalist struggles. Where employers could count on the assistance of the courts, police, local officials, state militia, and federal troops, even the best organized strike or job action was doomed to failure. The IWW was no match for the power of the state.

One last note: Dione Miles's extensive bibliography, "Sources for the Local History of the IWW" is a tremendous tool for anyone interested in exploring the topic and should serve as the standard reference guide for many years.

Rider College

JOSEPH M. GOWASKIE


When Arnold Miller, the Miners for Democracy candidate for United Mine Workers president, defeated Tony Boyle in 1972, the reform movement in the UMW attracted national attention. As Paul F. Clark, who worked briefly for the union's research department in the mid-seventies, describes in *The Miners’ Fight for Democracy* within it first two years the reform movement successfully democratized the union.

But events in the mid-seventies suggested that despite the reform process the union was still in trouble. Wildcat strikes had increased dramatically to a record 2787 in 1976, accounting for nearly two million lost workdays in an industry employing less than 200,000 workers. The union was beset with internal strife at all levels. Many of the wildcats were directed at union leaders, while the leadership was bitterly divided. The union lost ground in the industry as the proportion of UMW coal declined sharply. One of the former MFD leaders, Secretary-Treasurer Harry Patrick ran against Miller in the 1977 union presidential election, and Miller received only 36 percent of the vote in a three-way race—only 20 percent of those eligible to vote supported him. By 1979 Harry Patrick charged, "All of the things we fought for in 1972 . . . it's all right back where we started."

Using UMW Convention Proceedings and other union publications, newspaper articles and a variety of secondary works Clark chronicles the internal battles of the Miller administration between 1972 and 1979. His assessment is more positive than Patrick's. While carefully describing the problems that formed the basis of Patrick's charges, he concludes that "the UMW's experience during the Miller years . . . reveals that the union is not back where it started. While the reform movement may be halted, the union was made an unquestionably more progressive, open, and responsive organization than it was under Tony Boyle."

Clark's book is well documented, clearly and concisely written. He makes the potentially dry details of internal union politics come alive, and despite clear sympathies for reformers his presentation is fair and balanced. The book's major
weakness is its preoccupation with union leaders and administrative practices. Nearly all the book is devoted to international conventions, internal disputes in the union's Executive Board, the internal politics of the national Bargaining Council, and the 1977 union election campaign. For a book on rank and file union democracy we hear surprisingly little from working miners. All of the quotes from rank-and-filers come from newspaper articles or union publications. Clark does not appear to have talked to any miners.

Clark's conception of democracy is quite bureaucratic, placing overwhelming emphasis, for example, on the 1973 and 1976 conventions (involving 1000 and 1800 delegates respectively) as the source of democratization rather than on the actions of rank-and-file miners. He discounts the significance of 65 percent participation in the contract ratification elections in 1974 (the first time in modern history the miners had been able to vote on a contract) arguing that "the miner's union was transformed... by the membership through the democratic convention process." The wildcat strikes are discussed in the chapter on internal strife as one of the problems which "plagued the Miller administration." But up to two-thirds of the entire union membership joined the largest of the wildcats, far more than ever voted for Miller. Did they consider these strikes as "plagues" or as the most genuine expression of their "fight for democracy"?

There is also a surprisingly brief discussion of the larger economic and political situation the union faced. How much of the union's problems might be explained by factors external to union politics?

Despite these gaps Clark's book is a valuable study of the internal politics of one of the country's most important unions. Readers concerned with the administrative problems other union reform movements may face should read it.

*RICHARD OESTREICHER*

*University of Pittsburgh*


The principal objective of this persuasive, timely, heavily documented study is to examine the interaction between the coal coalition and state-federal governments during a twenty-year (1958-1978) evolution of public environmental policy. During that evolution the traditional American pluralist model of fragmented units competing independently in the marketplace of public policy underwent a significant transformation. By the late 1950s the process of industrial modernization forged a new series of financial and technological linkages among coal-related firms with the result that by the end of the 1960s there developed a broader based, interindustry political system. In turn this interlinked organization system led to a notably greater sustained political behavior on the part of this very large sector of industry in the United States.

Besides its effects on political organization, the industrial modernizing process altered the arena of political debate. After 1967 the technical complexity of environmental policy issues escalated beyond the grasp of nonexperts. The quality of strippable versus deep mineable coal reserves, the availability of effective scrubber technology, the capital costs of emission standards are all examples of issues in the political debate about which most congressmen,
affected businessmen and environmentalists—let alone the general public—knew little. In floor debates, even such congressional experts as Senator Muskie appeared at a loss when dealing with issues raised by difficult air pollution data. And at the state level this problem amplified a hundredfold, as painfully evidenced in the proceedings of Pennsylvania's Environmental Quality Board. The result of this growing complexity has been to shift more and more discretionary authority to administrative agencies and to the courts since both are staffed by experts.

The theme of this book—the interaction between the coal coalition and government aimed at bringing order to the market economy in regard to public environmental policy—is frequently obscured by the work's structure. The author gambols from the evolution of the coal coalition in chapter 2 to sportsmen versus strip mining in Pennsylvania in chapter 3 to air pollution as a national problem in chapter 5, all of which tends to shade continuity. However, the author probably is not at fault, given the tangled complexity of state-federal politics involved. But by the book's end the author has made his point—the two 1977 federal environmental acts merely marked the beginning of increasingly complex environmental politics. In the decades to come command and manipulation of highly technical data will become ever more important in influencing environmental policies. Meantime, the democratic process will weaken.

York College of Pennsylvania

CARL E. HATCH


The post-World War II shifts in population and industry to the Sunbelt have generated intense concern on the part of the local and state policymakers about the decaying communities left behind in the northeastern United States. As a result of this massive outmigration of capital and talent, residents of the older industrial cities face a host of social and economic problems that became apparent in the late 1970s.

Ills such as high unemployment and a deteriorating urban base are not new, for all their current publicity. Anthracite mining towns in northeastern Pennsylvania confronted virtually the same difficulties twenty-five years earlier, when the mining industry collapsed. Dwindling populations and the loss of the main employer—the anthracite corporations—threatened the very survival of these towns. How the people of these communities dealt with this crisis has gone relatively unnoticed until the publication of Dan Rose's study of Hazleton during the post-1945 years.

Rose explains Hazleton's decline as part of a broader change in energy sources from coal to oil and natural gas. This change was the fourth in a series of forty-to-sixty-year waves, identified by Russian academician Kondratieff, who had studied the trends in the capitalist world system since its inception in the late eighteenth century. As a coal-based community, Hazleton was one of the first to experience the reverberations of this shift to a less expensive and more efficient energy source. This change undermined the anthracite corporations, destabilized the labor pool, and precipitated a rapid population decline. Rose points out
that long-term changes in the world system can have catastrophic impact on the local community.

Rose argues that Hazelton's response to these conditions illustrates current anthropological notions of society. He conceives of society as an energy conversion process, whereby humans transform energy, matter, and information into essentials for survival. Hazelton's leaders were confronted with the decline of their critical energy source—anthracite coal—and the loss of that industry's social power. To replace the anthracite corporation, which had been the primary institution controlling the conversion process, Hazelton's business and professional people built a series of local development committees to adapt the community's resource base and labor force to the new energy sources of the post-World War II era. The most prominent of these was CAN-DO (Community Area New Development Organization).

Composed of bankers, professionals, and business leaders, CAN-DO set out to mobilize local energetic sources—capital, labor, and land—and exchange these for employing industries geared to oil and natural gas. Assisted by the Pennsylvania Industrial Development Corporation, the Pennsylvania Power and Light Company (PP and L), the main corporation in the area, and local banks, CAN-DO was able to gather large amounts of capital and land to offer prospective manufacturing companies. It was also able to use the cultural conservatism, the reputation for hard work and the unskilled character of its work force to induce a number of firms to relocate to Hazleton. Last, CAN-DO used its political influence in federal government to secure a major interstate highway exchange necessary to give companies access to east coast markets. By the 1970s, CAN-DO had successfully reorganized the local social system, adapted the local economy to oil and natural gas-based industries and transformed Hazelton into a manufacturing city. The population decline had stopped and the area saw the return of full employment.

Rose has raised a number of important issues about underdevelopment in contemporary America. He has successfully explained why communities based on older energy sources suffered such intense economic depression, while the rest of the country experienced the post-World War II boom. Rose has also shown that depressed communities, such as Hazelton, can effectively manipulate state and federal government and outside corporations to promote recovery when that seems an impossibility. This is in sharp contrast to older views which picture the community as powerless in the face of large-scale public and private agencies.

The main problem with the study is the lack of a comparative perspective. It is difficult to understand why Hazleton succeeded where other communities in the coal regions failed. Certainly, cities in the nearby Wyoming Valley had equal access to state and federal government, particularly since two of the post-1945 governors were from this area. Their economic power in the years before World War II was probably much greater than that of Hazleton, yet their recovery never materialized. While Rose did not set out to answer this question, he raised the issue at several points in the study and even points out that these communities adopted Hazelton's strategy. Still, Rose's work stands alone in its focus on the plight of the anthracite region, and for this reason it is an important contribution to recognizing and understanding the underdeveloped community in twentieth-century America.
As a background information piece, designed to interest local government officials and building owners in preserving the historic structures of the small town of Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania, this is a fine book. It is well researched, has good drawings and photographs, and is well designed and handsomely printed. It contains a brief history of the town, then a mixture of observations about the buildings, recommendations for their preservation and enhancement, and some recommendations and information on financial resources.

There is an inherent problem with this kind of study in that it is attempting to address a number of different audiences and cannot do so successfully no matter how well equipped the author is. For example, if one is attempting to arouse public interest, good photographs and a lively text would do that but information of a planning nature for technical people doesn't create much laymen response. For public officials, this kind of study is good because it gives them some general principles and background information to go on, but it really doesn't provide a good step-by-step development plan. In fact the plan submitted is the only fault that I would find with the author's work. He indicates that several mini-malls should be developed, and if any planning idea has ever lost all of its credibility, it is that one. One can hardly find a malled street in the United States that has not been a disaster. Even the great Chestnut Street in Philadelphia has lost its sound retail base since what James D. Van Trump once called the "new mall to mall magic carpeting" was installed in 1976.

For a developer, the book is useful to give some information on the kind of buildings that exist, but it does not provide any specific trigger mechanisms by which a developer could become involved—and perhaps none is wanted.

The developer can utilize the various building use maps in the book, the concept recommendations, but he, as well as each of the building owners, needs information on how funds are being recommended to be provided and he needs some budgets. In the studies of single buildings, for example, no number work has been done. No projections of costs of the concepts presented in the booklet are available nor any budget, not even one to get the program geared up.

Recommendations need to be much more specific. It is not sufficient to say that the town needs some improvements in its marketing. It would be much better to say that X, Y, and Z should be done in such and such an order and here are the costs.

Again, I do not fault the author because he may well be fulfilling exactly what his contract required, but as a person who deals extensively with the revitalization of downstairs, I find such studies of only the most limited use. What I have learned from the book is that Bloomsburg, like most small towns, has a good architectural treasury, lacks exploitation of that treasury, has little money and less direction, and is now wanting to go somewhere but has little idea of how to get there.

But how do I as a store owner or a developer or a public official find my sense of direction, what are the priorities, what are the tested steps of implementation?
BOOK REVIEWS

Finally, I would like to suggest to all members of the planning community that they stop printing books that physically are long and floppy, that one cannot hold in one’s hands and read. If there is to be extensive text in a book, it should hold itself flat when in your lap so that you can read it. There can always be a pull-out for a long plat map or elevation of a block of buildings.

Tom Deans has done a fine job, doing what the town seemed to ask of him as a planner. But it is time for planners to say no to generalizing and instead produce good specific programing information together with these general recommendations.

Pittsburgh History and Landmarks Foundation

ARTHUR P. ZIEGLER, JR.


Armies are created to fight. While scholars continue to study the military as an institution reflective of society or to analyze military thought to give military history an aura of academic respectability, their frequent neglect of operational military history forces readers to turn either to glorified war stories or dry official histories. This neglect dismay both discriminating readers and professional officers who seek to examine the organizational, doctrinal, and tactical concepts of armies at war.

One scholar who realizes the purpose of an army is Professor Russell F. Weigley of Temple University. He is the author of seminal books about institutional U.S. Army history and American military thought. In Eisenhower’s Lieutenants Weigley applies his earlier researches to a study of battle, the campaigns of the American army in France and Germany during World War II. The result is a significant and readable book of commanding interest to students of military operations.

Weigley suggests three major themes as a basis for understanding the European campaigns. The first is the American strategic tradition of the application of overwhelming combat power dating from U.S. Grant and the Civil War. The second theme emphasizes the American army’s reliance on mobility which was the predominant influence on equipment, training, and organization. The third theme deals with the fervent desire of the British to husband their manpower resources and avoid the ghosts of 1916. American war planners rejected the so-called “indirect approach” of the British, who favored a Mediterranean strategy, and pressed for the direct application of force through an invasion of the European continent. Eisenhower and his lieutenants faced the problem of how to command men and machines to overcome strong German resistance. Their task was hindered by a heritage which did not always indicate the best way to fight a skillful and experienced enemy.

In Part One of the book, titled “The Armies,” Weigley compares and contrasts American and German equipment, organization, and manpower at the time of the cross-channel attack. He reviews the Normandy invasion plans and examines the men who would execute them. He explains ULTRA intelligence, by which the allies read coded German wireless communication. Moreover, the author integrates this information and its use throughout the book. Unlike other recent works, Weigley is not blinded by ULTRA; he understands that it could not do the Allies’ fighting.
Part Two of the book covers the Normandy campaign from the massive invasion of June 6, 1944, through Operation Cobra and the breakout in July. While the focus is clearly on Eisenhower’s lieutenants, Generals Bradley and Montgomery, and the problems of high command, Weigley still manages to interweave into the text significant small unit actions, such as the heroic struggle to move inland from bloody Omaha beach. These vignettes provide a vivid reminder that courage is an essential quality in battle.

For this study, Weigley successfully synthesizes the vast amount of information found in the multi-volume official history of the United States Army in World War II: The European Theater of Operations. A comprehensive bibliography of available English language secondary sources is provided. The author consulted primary source documents based, it appears, both on availability and necessity. His study is more than a narrative of events because the author seeks explanations and candidly provides his own opinions and insights.

Weigley devotes the majority of the text to the Allies’ operations in France, Holland, and finally Germany. He clearly describes and candidly assesses all of the significant battles. Critical and controversial decisions are interpreted, although the issues are far from final resolution. Weigley, for instance, blames Bradley as well as Montgomery for failing to close the Argentan-Falaise gap, thereby allowing the Germans to escape the trap. Operation Market-Garden failed, he indicates, not only because the Arnhem bridge was A Bridge Too Far, but because tactical execution did not match a bold strategy. He also criticizes both Eisenhower and Bradley for halting their advance in Germany at the close of the war.

There are rare lapses. The too frequent use of unit designations is a distraction to the reader. Maps are inadequate. The horrors and confusion of war at times are distant from Weigley’s descriptions of operations.

Weigley expertly employs geography, history, and personality to explain the campaigns in France and Germany during 1944 and 1945. He concludes that the Allied Campaigns were prolonged and costly because “American military skills were not as formidable as they could have been,” mainly owing to the dichotomy of mobility versus overwhelming power. Professor Weigley’s conclusion and his entire volume support the necessity for the continued study of operational military history.

Combat Studies Institute,  
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
ROBERT H. BERLIN