Edward G. Roddy and the Anti-War Movement in Civil War Pennsylvania

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It was Tuesday, April 16, 1861. Within the downtown offices of Uniontown, Pennsylvania's, Democratic newspaper, the *Genius of Liberty*, Edward G. Roddy, recent purchaser of the *Genius*, must have been wondering if perhaps he had chosen the wrong profession. Numerous reports were circulating about town regarding recent mobbings of Philadelphia newspapers. There now came to Roddy's door an anonymous letter promising similar treatment for the *Genius* should it fail to "show the flag."¹

Fortunately for Roddy these threats were never carried out. Other Democratic newsmen, however, were not so lucky. The ante-bellum South had been highly Democratic in its political sympathies, and the party would pay a high price for this loyalty during the days following Fort Sumter as enraged Republicans took their revenge upon the "treasonous" opposition press.²

What makes Edward G. Roddy a worthy subject for investigation is what he reveals about the anti-war movement in a geographic region largely ignored by historians. Anti-war sentiment, particularly of the Copperhead variety, has been primarily regarded as a midwestern trend and it is in that region that most research has focused. But while strongest in the Midwest, the anti-war movement was present throughout the North including Western Pennsylvania.³

In fact, with its large immigrant population, strong Democratic base and close Southern ties, via the Monongahela-Ohio-Mississippi river trade, Western Pennsylvania probably had more in common with the agrarian Midwest, where Copperheadism flourished, than with the cosmopolitan Northeast. But what little research exists on Pennsylvania Copperheads has mostly dealt with the central and eastern parts of the state, while neglecting the West.⁴

It is within the context of the neglect demonstrated by historians towards Western Pennsylvania Copperheads that the career of Edward G. Roddy becomes significant in furthering our understanding of the anti-war movement. The Democratic Party, like the nation at large, was deeply divided by the war, having within its ranks both supporters and opponents of a military approach to the crisis. War Democrats, such as Stephen A. Douglas, felt that it was every citizen's duty to rally behind the president. The Peace faction was not so unified, being composed of groups ranging from moderates, who felt that the Union could best be preserved through negotiation rather than war, to radicals, whose position basically amounted to "Peace at any Price."⁵
The moderates drew their numbers primarily from the laboring classes, immigrants, and small farmers. Radicals were more of the professional and merchant classes and were closely tied, both economically and socially, to the South. They were also strong defenders of states' rights. Both factions shared a virulent opposition to emancipation.6

Within the radical faction a small fringe existed that actively sought to aid the Confederacy. Its members of this fringe element were often referred to as Copperheads by Republicans who sought to exploit the division within the party by characterizing all Democrats as being involved with this "Copperhead conspiracy." Because of the success of Republicans in associating Democrats with Copperheads, it is important to establish some working definition of a Copperhead. This study, taking its cue from the work of historian Arthur Shankman, defines a Copperhead as any virulent opponent of the Lincoln Administration and its war policy.7

Historians, immediately following the war and into the early twentieth century, essentially echoed the Republican view of a Democrat-Copperhead conspiracy. But since the 1950s and 1960s, as a result of the work of revisionist scholars such as Shankman and Frank Klement, a more balanced, nuanced, view has emerged. The former conspiracy theories are being discarded as mere political propaganda. As will be seen from examining the career of Edward G. Roddy, the anti-war movement was even more complex than even these revisionist historians have envisioned.8

Little is known of Roddy's early life. Born in Addison, Somerset County, on June 12, 1824, Roddy first came to Uniontown in 1843 and found work in the dry goods business of Colonel Ewing Brownfield. By 1852 he had relocated to nearby Menallen Township where, along with a mercantile business, he operated the local post office. While residing in Menallen Roddy met and married the former Lydia Jane Beeson, a daughter of one of Fayette County's most prominent families. A son, Ewing Beeson Roddy, was born in 1856. Roddy returned to Uniontown in 1858 and three years later purchased from E. B. Boyle a newspaper called the Genius of Liberty. In assuming the duties of his office Roddy promised his readers to produce a paper "... worthy of the confidence and support of the gallant Democracy of Fayette County."9

The Genius had been founded in 1805 by former sheriff James Allen and Zadoc Springer as the Genius of Liberty and Fayette Advertiser. Over the years it would carry many titles, being known at various times as The Genius of Liberty and American Telegraph, The Genius of Liberty and American Observer, and The Genius of Liberty and Greene Advertiser. Except for a brief period from 1818 to 1821 when half-owned by a Federalist, the Genius always aligned itself and was a vocal advocate for the Democratic Party.10

In the words of his contemporaries, Edward G. Roddy was "a man of high character and unimpeachable integrity", "a perfect gentleman and con-
servative in his philosophy" who possessed "a quiet, dignified and unassuming manner." "Firm and unyielding in party fidelity, he was nevertheless so mild and dignified in the dissemination of his views, as to command the respect of men of all parties." Simply stated, he was a man who loved his country, believed in conservative principles, the racial superiority of whites, and the near infallibility of the Democratic Party.\textsuperscript{11}

In addition to his duties as editor of the \textit{Genius}, the civic-minded Roddy served on the Board of Directors of Fayette Bank, as school director, and, in 1864, as a member of Uniontown borough council. He was a member of the Methodist Episcopal Church and both the Masonic and Odd Fellows Lodges.\textsuperscript{12}

The Fayette County to which Edward G. Roddy came in 1843 was a community with a longtime tradition as a Democratic stronghold, being carried by that party's candidates in eight of nine presidential elections between 1828 and 1860. Anti-war sentiment never enjoyed much influence, and young men of the county had served with valor and distinction in all of America's wars. When Lincoln called for volunteers, Fayette Countians once again eagerly rushed to enlist, the first company departing a mere six days after Lincoln's plea. Fayette troops served in a number of Pennsylvania regiments during the war including the 8th and 11th Reserves, the 85th, 116th and 142nd Infantry, the 14th and 16th Cavalry and the 2nd Heavy Artillery.\textsuperscript{13}

In the mid-nineteenth century, an intimate relationship existed between newspapers and their readers, especially in isolated areas like Fayette County, where the local paper was relied upon not only for local events but also for national news. More importantly, the press as a whole took a more frankly partisan approach to news reporting. Newspapers, out of economic necessity, often had to align themselves with a political party, making it axiomatic that fortunes were directly tied to those of their patron party. After the Republican victory in 1860, newspapers backing Lincoln could look forward to a steady diet of government printing contracts; the Democratic press would have to do without.\textsuperscript{14}

Beyond economic pressure, Democratic editors often had to contend with more direct efforts aimed at restricting their movements. The government doubtless had legitimate security concerns in monitoring the press, but Republicans often used national security as an excuse for muzzling the opposition. Federal officials employed two principle methods of controlling newspapers—mob violence and "civil and military" action In practical terms, the latter often meant questioning the loyalty of Democrats. Because the seceded states had been heavily Democratic, Republicans reasoned, all Democrats must be in league with the rebellion.\textsuperscript{15}

It was in such an atmosphere of distrust and recrimination that Roddy published his first issue of the \textit{Genius of Liberty} on January 31, 1861. Lacking both training and experience as a journalist, Roddy made up for his want of
expertise through sheer bombast. In one of his first editorials Roddy described his main rival, Andrew Stewart, owner of the Republican *American Standard*, as possessing a "mind and heart" composed of "the petrified sum of all villainies." He excoriated Republican politicos, in general describing them with such colorful phrases as the "feast of death" and "cesspool of iniquity."

The editorial page itself was a hodgepodge of classified advertisements, public announcements, and editorials, most of the last composed by Roddy. Also included were columns reprinted from other newspapers such as the *Pittsburgh Chronicle*. Lacking the means to send correspondents directly to the battlefield, Roddy had to rely upon articles in larger newspapers and letters from soldiers for his war reports. At the time Roddy took over the paper national attention focused on Fort Sumter and the question of its resupply and abandonment. Taking a hawkish stand, Roddy brushed aside concerns about the rebel batteries with blithe assurance: "the success of this attempt cannot admit of reasonable doubt."

If Roddy had nearly boundless faith in the military, he had none in the new president. He considered Abraham Lincoln little more than an amiable dunce who had only managed to get elected through the dissension within the Democratic Party. Not everyone felt this way, but many people, rather than stand by and wait for the inevitable, tried to find some means of avoiding war. A number of proposals were put forth, among them the so-called Crittenden Compromise and Washington Peace Convention, none of which inspired Roddy. In the end, Roddy's assessment proved all too accurate. War began on the morning of April 12, 1861, when Confederate batteries at Charleston opened fire on Fort Sumter.

Roddy's support for the war, while sincere, was also conditional. Like many Democrats, he blamed the war on abolitionists' efforts to deprive the South of its "rights." Summoning all of the malevolence at his disposal, Roddy lashed out at those he held responsible for the nation's woes:

> The unholy [abolitionists'] crusade against nearly one-half of the States of this Union, conceived in sin and born in iniquity, based upon false premises, and carried on for forty years with a zeal and fanaticism unequalled in the history of man, is culminating. Terrible, indeed, are the consequences.

But while conceding that the South had legitimate grievances, Roddy believed secession to be unlawful and ill advised. It would have been better to remain in the Union and seek redress through legitimate constitutional means. He pronounced the government justified in resorting to force to preserve the Union but not in turning the war into an abolitionists' crusade. In supporting the effort to preserve the Union, Roddy followed the lead of prominent War
Democrats such as Stephen A. Douglas. This period of bipartisan support would last only until the first major battle of the war at Bull Run, in which Union troops were driven from the field in ignominious defeat.20

Roddy and other Democrats blamed this humiliation on the Lincoln Administration's having underestimated the strength and leadership of the rebel army. Local Republicans responded to these accusations by denouncing their critics as disloyal. Lincoln soon summoned General George B. McClellan to command the Army of the Potomac. Fresh from a series of minor but well-publicized victories in western Virginia, McClellan seemed to be just what the Union cause needed, and he set to work right away retraining and reorganizing the army. Very little war news appeared in the Genius until the armies opened the spring offensives of 1862.21

Events in 1862 sorely tested Roddy's support for the war. As the self-described editor of a "White Man's Paper," Roddy saw it of paramount importance that the war be prosecuted as quickly as possible lest it be perverted into an abolitionists' crusade. With the war entering its second year, hopes for a swift conclusion came to rest upon the man Roddy considered "the greatest and best commander we have," General McClellan.22

Ulysses S. Grant's victories at Fort Donelson and at Shiloh early in 1862 had sent the western Confederate armies reeling and raised the hope among many northerners that one bold stroke from McClellan would capture Richmond and end the Rebellion. Unfortunately, when it came to bold action George McClellan was the wrong man for the job. Since his appointment to command, he had shown little inclination for waging war, offering countless excuses why he could not or should not fight. While Roddy may have interpreted this as discretion on the part of an officer who wanted to avoid another disaster like Bull Run, it left McClellan at the mercy of Republicans who charged the life-long Democrat with being sympathetic toward the rebellion.23

Whatever effect McClellan's dissembling may have had in convincing Roddy of the general's military abilities, it had none upon the enemy. The Confederates turned McClellan away from Richmond during the Seven Days campaign, after which Union forces under the overall command of John Pope suffered further defeat at Cedar Mountain, and Second Bull Run. Only good fortune and a huge edge in numbers allowed McClellan to fight the rebels to a draw at Antietam. Awaiting a victory to announce his Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln decided that Antietam was sufficiently decisive and made the announcement on September 22, 1862.

Roddy's predictably labeled the Proclamation "evil and disastrous." But rather than withdraw his support for the war, Roddy chose to focus on the fall elections. If the Democrats could retake control of Congress, there might be time to stop Lincoln from going forward with emancipation. Democrats of the 21st Congressional District, which included Fayette County, ran on a
platform advocating the preservation of the “Union as it was, . . . the Constitution as it is” along with civil and religious liberties. Their candidate, John L. Dawson of Brownsville, ran against Republican William M. Stewart. Roddy summed up the election as a choice “between abolition fanaticism and constitutional liberty.”

Herein may be detected an inconsistency that would become more pronounced as the war progressed. While urging his readers to support Democrats in order to stop the abolitionist agenda, Roddy also asked them to support McClellan whose lack of martial vigor had helped allow the rebellion to continue long enough to bring emancipation to the fore. In order to reconcile this apparent contradiction, Roddy resorted to flimsy excuses. Lack of vigor had not prevented McClellan from pursuing the enemy after Antietam; rather the fault lay with duplicitous abolitionists who deliberately withheld supplies lest McClellan destroy Lee before the Emancipation Proclamation could take effect at year’s end.

The 1862 elections proved successful for Democrats, who gained thirty-four seats in Congress, John Dawson’s among them, along with several governorships and state legislatures. But rather than being a restraint, the election spurred Lincoln on to bolder efforts beginning with the dismissal of McClellan. Lincoln had not dared move against McClellan out of fear of alienating War Democrats, among whom McClellan enjoyed great popularity. With an influx of Peace Democrats, the president felt less reluctant about making what he felt were necessary changes.

To Roddy, McClellan’s dismissal had less to do with his competence than with that of Republicans who were taking out their frustrations over their electoral losses on the general. This view seemed to be borne out by the performance of McClellan’s successor, General Ambrose E. Burnside, whose own ineptitude resulted in the worst Union defeat yet at the battle of Fredericksburg in December 1862.

By 1863 the nation, in Roddy’s view, was “on the high road to despotism.” Having seized the machinery of government, Republican abolitionists were determined to use their newfound power to crush their Democratic opponents. Locally this manifested itself in a “Union Peace Meeting” at the Fayette County Court House in early March. Ostensibly intended to drum up support for the administration’s war efforts, its real purpose was to denounce Democratic peace meetings then being held in the area. Most notable among the proposals made at this meeting was one denying the people’s right to criticize the government.

Alarmed by this “trend,” Roddy made Republican despotism rather than the military side of the war the main item on the Genius’s editorial agenda except during the months of June and July when news of Lee’s invasion would dominate. Regarding the invasion, Roddy expressed confidence in the army's
ability to drive the rebels out, yet had to question the wisdom of replacing Joseph Hooker as commander of the Army of the Potomac with Pennsylvanian George Meade in the midst of the campaign. Hooker's removal, stated Roddy, gave further evidence of Lincoln's incompetence.

The Confederate retreat from Pennsylvania prompted Roddy to return to the theme of despotism. The *Genius* devoted endless column space to condemning "Union Leagues," which had arisen in response to an alleged Copperhead conspiracy that Republicans believed to be operating through organizations such as the Sons of Liberty and Knights of the Golden Circle. Roddy considered the Union Leagues nothing more than armed hoodlums out to intimidate Democrats with threats and accusations. Roddy himself experienced some of this first hand when local Republicans threatened violence to thwart what they saw as his nefarious plans.

Although such threats could not dissuade Roddy from pursuing his chosen profession, economics would prove a more formidable foe. The *Genius* was highly successful when Colonel Roddy purchased it, but by 1863 had undergone a sad decline. Roddy had complained about rising costs and decreasing revenues and demanded payment from delinquent accounts since November 1861. So far did the *Genius's* fortunes fall that in February 1863, Roddy tried to sell it to R. B. Brown, editor and owner of the Brownsville *Times*. Brown, however, fared no better and the paper returned to Roddy after only one issue.

Edward Roddy's business acumen and faith in the Union cause would be severely tested in 1864. Both parties viewed the fall presidential election as a referendum on Lincoln's policies, and many Confederates pinned their last hope on the Copperhead's ability to undermine the Northern will to fight. The electorate faced two great questions: Would the effort to preserve the nation go forward, or would defeatism force the government to sue for peace? Would emancipation continue to be a war aim, or would Lincoln be forced to break his word in the interest of political expediency?

Roddy remained relatively quiet about the war during the spring and summer campaigns, probably out of fear of alienating War Democrats. Instead, he contented himself with reprinted accounts of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, and other battles, apparently hoping that the lengthy casualty lists would speak for themselves.

The presidential campaign began the first week in June when the Republicans renominated Lincoln. In order to garner support from War Democrats and Border State Unionists, Republicans decided to campaign under the banner of the "National Union Party," an idea Roddy condemned as an attempt to destroy the Democratic Party.

The Democratic convention, held during the last week of August, confronted serious problems. The factionalism, that had split the party and al-
allowed Lincoln to win in 1860 by 1864 coalesced around two main groups—the Peace Democrats and the War Democrats. The Peace Democrat's platform of restoration through negotiation, enjoyed considerable support in the Copperhead-plagued Midwest; however, the party hierarchy realized that any candidate advocating such a program stood little chance against Lincoln. The convention decided to nominate George B. McClellan, who possessed impeccable military credentials. Roddy had long been an ardent supporter of McClellan, seeing him as a military genius whose plans had been continually undermined by abolitionists within the administration. Once elected, McClellan could rid himself of such obstructionists and lead the Union on to victory.

But after making what appeared to be a strong choice in McClellan, the Democrats, attempting to promote party unity, saddled him with a platform that practically advocated Northern surrender and a blatant Copperhead for a running mate in Congressman George Pendleton of Ohio. As was apparent even to Roddy, various Democrats were as likely to be alienated by either McClellan or Pendleton as to be united by them. Despite such handicaps, Roddy expressed confidence in McClellan's triumph. Indeed, history seemed to be on the general's side: no president had been re-elected since Andrew Jackson. Divided though the Democrats might be, they were no more so than the Republicans, among whom abolitionists and moderates fought bitterly for control of the party.

More than anything else, the Democrats pinned their hopes on the public's growing disillusion with a war that had ground to a halt on every front. For many the huge sacrifices in blood and treasure that the North had made came to symbolize the entire record of the Lincoln administration: "four years of failure." This was a powerful argument. With Grant bogged down at Petersburg and Sherman likewise stymied at Atlanta, the Confederacy did indeed appear invincible. Blaming abolitionists for having started the war in the first place, Roddy further claimed that, rather than trying to make peace, they were deliberately prolonging the conflict: "The Abolitionists want no peace. They make money out of the war, and therefore they want the war to go on." With so much loss, and so little to show for it, many in the North began to ask if perhaps the Democrats were not right about Lincoln's mismanagement. At one point even Lincoln himself admitted the likelihood of his defeat at the polls.

Good news from the battlefield lifted northern spirits. Grant and Sherman, who appeared to be bogged down, were jockeying for position in order to force the rebels out of their entrenchments. This strategy paid off in Georgia. Sherman captured Atlanta on September 2, 1864, effectively sealing the fate of the Confederacy, and with it the candidacy of George B. McClellan, who was defeated by an electoral margin of 212 to 21.
Thanks, in part, to the efforts of Colonel Roddy and the *Genius of Liberty*, Democrat John L. Dawson was re-elected to Congress, carrying Fayette County by a majority of 814 votes. Gratifying as this must have been to Roddy, it could not lessen the chagrin he must have felt at the defeat of George McClellan. Roddy viciously struck out at Lincoln in a blistering editorial that clearly signaled his defection to the “Copperhead” camp: “We should rejoice in a speedy termination of the war, by any honorable means—by fighting or compromise, but it is because we believe that it cannot be brought to an end by fighting only, that we prefer compromise.”

By this time, Roddy appears almost irrational. Having suffered severe defeats in the Shenandoah Valley and at Franklin, Tennessee, as well as enduring Sherman’s March to the Sea, the Confederacy approached collapse. Yet Roddy printed what can only be interpreted as a call for Union surrender. Perhaps to his partisan mind the war had been lost the moment George McClellan failed to win the presidency.

Roddy conceived of the war not so much as a military struggle between North and South as a philosophical contest between conservatism and extremism. Fighting not to free slaves, he hoped to preserve “the Union as it was, the Constitution as it is.” Lincoln’s re-election meant that abolitionists would now be at liberty to do as they pleased. Faced with the choice of despotism or anarchy, the only reasonable alternative was to seek accommodation with conservatives in the South.

But compromise was a dead issue by late 1864. The Confederacy teetered on the brink and only needed one more push to finish it off. That push came on the morning of April 9, 1865, when Grant’s all-out assault at Petersburg forced Lee’s army to abandon Richmond and flee westward. Failing to break out at Appomattox, Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia on April 9, 1865, ending the war for all practical purposes.

Lincoln’s assassination less than a week later appears to have genuinely distressed Roddy. Unlike some of his fellow Democrats, Roddy bore no personal malice toward Lincoln. His opposition was philosophical. Once the president was dead Roddy put aside all partisanship and struggled to express his feelings of despair: “Language fails us to express the deep sorrow and gloom with which the terrible announcement was received by all.”

The key to understanding Roddy, and the evolution of his views, lies in his attachment to General McClellan. To Roddy, McClellan embodied everything a public man ought to be: conservative in his philosophy, opposed to abolition, and the very model of manly virtue. McClellan represented the best chance for preserving “the Union as it was, the Constitution as it is.” When Lincoln won re-election, Roddy lost heart and turned against the war.

That Roddy was a Copperhead cannot be doubted. He clearly fits the criteria established by Shankman, being not only a Democrat and a racist but
by late 1864 an outspoken peace advocate. The only real issue concerns his classification as radical or moderate. Like all Copperheads he had an intense dislike for abolitionists, blaming them for having brought on the war through their efforts to "subdue" the South.\textsuperscript{41}

Unlike the radicals, Roddy did not advocate a "Peace at any Price" position nor did he sympathize with the rebellion. But he also differed from moderates in ways that were subtle yet significant. He came to favor negotiation over fighting not because he believed the war could not be won, but because he thought it did not matter who triumphed. It was defeat at the ballot box, rather than on the battlefield, that changed Roddy's mind.

Had McClellan been elected, Roddy would have been more than willing to support the military option. He was not opposed to fighting, he was opposed to extremism. Extremists in the North had provoked the war and now extremists on both sides were prolonging it. Neither side was willing to compromise, either would lead the country to ruin should it prevail. Confederate independence meant disunion and factionalism; Republican success promised despotism and racial upheaval. Therefore the war had to be stopped. Conservatives in both sections had to come together to prevent the extremists from leading the country to ruin.

The Copperhead movement was more complex than revisionist historians have ever suggested. Roddy represents, in addition to moderates and radicals, another, somewhat ill defined, category of Copperheads that can be labeled conservative. Conservatives were, for the most part, supporters of George McClellan in the presidential election of 1864. They were people whose courage and patriotism were beyond reproach, who abandoned the war effort only after losing all hope of restoring "the Union as it was, the Constitution as it is."

Roddy offers a glimpse into the anti-war movement in a geographic region outside of its traditional midwestern strongholds. Copperhead sentiment probably did not represent a majority view of Fayette County Democrats. Most Copperheads in the county were probably moderates or conservatives. Aside from a few noisy newspaper editors such as Roddy, there seems to have been almost no local resistance to the war.\textsuperscript{42}

Fayette County's example supports the notion that there was no Copperhead "conspiracy." Had one existed, southwestern Pennsylvania would have been the logical place from which to strike. If Vicksburg was in Jefferson Davis's words the nail that held the South's two halves together, Pittsburgh, as a key link in the Union's east-west transportation system, held a similar importance for the North. Outside of a few unconfirmed rumors and some harmless peace rallies, there were no recorded instances of Copperhead activity in southwestern Pennsylvania.\textsuperscript{43}
Edward G. Roddy was admittedly a rather obscure figure even in his own day. But at a time when newspaper editors were routinely subjected to official and unofficial repression, obscurity could be an asset. Working in provincial Fayette County, rather than a more metropolitan area, Roddy was less likely to attract attention to himself than his more prominent colleagues. Even greater than his role in expanding our understanding of conservative copperheads, is Roddy's legacy to the cause of free speech. He displayed great courage in speaking out against what he perceived to be the tyranny of Republicans. In an era during which journalists, Republican and Democrat alike, often faced mobs, arson, and other forms of intimidation, it was important that Colonel Roddy and others like him continue to challenge the boundaries of what was considered acceptable journalism.

Preserving the Union was a worthy aim, but at what cost? Was it to be a Union of censorship and martial law or a Union of liberty and justice? Edward G. Roddy, by his uncompromising advocacy of his beliefs, helped to ensure not only the survival of a free and unfettered press, but also that small town newspapers, such as the *Genius of Liberty*, would continue to play a role in American public life.

**Notes**


2. Among the attacks carried out against newspapers during April, 1861, just in Pennsylvania, were those against the *Palmetto Flag*, the *Argus*, and the *Southern Monitor*, all in Philadelphia and the sacking of the Wilkes-Barre Luzerne-Union. Edward G. Everett, “Pennsylvania Newspapers And Public Opinion” *The Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine*, 44 (March 1961): 6-7.


5. Shankman, 14-16.

6. Ibid.

7. The exact origins of the term “Copperhead” are obscure. One popular version attributes it to the head of the goddess of liberty on copper pennies that some Democrats cut out to make badges by which to identify themselves. Shankman considers only the moderates to have been true Copperheads. The smaller and more radical group he calls the “peace at any price” faction. In doing so he rejects the mono-
lithic view of the anti-war movement. However, to attach the label of Copperhead to the moderate faction and then conclude that Copperheads were not traitorous seems a bit too convenient. See Shankman, 14-16; 116-17.


9. Members of the Beeson family were among the earliest settlers of Uniontown which was originally called Beeson's Mills. James Hadden, A History of Uniontown, The County Seat of Fayette County, Pennsylvania (Uniontown, Pa.: privately printed, 1913), 662; Genius, January 29, 1852, 4; E. G. Roddy, "To the Patrons of the Genius," Genius, January 31, 1861, 4. The paper would also know an abundance of owners, including Allen and Springer, 1805-1812; Jesse Beeson, 1812-1818; John Bouvier and John M. Austin, 1818-1821; Thomas Patton, 1821-22; Jackson and Brown, 1822-29; Whitton and Redick, 1829-1830; Whitton alone, August-Fall 1831; Thomas Patton & Amos Littell, Fall 1831; Littell only, 1831-1838; Littell and Justin B. Morris, 1838-1840; John W. Ivan's, 1840-1846; John W. Shugart, 1846-1848; Ivan's again, 1848-1850; John Skiles and later. T. Galloway, 1850; Armstrong Hadden and Colonel T. B. Searight, 1850-2; Searight and George W. K. Minor, 1852-53; Minor alone 1853-4; Bierer (briefly), 1854; Searight and Boyle, 1854-1860; Franklin Ellis, ed. History of Fayette County, Pennsylvania, with Biographical sketches of many of its Pioneers and Prominent men, Illustrated. Vol. 1. (Philadelphia: L. H. Everts & Co. 1882), reprinted by Windmill Publications, Inc. 6628 Uebelhack Road. Mt. Vernon, Ind. 47620, (1991), 3-5-6; Hadden, 457; Ellis, 305.


13. Significant events of both the French and Indian War and Whiskey Rebellion were played out within Fayette County. Walter "Buzz" Storey, Stories of Uniontown and Fayette County (Dunbar, Pa.: Stafone's Printing Co.): 226-227; Ellis, 35-191.


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42. The exact degree of Copperhead sentiment in the area is difficult to accurately gauge. A chapter of the Knights of the Golden Circle was rumored to have operated in neighboring Greene County but little evidence exists to support this. That there was discontent cannot be denied, but for the most part Fayette Countians remained loyal to the Union. For his part, Colonel Roddy denied any involvement with subversive groups, and based on the record of the *Genius*, he must be taken at his word. He never advocated resistance to the draft, never called for action against the government, and never expressed sympathy for the Confederacy. Ellis, 1:300-306; Hadden, 458-61; 43. Brewster, "The Rise of the Anti-slavery Movement . . .", 14-15.