

The Johnstown Steel Strike of 1919: The Struggle for Unionism and Civil Liberties

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The convergence of two historiographical currents, David Brody's institutional focus and the state perspective of Alan Dawley and Melvyn Dubofsky, illuminate our understanding of the steel strike of 1919. Brody in his classic study, *Labor in Crisis: The Steel Strike of 1919*, described the key personalities, major developments, and the outcome and significance of the strike. In several key respects the Johnstown strike conformed to the national pattern described by Brody. Workers demanded higher wages, shorter hours, and collective bargaining. They also suffered from infringement of their civil liberties. On the other hand, Johnstown exhibited distinctive characteristics including more solidarity between skilled and unskilled workers, less use of African Americans as strikebreakers, and the key role of the Citizens' Committee in the company's victory. The Johnstown strike supported Dawley's assertion in *Struggle for Justice: Social Responsibility and the Liberal State*, that the state aided big business in repressing immigrant industrial workers in the immediate postwar era. In addition, the strike confirmed Dubofsky's conclusion, in *The State and Labor in Modern America*, that without state assistance workers and union could not defeat the open shop campaign of big business.¹

Involvement in World War I changed the international position of the United States and altered domestic American society. Mobilization enhanced the power and role of the federal government in the economy and brought company and union representatives to boards which set priorities and engaged in some planning. The executive branch, in particular, sought a more regulated economy and viewed the mainstream labor movement as an important component of this system. Under the leadership of President Woodrow Wilson, it offered tangible and intangible inducements to secure the loyalty of labor leaders and workers. In this supportive atmosphere, many labor unions gained members and influence and workers often obtained higher wages and better conditions. Wartime rhetoric which stressed making "the world safe for democracy" and "self determination" inspired workers who responded to patriotic appeals by increasing production, buying Liberty Bonds, and condemning the Kaiser. Although many big businessmen resented concessions to workers and the labor movement, the opportunity to earn high profits and the restraint of the federal government kept most businesses in line.

However, big business eagerly awaited the end of the war to mount a counterattack and to achieve a "return to normalcy." Workers and their allies tried to obtain "industrial democracy" and the collective bargaining, more respect, and higher wages that ideal promised. At the same time, women agitated for political enfranchisement and other forms of empowerment, and African Americans condemned racism and demanded economic and political equality. Widespread unrest erupted in 1919 as the forces of social change collided with the bastions of conservatism in a series of pitched battles. The outcome of these struggles would be determined, in large part, by the roles of the federal government and public opinion. A strike wave polarized the nation with much attention focused on the Steel Strike of 1919, which pitted the steel industry, headed by U.S. Steel, against the steel workers and the National Committee to Organize Iron and Steel Workers. This conflict centered in the Pittsburgh region and the Chicago-Gary area, but other localities played important roles. In Johnstown, the Cambria Steel Company and its allies mobilized against a united front of steel workers who demanded union recognition, higher wages, and shorter hours. Locally and nationally, the wealth and power of the corporations overwhelmed the workers and their unions in the absence of support for the strikers from the federal government and public opinion.

The coming of World War I brought significant changes to the steel industry, the nation, and the city. The labor system of the steel industry became more destabilized with the onset of the conflict. A major change resulted from a shift in the balance of supply and demand for labor. Increased military orders and the virtual cessation of European immigration produced a labor shortage. Although steel companies responded to this predicament and the growing worker unrest with a wage increase, immigrant workmen who sought job mobility found limited opportunities for promotion. Companies sought to instill patriotism in their employees as a tool for increasing production through the use of parades, flag-raising ceremonies, and Liberty Bond drives. However, new, more critical, perspectives emerged among steelworkers who found no way to reconcile the importance of their labor with long hours, deteriorating living conditions, and low income.²

The mobilization of the United States for World War I left unclear what effect wartime nationalism would have on the balance of power in industry. The captains of industry expected to gain more leverage as a result of their command over war production. The laboring masses hoped that an improved labor market and the need to win their cooperation in production would lead to industrial democracy. President Wilson appointed Samuel Gompers and other AFL leaders to government posts and used mass culture to reach the workers. Gompers eagerly collaborated with the federal government and appreciated his rising status and the growing membership of AFL

affiliates. Many workers held a less benign view of their circumstances and industrial discontent rose dramatically. Runaway inflation undermined the living standards of working-class consumers who resorted to direct action, including strikes among Central Pennsylvania coal miners and food riots by Jewish housewives in New York. These worker initiatives often generated a backlash as the repressive machinery of the state stifled their protests. The effects of Wilson administration policies had a dual effect as they legitimated state power which was used to support corporate capitalism during and after World War I, but also boosted progressive solutions to industrial discontent.³

The Wilson administration's wartime labor policy lacked consistency and uniformity. Initially, proponents of more conservative labor policies played a key role and in the west federal troops broke strikes, persecuted suspected labor radicals, and aided local authorities in conducting unlawful searches and seizures. However, other influential federal officials displayed a more positive response to working-class discontent. The National War Labor Board, spearheaded by co-chair Frank P. Walsh, played the decisive role in this approach. Walsh, a lawyer, published a newspaper and headed the Board of Civil Service in Kansas City before he gained national recognition as the Chair of the Federal Commission on Industrial Relations, 1913-15. He promoted rising wages, shorter hours and collective bargaining for many workers. Labor organizers often looked to the federal government for support and William Z. Foster, who would lead the organizing drives in the meatpacking and steel industries, developed a close and excellent working relationship with Walsh. Government intervention aided the Stockyards Labor Council, led by Foster, in struggles against the packers in Chicago and workers won improvements in conditions, wages, and hours.⁴

World War I also changed conditions in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. The population of the city continued to grow but at a slower pace. It increased from 55,000 to 67,000 between 1910-20 while the adjacent boroughs grew from almost 8,000 to almost 15,000 in the same decade. The ethnic composition of the population remained relatively stable with native-born Americans of native parentage comprising one-half of the city's population and East Central European foreign-stock residents making up a significant percentage of the rest. The economic character of the city continued to focus around coal and especially steel and the Cambria Steel Company, the area's major employer, whose executives dominated all facets of Johnstown life. As World War I heightened the demand for steel a new wave of corporate mergers began. In 1916 the Cambria plant came under the management of the Midvale Steel and Ordinance Company of Philadelphia, headed by William E. Corey. Midvale continued the investment program initiated by the Cambria Steel Company and emphasized military production. The compa-

ny used patriotic appeals to workers to stimulate productivity and company loyalty. It also made promises to their workers to improve the pension plan, to build a hospital, and to provide good, cheap houses. Another facet of paternalism emerged with the inauguration of an employee representation plan in September, 1918. The plan provided for the election of committees from each division of the plant, a plant conference committee and a general committee. At the apex of the structure was a quarterly meeting of employee representatives from all plants with key management personnel. The superintendent of the plant surprised employees with an announcement that they should elect representatives for a meeting. The employees complied with this demand, although they neither understood the plan's purpose nor had an opportunity to formulate their demands. Unionized workers decided to participate, although they felt deeply suspicious. But as the representatives chosen from the unions affiliated with the American Federation of Labor were fired by the company, the credibility of the plan plunged. The workers also criticized the company union for its failure to protest against the extended work day and the dismissal of employees accused of union activity. Discharges continued at Cambria as managers and detectives noted the names of employees who attended union meetings, and visited the union hall, and fired them. Many of the oldest and best employees were discharged in a systematic campaign to intimidate the workers.⁵

However, many Johnstown steelworkers remained unintimidated. They viewed the national emergency as an opportunity to push for higher wages, shorter hours, and collective bargaining. William Z. Foster's initiative in campaigning for a national steel drive offered them a vehicle for their discontent. Using a rhetoric of economic democracy, organizers under the auspices of the National Committee to Organize Iron and Steel Workers arrived in steel centers to rally workers to their banner. Johnstown's organizing drive began in the winter of 1918-1919 under the direction of Thomas J. Conboy, an American Federation of Labor organizer, who was invited to the city by local steelworkers. Angered by their atrocious living conditions as well as low wages, long hours, and the lack of collective bargaining many steelworkers flocked to the union. They displayed their solidarity and strength at a labor parade in Johnstown on April 1, 1919 which involved thirty-five hundred marchers including coal miners and railroad workers from towns in the region. At the mass meeting which followed the parade, several speakers addressed the audience, including Thomas J. Conboy and Dominick Gelotte, an organizer for District 2 of the United Mine Workers, who served as a liaison to the steelworker organizers in Johnstown.⁶

Nationally, the end of the World War I changed the mood and shifted the balance of power in labor-management relations. At this point President Wilson was preoccupied with creating a new world order through the

League of Nations. Employers resisted efforts by the federal government to plan for peacetime reconversion and reconstruction. Management sought to reestablish the prewar situation and demanded a withdrawal of federal involvement in "private business matters." The national political climate reinforced this perspective as Republicans won control of Congress in the 1918 election and the Wilson administration lacked political power on the domestic front. After the war, national loyalty was equated with the open shop in the "American Plan" of big business. Industrial unrest engulfed the nation in 1919 with more than four million workers involved in strikes and lockouts including 400,000 coal miners and over 300,000 steelworkers. These workers, spurred by the effects of postwar inflation, struck for an American standard of living and the empowerment embodied in "industrial democracy."⁷

America was splitting into opposing camps. Social conflict emerged out of the struggles between the New Women and antifeminists, the New Negro and the old racial system, and the new immigrants and the native born. Racial tension and violence erupted in a series of race riots highlighted by Chicago's in which twenty-three blacks and fifteen whites died. Increasing assertiveness by African Americans and some of their leaders caught the attention of federal officials who linked their ideas and activities to the Red Scare. Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer and J. Edgar Hoover, head of the Anti-Radical Division of the Justice Department, saw connections between the rise of the "New Negro" and the "Red Menace." The Bolshevik Revolution changed international diplomacy and provided a new framework for domestic developments which challenged the existing arrangements. Its influence, while threatening, provided a necessary and sufficient explanation acceptable to many Americans for the intractable social problems afflicting the United States. Unrest associated with the assertiveness of women, African Americans, and immigrant workers could be ascribed to the influence of the Communists and inoculating Americans with a vaccine of 100 percent Americanism was offered as a cure for national problems.

Advocates of conservative Americanism welcomed the American Legion as a major partner in their battle against radicalism and subversion. Legion officials and members opposed free speech and assembly for the nation's enemies which included socialists, pacifists, and liberals. The Legion capitalized on the Red Scare and its opposition to radicalism and immigration to attract veterans fearful of postwar unrest and established itself as a leading anti-radical organization. In the spring and summer of 1919 this anticommunist and antiforeign agitation peaked as "patriots" repressed peaceful May Day demonstrations in major cities, especially in Cleveland and New York. F. Scott Fitzgerald's novelette "May Day" captured this mood

very effectively, particularly in his juxtaposition of a scene of joyousness at the end of World War I and the physical assault by soldiers against a radical orator in New York who had decried the war as a fight which benefited only J. P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller.⁸

Local newspaper coverage kept Johnstown residents aware of national developments, particularly May Day demonstrations in major cities. For example, The *Johnstown Democrat* presented front page articles about these events, particularly the Cleveland march in which one man died and many others suffered serious injuries. A proposed parade in Homer City, an Indiana County town about twenty miles from Johnstown, captured most of the local attention. Officials reacted to this "threat" by holding mass meetings which featured patriotic sentiments, anti-Bolshevik rhetoric, and the deputizing of several hundred men. Local authorities requested aid from the state police and Sheriff Boggs issued a proclamation which forbade mass meetings and parades. The American Defensive Association of Indiana County, armed with the power of deputy sheriffs, supplemented official measures by patrolling streets, guarding highways, and searching trains and trollies for "suspicious looking aliens." The State Police prevented the Homer City parade and arrested eight individuals, while the local press praised the officials' wisdom and effectiveness. In Cambria County dissidents had somewhat greater success. Seven hundred miners met in Nanty-Glo, a center of worker power, to hear speakers and pass resolutions. Dominick Gelotte condemned the lengthy prison terms of political prisoners as "contrary to the fundamental principles of the American constitution." One of the resolutions passed at the meeting called for the restoration of the rights of free speech, free press, and free assembly. The hostility from police and politicians experienced by Gelotte and the coal miners convinced them to champion the Bill of Rights. This stance received strong support from District 2 President John Brophy and led to local union resolutions demanding the release of Eugene Debs. A smaller meeting in Johnstown passed a similar resolution.⁹

At the national level William Z. Foster played the pivotal role in the steel organizing drive. To accomplish his purpose of unionizing the steel industry he needed the aid of Samuel Gompers, the cooperation and financial contributions of American Federation of Labor affiliates, and support from the federal government and public opinion. On its own the National Committee to Organize Iron and Steel Workers lacked sufficient funds and organizers to mount a successful campaign against the "steel trust." However, most mainstream labor unions moved cautiously and feared precipitous actions by immigrant steelworkers and radical rhetoric and provocative behavior by Foster. Steelworkers pressed Foster and his colleagues to call a national strike while politicians and labor leaders counseled moderation.

Organizers scored initial successes in the Chicago-Gary area and then shifted their attention to the vital Pittsburgh region. The steel companies in this area found many allies in the pulpit and the press. Political power reinforced the leverage generated by wealth as town officials prohibited public meetings. For example, in McKeesport Mayor Lysle continued to deny permits for union meetings. This position made the free speech issue crucial for the success of the organizing drive. The National Committee also faced the problem of lack of funding to hire sufficient organizers because of the inadequate financial contributions of most American Federation of Labor affiliates. In addition, few important American Federation of Labor officials spoke in Pennsylvania during the free speech struggles, which featured the fiery oratory of Mother Jones in Homestead. Gompers never delivered a speech in a major strike district. Their indifference most likely reflected their suspicion of unskilled, recent immigrant workers and their fears about Foster's radicalism and his potential challenge to their leadership of organized labor. In addition, the federal government could no longer be counted on as an ally after the War Labor Board's statutory authority expired following the Armistice. Steel company rhetoric harped on Americanism, stressed the divisions between American and immigrant workers, and condemned Foster as unpatriotic and radical. Although Foster belonged to the Socialist Party and the Industrial Workers before he concentrated on radicalizing mainstream labor organizations, he presented moderate demands as the leader of the steel strike of 1919.¹⁰

In spite of these obstacles the organizing drive continued as workers nationwide flocked to the union banner, company officials spurned meetings and communication with labor leaders, and the National Committee met to, formulate their demands and plan for a strike vote. The major demands, approved at a Pittsburgh meeting in July, included the right to collective bargaining, an eight hour day, and wages sufficient to guarantee an "American standard of living." Many workers interpreted Wilson's wartime rhetoric as sanctioning "industrial democracy" which included reasonable hours of labor, the opportunity to participate in decisions about their work and an income sufficient to supply the basic needs of their families. The workers, by a 98% vote, supported a strike call. While Samuel Gompers and Woodrow Wilson urged a postponement, Foster convinced the National Committee to adhere to its September 22 strike date. Around 300,000 workers responded to the strike call, about half the industry's labor force. Restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly and splits in the labor force between the more enthusiastic immigrants and the more apathetic native born workers caused problems for strike leaders in Western Pennsylvania. Public officials and the police restricted the activities of organizers and employers exploited schisms within the strikes' ranks through advertisements and back-to-work campaigns.¹¹

resolution which declared that the way to alleviate industrial unrest was to increase production, not to increase wages or shorten hours. This resolution enraged the skilled workers, usually senior employees, who responded by joining the labor movement in a move which helped to raise the number of unionized workers to close to twelve thousand on the eve of the strike. Nevertheless divisions did emerge among workers, even within families. For example, in the Friedhoff family three brothers, all rollers, criticized the union and refused to speak to their "radical brother" John, a union leader.¹³

Virtually the entire labor force of Johnstown honored the strike call on September 22. On September 23 local strikers organized an Executive Committee to assist the strike coordinator, T. J. Conboy. The committee, headed by Harvey Thomas, assigned strikers to picket duty on September 24 and stated that union members should obey the strike leaders. Two related developments buoyed the strikers' spirit. Organized employees of the Pennsylvania Railroad and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad told them that they would refuse to haul raw materials into or finished products out of the mills if Cambria Steel attempted to operate its mills. In addition, two thousand area coal miners, employed by a Cambria Steel subsidiary, struck to obtain union recognition. A rally in Johnstown on September 24 attracting 1,500 to 2,000 strikers who applauded a speaker who lauded workers for their role in winning World War I. In spite of the scale of the strike and the intense emotions it generated, the city remained quiet and free from disorder but the Cambria Steel Company refused to negotiate with the strikers, and as the strike dragged on the morale of the strikers became an important issue. The Executive Committee developed a variety of welfare programs to keep up their spirits. These programs included a grocery department, a free food commissary, and a legal aid fund. An Amusement Committee provided entertainment for the strikers and their families which featured regularly scheduled games and athletic events.¹⁴

Two developments in November fundamentally altered the balance of power in the strike and placed strikers and strike leaders on the defensive as a Citizens' Committee, which included many businessmen and clergy, organized a back-to-work movement and the State Constabulary arrived. The presence of the State Constabulary generated fear among the workers and the emergence of the Citizens' Committee followed a Cambria Steel Company announcement which invited former employees, willing to renounce their union affiliation, to go to the company personnel office to sign up for work. Young Men's Christian Association Secretary William R. Lunk and Johnstown Chamber of Commerce President H. L. Tredinnick led the Citizens' Committee which included business and civic leaders, Roman Catholic clergymen, and company officials. The committee used a series of full-page ads in Johnstown newspapers to announce its back-to-work cam-

From William Z. Foster, *The Great Steel Strike*.

BALLOT

IRON & STEEL WORKERS

The Union Committees are now seeking to get higher wages, shorter hours and better working conditions from the steel companies. Are you willing to back them up to the extent of stopping work should the companies refuse to concede these demands?

TAJNO GLASANJE

Odpor junije sada traži da se dobije bolja plaća, kraći radni satovi i bolji uvjeti za rad od kompanija čelika. Dali ste voljni isti do skrajnosti podupreti da se prestane sa radom ako bi kompanija odbila da udovolji zahtevima?

SZAVAZZON!

Az Union Bizottsága, az Acél Társaságoktól való—magasabb fizetés, rövidebb munka idő és jobb munka feltételek—elnyerése után törekszik. Akar ezek után törekedni? s a végsőkéig kitartani? és ha a társaságok ezen kívánnaknak nem tesznek eleget a munkát beszüntetni?

VOTAZIONE.

I comitati dell'Unione stanno cercando di ottenere paghe piu' alte, ore di lavoro piu' brevi, e migliori condizioni di lavoro. Desiderate voi assecondarli, anche quando dovesse essere necessario di fermare il lavoro se le Compagnie rifiutassero di accettare le domande?

HLÁSOVACÍ LÍSTOK

Výbor uniový chce dosiahnuť podvýšenie mzdy, menej hodín robíť a lepšie robotnícke polozenie od oceliarskych spoločností. Ste vy ochotní ich podporovať do krajnosti, až do zástavenia práce, v prípade by spoločnosť odoprela žiadostučinám tým požiadavkám.

BALOT

Komitet Unii stara się obecnie o uzyskanie od Stalowych Kompanij większej płacy, krótszych godzin i lepszych warunków pracy. Czy jesteście gotów poprzeć nas aż do możliwości wstrzymania pracy na wypadek, gdyby Kompanie odmówiły naszym żądaniom?

VOTE YES OR NO.

Mark X in square indicating how you vote



Yes



No



National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers
WM. Z. FOSTER, Secy-Treas. 303 Magee Bldg., Pittsburgh, Pa.



Strike Ballot for 1919 Steel Strike.

paign. The ads featured references to the dictates of outside leaders and agitators as responsible for the strike and included a back-to-work ballot. Mass meetings sponsored by supporters of the steel company reinforced the message of the ads and stressed that the Cambria Steel Company would be fair to the men.¹⁵

The Johnstown Strike Executive Committee used several quarter-page ads in the Johnstown newspapers to respond to the Citizen's Committee. In its rebuttal the Executive Committee emphasized that bad local conditions led to the strike, workers had a right to unionize, and justice was the real issue in the conflict. It placed the responsibility on Cambria Steel Company to take a more responsible position and to break the deadlock. The Executive Committee noted the lack of violence, emphasized its willingness to meet with management, and called on the Citizens' Committee to stop its interference in the dispute.¹⁶

By November, the strike situation in Johnstown had lost some of its distinctiveness and began to resemble other strike regions where public officials and the police strongly supported the employer and steel companies conducted massive back to work campaigns. The National Committee fought the strike in the steel towns and on the national front, stressing the need for civil liberties and the importance of union recognition. The political climate in steel towns and cities varied greatly. In the crucial Pittsburgh district strike leaders and strikers faced W. S. Haddock, Sheriff of Allegheny County, and his deputies, the State Constabulary, and local regulations which prohibited meetings. On September 20 Allegheny County issued an emergency proclamation which prohibited the congregation of three or more people in any outdoor place. Full-page ads in Pittsburgh newspapers, especially in October and November, featured the back-to-work theme and attributed violence to radicals and workers. Some clergymen joined the press to oppose the strike and added to the pressure applied by politicians and the police. Undercover agents spreading rumors of defeat and the presence of strikebreakers further undercut the morale and power of the strikers. Steelworkers also faced repression in Gary where outbreaks of violence led the mayor to request outside help. A division of Army regulars under General Leonard Wood arrived in early October and declared martial law, prohibited outdoor meetings, and arrested strike leaders and pickets. In other locales, especially in Cleveland, steelworkers met, paraded, and picketed without interference or assault. In Cleveland the mayor prohibited the importation of strikebreakers. On the national level, the steel companies identified the open shop with upholding the American Constitution. However, this approach proved less effective than a focus on Foster's radicalism and his desire to overthrow the existing order. This technique benefited from the ethnic composition of the strikers which led to the use of a current


Americanism vs. Alienism theme. The steel companies and their allies emphasized the Red Scare and linked the steel strike to the Seattle general strike, the May bombings, and the Boston police strike. Public opinion, which focused on the threat to the public order, precluded federal government intervention on the side of the strikers and gave steel manufacturers and their allies complete freedom of action in the strike.¹⁷

William Z. Foster's decision to address a rally of Johnstown strikers on November 7 linked these national developments to events in Johnstown as the Citizens' Committee violated his civil liberties. When he arrived in town the night before, two newspapermen advised him to "get out of town at once." He rejected this advice. On his way to the Labor Temple, two city detectives warned him against going there, but refused to provide him with protection. While approaching City Hall with T. J. Conboy to ask Mayor Francke for protection, an armed crowd of Citizens' Committee members accosted him and forced him to go to the railroad station and leave Johnstown. Soon thereafter, in a speech at Madison Square Garden in New York, Foster told a mass meeting to benefit steel workers about his experience with the armed men in Johnstown. He also called the State Constabulary Cossacks and requested financial aid for the strikers from labor unions represented at the meeting.¹⁸

Although Foster's expulsion from Johnstown generated the most publicity, organizers also suffered much harassment as well as deprivation of their civil liberties. The experiences of Dominick Gelotte, a United Mine Workers organizer from Nanty-Glo, offer a case study of this oppression. His activities in the strike also illustrate the close linkage between the National Committee and the United Mine Workers. Gelotte played a dual role in the Johnstown area as the leader of an organizing drive among coal miners and as a liaison between District 2 of the United Mine Workers and the steel strike. He organized a successful labor parade in Johnstown, spoke in favor of civil liberties at a mass meeting of miners in Nanty-Glo, and wrote a circular which condemned Cambria Steel and called for liberty and democracy through unionization. These activities enhanced his reputation for dynamism, flamboyance, and fearlessness and made him a prime target for the Citizen's Committee's repressive activities. This group, in cooperation with local politicians and the police, sought to expel labor organizers from the city. Gelotte suffered harassment from the Citizens' Committee and arrest by the police. After his release from jail Mayor Francke advised him to leave the city to avoid additional trouble, but he refused to be forced out and insisted on his constitutional rights. He continued to organize coal miners and to speak at mass meetings of steel workers.

Other United Mine Workers organizers came to Johnstown. They organized coal miners and steel workers and spoke at the Labor Temple.

From William Z. Foster, *The Great Steel Strike*.



Pennsylvania Law and Order, State Police driving citizens out of business places, Clairton, Pa.

Frank Kurowski, from the anthracite coal region, played a pivotal role in these activities. He attempted to get the Labor Department and local clergy involved in settling the dispute. These activities brought retribution from the Citizens' Committee, who forced him and almost all of the organizers to leave the city. John Brophy, President of District 2 of the United Mine Workers, also gave strong support to the cause of the steelworkers. He invited William Z. Foster to address the delegates attending the District 2 convention at Johnstown. In his speech Foster described the steel strike as a struggle for collective bargaining, human rights, and industrial democracy. Brophy also sent a telegram to Governor William Sproul in which he condemned the Johnstown Chamber of Commerce for denying organizers the rights of freedom of speech and assembly. He then called on the governor to maintain civil liberties and suppress mob rule. He also wrote to President Woodrow Wilson, condemning the Cambria Steel Company, and requesting his help in organizing a meeting with company executives. He noted that the company had fired thousands of employees, refused to confer with union leaders, and denied collective bargaining. President Wilson had rejected such policies, hostile to labor, during World War I.¹⁹

Assistance from other labor activists boosted the morale of the strikers, but the forces arrayed against them proved too formidable. Although local elements played the decisive role in the outcome, the state government also became involved in the struggle. Governor William Sproul sought to maintain "law-and-order" by collecting a large stockpile of firearms and dispatching contingents of the State Constabulary to Indiana County to deal with the coal strike and to the Johnstown area for duty in the steel strike. Participants disagree about whether Cambria Steel officials or Sheriff Custer initiated the request. However, the role of the state troopers in Johnstown is evident from their quartering arrangements, their assigned duties, and their activities. Sheriff Custer of Cambria County made arrangements with the Cambria Steel Company to quarter a contingent of troopers at the Cambria Country Club in Westmont. Their assignment was to maintain law and order in the borough and to protect the homes of Cambria Steel Company officials who lived on the hill. The troopers were active in the city although order prevailed before their arrival. Harvey Thomas, President of the General Strike Committee, accused the state police of misbehavior for charging into crowds of peaceful strikers in Cambria City on November 15 and 16 and engaging in other acts of physical and verbal brutality including clubbings, invasions of homes, and arrests. Thomas offered to provide three hundred World War I veterans to maintain the peace and asked Governor Sproul to remove the troopers from Johnstown. A meeting of service men at the Labor Temple reinforced this sentiment when a committee drafted a petition for submission to the City Council. It protested against the presence of the state

police and offered to recruit 300 service men of the World War to be used "in maintaining law and order in such a way that will guarantee to each and to all the right of protection to which all American citizens are entitled." A few days later a mass meeting held by strikers passed a resolution calling for the removal of the State Constabulary from East Conemaugh because "their presence tended to create rather than quell disorders." Two troopers were held for court on charges of assault and battery and the State Constabulary was accused of worsening rather than improving the situation. A request by Secretary John Friedhoff of the Central Labor Union to the delegates of that body to fund the printing of 1500 circulars, which called on labor unions to protest against the State Police, reflected the widespread dissatisfaction with its presence in Johnstown.²⁰

Before early November, local officials, led by Major Louis Francke, emphasized the quietness of the situation and the lack of need for additional police. However, even at this stage the mayor displayed a more critical stance toward national strike leaders, especially William Z. Foster, although the city permitted the strikers to hold regular meetings and rallies at the Labor Temple. On the other hand, political figures and the police refused to provide Foster, Gelotte, and American Federation of Labor organizers with protection and recommended that they leave the city while the mayor offered protection to strikebreakers who wanted to return to work. In early November Francke stated that he was anxious for the strike to end in order to relieve the workers' suffering. Strikers also suffered a political setback in the mayoralty election of 1919 when their candidate, Charles A. McKeown, lost a close race to Joseph A. Cauffiel, an independent. His defeat meant that the strikers would continue to find the mayor unsympathetic to their cause. Cauffiel's outlook on social issues is reflected in a speech he delivered at a meeting of the Kiwanis. He favored a resolution obliging residents of the United States to speak only in English and suggested that Johnstown become the first community to introduce this measure.²¹

The role of Johnstown's press differed from Pittsburgh's, which adopted a strong pro-company posture. The Interchurch World Movement noted that the *Johnstown Democrat* "presented at times during the strike a very great contrast to the Pittsburgh papers" and came nearer to the earlier independent press. This assessment reflects the intense negative coverage of the strikers in the Pittsburgh press, rather than the Johnstown paper's sympathy for steel strikers. The editor of the *Democrat* took pride in the paper's neutrality in replying to a critic who contended that the newspaper refused to print his letters critical of the Citizens' Committee while publishing articles about workers returning to work. He noted that the paper had received criticism from opponents of unions as well. The editorial affirmed the paper's position of not publishing letters from partisans and not discussing the merits of the

dispute in its own editorials. Instead, the *Democrat*, according to its editor, sought to remain neutral and print the actual news while expressing its general opposition to strikes, discouraging violence, and focusing on the nobler aspects of society. The *Daily Tribune*, Johnstown's other paper, provided detailed coverage of radical activities and strikes in other locales as well as articles on the steel strike and the coal strike in the Johnstown area. The editorial page dealt with on political issues rather than the local steel strike with the exception of an editorial on November 11, entitled "The Rights of the People." The editor declared that these rights, the most important consideration in this conflict, were being ignored. Steel workers should take account of the rights of all of the people as well as their own. In addition, the editorial advocated a "works" or "shop" organization (company union) as a better means for workers to pursue their own welfare than through affiliation with an outside organization. The editor recalled his earlier characterization of William Z. Foster as an avowed radical, a believer in syndicalism, and "in other days, at least, a member in good standing in the I.W.W." In reality, Foster opposed Industrial Workers of the World for pursuing a dual unionism policy. A cartoon captioned "Stamp Them Out" in the November 1 issue offered a more graphic and emotional perspective on current issues as it depicted the boot of Americanism about to crush the triple snakes of Anarchism, Bolshevism, and IWWism.

Clearly, the steelworkers in Johnstown lacked a supportive local newspaper. The *Johnstown Tribune* continued its long standing strong advocacy of Cambria Steel's labor policies while the *Johnstown Democrat* criticized strikes although it refused to adopt an editorial position or publish controversial letters about the steel strikes. Strike leaders tried to counter local press coverage and to offer their alternative perspective to strikers and the general public through two approaches. They condemned the local newspapers, especially the *Leader* and the *Tribune*, as tools of the tyrannical steel company. They called on workers to protest to the papers and, if they failed to get a satisfactory response, to boycott them. Strike leaders also published a weekly bulletin and made arrangements with the *Altoona Times* to publish a labor page reflecting the perspective of the Johnstown strikers.²²

The Johnstown clergy took an even stronger stance in behalf of the Cambria Steel Company and in favor of the strikers returning to work, although Frank Kurowski made an abortive attempt to convince the clergy to serve as intermediaries between the union and the company. Many Roman Catholic priests declared that radicals led the strike and that workers should stand up for "Americanism" and eschew treason. One clergyman, George Dono Brooks, pastor of the First Baptist Church, championed the cause of the strikers and condemned the church for its indifference to social evil, although this stand led his congregation to dismiss him. This isolated

case could not outweigh the anti-strike efforts of other clergy from outside and inside of Johnstown. Eugene A. Garvey, Roman Catholic Bishop of the Johnstown-Altoona Diocese, condemned the strike. In a speech before a local congregation he criticized radical labor leaders and advised the workers to increase production and save their money rather than demand higher wages. Reverend A. F. Campbell of Bridgeport, Connecticut, provided an ongoing clerical presence. He offered a message which urged the strikers to return to work and be good citizens by supporting American institutions. He added an emotional twist to his presentation by painting "an unpleasant picture of the home without the cheer of Christmas [and] the father who could not endear himself to his children and make glad their lives by playing Santa Claus."²³

Reverend Campbell's appearances in Johnstown were sponsored by William R. Lunk, Executive Secretary of the Johnstown Young Men's Christian Association, and by the Citizens' Committee. The Citizens' Committee played a pivotal role in the strike as it placed back-to-work movement ads in local newspapers, spearheaded the campaign to remove Foster and the strike organizers from the city, and held numerous mass meetings designed to break the strike. Lunk saw the mass strikes as "part of a national Bolshevik movement," and he declared that everyone knew Foster to be a revolutionist. He focused on getting the strikers back to work, creating a good climate by opening his meetings with a prayer, and preaching 100% Americanism and the need to reach suspicious foreigners with this message. Lunk hoped to bring Mayor Ole Hanson of Seattle, a strong opponent of the Seattle General Strike and labor activism, and other speakers of that type to Johnstown to counteract the trade union agitation.²⁴

This substantial base of support added to the strength of the Cambria Steel Company and contributed to its decision to reopen its facilities on November 17. Many workers reported for work but the company faced a shortage of unskilled laborers. That day saw heavy police protection and the arrest of some pickets. The following day additional workers returned to the job and there were fewer pickets and fewer arrests. In spite of these serious setbacks, many local labor leaders persevered and meetings continued to be held at the Labor Temple, the strike headquarters in Johnstown. Nevertheless, operations expanded at the Cambria Steel Company. More employees returned to work as the morale and resources of the strikers ebbed by the end of the month. National developments paralleled the demise of the strike in Johnstown as the strike collapsed in stages. The Chicago-Gary region fell first followed by Johnstown, Wheeling, and Youngstown. Lackawanna and scattered mills in the Cleveland and Pittsburgh regions held out the longest, remaining on strike until December. Johnstown's steelworkers lost the strike because of a variety of factors which included compa-

ny and police repression, patriotic propaganda, and internal divisions within the labor movement and the labor force. Most typical national factors, with the exception of the extensive use of black strikebreakers, played important roles in the Johnstown area. Cambria Steel Company refused to negotiate, steelworkers suffered from a denial of civil liberties, and the business community backed the steel company. The Citizens' Committee was a chief factor in the loss of the strike in Johnstown as it harassed and expelled organizers, rallied clergy and skilled workers to support the back-to-work movement, and labeled the strike as radical and a resumption of production as the American way. Its special role in repressing strikers and organizers provided the steel company with "community support" to legitimize its position and to reinforce its own power and government aid.²⁵

Cambria Steel capitalized on its victory to expand its operations and to continue an open shop policy based on its employee representation plan. Apart from conceding an eight-hour day to its employees, Bethlehem Steel, its successor, maintained its hardline labor policy and steel workers remained on the defensive until the end of national Republican ascendancy.²⁶

The initial stage of the Great Depression intensified the problems of workers at a time when they suffered from an unresponsive government and a small, unenergetic labor movement. The election of 1932 began to lift the feelings of despondency and impotence as Franklin D. Roosevelt promised a New Deal. He delivered the National Industrial Recovery Act including section 7A, which provided workers with federal government protection of the right to unionize. The positive response of the federal government to the plight of the workers and the opportunities presented to aggrieved workers and motivated labor leaders by section 7A led to a resurgence of labor organizing. Coal miners, auto workers, and steelworkers flocked into unions and other workers generated a strike wave in 1934. These initiatives empowered workers politically as well as at the workplace. President Roosevelt gave the final push for the passage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935 known as the Wagner Act. It provided a more solid footing for the formerly precarious legal rights of workers. The New Deal era linked civil liberties and workers' liberties, in contrast to the 1919 strike wave when President Wilson deserted his wartime labor allies and the federal courts issued injunctions against strikers. It opened up new possibilities for the federal government to act as a guardian of first amendment freedoms threatened by actions of local governments and private citizens.

Along with the Wagner Act, the LaFollette Civil Liberties Committee of the United States Senate and the CIO provided the setting for steel workers to embark on another major organizing drive. The LaFollette Committee hearings highlighted the violations of the civil liberties of industrial workers and their allies: the use of company spies, company arsenals, and back to

work campaigns orchestrated by spurious citizens' committees. The CIO, led by John L. Lewis, provided industrial workers with a more effective mechanism to obtain collective bargaining. The Steel Workers Organizing Committee, a CIO creation, achieved mixed results in its unionization campaigns. While Lewis and Myron Taylor, Chair of the Board of U.S. Steel, negotiated a collective bargaining agreement, most "Little Steel" companies, including Bethlehem, resisted unionization and several violent strikes, including Johnstown, ensued at their steel plants.²⁷

In Johnstown, the SWOC drive for union recognition faced a formidable challenge as Bethlehem Steel, which dominated the city, opposed unionization and took pride in its long-standing employee representation plan which began in the World War I era. Nevertheless, the organizing drive in Johnstown achieved some success in 1936 because of the low wages and bad working conditions of many workers, combined with the refusal of company officials to meet with union leaders. Employees of local "captive" railroads triggered the strike with a walkout in June. A few days later steelworkers and coal miners, employed by "captive mines" (mines owned by the mining company subsidiary of Bethlehem Steel) joined the strike. Mayor Daniel Shields, aided by the Bethlehem Steel Company and the Citizens' Committee, orchestrated an effective campaign to reopen the mill. The Bethlehem Steel Company was the primary financial supporter of the Johnstown Chamber of Commerce, parent of the Citizens' Committee which took the same stance as its 1919 predecessor although its composition had changed. The Citizens' Committee, including many businessmen and some clergymen, focused on the law-and-order theme as in 1919 and suggested that communists and other radicals were leading the strike. Mayor Shields and the Citizens' Committee were more concerned about the economic losses which the city suffered from the strike than with the denial of speech and assembly which resulted from their efforts to end it. Most dramatically, city officials permitted private citizens to assume police powers and to deny others their civil liberties. The American Legion supported big business during the CIO organizing drives in auto and steel, particularly in the "Little Steel" Strike of 1937. Mayor Shields recruited 300 Legionnaires for "special police assistance" with the right to exercise full police powers during the strike, although State Commander Walter Kress persuaded the Johnstown Post not to take official action. These diverse and concerted efforts by the employees and their allies along with the schism in the ranks of the strikers led to the defeat of the 1937 strike and a continuation of company domination. Americans and men of western European background usually supported the company's Employee Representation Plan and participated in the "back-to-work movement." On the other hand, 70% of the strikers were East Central Europeans, Italians, and Mexicans. Aided by the

federal government, in 1941-42 SWOC succeeded, after a protracted struggle, in organizing Bethlehem Steel and ending the era of unilateral company domination.²⁸

Many of the roots of employer hegemony emerged in the early twentieth century when the Cambria Steel Company dominated most major aspects of Johnstown life because of its preponderant economic power. To be sure, on occasion, steelworkers mounted major challenges to company domination of the city. In 1919 Johnstown steelworkers presented a united front in behalf of demands for collective bargaining, a shorter work day, and higher wages. In this campaign they drew on the gains they registered in the World War I era and their role in wartime mobilization. Their call for "industrial democracy" also fitted well with national war aims. Nevertheless, they faced a very difficult task in their attempt to transform labor-management relations and to empower workers. The leading steel companies possessed great wealth and a determination to retain unilateral control of their operations. They could usually count on the support of local elites including politicians, pulpit, and press. In Johnstown, the Citizens' Committee played a pivotal role in the defeat of the 1919 strike. The "Red Scare" aided them as the national obsession with radicalism opened the door to a campaign which identified strike leaders with subversion and the open shop with Americanism. A conservative "Americanism" defined patriotism narrowly and placed immigrant steel workers, the National Committee to Organize Iron and Steel Workers, and William Z. Foster outside "the pale," subjecting them to vilification and repression. The Palmer Raids, the strike wave, and radical unrest received headline coverage in the local press and linked national events to developments in Johnstown.

The denial of civil liberties at the national level validated local outrages which occurred repeatedly during the steel strike. Although the Johnstown area did not experience the level of oppression found in Pittsburgh and the Chicago-Gary region, the expulsion of William Z. Foster, the harassment of Dominick Gelotte and other organizers, and the brutality of the State Constabulary provide important examples of the denial of civil liberties to workers and their supporters. Critics of the strikers accused "labor agitators" of stirring up a labor force of generally satisfied employees. Particular attention focused on William Z. Foster, especially during his brief visit to Johnstown, as the Cambria Steel Company and the Citizens' Committee labeled him a "radical" and forced him to leave the city before he delivered his scheduled speech at the Labor Temple.

The General Strike Committee countered this viewpoint in an advertisement which cited the conditions of work rather than "agitators" as responsible for the successful unionization campaign and the strike by the Johnstown Steel Workers. A letter to the editor signed "A Union Man"

offered a different perspective than the Citizens' Committee and called Reverend A. F. Campbell of Bridgeport, Connecticut, the "Company's Outside Agitator." The state police could also be characterized as "outside agitators" as "their presence tended to create rather than quell disorders." In the 1937 strike the civil liberties issue took a somewhat different form, with the role of the company and the mayor more overt than in the 1919 strike, as the Bethlehem Steel Company, Mayor Daniel Shields and the Citizens' Committee conducted a campaign that denied the protection of the Bill of Rights to citizens and assured the company's victory. Today, Bethlehem Steel is more of a memory than a tangible presence in Johnstown, but its influence continues and still inhibits the development of creative approaches to urban and economic problems which would serve the interests of all of the city's residents. A long period as a "large company town" contributed to an attitude supporting cooperation across class lines rather than labor-management antagonism, and stimulation of economic growth rather than conflicts about the division of the wealth and the decision-making process.²⁹

Notes

1. David Brody, *Labor in Crisis: The Steel Strike of 1919* (Philadelphia, 1965), 79, 95; Alan Dawley, *Struggle for Justice: Social Responsibility and the Liberal State* (Cambridge, Ma., 1991), 3; Melvyn Dubofsky, *The State and Labor in Modern America* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1994), 79.
2. David Brody, *Steelworkers in America: The Nonunion Era* (New York, 1969), 103, 180-98, Brody; 45-7.
3. Dawley, 196-203.
4. Dubofsky, 65-74; James R. Barrett, *Work and Community in the Jungle: Chicago's Packinghouse Workers* (Urbana, IL., 1987), 198-200.
5. *Johnstown Democrat*, April 21, 1919, p. 12, June 5, 1919, p. 1; Heber Blankenhorn Papers, Series II NO. 4, Archives of Industrial Society, University of Pittsburgh; William Z. Foster. Testimony, Interchurch World Movement Committee, 24-6, 30, David J. Saposs Papers, Reel 2, Wisconsin State Historical Society, microfilm edition. Ewa Morawska, *For Bread with Butter: The Life-Worlds of East Central Europeans in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, 1890-1940* (Cambridge, Eng., 1985), 84, 160.
6. Brody, *Steelworkers in America*, 214-5, 223; Blankenhorn Papers, Series II, No. 5, Dominick Gelotte to John Brophy, March 24, box 22, United Mine Workers Papers, District 2, Special Collections, Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP); Dominick Gelotte to John Brophy, N.D., Box 22, District 2 Papers.
7. Dubofsky, 77; Dawley, 234-5; Brody, *Labor in Crisis*, 76-7.
8. Dawley, 240-1, 243-5; Brody, *Labor in Crisis*, 128-30. F. Scott Fitzgerald, "May Day" in Matthew J. Bruccoli, ed., *The Short Stories of F. Scott Fitzgerald* (New York, 1989), 97, 108; Roscoe Baker, *The American Legion and American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1954, 26-7; Terry Radtke, *The History of the Pennsylvania American Legion* (Harrisburg, 1993), 13-14; William Pencak, *For God & Country: The American Legion, 1919-1941* (Boston, 1989), 8, 14.
9. *Democrat*, May 2, 1919, p. 1; May 3, 1919, pp. 4, 10.
10. Edward P. Johanningsmeier, *Forging American Communism: The Life of William Z. Foster* (Princeton, N.J., 1994), 116-25; Dominick Gelotte to John Brophy, June 18, 1919, Box 22, District 2 papers; Dominick Gelotte to John Brophy, July 18, 1919, Box 22, District 2 papers, IUP.
11. Johanningsmeier, 118-9, 125-8.
12. Blankenhorn Papers, Series II, No. 4, University of Pittsburgh; Dominick Gelotte, Letter to the Editor, *Nanty-Glo Journal*, September 1, 1921.
13. William Z. Foster *The Great Steel Strike and Its Lessons* (New York, 1971), 48; Interview with Frank Friedhoff, 500-01, 504, Saposs Papers, Reel 1, Wisconsin State Historical Society.
14. Robert R. Smith, "The Steel Strike in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, 1919" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 1982), 32-6, 45-6; Dominick Gelotte to John Brophy, September 29, 1929, Box 22, District 2 Papers, IUP.
15. Smith, 47, 49-50; *Democrat*, October 31, 1919, pp. 12, 13, November 3, 1919 p. 16.
16. Smith, 51; *Democrat*, November 1, 1919, p. 8; November 4, 1919, p. 8; November 10, 1919; *Johnstown Tribune*, November 1, 1919, p. 12.
17. Brody, *Steelworkers in America*, 243-8.
18. Foster, 188-9; Correspondence John Brophy and Dominick Gelotte, Box 22, District 2 Papers, IUP; *Democrat*, November 10, 1919, A16; Johanningsmeier, 144; *Johnstown Tribune*, November 7, 1919, p. 24; November 8, 1919, p. 1.
19. *New York Times*, November 8, 1919, p. 2; Eileen Mountjoy Cooper, "To Organize the Unorganized," *Pennsylvania Heritage* (Winter, 1989), 32, 36-7, *Democrat*, November 10, 1919, p. 16; Blankenhorn Papers, Series II, 25, 26, University of Pittsburgh; Johnstown Strike, 1919, Box 22, District 2, Interchurch World Movement, Commission of Inquiry, *Public Opinion and the Steel Strike* (New York, 1921), 199, IUP; *Tribune*, November 8, 1919, p. 1; November 10, 1919, p. 16; P. H. Egan to John Brophy, December 1, 1919, Box 22, District 2 Papers; John Brophy to Woodrow Wilson, August 10, 1919, Box 22, District 2 Papers; John Brophy to William Sproul, November 8, 1919, Box 22, District 2 Papers, all IUP; Frank Kurowski Testimony, Interchurch

World Movement Committee, 147-52, David J. Saposs Papers, Reel 2, Wisconsin State Historical Society.

20. The Records of the Pennsylvania State Police (Record Group 30, Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg) included very little information about the role of the Pennsylvania State Police in the Johnstown Steel Strike. For example, its activities in this labor struggle were not included in an extensive section on Important Events, 1919. Governor Sproul did direct the Commissioner to dispatch an additional four state police to Holsopple (Somerset County) to watch the situation at Johnstown. In addition, the State Police established a sub-station at Johnstown on November 12, 1919. The staff consisted of one Sergeant, one corporal and eleven privates; B. M. Clark to Lucius W. Robinson, October 29, 1919, Collection 51, Box 3, Rochester and Pittsburgh Coal Company Collection, Special Collections, Indiana University of Pennsylvania; *Democrat*, November 11, 1919, p. 16, November 21, 1919, p. 1; Circulars, 1919, Box 22, District 2 Papers, IUP; *Tribune*, November 1, 1919, p. 4; November 11, 1919, p. 4; November 17, 1919, pp. 1, 7; November 18, 1919, p. 18; November 19, 1919, p. 1; November 20, 1919, p. 14; Circular, General Strike Committee, November 1919, Saposs Papers, 302, Reel, 2, Wisconsin State Historical Society; proceedings, Workers Labor Party League of the Nineteenth Congressional District of Pennsylvania, 1920, 4, Box 25, District 2 Papers, IUP.

21. Smith, 36-9; *Democrat* November 3, 1919, p. 16, November 14, 1919, p. 2; Blankenhorn Papers, Series II, 25, University of Pittsburgh; *Tribune*, November 5, 1919, p. 17; Kurowski, Testimony, 148-52, Saposs Papers, Reel,

Wisconsin State Historical Society.

22. Smith, 62; *Interchurch*, 156; *Tribune*, November 11, 1919, p. 6; November 1, 1919, p. 7; John Gaventa, *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Unrest in an Appalachian Valley* (Urbana, IL, 1980), 14; *Iron and Steel Workers Bulletin*, 3-12, Saposs Papers, Reel 2; Thomas Conboy Statement, 887, Saposs Papers, Reel 1, Wisconsin State Historical Society; Dominick Gelotte Statement of General Strike Committee, N.D., Box 22, District 2 Papers, IUP.

23. Smith 41-3; *Democrat*, November 13, 1919, p. 16, November 15, 1919, p. 16; Kurowski statement, 147, Saposs Papers, Reel 2, Wisconsin State Historical Society.

24. Blankenhorn Papers, Series II, 26, University of Pittsburgh.

25. Smith, 56-8, 61-2; Brody, *Steelworkers in America*, 262; Brody, *Labor in Crisis*, 174-6; Dominick Gelotte to John Brophy, N.D. Box 22, District 2 papers, IUP.

26. Brody, *Steelworkers in America*, 263, 270-4, 78.

27. Jerold Auerbach, *Labor and Liberty: The La Follette Committee and the New Deal* (New York, 1966), 89-92.

28. *Ibid*, 135-8; Donald McPherson, "The 'Little Steel' Strike of 1937 in Johnstown, Pennsylvania," *Pennsylvania History* (April, 1972), 219-20, 222-6, 235-7; Morawska, 180-81; Radtke, 49; Pencak, 226, 228, 230.

29. *Tribune*, November 8, 1919, p. 1; November 1, 1919, p. 12; November 13, 1919, p. 6; November 21, 1919, p. 1. The author thanks Elizabeth A. Cocke for the idea of viewing the term "outside agitator" from several divergent perspectives. Jack Metzger, "Plant Shutdowns and Worker Response," *Socialist Review*, 10 (September-October, 1985), 9-50.