The People’s Triumph: The Federalist Majority in Pennsylvania, 1787-1788

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In 1787-1788 a sizeable portion of the American population opposed ratification of the Federal Constitution; probably a majority in New Hampshire, New York, Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina, and Rhode Island; and significant minorities in most other states. In the end the Federalists won, but only after protracted contests, only by narrow margins, and only through clever and occasionally devious electoral tactics. In Pennsylvania, Antifederalists also claimed to speak for the majority of the people and depicted their opponents as aspiring aristocrats conspiring to create a powerful, remote, unresponsive central government beyond popular control. Here, too, Federalists prevailed, but Antifederalists continued to insist that they, not the Federalists, spoke for the people of Pennsylvania, and that only a lack of time and resources had prevented mobilizing a solid majority against the new system.¹

Some evidence, particularly the Federalist "precipitancy" in calling an early state ratifying convention, appears to support the Antifederalists claims, but a closer look at the popular voting and at the public debates in 1787-1788 leads to quite the contrary conclusion.² Pennsylvania, in sharp contrast to such other large states as Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia, began and ended solidly in the Federalist camp.

Federalists carried the annual assembly election in October and the special convention election in November by solid margins, suggesting strong popular approval of the Federal Constitution in Pennsylvania.³ Then, events of the following months confirmed the depth and the strength of their support. The press exchanges between Federalists and Antifederalists, especially in the winter of 1788, combined with the failure of the Antifederalist campaign for nullification of ratification in February and March, and finally, the elections in the fall of 1788 all indicate that in Pennsylvania supporters far outnumbered opponents of the Federal Constitution in 1787-1788.

THE FALL, 1787 ELECTIONS

The annual legislative election of October, 1787 provided the first test of public opinion on the new Federal Constitution. For well over a decade two well-organized political parties had contested for power in Pennsylvania: the Constitutionalists, noted for their defense of the state’s constitution of 1776 with its all powerful unicameral legislature, and the Republicans who wanted to rewrite that
state constitution to give Pennsylvania a bicameral legislature with an independent executive. In the fall of 1787 most of the Constitutionalists opposed ratification of the proposed Federal Constitution at least in part because the new system with its two house legislature and its single powerful executive implicitly repudiated the principles of their state frame of government. Republicans, to a man, supported ratification of the new Federal Constitution, at least in part for much the same reason. Each side rightly sensed that the outcome of this contest over the Federalist Constitution could decide the future distribution of political power in Pennsylvania.

As the October, 1787 election approached, Federalists were apprehensive. On the one hand, the assembly's strong support in September for an early convention augured well for the Federalists' cause. Pennsylvania's legislators were as sensitive to popular opinion as any in the new nation. They stood for election yearly; they debated in an open public form; their decisions and their arguments and their votes appeared regularly in the official publications; their constituents knew how they were behaving, and had frequent opportunity to discipline them for unwise or unpopular decisions. Furthermore, in September, 1787 when Pennsylvania's legislators had voted for an early state convention to consider ratification, they had just returned from a long summer recess at home; and in a few days they would return home to face re-election campaigns. No men in the state could better gage public opinion. No legislators in American history were ever more susceptible to public pressure. That these men had voted almost two to one for a November convention was a significant good sign.

On the other hand, no political leader in Pennsylvania could rest on his oars. Since independence no party had enjoyed easy or consistent control of the all-powerful unicameral legislature and political fortunes changed quickly and dramatically. Two years earlier (1784-85) Republicans (now Federalists) had been a weak and powerless minority with no more than a third of the assembly seats. In September, 1787 they were the majority, but the next election could radically alter that.

The returns for the October Assembly election made clear that if the Federalists had worried, they had done so needlessly. Voters returned more than seventy percent of the incumbents, and replaced ten percent with men of like partisan identification and sentiment. Eighty-three percent of the Federalists and eighty percent of the Antifederalists were either reelected or replaced by men who agreed with them.

Two points deserve special attention. First, this rate of return was high in a legislature in which a fifty percent annual turnover was not uncommon. Second, most voters probably knew the position their representatives had taken on calling an early convention. The legislators had voted in a public roll call; observers had filled the open galleries; the newspapers had spread accounts far and wide; and when the voters had assembled in large numbers at the relatively few polling places.
places in the state, both incumbents and challengers had had opportunities to enlighten them.

Voters may or may not have understood the Constitution and its implications. Few, however, could have remained ignorant of their assemblymen’s action in the dramatic, violent and widely publicized last two days of the legislative session in late September. At that time the Republican (Federalist) majority had resorted to extraordinary means to schedule election of the state’s ratifying convention on November 6, a mere six weeks away. With few exceptions, these voters expressed their overwhelming support for what their legislators had done; and the exceptions themselves suggest the degree to which voters cast informed ballots.

For example, Hugh Henry Brackenridge, representative of Westmoreland in the far western reaches of the state, had committed himself on September 28 to the new frame of government. Less than two weeks later, his angry constituents decisively repudiated him. They elected a strongly Antifederalist delegation to the state assembly in October, and sent a solid Antifederalist delegation to the state convention in November.

Other factors contributed to Brackenridge’s defeat. He had already antagonized many by his behavior earlier in the legislative year. But his case was not unique. The voters in Northumberland, on the northwestern frontier, disciplined their legislators with equal vigor. Frederick Antes and Samuel Dale, both supporters of the state Constitutionalist party, had joined with their fellow partisans in the legislature in opposing the early state convention. In the assembly election in October, 1787 the voters of Northumberland replaced both men with Republican party members who supported the Federal Constitution. Then, in the November, 1787 election, Northumberland’s voters sent a Federalist delegation to the state convention. Finally, the next year, in the assembly election of October, 1788, Northumberland’s electorate confirmed this decision by returning the two Republican-Federalists to the state legislature.
Thus, in the October, 1787 assembly election voters in Westmoreland, in Northumberland and across the state reacted in ways which suggest that they knew and judged the position taken by their representatives on an early election of the state convention. In the November election that followed, the electorate re-confirmed their earlier decision. Counties whose legislators had supported an early convention sent Federalists to the convention; counties whose legislators had opposed the early convention sent Antifederalists to the convention; and the net change favored the Federalists.9

Twice in the fall of 1787 Pennsylvanians elected men who supported the proposed Federal Constitution. To the degree that this reflected informed choice
on the part of the voters, the overwhelming majority of the electorate in Pennsylvania favored ratification in the fall of 1787.

But did these voters know and understand what they were supporting? Possibly not. Antifederalists charged that the hurried elections had deprived many of the opportunity to study and debate the proposal, that in some areas people had voted before seeing the document, and that the Federalists had deliberately rushed ratification to preclude study and prevent understanding.

This is a serious charge. If true, then election returns and the political complexion of the elected bodies tell us less than we might hope to know about public attitudes towards the Federal Constitution. Furthermore, we cannot directly assess these Antifederalist arguments, since we cannot measure the quantity of knowledge and the quality of the understanding possessed by any particular set of voters.

The geographic distribution of Federalist and Antifederalist support across the state, however, is inconsistent with this Antifederalist conspiracy hypothesis. The voters in Philadelphia and the counties immediately surrounding it had the most opportunity to see and debate the proposed constitution. They sup-
ported it in overwhelming numbers. On September 21, the *Pennsylvania Packet* reported a "meeting of a very respectable number of the inhabitants of the different wards of this city, the district of Southwark and the township of the Northern Liberties" which unanimously agreed that the Constitution "be adopted as speedily as possible." The next day the paper described a similar meeting, chaired by Dr. Charles Bensel, in Germantown. And on September 24 a correspondent commented that "The eagerness that so unanimously has been shown to promote a federal government and insure the prosperity and liberty of America must evince the patriotism of the individuals who compose both the Constitutional and the Republican parties in this city...."11

Petitions to the legislature confirm press reports of widespread popular support in and around Philadelphia. Within days of the publication of the Constitution, some 4,000 individuals had signed petitions requesting early ratification. Opponents downplayed these petitions, arguing that half of the 7,000 or so taxables in the city and the suburbs had not signed, and that the signers included "minors, foreigners, and old women...." Antifederalists might well have been right on both counts, but the charges detracted little from the magnitude of the Federalist accomplishment. Generating 4,000 signatures from a population of 7,000 in few days was an awesome political accomplishment, possible only as a result of widespread and exuberant support for the measure.12

The election returns from the city tell the same story. In the Assembly election in October, two legislators who had led the Federalist effort in September (George Clymer and Thomas FitzSimons) easily won reelection, running at the head of their ticket. In the election of delegates to the convention in November, the Federalist candidates also won easily, averaging 1198 votes to the Antifederalists' 160 (142 if we remove the 235 votes Federalist Benjamin Franklin drew on the Antifederalist ticket). Federalists defeated Antifederalists by better than seven to one, drawing more than eighty-five percent of the votes cast here among the best informed and most sophisticated political participants in the state and among those who had had the most time to study, discuss and debate the proposed changes.13

This second election in Philadelphia, the November 6, 1787 election to the state convention, takes on added significance when placed in some historical context. The leading Antifederalist candidate, Charles Pettit, polled 150 votes, while the weakest Antifederalist candidate, James Irvine, polled 132. Three years earlier, in the assembly election of 1784, Pettit and his entire Constitutionalist party ticket had defeated future Federalist Thomas FitzSimons and his Republican party ticket by approximately 1,000 to 750. In 1785 Pettit and the Constitutionalist ticket lost by about 100 votes (averaging 1117 votes to the Republican's 1231), and the next year, in the fall of 1786, Pettit and Irvine each polled about 1,000 votes in a losing campaign. Thus, by the fall of 1787 both Pettit and Irvine were well known political figures in the city, and both had demonstrated a solid partisan base of support. When standing for election as opponents of the new
Federal Constitution, however, both went down to an ignominious defeat, gaining less than fifteen percent of their earlier vote.

Turnout in Philadelphia in this special November election of convention delegates was extraordinarily low. The number of Federalist voters was about average, but the number of Antifederalists voters plummeted. During the campaign Pettit and his running mates had remained virtually invisible, and on election day, they fared poorly. Their partisan supporters, dispirited by the obvious and overwhelming Federalism of the city, apparently chose to sit out the election.

The Antifederalists exhibited a similar paralysis in neighboring Bucks county. There, Francis Murray, like Pettit, Irvine, and the other Antifederalist candidates, was a long time member of the state Constitutionalist party. Murray had initially favored the Constitution. As reported by Joseph Hart, a fellow Constitutionalist party member from Bucks, Murray had "declared he was resolved to adopt it before he knew anything what it would do. . . ." Converted to Antifederalism by pamphlets written and distributed by Comptroller John Nicholson, Murray considered organizing an opposition (i.e. an Antifederalist) ticket in Bucks, but then gave it up. There was, he said "little hopes of carrying it, as the Quakers are entirely in favor of the new Constitution." Faced with certain defeat Murray could not muster the energy and the effort to organize what he recognized in advance must be a losing campaign. In Bucks as in Philadelphia, the people with the most time and the greatest amount of information supported ratification in such overwhelming numbers that Antifederalists saw no hope and made no effort.14
The distribution of Federalist and Antifederalist electoral support across the state also runs counter to what we would expect if voters at a distance from the sources of information supported ratification because of ignorance. If access to information determined voting behavior, then constituencies in similar geographic areas should have behaved in similar ways. This did not happen.

Possibly Montgomery and Berks counties best illustrate the inconsistency. Located northwest of Philadelphia along the Schuylkill River, both constituencies enjoyed easy access to the city papers and to the city leaders. Montgomery had four representatives in the legislature; Berks five; and in September, 1787, seven of these nine assemblymen voted with the Federalists. In the assembly elections early in October the voters expressed their dissatisfaction, replacing five with men of the opposite party, and reelecting four, two of whom had switched positions on the Federal Constitution. Thus, the electorate in these two counties initially took a strong Antifederalist position. The next month, however, in the election of delegates to the state convention, Montgomery chose a solid Federalist slate while Berks sent a solid Antifederalist delegation.

Here, on the upper reaches of the Schuylkill River, within easy distance of the city of Philadelphia, where each side had the time, the organization and the resources to explain its cases, the two months of debate had reinforced the initial Antifederalism in one county, and eroded it in the other. Why and how remains to be investigated. What is clear at this point is that Antifederalist charges that Federalists hoodwinked voters into easy and unthinking acceptance of the Federal Constitution do not explain why the citizens of these two counties, with similar access to information, acted in quite different ways. Furthermore, and in direct opposition to the Antifederalist's contention, the county with slightly less access to the common source of information voted no; the county with slightly better access voted yes.15

Nor were Montgomery and Berks unique. York and Cumberland, both west of the Susquehanna River and about equidistant from the city, acted in opposite ways: York was Federalist; Cumberland was Antifederalist. Lancaster and Dauphin, on the east side of the river, were also about equidistant from Philadelphia. Lancaster was ardently Federalist (six to one); Dauphin was vehemently Antifederalist.

In the far west, over the mountains, much the same pattern emerges. Fayette County adamantly opposed ratification; Washington, the most western county in the state, split about evenly. Westmoreland County, with a strong Federalist press in its midst (Pittsburgh Gazette) elected only Antifederalists. Examples and comparisons could be multiplied. The results remain the same. Counties in similar geographic areas with similar access to information reacted to the proposed Constitution in quite different ways.

In short, the geographic distribution of the Federalist and Antifederalist support, whether viewed from the state or the regional level, runs counter to the
Antifederalist contention that more remote areas failed to understand and therefore to oppose ratification. Areas with the earliest, best and easiest access to information overwhelmingly supported ratification, and the more remote areas divided in ways which bear no obvious relationship to their relative degree of isolation.

Finally, if access to information and thus depth of understanding were crucial, public sentiment should have shown signs of change during the eight months of debate between September, 1787 and April, 1788. To some degree this happened, but unfortunately for Antifederalist arguments, the change was in the wrong direction. Time, and presumably the dissemination of information, only strengthened popular support for ratification.

ANTIFEDERALIST RHETORIC, JANUARY TO APRIL, 1788

The state convention approved the Federal Constitution early in December, 1787, but this did not end the fight over ratification in Pennsylvania. On the contrary, the most intense phase of the struggle was yet to come, and this post-convention agitation between January and April, 1788 provides additional insights into the relative popular strengths of the contending sides. Two particular aspects of this period deserve careful attention: the barrage of Federalist and Antifederalist newspaper articles between January and April; and the petition drive for legislative negation of the convention’s decision.

First, the newspaper debate. Federalists and Antifederalists had argued the merits of the proposed system vigorously almost from the moment of its publication, but the volume of their newspaper exchanges reached new heights in the three months following the ratification. For example, a sample of four Philadelphia newspapers shows that Federalists and Antifederalists published with about equal frequency before the Convention (September 30 to December 16). After the convention, both sides substantially increased their rate of publication, Federalists by about fifty percent, Antifederalist by about one hundred percent. In short, the most extensive and impassioned newspaper debate on the Federal Constitution in Pennsylvania took place after the state convention had ratified the document. Why this was so is directly related to the second major development of this period: the all-out effort by the Antifederalists to pressure the legislature into nullifying the convention’s decision.

In this second, more intense phase of the public debate, Antifederalists inadvertently confessed their inability to attract and hold the loyalty of any sizeable portion of the people of the state. Although from the beginning Federalists claimed widespread popular support and condemned their opponents for refusing to submit to the will of the majority, Antifederalists never explicitly conceded this point. In time, they grudgingly admitted that the city and county of Philadelphia were Federalist, but as late as April, 1788, they continued to assert
that the majority opposed ratification.\(^17\) What they said, however, and how they said it, reveals that they themselves knew this not to be the case.

Most Antifederalist publicists offered vague assertions of generic, across-the-board support: "the people"; "all west of the Susquehanna"; "three-fourths of the lower counties"; "Germans, almost universally"; "nine-tenths of Pennsylvania"; "four-fifths"; eleven-twelfths; more than half of the people; "the back counties".\(^18\) When Antifederalists tried specificity, Federalists challenged their claims. For example, when an Antifederalist asserted that Quakers opposed ratification "Undeniable Facts" pointed out his faulty logic: "that numerous and
weighty society is certainly more universally in favor of it than any other society in this state." Were they not, he continued, their numbers were sufficient to allow them to easily elect Antifederalists from the city and county of Philadelphia.19

Federalists, on the other hand, claimed the support of identifiable groups and specific areas: the city, the Northern Liberties, Southwark, and Germantown, for example. They also gave precise details about popular and public meetings which endorsed the new Constitution: "a very numerous meeting" at the State House on November 3, voted unanimously in favor of the new Constitution; likewise: a meeting at Carlisle on October 3 chaired by John Armstrong; one in Easton on December 20 chaired by Alexander Patterson; another in Bethlehem (Northampton County) chaired by Peter Rhoads; a meeting at the house of William Lesher in Germantown; a meeting of the inhabitants of the city of Pittsburgh at the house of Messrs. Tannehills and chaired by General John Gibson.20

Antifederalist response to these specific cases is revealing. The aggregation of particular Federalist claims amounted to a major portion of the population of the state. More importantly for an understanding of the relative popularity of the contending sides, while the specificity of the Federalist assertions made them easily refutable if erroneous, Antifederalists seldom if ever challenged specific Federalist claims. This Antifederalist omission lends credence to the Federalists’ reports.

At the same time, Federalists ridiculed their opponents’ lack of support. The Antifederalist Pennsylvania Herald had folded, Federalists pointed out, because Federalists withdrew their subscriptions and Antifederalists were too few to support the paper.21 In the same vein, Federalists reported that an Antifederalist meeting in Montgomery County, at the Widow Thomson’s, was attended by only five people, "Not withstanding it is said great exertions were made to procure a numerous meeting."22

A second feature of the post-convention public debate suggests a growing Antifederalist frustration with popular electoral politics. Beginning in January, and with increasing intensity throughout the spring, Antifederalists talked of civil war. William Findley, in the closing days of the state convention, had hinted at future trouble. As reported in the Independent Gazetteer on December 21, 1787, "He concluded with declaring that he did not conceive ... the minority of the state could be bound by the proceedings at this day, but would still have a right ... to object to the proposed constitution, and, if they pleased, to associate under another form of government." In January, a "Free Born American" saw the potential for violence when he reported: "The lives of the federalists, say the members of the political club of Cumberland, will scarcely atone for their conduct."23 Another correspondent explicitly linked these two elements. The minority of the convention, he asserted, "are supported not only by their constituents but by a very considerable part of the whole body of the people of Pennsylvania,
who, it is expected, will soon confederate under these sentiments." And if the
constitution is ratified by the other states "A civil war with all its dreadful train of
evils will probably be the consequence. . . ."24

Hints gave way to threats in "An Address to the Minority of the State Con-
vention" signed by thirty Antifederalists in January, 1788. "The history of man-
kind," they began, "is pregnant with frequent, bloody and almost imperceptible
transitions from freedom to slavery. . . . Discontent, indignation and revenge" they
continued, "already begins to be visible in every patriotic countenance and civil
discord already raises her sneaky head. . . ." "If," they concluded, "the lazy and
great wish to ride, they may lay it down as an indisputable . . . axiom, that the
people of America will make very refractory and restiff hackneys. . . ." By April,
"Philadelphiensis" was warning: "Is the flame of sacred liberty so entirely extin-
guished in the American breast as not to be kindled again? No; you mistaken
despots, do not let such a preposterous thought madden you into perseverance,
lest your persons fall sacrifice to the resentment of an injured country."25

Antifederalist observers on the scene reported that blood was up, and that
men were ready to fight and die for liberty. "I am very confident that on the West
side of Susquehanna . . . there is at least nine out of every ten that would at the
risk of their lives and property be willing to oppose the new constitution," one of
John Nicholson's correspondents reported. In Shippensburg, Benjamin Blyth
also found men willing to "defend their Established Constitutional Liberty with
the risk of their Lives."26

In the press and on the hustings, Antifederalists saw themselves as beset, as a
people driven to extremes to defend liberties they could not protect through
normal electoral politics. Resort to violence, bloodshed and civil war is, by its
very nature, evidence of political failure. The Antifederalists' drift in this direc-
tion, if only rhetorical, suggests that they themselves increasingly despaired of
persuading their fellow Pennsylvanians through normal discourse.

Finally, while asserting vague claims to majority support, and acting like a
beleaguered and embittered minority, Antifederalists maintained hope, and their
expression of this hope reveals their perception of the state of public opinion.
They claimed repeatedly that they were making progress in enlightening their
deluded fellow citizens and that the popular attachment to ratification was erod-
ing. In January, a "Correspondent" reported that "The enemies of the proposed
government grow more numerous and more determined every day. . . ." At about
the same time "Philadelphiensis" cautioned: "Those who say that its [the Federal
Constitution] enemies are a few insignificant individuals, talk something like the
British military at the commencement of the war. . . ." But the conversion pro-
cess went slowly, at best, and some Antifederalists allowed their anger to show.
The inhabitants of Carlisle, for example, in their "Address of Thanks" to the
minority of the Convention struck viciously at the Federalism of what they called
"the senseless ignorant rabble of Philadelphia."27
Most Antifederalist publicists, however, remained outwardly optimistic. As late as March, a Letter from Franklin County reported that "Every hour the new Constitution loses ground in this part of the state" and the author of this letter believed that Franklin County was typical. The city alone, he concluded was still supporting ratification. "Philadelphiensis" admitted "that through fraud and surprise, many have inconsiderately joined themselves to its [the Federal Constitution] deceptive standard; but," he continued to believe, "their number is diminishing rapidly...".

"Philadelphiensis," like his fellow Antifederalists, hoped to wean the people from their Federalist attachments. Although he and other Antifederalists might have denied it, the logic of their statements suggests both the breadth and the strength of the popular support for the Federal Constitution in Pennsylvania. By what they said in public, Antifederalists defined themselves: an increasingly frustrated and angry minority, hopeful that the people would repent and join them, but unable to identify more than a handful of specific allies, and moving towards violence and civil war as the bulk of their fellow citizens failed (or refused) to see the dangers lurking in the diabolical system.

By April, even the threat of civil war had become unlikely. The press barrage had converted few. The number of men ready and willing to spill real rather than rhetorical blood was uncertain, and few heroic leaders offered to risk all for the cause of liberty. As a Federalist had earlier taunted, "will [Centinel] risk himself, at the head of a company of his Carlisle white boys ... or ... would [he] not rather shelter himself under a safe office, as he did during the late war, until the bloody storm was over?"

Although the verbal battles were over, no one was ready for real war, and Antifederalists were reduced to insulting their opponents. "You were from your infancy" one informed the Federalist writer Francis Hopkinson, "known to be little, and little folks will always be dirty... You are," he continued, "a 'pimp' or at least you have used 'pimping methods' [and you are] a petty-fogger and insignificant." When the exchange reached that level, it must have been clear to most that the Federalists had won.

Inadvertently and unintentionally in the spring of 1788, Antifederalists by their posture, their pleas, their laments, and their anger indicated that they viewed themselves as a politically impotent minority. And in March, 1788 the final failure of the massive Antifederalist petition drive for revocation of ratification both reflected and reinforced this perception.

THE ANTIFEDERALIST PETITION CAMPAIGN, JANUARY TO MARCH, 1788

The history of the petition campaign to negate Pennsylvania's ratification of the Federal Constitution remains to be written. What we know, however, is suffi-
cient to draw several conclusions. After Pennsylvania's state convention had ratified the Federal Constitution in December, 1787, John Nicholson, Comptroller General of the state, initiated a well-organized campaign to pressure the legislature into nullifying the convention's decision. He drafted and circulated a petition demanding “that it [the Federal Constitution] may not be confirmed by the legislature of this state, nor adopted in the said United States, and that the delegates to Congress of this state be instructed for that purpose.” In short order, Nicholson enlisted enthusiastic allies in Lancaster, Northampton, Franklin, York, Bedford, Cumberland, Northumberland, Dauphin, Westmoreland and Washington counties, and the campaign began.

The Antifederalist press commented favorably on the project, and the *Free-man's Journal* observed that “from the general temper of the farmers and the complexion of the assembly, it is almost certain that we will have another convention in a legal constitutional manner. . . . We may expect a power of petitions will be laid before the assembly . . . for this purpose.” Two weeks later a correspondent in the *Independent Gazeteer* noted that “the enemies of the proposed government grow nore numerous and more determined every day.”

Reports from the field confirmed this progress. John Black from Marsh Creek warned Federalist Benjamin Rush in early February that “Some of the people of Franklin County . . . are preparing a petition to the Assembly to interpose their authority that the new Constitution may not be adopted . . . .” Richard Bard, a Nicholson organizer, wrote to his mentor on February 1 that he was circulating a petition in his township (Mercersburg) and believed that “there will be at [least] ten persons that will sighn [sic] the petition for one that will refuse to do it.” His brother, he added, was meeting with good response in Bedford, and that people beyond the Allegheny Mountain “are enraged at [the Constitution] and even in york county where all the members in the late Convention voted for said constitution there are great numbers of the people much dissatisfyd. . . .”

In mid-March the petitions cascaded into the legislature. On the 17th, Peter Trexler of Northampton introduced appeals signed by about 230 people. By the end of that week the number of petitioners had grown to nearly 4,000 as Dauphin, Bedford, Franklin and Cumberland joined. The next week brought another 2000 or so from Cumberland and Westmoreland, and by March 29 the legislature had before it pleas from more than 6,000 people demanding nullification of the state's ratification of the Federal Constitution.

Massive petitioning was an old, tried and effective political technique in Pennsylvania. A similar petition campaign in the winter of 1779-80 had panicked legislators into reversing their earlier call for a popular referendum on the state constitution. Antifederalists obviously hoped for much the same result now, but their hopes were dashed.

At least two factors account for the failure of this petition drive and both tell us much about the state of public opinion in the winter and spring of 1788. First,
all of these legislators had been elected (or re-elected) in October, 1787, and most had taken a public stand on the Constitution before their election. Their constituents, knowing where they stood, had elected them. This alone should have strengthened the confidence of the sitting legislators. Secondly, most of these men had spent the winter recess among their constituents. These trips home had come after the ratification by the state convention and after some three months of public debate on the proposed document. These assemblymen thus knew what a close analysis of the geographic origins of the petitions revealed: the shrill cries for revocation of the state’s ratification came not from a broad cross-section of the electorate, but from a highly concentrated minority of voters in a small number of Antifederalist counties. Three counties alone, Cumberland, Dauphin, and Franklin, accounted for more than eighty percent of the total signatures.

The massive outpouring of sentiment against the Federal Constitution represented not the concerns of the general electorate, but rather the views of voters in those few counties already represented in the legislature by Antifederalists. The Antifederalist petition campaign posed no political threat to the Federalist majority in the house. They could safely ignore it, and they did.

The petition drive in the winter and early spring of 1788, like the press attack which accompanied it, reveals the continued minority status of Pennsylvania’s Antifederalists. In addition, the magnitude of the coordinated, two-pronged Antifederalist assault on the Federalists makes it difficult to attribute the Antifederalist failure to organizational or communication difficulties. Nicholson and his fellow Antifederalists orchestrated a complex and far-flung political campaign which flooded the press with rhetoric and the legislature with petitions. They amassed more than 6,000 signature from such widely scattered counties as Dauphin and Berks in the east and Westmoreland in the far west. The petition drive and press campaign demonstrated the Antifederalists’ capacity to inform and mobilize their potential supporters across a wide geographic extent and in remote regions of the state. The word went forth, but it converted few.

When the assembly adjourned in the spring without taking action on the Antifederalist petitions it voted with its feet in favor of the new Federal Constitution. These legislators believed that Pennsylvanians supported the new system of government. Six months later the voters overwhelmingly confirmed this judgment.

THE FALL, 1788 ELECTIONS

In the fall assembly election, Federalists gained another, and more impressive victory. The voters returned seventy percent of the incumbents, suggesting a fair amount of popular satisfaction with the work of the legislators. More importantly, the changes which took place favored the supporters of the Federal Constitution. In half of these cases, voters elected men of the same party (eight Republicans and two Constitutionalists). In nine of the remaining ten instances,
the Constitutionalists lost, giving up six seats to the Republicans and three to men who voted with neither bloc. When the dust settled it was clear that the Antifederalists had lost nearly thirty percent of the seats they had held in the previous assembly.37

By any measure, this was a devastating blow. In the previous legislature, the Twelfth General Assembly elected in October, 1787, Constitutionalists had been a sizeable minority, a viable political force still within striking distance of future control of the legislature. In the Thirteenth General Assembly, elected in October, 1788, they were powerless, with little hope for recovery. For all intents and purposes, this defeat ended an era in Pennsylvania history. The once powerful and popular Constitutionalist party, rebuffed by the overwhelming majority of the voters, was rapidly approaching oblivion.38

More to the point, the demise of the Constitutionalist-Antifederalist party in the fall assembly elections of 1788 again demonstrates the extent of popular commitment to the new Federal Constitution. The Constitutionalist party had provided both the leadership and the bulk of the electoral support for the opposition to the Federal Constitution in Pennsylvania. By the winter of 1787-88, in the minds of most, Constitutionalists and Antifederalists were one; and in October, 1788 the voters repudiated both. Opposition to the Federal Constitution was dead in Pennsylvania, killed by those on whom the Antifederalists had called, and for whom they had purported to speak, the people of Pennsylvania.

The popular vote in the November 1788 Congressional elections provide us with a final opportunity to assess public opinion in Pennsylvania on the Federal Constitution. Approximately 14,500 voters participated in the election, and they divided forty-four percent for the Harrisburg (Antifederalist) ticket to fifty-six percent for the Lancaster (Federalist) slate.

By November, 1788 the Federalists thus remained substantially more popular than the Antifederalists in the state of Pennsylvania. Furthermore, this 44 to 56 ratio probably exaggerates Antifederalist support. The issue in this election was not ratification of the Federal Constitution, but whether an already ratified document should be amended in ways which posed no serious threat or direct challenge to its fundamentals.40

A number of Federalists might well have supported these kinds of changes. Federalists, like Antifederalists, believed in civil liberties. Once ratification and implementation of the new system was assured, they could view demands for amendment not as an obstructionist tactic, but rather as reasonable additions to an already accepted and approved system. Some Federalists who had quietly recognized the need for modification may well have voted for the Harrisburg ticket to insure that now desirable result.

This option may have been particularly attractive to the Philadelphia Constitutionalists who had broken party ranks to support ratification (or at least had not responded to the Constitutionalist leadership demands for a negative vote).
Now that ratification was assured, these men could comfortably return to their older loyalties and support traditional Constitutionalist candidates with little fear of losing the Federal Constitution. This, for example, may well explain the unusual political behavior of Charles Pettit, a well known Constitutionalist and a prominent Philadelphia businessman, who remained almost invisible during the ratification controversy and then emerged as a leading figure in the post-ratification drive to elect Constitutionals to Congress.41

The central point remains. Fourteen months after publication of the Federal Constitution, and a full year after the election of the state ratifying convention, and after one of the most extensive and intensive and protracted and heated examinations in the entire nation, Federalist voters in Pennsylvania still exceeded Antifederalist voters by a substantial margin.

The Federalists carried the two popular elections in Pennsylvania in the fall of 1787 by approximately a two to one ratio. The Antifederalists, by the spring of 1788 talked like a discouraged and defensive and beleaguered minority. The legislature chose to ignore and thus defeat a major Antifederalist petition drive for nullification of the state's ratification. The voters of the state then demonstrated their approval by significantly increasing the Federalist control of the legislature and by sharply reducing the Constitutionalist-Antifederalist contingent. Finally, in the election for the U.S. House of Representatives in November, 1788 the voters again demonstrated their support for the avowed Federalist candidates.

The Antifederalists had had over a year to convert the people of Pennsylvania from their stubborn support of the new Constitution. The Antifederalists had lacked neither the organizational skills nor the leadership necessary for an effective political campaign. The Philadelphia press had teemed with Antifederalist polemics and John Nicholson put together an impressive network of correspondents across the state to mount the petition campaign.

Neither ignorance nor isolation nor lack of information played the decisive role in Pennsylvania's response to the Federal Constitution. One of the most well-informed and politically active and astute electorates in the new nation, participating in a sophisticated political system, under the auspices of one of the most democratic constitutions in the new nation, and in the state with a well developed and complex communication and transportation network, overwhelmingly, frequently, and persistently approved ratification of the Federal Constitution between September, 1787 and November, 1788. Why Pennsylvanians behaved in this way, and how they actually divided over the issue, and how this relates to the evolution of partisan politics in the state, and to the developing political cultures and structures of the new nation, is currently being explored. But however we finally interpret this major event, we must start with the realization that Pennsylvania stood alone among those large states whose ratification was crucial. Its voters knowingly, repeatedly and in overwhelming proportions supported the new frame of government.
Notes

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4. Ibid., passim.

5. Party designation of individuals through this essay is based on Guttman scale analysis of all legislative roll call votes in the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Pennsylvania General Assembly. See O. S. Ireland, "Crux of Politics," William & Mary Quarterly, XII (Oct., 1985), 453-475 for details. Estimates of party strength in elected bodies rely heavily on these party designations.


9. In September, 1787 Federalists controlled nine counties with 39 seats, Antifederalists controlled eight counties with 20 seats. In November, 1787 Federalists controlled ten counties with 39 seats; Antifederalists controlled six counties with 19 seats. Two others were evenly divided; one was new. Nine county delegations with 36 seats remained the same: five Federalists counties with 25 seats; four Antifederalist counties with 11 seats. Fed-
eralists strengthened their position in five other counties, gaining control of one, solidifying their majority in two, and picking up half of the delegation in two. Antifederalists strengthened their position in three, gaining control of one, strengthening their position in another, and picking up an isolated seat in a third.

10. Obviously circumstances vary from constituency to constituency and local issues can influence local contests. The point being made here is simply that whatever may have caused the particular geographic distribution of Federalist/Antifederalist support, the details of that pattern do not support the Antifederalist conspiracy hypotheses. On the contrary, the pattern is quite inconsistent with such a view.


13. Election returns for this and following paragraph from Brunhouse, Counter-Revolu-


15. Here, as earlier, the point is that the geographical distribution of the Federalist/Anti-federalist vote is inconsistent with the Antifederalist conspiracy hypothesis.

16. These generalizations are based on a simple frequency count of four Philadelphia newspapers: a weekly and a daily on each side of the issue. Articles in the Packet, a Federalist daily, were 81 percent in favor of ratification; those in the Mercury, a Federalist weekly, were 94 percent in favor; articles in the daily Independent Gazetteer were 65 percent Antifederalist; those in the weekly Freeman's Journal were 88 percent Antifederalist. I read each issue of each paper from late September through early April. Within each issue I counted every prose item which contained a negative or a positive com-

17. Tangentially, but of no little consequence for our understanding of the nature of the political divisions in late eighteenth century Pennsylvania, both Federalists and Antifederalists appealed to the same basic source of legitimacy: the will of the majority. They differed only in their judgment as to which of them met this criterion.


22. Independent Gazetteer, Jan. 16, 1788.


25. Independent Gazetteer, Jan. 9, March 8, 1788.


30. "To Hopkinson from Scordato", Mercury, April 5, 1788. The Antifederalist Harrisburg Convention of September, 1788 accepted the
Federalists' victory. It asked the people of Pennsylvania to peacefully accept the new frame of government and then went on to nominate candidates for the fall elections and to propose amendments to the Federal Constitution. For a good, brief description of this meeting see Baumann, "The Democratic-Republicans of Philadelphia," pp. 127-132.

Whether the organizers of the Harrisburg Antifederalist convention initially hoped for more remains unclear. They issued the call in a circular letter dated July 3, 1788. By that time the ninth (NH) and the tenth (VA) states had ratified and further resistance was futile. Possibly, the initiators of the Harrisburg Convention were not aware of or did not care that NH and VA had already ratified, but in any case, by Sept. they no longer threatened civil war nor worked for popular rejection of the new Federal Constitution.

36. Ibid. My calculations.
37. See footnote 5 for sources of partisan attachments of individual assemblymen.
38. Ibid.
39. Like each of the previous measures, this one also has its limitations. The principal unknown variable is the "German Question," i.e. the degree to which electoral support for well-known and widely recognized Germans on both the Federalist and Antifederalist tickets reflect an ethnic vote which was unrelated to the ostensible issue at hand.

The difficulty arose when neither the original Harrisburg Antifederalist ticket nor the Lancaster Federalist ticket contained the expected proportion of German candidates. Each ticket went through a number of official and unofficial modifications, and in the final line-up the Antifederalist ticket contained five long-time Constitutionalists, one recent convert (William Irvine) and two highly visible Germans: Lutheran Peter Muhlenberg and Reformed Daniel Heister.

Heister, a long time Constitutionalist had initially vacillated on the question of the Federal Constitution. In time, however, he came to accept the ardent Antifederalism of his constituents in Berks County. Peter Muhlenberg, in sharp contrast, had no public partisan image or history in Pennsylvania and had taken no public position on the Federal Constitution. All indicators, however, suggest that he was a Federalist: his long service as an officer in the Continental Line, his family's ties to the Republicans, his brother's conspicuous leadership of the Federalists, and his own later political behavior, all point in that direction.

These two Germans, the one an avowed Antifederalist with long and strong ties to the Constitutionalists and the other a probable Federalist with Republican associations, led the Harrisburg Antifederalist ticket in popularity, running about 800 votes ahead of the next highest Antifederalist (Findley) and almost 1500 ahead of the lowest Antifederalist (Whitehill). Both men polled a fair portion of their "extra" votes in Federalist areas with substantial German populations: Philadelphia city and county, and Northampton County.

The "extra" (and probably ethnic) votes gained by Heister and Peter Muhlenberg skewed the Federalists results. Five long-time Republicans who were ardent public supporters of the Federal Constitution averaged about 8160 votes each (all five were within about 100 votes of this figure, for an average deviation of less than two percent from the mean). A sixth, also a long time Republican and staunch Federalist, was the prominent German Lutheran Frederich Muhlenberg. He led the Federalist ticket with 8726 votes, well above the average for his five non-German colleagues. The remaining two Federalists lost, running about 1,000 votes behind their fellows. The gap between them and their successful running mates approximated the number of votes by which the two successful German Antifederalist candidates exceeded the votes of their non-German running mates.
Obviously, precise measures of the size and thus the significance of the "German vote" remain impossible. If, however, we subtract 1,000 votes from the two Germans on the Harrisburg Antifederalist ticket and add this to the two non-German losers on the Lancaster Federalist ticket, then all eight Antifederalist candidates average about 6400 votes (plus or minus a few percentage points) and the seven non-German Federalists on the Lancaster ticket average about 8100 votes (plus or minus a few percentage points). Figures from Brunhouse, *Counter-Revolution*, pp. 343-344.

A different set of assumptions and a different set of calculations would produce somewhat different figures, but fine-tune the results as we may, the conclusion remains approximately the same.

40. Merrill Jensen and Robert Becker, eds. *The Documentary History of the First Federal Elections 1788-1790* (Madison, WI, 1976), I: 259-264 for details of Harrisburg Antifederalist convention and its proposed amendments. See Jensen, ed., *Ratification*, II: 597-9 for Antifederalist amendments offered by Robert Whitehill on the last day of Pennsylvania's state convention, Dec. 12, 1787. Although the two sets of proposed amendments differ substantially, both accepted the end of the Confederation, the federal government's need for an independent revenue, the exclusive national control of international trade and commerce, the sanctity of contracts, the limits on paper money, the separation of powers, a bicameral legislature, a single and independent executive with veto power, and the entire package of internal checks and balances.

41. In 1791 Pettit said he had been at the Harrisburg convention to be "instrumental in restoring harmony in the state" Jensen and Becker, eds., *First Federal Elections*, I: 258. I wish to thank Roland Baumann for bringing this to my attention.