Civil-Military Relations in Pennsylvania, 1758-1760: An Examination of John Shy's Thesis

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In 1763 the British government decided to maintain a permanent army of regulars in North America—an action that had profound consequences for imperial relations. In *Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution*, John Shy offers a cogent analysis of this decision, exploring both the government's rationale for keeping regulars in the colonies and the role it envisioned its soldiers playing in administering a vastly expanded American empire. As Shy demonstrates, this role changed in response to the political crises that punctuated Anglo-American relations after 1763. On the eve of Lexington, a force that had been initially viewed as a frontier constabulary was now perceived as an instrument of British coercion and control.

While the main theme of *Toward Lexington* is the role of the British army in America between 1763 and 1775, it also explores “American attitudes and behavior” towards the military during this period. Here Professor Shy advances several important theses. First, in reflecting on the experience of the Great War for the Empire in shaping American attitudes towards the British army, Shy acknowledges that “during the early years of the war, there had been civil-military friction sufficient to explain an American rebellion if one had occurred. But the last five years had been a time of triumph, educative and euphoric in effect.” And that while “friction had never altogether disappeared . . . the elation that came with victory was a balm that healed sore points.” Second, he argues that “Americans were less afraid of regular soldiers in the classic, Praetorian sense than” they were of the corrupting influence of the soldiery, especially the officer corps. Finally he argues that it was only after 1768, with the decision to garrison troops at Boston, that American attitudes began to harden against the regulars. Despite this hardening of feeling, the army, Shy maintains, never became “a major grievance in itself.” Instead the army became “the medium” through which the government communicated its intent. “Read in the visible results of military policy,” Shy states, the government’s message to America “betrayed ignorance, weakness, procrastination, and malice.”

My own research on the British army in Pennsylvania during the French and Indian War as well as arguments advanced in several monographs produced since the publication of *Toward Lexington* have led me to question some of Shy’s conclusions, at least with respect to Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania significant civil-military friction during the French and Indian War persisted into 1760—two years after Shy posits a relaxation in Anglo-American tensions. Memories of Pennsylvania’s experiences with the army were more powerful and enduring than Shy would credit, reflecting more a concern with constitutional issues and a lawless soldiery than with a corrupt officer corps. While these experiences were not in themselves determinative, they surely made some Pennsylvanians open to the idea of independence.

If we examine the state of civil-military relations in America during the Great War for the Empire, then Shy’s assessment of colonial attitudes rings true—there certainly was enough friction between civilians and the military to justify rebellion. The war measures which caused the strongest American protests were recruiting, quarter-
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ing, and impressment. While complaints may have subsided by 1758 in other colonies, in Pennsylvania quartering and impressment continued to trouble civil-military relations into 1760.

The Quaker colony was first called upon to house British regulars in the summer of 1755 when it appeared that the remnants of Major General Edward Braddock's defeated force would winter at Philadelphia. To provide for this contingency, the assembly passed a bill extending to Pennsylvania those portions of the Mutiny Act relating to quartering. The preamble of this new law set forth a fundamental principle of the British Constitution: that it was "the undoubted right of British . . . subjects" not to have troops billeted on them against their will and that "any subject" had the right "to refuse to quarter any soldier or soldiers, notwithstanding any demand, warrant or billeting whatsoever."

Because the regulars were eventually sent to New York, the Quartering Act of 1755 was not put into effect. But in July of the following year, the Pennsylvania act was disallowed by the King in Council. The King's attorney general had objected to the language in the bill's preamble, arguing that:

the tendency of this act must unavoidably be to cramp the public service and obstruct the defense of the province. It assumes propositions true in the mother country and rightly asserted in the reigns of Charles the 1st and Charles the 2nd in times of peace and when soldiers were kept up without consent of Parliament. But the application of such propositions to a colony in time of war in the case of troops raised for their protection by authority of . . . Parliament . . . should not be allowed to stand as law.

Traditional rights, at least in the colonies it would seem, could be suspended in the name of wartime expediency.

In the early fall of 1756, Pennsylvania was again called upon to house regulars when Lord Loudoun, the British commander-in-chief, requested winter quarters for five hundred men of the First Battalion of the Royal American Regiment. The assembly responded to Loudoun's message by passing a bill that provided for quartering soldiers in public houses such as taverns and inns. By the time the Royal Americans arrived at Philadelphia in mid-December, it had become apparent that the city did not have enough room for the soldiers in its public houses. Governor William Denny then attempted to execute a warrant to have the soldiers billeted in private homes. The governor's action infuriated the lawmakers who challenged the legality of his proceeding. They expressed surprise that he would "issue Orders so diametrically opposite to . . . express Law." They rejected Denny's argument that the law governing quartering extended further in wartime than in peacetime, and refused to amend the law to house the soldiers in private homes. The impasse would have continued had not Loudoun threatened to march troops to Philadelphia and forcibly "Quarter . . . the whole" on the city. Faced with the threat of British bayonets, the assembly's leadership capitulated and made provision for all troops. The building of
a 5000-man barracks in the city's Northern Liberties the following year alleviated most of the anxiety over quartering in Philadelphia.10

But disputes over quartering in Pennsylvania did not subside with the completion of the barracks in the capital city. In fact, the most strongly worded protests over quartering did not come in 1756 from Philadelphia but in 1759 from the inhabitants of Lancaster. In his discussion of the quartering controversy during the Great War for the Empire, Stanley Pargellis notes that "only once did it ever approach the popular conception of... redcoats forcing their way into private houses and driving the owner and his family to the thin comforts of the attic"—this in Albany in 1756.11 But if the list of grievances submitted to the Pennsylvania Assembly in February and March of 1759 are to be believed, then Pargellis' statement requires amendment.

Lancaster had provided quarters for regulars as early as the winter of 1757-58. There had been enough problems with the soldiery at this time for the town fathers to consider petitioning the assembly for funds to build a barracks in Lancaster.12 But it was the succeeding winter when the most serious problems over the billeting of regulars arose. The army's plan for quartering troops in Pennsylvania during the winter of 1758-59 called for stationing seven companies of regulars at the barracks in Philadelphia: "Four [companies] at Lancaster, Two at Reading, Three at Germantown and one at Chester and Darby."13 Word of the intended disposition of regulars caused apprehension in some of the designated towns. In Reading, Berks County
magistrate Conrad Weiser reported that "the Tavern Keepers are under the Greatest Consternation, having received nothing as yet for last years quartering Soldiers, some take down their Signes, having received great abuses last year." "Trouble in Lancaster occurred soon after the arrival of a contingent of the First Highland Battalion. On January 8, 1759, the battalion commander, Colonel Archibald Montgomery, wrote Brigadier General John Forbes that "the People of this Place are Such Scoundrels that they will give No quarters to the Troops." The public houses contained three times the number of soldiers they were capable of maintaining. And the "Magistrates refuse[d] giving billets." Either on his own initiative or on the orders of Forbes—it is not clear—Montgomery remedied the situation at Lancaster by forcibly billeting his troops.

Angered by the heavy-handed manner in which the Highlanders had been quartered on their town, the people of Lancaster petitioned the assembly for relief from the troublesome soldiers. On February 28, 1759, that body's standing committee on grievances submitted a report to the full house complaining of abuses committed by the military against the populace. Army officers had "attempted, by Menaces, and other illegal Methods, to extort Billets from the Magistrates of the County and Borough of Lancaster, for quartering Soldiers on private Houses." Having failed in this objective the officers resorted to "open Violence" to secure quarters for their troops. Soldiers had "forced" their way "into the Dwelling-houses of the Inhabitants, taking their Beds and other Necessaries from them, for the Use of the Soldiers." "One Family," the report charged, had "been obliged to give up their own House . . . and seek Lodgings for themselves in the Houses of their Friends."

After hearing this report, the assembly appointed an eight-man committee to draft an address to Governor Denny relating the army's violent and illegal behavior. On March 1, the committee laid the draft of its address before the assembly. It was a verbatim restatement of the report submitted the previous day. The final paragraph of the address hinted that the assembly would not take action on the army's supply bill if the grievances were not remedied. Denny received the address on March 2 and immediately forwarded a copy of it to the new commander-in-chief, General Jeffery Amherst.

While the assembly awaited Amherst's response, petitions concerning violations of the provincial Quartering Act continued to flow into the assembly. A petition of John Baldwin, of Chester County, complained that soldiers from "Colonel Montgomery's Highland Regiment [had] . . . been quartered on him without Billets from any Magistrate." These troops, Baldwin said, had "very much abused and insulted him and his Family" and were dissatisfied with the necessaries he had supplied them. The assembly also received two petitions, one from the Burgesses of Lancaster, the other from the inhabitants of that borough, requesting the construction of barracks at Lancaster. Numerous petitions like these proved so disturbing that the assembly instituted a new committee to review and amend the laws respecting quartering to prevent future "Mischiefs."
On March 10, the assembly received Amherst's answer to its petition. The general stated that "the Quartering of Soldiers on private Houses" was unavoidable when accommodations in public houses were insufficient—as in the case of Lancaster. "If, therefore, the Magistrates refused them Billets, they could not do less than make their Quarters good, which is an old Practice wherever the seat of War lies." Such measures, Amherst argued, had been taken in England in times of necessity. It would be impossible for the army to carry out its objectives if the troops were improperly housed. So as not to leave the assembly with the impression that he meant to "refuse them Justice, or to Screen the Troops . . . guilty of any irregularities," Amherst promised to punish abuses of the Quartering Act if given "proper proof" by the assembly. Once again traditional rights and liberties were sacrificed in the name of wartime expediency.

Realizing that Amherst would offer little satisfaction to their complaints, the assembly gathered more evidence for an appeal to the governor. On March 13, a committee was ordered to "collect such Proofs and Facts" relating to the grievances which had "been communicated by Petitions to [the] Assembly." On April 6, the committee concluded that the evidence of "Oppression is of so extraordinary a Nature, that it calls for immediate Redress." Accordingly, an address was ordered drawn up for presentment to the governor; Denny received it on April 11.

The assembly's memorial stated that the King's officers had violated an act of Parliament and the "civil Authority of the Government" by forcibly quartering "a large Number of Soldiers on the private Houses" of Lancaster. Furthermore, it accused the soldiers of "committing great Outrages on the People, by Seizing and depriving them of their Possessions and Property, assaulting their Persons (Magistrates not excepted) in a violent Manner, and by obliging them to pay Sums of Money for their Quarters, or to receive the Troops into their private Families." There had "not been the least Cause or Necessity . . . to justify these arbitrary Measures" especially when barracks "capable of receiving all his Majesty's Troops" lay empty at Philadelphia. The memorial concluded with expressions of Lancaster's affection and devotion to the King's service and appealed to the Governor to come to their relief.

If Governor Denny replied to this memorial there is no record of it. However, he willingly assented to the assembly's efforts throughout May and June to draft plans and raise monies for the construction of a five hundred-man barracks at Lancaster. Two thousand pounds was appropriated for this project which was completed the following year.

The assembly took additional steps to protect the citizenry and to redress the grievances relating to quartering. On April 21, it passed a new quartering act that forbade magistrates from issuing any billets to the army unless the barracks in the colony were full. It also approved the establishment of a fund to pay the monies the army owed to public householders for previous billeting. In January 1760 the Provincial Commissioners began to advertise to have persons bring in their unpaid
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accounts for settlement.\textsuperscript{25} In the winter of 1759-60, the town of Lancaster was put to the test again when four companies of Royal Americans were quartered on the town. Once more, the magistrates refused to quarter the regulars because the barracks at Philadelphia remained empty. Like Montgomery before him, Colonel Henry Bouquet quartered his troops on the town over the objections of local authorities. But unlike his predecessor, he was able to accomplish this feat “without noise or complaints,” perhaps because of the Swiss officer’s greater political savvy and superior skill in dealing with civilians.\textsuperscript{26}

This was the last noteworthy conflict over quartering in Pennsylvania during the French and Indian War.\textsuperscript{27} The completion of the barracks in Lancaster and the establishment of a fund to discharge the accounts of public householders removed the most immediate causes of civilian complaint. A reduction in the number of regulars stationed in the colony after the winter of 1759-60 also helped to ease civil-military tensions. For the remainder of the war, the number of redcoats serving in the Quaker colony seldom rose above six companies, and these men remained garrisoned at frontier outposts.\textsuperscript{28}

The second war measure that generated friction between the army and civilians in Pennsylvania until 1760 was the impressment of transport. Pennsylvania’s first experience with providing transport to the army occurred during the Braddock Expedition in 1755. Although no wagons were pressed into service, it took the threat of a press and the promise of army gold to prompt Pennsylvania farmers to hire out their wagons to the general. Unfortunately for the military, the army failed to settle its accounts with the colony’s wagon owners in a timely fashion, thereby discouraging compliance with future requests for wagons.\textsuperscript{29}

The colony did not have a heavy demand placed upon its supplies of wagons and horses until 1758, during the expedition commanded by General Forbes to capture Fort Duquesne. Forbes’s strategy for reducing the French fortress called for a protected advance along a road running west from Carlisle to the forks of the Ohio. This road, which had to be hacked out over several hundred miles of wilderness terrain, was to have fortified depots constructed along it at forty-mile intervals. The idea was to push the army westward along this well-supplied, fortified line towards Duquesne where it could be massed for a final hammer blow against the enemy. In the case of a military reversal, the army could safely retreat along a fortified supply line.\textsuperscript{30}

The logistical demands of such a campaign were daunting. The army’s weekly rations alone amounted to over seventy tons of provisions.\textsuperscript{31} Add to that the large quantity of forage, tools, and munitions required by Forbes’s expeditionary force, and the true dimensions of the army’s transport problems can be appreciated. To move this mountain of supplies required hundreds of wagons and thousands of horses.

The work of gathering and transporting supplies began in mid-spring 1758. Pennsylvania had sufficient wagons and horses to meet this need, but farmers proved
unwilling to part with them. In part this owed to necessity. Farmers needed their horses and wagons to work their farms and sow their crops. Others disregarded the army’s advertisement for wagons because they thought the terms of hire unfavorable. There was also much resentment over unpaid accounts from previous years. George Stevenson, recruiting officer for the Pennsylvania forces and prothonotary for York County, informed Colonel Henry Bouquet that he had had “little Success” in obtaining wagons for the army. “The People,” he told the Swiss officer, “. . . are willing to do every thing they can, but that they are afraid of being ill treated: by what I can learn amongst them, this Jealousy arises, from some Unfair Usage, which they alledge, some of ‘em have formerly rece’d from Officers of the Army.”

Despite the sincere efforts of some of the leading citizens and magistrates to encourage people to bring in their wagon teams, insufficient numbers forced General Forbes to request press warrants from Governor Denny. These ultimately brought in the needed wagons and animals but left bad memories on both sides. Both Bouquet and Forbes were angered that some magistrates failed to execute the warrants or that they warned the people to hide their wagons. “Civil authority,” Bouquet wrote his superior, “is so completely nonexistent in this [Berks] county that, after all the efforts I have made for four days, I have been able to obtain only eight wagons up to the present time. . . . These people seem so obstinate and so unfriendly, the magistrates are so weak and so afraid of displeasing the country folk, that the service which may depend on them will be totally neglected as soon as I have gone.” Bouquet’s sentiments were echoed by a Berks County magistrate who condemned the obstructionism in his own district. “We have a Set of people here,” he told Bouquet, “that will not only do nothing, in this affair, but by their Exemple and Ill will, puts Mischief into others.”

Still, by July Bouquet could report that the numbers of wagons were adequate and supplies were moving forward with good speed and in sufficient quantity. But the roads along the communication were so rocky, steep, and difficult that they quickly took their toll on the army’s transport. Reports of wagons “breaking to pieces” fill Bouquet’s correspondence. The situation was further aggravated by the failure of the army’s deputy quartermaster general, Sir John St. Clair, to lay in adequate stores of provender for the pack and wagon horses. As a consequence, the animals were collapsing from malnourishment and fatigue. “Most of . . . [our farmer’s] horses . . . [have] come home in such a starved Condition,” a Lancaster justice informed Forbes, “that they are not able to carry loads back again.” The horses that managed to continue had to have their loads reduced so they would not collapse. Additional horses fell due to the inattention of the wagoners and pack horse drivers.

By mid-August losses of wagons and horses were beginning to mount and Bouquet saw a supply shortage looming. He warned Forbes as early as August 8 that the position of the army would be rendered precarious if more provisions could not be brought forward along the road. By early September, the supply situation had
become critical. "Everything depends on having wagons," Bouquet counseled. "Once this point is obtained, everything else is at your disposal." Action had to be taken or the chances of capturing Duquesne before year’s end would fade. He suggested the use of suasion, bayonets, and a new compulsory wagon law to be enacted by the assembly. Following Bouquet’s advice, Forbes pressed the assembly for the necessary legislation warning that body of direful consequences if it failed to act. Fortunately, the assemblymen promptly addressed the general’s appeal. On September 20, the lawmakers passed a new wagon act imposing a fine of £20 on individuals who refused to provide wagons to the army. This threat, and the efforts of Sir John St. Clair in pressing horses and wagons, enabled the army to procure sufficient transport so that by mid-October supplies were once again pushing forward along the military road. Forbes’s reliance on impressment insured that his expedition would not fail for lack of transport, but the army would pay a heavy price for its resort to such strong-arm tactics.

The capture of Fort Duquesne in November 1758 by Forbes’s expeditionary force in no way lessened the army’s need for an efficient supply line into western Pennsylvania. The British determined in 1759 to strengthen their hold on the Ohio by erecting a new fort on or near the ruins of Duquesne, which necessitated the garrisoning of thousands of provincials and regulars at posts along the communication. As in 1758 the success of the campaign hinged on the military’s ability to maintain the flow of supplies and provisions westward along this road. But the large numbers of wagons and horses hired in 1758 and the heavy losses of animals and transport during a rigorous campaign had left the army strapped with debts totaling £180,000. Until these were paid off few Pennsylvanians would willingly enter their wagons in the King’s service.

Forbes’s first hint of this looming problem came in December 1758 when disgruntled wagoners refused to reenter their carriage into military service because they had not been paid as promised. The general took steps early in the new year to pay off all wagon accounts contracted “during the late Campaign to the Westward” by directing those with claims against the army to bring in their accounts for settlement. The procedure for inspecting and settling these accounts was so cumbersome, however, that Forbes only further exasperated an already frustrated populace.

Before long wagon owners turned to the assembly for relief in recovering their money. On February 28, in the same report that detailed abuses of the regulars quartered at Lancaster, the Committee of Grievances criticized the military for the harsh methods it had used to secure wagons and horses the previous year. “Both Officers and Soldiers have paid so little Regard” to the laws regulating the hire of horses and carriages, that they “have terrified, abused, and insulted the Inhabitants, in many Parts of the Province.” Individuals who had legally contracted to supply the army with wagons and horses had not yet been paid, nor had they been compensated when their transport was returned damaged—“most of [the packhorses] . . . returned were so low in Flesh, as to be in a great Measure useless.”
These grievances appeared in the assembly’s address of March 2, which Governor Denny forwarded to General Amherst. “I must observe,” the general responded, “that I believe they have themselves mistaken the Extent of those Laws; for it is not to be supposed that either the Officers or Soldiers would apply for more Carriages and Horses than the Service absolutely required, and where they could not obtain such upon a proper application, it was certainly their Duty, and incumbent on them, for the Good of the Service, to impress them.” While disappointed that the lawmakers “would have started any Difficulties” at such a critical juncture, Amherst promised to take steps to remedy the wagon owners’s grievances.

To this end he directed Sir John St. Clair “to call in all the outstanding Accounts of Expenses” from the Forbes expedition. These were soon found to be “of so intricate and complicated a nature” that the commander-in-chief felt they should be carefully inspected before being paid. Amherst therefore ordered the appointment of four commissioners to examine and settle the wagon accounts, who began work by April 15. Despite the general’s good faith effort, the army was no closer to settling the wagon accounts in April than it had been at the beginning of the year because it lacked money to pay them off.

That wagons would not be forthcoming until British gold started flowing became evident by mid-May. On the fourth of that month Brigadier General John Stanwix, the deceased Forbes’s replacement, advertised for the province’s eight counties to supply 580 wagons for the upcoming campaign. A note following this advertisement in the May 17 edition of the Pennsylvania Gazette warned that “those who obstinately refused to comply with” the army’s demands could expect to have their “Horses or Carriages impressed.” The ad drew little response, in part because some wagon owners found the terms unfavorable, but most were unwilling to hire out their wagons again until the army paid off its old accounts.

In late May Stanwix turned to the assembly for assistance, asking the colony’s lawmakers to reenact a law imposing a £20 fine on individuals refusing to provide horse and carriage to the army. He also requested a loan of £100,000 in Pennsylvania currency so that the army could pay off its outstanding transport debts, thereby encouraging others to hire out their wagons. When the assembly delayed answering Stanwix, the general appealed to Governor Denny to prompt the legislators to action. “The King’s Service is absolutely at a Stand,” he informed Denny. If the assembly did not pass a law obliging the people to provide horses and wagons Stanwix predicted “the Advanced Posts must be abandoned, and that Country lost, which has cost the King and the Colonies so much Blood and Treasure.”

Disturbed at the abuses that had occurred the previous year when the army resorted to impressment, the assembly was unwilling to enact any more legislation that would enable the military to coerce more wagons from the citizenry. It did, however, provide the army with a loan—albeit only half the amount Stanwix had requested. Although this was less than one third of the money needed to pay off all the arrears owed to wagon owners, it did provide some relief. To encourage those
holding the army’s I.O.U.’s to reenter their wagons again in military service, Stanwix directed that their accounts be paid off first. As an additional inducement, Stanwix appointed respected civilians in each county rather than army officers to handle wagon contracts. He also authorized the payment of cash advances to those hiring out their wagons.\(^5\)

The payment of arrears brought some wagons into service but not enough to maintain the steady flow of supplies and provisions along the communication to the fort being built at Pittsburgh. Five counties—Lancaster, Chester, Berks, York and Bucks—were particularly backward in supplying the quota of wagons Stanwix had assigned them.\(^5\) Their citizens offered a variety of excuses: some needed their wagons to bring in the summer harvest; others claimed that a shortage of laborers made it impossible for them to hire the required drivers; and still others stated that assisting a war was against their religious principles.\(^6\)

Nor did efforts to impress wagons achieve significant results as civil and military officers met with all manner of obstructions. The first press warrant Governor Denny issued went unexecuted because somehow it was “secreted” away.\(^6\) Subsequent attempts proved little more successful. An exasperated Bouquet complained to Governor Denny that: “The People send their Wagons & horses out of the County to avoid the press, and the majestrates [are] unwilling to levy even the small fine prescribed by Law. . . . We have tryed to send Soldiers with the Constables to impress Lancaster and Chester Countyts, but the bad Success they have had, Shews plainly the insufficiency of that Expedient.”\(^6\) Even when wagons were willingly supplied the horse teams pulling them were so worn out that they were of little use.\(^6\)

Stanwix’s failure to secure sufficient wagons to meet his force’s logistical needs severely hamstrung British efforts to consolidate their hold on the Ohio throughout the spring and summer of 1759. Poor road conditions that hampered travel, enemy attacks on depots and supply trains, and the need to feed Indians out of military stores resulted in a provisions shortage that jeopardized the army’s position at the forks of the Ohio.\(^6\) In early July a desperate Stanwix implored Governor Denny to apply again for a new wagon law: “For God’s Sake, Sir, press the Assembly for the same Law as last Year, with the Penalty of Twenty Pounds, tho’ it be but for four or five months; it will be of infinite use to us.”\(^6\) The assembly replied to Stanwix’s appeal with a strongly worded message placing full blame for the general’s plight on the army itself. There would be no need for a new wagon law if the army had respected the previous one. The best way for Stanwix to secure the needed transport was to settle unpaid accounts which “both his Majesty’s Service and Justice to the People loudly demand.” The assemblymen saw little point in passing new laws when the old ones had “been in a great Measure disregarded by the General.” Therefore, they declined to comply “with the General’s Request, until they [had] . . . Reason to believe [that] the Laws they shall make will be executed and obeyed by him.”\(^6\)

A final plea by Stanwix in August for a new wagon law achieved no better results. The legislators were surprised that the general would renew his application
"without taking the least Notice of our Reasons for declining such a Measure." They still suggested that the best method for Stanwix to secure transport was to pay off old contracts.67

Stanwix's inability to form "even a small Magazeen at Pittsburg" delayed British efforts to construct a new fortification there until September 1759.68 Upon learning that the French had destroyed their remaining forts in western Pennsylvania, a frustrated Bouquet expressed a sentiment that certainly must have been shared by his fellow officers: "We have no other Ennemys for the present than the People who refuses to furnish their Waggon's, to enable us to build the Fort at Pittsburgh."69

The army successfully weathered the transport crisis of 1759, though not without suffering, anxiety, and, as Bouquet's words suggest, much anger. The military was able to avoid such problems in the future for several reasons, perhaps the most important being the reduction in the number of troops being supplied in the colony after 1759. The opening of a new supply line to Fort Pitt from Virginia and a greater reliance on horses and wagons purchased for the king's service also contributed to an improved supply system. Thus, by 1760, significant civil-military friction over the impressment of transport in Pennsylvania had ended.

While quartering and impressment were the most persistent war measures that divided regulars and civilians in Pennsylvania, other issues fractured civil-military relations between 1755 and 1763. The one war measure that elicited the most violent reaction of Pennsylvanians and that caused the greatest "bitterness between the province and the King's officers" was the enlistment of servants in the army.70 In January 1756, in response to this practice, tradesmen rioted in Philadelphia, soldiers and apprentices were jailed, and a recruiting sergeant was murdered by a crowd. Given the investment many Pennsylvanians had in indentured labor, the intensity of their reaction is understandable.71 The colonists believed themselves to "have a legal Property in the Time and Service of . . . Servants." The army's efforts to enlist their servants represented "unconstitutional and arbitrary Invasions of [their] . . . Rights and Properties."72 Even after the British ministry's decision to acknowledge the complaints of American masters and extend the protection of the Mutiny Act to America, isolated attacks on recruiters continued to take place.73 Stanley Pargellis has written that recruiting parties were "the only British soldiers whom the majority of colonials ever had a chance to see."74 Given the anger over the servant issue and the unsavory reputation recruiters enjoyed, it was indeed unfortunate for civil-military relations in the colonies that the British army has such ambassadors as these.

Conflict between soldiers and citizens occurred too because the regulars misbehaved. Redcoats were arrested for a variety of crimes against the colony's inhabitants including nonpayment of debts, theft, vandalism, assault, and even murder.75 Is it any wonder then that some citizens may have dreaded the prospect of having the King's troops billeted on their community? Nor did the military fail to inspire a sense of antipathy in the civilians who either worked with the army or who followed it on the march. Sutlers, traders, wagon masters, and packhorse drivers all experienced
rough handling at the hands of the soldiery. Even the men who administered the colony's war effort—the provincial commissioners—suffered the army's wrath, though verbal rather than physical. Forbes declared the provincial commissioners to be "the most perverse generation of mortalls that ever breathed Air." Sir John St. Clair became so enraged at the failure of commissioners to assist the Braddock Expedition that he threatened to bring fire and sword to the colony if the campaign failed.

Finally, significant friction occurred between the King's troops and the thousands of Pennsylvanians who served alongside them in uniform. Assigned more arduous fatigue duties during the campaigning season and given less hospitable quarters during the winter months than their scarlet-coated comrades-in-arms, Pennsylvania soldiers must have resented the more favored status regulars seemed to enjoy. They certainly were not ignorant of the utter contempt in which so many British officers held them. It angered the colonists to see their martial prowess denigrated and their contribution to the war effort slighted by their cousins from across the sea.

On reviewing the course of civil-military relations in Pennsylvania during the French and Indian War, it becomes clear that John Shy's thesis—at least with respect to the Quaker colony—needs revision. Significant friction between the British army and Pennsylvanians over quartering and impressment persisted into 1760, well beyond the time Shy states it subsided. Also Shy is wrong to state that the greatest fears expressed by the colonists about the army—at least in wartime—concerned the corrupting influence of the soldiery on the morals of the citizenry. They had to do with more immediate concerns: the sanctity of property and home, the protection of traditional rights and liberties, and the dangers of an intimidating, unchecked military.

What then is the significance of civil-military conflict in Pennsylvania during the French and Indian War? Shy states that it had little significance for Anglo-American relations because the euphoria of victory over the French became the "balm that healed sore points" between soldiers and civilians. For Shy the conflicts that decisively affected American attitudes toward the military occurred after 1768, not before it. But to dismiss in such a fashion the angry encounters that took place between Pennsylvanians and the army during the war is to miss their significance. For many Pennsylvanians, confrontations with the King's troops had been a highly emotional, even traumatic experience. Surely the memory of clashes with soldiers such as occurred in Lancaster in the winter of 1758-59 was not likely to fade or mellow in the afterglow of victory.

The significance of such clashes was two-fold. First, they reinforced long-held suspicions and distrust of regular soldiers, attitudes as much bound up with experiences in the Old World as in the New. Although Pennsylvanians had had almost no contact with regular soldiers before war visited their borders in 1755, the succeeding five years had provided an object lesson in the dangerous ways a professional army
could act. Civilians opposed the King's forces over a variety of military measures including quartering, the impressment of transport, and the enlistment of servants. In their disputes with regulars, Pennsylvanians responded in similar ways to their fellow countrymen across the Atlantic, where in the mid-eighteenth century the mere sight of a redcoat in some English communities was enough to touch off a riot. Certainly the Germans, Irish, and Scots, who comprised a significant percentage of Pennsylvania's population, knew the oppression of standing armies in their native lands intimately.

These negative images of the military, a result of European heritage and colonial wartime experience, powerfully shaped how Pennsylvanians responded to soldiers in their midst for years to come. During the War for American Independence, this anti-soldier sentiment found widespread expression as large professional armies once again operated in the state. As they had in the previous war, Pennsylvanians proved adept at frustrating and obstructing officers attempting to supply the army. As they had against the British, Pennsylvanians employed the law and the interference of civil officials to protect themselves from a hungry, grasping soldiery—this time the Continental Army.

Secondly, I would argue that civil-military friction during the Great War for the Empire played a role in shaping how some Pennsylvanians responded to the imperial crisis that culminated in the American Revolution. Recent monographs by Douglas Leach, Fred Anderson, and Harold Selesky have argued that the experience of Americans with regulars during the earlier war served "to poison imperial relations." They point out that the first war gave the provincials an opportunity to take the measure of the British army "with an intimacy and on a scale unprecedented in colonial history." In so doing, the colonists learned "what could be expected of redcoats," and what could be expected was usually little good. When Pennsylvanians recalled their wartime experiences, there were, to be sure, memories of a glorious victory won for king and country, but there were also some very disturbing images too—Montgomery's Highlanders in Lancaster, Lord Loudoun in Philadelphia, and General Stanwix on the western frontier. The war had shown that professional armies acted in threatening ways— to person, property, and state. Perhaps such experiences explain, in part, why radical Whig literature found such a receptive audience in the colonies. Pennsylvanians who had lost servants to fast-talking recruiters, had their horses and wagons impressed, or had troops quartered on them did not need to reflect long on the dangers of a standing army or of arbitrary power. They had experienced them firsthand.

The author thanks Louis M. Waddell of the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Don Higginbotham of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and Michael Crawford of the Naval Historical Center for comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.
Notes
2. Ibid., 143, 147.
3. Ibid., 380.
4. Ibid., 397.
5. These issues and others are examined topically in Alan Rogers, Empire and Liberty: American Resistance to British Authority, 1755-1763 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974). See also chapters 5 and 6 in Douglas E. Leach, Roots of Conflict: British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677-1763 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986).
7. William Murray to Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, 7 April, 1756, ibid., 537. Nine years later, Murray's opinion was cited in Daniel Dulany's pamphlet Considerations on the Propriety of Imposing Taxes in the British Colonies for the Purpose of Raising a Revenue . . ., a work best remembered for arguing the right of Americans to tax themselves. In this essay the Maryland lawyer observed that the “Many opinions of court lawyers upon American affairs . . . have been all strongly marked with the same character . . . They have declared that to be legal which the minister for the time being has deemed to be expedient.” The implication of such reasoning was obvious. If the British government could justify the suspension of certain traditional rights on the basis of expediency, could not other privileges be swept away on identical grounds? See Pamphlets of the American Revolution, vol. 1, 1750-1765, ed. Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1965), 617.
10. From time to time army officers complained that the barracks were not properly provided with bedding and necessaries for the troops. For example, in the spring of 1758, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Haldimand reported to Governor Denny that his men were “Lying on Straw without Beds having no proper Utencils or Other Necessaries.” See Haldimand to Denny, 7 April 1758, Richard Peters Papers, vol. 5, 37, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. For additional examples, see Jeffery Amherst to John Forbes, 4 February 1759, PRO, WO 34/44, fols. 243-44, 243v, and, Amherst to Denny, 13 January 1759, Minutes 8:262.
13. Denny to Forbes, 14 December 1758, PRO,
WO 34/33, fol. 4r.
15. Montgomery to Forbes, 8 January 1759, SRO, Dalhousie Muniments, GD 45/2, item 87, fol. 4.
17. For the text of this address, see ibid., 4932-34.
18. Statutes at Large 5:361-71. This act was passed on April 29, 1758. It directed, among other things, that soldiers could not be billeted on any houses in Philadelphia until the barracks in the city had been filled up. Compare this law with text of the Quartering Act passed the following year which directs that no houses in the colony are to have soldiers billeted on them until all the barracks in the province are filled up. See note 24.
19. For Baldwin's petition, see Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser., 6:4935-36; italics in original. For petition's from Chester, see ibid., 4934; from Reading, see ibid., 4935, 4994; and from Lancaster, see ibid., 4936, 4939, 4988, 4999, Quote at conclusion of paragraph from ibid., 4936.
20. Amherst to Denny, 7 March 1759, Minutes 8:285-86.
22. Ibid., 4978; for text of entire address, see ibid., 4977-79. Although murder was not among list of grievances against the army complained of by the assembly, the speaker of that body, Isaac Norris, would level this charge a year after the fact. See his letter to Benjamin Franklin in which he writes: "The Highlanders who bear a most wretched Character here were particularly mischievous at Lancaster, last Winter, forced themselves into private Houses killed several in a most shameful Manner and committed every Disorder which could be expected or fear from such worthless miserable Creatures." Norris to Franklin, 4 January 1759, The Papers of Benjamin Franklin, ed. Leonard W. Labaree, et al., 29 vols. to date (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1959 - ), 9:11.
23. For documentation on the barracks at Lancaster, see Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser., 6:4995, 4999, 5002-5003, 5143; John Hubley to George Bryan, 10 January 1780, Case 1, Box 15, Pa. Series, Committee and Council of Safety 1775-1777, Simon Gratz Autograph Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania; and Wood, Conestoga Crossroads, 78-79, 80, 82.
27. Quartering did not entirely disappear from public discourse in 1760. It was cited as a political grievance in the pamphlet A Letter to the People of Pennsylvania, a work attributed to Joseph Galloway. Galloway criticized the governor, his council and the magistracy for failing to prevent the colony's citizens from having their "houses (which by law are to every man a place of refuge and safety) . . . being made barracks for the soldierly." See Pamphlets of the American Revolution, 269.
28. For dispositions of the regular troops serving in North America for 1758-1763, see Amherst's personal journal, Kent Archives Office, Amherst Papers, U1350, item 014.
30. This strategy is described in Forbes to William Pitt, 17 June 1758, Writings of General John Forbes Relating to his Service in North America (Menasha, Wis.: Collegiate Press, 1938), 117-18.
31. This figure is based on calculations in Daniel J. Beattie, "General Jeffery Amherst and the Conquest of Canada, 1758-1760" (Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1975), 118, n. 2.
32. Forbes to Bouquet, 29 May 1758, Papers of Henry Bouquet 1:381; see also Shippen to Bouquet, 4 June 1758, ibid., 2:31. The terms under which the army hired wagons were published in the Pennsylvania Gazette, 11 May 1758. This advertisement is reproduced in Writings of
John Forbes, 88-89. The rates established by the assembly on April 8, 1758, for the hire of carriage are printed in Statutes at Large 5:330-34.


34. A press warrant was a legal writ issued by a civil magistrate authorizing the seizure of wagons. Copies of press warrants dated May 31, and July 21, 1758, are reproduced in ibid., 405, 2:247.

35. Bouquet to Forbes, 29-30 May 1758, ibid., 1:386, 387.

36. Weiser to Bouquet, 14 June 1758, ibid., 2:90.

37. Lewis Ourry to Bouquet, 4 July 1758, Papers of Henry Bouquet 2:161. For several other examples, see Bouquet to Forbes, 22 June 1758, ibid., 126; and Bouquet to Forbes, 11 July 1758, ibid., 180.

38. See for example Forbes to Bouquet, 14 July 1758, in which the general informs his subordinate that "Wee likewise have been and were like to be at one Intire stop for want of provender for our horses as Sir John had only made ane Imagery provision." ibid., 208. St. Clair proved such a trying subordinate that Forbes stated: "I am sorry it has been my fate to have any Concerns with him." Forbes to Bouquet, 4 September 1758, ibid., 477.

39. Shippen to Forbes, 26 August 1758, Balch-Shippen Papers, vol. 1, 64, Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Internal evidence in this letter suggests it was written to Forbes. See also Forbes to James Abercromby, 11 August 1758, Writings of John Forbes, 173.

40. See for example Bouquet to Forbes, 3 August 1758, Papers of Henry Bouquet 2:313, 314, n. 14; and Bouquet to James Sinclair, 9 September 1758, ibid., 483.

41. Bouquet to Forbes, 4 September 1758, ibid., 472.

42. Statutes at Large 5:372-74. It is likely that the assembly was influenced by a strongly worded letter Forbes circulated among that body's leadership in which he threatened to send Sir John St. Clair "to sweep the whole Country indiscriminately of every Waggon, Cart, or Horse that he could find" if the legislators did not pass a new wagon law. This letter has not been found but its existence is mentioned in Forbes to Bouquet, 17 September 1758, Papers of Henry Bouquet 2:523.

43. Horses were being impressed as late as October 6. See Jacob Orndt to Samuel Nelson, 6 October 1758 and Denny to Nelson, 7 October 1758, SRO, Dalhousie Muniments, GD 45/2, item 53, fol. 6; and St. Clair to Nelson, 6 October 1758, ibid., fol. 7. Denny ordered Nelson to report "all persons, whom you may detect that are guilty of secreting the carrages."

44. For the British strategy for 1759, see Pitt to Amherst, 23 January 1759, and, Pitt to Forbes, 23 January 1759, Correspondence of William Pitt when Secretary of State with Colonial Governors and Military and Naval Commissioners in America, ed. Gertrude S. Kimball, 2 vols. (1906; reprint, New York: Kraus Reprint Co., 1969), 2:12-13, 16-18. Pitt did not rule out offensive operations in the Ohio region. Such operations, however, were secondary to the construction of a fort at the forks of the Ohio.

45. The figures for the total debt carried over from the Forbes Expedition are cited in Stanwix to Pitt, 22 June 1759, ibid., 130.

46. Joshua Howell to Forbes, 18 December 1758, SRO, Dalhousie Muniments, GD 45/2, item 90, fol. 17. "I Believe it will be pretty well Known that my Credit is Entirely lost with [most] if not all Waggoners," Howell lamented, because he had been unable to pay them upon their return to Lancaster.

47. Quoted material is from a notice of January 30, 1759, published in the Pennsylvania Gazette, 1 February 1759. For complaints about the cumbersome nature of settling accounts, see George Stevenson to Bouquet, 25 February 1759 with enclosed York County Petition to Forbes, Papers of Henry Bouquet 3:149-151.


49. Amherst to Denny, 7 March 1759, Minutes 8:285.

50. Amherst to Denny, 30 March 1759, Minutes 8:322. See also Stanwix's notice of March 28 published in the Pennsylvania Gazette, 29 March
1759, and, St. Clair's notice of April 13, 1759, published in the Pennsylvania Gazette, 19 April 1759. Both these notices promised the payment of accounts from the Forbes campaign once they had been adjusted. On the first meeting of the committee to settle the wagon accounts, see Stanwix to Amherst, 15 April 1759, PRO, WO 34/45, fol. 52r-53v. According to Stanwix there were five members of the committee.

51. An unfortunate coincidence of events caused the army's money shortage. First, Forbes was so incapacitated by the illness that led to his death on March 11, 1759, that he failed to solicit funds from the deputy paymaster general to pay off debts from the 1758 campaign. By the time Brigadier General Stanwix arrived to replace Forbes, the monies in the paymaster's hands had already been spent on other services. Second, the expected shipment of specie from England had not arrived. Thus, the army's treasury was temporarily exhausted. See Stanwix to Pitt, 22 June 1759, Correspondence of William Pitt 2:130-31, and Stanwix to Amherst, 13 May 1759, PRO, WO 34/45, fol. 63r-66v, 63v-64r.

52. The text of this ad is reprinted in Papers of Henry Bouquet 3:269-71. Under the terms of the offer made by the army, wagon owners were to be paid based on a weight/distance formula. Most Pennsylvanians wanted to be paid according to the terms of the colony's own wagon act which called for payment of fifteen shillings per day. For the text of the provincial law, see Statutes at Large 5:420-24. The 580 wagons called for by Stanwix in his ad was less than half of the 1300 wagons the general calculated he needed for the year's campaign. See Stanwix to Amherst, 13 May 1759, PRO, WO 34/45, fol. 63r-66v, 64v-65r.


54. On May 22, Stanwix's proposal for a new wagon act was laid before the assembly. See Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser., 6:4999-5000, 5001. See also Stanwix to Amherst, 4 June 1759, PRO, WO 34/45, fol. 69.

55. On May 13, Stanwix informed Amherst that he had approached Governor Denny and Speaker of the Assembly Isaac Norris about the possibility of a £100,000 loan and expressed some optimism about obtaining it. See Stanwix to Amherst, 13 May 1759, PRO, WO 34/45, fol. 63r-66v, 63v-64r. The request for the loan first appears in the records of the assembly in a memorial from John Hunter to the assembly dated May 29, 1759, and, in a letter of the same date from Stanwix to Norris. See Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser., 6:4996-98.

56. Stanwix to Denny, 9 June 1759, Minutes 8:344.

57. The assembly's action on these two measures is recorded in Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser., 6:4999-5000, 5001. See also Stanwix to Amherst, 4 June 1759, PRO, WO 34/45, fol. 69.

58. Stanwix to Amherst, 20 June 1759, PRO, WO 34/45, fol. 73r-75v, 73r-74r. Stanwix wrote: "our Credt is so bad here from the Peoples not being paid that I have & am obliged to deposite money in the hands of a Creditable person in each of the eight Countys in this province." Quoted material appears on fol. 74r. For advertisements of cash advances, see Pennsylvania Gazette, 7 June 1759, and 8 July 1759.

59. These counties were to supply three quarters of the wagons Stanwix requested in his ad of May 4. For complaints about the backwardness of these five counties, see Bouquet to James Burd, 27 June 1759, Papers of Henry Bouquet 3:384; Bouquet to Denny, 12 July 1759, ibid., 401; Stanwix's Memorandum for a Letter to Governor Denny, c. 13 August 1759, ibid., 555; and, Bouquet to Stanwix, 12 September 1759, ibid., 4:83.

60. See for example Report of Meeting of Magistrates, 9 August 1759, ibid., 3:523; Shippen to Bouquet, 3 September 1759, ibid., 4:31; and, Roger Hunt to Bouquet, 18 August 1759, ibid., 3:579-80.

61. The date of this press warrant was probably June 15, 1759. See Weiser to Denny, 25 June 1759, ibid., 3:379-80, 381 n. 4. Quoted material from Bouquet to Denny, 12 July 1759, ibid., 401.


63. For example, see Bouquet to Alexander Graydon, 13 August 1759, ibid., 546. According to Graydon, the people of Bucks County had deliberately "ruined their Horses by Overworking them at their Plantations to make them unfit for the Service, and avoid being Impressed." Bouquet to Stanwix, 12 September 1759, ibid., 4:83. See also Graydon's notice of September 3, 1759, stating that unfit horses will not be accept-
ed into service published in *Pennsylvania Gazette*, 4 September 1759.

64. For examples of these various problems, see Bouquet to Stanwix, 26 April 1759, *Bouquet Papers*, 3:256; Thomas Lloyd to Stanwix, 23 May 1759, *ibid.*, 309-11; and George Mercer to Bouquet, 1 August 1759, *ibid.*, 478-79.


68. Stanwix to Amherst, 16 August 1759, PRO, WO 34/45, fols. 89r-91v, 90v.


71. Robert Strettell to William Shirley, 24 January 1756, *Minutes* 6:777-78. The evidence suggests that the enlistment of servants did exact a heavy toll on Pennsylvania masters. Stanley Pargellis estimates that "from a seventh to a fifth of all American recruits [raised between 1755 and 1756] were Pennsylvania servants." Pargellis, *Lord Loudoun*, 121. According to Gary Nash, the recruits Philadelphia supplied to the crown were chiefly servants and immigrants. The loss of these laborers created certain economic hardship, especially for tradesmen. A robust wartime economy and a shortage of laborers had combined to drive up the cost of free labor. When servants ran off to enlist, their masters were not only out the purchase price of the indenture, they were forced to replace them with free laborers at a higher cost. Gary B. Nash, *The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), 243-44.


73. For example, in January 1758 a mob assaulted a recruiting party of the Royal American Regiment in Lebanon Township, Pennsylvania. The leader of the mob, George Reynolds, a former soldier in the Pennsylvania service, seized three recruits and threatened to murder the soldiers if they dared to recruit for their regiment in Lebanon. See Deposition of George Yedder, 26 January 1758, RG02, Clerk of Courts Series, Lancaster County Quarter Sessions Docket, ser. 0905, Lancaster County Historical Society, Lancaster. Reynolds was fined six pence plus court costs. See also Robert Dunn to Bouquet, 12 February 1759, *Papers of Henry Bouquet* 3:114-16.


75. For examples of each of these crimes as they are listed in the text, see Gavin Cochrane to Bouquet, 19 October 1758, *Papers of Henry Bouquet* 2:569; Ourry to Bouquet, 12 July 1758, *ibid.*, 197; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 6:4966; Petition of Charles Campbell to Denny, n.d., Records of the Provincial Council, 1682-1776, Miscellaneous Papers, RG21, Division of Archives and History, Pennsylvania Museum and Historical Commission; and *Minutes* 8:336.

76. For example, see Ourry to Bouquet, 4 July, *Papers of Henry Bouquet* 2:162, n. 3., and, Forbes to Denny, 9 September 1758, *Writings of John Forbes*, 207.


