

The Politics of Ideology: The Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention of 1789-90

Joseph S. Foster
*Biographical Dictionary of
Early Pennsylvania Legislators*

The decision of the Pennsylvania Assembly to rewrite the state constitution in 1789 brought to a merciful conclusion the bitter controversy surrounding the politically charged 1776 Constitution. Even so, the strife that the House put behind it did not resolve the uncertainties over the state's political future. What kind of constitution would be adopted, and would it serve as a unifying symbol for all Pennsylvanians, while embodying the republican and democratic values that emerged during the Revolution? The answers were not clear, for the public had yet to define those very values in terms upon which all could agree. Their anxieties, however, were readily allayed, because the new constitution established a popular frame of government. With that result in mind, historians have generally stressed the partisan and ideological triumph of the new constitution's supporters over the faction supporting the 1776 document, and that the new document represented the end of one era and the beginning of another. Sometimes lost within the broader approaches to Pennsylvania's post-war constitutional history are the subtle, and dramatic, political changes that occurred during the state constitutional convention itself.¹ Recent literature on the constitutional period in Pennsylvania (1776-1790) focuses on a variety of issues, including constitutional development and republican dialogue. The article, by contrast, examines the influence of politics and constitutional theory upon one another, as evidenced in the 1789-90 Pennsylvania State Constitutional Convention.²

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During the war and for a brief period from 1784 to 1785 the Constitutionalist faction controlled the state government, while the Republican faction wielded power during most of the 1780s, particularly from 1786 to 1790. In 1787 the Republicans engineered Pennsylvania's ratification of the proposed federal Constitution, and by 1789 they had reversed nearly all of their opponent's major political programs. One item remained. On March 24, 1789, the Republicans passed a resolution suggesting that a convention should be held to abolish the 1776 Constitution and to replace it with a new model of government. On September 15, the House made the suggestion official and ordered the election of delegates to a constitu-

tional convention that would convene on November 24.³ As the Republicans anticipated, they and their supporters easily won a majority in both the Assembly and the convention during the October elections.

Although some members from the western counties had yet to arrive, the delegates assembled at the State House in Philadelphia on the afternoon of November 25, 1789 and called to order the convention for altering and amending the state constitution of 1776. They elected as chairman Thomas Mifflin, the veteran Pennsylvania politician and president of the Supreme Executive Council.⁴ By the time the convention adjourned ten months later the delegates had repealed Pennsylvania's frame of government enacted in the early months of the Revolution, replacing it with the 1790 Constitution, a document that embodied the republican principles of 1776: a Bill of Rights, an independent judiciary, and an elected legislature and executive. The new frame of government, however, significantly altered the relationship between the branches of government. Gone were the weak plural executive and the all-powerful unicameral Assembly; in their place the delegates provided for a governor equipped with veto power and a bicameral legislature. Furthermore, the convention established the direct popular election of the governor and the members of the Senate and House of Representatives and provided for legislative districts based on equitable divisions of population.

Yet while the 1789-90 convention ultimately produced a popular constitution, it had also witnessed debates that revealed an unexpected conflict among the delegates over the purpose of bicameral government and its role in a democratic society. At issue was the proposed state Senate and whether it should represent population, wealth, or a political system that established an exclusive group of senators elected by an intermediary body of popularly-chosen electors. The debate was not simply over form, but in fact reflected two irreconcilable perceptions of republicanism. On the one side stood the traditional philosophy of mixed government; on the other, an emerging ideology that challenged previous assumptions over representation and argued for a mixed government based on a more inclusive democracy. This ideological clash had significant political reverberations, deeply dividing the majority party at the convention. The issue was only resolved through the formation of unlikely political alliances among the convention delegates.

The 1790 Pennsylvania Constitution was written over a period of ten months, but the political context that led to its drafting and enactment had existed for fourteen years. The genesis of the 1790 Constitution lay in the upheavals of the Revolution and the controversial 1776 Constitution—a document that struck at the heart of republican ideology through its revolutionary structure of the legislature. In the nation-wide public debates during the war and post-war periods over who was more qualified to govern, twelve of the thirteen states adhered to the traditional

concepts of eighteenth-century English Whig political thought, and established, or continued, property qualifications for those elected to public office. Only Pennsylvania departed from contemporary political ideology by rejecting an upper house, or Senate, and abolishing any differences between the elected and the electors, establishing instead an unicameral, all-powerful, legislature. The plural executive with weakened powers was typical of the state constitutions adopted during the Revolution, but the absence of a Senate created a controversy in Pennsylvania that lasted fourteen years.⁵

The sharp debate over the 1776 Constitution involved two factions, the Republicans and the Constitutionalists. While their mutual opposition was partisan and at times petty, the two groups represented serious differences of opinion over the nature and form of government. Constitutionalists assumed that specially selected upper councils or executives of equal or greater authority than that of the Assembly were unwarranted intrusions upon the people's liberties and compromised the integrity of the House, which they considered the only legitimate voice of the people. Consequently, the single House was the linchpin of their philosophy, for it would place society's numerous interest groups upon an equal footing with one another in the unicameral legislature and thereby prevent special constitutional advantages to any one group. Annual elections were also established as an added safeguard against political entrenchment. Constitutionalists also assumed that through a shared sense of civic duty those interest groups in the Assembly would form a common bulwark against factionalism and tyranny.⁶

The Republicans, by contrast, argued that competing interest groups would not form a common bond, and that the unicameral legislature lacked any real checks or restraints. Public policy under such a system was bound to be inconsistent, as in the case of the chartering, unchartering, and rechartering of the Bank of North America within the space of seven years. An anonymous Republican polemicist observed in 1789 that as the "public duty" was "ever best discharged when most connected with private interest," the constitution should be structured to reflect society's diversity, allowing freedom of expression for all groups, while stabilizing the government's ability to make policy.⁷ Only through a system of checks and balances, or a polity consisting of two legislatures and an executive with the power of veto, could a republic guarantee freedom for all.⁸

The debates of the 1789-90 state constitutional convention brought into focus the unresolved, or undefined, purpose of bicameral government, beyond its purported stability when compared to a unicameral polity. Nearly all of Pennsylvania's politicians unequivocally supported popular sovereignty; conflict arose among them over the issue of representation. For some delegates, the presence in the government of those who were deemed more qualified than members of the general population was essential to the survival of the republic. This traditional

Whig theory greatly influenced American colonial and revolutionary governments.⁹ For other delegates, a variation of the traditional Whig theory prevailed; they argued that property needed to be tied to the distribution of political power. In the event, proponents of these positions envisioned the Senate as the most appropriate political and constitutional institution that would accommodate these traditional values.

By the 1780s a growing number of Americans had rejected the traditional view of bicameralism, arguing that attempts to construct upper councils based on social characteristics were impractical and undemocratic, undermining the foundations of republican government. Instead, these new voices claimed that bicameralism, in conjunction with an executive having veto power, served solely as a check upon the actions of each branch of the legislature. Beyond that, the legislators were to represent the entire voting public, without regard to social or economic distinction. There the issue remained until the opening of the 1789-90 Constitutional Convention, and while the delegates were ready to resolve the debate over the unicameral legislature, many of them were unprepared to grapple with the more divisive issue of the purpose of bicameralism.¹⁰

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Historians have generally viewed the 1789-90 convention as both the conclusion of ideological and partisan factionalism arising from the controversial Constitution of 1776 and the beginning of political conflict based on national issues as represented by the Democratic-Republican and the Federalist parties. This perception has been reinforced by Pennsylvania historians of diverse historical traditions, including Robert L. Brunhouse, Harry M. Tinckom, C. Page Smith, Roland Baumann, Barbara Weill, and Douglas MacNeil Arnold, the last mentioned providing perhaps the most thorough discussion of the convention proceedings.¹¹ In his history of Revolutionary and post-war Pennsylvania, Arnold supports the traditional theme that at the convention the Constitutionalists were forced to abandon the unicameral legislature, while the Republicans divided over the manner in which senators should be elected in a bicameral government. In this analysis, one group of Republicans led by James Wilson joined with the Constitutionalists and established that members of the upper chamber would be elected directly by the people, who would vote in legislative districts based solely on the distribution of population. Arnold stresses that differences among Republicans over representation in the Senate were only secondary, and that by achieving their fundamental goal of a bicameral government, they were ultimately triumphant.¹²

Although the argument that the Convention served as a signpost marking the passage of one political era to another remains persuasive, it ignores the political drama that unfolded during the convention's proceedings. When the convention adjourned *sine die* on September 2, 1790, the delegates undoubtedly understood that an era had come to an end and that the two parties that gave expression to the

war and post-war periods had undergone a lasting transformation. But they must have been equally aware that the events of the convention itself had revealed a profound uncertainty over the nature of republican government and that the differences between the Republicans over bicameralism were not secondary, but were, in fact, fundamental, while the compromise of the Constitutionists represented less a surrender than a friendly takeover. Finally, the delegates must also have realized that they had reached a significant moment in the development of American political thought by establishing the direct election of the representatives by the people—that is, white males, without any reference to wealth, wisdom, or any other yardstick except the standard one of gender.

The about-face performed by the Constitutionists and the explosive rupture among the Republicans at the convention provided the central political drama that characterized the convention's proceedings. After fourteen years of tirelessly espousing the superiority of the all-powerful unicameral legislature, the Constitutionists at the convention voted to abolish the single house in favor of a bicameral legislature and to establish a strong executive, with only five dissents in the first instance and none in the second. The behavior of the Republicans at the convention, on the other hand, was equally remarkable. After years of debating the necessity of a balanced government, they broke ranks, argued among themselves, and failed to build a majority among the delegates on the issue of the bicameral legislature.

During the spring of 1789, and in the months that followed, the Constitutionists publicly decried the expense, illegitimacy, and unpopularity of the proposed convention and the Republicans' claims of public support. Missing from their articles and addresses, for whatever reasons, was the spirited ideological defense of the unicameral government that had characterized the constitutional debates of 1776. Samuel Bryan's "Centinel Revived, No. XXXVII" provided a detailed defense of the ideological underpinnings of the "single Legislature," and its ability to secure "the rights of the people."¹³ Buy Bryan's exposition was perhaps more personal than practical, because it was published on November 11, 1789, one month after the convention elections.

For their part, the Republicans zealously attacked the 1776 Constitution and demanded a new state polity, while methodically laying out their reasons for the necessity of a convention. Yet their failure to define their notion of bicameral government pointed to either uncertainty or inconsistency. Thus, while one author asserted the need for two undefined branches to be elected every two years, another called for one of the two houses to represent specifically the "men of middling fortunes," while presumably the other branch would represent men of better fortune.¹⁴ Benjamin Rush contributed to the confusion by arguing that apportionment of the national legislature should have been based

upon population and wealth.¹⁵ Just as the Constitutionalists lacked ideological fervor for their old frame of government, so also the Republicans couched their visions of a bicameral legislature in general terms.

The political context of the constitutional debate was equally influenced by those who represented the two parties at the convention. Many of the delegates lacked political experience, only about half having served in either the Assembly or the Supreme Executive Council prior to their election to the convention. The Republicans, however, were particularly inexperienced. Although delegates James Wilson and William Lewis were well-known politicians and party leaders, only five Republican delegates, including Lewis, had served three or more terms in the Assembly.¹⁶ Moreover, such party dignitaries as Thomas Fitzsimons, William McClay, Benjamin Rush, Gerard Wynkoop, William Bingham, and Jared Ingersoll, most of whom were at Rush's house in the spring of 1789 laying the groundwork for the overthrow of the 1776 Constitution, did not stand for election to the convention.¹⁷ Consequently, the Republicans relied on lesser party members or anti-Constitutionalist sympathizers for support, albeit with less than complete success. "Take your seat in the Convention as soon as possible," wrote Jacob Rush, brother of Benjamin, to Supreme Court Justice William Atlee, a delegate from Lancaster County, for "you are one of the oldest judges in the state & your non-attendance will consequently be a subject of infinitely more speculation than the non-attendance of a dozen others."¹⁸ Despite Rush's sense of urgency, Atlee's attendance was sporadic.



William Findley

Although they were the minority party, the Constitutionals, on the other hand, were well represented by their political leaders and party veterans. Eleven of that party's delegates had served for three or more terms in the Assembly, and the party was led in the convention by many of its most prominent leaders.¹⁹ Constitutionalist delegates William Findley and John Smilie were both four-term Assemblymen who had also served in the Supreme Executive Council, the Council of Censors, and the 1787 state ratifying convention, while party leaders Robert Whitehill and James McLene were both six-term Assemblymen, members of the 1776 Constitutional Convention, and of the Supreme Executive Council. Whitehill also participated in the ratifying convention, while McLene served as a state representative to the Confederation Congress. Unlike their opponents, the Constitutionals were well prepared for the political confrontations and party discipline that proved crucial during the convention debates.

Thus, the backdrop to the convention debates had, in part, already been established by the time the delegates arrived in the city, sought their lodgings, renewed acquaintances, and traded political gossip in the last week of November 1789. The Constitutionals, perhaps weary of the ideological contests based solely on the principles outlined in the 1776 Constitution, appeared at the convention led by experienced party veterans seeking the means to participate effectively in the proceedings. The Republicans, on the other hand, were perhaps the least prepared, despite their eagerness to rewrite the state constitution. They had failed to establish among themselves the definite meaning and function of bicameral government and, ironically, were relying on lesser experienced party members or associates to carry out their goals.

During the first several days of the convention, the delegates proceeded cautiously on the issue of constitutional revision. On November 30 the convention carefully avoided possible disruption by resolving itself into a committee of the whole in order to consider "whether and wherein" the present Constitution required "alteration or amendments." Although the answer to that question was a foregone conclusion, Alexander Addison, a Constitutionalist delegate from Washington County, nevertheless inquired on December 2 whether the current unicameral Assembly "ought to be altered" at all? After a protracted debate, James McLene sought to stave off the inevitable by suggesting that the committee adjourn for the day, but a majority of delegates easily defeated first McLene's motion and then that of Addison, signalling the end of Pennsylvania's experiment with the unicameral legislature, the heart of the 1776 Constitution.²⁰ One week after Addison's unsuccessful motion, the Constitutionals joined the other delegates in supporting a series of resolutions that ordered the new government to consist of a single executive with veto power, and two legislative houses. The motions easily carried, 56-5, 64-0, and 60-4.²¹

Despite their acquiescence to the new political order, the Constitutionalists, had in fact, maneuvered themselves into a position of power, in part because of the efforts of William Findley, the savvy party leader from Westmoreland County. While he was probably anxious to avert the political disaster his party had suffered at the 1787 state ratifying convention, Findley believed that the time was right for constitutional revision. He never completely approved of the 1776 document and believed that it would always "want of confidence," as "so great a difference of opinion" prevailed over it. The old constitution was perhaps "good in theory," but he argued that the history of controversy, deviation, and disgust with the effectiveness of the Supreme Executive Council shared by both parties, made "vain" any hope of restoring the revolutionary document. Findley was ready, therefore, to support a new form of government if it conformed to acceptable democratic principles, and in this goal he found a ready ally in Republican leader James Wilson.²²

A delegate from the city of Philadelphia, Wilson welcomed Findley's support. Like his party colleagues, Wilson believed in the efficacy of a bicameral legislature and a strong executive as suitable checks and balances for a democratic government. He maintained, however, that governors and representatives should be elected directly by the people in districts based solely upon population. Contrary arrangements, he argued, created artificial distinctions that undermined popular sovereignty and hoisted governments upon foundations that were "neither solid nor lasting." Although Wilson unsuccessfully argued at the 1787 Philadelphia Federal Convention for the direct election of national senators to a chamber based upon population, he now, in December 1789, proposed the same principles to be used in the state constitution. To achieve his goal, Wilson reached an understanding with Findley sometime during the second week of December. They agreed to support one another in the debates over direct election of senators and, through their combined efforts, help to defeat attempts to predicate the state constitution upon traditional Whig principles.²³

On December 11, the convention elected a Committee of Nine to propose a constitution based upon the resolves passed the previous day. The committee consisted of Findley, Wilson, Lewis, Addison, Henry Miller, James Ross, Charles Smith, and William Irvine.²⁴ Despite the presence of Findley, Wilson, and Addison, the committee followed the lead of Lewis, a prominent Republican politician during the late 1780s. A lawyer by profession, Lewis had led the prosecution against anti-Federalist printer Eleazer Oswald in 1788 and, as an Assemblyman, had supported the overthrow of Pennsylvania's 1776 frame of government in the spring of 1789.²⁵ Now, at the convention, he prepared a constitution that omitted any mention of property requirements either for senators or the governor and that contained a franchise identical to that of the 1776 Constitution (all freemen, aged 21 or older, who paid taxes). The document also provided for two branches of the legislature and a single executive with the power to veto legislation.²⁶

Yet Lewis's constitution was firmly fixed in the traditional Whig political philosophy, for it proposed the indirect election of senators through a small, intermediary body of representatives. His senatorial election plan called for citizens, while voting directly for their representatives, to also cast ballots for two Electors, who, in turn, would "meet together at some convenient place within the district, and elect the Senator or Senators for their district."²⁷ An Elector could not vote for himself, be an officer of the government, or a member of the legislature. Modeling his plan after the Maryland Senate, Lewis sought to provide the basis of electoral differentiation from the lower house that would, in theory, sift out from Pennsylvania society its wiser leaders for the upper house. Like Findley and Wilson, Lewis supported popular sovereignty, but, as a traditional Whig, he believed that constitutional mechanisms were necessary to ensure the presence in government of those who possessed "the *most* wisdom, experience and virtue."²⁸

On December 21, the Committee of Nine presented Lewis's draft to the convention. Whether Lewis foresaw the disruption his plan would cause is uncertain, but his proposal revealed the sharp differences of opinion among Republicans and their supporters over legislative representation in a democratic republic. Instead of the convention debates turning on the merits of bicameralism vis-a-vis unicameralism, as the Republicans perhaps anticipated, the debate now focused on the purpose of the convention itself. Was it called in order to establish a political system steeped in the richness of traditional English Whig philosophy? Alternatively, was it called to extend the principle of popular sovereignty to its logical conclusion by declaring that each part of government was to serve only as a check upon itself and each to be directly responsible to the people on an equal basis? For several weeks the delegates debated and argued, sometimes bitterly, and realigned their former political associations before resolving the central question posed by the competing proponents of bicameralism.

At the outset of the debate, some delegates urged that wealth be used as an additional criteria in Lewis's proposed election process. Accordingly, on December 23, Samuel Ogden proposed that representatives to the lower house possess a freehold estate of £100. Because of an apparent lack of support, he withdrew this motion the following day. Four days later Timothy Pickering suggested that the distribution of senatorial districts and senators be based solely upon the wealth of the district, measured by the amount of public taxes paid. Pickering's motion hit a nerve, for an intense debate erupted, and an attempt by Robert Hare to adjourn for the day was defeated. More debate followed, and a second motion to adjourn, proposed by Wilson, passed only after the presiding chairman, Thomas McKean, cast a tie-breaking vote in the affirmative. Despite the intensity of the debate, Pickering's motion on the following day was easily defeated, with support coming only from its author and William Robinson.²⁹

A still greater debate lay ahead. On December 30, an attempt by Wilson and Findley to bring to the floor Lewis's elector system was initially denied, but later that day Wilson (seconded by McLene) again requested the delegates to consider the indirect election of senators; this time the members agreed.³⁰ Once again, furious discussion ensued. Wilson argued forcefully for the direct election of the senators by the people, despite opposing arguments from Pickering and Hare. Lewis soon joined the fray, and the debate narrowed to personal and abusive attacks between Lewis and Wilson.³¹ Lewis, however, was apparently overmatched, for Wilson's speeches were described by an observer, William Bradford, as "ingenious, solid, sublime, and couched in the most glowing expressions."³² The debate shattered the traditional political roles and associations of the delegates, while simultaneously crystallizing the conflicts inherent in the unresolved questions about bicameral government. Forced to choose between competing ideologies, the delegates, according to Bradford, were no longer "divided" into parties; rather, "every man" seemed "to speak out and vote with a greater share of honest independence than was ever known in Pennsylvania."³³

Between December 30, 1789 and January 8, 1790 the debate raged over the proposed Senate. On January 4, Lewis and Ogden proposed to establish senatorial districts as a "compound ratio" of population and public taxes, but the motion was defeated 19 to 38. Immediately afterward, Lewis's elector plan was also rejected, as the Convention approved, by a vote of 38 to 21, the direct election of senators. In an attempt to offset Wilson's victory, Samuel Sitgreaves and Ogden reintroduced on January 7, the proposal calling for senatorial districts to be based upon wealth and population. Although the final vote reflected increased support for the proposal relative to the vote of January 4, the measure was still rejected, 26 to 39. On the following day a majority of the delegates agreed that legislative districts were to be based on population alone, bringing to an end, for the most part, the debate over senatorial representations.³⁴ The convention, encouraged principally by Wilson, rejected the once widely accepted theory of traditional Whig government, and established in its stead a bicameral policy based solely on popular democracy. Further attempts during the remainder of the convention sessions to revive the defeated proposals for an "aristocratic" Senate were easily turned aside. Undoubtedly, the success of direct and popular election was the result primarily of Wilson's skills as a debater, and his ability, working closely with Findley, to forge a steadfast majority. His victory intact, Wilson continued, in the words of Benjamin Rush, "unrivalled in the Confidence of the members."³⁵ In late January Wilson left the convention for a week to travel to New York to accept the position of association justice in the federal government's Supreme Court.³⁶

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On the whole, the coalition that Wilson and Findley built was an inclusive group. It represented 16 of 21 counties, stretching from Northampton County in

northeast Pennsylvania to the state's southeast corner and to the border counties of Allegheny and Washington along the western boundary line. Its core membership numbered at least 34, 20 of whom were Constitutionalists, while only Wilson was a known Republican. Members in the coalition from the western, central, and northeastern counties numbered 29, while the remaining five came from the southeastern portion of the state. Illustrative of some of the coalition's characteristics, the following table highlights the predominant influence within the coalition of those members from the western and northeastern portions of the state.

Courtesy of Historical Society of Pennsylvania



James Wilson

The Constitutionalists' support of the coalition was inevitable, since for them there was not an acceptable alternative to a direct and popular election. They feared the establishment of a "much more dangerous system," such as the indirect election of senators, and for that reason they had announced in the previous Spring their objection to the creation of "another branch of the Legislature."³⁷ Initially they worried that they would be powerless to stop the Republicans from implementing such a plan. Consequently, they resisted the calling of a state convention, even to the point, in the example of Albert Gallatin, of suggesting a boycott of the convention.³⁸ Once at the convention, however, the Constitutionalists led by

TABLE ONE

Political and Geographical Characteristics of the Wilson-Findley Coalition

	Constitutionalists	Republicans	Republican sympathizers, neutrals, or unknown
From Western Pa.	14	0	5
From Northeastern Pa.	6	0	4
From Southeastern Pa.	0	1	4
Total	<u>20</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>13</u>
Federalists present at the 1787 Ratifying Convention	0	1	2
Anti-Federalists present at the 1787 Ratifying Convention	9	0	0

Findley joined with Wilson and served as a solid foundation against the trappings of traditional Whig ideology. They never wavered in their opposition to Lewis. As members of the coalition, 11 of the 20 Constitutionalists were veteran politicians, with extensive political backgrounds. Of the remaining nine party members, five had not held an elected office on the provincial level prior to the convention, but were clearly Constitutionalists, as were another three members who served one or two terms each in the assembly.³⁹ The ninth member was Joseph Heister, who during the 1780s voted with the party at the 1787 ratifying convention in opposition to the federal constitution and steadily sided with his Berks County colleagues and the Constitutionalist party during the 1789-90 state constitutional convention.

The 13 members of the coalition, who were either Republican sympathizers, neutrals, or whose political leanings are unclear, represented all sections of the state. They did not necessarily share a common political background. Attempts to coordinate their efforts among themselves were unlikely. Of the 13, however, seven may have favored the Republican party. Dauphin County Federalist Alexander Graydon, for example, sided consistently with Wilson on senatorial representation as well as on virtually all other issues debated during the convention. John Arndt and William Gibbons were Federalists who voted in favor of adoption at the ratifying convention in 1787, while the political attitudes of Thomas Ross, Lindsey Coates, Thomas Mawhorter, and Peter Rhoads probably leaned towards the Republicans' point of view. The political sentiments of four coalition members, William Reed, James Boyd, John Gloniger, and Matthew Dill, are uncertain, although Dill and Gloniger generally supported the Constitutionalists in the convention. Equally uncertain are the attitudes of Andrew Henderson and John Gibson, both of western Pennsylvania.⁴⁰ Of the known Republicans, only Wilson consistently supported popular democracy.

The coalition invariably numbered more than 34 members on actual roll call votes, usually gaining an additional four to seven votes because of cross-overs from the other camp. The motivation of some of those delegates are unclear, while others joined the coalition when it became apparent that Wilson would be victorious. William Robinson and Enoch Edwards from Philadelphia County. Hillary Baker from the city of Philadelphia, John Hubley, the former Constitutionalist from Lancaster County, and Samuel Sitgreaves from Northampton County, opposed Lewis's indirect election, and chose to vote instead, in the words of Sitgreaves, "with the Western Interest" to establish "the popular Election." For the "Security of Property," however, they supported the January 7 roll call vote calling for senatorial apportionment to be established among "taxables and Taxation." Yet four of these same five (the fifth not voting) had joined with Wilson and the Constitutionals on January 4 in voting against the Lewis-Ogden motion that called for a similar apportionment.⁴¹

The coalition also gained support from those Republicans who recognized indirect election and the use of wealth as a criteria for districting as lost causes. On the vote for apportionment based on population alone, Wilson was joined by ten other Republicans, including Lancaster County delegates Edward Hand, Robert Coleman, and William Atlee, York County members Henry Miller and Henry Slegle, and Montgomery County delegate Samuel Potts, all previously staunch supporters of indirect election and districting based on wealth coupled with population.

Since the average number of votes cast in any given roll call was 60.5 and because any number of votes over 35 ensured victory, the core of the coalition established by Wilson and Findley was nearly invincible. The opposition was never able to detach from the coalition the votes necessary for victory; the division between Republican leaders Lewis and Wilson was principally responsible for that fact. The lack of unity among the Republicans ended Lewis's hope of a traditional Whig government, despite his core of supporters, who were themselves never completely unified. As Sitgreaves explained, the delegates were divided into "three Parties—the one for Electors, the other for this Compound Representation, the third for a pure popular Election and Representation according to Numbers." The splintering of the members into different camps resulted in curious voting patterns. "Some Members," reported Sitgreaves, "who voted against Electors did it with a View to obtain the Resolution" supporting apportionment based on wealth and population. If that resolution should fail, those delegates planned to "abandon their former Vote—So that upon the whole," continued Sitgreaves, there was "no conjecturing at present what the Event will be."⁴² In the event, few delegates consistently supported indirect election or apportionment according to wealth and population. Despite the strong support for a traditionalist Senate by George Roberts of the city of Philadelphia, George Gray of Philadelphia County, Thomas

Bull of Chester County, and Timothy Pickering of Luzerne County, only McKean and Lewis supported the traditional Senate consistently throughout the remainder of the convention when many of these same issues were reintroduced.⁴³

An examination of the delegates' responses to key roll call votes relative to the state Senate enhances understanding of the structure of the successful coalition. Measuring the percentage level of agreement among the delegates on ten roll call votes that dealt directly with the construction of the state senate, Chart Two (Appendix) shows a very large, unified voting majority in the lower right-hand corner: the Constitutionals and those delegates influenced by Wilson. The smaller, less cohesive group in the upper left hand-corner are the supporters of indirect election and/or apportionment based on some measure of wealth. The chart clearly demonstrates this group's minority status on this issue and further reveals its inability to form a unified front for the promotion of indirect election or compound apportionment. The presence of several sub-groups within this group of members reflects their divergent and shifting opinions towards the senate.

A similar voting pattern characterized the responses of delegates to issues other than senatorial elections, for a small group of members continued to play a pivotal role as swing voters. The delegates did not act as a bloc, or form significant voting associations with other Republicans or Constitutionals, or even among themselves. Rather, they voted independently of each other on specific issues, but usually provided the necessary votes for the formation of majorities. The evidence of their importance can be seen in Chart One (Appendix) which reveals levels of agreement based on delegate responses to a total of 75 (out of 124) roll calls. These votes were selected because of their higher degree of divisiveness, while the remaining 39 votes were ignored because they were either unanimous or lopsided tallies, and were not therefore a useful measurement of voting association. In the chart, the Constitutionals occupy the lower right-hand corner, revealing once again a very high degree of voter unity. Many of the Republicans and their supporters are located in the upper left-hand corner, and again, appear less unified and more sub-divided. In between the two groups are thirteen delegates displaying little or no significant voting associations with either of the two larger groups. Several of the delegates, William Robinson, Wilson, and James Morris, were Republicans, whereas Alexander Graydon, Andrew Henderson, Lindsay Coates, Enoch Edwards, Thomas Ross, Robert Hare, and Jonathan Shoemaker, were either Republicans or were generally supportive of that party. William Reed, however, formed a significant degree of voting association with some of the Constitutionals, whereas the two remaining delegates, John Gibson and Simon Snyder, established minor voting associations with several other members, including some Constitutionals. Of these thirteen delegates, six were members of the Wilson-Findley coalition; the remaining seven delegates initially supported indirect election and/

or apportionment based on population and wealth.

The results shown in Chart One demonstrate that the Republican party, contrary to expectations, was unable to dominate the convention proceedings. Rather, the Republicans' lack of voting unity, coupled with the highly disciplined voting patterns of the Constitutionalists, indicate that all divisive issues were resolved only through constant coalition-building. Such arrangements, though frustrating for some delegates, produced consensus. Although the fluidity of the delegates' political associations made it impossible for any one partisan faction to dominate, the success of Wilson and Findley in establishing direct election of senators set a prevailing opinion in favor of popular democracy. Consequently, motions that were heavily influenced by the extreme views of either party were defeated. The result, ultimately, was a constitution that required the approval of all of the political interest groups at various points. While no one faction could dominate, all groups were able to exert some influence.

The issues that divided the members throughout the convention, as illustrated in Chart One, were both partisan and philosophical, or, in the instances of the proposed High Court of Chancery and dual office holding, a combination of both. The High Court of Chancery, which Lewis included in his proposed draft constitution, would have served (along with the Supreme Court) as the highest court in the state. The court was to consist of a High Chancellor, with each circuit court having a subordinate chancery court; the President of the Court of Common Pleas for that circuit would act as its chancellor. The delegates unceremoniously rejected Lewis's plans for a chancery, and continued to leave equity cases under the jurisdiction of the courts of Common Pleas.⁴⁴ The minutes do not record the reasons why the chancery was opposed, but such a court may have been too reminiscent of the English Court of Chancery and offensive to the republican sensitivities of the delegates.⁴⁵ Moreover, Pennsylvania's experience with a chancery had been fleeting and unpopular. The delegates may not have perceived any political advantage in its reestablishment, especially if they believed it would only have benefited the lawyers of the southeastern counties.⁴⁶ Of the 21 delegates who opposed an amendment that was stripped of language calling for a separate chancery, sixteen were from Philadelphia, Lancaster, Bucks, and Delaware counties, and included lawyers Lewis and Wilson, and jurists McKean and Atlee.⁴⁷

Dual office holding was another source of ideological and partisan debate. At issue was the proposed amendment that prohibited any Pennsylvania federal congressman or appointee from holding a state office at the same time. The practice of plural office holding was always a volatile subject; as early as 1718 the Pennsylvania Assembly attempted to limit its effect by prohibiting plural office holders from participating in offices that conflicted in interest.⁴⁸ In 1781 Thomas McKean, initially a Constitutionalist, was admonished by his own party for his dual role as

the state's chief justice and as a representative for Delaware in the Confederation Congress.⁴⁹ But despite the philosophical opposition to the practice, the proposal also had a specific political purpose, or so thought James Wilson, who felt obligated to "plead" his "own cause" at the convention. Wilson admitted to the members that an accumulation of offices was perhaps improper, and that many offices were "incompatible in point of propriety," but he further observed that the amendment did not correct those circumstances. Rather, it only prohibited federal employees from holding a state position, but ignored whether or not a state officeholder could possess unlimited state offices, or offices from unlimited states, or even the holding of offices "under France," or "any other state in Europe." Although he acknowledged the opposition's fear of the possible abuse of power by an engrossing central government, Wilson attributed the motives behind this proposal to anti-federalist politics and an unwarranted hostility towards the federal polity. Despite Wilson's impassioned pleading, the dual office prohibition carried, 46 to 19.⁵⁰

The Republicans successfully forged a majority that strengthened the governor against the prerogative of the legislature by requiring a two-thirds majority to override his veto, as opposed to either a three-fifths or majority vote, which some Constitutionals suggested.⁵¹ Neither party proved able to advance its preferred position on the debate limiting the number of terms a governor could serve. Lewis proposed a maximum of four successive terms, whereas McLene advocated limiting the governor's term to any six years out of nine. Both positions were rejected. A compromise allowed a governor to serve a maximum of three out of any four consecutive terms, each term consisting of three years.⁵²

Another compromise created a secretary of state. Findley initially proposed that an executive council be created to "share" the executive duties with the governor. An obvious ploy to weaken the prerogative of the single executive, it was easily defeated.⁵³ Findley then introduced the idea of a governor's secretary, who would administer the executive papers, transcripts, and correspondence, while being responsible to both the governor and the legislature. By insisting that the position be appointed by the legislature, Findley made it clear that he was attempting to place a quasi-legislative agent in the executive department. But for most delegates, including some Constitutionals, this was too drastic. A compromise called for the governor to appoint the secretary, who would serve only during that governor's continuance in office. Ogden and Hand counter-attacked by proposing to eliminate the position completely, but their attempt failed, whereas subsequent motions that further defined the secretary's role succeeded.⁵⁴

The geographical differences between the Constitutionals and the Republicans also played a role in the convention, as in the issue of the proposed size of the Senate. The convention had opted for a Senate varying in size from one-

quarter to one-third the size of the House of Representatives, which translated to a Senate consisting of 17 to 23 members. An attempt by the members from the western counties to set the number at 23 was defeated by the delegates from the southeastern portion of the state. With some exceptions, county delegations uniformly supported or opposed that motion depending on their geographical location, but, interestingly, where division occurred among county delegations, members voted according to their political associations. Thus, for example, Henry Miller, Henry Slegle, and Benjamin Tyson of York County continued their support of the Republicans on this issue, while Reed and Dill signaled their backing for the Constitutionals by voting in favor of a larger senate.⁵⁵

Yet the unity of the delegates from southeastern Pennsylvania against the western members proved illusory. They split over an attempt to increase a senatorial district's minimum number of senators from one to three. Since the total number of senators was fixed, an increase in the minimum number of senators per district would have resulted in fewer districts, which would have been accomplished by absorbing more counties into fewer districts. The proposal provided a distinct advantage to the more populous counties. Not surprisingly, delegates from Philadelphia sponsored the amendment, while the proposal met with staunch resistance from Lancaster, York, Northampton, and the western counties.⁵⁶

A motion proposed by William Robinson from Philadelphia was less subtle. He specifically suggested that the counties of Bucks, Chester, and Montgomery be combined into one district in order to elect a total of three senators, instead of their electing one senator each as originally planned. His motives remain unclear, but he may have perceived an advantage to the Republicans by combining the party's strength in those three counties in order to prevent a possible defeat in any one county; if so, he did not necessarily intend his plan to be a slight to local sensibilities. However, only Philadelphia and Montgomery counties supported the motion, whereas Chester and Bucks counties joined with the Constitutionals in defeating the scheme.⁵⁷

* * *

The proceedings of the convention produced a definite movement away from both the "radical" precepts of the 1776 Constitution and traditional Whig philosophy. The consensus necessary for such a movement came from the Constitutionals and a small group of Republicans and non-aligned delegates, who, for varying motives, adjusted their politics and found a common ground. In the process they created a uniquely American constitution, based squarely on the precepts of popular democracy. Out of the twelve states that adopted constitutions during or after 1776, Pennsylvania became only the third to establish an upper house directly elected by the people or to qualify senators (and governors) without reference to personal or district wealth.

For William Lewis the loss of the senatorial elector system was a bitter defeat. He believed that the absence of social discrimination in legislator selection rendered bicameral government as defective as unicameral government. For him the convention had been called in vain.⁵⁸ Lewis and his supporters were stunned and angry, having anticipated that the opposition would be ineffective, little more than passive recipients of the new order.⁵⁹ They proved, therefore, to be poor losers. George Roberts refused to vote for the final document, and such apostates from their cause as Alexander Graydon were conspicuously ignored at dinner tables.⁶⁰ One disappointed Republican observer lamented that the Senate would become a "weather cock" rather than a "strong anchor,"⁶¹ whereas Lewis referred to his erstwhile friend Wilson, with whom he had shared the misadventure of the Fort Wilson riot in 1779, as a jay in borrowed plumes.⁶²

For the Republican party, the events of the convention forecast future difficulties. The debates over representation in the Senate revealed the fragility of the Republican, anti-Constitutionalist, and Federalist coalition, a coalition that found it easier to stand united in opposition to the 1776 Constitution than to articulate the political attitudes that prevailed among the people. This circumstance was immediately confirmed by Pennsylvania's first gubernatorial election in 1790. The Republican-supported candidate, Arthur St. Clair, was humiliated by the popular politician, Thomas Mifflin, who received more than ninety percent of the vote. The Constitutionlists, however, continued to dominate Pennsylvania politics throughout the 1790s, although they were operating under different party labels.

Writing 48 years later, Albert Gallatin recalled that at the time of its promulgation "no public act was ever more universally approved" than the 1790 constitution, although it was never ratified by the people at large. He added that "a desire to conciliate opposite opinions by mutual concessions," along with debates filled with "less prejudice and more sincerity" than usual contributed to the constitution's favorable reception among the public and politicians alike. He also recalled that many of those differences were "almost exclusively" based on "general and abstract propositions," a testimony that underscored the fundamental nature of the debates as they related to democracy and representation.⁶³ Those differences were subtle, as Samuel Sitgreaves learned to his chagrin in 1790 when he opposed the senatorial electoral scheme and supported the senatorial apportionment based on wealth and population. Sitgreaves lamented that for the former he was called an "Apostle of Faction," and for the latter a "Disciple of Aristocracy." Yet Sitgreaves remained convinced that his position represented "genuine Republican Principles."⁶⁴ Those sentiments constituted the heart of the debate. The delegates argued from conviction regarding democracy and republicanism, attempting to resolve the unanswered questions that emerged during the upheavals of the Revolution. The members of the 1789-90 Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention led

by Wilson and Findley provided the answer to those questions through their definition of popular democracy, a philosophical framework which has remained unchanged since its adoption. In the process, the delegates forged political coalitions that had been unthinkable for the fourteen years prior to the convention and that laid the groundwork for significant political changes throughout the 1790s.

Notes

1. See, for example, Robert L. Brunhouse, *The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, 1776-1790* (Harrisburg, 1942); Harry M. Tinkom, *The Democratic-Republicans and the Federalists in Pennsylvania, 1790-1801* (Harrisburg, 1950); C. Page Smith, *James Wilson, Founding Father, 1742-1798* (Chapel Hill, 1956); Roland M. Baumann, "The Democratic-Republicans of Philadelphia: The Origins, 1776-1797" (Ph.D. diss., Pennsylvania State University, 1970); Barbara Weill, "Democracy and Revolution: Democratic Leveling Movements in Pennsylvania, 1776-1790" (Ph.D. diss., New School for Social Research, 1977); Douglas McNeil Arnold, "Political Ideology and the Internal Revolution in Pennsylvania, 1776-1790" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton Univ., 1976).

In Brunhouse's *Counter-Revolution* the convention is depicted as a crushing defeat for the Constitutionalists and as a total triumph for the conservative, if not reactionary, Republican party. This view, in the main, has remained the standard conclusion about the 1789-90 state constitutional convention, with, however, some significant modifications. Baumann, Tinkom, and Arnold, for example, stress that compromise was necessary in order for the Republicans to achieve their goals, and Arnold further concludes that the term reactionary is incorrect, arguing that from 1776 until 1790 the Republicans incorporated into their political philosophy much of the liberal democratic rhetoric that once characterized the Constitutionalists. In a similar vein, but more in line with the consensus histories of the 1950s, C. Page Smith viewed the convention as a mutually pleasant experience for both parties, who compromised their way to an acceptable state constitution. While agreeing with the central conclusion that the Republican goal of establishing a bicameral gov-

ernment represented a significant victory for that party, this essay also concludes that, ironically, that same victory was the undoing of the Republicans, and that the Constitutionalists emerged from the convention's proceedings both transformed and triumphant.

More recently, Owen S. Ireland describes Pennsylvania's overwhelming support of the federal constitution and the resulting popularity of the Federalist/Republican party in 1787-88, despite the vocal opposition of the minority. Owen S. Ireland, "The People's Triumph: The Federalist Majority in Pennsylvania, 1787-88," *Pennsylvania History*, 56 (April 1989): 93-113. This study ("Politics of Ideology") follows the fate of the Republicans in 1789 and demonstrates how the political unity of the Republican party unraveled in face of effective opposition.

2. Examples of the recent literature are: Michael Vinson, "The Society for Political Inquiries: The Limits of Republican Discourse in Philadelphia on the Eve of the Constitutional Convention," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, 113 (April 1989): 185-206; Robert N. C. Nix, Jr., & Mary M. Schweitzer, "Pennsylvania's Contribution to the Writings and the Ratification of the Constitution," *PMHB*, 112 (January 1988): 3-24; Robert F. Williams, "The Influence of Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution during the Founding Decade," *PMHB*, 112 (January 1988): 25-48; and, Paul E. Doutrich, *To Form a More Perfect Union*, (Harrisburg, 1986).

3. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, 25 March, 16 September 1789.

4. *Pennsylvania Journal and the Weekly Advertiser*, 25, 28 November 1789.

5. Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787* (New York, 1969), 248-50,

450-51; Willi Paul Adams, *The First American Constitutions. Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era* (Chapel Hill, 1980), chs. 9 and 11. See also Robert Gough, "Can a Rich Man Favor Revolution? The Case of Philadelphia in 1776," *Pennsylvania History*, 48 (July 1981): 235-50.

6. Richard A. Ryerson, "Republican Theory and Partisan Reality in Revolutionary Pennsylvania. Toward a New Vision of the Constitutionalist Party," in Ronald Hoffman and Peter Albert, eds., *Sovereign States in an Age of Uncertainty* (Charlottesville, 1981), 95-133; and Wood, *Creation*, 229, 363-64.

7. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, 28 October 1789.

8. Wood, *Creation*, 248-49, 398, 402.

9. For a summary of the republican synthesis, see Robert E. Shalhope, "Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography," and "Republicanism and Early American Historiography," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 29 (January 1972): 49-80 and 39 (April 1982): 334-57.

10. See Wood, *Creation*, especially ch. 7, where he argues that many Pennsylvania Republicans had abandoned the perception that the upper house should incorporate society's wealth or talent and rather should serve as a check against unrestrained legislative power, but that also "most men in the 1780's only vaguely glimpsed where their thinking about the senates was taking them." (252-51).

11. See footnote 1.

12. Arnold, "Political Ideology," 299-313.

13. *Independent Gazeteer*, 11 November 1789.

14. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, 4 February, 10 June 1789.

15. L. H. Butterfield, ed., *Letters of Benjamin Rush*, (Princeton, 1951), 1:514, 523.

16. The five are: George Gray (Philadelphia County) nine terms, four of which were before the Revolution; John Sellers (Delaware County) six terms, all prior to the Revolution; William Robinson (Philadelphia County) four terms; William Lewis (Philadelphia City), three terms; Henry Miller (York County), three terms.

17. George W. Corner, ed., *The Autobiography of Benjamin Rush* (Princeton, 1948), 178.

18. Jacob Rush to William Atlee, 26 November 1789, Atlee Papers, Peter Force Papers, Library of Congress.

19. The eleven are: Robert Whitehill (Cumberland County) six terms, one term Supreme Executive Council; James McLene (Franklin County), six terms, two terms Supreme Executive Council; Jonathan Hoge (Washington County), six terms; Baltzer Hehr (Berks County), five terms; John Piper (Bedford County) four terms, one term Supreme Executive Council; John Smilie (Fayette County) four terms, one term Supreme Executive Council; William Findley (Westmoreland County) four terms, one term Supreme Executive Council; Christian Lower (Berks County) four terms; Abraham Lincoln (Berks County), four terms; William Todd (Westmoreland County), four terms; William Brown (Dauphin County).

20. *Minutes of the Grand Committee of the Whole Convention of Pennsylvania*, (Phila., 1789-90), 4.

21. *Minutes of the Convention of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*, 24 November 1789 (Phila., 1789-90), 32-36. The delegates also passed resolutions establishing a bill of rights and a supreme court independent of the legislature.

22. "William Findley of Westmoreland, Pa. An Autobiographical Letter, 27 February 1812," *PMHB*, 5 (1881): 440-50.

23. The quote is found in Max Farrand, ed., *The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787* (New Haven, revised ed., 1966), 1:483. Also, Daniel M. McCarthy, "James Wilson and American Republicanism" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Notre Dame, 1982), and Morton Rosenberg, "In Search of James Wilson," *Pennsylvania History*, 55 (July 1988): 107-117.

24. *Minutes of the Convention*, 38.

25. For details of Lewis and the Oswald case see Thomas P. Meehan, "The Supreme Court in the Law and Politics of the Commonwealth, 1776-1790" (Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Wisconsin, 1960), 490-508; for Lewis's role in the Assembly see the minutes of the twelfth and thirteenth assemblies.

26. *Minutes of the Convention*, 39.

27. *Minutes of the Convention*, 39.

28. Francis N. Thorpe, comp. & ed., *The Federal and State Constitution* (Washington, 1909), 3:1694, the quote is part of the Maryland Constitu-

tion, the italics are mine; Wood, *Creation*, chap. 6; see also, Philip A. Crowl, *Maryland during and after the Revolution: A Political and Economic Study* (Baltimore, 1943).

29. *Minutes of the Grand Committee*, 10-11, 16-18.

30. *Minutes of the Grand Committee*, 20-21.

31. Jacob C. Parsons, ed., *Extracts from the Diary of Jacob Hiltzheimer of Philadelphia, 1765-1798* (Philadelphia, 1893), 156; William Bradford to Elias Boudinot, 5 January 1790, Wallace Papers, 2:9, HSP.

34. *Minutes of the Grand Committee*, 24-27.

35. Benjamin Rush to Tench Coxe, 15 August 1790, Tench Coxe Papers, HSP.

36. Smith, *Wilson*, 306.

37. *Minutes of the 13th General Assembly*, 24 March 1789, Appendix.

38. Henry Adams, *The Life of Albert Gallatin* (1879; reprint ed., New York, 1943), 80.

39. The five were Alexander Addison, Albert Gallatin, George Matthews, James Power, and Paul Groscof. The three were Thomas Beale, two Assembly terms; Joseph Powell, two Assembly terms; and David Redick, one term in the Supreme Executive Council.

40. For the election of John Gibson, see Francis Bryan to George Bryan, 24 October 1789, Bryan Papers, HSP.

41. *Minutes of the Grand Committee*, 24-27.

42. Samuel Sitgreaves to [?], 6 January 1790, Dreer Collection, American Statesman, HSP.

43. *Minutes of the Convention*, 166-67, 170-71.

44. *Minutes of the Grand Committee*, 57.

45. The Chancery was never popular in America, the Massachusetts Assembly, for example, abolished that colony's chancery in 1657. Thorp L. Wolford, "The Laws and Liberties of 1648," in David H. Flaherty, ed., *Essays in the History of American Law*, 167, 167n.

46. *Colonial Records*, Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania (Harrisburg, 1851), 4:27-39.

47. *Minutes of the Grand Committee*, 56-57; William Bradford to Elias Boudinot, 17 January 1790, Wallace Papers, 2:11, HSP.

48. *Votes and Proceedings of the Pennsylvania General Assembly* (Phila., 1753), 2:223.

49. G. S. Rowe, *Thomas McKean: The Shaping of an American Republicanism* (Boulder, Col., 1978), 167.

50. *Minutes of the Grand Committee*, 51; *Minutes of the Convention*, 82-85; Bird Wilson, *The Works of the Honourable James Wilson, LL.D.* (Philadelphia, 1804), 3: 339-53.

51. *Minutes of the Grand Committee*, 40-43.

52. *Minutes of the Grand Committee*, 45-46; *Minutes of the Convention*, 70-71.

53. *Minutes of the Grand Committee*, 39-40.

54. *Minutes of the Grand Committee*, 79; *Minutes of the Convention*, 87-89, 173-74.

55. *Minutes of the Convention*, 136. Of the 36 votes cast against the motion, 20 were from Philadelphia city and county, and Bucks, Montgomery, Chester, Delaware, and Lancaster counties.

56. *Minutes of the Convention*, 168.

57. *Minutes of the Convention*, 191.

58. John Littel, ed., *Alexander Graydon, Memoirs of His Own Time, with Reminiscences of the Man and the Events of the Revolution* (Philadelphia, 1846), 344.

59. Littel, *Graydon*, 348; William Bradford to Elias Boudinot, 21 January 1790, Wallace Papers, HSP.

60. Littel, *Graydon*, 347.

61. George Clymer to Tench Coxe, 18 January 1790, Tench Coxe Papers, HSP.

62. Tinkcom, *Democratic-Republicans*, 276n.

63. Adams, *Gallatin*, 83.

64. Samuel Sitgreaves to [?], 6 January 1790, Dreer Collection, American Statesman, HSP.

Appendix

Note: The two charts link together those members who shared a high level of voting agreement (in this case 70 percent), while proportionately distancing those members from one another with the least level of voting agreement. Thus, for example, after eliminating individual absences, Constitutionalist leader William Findley and fellow Westmoreland County delegate William Todd voted together on 72 of the 75 selected roll call votes as demonstrated in Chart One. On 65 of those 72 votes they voted identically, for a per-

centage of agreement of .902 (65 divided by 72). By the same method, Findley and Northampton County delegate Peter Rhoads agreed on 37 of 67 roll calls for a percentage of .552, while Findley and William Lewis agreed only on 16 occasions out of 72 shared roll call votes for a level of agreement percentage of .225. In each instance, the distance of Todd, Rhoads, and Lewis, to Findley on the chart is proportionate to those levels of agreement.



