Three stages in the dominant conception of formal rhetoric can be identified in eighteenth-century Philadelphia. A distrust of formal rhetoric characterizes the first stage. This distrust of formal rhetoric was part of the belief system of the Society of Friends who were preeminent in Philadelphia in the early decades of the century. Friends believed in a plain style of speech and were hostile to formal education and bookish learning. The distinguishing traits of the second stage are the increase in and the variety of rhetorical treatises available from booksellers at mid-century and after and the establishment of classical curriculas, including courses in Rhetoric, that would prevail throughout the second half of the century and into the nineteenth-century. It is clear that during this stage a cultural, though not a political, convergence occurred between Anglican and Quaker elites. The third stage is identified as that period during and after the Revolution when all forms of traditional authority were challenged. Rhetoric and the way in which it was taught were challenged, but the authoritative modes of rhetoric that were established at mid-century survived the period of cultural confusion that marked the latter decades of the eighteenth-century. This essay considers only the first two stages in the dominant conception of formal rhetoric in eighteenth-century Philadelphia.¹

Rhetoric, as conceived and taught in Philadelphia at mid-century, was not as we think of it today, a broad theory of all communication. Rather, it was an instrument that very few were taught to play. Even after the Friends ignored their distrust of rhetoric long enough so that their schoolmasters could include it in the curriculum, all students did not learn it. Rhetoric, in the Friends schools, in the College of Philadelphia, and in most of the available rhetorical treatises, was thought of as one of the crowning achievements of a classical education suitable only for a very select few. The English Schools, the schools for "mechanics," did not offer rhetoric. In short, rhetoric was taught to young men from elite backgrounds soon before they were to enter the world as commercial, political, or religious leaders.

The word leader is important here for, building on their classical model, these individuals believed that the best men were and would be the best orators. An essential characteristic of the gentleman aristocrat was to be able to please, to inform, and to persuade in both speaking and writing for purposes of the common good. The dominant conception of formal rhetoric in eighteenth-century
Philadelphia was, therefore, antithetical to the larger cultural challenge to traditional authority, a challenge embodied by the American Revolution. Because of its emphasis on the education of elite social leaders, this rhetoric was at odds with the egalitarian emphasis of both traditional Quakerism and emergent secular political trends. Formal rhetoric was part of a counter-trend, a trend that did not foster egalitarian ideas, but, instead, supported and maintained hierarchical ones. Once a dominant mode of rhetoric had been established, the elites who learned and used that mode viewed it as part of their control and power. When their authority was challenged, holding on to the traditional view represented for them one way to hold on to their power.

In *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman*, by Laurence Sterne, Tristram informs the reader that his father was "irresistible, both in his orations and disputations, he was born an orator." "And yet," Tristram continues, "'tis strange he had never read Cicero nor Quintilian *de Oratore*, nor Isocrates, nor Aristotle, nor Longinus amongst the ancients;—no Vossius, no Skioppius, nor Ramus, nor Farnaby amongst the moderns." The colonists who joined William Penn in his holy experiment in America believed that one should be as untrained in the art of formal rhetoric as Tristram's father. The Society of Friends distrusted rhetoric and advocated, instead, a straightforward, unadorned speech and prose style. Yet, the rhetorical treatises and related works available in Philadelphia as the century progressed were abundant, and though many of these advocated, in whole or in part, an unadorned prose, some advocated, in whole or in part, a highly ornate prose. Among the most influential rhetorics were those written by or derived from the classical rhetoricians Cicero and Quintilian. One concept found in or derived from Cicero and especially from Quintilian was the idea that rhetoric is more than a theory of speaking; it is a tool for the education of the ideal man. Defining the characteristics of the ideal man was also a concern of the eighteenth-century moral philosophers who promoted benevolence. Parallels can be drawn between the final book of Quintilian's *Institute of Eloquence* (and its use by eighteenth-century rhetoricians), the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting Book of Discipline, and the doctrine of the third Earl of Shaftesbury and others.

* * * *

The first quarter of the eighteenth-century in Philadelphia was influenced by the belief that rhetoric was a devious craft and a worthless pursuit. William Penn's popular enchiridion *Some Fruits of Solitude* (1693) warned its readers to avoid worldly knowledge, including formal rhetoric and urged them to gain understanding of the works of God. More specifically, Penn asserted that in writing or speaking one should "beware of affectation" which "often wrongs matter." "There is truth and beauty in rhetoric," Penn wrote, "but it oftener serves ill turns than good ones." Rhetoric, he said, "is too artificial for simplicity, and
oftentimes for truth." Truth needs no rhetoric and, Penn concluded, "where thou art obliged to speak, be sure to speak the Truth."  

Similarly, yet more forcefully, Thomas Lawson's *A Mite into the Treasury* (1680) provides a comprehensive synopsis of early Quaker attitudes about rhetoric. He addressed his work "to Heptatechnists, the Professors of the Seven Liberal Arts" and attempted, like Penn, to articulate the vanity of human worldly knowledge. Grammar, logic, rhetoric, music, arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy lead men away from the more important spiritual truths. "Christ commended them [the Disciples] not to heathen Schools, not to Aristotle, Plato, or any other Heathen, to enable them to refute Hereticks, but to his own Gifts, his Wisdom, Armour of proof, his Sword put into their Hands, enabling them for his Work." Logic, rhetoric, philosophy, pagan ethics, physics, metaphysics: "they are not of the Armour of God," Lawson proclaimed, but "of the old Dragon the Devil."  

Lawson elaborated his theme of the satanic nature of all the seven liberal arts in individual chapters on each art. In the chapter on rhetoric, for instance, Lawson provided a straightforward and standard definition of rhetoric: "Rhetorick is defined to be an Art of speaking Ornately, Finely, Eloquently, with *Rhetorical* Colours and Ornaments," and then followed his straightforward definition with
the claim that rhetoric was a result of the Fall, of the corruption of Man:

The Serpent that deceived man, and incorporated him into another Power, therein to think, speak, and act, brought forth another Language, out of the Simplicity of Truth, savouring of the Womb of its Original; though plausible, painted, eloquent, garnished with Colours and Ornaments of Pagan Rhetorick, yet 'tis Abomination to the Lord, stinks in his nostrils, and in the Nostrils of such as are truly re-born.

The only heavenly eloquence, Lawson wrote, is the language God speaks and it is a simple and plain language, a language that those educated in worldly ways consider "Rude, Clownish, and Babling." Lawson concluded, "Wisdom from below, introduced by the Serpent, Pagan Rhetorick, Eloquence, Enticing Words of Mans Wisdom, we deny, knowing the same to be foolishness with God."\(^5\)

Religious leaders within the Society of Friends were not the only writers to warn readers of rhetoric's shortcomings. "Enlightened" authors also inveighed throughout the century against rhetoric's power to mislead. In the often quoted conclusion to the "Of the Abuse of Words" chapter from An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke warned that rhetoric, "that powerful instrument of error and deceit," often insinuates wrong ideas and misleads the judgment. "Where truth and knowledge are concerned," Locke said, "words of eloquence are wholly to be avoided." Yet, in "Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman" he highly recommended Cicero, Quintilian, and Boileau for improvement in speaking and writing.\(^6\) Locke both endorsed the reliance on traditional authorities (such as Cicero) and fostered an empiricist emphasis on individual inquiry. These contradictory attitudes between traditional precept and individual inquiry lasted throughout the century. A second cause, therefore, of the ambivalent attitudes about rhetoric expressed in the eighteenth-century is the seemingly contradictory positions of traditional literary authorities and contemporary empirical scientists.

Some of this confusion or ambivalence is evident in the careers of Lawson and Penn. Although both men inveighed against formal education in their writings, both also were university educated. More significantly, in discussing eloquence Penn's maxims used personification and analogy and followed an expository development of thesis, illustration, comparison, contrast, and conclusion.\(^7\) Lawson, who ranted against rhetoric so prodigiously, hardly used a plain, unadorned style. Indeed, his entire volume employed a rhetorical conceit: that the seven liberal arts (worldly knowledge) were insufficient to open any of the seven seals of God's holy book. Rhetoric, according to Lawson, is "altogether incapable of opening any one of the Seals of the seven Sealed Book."\(^8\)

Furthermore, it appears that the rhetoric which Penn and Lawson condemned was that formulated by Petrus Ramus. Lawson's definition of rhetoric is
in fact quite clearly Ramistic. Ramus, a sixteenth-century French educational reformer, appropriated invention (the finding of arguments) and arrangement (the proper ordering of arguments) to the realm of logic and left rhetoric with only style and delivery. While Cicero's rhetoric was a broad discipline, Ramus's was, for the most part, limited to the ornaments of style. While the New England Puritans found Ramistic rhetoric quite to their theological liking, the Pennsylvania Friends did not. For the Ciceronian emphasis on the connection between rhetoric and virtue, embodied most clearly in his notion of the ideal orator, has no counterpart in Ramism.  

Early Friends school books followed the warnings and urgings of Lawson and Penn. George Fox's Instructions for Right Spelling, and Plain Directions for Reading and Writing True English, which had its first Philadelphia printing in 1701, was illustrated with Biblical examples and spiritual maxims, not with pagan quotations or contemporary verses. By the end of the century, however, a school book such as Milcah Martha Moore's Miscellanies, Moral and Instructive offered as examples of fine composition excerpts from Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Seneca, Plutarch, Pope, Cowper, and Young as well as Biblical extracts.

As the taste for reading grew, as book knowledge came to be viewed as a sign of prestige and power, the number and diversity of rhetorical treatises available to eighteenth-century Philadelphians increased. Advertisements and catalogues for Philadelphia book sellers demonstrate just how much was available. The earliest book advertisements listed only Bibles and primers. Gradually, Latin classics were also included and, by the mid-1740s, a wide range of books were listed, including many of the most contemporary rhetorics. By the 1760s, booksellers' catalogues and broadsides listed literally every rhetorical treatise then in print: Rollin's Belles Lettres, Stirling's Rhetoric, Guthrie's Cicero de Oratore, Vertot's Elements of Criticism, Fenelon's Dialogues, Gibbon's Rhetorick, Longinus's On the Sublime, and many others.

Similarly, the catalogues of books belonging to the Library Company of Philadelphia show a marked increase in the number of rhetorical treatises available at mid-century and beyond. The first catalogue, published by Franklin in 1741, listed but a handful of rhetorical treatises or related works. Yet, as the century progressed, virtually all books relating to rhetoric were bought by or presented to the Library Company, often soon after their initial publication and very infrequently years later.

A common characteristic revealed by these various book lists is the interest in classicism and the fact that classical writings on rhetoric were held in high esteem. Indeed, Cicero's basic ideas were ubiquitous. Found in nearly every rhetorical used in the eighteenth-century—from John Newton's section on rhetoric in The English Academy (1677) to Hugh Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783)—were the Ciceronian five parts of rhetoric (invention, disposition, elocution, pronunciation, and memory), six part oration (exordium, narration, proposi-
tion, confirmation, refutation, and peroration), and three kinds of oration (deliberative, demonstrative, and judicial), and three kinds of style (low, moderate, and sublime). English rhetoricians—as well as their continental and American counterparts—followed these general aspects of Ciceronian rhetoric. Bernard Lamy, Rene Rapin, Baron Biefeld, as well as the Philadelphians William Smith and John Andrews, all spoke of Ciceronian rhetoric.¹³
In the introduction to a chapter of excerpts from Cicero in *The Classick Pages: Classical Reading of Eighteenth-Century Americans*, Meyer Reinhold has written that "in eighteenth-century America Cicero was admired by some as a model of diction and oratorical style, idealized by many as a paragon of opposition to tyranny, and valued by all as a moralist." Indeed, Cicero was all of these things to the eighteenth-century Philadelphian John Smith. His diary and his commonplace books indicate that he read many works by Cicero and that he especially liked Conyers Middleton's *Life of Cicero*, which included copious quotation in translation. But specifically of interest here is the fact that Smith, a Friend, viewed Cicero in much the same light that he viewed leading Friends. In a letter to John Pemberton dated May 5, 1760, Smith talked of Cicero, Chalkley, and Story all in the same breath. Cicero, then, like Chalkley and Story, was a moral model who set standards worthy of emulation.

This indicates a significant shift from the doctrines of Penn and Lawson. Whereas Penn and Lawson discouraged the study of rhetoric and rhetoricians, later Friends found in this concept of the orator as moral exemplar a parallel to their own codified beliefs. Although Cicero wrote that eloquence is one of the highest virtues, that it is learned not from rhetoricians alone, but from an exemplar's whole life, it was Quintilian who emphasized "That None But a Good Man Can Be a Finished Orator." For Quintilian rhetoric was not only knowledge of fine speaking, but was the final step in the education of the perfect man and the highest virtue achievable, one which very few attained. Quintilian thus emphasized the virtue of the orator and, like Cicero, bound rhetoric to morality. Such emphases explain the shift from Penn's and Lawson's distrust of rhetoric to its inclusion at the Friends Latin School. Whereas Penn and Lawson in thinking of rhetoric thought of the morally neutral model of Ramus, later Friends such as John Smith and his father-in-law James Logan thought of the older and broader conception of classical rhetoricians. In short, because the dominant conception of rhetoric had changed, Friends changed their view of rhetoric.

The dictum "no Man can be a compleat Orator unless he is a good Man" was common to all works of rhetoric composed during that age. From Constable's lengthy summary of Quintilian in *Reflections Upon Accuracy of Style* to Blair's Lecture 34, "the true orator is a virtuous man," the moral and ethical character of the orator was a matter of much concern and it offered a solution to the problem of rhetoric's power to deceive. It was universally asserted at this time that all learning was worthless without virtue (and it was oftentimes added, somewhat tautologically, that learning was itself a virtue). For example, Blair informed youth, "Whatever ornamental or engaging endowments you now possess, virtue is a necessary requisite, in order to their shining with proper lustre." Similarities exist between the society of Friends, Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, Book of Discipline and the writing of Quintilian. Created early in the eighteenth-century because Friends were not following precepts and in order to insure strict obedience to Quaker ways, the Discipline was hand scripted and
distributed to many meetings. The Discipline began, "This is called our Discipline in the exercise whereof Perswasion and gentle dealing is sought to be our practice." Ultimately, according to the Discipline, persuasion and conviction were to come directly from God and be known to all men. "All should be of one Mind and become as one Family," they wrote. Yet, since all were not yet "of one Mind" and "as one Family," it was necessary to be a perfect example for others to emulate. The inner spirit was in all, but some were not prepared to respond to it. Providing examples for imitation was the most effective way to prepare and to enable others to respond. Thus the Discipline demanded "Truth ... not only in your conversation, but in your whole Life." The Philadelphia Quakers "accounted Social Affection & Communicative Good to be the greatest Virtue & highest purpose of Life." Similarly at the start of the Institutes Quintilian wrote, "I think that a Man who understands the social Duties, and how to manage both public and private Concerns, to govern Cities by Wisdom, to regulate them by Laws, and to improve them by institutions, is, in Fact, nothing but an Orator" and later in the Institutes he added, "The great Scheme of virtuous Life turns upon our practising, ourselves, those Virtues we observe in others."

Just as Quintilian and the Society of Friends spoke of social affections and virtue, so did the eighteenth-century moral philosophers who promoted benevolence. Shaftesbury, the movement's most eloquent spokesman, postulated that "the wisdom of what rules, and is first and chief in Nature, has made it to be according to the private interest and good of every one to work towards the general good." Furthermore, Shaftesbury's virtuoso is the equivalent of Quintilian's "compleat Orator." As Shaftesbury said, "the science of virtuosi and that of virtue itself become, in a manner, one and the same."

In classical rhetoric and contemporary moral doctrine, then, the Friends discovered parallels to their own beliefs that eased their acceptance of the teaching of rhetoric in the Latin School. Rhetoric was tied to virtue just as their own notion of effective communication was tied to virtue. Neoclassical rhetoricians whose works were owned by the Library Company and by individual elite Philadelphians concurred that persuasion was unlikely without virtue. The French rhetoricians Fenelon, Lamy, Rapin all agreed that "An orator cannot be fit to persuade People, unless he be inflexibly upright ... he should be a Person of such unspotted Probity as to be a Pattern to his Fellow-Citizens." English rhetoricians were of the same view. "An orator," John Homes wrote, "cannot be fit to persuade People unless he be inflexibly upright" and he concluded, "Virtue is the chief and most essential Quality of an Orator."

Other qualities that an orator must have—qualities insuring success and warding against deceit, qualities comparable to principles expressed by Friends—were conviction, humility, and moderation. Quintilian insisted upon conviction. The honest will prevail, he said, and therefore a man must truly feel in order to persuade, he must "himself be affected, before he attempts to affect others." "Even the best Speakers," Cicero wrote, "they who speak with the greatest Ease
and Grace, appear to me almost with an air of Impudence, unless they compose themselves to speak with a certain bashfulness." Holmes maintained that the best speakers invariably spoke on the best subjects and "low & mean Things" were avoided. "Cherish Magnanimity," he said summarizing Longinus, for "'tis impossible for such, who thro' the whole Course of their Life, have been used to a low and mean way of thinking, to write any thing so Sublime as to convey a lasting Pleasure and Admiration to all Posterity."

The Philadelphia Friends, like classical and contemporary neo-classical rhetoricians, believed that moderation, humility, and conviction were three important virtues necessary for "Social Affection & Communicative Good." Avoiding "a low and mean way of Thinking" was of much importance to the Friends of Philadelphia. Friend William Shewen, for example, warned that "thou must not only forbear to tell Tales, but thou must take heed How thou hearest, Whom thou hearest, and What thou hearest." Their Discipline warned that speedy action would be taken against "Such as are guilty of Tattling, Talebearing Reproaching Backbiting or Speaking Evil of their Brethren or Neighbours or busily medling where not Concern'd with the Affairs of other Folks." William Wade Hinshaw's Encyclopedia of American Quaker Genealogy lists disownments from the Society of Friends and reasons for such severe sanction. Although most were disowned for marriage contrary to discipline or military activity, occasionally a Friend was disowned for profane language or deviation from plainness in apparel or speech. The Discipline indicates what forms of speech were not allowed and these were "Backbiting whispering and reporting any thing to the injury of another." A second limitation was the use of the pronoun "you": "Not only because it is contrary to the true Propriety of Speech and Scripture Language, but it gratifies that proud, Human-like Spirit, which possesses the Hearts of such who would arrogate to themselves, the Homage & Reverence due to God."

The examples cited above illustrate the Friend's belief in the virtue of moderation and humility. Friends were not to exceed the bounds of propriety in speech nor to "arrogate to themselves, the Homage & Reverence due to God." The Friends also believed in the efficacy of conviction. For example, the longest quotation under the category "Eloquence" in Friend John Smith's commonplace books was taken from Burnet's A Discourse of the Pastoral Care. Gilbert Burnet was an Anglican divine of the Latitudinarian tradition, the direct antecedent of the later benevolent school of thought. In the passage Smith included, Burnet said the great rule of rhetoric is that the speaker must know the subject, be himself convinced of the discourse, and sincerely have those feelings which he desires to impart to and instill in his auditors. Furthermore, in the excerpt copied by Smith, Burnet asserted:

He that is inwardly persuaded of the Truth of what he says, and that has a Concern about it in his Mind, will pronounce with a natural Vehemence, that is far more lively, than all the Strains that Art can
lead him to. An Orator, if we hearken to them, must be an honest Man, and speak always on the Side of Truth, and study to feel all that he says; and then he will speak it so as to make others feel it likewise.\textsuperscript{37}

Similarly, James Logan (John Smith's father-in-law) wrote Thomas Story that "it is by no means proper freely to publish all ones thoughts, yet it is indispensably incumbent on an honest man to publish nothing but what he is at least convinced of in himself, \& believes to be true."\textsuperscript{38} He told another correspondent, Josiah Martin, that he was convinced of the truth of his \textit{The Charge Delivered from the Bench to the Grand Inquest} (1736) and therefore, in reading \textit{The Charge} readers' affections of love and benevolence were greatly raised and their understanding was "enlightened by it during the time their Affections" were "thus raised."\textsuperscript{39}

Another similarity between classical and neo-classical rhetoricians, moral philosophers, and the Philadelphia Society of Friends concerns the perceived goals and means of formal education. Rhetoricians, philosophers, and Friends alike felt that the goal of education was virtue, not wealth, and that from unprincipled teachers students learned only bad habits. In \textit{Miscellaneous Observations Relating To Education}, Joseph Priestley insisted that truth and virtue, not riches and popularity, were the true end of education.\textsuperscript{40} Shaftesbury similarly observed that virtue was the "chief and most amiable" beauty and that without it a man "must be miserable."\textsuperscript{41} He also observed that ill educated people err in both aesthetic and ethical judgment. Rene Rapin, writing nearly a century before Priestley and more than two decades before Shaftesbury, concluded that the reason there were so few orators in his day was because of the "evil" education society's leaders had received in their youth.\textsuperscript{42} Similarly, the Overseers of the Friends Schools in Philadelphia firmly stated that virtue was the primary goal of education: "above all, let there be frequent Opportunities taken and every Occasion employed, to inculcate on their tender Minds, the Necessity and Advantage to themselves, both present and future, of strictly observing the social, moral and Christian Duties."\textsuperscript{43} Like Rapin, the Friends warned against an "evil" education. Repeatedly in the Education section of \textit{Christian and Brotherly Advices} (appendices to meeting Disciplines that were occasionally updated) Friends were warned:

\begin{quote}
We think there is much cause to apprehend that some children, by the evil Examples and bad principles of their School-masters have been learned with those principles, which have led them to bad practices in the Course of their Lives.\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

In the eyes of at least one mid-century rhetorician, education reforms succeeded. John Holmes said that in past ages oratory fell when virtue fell, when men sought riches and luxury rather than true learning and the public good.
However, he concluded, there were once again both good men and good orators. As the Friends "accounted Social Affection & Communicative Good to be the greatest Virtue & highest purpose in Life," so Holmes believed "the most glorious Quality of an Orator . . . is to set Truth in the fullest Light, to represent it as amiable, and engage Men to love and Pursue it." These feelings about virtue are well summarized by the rhetorical question Fordyce asked in his benevolist inspired *Dialogues Concerning Education* (read and recommended by John Smith and Benjamin Franklin among others), what good is a fortune without a life that is good?

Rhetoricians, moral philosophers, and Friends stressed the common good as opposed to selfish interests. Charles Rollin, for example, claimed that the orator must always prefer "the public good to his own interest" and the Friends wrote that:

> tho' Things, as to the outward, may for a short time afford a pleasing Prospect, yet while a Selfish spirit that is not subject to the Cross of Christ, continueth to spread & prevail, there can be no long Continuance in Peace & Tranquility.

The Philadelphia Yearly Meeting warned and exhorted those Friends who became selfishly interested in worldly and fashionable ways "to return to that which first convinced them." James Logan's philosophical treatise "Of the Duties of Man as they May be Deduced from Nature" also stressed the common good as opposed to selfish interests. Following the beneficient line of Cumberland, Clarke, Shaftesbury, and Hutchinson, Logan stated that "Man was formed for society & Benevolence." We should Logan wrote, "Discharge of all our Duties in Life to procure our own happiness Consistently with the general Good of our Species." Once again, classical and neo-classical rhetoric and contemporary moral thought parallels Friends' beliefs. While it is true that calls for the common good became commonplace during this period, it is also true that classical and neo-classical rhetoric as well as contemporary moral thought fit and fostered such calls.

Although calls for the common good became commonplace, only the orator, the ideal man could be the engine of such good, and only a young man of privilege could become an orator. It was Quintilian's belief that rhetoric was the finishing stroke of the ideal man's education. These penultimate or final lessons were not meant for the yeoman or the apprentice for whom as Quaker schoolmaster Anthony Benezet wrote, it was "thought sufficient that he be taught to read and write, with a little arithmetick, and that often but very imperfectly," but for the landed young gentleman.

Rhetoric came late in a student's schooling and was taught to young men of "quality." Before entering the rhetoric class students were to be versed in all other arts. "The Object of an Orator's Ambition lies indeed high, and, therefore,"
Quintilian wrote, "I require him to have every Accomplishment." According to Quintilian, once in rhetoric class students "continue for some Time after they come to be young Men."

The age of young orators in eighteenth-century Philadelphia was the same as that suggested by Quintilian for those of first century A.D. Rome. According to Benjamin Rush and Samuel Johnson, the best time for students to study rhetoric was between the ages of fourteen and eighteen. The leading colonial Anglican intellectual, William Smith, also thought that rhetoric class should come late in the young man's schooling. In *A General Idea of the College of Mirania*, an essay that outlined the educational practices of an imaginary college, Smith said that rhetoric was taught in the fourth class of the Latin School and the Latin School was comprised of five classes.

The year after *A General Idea* was published, Smith explained to Richard Peters that rhetoric should come late in a student's education "because in order to write well we should have at least a general notion of all the sciences and their relations one to another." Two years later, in the *Account of the College, Academy and Charitable School of Philadelphia*, Smith added:

> Whoever would build, must have both the art and the materials of building; and therefore *Composition*, from one's own stock is justly placed after *Criticism*, which supplies the art, and not before *Moral and Natural Philosophy*, which enriches the understanding, and furnishes the *Materials* or *Topics* for the Work.
Finally, in his "Introduction to the Study of Rhetoric," delivered at the start of his Lectures on Rhetoric, 1760, Smith, in beneficent or Friend-like terms, stated:

Last of all, when we have stor'd the Mind with useful Knowledge, and have clearly digested it into a System, we are to consider, that we are not made for ourselves alone. The Deity has made us sociable Creatures, capable of assisting one another in the Pursuit of Happiness by a Reciprocation of Sentiments; and as we could not have attained the aforesaid Knowledge without the Assistance of others, so it becomes us in our Turn to call forth our knowledge into Use for the Benefit of our Friends, Country, and Mankind. It becomes the responsibility of those privileged to receive an advanced education to communicate this traditional knowledge to others and for this purpose God has, according to Smith, "endowed us with a noble Faculty of Speech and made us capable of using other Signs for the Communication of our Ideas." The business of rhetoric, he concluded, is the right management of speech and signs for communicating our notions to others.

In sum, rhetoric lessons came late in a student's education. Rhetoric's purpose, according to Smith, was to propagate wisdom, truth, and goodness, to bind society together, and to promote friendship. Beside coming at or near the end of a student's schooling, the study of rhetoric took much time. As Smith said, "to invest and work up every Thought with Beauty, Strength, and energy, so as to please, instruct and persuade is the last Improvement of much Study and strong Application." Not only were rhetorical studies reserved for the advanced student, they were also the sole prerogative of the gentry. Indeed, the advanced student and the genteel were one and the same. From Richard Blome's *The Gentleman's Recreation* (1686) to William Nixon's *Prosody made Easy* (1786), most educational texts that went beyond a primer's rudiments were specifically addressed to "Gentlemen" not to members of all ranks, races, and sexes. Henry Felton, for example, explicitly stated that his treatise on style was written for "a young Nobleman of sprightly Parts, and a lively Imagination." Furthermore, when for a short time Latin was taught at the Friends Charity School, teacher John Wilson resigned, protesting that Latin should not be taught to poor children of low birth. Even Thomas Sheridan, known for widening the opportunities for education to more of the populace of Great Britain, nonetheless concurred that rhetoric concluded a student's studies and said that his plan of educational reform was "chiefly calculated" for Gentlemen and that "the subordinate ranks" would later "reap the benefit of it." Finally, Basil Wiley has written that it is not the vulgar that Shaftesbury took account of, but "only the enlightened few."
By mid-century, then, formal rhetoric had emerged in Philadelphia as something for the few and as one way in which those few, Friend or Anglican, could differentiate themselves from the many. Some Friends' attitudes about formal rhetoric changed from ambivalence to acceptance. Two of the influences toward this change were the moral emphasis of classical and neo-classical rhetoricians and the moral philosophy that promoted benevolence. Both the rhetoricians and the moral philosophers warned, as did the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting itself, that worldly luxury needed the check of virtue. The virtuous man, they all concurred, harmonized private and public interests. And all concluded that it was only the virtuous man who could be the complete orator and that the complete orator was an ideal man, an example to be emulated, a true gentleman and leader, a model citizen whose personal happiness was bound to the public good. Once again to quote William Smith, rhetoric was not for "raw youths," but for, as Smith paraphrased Longinus, "men conversant in public life," men who, Smith continued, "have laid a foundation in the Sciences, and whose business it is now become to Think, Speak, Write and Act for the General Good."

Notes

The author thanks Professors Carla Mulford and David Shields for commenting on an earlier draft of this essay.

1. For an analysis of the third stage in the dominant conception of formal rhetoric in eighteenth-century Philadelphia see my essay "Before the Revolution: Formal Rhetoric in Philadelphia During the Federal Era," Pennsylvania History LIV (1987), 244–262. Throughout this and the present essay I use eighteenth-century editions and translations. With few exceptions, I use only books that I know were owned and read by eighteenth-century Philadelphians. These volumes and corresponding manuscript material provide an accurate understanding of the formal rhetorical situation in eighteenth-century Philadelphia. By formal rhetoric I mean only that rhetoric taught in schools or available for self-study in rhetorical treatises and related works. I do not mean the rhetoric of architecture or parades. For the revolutionary period also see Stephen Lucas's Portents of Rebellion: Rhetoric and Revolution in Philadelphia, 1765–1776 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1976). Lucas, however, makes no reference to eighteenth-century rhetorical theory anywhere in his text or notes; his one rhetorical source is Aristotle's Rhetoric. Wilbur Samuel Howell's Eighteenth-Century British Logic and Rhetoric (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) provides a thorough history of its subject.


5. Ibid., 17–21.

Some Thoughts Concerning Education. Here Locke recommends Tully as a model of fine speaking, but also warns that students are "never taught how to express themselves handsomely with their Tongues or Pens in the language they are always to use."


9. For the Puritan use of Ramism see the chapter on rhetoric in Perry Miller's *The New England Mind: The Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954). There exists one eighteenth-century Philadelphia manuscript rhetoric modeled after that of Ramus. Presbyterian minister David Evans, following the Ramus precedent, defined rhetoric as "the Art of speaking ornately" and divided rhetoric into "Elocution and Pronunciation." "Brevissima rhetorices institutio" included only a long section on style, mostly tropes and figures, and, secondly, a short section on delivery. In his "Logic," however, Evans discussed invention and arrangement and here he explicitly acknowledged his debt to Ramus (Manuscript dated 1734, Presbyterian Historical Society). Evans's rhetoric was an anachronism.


11. See booksellers' ads in *The Pennsylvania Gazette*, especially from 1740 to 1744, and see the many catalogues and broadsides published by Bradford and Hall during the 1760s.


15. John Smith, Letterbooks, 1750-1762 (Manuscript, Quaker Collection of the Havardford College Library). 2. I use the term Philadelphian loosely here for Smith lived much of his life in Burlington, New Jersey. However, he wrote for Philadelphia presses and conducted much of his business, civic, and religious activities in Philadelphia. Indeed, during his most productive years he lived in Philadelphia.


20. Edwin B. Bonner supported this view in a paper entitled "Quaker Discipline and Order, 1680 to 1720," (The World of William Penn, edited by Richard S. Dunn and Mary Maples Dunn [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986], 323-335). Bonner noted that the American Quakers codified their Discipline long before the English Quakers did. Although the Americans codified an oral form, they did not publish it. Their Discipline was hand scripted as by a scribe. In the 1750s, Lewis Evans offered to print the Discipline, but his offer was declined.
21. In *Prodigals and Pilgrims*, Jay Fliegelman discussed the shift from precept to example in terms of parental authority and Lockean educational theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

22. In his essay "Speaking In The Light: The Role of the Quaker Minister," Richard Bauman wrote, "The beliefs concerning the source of the ministerial message were augmented by a body of theory relating to the results of rhetoric, how a religious message was receive and convincement effected. The foundation of this theory was the Quaker doctrine that the light of God is present in everyone, though unrealized and unexperienced in some. By virtue of the presence of this Inner Light, every person is potentially responsive to the Truth. If a minister hearkened to the Light within himself and spoke according to its leadings, it followed that his message would arouse the Spirit of God in his auditors, provided they were prepared to receive it, because the spirit is everywhere unitary and identical" (*Explorations in the Ethnography of Speaking*, edited by Richard Bauman and Joel Sheryer [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1974], 151).

23. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, Book of Discipline, 1719 (Manuscript, Quaker Collection of the Haverford College Library), 2-39. The 1719 PYM Discipline was effectively that used until 1793.


25. Anthony Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, *Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc.*, In Two Volumes (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1963), I, 338, 217. For an explication of Shaftesbury's doctrine see Stanley Grean, *Shaftesbury's Philosophy of Religion and Ethics: A Study of Enthusiasm* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1967), Part Two, 137-263. I am well aware that it may seem odd to some that the conceptions of benevolence that were to become appropriated by deists are in the present essay associated with the Society of Friends. However, such thinking had become so pervasive by mid-century that, as John M. Robertson noted in his introduction to Shaftesbury's *Characteristics*, it "affected even the orthodox theology which repelled it" (xxix).


32. PYM, Discipline, 1719, 39.


34. PYM, Discipline, 1719, 39.


38. James Logan to Thomas Story, November 15, 1737, Letterbook "A" 6 January 1735/6, 8 June 1736-8 September 1738 (Manuscript, Historical Society of Pennsylvania). For more on James Logan's rhetorical beliefs and practices see my essay "James Logan and Gilbert Tennent," *Early American Literature* XXI (1986), 103-117.

39. James Logan to Josiah Martin, July 12, 1736, Letterbook "A."


43. "Advice to the Teachers in the different Schools under the Care of the Overseers of the public school founded by Charter in the Town and Country of Philadelphia," entered in the Penn Charter School Minutes, Meeting of the Overseers of Friends public Schools, 2nd month, 11th, 1796 (Manuscript, Quaker Collection of the Haverford College Library), 69.

44. PYM, Christian & Brotherly Advices, "Education," 1746 (Manuscript, Quaker Collection of the Haverford College Library), 192. Quintilian also stressed that the morals of masters must be impeccable (*Institutes*, I, 72).


46. Ibid., I, 14. Fenelon wrote that the "End of Eloquence" is "to persuade Men to embrace Truth and Virtue" (*Dialogues*, 18).


49. PYM, Christian & Brotherly Advices, 1759 (Manuscript, Quaker Collection of the Haverford College Library), 235.

50. PYM, Christian & Brotherly Advices, 1734 (Manuscript, Quaker Collection of the Haverford College Library), 40.

51. James Logan, "Of the Duties of Man as they May be Deduced from Nature" (Manuscript, Historical Society of Pennsylvania), Chapter 1, "Introduction," and Chapter 3, "Of the Intellect."

52. Much has been written on the subject of the common good in eighteenth-century America. Whether or not an innate social disposition succumbed to commercial self-interest is the subject of studies by Gordon S. Wood, Joyce Appleby, J.G.A. Pocock, John Patrick Diggins and others.


55. Ibid., I, 72. Lamy, too, warned that the art of persuasion is not for the young scholar (*Art of Speaking*, 284).


College of Mirania (New York: J. Parker and W. Weyman, 1753), 16-19.


61. Ibid., 8-10.

62. Henry Felton, *A Dissertation on Reading the Classics, and Forming a Just Style* (London: Richard Baldwin, 1753). An advertisement published within this book notes that it is "For young Gentlemen, either at School or the University."


64. John Wilson, "Letter to Overseers," 12th month, 28th 1769 (Manuscript, Quaker Collection of the Haverford College Library).

65. Thomas Sheridan, *A Plan of Education for the Young Nobility and Gentry of Great Britain* (London: Printed for E. and C. Dilly, 1769), 102 and 52. It will be remembered that Lamy claimed that "Persons of Quality and Learning endeavour to advance themselves above the Vulgar, and therefore avoiding to speak like them, will not make use of Expressions that they have spoiled. Persons of Condition are readily imitated by everybody, so that in a short time, those Words which are rejected by the Rich, or the Learned, are rejected by every body, and forced from the Court and the City, to retire into the Country, and become the Language of the Peasants" (*Art of Speaking*, 52). By the time Sheridan's improvements trickled down to the lower ranks would they be so antiquated as to be rendered useless?
