After nearly 125 years of scrutiny, the American Civil War remains a fertile ground for historical inquiry. But while we know much about political developments, military strategies and battlefield experiences, our knowledge of life on the Northern home front remains meager. One aspect of the home front experience has attracted widespread notice. Numerous scholars have noted that the wartime tensions in general, and those surrounding conscription in particular, led to periodic outbreaks of rioting, with the bloodiest occurring in New York in July 1863. This essay will use those disorderly episodes as a backdrop to explore a less dramatic facet of Philadelphia’s wartime experience: Despite ample provocation, serious rioting never disrupted the City of Brotherly Love.¹

It is a bit tricky to claim that a particular place and time was “orderly.” How does an historian ask the historical record such a question? Newspapers or diarists rarely note that a city is unusually orderly. Those who are likely to make public statements on the issue generally have an axe to grind. Mayor Alexander Henry—a gentleman who emerges as something of a hero in this piece—noted the “almost uninterrupted order and quiet of the city” in the war’s first year and added similar pronouncements in his next three annual reports.² But we probably should not hang a judgment on the words of the man charged with keeping the city calm. While Henry’s optimistic words support the point, the conclusion that wartime Philadelphia was relatively calm rests on a broad reading of sources—both newspapers and personal papers—that should have revealed unusual disruptions.³
Of course such a conclusion implies some frame of reference. How much disorder must there be before a city is no longer “orderly?” Wartime Philadelphia appears orderly when measured against antebellum Philadelphia or against other wartime cities. On the eve of the Civil War Philadelphia had a long tradition of rioting. One historian, noting battles involving Irish immigrants, handloom weavers, rival fire companies and anti-abolitionist mobs, has called the three post-war decades “the bloodiest period Philadelphia has known.” The city’s most violent mobs roamed the streets during the 1844 riots which stemmed from rising hostilities towards the city’s Irish. Two altercations, in May and July, left at least eighteen dead, as many as ninety wounded, and an enormous amount of property destroyed. In New York’s July 1863 riot mobs of predominantly Irish New York workers responded to the Draft with four days of violence which left roughly 120 dead and 200 seriously wounded. In numerous other Northern cities and towns citizens responded to conscription with serious, if less devastating, violence. As we shall see, although potentially disruptive tensions often flared up in Philadelphia, apparently the various war-related conflicts claimed only one victim.

April 1861

The story begins in the hours after the firing on Fort Sumter. As news filtered into the city, Philadelphians took to the streets in search of more information. Soon crowds formed on streetcorners and in front of newspaper office bulletin boards. Although many in the city had favored peaceful compromise with the South, once war began Philadelphia’s streets were dominated by ardent patriots. As tensions mounted, anyone who seemed to support the young Confederacy risked mob violence. One citizen’s comments on the “alleged wrongs of the South” attracted a substantial mob, forcing him to take refuge in a Chestnut Street drug store. Later that evening a crowd forced an intoxicated Southern sympathizer to raise his hat and give three cheers for the Union. A third secessionist had his clothes ripped from his back, mobs threatened another with lynching, and several others were roughed up in the first days after Fort Sumter’s fall.

But such actions were only incidental to the mob’s larger agenda. On April 15th, the day after Sumter’s fall, crowds gathered at the Chestnut Street office of the strongly pro-Southern Palmetto Flag. From there they rushed to the homes of several wealthy Southerners (whose names and addresses were conveniently listed in a local newspaper) demanding
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shows of patriotism. For the next several days mobs swept through Philadelphia’s streets visiting hotels, colleges, newspaper offices and other prominent institutions.10

Many local diarists noted the wandering mobs and feared for their city, but despite rising tensions the disorder did not really amount to very much.11 On April 18th one citizen passing through the city found “the streets all a flutter with flags” and confidently reported that “we are not likely to suffer from the greater evil of partisan war among ourselves.”12 In fact, several days of tension resulted in very little damage. Buildings were visited, but none were burned to the ground; secessionists were harassed, but none were killed and apparently no one was seriously injured. In short, by the standards of the nineteenth century city, Philadelphia’s April 1861 disorders appear almost trivial. What explains this relative calm? Four forces combined to maintain calm in the war’s first few days; the first three depended on Mayor Henry for their success.

At the first appearance of danger the Mayor used his own powers of persuasion to mollify the crowd. When the mob threatened the Palmetto Flag’s offices, Henry personally appeared at an upstairs window waving a small flag and deftly calmed the crowd with a spirited speech.13 On the second day of rioting Henry once again stepped in to restore order, but this time he turned to preemptive actions to make his point. When a crowd gathered at the home of prominent Democrat William Reed, Henry arrived with a squad of policemen and announced that they would shoot to maintain the peace. Faced with this threat the mob quickly dispersed.14 Finally, Philadelphia’s intrepid Mayor turned to official threats to encourage citizens to return to their homes. On April 17th the newspapers printed a mayoral proclamation announcing that both individuals suspected of aiding the enemy and those guilty of “assembly in the highways of the city, unlawfully, riotously, or tumultuously” would be subjected to arrest.15

With these three techniques—personal appearances, preemptive police activity, and threatening announcements—Henry managed to maintain calm in the face of extreme tensions. To these we should add a fourth force: mob intimidation. While many Southerners and Southern sympathizers lived in Philadelphia, that April the streets were ruled by rabid anti-secessionists. Most who supported the infant Confederacy quietly slipped out of town, joined the Palmetto Flag (which shut down its operations) in judicious silence, or decorated their homes and offices with flags and banners. As one man put it: “It is at the risk of any man’s life that he utters publicly a sentiment in favor of secession or the
Thus, public pressure helped maintain order by silencing the opposition.

The first days after Fort Sumter’s fall established several patterns which were to mark Philadelphia’s experience for the next four years. Frequently tensions precipitated widespread concern for order in the city, but rarely were these fears realized. And those tools which kept the city calm in April 1861 served it well in the years to come.

**ORDERLY PHILADELPHIA**

In 1861 Philadelphia had numerous traits that could easily have provoked violent disorder in the years to come. Many members of the city’s elite were of Southern stock and much of the local economy relied on trade with slave states. Philadelphia also combined a greater proportion of blacks, four percent, than any other Northern city, with a widespread antipathy to abolition. In the pivotal election of 1860, Lincoln received only 52% of the Philadelphia vote as compared with 57% statewide. Moreover, local candidates spurned the Republican label (opting to run as the People’s party), while stressing tariff issues and ignoring abolitionism.

If the city’s population contained the “preconditions” for disorder, the war’s events certainly provided numerous potential catalysts. On several occasions inflammatory tensions developed when crowds gathered at the city’s various newspaper bulletin boards to learn the latest news from the battlefield. After Confederate soldiers routed Union troops at the Second Battle of Bull Run, for instance, Philadelphians were greeted with posted headlines from the New York *Tribune* (incorrectly) reporting that the Union army had been destroyed and Lincoln had denounced McClellan as a traitor. In the resulting confusion, one diarist reported “quarrels & fighting in the streets” while the *Ledger* described angry assaults on several anti-McClellan men. The offices of the Democratic *Age* attracted an angry mob in May 1863 by posting headlines applauding General Hooker’s defeat at Chancellorsville.

While losses on the battlefield led angry citizens to cast about for a victim on whom to vent their rage, political contests combined equally dramatic passions with immediately apparent enemies. As the war progressed, Lincoln’s policies—arbitrary arrests, greenbacks, conscription, emancipation, taxation—provided ample fuel for the loyal and disloyal opposition within the North. By the fall of 1862 Philadelphia’s Copperheads were openly in dissent. When, in January 1863, the *Evening Journal’s* Albert Boileau was arrested for publishing an
editorial criticizing Abraham Lincoln, many in the city feared the worst. A worried Sidney George Fisher wrote that he “should not be surprised if trouble grew out of this act” and George Fahrenstock surveyed the situation and concluded: “we are bordering upon anarchy.”21 A month after Boileau’s seizure, a jeering crowd turned out to assail Ohio Copperhead Clement Vallandigham as he spoke at the Girard House.22

While partisan political meetings were frequently the occasion for angry rhetoric, some of the most tense wartime moments accompanied election campaigning. The strongest upsurge of Democratic fervor, and the greatest threat to Philadelphia’s wartime public order, occurred in the weeks before the 1864 elections. On September 26th the Public Ledger warned: “Political excitement and partisan feeling are so high that, unless cool judgement is sprinkled over this passion, the contending parties are likely to come into serious collision at every public assemblage.”23 From mid-September to early November torchlight processions lit Philadelphia’s nights and on several occasions political displays disintegrated into brawls. On October 29th the Democrats held the largest torchlight procession the city had ever seen.24 When the Democrats passed the Republican headquarters on Chestnut Street a bystander was killed by an object reportedly thrown by a man sporting a McClellan button.25 From a window at the Age office, Anna LaRoche, the daughter of a prominent Democrat, watched the parade and later wrote: “we dread blood in the streets.”26

As Republican policies enraged local Democrats, wartime inflation placed a particularly heavy burden on Philadelphia’s workers, prompting them to turn to unionization and strikes to bring wages closer to antebellum levels. Such actions created several moments when problems could have led to violence, and the general inflationary climate could easily have molded an angry working class ready to respond to an unrelated incendiary incident.27

One particular subgroup, Philadelphia’s blacks, clearly feared that local tensions would bring violence down upon their heads. In August arsonists destroyed the home of a black Harrisburg man and in Philadelphia rumors circulated that hostile whites had prepared lists of leading black citizens destined for similar treatment.28 Following the March 1863 anti-black rioting in Detroit, Philadelphia’s black newspaper, the Christian Recorder, reported that “[e]ven here, in the city of Philadelphia, in many places it is almost impossible for a respectable colored person to walk the streets without being assaulted.”29 Then in July, with Philadelphia’s draft only a few days away, New York City
erupted into massive anti-draft and anti-black rioting. The Christian Recorder's readers felt the dangers most acutely:

Our citizens are expecting every day that a mob will break out here, in Philadelphia. And if so, it is thought, they will not only resist the draft, but will pounce upon the colored people as they did in New York, and elsewhere, and if so, we have only to say this to colored citizens of Philadelphia and vicinity: Have plenty of powder and ball in your houses, and use it with effect, if necessary, in the protection of your wives and children.\(^\text{30}\)

In addition to exacerbating political, class and racial tensions, the war also introduced a new disruptive force into Philadelphia: unruly soldiers. Philadelphia's size and location made it a critical depot for soldiers bound for the front as well as wounded and furloughed men on their way home. Throughout the war the city served as campground, training site, hospital and recreational haven for thousands of Union soldiers. By taking young men out of their homes the war unleashed a body with an enormous potential for mayhem.\(^\text{31}\) Frequently overzealous soldiers raised popular ire by battling in public places or, worse, shooting at deserters as they fled through city streets. But the greatest public outcry came when soldiers brawled with angry locals or stray bullets found innocent citizens.\(^\text{32}\)

While such strains certainly raised potentially disruptive tensions in Philadelphia, the principle cause of controversy, and the major catalyst for violence in other Northern cities, was conscription. The Northern draft rules were controversial both because Americans had relatively little experience with conscription and because the provisions of the Enrolment Act were widely viewed as biased in favor of the wealthy. The initial law allowed able bodied draftees to avoid service by hiring a substitute or by paying a $300 commutation fee. Vehement complaints helped lead to the removal of the commutation fee in 1864 (for all but conscientious objectors), but the substitute rule remained in place. (And with the commutation fee option removed, the market price for substitutes climbed rapidly.)\(^\text{33}\)

Dissent with government policies, dissatisfaction with the Enrolment Act, and occasional rumors that the drawings were fixed by the party in power helped turn many a draft day into a violent affair. In Philadelphia the first federal draft in July of 1863 was particularly tense, but while the enrolling officers ran into trouble in some wards and the provost marshals frequently had difficulties serving draft notices, the provost marshals reported no major violent incidents associated with the
draft.³⁴ On the final day of drafting the Evening Bulletin expressed its pride in Philadelphia for having withstood the draft with order and good humor.³⁵ The next three draft days also passed quietly in Philadelphia, but this was largely owing to the city’s vigorous recruiting efforts which filled most ward quotas without any need for conscription.³⁶

In sum, Philadelphia had every reason to break out in violence. The city had a long history of ethnic, racial and labor violence as well as a population with divided sympathies. Military setbacks, political conflicts, inflation, racial tensions, unruly soldiers and unpopular conscription all could have provided the tinder to set the city ablaze. Moreover, in many instances two or more of these catalysts came to a head at the same time, enhancing the chances for disaster. But although there was quite a bit a smoke, the record reveals precious little fire. The newspapers occasionally reported a fistfight or spontaneous crowd action in response to some ill chosen words by a Copperhead. Political contests regularly became heated, but apparently the only casualty came when a bystander at a Democratic torchlight parade was hit in the head by a rock. Some neighborhoods harassed draft enrollers, but when draft days rolled around the crowds who turned out for the public drawings were consistently calm and cooperative. In fact, probably the greatest violence attributable to the war must be laid at the feet of the Union soldiers who poured into the city. But even such episodes were infrequent, and they cannot really be attributable to wartime “tensions” per se.

UNDERSTANDING PHILADELPHIA’S CALM

Should Philadelphia’s wartime calm surprise us? Certainly other Civil War cities were not so fortunate. An examination of several violent episodes on the home front will help explain this paradox.

Often violence exploded at the confluence of several wartime tensions. In New York an unlucky draft day drawing ignited essentially anti-black rioting.³⁷ Rising job competition between blacks and whites, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, and the new class-biased Enrolment Act helped make Detroit a powderkeg in early 1863; but it was the arrest of a local mulatto for raping two girls which sparked racial violence in the Michigan city.³⁸ Irish stevedores in Cincinnati battled blacks in racial rioting touched off by the bitter struggle for jobs.³⁹ Draft day rioting in one Wisconsin town pitted Luxembourgers against German Protestants.⁴⁰ Charleston, Illinois Copperheads used draft riots
to repay a body of unarmed soldiers for repeated indignities at the hands of the military. The Confederacy, faced with much greater hardship, suffered through its own urban riots, many stemming from food shortages.

The accounts of these Civil War riots suggest that they reflected a wide range of long-term frictions—racial, ethnic, economic, political—which often combined with draft day tensions to disrupt local harmony. As we have seen, Philadelphians' lack of violence was not for want of tensions. Of course some of the conflicts which tore apart other cities were relatively less powerful in Philadelphia. For instance, secession temporarily crippled the local economy and rapid inflation certainly caused discomfort as the war progressed, but the war years were generally prosperous times in Philadelphia. And vigorous recruiting spared the city from substantial conscription in all but the July 1863 call-up. But this is only half the story. Philadelphia's wartime tensions were quite real and substantial. In several senses—history, racial and ethnic make-up, political climate, location—the city was a particularly strong candidate for violent upheaval. A full explanation for its orderly experience must consider what forces maintained that order.

Let us return for a moment to April 1861. In those anxious days Mayor Henry used personal persuasion, preemptive measures and shows of force to keep calm in his city. In a sense he was aided by the mobs themselves, who dominated the streets and effectively silenced dissent. These forces combined to keep local violence to a minimum.

In the years to come the same forces continued to serve Philadelphia well. When bad news from the battlefield threatened to divide the city, Copperhead voices were consistently silenced by the "patriotic" crowds who continued to rule the streets, forcing antiwar voices indoors. Those who did speak in public (often brave from drink) were frequently hustled off to jail by policemen before the mobs could do them much harm. More importantly, whenever planned events threatened local order, Mayor Henry positioned his police force ahead of time assuring that things never got out of hand. When Philadelphia's increasingly brazen Copperheads organized several large political rallies in mid-1863, the local police force massed outside and successfully kept angry hecklers at bay. Many expected a repeat of New York's disorders during the July 1863 drafts, but Philadelphia—profiting from its Northern neighbor's experience—kept calm with an impressive display of police and military forces at each drafting site. And when in May 1863 a thousand angry citizens massed before the offices of The Age, Mayor Henry, who had no time for a carefully orchestrated preemptive strike,
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personally came to the scene (accompanied by a large police force) and quelled the crowd much as he had two years before at the Palmetto Flag offices.

To these familiar means of preserving order were added new devices, rooted in federal power. Thus Federal troops joined local forces in preserving draft day order. And on several occasions federal marshals stepped in to arrest vocal Southern sympathizers and silence dissenting newspapers. But such arbitrary methods served to stir up disorder as well, as when Philadelphia Democrats used Constitutional arguments to stoke dissenting fires. In this same fashion, the military kept its own men in order with armed guards and provost patrols, but not without creating disorder and violence through their own overexuberance. And while provost guards were charged with arresting deserters, they were aided by hired civilian agents and private citizens who brought in deserters in exchange for government rewards. Thus, while the Civil War certainly yielded new methods for maintaining order, traditional means and players were most responsible for keeping disorder in check.

Of course the “public quiet” that Henry proudly noted in his annual reports should not be confused with civic harmony. The police force assembled in the mid-1850’s “battled” disorder quite literally. Henry’s predecessors had filled the force with tough veterans of Philadelphia’s street gangs who were quick to use familiar strong-arm tactics to maintain the peace. Thus, when the Mayor threatened violence his audience knew he could back up his words. And if the police force maintained order through intimidation, the citizenry certainly followed a similar formula. The mobs that demanded shows of patriotism in April 1861 and again four years later performed their own form of civic ritual, enhancing group solidarity while forcing community standards upon perceived enemies. Such demonstrations, coupled with the occasional street corner assaults on vocal Rebel sympathizers, assured relative order even when individual feelings ran high.

In April 1865 news of Lincoln’s assassination shocked the North. Philadelphia navigated the stormy waters that followed much as it had four years before. While most of the city joined in mourning, some were not so sorrowful. As in the days after Fort Sumter’s fall, several forces combined to assure order. First, the threat of mob violence encouraged many to keep their counsel. Second, police officers spirited away several loose-tongued Southern sympathizers before angry mourners could do much damage. Third, Mayor Henry anticipated assaults at the Age offices and ordered his police to protect the Democratic newspaper. And finally, Henry acted both publicly and behind the scenes to ease
tensions. The *Public Ledger* applauded his "personal efforts" in calming the streets. And recognizing that he and his police force could not be everywhere, Henry sent notes to prominent Democrats advising them to display mourning bows in their windows. Most heeded his advice and escaped unscathed. In short, when it came to maintaining order in the city, little seemed to have changed in four years of war.44

Let us now return to the other Civil War riots. The scholars who have examined these episodes have tended to focus on how particular events acted as catalysts, pushing underlying social tensions into open violence. But in each case there is another side of the story. Repeatedly the local forces for maintaining order proved insufficient and, more important, they were directed ineptly.

After a calm first day of drafting, New York City officials, expecting no trouble, left only a small police force at the draft office. When rioters overcame these men, inadequate reinforcements were sent. Once the riot got out of hand, a much larger force was required to restore order.45 The March 1863 riot in Detroit only broke out after the Provost Guard sent to escort the suspected rapist was removed from the scene.46 And similarly, the Cincinnati police successfully put down racial rioting until 120 of 160 available police officers were pulled away to help stop Confederate raider John Hunt Morgan.47 The Charleston, Illinois mob was led by the county sheriff, a prominent Democrat who relished the opportunity to attack unarmed soldiers.48 The draft commissioner in Port Washington, Wisconsin could not calm Luxembourger rioters because he himself was a hated German Protestant.49 And perhaps the most prominent case of official ineptitude came when Richmond's women, furious at food shortages, began looting the Virginia city. Despite widespread rumors of disorder, no police were on the scene as the crowd gathered. And when the violence started Mayor "Old Joe" Mayo (in stark contrast to the politically savvy Alexander Henry) stood atop a makeshift platform reading the riot act to a disinterested audience.50

What does all this add up to? In each case sufficient police or militia forces were probably available to calm crowds before they rioted, and in most instances local officials were aware of rising hostilities. The riots were not simply the result of uncontrollable tensions combining with unpredictable catalysts. Rather, these incidents could have been controlled with the tools at hand.

Certainly other cities managed to maintain calm under stress, but two such episodes reinforce the conclusion that Philadelphia's success was particularly striking. Boston, like Philadelphia, held its first 1863 draft
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in the wake of New York’s bloody rioting. In that city a North End mob assaulted two assistant provost marshals and a policeman who came to their rescue. The local police, who arrived unarmed, were soon overwhelmed and sought refuge in the station house until Mayor Lincoln arrived with military reinforcements. These combined forces soon dispatched the mob with far less carnage than New York had suffered.51

While Bostonians applauded their mayor and police for heroism under fire, the following year New Yorkers were, perhaps, spared further rioting through effective preemptive measures. As the 1864 elections approached, New York City braced for rumored sabotage by pro-Confederate forces. But election day passed peacefully as Major General Benjamin Butler—remembering the city’s inefficiency the previous July—deployed a large force in boats around lower Manhattan, leading one historian to credit Butler’s “unobtrusive yet ubiquitous presence” with maintaining calm.52

These two examples demonstrate that Philadelphia was not alone in diffusing potentially volatile situations. But each incident also underscores Philadelphia’s particular success. While Boston’s Mayor Lincoln showed bravery under fire, an armed police force might have silenced the mob without reinforcements while perhaps a better placed military force could have caught the riot before it got out of hand.53 The New York example reflects the power of an intimidating show of force, but whereas local forces generally preserved order in Philadelphia, the Secretary of War’s decision to deploy troops outside of New York was an explicit recognition that the civic authorities could not be entrusted with keeping the peace.54

Why was Philadelphia particularly successful? First, its police force was stronger and performed better than in other cities.55 And second, Mayor Alexander Henry was particularly adept at using the tools at his disposal. In so doing he artfully combined the skills of a “modern” mayor, directing a uniformed police force, with those of a traditional city mayor, relying on his own powers of persuasion to soothe an angry crowd.56

This success is partly owing to good fortune, but the fuller explanation lies in Philadelphia’s disorderly past. The two ethnic riots of 1844 had rocked the city. In the first instance the local militia hesitated too long; in the second case they acted decisively, but foolishly, producing more violence. The resulting loss of life generated a strong law and order backlash. On July 11, 1844, thousands of Philadelphians joined in a mass meeting in the State House Yard to promote civil order. During the
next 15 years a Philadelphia police force took form to further that end. In 1850 the legislature replaced the inefficient system of sheriffs and constabulary by a daytime “Marshal’s Police” with jurisdiction over all of Philadelphia County. Four years later the city council of the newly consolidated city created the first Philadelphia Police Department.

When Alexander Henry became mayor in 1858, one of his top priorities was an improved police force. In his first years in office Henry appointed a citizen board to oversee appointments, organized a special Detective Department, and put his force into new uniforms. By 1861, Philadelphians enjoyed a far more structured and efficient police force than during the riotous 1840’s. Thus, while successful recruiting and federal troops certainly helped matters, the key to Philadelphia’s wartime calm lay in its recent disorderly history.

NOTES

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1. The findings in this essay are part of a larger study of the Civil War home front in Philadelphia. See James M. Gallman, Mastering Wartime: A Social History of Philadelphia During the Civil War (forthcoming, Cambridge University Press).


3. This includes a complete reading of the Philadelphia Public Ledger from January 1861 through December 1865 and an extensive reading in several other local newspapers as well as in the available personal papers. The Ledger, which was published 6 days a week, was the city’s largest circulation newspaper. See Elwyn B. Robinson, “The Public Ledger: An Independent Newspaper,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography (January, 1940): 43–55.


8. By “war related violence” I mean conflicts over politics, conscription, emancipation and the like. Several individuals were killed in altercations involving soldiers or deserters.


11. For comments by onlookers see Joseph Boggs Beale Diary, April 15, 1861, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (hereafter HSP); J. A. Culley letter, April 15, 1861, manuscript room, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.; Fanny Kemble Wister, “Sarah Butler Wister’s Civil War Diary,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 102 (July, 1978): 274-276. Wister noted that the mob was “in the utmost state of excitement & the least thing would have fired them, & then riots must have followed.”


13. PL, April 16, 1861.

14. PL, April 17, 1861.

15. PL, April 17, 1861.


19. Scharf and Westcott, Philadelphia, 1:802; Diary of Jacob Elreth, Sr., September 1, 1862, HSP; PL, September 2, 1862.

20. PL, May 9, 1863; Dusinberre, Civil War Issues, p. 158.


23. PL, September 26, 1864.


25. In the weeks to come, Campbell, the only Philadelphian to die during wartime rioting, became a celebrated figure. Scharf and Westcott, History of Philadelphia, 1:819; PL, October 31, November 2, 4, 7, 19, 1864.


27. This issue is discussed in Gallman, Mastering Wartime, chapter 9. While real wages declined through most of the war and employers actively resisted the efforts of organized labor, Philadelphia’s workers enjoyed a very low unemployment rate.


30. CR, July 25, 1863.


34. Provost Marshals, Pennsylvania Districts One - Five, "Historical Reports," September 6, 1865, microfilm M1163, reel #4, National Archives.


42. For a description of the Richmond food riots see Michael Chesson, "Harlots or Heroines? A New Look at the Richmond Bread Riot," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 92 (April, 1984): 131–175.


44. PL, April 17, 1865; Glossman and Welch (editors of the *Age*) to Henry, April 15, 1865, F-2, Henry Letters, HSP. On April 15th Sidney Fisher wrote that an assault on the *Age* seemed "very likely" and perhaps even justifiable. Wainwright, *A Philadelphia Perspective*, p. 493.


48. Coleman and Spence, "The Charleston Riot."

49. Larsen, "Draft Riot in Wisconsin."


53. Lane notes that Mayor Lincoln summoned "regulars from outside the city." Lane, Policing the City, p. 133. When Philadelphia held its July 1863 draft the city's policemen were reinforced by both militia and federal troops. Of course this large preemptive force reflected Philadelphia's critical strategic position and was not entirely the mayor's responsibility. For communications concerning the July 1863 draft see Official Records, series III, volume 3, pages 491, 497, 499, 518–19, 532–33, 543, 573. In June a group of local citizens, dissatisfied with the troop build-up, appealed to President Lincoln. See Roy P. Basler, editor, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, eight volumes (New Brunswick, 1953), 6:279.

54. Longacre, "The Union Army Occupation of New York City," p. 131. Even when federal troops were used to protect order in Philadelphia, as they were in July 1863, such plans were made in concert with local police preparations.

55. Of course by "better" I mean that they were particularly successful at maintaining order; it is quite likely that disruptive citizens were less satisfied with the police force's methods.

56. John C. Schneider argues that by the mid-nineteenth century the traditional mayoral role as a "'moral' power ... was becoming increasingly irrelevant to the growing cities..." "Mob Violence and Public Order in the American City, 1830-1865," (PhD dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1971), pp. 81-111.
