Defending the Long Perimeter: Forts on the Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia Frontier, 1755-1765

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From Thomas Stone March, A History of Pennsylvania

An early view of Fort Duquesne.

The spring of 1993 marked the hundredth anniversary of Pennsylvania’s authorization for a study to locate the “various forts erected as a defense against the Indians . . . prior to [1783].” This statute initiated Pennsylvania’s extensive scholarship on forts of the French and Indian War and Pontiac periods (1754-1765). Those conflicts, puny as they seem in comparison with the American Revolution, were of a nature never seen before. Forts had a unique role to play. They largely determined how the wars were fought and therefore deserve attention. The real war was the combatants’ story, as it always is. Many of the fighters never donned regimental markings, but the structures they built determined where and when the fate of North America was decided. Decisions to invest labor and capital in certain types of structures at specific sites dictated the course of war.

Construction of inland forts was inconsistent with British Blue Water strategy as it had developed by the 1750s. Britain’s military system concentrated on her standing regiments of drilled infantry, which Russell F. Weigley has recently reminded us were comparable to Frederick the Great’s best. These, along with pounds sterling to hire allies, mercenaries, etc., could be rapidly moved around the world; forts could
not. Forts on seacoasts, to be sure, seemed a worthwhile investment for Albion—they enlarged the Blue Water arena—but inland forts were a French military specialty. Lawrence Sterne's 1759-1760 popular work, *Tristram Shandy*, conveyed a witty contempt for sophisticated European continental forts, as the wounded Uncle Toby spends his reclining years trying to reconstruct how he was hit during the siege of Namur in 1695.

What confusion in greater Theatres from words of little meaning, and as indeterminate a sense! when thou considerest this, thou wilt not wonder at my uncle Toby's perplexities—thou wilt drop a tear of pity upon his scarp and his counterscarp;—his glacis and his covered way;—his ravelin and his half-moon: 'Twas not by ideas,—by Heaven; his life was put in jeopardy by words.³

Ironically, Britain reluctantly engaged in inland fortification in North America to be competitive with the hated French.

Missing from existing scholarship is a unified treatment of the Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia forts. These posts formed an enormous convex, elliptical curve or semicircle paralleling mountain formations that ranged from the Delaware
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**ENLARGEMENT # 2.**
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Forts on the Virginia Frontier. From Douglas Southall Freeman, George Washington, II, 229, which was redrawn from F. G. Kegley, Virginia Frontier (Roanoke, Va., 1938), 244.

ENLARGEMENT # 3
ENLARGEMENT #4—FORTS IN CUMBERLAND COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, AND ON THE POTOMAC RIVER. Based on Hunter, Forts, 366, expanded by the author.
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River south to Virginia's Cherokee frontier. In their major campaign moves the Indian nations, first with and later without French assistance, shifted their aggression from one sector of the white settlers' frontier to another almost at will. When rebuffed in one sector they often applied pressure somewhere else. Thus, it is a mistake to consider the Pennsylvania fortification experience without also considering what happened in Maryland and Virginia.

This contiguousness and interdependence of the frontiers of the three was recognized by then-Colonel George Washington in November 1756:

The vast amount of land we have lost since this time twelve-months, must appear incredible to those who are not eye-witnesses of the desolation. Upwards of fifty miles of a rich and (once) thickly settled country is now deserted from the Maryland to the Carolina lines. . . . The cause of such desertion I believe is in a great measure owing to Maryland & Pennsylvania giving ground so much faster than we do: whereby we are left exposed in a very fine tract of land as low as monocasy, on the Maryland side.⁴

In a statement of grievances, in January 1757, to the new commander-in-chief in North America, Lord Loudoun, Washington explained:

Our Frontiers are of such immense extent, that if the enemy were to make a formidable attack on one side, before our troops on the other could march to oppose them, they might overrun [a] great part of the country; and it is not unlikely if they had a design upon one part, they would make a feint upon the other.⁵

A few instances of the Indians shifting from one sector to another can be traced.

1) From January through September 1756, Chief Shingas "the terrible" and Captain Jacobs led a combined Delaware and Shawnee war party that roved from the Maryland frontier to the Coves area to the Cumberland Valley, and north to the Juniata River.⁶

2) In 1758, various Indian groups unleashed a tremendous onslaught on the Virginia frontier, at the same time that General John Forbes's army was pushing their fellows west as it approached Fort Duquesne.⁷

3) In the summer of 1763, an Indian war party that attacked the Cove area south of Bedford was identified as the same group that had besieged Thomas Cresap's plantation at Old Town, Maryland, only a few weeks before.⁸

4) On August 1, 1763, a combined war party led by Keyashuta, about four hundred strong, which had been laying siege to Fort Pitt, moved into an ambush position at Bushy Run, twenty miles away, to attack the British relief column coming to save the fort.⁹

5) In 1764 the Augusta County, Virginia, area was left in peace by the Indians until late fall. Then, at the very time Colonel Henry Bouquet's expedition was bear-
ing down on the Indian villages in central Ohio, a party of fifty Delawares and Mingoes tore into Augusta County.¹⁰

Truly amazing was the capacity of Indian war parties both to travel great distances and to acquire and capitalize on knowledge of gaps in the colonial defense system. They seemed to know, for example, when militia units broke up, when farmers stood unguarded in harvest fields, and when fort garrisons decreased to skeleton size. The events surrounding the fall of Fort Vause on June 26, 1756, provide a glaring example. Not only did the Indians observe that all the garrison except eight were absent doing their own farming or guarding other farmers, but they also seem to have known that William Preston’s militia company had just received orders to disband nearby. Two days passed before Preston could gather a relief party, a fatal delay.¹¹

The Indians’ method of attacking forts was relatively limited, yet both intelligent and appropriate to their weaponry. They never directly assaulted fort walls. Their attacks consisted of sharpshooting, burning—especially by use of fire arrows—and surprise entry through any openings carelessly left by the defenders. In almost all sieges they had no artillery, battering rams, scaling ladders, or approach trenches.¹² A startling exception to this took place when a party of western Indians campaigning in northwestern Pennsylvania overpowered the British blockhouse at Presque Isle on June 20, 1763. Acting on the advice of a renegade Englishman, they moved in close to the fort walls by building breastworks.¹³

The accepted explanation of the natives’ unwillingness to rush directly at defended walls is that they sensed that their population was numerically inferior to the English colonies. Therefore, they would not risk combat when it was obvious beforehand that they would suffer heavy casualties. The historian Howard H. Peckham found another reason when he explained why Pontiac’s warriors were unwilling to storm beleaguered Fort Detroit in 1763. “They would not undertake a tactic which they knew in advance would certainly require the death of some of their warriors. They believed too thoroughly in individualism to accept the sacrifice of a few for the sake of the many.” This is perhaps to underrate the intelligence of the Indians, as they often sacrificed for their fellow warriors and the common cause in other circumstances.¹⁴

The relationship of all structures, including forts, to the tactics of the colonials was in sharp contrast to the role buildings played in Indian military operations. Colonial frontier fighters preferred to take shelter in any available building, whereas Indians only occasionally defended structures. Native Americans, except in a few instances, chose to spread out under the protection of natural objects even though a defensible building was available. But buildings held by the colonists—forts, homes, mills, barns, or even churches—gave the Indian war parties fixed goals toward which to direct attacks, providing organizational stability to their otherwise decentralized operations. These contrasting attitudes are illustrated in accounts of two skirmishes that took place in the early days of January 1756 and were reported together in dispatches to Maryland from Philadelphia dated January 15.
The substance of the Action at Gnaddenhutten . . . is this. The Lieutenant, who commanded, had fifty-two men with him at Gnaddenhutten, mostly Laboureres. . . . The Lieutenant and four others, were on a Scout on the other Side of the River, a little above the Town, which consisted of about 36 Houses, and a Church. They . . . came in sight of a String of 200 Indians, who were running round to hem them in . . . they were obliged to take right through the Water. . . . They got into the Church, where they defended themselves well for some Time, and killed several of the Enemy. . . . The Indians set the Town on Fire to the Windward of the Church, which presently filled it with Smoke, so that they could neither see nor breathe. Then having well charged all their pieces, they sallied out, and engaged the Enemy among the Houses. . . . The Action at Allemangle was thus. Three men, who had left their Dwellings over the Mountains, used now and then to go to the Top of the Mountain from whence they could see them to observe whether they were burnt, or yet standing. On Saturday last they saw Smoke from one of their Chimnies, and going a little nearer, saw two Indians standing centry, a Number being in the House. . . . Sixty Men who went over the Hill and divided into two parties to surround the House, but in going down the Hill one of the Men fell and his Gun going off, alarmed the Indians in the House, who ran out into a Pine Swamp. Our people went after them boldly into the Swamp. . . . The Indians proving too hard for our People in the Swamp, they retreated to a House, from whence they fired on the Indians that surrounded them, and killed several.15

Two accounts from Cumberland County in July 1763 illustrate Indian practices. Reported on July 21 was an encounter of a sheriff’s party with a group of warriors who were sheltered in a house twenty miles from Carlisle. When attacked the warriors fled to the fields. The following week an Indian party looting a house in Shearman’s Valley was caught by a group of settlers. Rather than defend the building they fled to hide in a thicket.16 The one startling instance of Indians defending structures in this period occurred during John Armstrong’s attack on Kittanning, September 8, 1756. There the Indians used their own dwellings as defensive posts, yielding primarily because the assailants set fire to the houses which exploded gunpowder stored within. But even there they had first scurried their women and children to the surrounding wilderness; perhaps they would have run themselves if they had not been protecting large caches of gunpowder.17

The importance of forts can be analyzed in terms of two concepts: (1) the geographical depth and population density of the communities of colonists, and (2) a principle that may be compared to a lodestone effect. The two tended to work against each other, but were not absolutely exclusive.

Depth and density of communities in their civilian, primarily agrarian roles, determined the use of forts in two respects. First, because the backcountry lay behind (i.e., east of) the mature geography of the colonies, it is inconceivable that the Indian war parties that wreaked havoc in the backcountry—usually of ten to fifty warriors—
could have penetrated to the urban colonial centers or could have survived in the heavily settled and cleared farming areas. If they had appeared there, they would either have been overwhelmed by the civilians—so numerous as not to have needed forts—or have had to surrender. Although they might have re-formed into larger parties, their overall numerical inferiority would in the long run have brought them down. They could never have driven the colonists into the Atlantic Ocean. This premise underlay the entire conflict. The point cannot be demonstrated, of course, because it never occurred. However, the sequence of events might have resembled the Paxton Boys’ march to Germantown in early 1764, in which the relatively small band of aggressors was placated by promises and returned home without a fight.

The community depth and density concept is important because so many colonial leaders insisted that forts be placed only where there were surrounding groups of settlers. Once settlers had entirely fled an area, these officials usually opposed maintaining forts there. A fort might, however, be set up to lure settlers to return to an area they had farmed before danger arose.

Three reasons for building forts are often mentioned in standard studies: (1) shelter for soldiers, (2) shelter for threatened settlers, and (3) trade and diplomatic contacts with Indians. To these a concept called the lodestone principle should be added. Forts were deliberately placed beyond the settlement line so that the war would be drawn—as by a lodestone—toward them, sparing the settled communities from the violence. This principle was seldom specifically articulated, although at the peak of Indian warfare in 1763 one observer thought that the forts of western Pennsylvania were absorbing all the Indians’ momentum.

Virginia’s decisions about forts were based primarily on community density and depth and repudiated the lodestone concept. Although the importance of community density and depth could not by its nature have been ignored in any of the colonies, lodestone thinking was very important in Pennsylvania, both under provincial supervision and, from 1758 on, under British Army command. The great expense of the isolated, elaborate works at Fort Pitt and Fort Augusta can only be understood in the light of this concept. Maryland was understood to be the connecting link and the weak point in the entire perimeter.

Maryland, which had only a very narrow frontier—ten miles wide at Fort Cumberland, eight miles at Conococheague Creek, and two miles at Hancock—had elements of both the depth and density and the lodestone concepts in its experience. Many conclusions have been advanced to explain Maryland’s failure to participate significantly to the war between 1754 and 1764. Historian Lawrence Henry Gipson found the basic reason in her lack of interest in western lands. The eastern predominance in Maryland’s Assembly thwarted proposals for military involvement, and
it is also doubtful that the Lower House truly represented the interests of all the province. Older, locally patriotic Maryland state historians used these factors to explain the Assembly’s negative approach and to apologize for Maryland.21 But Gipson called their approach “fiction, embodied, it is true, in American national tradition.”22

Maryland’s involvement, such as it was, began when a veteran soldier, Horatio Sharpe, arrived as governor in 1753, expecting to fill a dual role as the colonial executive and the military leader commissioned to confront the French and Indians threatening from the west.23 Although the Assembly had always been parsimonious, it was not at first entirely opposed to military spending. Maryland initially showed a spirit of cooperation with Virginia’s militant westward moves, and it appeared that the Chesapeake province would also assist its other neighbors and the general imperial effort in North America. Governor Sharpe, who made many inspection trips to the frontier, was originally authorized to lead an expedition from Virginia to Fort Duquesne before the appointment of General Edward Braddock.

In July 1754, following the defeat of Virginia forces at Fort Necessity, the Maryland Assembly appropriated £6,000 for “the defense of the Colony of Virginia, and his Majesty’s Dominion,” to be paid to Sharpe and spent at his discretion.24 Revenue sources identified in the statute included the license fee on ordinaries—eating places and taverns selling regular meals—which was specifically claimed by the proprietor, Frederick Calvert the Sixth Lord Baltimore, as a proprietary revenue. Sharpe defied proprietary instructions by signing the bill into law. Eventually Baltimore accepted the situation, although he did not intend to yield the ordinaries permanently.25

Ironically, just as Maryland’s territory was thrown into immediate danger by Braddock’s defeat on the Monongahela, July 9, 1755, the Lower House became insistent that the proprietor yield permanently several revenue sources, including the ordinaries fee. In December 1755, the Annapolis lawyer and statesman Daniel Dulany noted that by refusing to yield the proprietor was hurting his own interests, because undefended western lands could neither be sold to produce revenue nor improved to enlarge Maryland’s overall wealth. Dulany also grasped a similarity between the gridlock politics of Pennsylvania and Maryland, the legislatures of both threatening to withhold defense spending unless proprietary privileges were surrendered. However, he did not express sympathy for the frontier settlers of either Pennsylvania or Maryland, the arguing point most often used in Pennsylvania.26

In early 1756, a twelve-week period of disagreement occurred in the Maryland Assembly over the supply bill, but was finally compromised in May. There was a £40,000 issue of paper currency for defense spending. To sink the obligation this incurred, the statute specified collection of revenue from several sources. This time the ordinaries fee was not mentioned, but the use of two items specifically violated proprietary policy, a land tax applied to the leased and productive lands of the proprietor and a double tax penalizing Roman Catholic landowners, the latter contra-
dicting proprietary instructions requiring religious equality. For Sharpe, whose sincerity for defending the west is hardly questionable, this meant once again either signing an act contrary to instructions or allowing the frontier to remain undefended. Maryland's Lower House was not intimidated by any resurgent sentiment from its frontier population, and it was not bluffing. Sharpe signed. By the £40,000 statute the Assembly also seized authority to oversee spending for most military items, another area in which Sharpe had to yield.27

Little evidence of a Maryland fortification system other than Forts Cumberland and Frederick has come down to us, but the disputes in Annapolis provide interesting clues. At some point in 1754 or 1755, Governor Sharpe had arranged the construction of a fort "near Potowmack on Tonallaway Creek." On August 31, 1756, he stated that he had subsequently ordered it destroyed to placate the Assembly: "our Assembly by the Act they made last session [May 1756] for granting a supply for the Defence of this Province obliged me to abandon and destroy [the fort] because it was five or Six Miles beyond our present Settlement." This post must have been intended to serve as a ranging station between Forts Cumberland and Frederick, reducing the distances the ranging patrols would undertake between periods of recuperation.28

In the Assembly debates of May 14, 1756, considerations of fort location were argued at length. The Upper House, although modestly disclaiming knowledge of military matters, advanced the view that the "Fort on North Mountain" which became Fort Frederick was much needed, but that it ought to be supplemented by another "at the conflux of the North and South Branches of Potowmack and a blockhouse or small fort between that location and the north Mountain[,] and a body of three hundred men supported to garrison them and Patroll or Range." Many desirable results were expected to follow from this supplementary fort. Not only would it make cooperation with the "Neighboring Provinces" feasible, but it would also support "Fine settlements beyond the North Mountain." The second reference was to the western holdings of Thomas Cresap and others who emulated him. Cresap, a trading post operator, inn keeper, assemblyman, and partisan leader, who had been influential on the western Maryland frontier since the 1730s, had developed his lands and built structures. The projected fort was also considered necessary to facilitate a new major offensive westward to Fort Duquesne, which most leaders of the time felt must eventually occur.29

But the supplementary fort was not built. On September 23, 1756, Sharpe delivered to the Lower House an extract of a description of the military assets of the province. On the subject of forts it stated: "There are no works in this Province that deserves the name of fortifications, Just behind and among our Western most Settlements are some small stoccado or palisaded Forts built by the Inhabitants for the Protection of their Wives and Children: and besides these there is one larger one . . . not much more capable of Defence on Potowmack about 56 miles beyond our
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Settlements . . . Fort Cumberland. 30

Two days later, the governor explained to the Lower House the progress that was slowly being made toward completing Fort Frederick. This time he expressed no desire for funding another Maryland fort, probably because he was apologetic about Frederick's slow progress and estimated £5,000 cost. 31 (It would ultimately be over £7,000.) In his review he mentioned "several Block Houses or Stoccado Forts built on and near the North Mountain, particularly on the Plantations of Evan Shelby, Isaac Baker, Allen Killough, and Thomas Mills: They were raised before I went to the Frontiers." Presumably these were the same small forts disparaged in the report delivered on September 23, although close comparison reveals some contradiction locations of the fort sites. 32

The Assembly's policy was to provide nothing for Fort Cumberland, leaving the entire responsibility to Virginia. Although the Assembly provided a garrison for Fort Cumberland during the Forbes campaign of 1758, Maryland contributed nothing to Forbes' army. A few individuals and groups of Maryland soldiers accompanied Forbes, but they were supported from British Army contingency funds. 33

A series of letters between the garrison commander at Baker's Fort, Captain Joseph Chapline, and Sharpe and his assistant John Ridout, written between May 10 and July 30, 1757, provide some descriptive information about fort operations in Maryland. Authorized by a letter from Sharpe dated April 23 to range with his militia company until a greater body of troops could be raised to relieve him, Chapline reported on May 10 that he had sixty good woodsmen at Conococheague, which had encouraged the people to stay and plant corn. He reported hearing that colonial forces had been defeated at Fort Cumberland, an inaccurate comment, and told the governor that a prisoner who had escaped from Fort Duquesne had recounted that a French column was on its way to destroy the Maryland settlements. On May 14, he reported having scouted North Mountain and nearby areas where Indians might have hidden, without encountering the foe. John Ridout, responding in Sharpe's name on May 12 from Annapolis, explained that the skirmish at Fort Cumberland had indeed taken place on May 4, but the enemy had been driven off. He said that Brigadier John Stanwix's redcoat unit was soon to march from Carlisle to Maryland and should overwhelm any enemy in its path. Ridout's letter also shows that Chapline had denounced Captain John Dagworthy of the Maryland provincial troops for fraudulent administration at Fort Cumberland. On July 20 Chapline returned to the subject of his need for additional soldiers, explaining that the inhabitants between South Mountain and Conococheague had "divided into 'Heaps' many of which are fleeing; the rest are expected to follow" unless Sharpe could send reinforcements. In the last of the series, written July 30, Chapline told Sharpe that Captain Beale's provincial regulars had arrived at Fort Frederick, but that "most of them are presently useless until they recover from sickness." 34

Despite such developments, from 1759 until the crisis of 1763 Maryland, unlike Virginia and Pennsylvania, could basically afford to ignore western defenses.
It was a period of high planter indebtedness as the European tobacco market and its dependent Scottish traders collapsed. Greater resistance to revenue measures arose in the Assembly. A few enterprising people like the Cresap family penetrated further west of the Conococheague Creek settlement line in these years because the Indians there were content, in contrast to the uneasiness that prevailed on the frontiers of Maryland's two neighbors.  

Although the British victory at Bushy Run in August 1763 was a severe setback for Indian war efforts, in the October 4 to November 26, 1763 Maryland legislative session the question of funds for military operations was again argued stormily with results similar to 1756. Once again, military spending was thwarted because the majority of the Lower House gave a priority to attacking proprietary controls. The duplicitous frontier leader Thomas Cresap, a delegate to the Lower House, had since 1762 been supplying Iroquois war parties passing through his Old Town trading post and stronghold, on the assumption that they were proceeding south to fight the Cherokees. Governor Sharpe approved Cresap's giving them food so that they would not raid farmers, and the governor promised to seek reimbursement for the trader from the Assembly. But the Assembly would not cooperate. At the beginning of the session Cresap returned to Old Town, where he reported threatening Indian war parties and picked up news that these had already attacked Pennsylvania's Coves. On his return to Annapolis, some legislators used his news to support a bill for raising a company of fifty rangers to protect the west. It failed, however, because there was no agreement on the revenue sources. The Upper House, still unwilling to surrender the proprietor's right to the fee on ordinaries, suggested funding from certain unexpended surpluses in the Loan Office. The Lower House rejected the compromise, insisting on the ordinaries money or nothing. Thus it was possible for both houses to accuse each other of forsaking the safety of frontier inhabitants in order to carry on a constitutional argument. The ranger company was never raised. Instead, the Assembly passed several measures that did not require heavy funding: a £50 scalp bounty, a prohibition against the Indian trade, and an exclusion of Indians not loyal to Britain from entering the province.  

Both Virginia and Pennsylvania went far beyond Maryland in establishing chains of forts as defensive perimeters against Indian offensives. These were undertaken only on the assumption that systematic "ranging" by detachments of soldiers, moving from one post to another, would effectively detect and deflect incoming war parties. But from the beginning defects in the ranging system were apparent. Every knowledgeable person understood that the Indians would naturally choose routes out of sight of the forts, which they did not intend to attack. As early as January 27, 1756, Indians raided the Juniata Valley, just three miles south of Patterson's Fort, without being detected by the garrison. Of the numerous accounts of skirmishes
between colonials and Indians, the preponderance involved armed colonials pursuing Indians who were returning home having already murdered and plundered undefended farmsteads. Seldom did skirmishes arise from ranging patrols spotting war parties before they had killed settlers. As Washington explained to Loudoun in January 1756,

Erecting of forts at greater distances than fifteen and eighteen miles, or a days march asunder, and garrisoning them with less than eighty or an hundred Men, is not answering the intention; because if they are at great distances, it is inconvenient for the soldiers to scout between, and give the enemy full scope to make their incursion without being discovered, till they have struck the Inhabitants and committed a ravage.

In defense of ranging, however, the fact that the colonials never entirely repudiated it suggests that it may have served some good. It may have frightened away some undetected war parties, although we will never know how many. An alternative to ranging, often ordered by Washington, was the one-time “scouring” of an area by a specified detachment when there was reason to believe marauders were lurking there.

A comparison of the fortification histories of Virginia and Pennsylvania is important. Both were confronted with the same problem, how to defend a long expanse of frontier settlements stretching diagonally, southwest to northeast, across the province. The defensive line in Pennsylvania from the Delaware to Maryland was approximately 210 miles long. Virginia’s defensive line was spoken of as three hundred miles in length.

Although there were a number of private and community forts in Virginia before 1755, and none on the Pennsylvania frontier, Pennsylvania’s plan for a chain of forts was conceived in December 1755, whereas Virginia did not begin planning until it was mandated by the House of Burgesses in April 1756. In both colonies there was a three-tier system in which private forts, county militia forts, and provincial forts existed side by side. There was a degree of harmony among these three administrative authorities, although Colonel George Washington’s contempt for the militia system was based considerably on its lax performance during fortification assignments. In Pennsylvania, unlike Virginia, there was an outer ring of forts, which I classify as the lodestone type, all built by the province except for the outer ring in Berks and Lancaster counties where county control was in authority. In Cumberland County the militia maintained a series of internal forts. Mingled among these were the private or family forts.

Governor Morris, Benjamin Franklin, and Conrad Weiser were the leaders who created the outer ring system in Pennsylvania. Assisting them was a Massachusetts professional soldier Franklin had recruited, Colonel William Clapham, who had served in Massachusetts’s remote frontier forts in years past. That experience made him an exponent of lodestone forts for Pennsylvania. From the Delaware to the east
bank of the Susquehanna, the outer ring was designed to block the passes through the Blue Mountain. These forts as a group were the only ones in Pennsylvania, and perhaps in the entire perimeter, that took advantage of strategic elevation. Although the passes in the mountain were at lower elevations than the peaks, they were still higher than the plains that lay to the north and south. Across the Susquehanna were four provincial forts in a semi-circular pattern, surrounding Cumberland County at a distance beyond the second series of mountain ridges that runs west and north of the Cumberland Valley (Fort Granville, Fort Shirley, Fort Lyttelton, and Patterson's Fort).

From the start, Virginia's chain of forts was meant to mesh with clusters of the settler population. The colony's chain ran south on a line just east of the Allegheny Mountains until it reached south of the Shenandoah Valley. Then it crossed the flat land of the Roanoke Valley and swung south again on a line just west of the Blue Ridge. As long as he could, Washington kept the forts of 1756 as close together as possible to facilitate ranging. He gradually yielded in his demands, however. In July 1756, he substituted a distance of thirty miles between forts for the fifteen to eighteen he earlier had required. In September, he recognized that the costs to the dominion were so great that perhaps only three new forts could be built, one in each of the frontier counties, Augusta, Hampshire, and Bedford. Presumably he intended the local forts to serve as ranging stations.

Several of the forts—Vause's and Dickenson's especially—were placed in passes known to be used by Indians to travel eastward. Washington also preferred sites at stream heads where, he reasoned, it was most convenient for settlers to gather. But the most important factor was the presence of a settler population. In at least one instance a community, the settlement along the Bull Pasture branch of the Cow Pasture River, was to be asked to pledge not to flee in the face of marauding Indians if the government would build a fort there. Major Andrew Lewis expressed the arrangement to his fellow frontier leader, Captain William Preston.

In case Mallar & Willson moves thire familes Continuing a garison at Millars will be of no use. If you find they are intent on moving you are to Consult with Ye Inhabitants of ye Bull pasture with all posable Speed in order to chose a place ye most advangtageous for ye protection of that Settlemen, where you are to Build a Fort providing they make a Stand and in Order to prevent thire Removal Send them word Soon of your Intent. I supose ye Inhabitants there will assist you in Buildling a Fort & gather there familes to it.

Two offensive attempts in 1756 bear comparison for their impact on the defense systems, Virginia's unsuccessful Sandy Creek expedition of February and March aimed at the Shawnee villages in the Scioto River valley, and John Armstrong's victory at Kittanning in Pennsylvania that September. Both were undertaken because offensive operations were much less costly than fortification, and both were aimed at Indian communities rather than Fort Duquesne. The first was a miserable failure; the
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second ostensibly successful. Governor Dinwiddie, an advocate of offensive opera-
tions, had high hopes that Major Andrew Lewis's volunteer frontiersmen could reach
the Shawnee villages, accompanied by Cherokees also at war with the Shawnees, by
marching along the New River and Sandy Creek. Unable to find game animals to
survive, however, Lewis's force was reduced to starvation and eventually deserted. 55

The contrast between the Sandy Creek failure and the success of Pennsylvania
volunteers at Kittanning was not as great as traditional histories suggest. As historian
William Hunter pointed out, the costly Kittanning battle was far from a model vic-
tory and had only limited impact on the war. 56 Despite victory celebrations in
Philadelphia, nothing so daring was tried again. In Virginia, the despair over Major
Lewis's failure led to greater reliance on forts. Both Dinwiddie and Washington had
always believed that offensive operations were more efficient than defense and would
ultimately be necessary to dislodge the enemy. But unlike Dinwiddie, Washington
had never had confidence in Lewis's operation or its goal. On April 24, 1756, he
wrote John Robinson, Virginia's treasurer and the speaker of the House of Burgesses,
arguing that no expedition, no matter how many soldiers it involved, could take Fort
Duquesne without artillery, engineers, and a wagon train. Despite the cost this would
involve, eventually it had to be done because "if we do not undertake to remove the
cause we are liable to the same incursion seven years hence as now; if the war con-
tinues and they are allowed to remain on Ohio." 57 After the Sandy Creek failure was
reported, however, Washington dutifully accepted a mandate from both Dinwiddie
and the legislature that a new fort system had to be arranged.

The virtually simultaneous fall of Virginia's Fort Vause (June 26, 1756) and
Pennsylvania's Fort Granville (August 1, 1756) had mixed results. Virginia's leaders
insisted that the pass where Vause was located had to be protected, so it was soon
rebuilt. 58 But Fort Granville's fall led to the gradual abandonment of Pennsylvania's
outer ring system. 59 Not surprisingly, William Clapham sought to excuse the surren-
der of Granville by stating that the garrison had had no ammunition, a fact Benjamin
Franklin disputed. 60 Clapham was defending his outer-ring, lodestone system. Even
as Pennsylvania gradually pulled back from the outer ring, however, it constructed
one truly superior stronghold, Fort Augusta at Shamokin. This was in isolated terri-
tory closed to white settlement although owned by Indian nations. Virginia, by com-
parison, also built one majestic structure, Fort Loudoun near Winchester, but it lay
in back of Virginia's chain of frontier forts, supported it, and served as a storage cen-
ter as well as Washington's headquarters. 61 As for Pennsylvania in 1756, Fort Augusta,
in the lodestone tradition, had to be supplied by a route along the Susquehanna,
where small posts had to be maintained for that purpose. 62 This arrangement was a
"communication," the contemporary military term for a column of forts maintained
to support passage to a very important forward position. Fort Augusta's odd location
was a compromise to protect both Cumberland County and the settlements east of
the river and south of the Blue Mountain (Lancaster, Berks, and Northampton coun-
ties). It stood in the way of any French and Indian drive south along the river from
New York and the Iroquois nation into Cumberland County, but it also outflanked the Indian center of Nescopeck (on the Susquehanna near modern Berwick) from which warriors had been raiding the settlements south of Blue Mountain. If Pennsylvania's lengthy diplomacy with the upstart Delaware leader Teedyuscung had not neutralized Indian aggression in northeastern Pennsylvania, Fort Augusta might have become the center of significant military operations. In 1757 both Virginia's and Pennsylvania's defense systems were cut back so extensively that regular ranging operations connecting the posts were impossible. Virginia received assistance only through its uneasy alliance with the Cherokees, which lasted merely to the end of the year.

Pennsylvania in 1757 took heart from the presence of a battalion of redcoats of the Royal American Regiment under Colonel John Stanwix, stationed at Carlisle. But a strategic stalemate prevented Stanwix from making the strike at Fort Duquesne for which so many had hoped. Rumors, which even Washington believed, indicated that a French and Indian expedition was under way from Fort Duquesne directly down the Braddock Road into Maryland and northern Virginia, and Stanwix's force was held back in readiness to move to the southeast. The hoped for attack on Fort Duquesne was postponed another year. Meanwhile, other outer forts in Pennsylvania (Carlisle, Fort Morris in Shippensburg, Fort Lytellton, and Fort Loudoun of Pennsylvania) were formed into a "communication" pointing toward Raystown, later named Fort Bedford, the logical Pennsylvania route to the Forks of the Ohio.

The Forbes expedition of June through November 1758 changed everything. In retrospect it is hard to understand why the British built the enormous Fort Pitt, beginning in 1760, after the French menace was clearly gone. However, it is likely that an appreciation of the lodestone principle justified for them the great expenses at Fort Pitt and its dependent posts (Ligonier, Bedford, LeBoeuf, Presque Isle, Venango, Burd, etc.). In the period between 1760 and the eruption associated with Pontiac in the spring of 1763, the Indians of the upper Ohio Valley were certainly awed by the British forts. We can conjecture that without the successes of the western Indians, who swept east into the Valley coordinating with and perhaps inspired by Pontiac's attacks in the west, the Indians resident in Pennsylvania and the upper Ohio Valley never would have taken up arms in 1763.

What happened to the Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland perimeter in 1763-1764, the Pontiac period?

Pennsylvania's experience illustrated the lodestone principle. Much Indian aggression was expended against British forts in Ohio and Pennsylvania, far beyond the settlement line. It did not, however, shield the settlers from other Indian war parties, some of which penetrated into Lancaster, York, and Berks Counties. So dan-
gerous was the countryside and thin the Pennsylvania provincial and redcoat forces in the upper Ohio Valley that there was no attempt systematically to seek out the western war parties. The lesson with regard to fortification methods seemed to be that small garrisons of a dozen or less, even though made up of redcoat regulars, were inadequate. The enormous material expenditure put forth to build Fort Pitt was partially justified in that the citadel did not fall. The decision that had been made in 1758 to complete Fort Ligonier, located half way between Fort Bedford and Pittsburgh in the valley between Chestnut Ridge and Laurel Hill, in a thorough fashion at the cost of delaying the march of Forbes army to Fort Duquesne, now must have been thankfully remembered.

The old provincial and local forts had fallen to pieces, however. Therefore, in Cumberland County in July 1763, the British commander Colonel Henry Bouquet gave orders for an emergency system of eight forts to be located from Carlisle south to the Maryland line, and one, Roddy's Mill, in Shearman's Valley. All but one of the nine was a mill; three of the mills had been fortified in the 1755-1758 period. This suggests that the heavy timbered mills were easy to defend. Although the stockades with which they had been surrounded in the previous war had collapsed, those could easily be rebuilt. Bouquet explained that he had to abandon most of the northern portion of the county in order to concentrate on the defense of the more populated southern sections. As a direct result, an Indian war party wreaked death and destruction in undefended Buffalo Creek Valley and much of Shearman's Valley. It was a cruel twist of circumstances.

In Virginia, the forts from the 1755-1758 period were good enough to be used again, although the Virginia Regiment had been disbanded and was not reconstituted. Virginia's Indian fighters developed a level of savagery not previously noted in the accounts of former years. Many surprise attacks on Indian plunder parties occurred, suggesting that the Virginians had improved their tactics, and accounts of these small victories emphasize the value of booty retaken from the marauding Native Americans, including scalps they had just cut from their Virginia victims. These changes illustrate a gradual increase in the whites' savage conduct, anticipating the methods used by George Rogers Clark and other frontier raiders of subsequent decades.

In Maryland the line of Conococheague Creek held up against Indian incursions, but just barely. Savagery, especially on the part of Thomas Cresap's followers who disguised themselves as Indians and openly traded in scalps, increased because of the absence of a good system of forts. As trading post operators the Cresap group manipulated the market price of scalps upward. The Assembly assisted by raising the scalp bounty to £50, thus subsidizing professional terrorists to save the cost of building forts. The implication is, therefore, that—assuming warfare in some form was inevitable—the existence of forts made for a less savage attitude on the part of the colonials.

Practical considerations of waging war seem to have given rise to the acceptance
of a quickly improvised type of fort that protected soldiers but were technically and theoretically flawed. Thus, although the King’s Army on the European Continent had virtually no occasion to build fortifications in the Seven Years War, by 1768 Britain, thanks to experience in North America during the previous decade, developed a usable manual on field fortifications. This trained unit commanders

Without the association of Engineers. . . . to trace out, and construct, all sorts of redouts, field-fortifications, tetes-de-pont, and etc. . . [and] put in proper state of defense churches, church-yards, old castles, villages, small and large towns, & Co.76

Although in 1754 one such makeshift, Fort Necessity, had proven pathetically inadequate when attacked, any measure of its true value must consider the dangerous alternatives available to Washington’s once he had decided to stand and fight north of the Potomac. Many of the British forts on the Pennsylvania communication between Carlisle and Fort Pitt that were completed for the Forbes expedition had been conceived with no idea that they would become permanent posts.77 The line between a hastily-constructed strong point and a proper fort was well brought out when General Forbes lost his temper over Fort Ligonier (the post on Loyalhanna Creek) and wrote Bouquet

I was told this day to my great surprize that Capt Gordon was building at Loyal Hannan fitt to stand a siege, you know we want nothing but a strong post So for Gods sake think of both time money and Labour and put a Stop to all superfluities.78

Colonel Henry Bouquet’s defensible camps for the 1764 Ohio expedition, most of which were merely sites favored by nature for defense, also suggest spontaneous and improvised defense works were acceptable to the British when useful.79 The fortification experience from 1755 to 1765 cannot be said to have been a total triumph either for the lodestone principle or for restricting forts to areas of depth and density.80 Britain maintained many forts in the Indian-reserved wilderness for a few more years on the assumption that they would improve military and economic conditions. When they did not, they were gradually abandoned as being too expensive.

Several factors, in addition to the imperial decision to enlarge garrisons close to the discontented colonists on the East Coast, worked against continuing the western forts. Historian John Shy believes that the fort sites most intelligently located for controlling the Indian nations had fallen in 1763, and were considered by General Thomas Gage and others to be too expensive to rebuild. When the Earl of Hillsborough became the first Secretary of State for the colonies at the beginning of 1768, replacing the Earl of Shelburne who had previously overseen them through the Southern Department, schemes for new inland colonies in the North American west
lost favor. Hillsborough soon convinced the British government to abandon the regulation of Indian trade, a policy that had made required the perpetuation of frontier forts. In 1771, Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan Company, the Philadelphia firm trading at Fort Chartres, collapsed. Also, the international threat posed by the Bourbon Family Compact disappeared when France refused to back Spain in its conflict with Britain for the Falkland Islands. In 1772, both Forts Pitt and Chartres were abandoned, leaving only the three posts on the Great Lakes to face any new combination of enemies.81
Notes

1. Pennsylvania. *An Act Authorizing the Governor to appoint five persons to... make report... the advisability of... marking the various forts erected as a defense against the Indians.* Act of 23 May 1893, Pamphlet Laws 123.


5. Washington to Lord Loudoun, Jan. (no day), 1757, *ibid.*, IV, 82.


12. Thomas Lewis to William Preston, March 9, 1757. Draper Papers as cited in n. 11.


25. Charles Albro Barker, *The Background of the Revolution in Maryland* (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1940; reprint, Hamden, Ct.: Archon Books, 1967), 233, 239. The ordinaries revenue had been earmarked for the proprietary secretary early in the century. In 1733 the proprietor succeeded in halting Assembly encroachment on many revenue sources, but in 1739 the Assembly appealed to royal favor to curtail Lord Baltimore, and in 1740 the ordinaries money was successfully placed in a supply bill to fund the British expedition to Cartagena but with a presumption that it would not be permanently controlled by the Assembly. *Ibid.*, 239.

28. Horatio Sharpe to Robert Dinwiddie, Aug. 23, 1756, Archives of Maryland, VI, 469.
29. Ibid., LII, 280-282.
30. Ibid., 608. It is not clear whether Sharpe was the actual author of the report, but he must have agreed with its content.
31. Ibid., 615-617.
32. Compare ibid., 608 and 615-617. “On and near North Mountain” should have been slightly west of Conococheague Creek, the vicinity so often presented as the most western settlement area, whereas “Just behind and among our western Settlements” should have been an area further east. North Mountain is west of modern Elizabeth Town, on the Potomac.
33. Gipson, *British Empire*, VII, 248; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 340, 407. The Assembly reversed its 1754 policy of supporting Virginia and turned cool toward Pennsylvania and Virginia, as seen in a passage in the £40,000 Act preventing spending for military expeditions unless the two neighbors also provided funds. *Archives of Maryland*, LII, 492.
34. Ibid.; IV, 335-341. These were all letters annexed to Gov. Sharpe’s address to the Lower House, Dec. 9, 1757: Sharpe to Joseph Chapline, April 23, 1757; Chapline to Sharpe, May 10, 1757; same to same, May 14, 1757; John Ridout to Chapline, May 12, 1757; Chapline to Sharpe, May 18, 1757; same to same, May 29, 1757; Ridout to Chapline, June 1, 1757; Chapline to [Ridout], June 10, 1757; Ridout to the Chapline, June 13, 1757; Chapline to Sharpe, July 20, 1757; Ridout to Chapline, July 24, 1757; Chapline to Ridout, July 30, 1757. The nature of the soldiers’ sickness was not mentioned.
36. *Archives of Maryland*, LVIII, lxx-lxxii.
37. Land, *Maryland*, 244.
38. *Archives of Maryland*, LVIII, lxxii.
39. E.g., Henry Hooper, Speaker of the Maryland Assembly, to Gov. Horatio Sharpe: “Yet we cannot learn that the Forces at Fort Cumberland . . . have very rarely, if ever, molested those Savages, in those their Incursions, from whence we would willingly presume their Passage is below the Ranges, which troops station’d at Fort Cumberland can, with Safety to that Fort, extend themselves to.” Quoted in High, “Sharpe,” 138. Also, Address of the Upper House to the Lower House, May 14, 1756: *Archives of Maryland*, LII, 281: “Tho a Fort on the North Mountain will be very proper . . . parties of Indians may easily pass the Fort come down destroy the Inhabitants and retire again beyond the Fort in a few hours without being observed or before an alarm can be given.”
42. Washington to Lord Loudoun, Jan. (no day) 1757, *Washington Papers*, IV, 82. On April 24, 1756 he had used exactly the same argument in a letter to John Robinson, adding that the penalty for not placing forts within eighteen miles of each other would be allowing “the Enemy to pass between without being easily discovered; and when discovered, so soon pursued.” Ibid., III, 48.
46. Memorandum Respecting Militia, May 8, 1756, Statutes; the entire military effort is found in Henning's Statutes, VII, 9-29. Hunter, Forts, 214, 301, 365.


47. Hunter, Forts, 178. William A. Hunter followed the historians' convention of styling private forts with the owner's surname followed by "Fort" (e.g., Hunter's Fort), although contemporary writers used Fort Hunter and Hunter's Fort indiscriminately. Ibid., 548-549.


50. Ibid., 365-367.


54. Andrew Lewis to William Preston, April 4, 1757, Draper Papers, IQQ (Preston Papers), 150-151.

55. Robert Dinwiddie to Henry Fox, March 20, 1756, Dinwiddie Records, II, 372; Dinwiddie to Washington, April 8, 1756, ibid., II, 382; F. B. Kegley, Kegley's Virginia Frontier: The Beginning of the Southwest—The Roanoke of Colonial Days, 1740-1783 (Roanoke, Va.: Southwest Virginia Historical Society, 1938), 224-228; Maryland Gazette No. 574, May 6, 1756. Washington had been convinced that the expedition was impractical. Washington to Dinwiddie, April 7, 1756, Dinwiddie Records, II, 334.


60. Ibid., 391-392.


63. For the history of diplomacy involving Teedyuscung prior to the recapture of the Forks of the Ohio, see Jennings, Empire of Fortune, 274-280, 341-347, 398-400.


66. Thomas G. Toussey, Military History of Carlisle and Carlisle Barracks (Richmond, Va.: Dietz Press, 1939), 17-20; Hunter, Forts, 446-448. There was another reason for putting off the offensive, a report that a French and Indian offensive was being directed toward Cumberland County.

67. Hunter, Forts, 474.

68. In the judgment of the architectural historian Charles Morse Stotz, "Fort Pitt, built at the Forks of the Ohio during 1759 through 1761, was the most elaborate and costly fortification erected by the British on their frontier in North America. Judging with informed hindsight, we now know that Fort Pitt was unnecessarily large. The question arises: why did the British build a fort there of such enormous size?" Stotz, Outposts of the War for Empire, The French and English in Western Pennsylvania: Their Armies, Their Forts, Their People, 1749-1764 (Pittsburgh: Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, 1985), 127.

69. Sipes, Indian Wars, 453.

70. Fort Vause with its eight men, Sandusky Bay with only fifteen, and Fort Venango with fifteen or sixteen, were examples of small garrisons that succumbed to Indian attacks. Although the British officers in Pennsylvania realized that small garrisons were dangerous, they also seem to have enjoyed risking fate—bluffing the Indians with a handful of men—as long they got away with it. An anonymous work published after Bouquet's Ohio campaign, attributed to the educator and clergyman Dr. William Smith of the College of Philadelphia, warned against skeleton-sized gar-
risons. “A few forts with strong garrisons [will do] more service than a great number weakly guard-
ed.” Historical Account of Bouquet’s Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in 1764 (1765; reprint, Cincinnati: Robert Clarke Co., 1907), Appendix I, 115.


72. Henry Bouquet to James Hamilton, July 1, 1763, ibid., VI, 280-283.

73. Pennsylvania Gazette No. 1805, July 28, 1763;
Sipes, Indian Wars, 430-438.

74. Extracts of letters, Oct. 3, 1763 through Dec. 8, 1763, Draper Papers, 15DD (King’s Mountain Papers), 1-8.


77. E.g., Storz, Outposts of Empire, 110, 113, for forts at Juniata Crossings and Bedford. For conceptualization of the forts developed on the Forbes expedition, see Bouquet Papers, II, passim.


79. [Smith], Historical Account of Bouquet’s Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in 1764, 38, 39, 40, 49-50. Camps numbered 4, 6, and 8 on the march toward the Indian concentrations were protected by elevation, streams, dry ditches, and thickets. Camp Number 16, to which Bouquet had good reason to expect he would have to retreat to under enemy fire, was fortified with four redoubts.

80. Forts in the wilderness, including aspects of the lodestone principle, were lauded by Dr. William Smith. Such forts had proved valuable in Pontiac’s War because the Indians had “bent their chief efforts against the forts and have been less able to distress our settlements.” Historical Account of Bouquet’s Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in 1764, Appendix I, 114.