Pennsylvania's Awakening: the Kittanning Raid of 1756
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. . . . . let Pennsylvania wake,
And on the Foes her Terrors shake:
Their gloomy Troops defy . . . !

On Wednesday, 8 September 1756, Lieutenant-Colonel John Armstrong's Second Battalion of the Pennsylvania Regiment attacked and burned the Delaware stronghold at Kittanning, some forty miles east of present-day Pittsburgh, destroying crops and substantial supplies of munitions, killing an estimated 50 Delaware, among them the famous war-leader Captain Jacobs, and freeing 10 white captives (several of whom were later recaptured). Armstrong listed his casualties as 17 killed, 13 wounded, and 19 missing (several of the latter eventually made their way back east). Although the expedition eliminated Kittanning as a principal staging point for French and Indian attacks on the Pennsylvania frontier, and although it far surpassed a similar but poorly executed attack by the Virginia Regiment in March of the same year against the Indian town of Sandy Creek, the expedition's ultimate military achievement remains a subject of some debate. It did, however, immediately raise the morale of the Pennsylvania backcountry and put a momentary end to the raids that had continued almost without check since July of 1755. To commemorate the feat, the city of Philadelphia struck a medal for distribution to the officers of the Pennsylvania Regiment. Pennsylvania proprietor Thomas Penn, never acclaimed for his generosity, even awarded Armstrong a sword and a belt.

To the modern enquirer, the Kittanning raid dramatically reveals the problems Pennsylvania encountered and the measures it resorted to as it struggled to stave off disaster in the wake of Braddock's defeat in 1755. In several significant ways, moreover, the expedition helped the province prepare for the daunting challenges posed a couple years later in 1758 when Brigadier General John Forbes led a combined royal and provincial army of 6,000 against the French fortress of Fort Duquesne. Although executed on a far smaller scale, Armstrong's expedition may be interpreted as Pennsylvania's dress rehearsal for its participation in the Forbes expedition. Additionally, it may also be viewed as clarifying the obstacles, some virtually insurmountable, that beset the backcountry in its struggle to meet internal and external threats to its survival. The following discussion seeks to identify how the province responded to several problems besetting it during the years following Braddock's defeat and how those solutions and failures, climaxing with the reduction of Kittanning, may have in a modest way helped prepare Pennsylvania for its participation in the Forbes expedition of 1758.
During the summer of 1755, a British army commanded by Major General Edward Braddock set out to seize Fort Duquesne, the French stronghold occupying the strategic junction of the Allegheny and the Monongahela Rivers, on the site of present-day Pittsburgh. As every schoolchild knows, Braddock's army, moving north along the Monongahela, was ambushed and all-but annihilated on 9 July 1755, a few miles south of Ft. Duquesne. A disaster for Braddock's combined colonial and royal army, the massacre also plunged Pennsylvania's frontier into chaos, for the French and their Indian allies subsequently were able to use Ft. Duquesne to raid with impunity the settlements recently established on the western margin of the Susquehanna.

With the French and Indian attacks that followed Braddock's debacle, the people of the frontier panicked and began directing a stream of letters to Philadelphia, as well as to one another, recording the paralysis and terror that swept through Cumberland and western York counties like a wild fire. From Carlisle on 2 November, militia leader and the Penns' official surveyor and land agent in Cumberland County, John Armstrong advised Governor Robert Hunter Morris that

At four o'Clock this afternoon by Expresses from Conegochege, we are informed that Yesterday about 100 Indians were seen in the Great Cove, among whom was Shingas the Delaware King; that immediately after the discovery as many as had notice fled, & looking back from an high Hill they beheld their Houses on Fire, heard several Guns fired and the last shrieks of their dying neighbours; . . . Mr. [Hans] Hamilton was here with 60 men from York County when the Express came, and is to march early to-morrow to the upper part of the County. We have sent out expresses every where, and intend to collect the Forces of this Lower part, expecting the Enemy every moment at Sheerman's Valley if not nearer [at] hand.³

And on the same day from nearby Huntington or Reading township in western York, now Adams County, the Anglican itinerant missionary Thomas Barton also wrote the governor, pointedly endorsing his letter "3 o'clock in the Morning" to stress the urgency of his communication:

I am just come from Carlisle. . . . The great Cove is entirely reduced to ashes. . . . I suppose by to-morrow there will not be one Woman or Child in the Town. . . .

I intend this morning to return to Carlisle with a Party of men to guard that Town; the Gentlemen there desire me to request your assistance without Delay.⁴
Although these and other letters disclose that the settlers wasted no time in requesting aid from the governor, Morris could do little. Thwarted by a legislature that was dominated by the pacifist Quaker faction, he could not immediately obtain the militia and supply bills needed to meet the emergency. In a stop-gap solution, Morris invoked powers he enjoyed under royal charter to raise volunteer units of militia known as "associated companies." In addition to forming companies of militia, the backinhabitants urged the building of a defensive chain of fortifications beginning at the Delaware River and running west and southwest to the Maryland border. In his 2 November 1755 letter, John Armstrong expressed the pervading feeling about the need for these outposts:

I’m of opinion that no other means than a Chain of Block Houses along or near the South side of the Kittatinny Mountain, from Susquehanna to the Temporary Line [i.e., the unsurveyed border with Maryland], can secure the Lives and Properties even of the old Inhabitants of this County, the new Settlement being all fled except Sheerman’s Valley, whom (if God do not preserve) we fear will suffer very soon.6

A few days earlier, on 30 October 1755, Sheriff John Potter of Cumberland County had already summoned a meeting in Shippensburg. Augmented with “Assistant Members” from York county, the General Council of Cumberland County resolved that five “large forts” should be constructed at the following locations: “Carlisle, Shippensburg, Collonell Chambers’s [i.e., today’s Chambersburg], Mr. Steells Meeting House [near present-day Mercersburg], & at Willm Allison’s Esqr. [i.e., today’s Greencastle].”7 Additionally, to meet the emergency and later to reinforce the thin line of provincial forts, several private individuals erected their own fortifications. In short time, these and other stronger posts secured the defensive “wall” that men like Armstrong had argued for to reduce enemy infiltration and to provide protection during actual attacks.8

Among the fortifications constructed by the province once the Assembly passed the supply and militia bills was Fort Granville, erected on the Juniata at the site of today’s Lewistown, Mifflin County.9 Captain George Croghan, an Irish Catholic who had conformed to the Church of England and was on his climb to becoming principal deputy to Indian Agent for the Northern District Sir William Johnson, had been ordered to construct three forts, “one back of Patterson’s, One upon Kishecoquillas, and one Near Sideling Hill.”10 Respectively, these became known as Patterson’s Fort, Fort Granville, and Fort Lyttelton. Croghan’s orders provided further that the forts were all to be built to the same design: “Fifty feet Square, with a Block-house on two of the Corners, and a Barrack within, capable of Lodging Fifty Men.”11 Evidence sug-
gests that Governor Morris later revised his plans, substituting sides measuring 83 paces and bastions at each corner instead of the original two blockhouses. The larger dimensions permitted an increase in the strength of the garrison from 50 to 75 men.12

During the early spring of 1756, Indians struck over the Alleghenies as far east as present-day Chambersburg. On 1 April they attacked and destroyed a private fortification, McCord’s Fort, situated northwest of Benjamin’s Chambers’s fortified mills. Retreating, they were pursued by militia from Lurgan township, Cumberland County. Reinforced by 19 men from Captain Hans Hamilton’s company at strategically sited Fort Lyttelton, the combined forces intercepted the warparty at Sideling Hill on 2 April.13 In a letter written two days later, however, Hamilton returned early news of the provincials’ defeat:

These are to Inform you of the Malancholy News that Occurd on the 2nd Instant. . . . our men Engaged about 2 hours, being about 36 in Number & we Should have had the better had not thirty Indians Came to their Assistance. Some of our men fir’d 24 Rounds a piece, and when their Amunition Faild were oblig’d to Fly.'14

Of even greater strategic significance than the successful attack on McCord’s Fort, a French-and-Indian war party at the end of July 1756 captured and burned Fort Granville.

Initially, the fort provided the protection intended. On 22 July, it withstood an attack by about 60 Indians.15 Unable to force entrance, the attackers turned on several nearby small farms, destroying them. On 30 July, to protect harvesters in Sherman’s Valley, Captain Edward Ward led most of his command out of the fort, leaving it in the hands of Lieutenant Edward Armstrong, brother-in-law to Lieutenant-Colonel John Armstrong. A combined force of French regulars and Indians then descended upon the under-garrisoned outpost. Although Lieutenant Armstrong and his men resisted into the next day, the attackers eventually succeeded in setting part of the log stockade afire and thereby compelled the small garrison to surrender.

In the assessment of William A. Hunter, authority on Pennsylvania’s French and Indian War forts, “the loss of this fort was a stunning blow.”16 Indeed, just how imperiled the settlers felt after its destruction may be appreciated in a missive the Reverend Mr. Barton sent to Richard Peters, the provincial secretary:

I came here this Morning, where all is Confusion. Such a Panick has seized the Hearts of People in general, since the Reduction of Fort Granville, that this County is almost relinquished, & Marsh Creek in York County is become a Frontier. . . .
I should be extremely glad to have the Pleasure of a Line or two from you. Your Advice would be of service to me at this Time, when I know not what to do, whether to quit this Place, or to remain a little longer, to see whether any thing favourable will turn out for us.  

Beyond the immediate demoralization that it precipitated, Granville’s destruction revealed the weaknesses of what later became known at the outbreak of World War II as the “Maginot mentality,” that is, of passively relying upon a line of fortifications that were “widely spaced, lightly garrisoned, and difficult to supply and to reinforce.”

Pennsylvania’s defensive line was failing to check enemy incursions along the western frontier. More widely, backsettlers from Pennsylvania to the Carolinas, reeled under the Franco-Indian attacks. As Ian K. Steele has noted recently, by the autumn of 1756, some “three thousand colonists had been killed or captured, along with the massive destruction of frontier property. . . . Pennsylvania was politically convulsed by these raids, which soon destroyed its Quaker government.” The Indian success at Granville decisively convinced the Pennsylvania backinhabitants that they needed to set aside their defensive passivity and carry musket and torch into enemy territory. In a petition sent to Governor Morris on 21 August 1756, the male residents of York County concluded with a plea that additional royal troops be sent to the frontier and that “the provincials now in pay may go against the Enemy to avenge our bleeding Cause!,” thus perhaps following the example Maryland had provided in its war against the Susquehannocks at the end of the seventeenth century and, more recently, Virginia against its Shawnee and other native populations.

As early as January 1756, the Provincial Council might have been weighing Kittanning against other possible targets such as Logstown, another well-known staging-point. At an Indian conference held in Carlisle in January, George Croghan reported that he had dispatched a friendly Indian, Delaware Jo Hickman, to

Kittanning, an Indian Delaware Town on the Ohio about forty Miles above Fort Duquesne, the Residence of Chingas and Captain Jacobs where he found one hundred and forty Men Chiefly Delawares and Shawonese, who had with them above one hundred English Prisoners big and little taken from Virginia and Pennsylvania. Identified as the residence of Shingas and Captain Jacobs, Kittanning would have been appreciated as the most appropriate objective for a punitive attack. If the provincial authorities appear to have had little doubt about where to deliver the counterstrike, we must bear in mind that few at that time had an
accurate idea of where exactly Kittanning lay, how to get there, or how long an expedition involving 300 men and their supplies would require. The geography west of the Alleghenies was largely a mystery, and although Pennsylvania's western border lay in that area, no one knew exactly where to draw the line. Extant records from just before the 1750s and on disclose increasing anxiety about determining that boundary, not only because it appeared the French had commenced building forts within the province, but also because Virginia claimed much of the Ohio River Valley for itself.

As Howard N. Eavenson has argued, Pennsylvania, unlike Virginia, needed to know if and exactly where the French had begun to fortify the disputed territories. In 1753, Pennsylvania Governor James Hamilton commissioned John Patten "to take a particular Account of the Road from Carlisle, so as to know how far Westward Shanoppin is from thence, and whether to the Northward and how much so, and how far the French Forts are from Lake Erie or from the Straits of Niagara." Shanoppin's Town was a settlement on the main trail between Kittanning and Logstown, located about two miles north of the Forks of the Ohio (on a site within today's Pittsburgh) and was already well-known to Pennsylvania's Indian traders. The map which resulted from Patten's reconnoiter has been lost, but apparently colonial and royal authorities valued it as the first map to show Pennsylvania in any detail west of the Alleghenies. Patten's information was supplemented by estimates of distance deposed during 1754 and 1755 by other travellers and traders: Conrad Weiser, John Harris, George Croghan, Hugh Crawford, Andrew Montour, and William West. The year 1755 also saw the publication of Lewis Evans's great map which indicated the location of Kittanning, although the map's grand scale would not have significantly helped the frontiersmen pinpoint the town in the trans-Allegheny wilderness. As late as 27 August 1756, Provincial Council minutes mistakenly recorded that Kittanning lay "about twenty Miles above Fort Duquesne," when, as other testimony suggested, it was more than twice that distance. Thus, on the eve of Armstrong's expedition, disagreement existed about the proximity of Kittanning to Fort Duquesne, whence relief forces could be expected. The uncertainty was to affect the ultimate success of the raid.

As was generally recognized at the time, travellers west could use one of two routes, the Raystown or the Frankstown Indian paths. Of the two, the Raystown trail was the easier. Intelligence gathered at this time assisted the province in selecting the Raystown path as the course James Burd was to follow when in the spring of 1755 he began cutting a road from Shippensburg to the Turkey Foot on the Youghiogheny, there to join the road Braddock was cutting for his northern march from Virginia to Fort Duquesne.
The Kittanning Raid of 1756

 Courtesy of the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission.

Paul Wallace's Map of the Frankstown-Kittanning Path (used by Armstrong) from Paul A. W. Wallace, Indian Paths of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, 1993.)
Possibly because it was more convenient to Shippensburg and Carlisle, and to the province's principal fortress, Augusta, guarding the Forks of the Susquehanna, however, Armstrong decided in 1756 on the Frankstown path. Participation by western Pennsylvanians, including himself, in surveying and cutting the Burd road in 1755, would have contributed to his choice. In the event, John Armstrong came to regret selecting the shorter route, for he later apparently confirmed it as "a very bad Road, abounding with Morasses and broken Hills difficult of passage." Weighted down with supplies carried on horseback and moving cautiously to avoid detection and becoming lost, Armstrong's forces required nine days to arrive within striking distance of Kittanning. (Conversely, even though burdened with wounded, and thinking they were being pursued by French and Indians, they took only four-and-a-half days to fall back upon Fort Lyttleton.)

Photo by James P. Myers, Jr.

An extant stretch of the Kittanning Path, Eckenrode Mill, Cambria County.
Although documentary evidence of the fact is lacking, the experience of Armstrong and his men with the difficulties of the Frankstown path might well have warned Forbes and Bouquet of the many obstacles and dangers of the more direct northern route, had they considered it. It is certainly suggestive that on several occasions Bouquet, when bedeviled with a dearth of knowledgeable guides, wrote appreciatively of the pathfinding and geographic expertise of one of the Kittanning expedition’s participants, Indian trader Captain Robert Callender. Additionally, the facts that Colonel James Burd of the Second Battalion had already cut a road in 1755 generally following the Raystown path and that the road had been mapped soon after the Braddock debacle must have inclined Forbes to select the southern, easier route, even though it was longer, when he determined to open a way across Pennsylvania for his attack on Fort Duquesne in 1758.

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To Pennsylvanians, killing Captain Jacobs (Tewea) proved one of the outstanding accomplishments of the expedition. So named because of his supposed resemblance to a burly German who lived near today’s Lewistown, near where he also resided early in his career, Jacobs was, with Shingas, one of the most feared Delaware war leaders from the time of Braddock’s defeat to his own death in September 1756. Among his most noteworthy exploits was the destruction of McCord’s Fort and the subsequent killing or taking of the twenty-seven settlers who had sought refuge there on 1 April 1756, and then his defeat of pursuing militia and troops the following day near or at Sideling Hill, killing some twenty of the latter. On 30 August 1756, with a party of French, he besieged and burned Fort Granville, giving credence to his boast that “he cou’d take any Fort that wou’d Catch Fire, and wou’d make Peace with the English when they had learned to make Gunpowder.” News of his death at Kittanning was particularly gratifying to the province.

That three different accounts of the killing of Captain Jacobs have survived may intimate something of the personal and ethnic/religious rivalries that were to surface later in connection with the Forbes campaign. Additionally, their respective perceptions may intimate something of the changes that were occurring in Pennsylvania’s attitude toward the Indians, with whom the province had enjoyed generally good relations until the eve of the French and Indian War. The most curious is John Armstrong’s, teasing because of what it fails to tell us, written on 14 September as soon as his battalion had regrouped at Fort Lyttleton. In order to compare it carefully with the others, it must be cited in full:
... one of the Indians in particular answered and said he was a Man and would not be a Prisoner; Upon which he was told in Indian he would be burnt. To this he answered he did not care, for he would kill four or five before he died, and had we not desisted from exposing ourselves they would have killed a great many more, they having a Number of loaded Guns by them. As the Fire began to approach & the Smoak grew thick one of the Indian Fellows to show his Manhood began to sing. A Squa in the same House & at the same Time was heard to cry & make a noise, but for so doing was severely rebuked by the Man, but by and by the Fire being too hot for them, two Indian Fellows and a Squa sprung out and made for the Corn Field, who were immediately shot down by our People, then surrounding the Houses it was thought Capt Jacob [sic] tumbled himself out at a Garret or Cock Loft Window, at which he was Shot; our Prisoners offering to be qualified to the Powder Horn and Pouch there taken off him, which they say he had lately got from a French Officer in Exchange for Lieutt Armstrong's Boots, which he carried from Fort Granville where the Lieut. was killed. The same Prisoners say they are perfectly assured of his Scalp, as no other Indians there wore their Hair in the same manner. They also say they know his Squa's Scalp by a particular Bob, and also know the Scalp [of] a Young Indian called the King's Son. 37

Significant in Armstrong's retelling is the impersonal anonymity of the two Delaware men, the one who retorts that "he was a Man and would not be a Prisoner" and the other who, while the house burns, sings "to show his Manhood" and rebukes the woman who cries out.

Writing from western York County to colleague and friend the Reverend William Smith of Philadelphia, the Reverend Thomas Barton offers a different version of Jacob's end:

I shall... observe to you, that the famous Captain Jacobs fought, & died, like a Soldier. He refus'd to surrender when the House was even on Fire over his Head; And when the Flame grew too violent for him, he rush'd out into the Body of our Men flourishing his Tomahawk, & told them he was born a Soldier, & would not die a Slave. 38

Noteworthy in Barton's little narrative is the heroism he associates with Captain Jacob's end—his refusal near the moment of death to submit to his inexorable fate, a grand, tragic defiance. No disembodied, anonymous voice crying out from within the burning cabin, no half-clownish tumbling out of a loft window as in Armstrong; rather, Jacobs "rush'd out into the Body of our Men flourishing his Tomahawk" like a Delaware Macbeth, nobly refusing to die the slave's death.

One must be careful of extrapolating too much on the basis of tonal and stylistic differences. Nonetheless, Armstrong's slightly jumbled, slightly dis-
John Armstrong's ms. draft map of Kittanning with Shingas' and Captain Jacobs' villages noted.
dainful account and Barton's rather more literary—indeed, tragic—retelling could be interpreted as reflecting proprietary—that is, essentially Anglican and Quaker, English and Anglo-Irish—and backsettlers'—that is, largely Scots-Irish and Presbyterian—attitudes towards the Indians, the former more respectful, more humane, the latter more vindictive, less tolerant. This gradual displacement of the former by the latter hastened the powerful growth in Pennsylvania of a policy insisting that the Native Americans, in Alden T. Vaughan's assessment, were "an innately inferior people . . . unworthy even to exist." It resulted in a sad "record of atrocities from the Paxton Boys' assassination . . . In late 1763 until the eve of the American Revolution."39

So far as we know, Barton did not participate in the expedition. A compulsive letter writer, he would have mentioned the fact somewhere. From whom, then, did he obtain his information? As a missionary in Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts since 1755, with congregation in Carlisle, Huntington township (then York County) and York, and a captain in the associated militia organized by Governor William Hunter Morris, he would have known men who participated. In a letter to proprietor Thomas Penn written several months later, he pointedly stresses the prominent role of one of his parishioners, Lieutenant Robert Callender, the same officer later praised by Bouquet for his knowledge of geography and Indian paths:

One Mr. Callender, who at that Time bore only a Lieutenant's Commission, distinguish'd himself by the most uncommon Bravery & Resolution. It is asserted that when Jacobs took to a House, out of which he kill'd & wounded Many of our Men—Callender undertook to fire it, which he accomplish'd at the infinite Hazard of his Life;—And that when our People precipitately retreated upon a Report prevailing that the French were to be up that Day from Fort du Quesne, Callender not content to leave the Houses standing, went back with a small Body of Men, & set Fire to them all.40

Barton identifies Callender as the principal agent in Jacob's tragic end, although he fails to note here the sachem's heroism as he had in his letter to Smith. Callender's promotion to captain soon after the Kittanning raid may indeed suggest he was rewarded for his performance. (Note how Barton also subtly draws attention to the recent promotion: "Callender, who at that Time bore only a Lieutenant's Commission . . . ").

In his 23 September 1756 letter to William Smith, Barton says not a word about Callender. Five months later, however, he singles out his Anglican parishioner for special recognition by the most powerful proprietor of the province. Why? A possible answer may be found in the circumstances surrounding the writing of Armstrong's report of 14 September. Wounded in the
shoulder during the attack, Armstrong had to dictate his account; the account’s handwriting shows that Robert Callender prepared the report. Also missing in Armstrong’s account is the identity of the man who led the men back to burn the village. These omissions, of course, lead one to ask further, why in dictating his report to the officer later identified by Barton as the outstanding actor in the killing of Captain Jacobs and in the burning of Kittanning does Armstrong not mention Callender by name?

The problem is additionally complicated by yet a third telling of Jacob’s death, one which stresses the actions of another soldier. Robert Robison, whose recollection was published well after the attack, in 1811, names John Ferguson as the soldier who fired the town after the main attack:

... he goes to a house covered with bark, and takes a slice of bark which had fire on it, he rushes up to the cover of Jacob’s [sic] house and held it there until it had burned about one yard square, then he ran, and the Indians fired at him[,] the smoke blew about his legs but the shot missed him; ... then Jacobs and those before mentioned sprung out, Jacob’s squaw wielded a tomahawk round her head before she jumped the fence, Jacobs fell first, then his wife, and then his son, in proportion seven feet high.42

Recalling events that occurred some 55 years earlier, Robison specifies John Ferguson as leader of the concerted effort to burn the village and kill Jacobs. We also need to bear in mind that the confusion of battle can make identifying certain actions and actors difficult—certainly, both Callender and Ferguson might have played important roles in the same events. What is puzzling, however, is John Armstrong’s silence—he speaks only of “sundry of the Officers and Soldiers”—especially when he indeed includes individuals’ names at other points in his narrative: Lieutenant Hogg, posted to prevent an attack by a small band of Indians encamped to the army’s rear and later killed; “one Baker, a Soldier,” who interpreted certain Delaware customs; and Captain Hugh Mercer and Ensign John Scott, involved in a rear action and later reported missing. Although Armstrong in his haste to set down the recent events might simply have omitted mentioning Callender’s possible role, his silence might also be pointedly intentional, especially since he was dictating the report to Callender himself—how could he overlook the outstanding performance of the man to whom he was dictating (granted that Callender had performed as Barton testified)? His failure to note Callender’s role here intimates a pointed slighting of his transcriber’s recent valor. Armstrong does not, of course, name Ferguson either. He well might have been selecting and stressing facts to emphasize his own prominence in the raid, including his being wounded in the action which resulted in burning the town:
I . . . Ordered the contiguous Houses to be set on Fire which was performed by sundry of the Officers and Soldiers with a great Deal of Activity, the Indians always firing whenever an object presented itself, & seldom mist of wounding or killing some of our people. From which House, in moving about to give the necessary Orders & Directions I received a Wound with a large Musket Ball in the Shoulders.  

Nine days after the date of Armstrong's account, Thomas Barton wrote the Reverend William Smith, not mentioning his parishioner Robert Callender's actions. Yet in February of the following year, he drew Thomas Penn's attention to Callender's heroism, most probably in an attempt to set straight the incomplete record circulated by Armstrong. At the same time and in the same letter, Barton pointedly minimizes the overall success of Colonel Armstrong's attack, almost trivializing the event:

But alas! I fear the approaching Spring will again make us tremble. We have a great deal to do, & but little done. Tho' killing a few Indians & burning their Huts at the Kittanning is an Action not very considerable in itself, yet it is the best that has yet appear'd for this Province.

While Pennsylvania Anglicans, concentrated in the eastern part of the province, may have shown sympathy for the Indians, the Scots-Irish did not. Although on the one hand the North-of-Ireland attitudes shared by peoples of the frontier enabled them to overcome the passivity that often characterized Pennsylvania's earlier Indian relations and attack the strong Indian settlement at Kittanning, the same, largely Ulster-rooted aggressiveness and contentiousness also pitted settler and religious denomination against one another. This ethnic/religious conflict, sadly neglected, merits further scrutiny, if only for the light it might shed on the origin of the turbulent forces which brought the radical Presbyterian party to power during the first years of the Revolutionary war. From the distance we occupy at the end of the twentieth century, we may find it difficult to credit the existence on the Pennsylvania frontier of a virulently religious factionalism. Close reading of extant documents, however, discloses that the colony's pluralistic religious climate was far from harmonious and cordial. If anything, the conflict among the Church of England, the Presbyterian, and the Quaker denominations, between Scots-Irish and Anglo-Irish/English that deeply troubled life in Philadelphia and parts of the eastern counties, was exacerbated in the backcountry where the predominately Irish settlers had transplanted their ancient religious jealousies and factionalism from the British Isles, particularly from the province of Ulster (both Armstrong and Barton were native-born Ulstermen). Notwithstanding the esteem with which the Penn proprietary regarded Armstrong in the early 1750s, moreover, suspicions of his contribution to the conflict and his suspected obstruction of pro-
proprietary policy precipitated his fall from favor. In the perception of Armstrong biographer Robert Crist, "Armstrong in the 1760s did not deliver what was expected of him." The ethnic and religious rivalries, which in part inspired Anglo-Irishman and Church-of-Englander Barton to publish in 1755 his exhortation *Unanimity and Public Spirit*, festered during the Forbes campaign, burst out of control briefly during the Paxton-Boy disturbances of 1764, and climaxed with the triumph of the radical party during the first year of the new state.

During the Forbes campaign two years later, this ethnic-religious tension reinforced other pressures resulting from personal animosities which also jeopardized the expedition's success and at times competed with problems in road building that daily perplexed the dying general, John Forbes, and his able second-in-command.

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The attack on Kittanning itself, aided by complete surprise, resulted in the burning of the town, the destroying of food and military supplies, and the killing of Captain Jacobs. Uncertainty of the distances separating him from French reinforcements from Fort Duquesne prompted Armstrong abruptly to break off the action. Compounding his anxiety, he had not sufficiently prepared to defend his rear, where he had positioned a small group of soldiers to guard the horses and provisions against, it was thought, a handful of Indians encamped nearby. In fact, a substantial force of Indians counterattacked the base-camp and drove off or killed its defenders. Other Indians hidden in the forest commenced picking off his troops. An expedition that started so well was soon very much in jeopardy. Accordingly, Armstrong precipitately ordered a retreat in which some of his men became lost, four of the English prisoners were recaptured, and substantial supplies were destroyed or abandoned. In his report, Armstrong attributed the reversal to cowardice and poor intelligence which led to faulty decisions:

Upon the whole, had our pilots understood the true Situation of the Town and the Paths leading to it so as to have posted us at a convenient place where the Disposition of the men and the duty assigned to them could have performed with greater advantage, we had, by Divine Assistance, destroyed a much greater Number of the Enemy, recovered more Prisoners, and sustained less damage than what we at present have.

If Forbes in 1758 lost valuable time in securing his rear, in obtaining intelligence of what lay ahead, and in carefully plotting his route, he might well have done so to avoid the oversights and mistakes both Braddock and
Armstrong (who commanded his army's Pennsylvania Regiment) made. In this respect, the relative failures of the Kittanning raid in the long run may have helped produce several measures needed to secure Forbes his victory.

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Not to exaggerate its military significance, the reduction of Kittanning achieved immediate, though minimal, military success: it eliminated a major staging point for raids across the Alleghenies and down into Maryland; it put an end to the career of the able Delaware leader, Captain Jacobs; it freed several prisoners and returned them to their homes in the settlements. In the assessment of Robert Crist, "from the Indian standpoint the Kittanning expedition was a fearful thrust and a clear warning of English determination and power." The attack compelled the Delawares to move their line westward, closer to the protective cover of Fort Duquesne and its dependent forts, LeBoef, Presque Isle, and Machault. However, the attacks on the Pennsylvania frontier resumed, and the state archives contain intelligence that the French and their Delaware and Shawnee allies were even massing along the West Branch of the Susquehanna for a major assault on Pennsylvania's largest frontier fort, Augusta (present Sunbury) as late as the spring of 1758. To be sure, the intelligence might have been more rumor than fact. Although the documents repeatedly record that between 500 and 1,000 French and Indians were preparing an attack and even had cut a road to within 10 miles of Augusta, scouts sent out from the fort by commandant James Burd in 1758 could never verify the rumors. Evidence nonetheless exists that the French, particularly after Kittanning, maintained pressure on Augusta by sending numerous large raiding parties, rather than a small army, into the vicinity of the Forks of the Susquehanna, thereby tying down men and supplies needed elsewhere. The Kittanning success early-on convinced the governor of New France, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, Philippe de Rigaud, that the Pennsylvanians were capable of mounting an even larger expedition against the satellite forts north of Duquesne and even against Duquesne itself. This indeed proved to be the case.

There can be little question but that the Kittanning expedition helped prepare Pennsylvania, and possibly the Crown as well, for the campaign that in 1758 secured the Forks of the Ohio for the British. Unlike the disastrous Sandy Creek expedition in Virginia, it proved that a substantial body of colonial troops—some 300—could pass through the relatively uncharted, indeed, at times almost impassable, wilderness with sufficient secrecy to surprise and destroy a military objective over 150 miles from its point of departure (Fort Shirley, today's Shireleysburg, Huntingdon County). Such an undertaking, albeit involving a relatively small force, nonetheless required considerable skill.
in planning—quantities of food, supplies, armaments, and pack-horses had to be estimated correctly and assembled. A route of attack requiring knowledgeable scouts and guides also had to be charted. And clashes of personality, and ethnic, religious rivalries had to be set aside, transcended, if only for the moment. Perhaps more than the actual military advantage obtained—in Barton's sharp words, "the killing of a few Indians & burning of their Huts"—it is in the modestly successful execution of the expedition and the way in which it suggested that Pennsylvania and other frontier colonies need not simply endure or try to beat back Indian attacks on their settlements that Armstrong's raid must be appreciated. Subsequent forays into Indian territory may even have been inspired by Kittanning.

In autumn of the same year, William Clapham, commandant of Fort Augusta, dispatched Captain John Hambright "to attack, burn and destroy, an Indian Town or Towns, with their Inhabitants, on the West Branch of Susquehanna, to which Monsieur [Andrew] Montour will conduct you." Arriving at Great or Big island (near today's Jersey Shore), Hambright's expedition, however, found the town deserted and returned to Augusta "without finding any Enemy."

The Native American settlements near or at Great Island were a favorite staging point for attacks down the West Branch toward Fort Augusta which commanded the Forks of the Susquehanna. During Bouquet's 1763/64 campaign against Pontiac, John Armstrong tried to replicate Kittanning by leading 300-600 men on another expedition to Great Island in order, in the words of William Plumsted, "to destroy every thing they meet with." Once more, however, the Indians fled, so that the Pennsylvanians had to be content only with destroying great quantities of grain and provisions.

The occasional policy of mounting punitive expeditions against Indian settlements continued with Virginia Governor Lord Dunmore's 1774 invasion of the Ohio valley to "chastize" the Shawnees and with Major General John Sullivan's famed 1779 campaign to punish the Iroquois Confederacy for its active support of the British during the Revolution. Armstrong's Kittanning raid, Dunmore's expedition, and Sullivan's campaign all more or less succeeded in their immediate ends—that is, to retaliate on various Indian tribes for their attacks on the frontier settlements and to raise backcountry morale. Their long-term effects, however, remain moot: Dunmore's successes were offset, as it were, by driving the Indians into alliance with the British at the outbreak of the Revolutionary War. Similarly, although Sullivan destroyed great amounts of produce and burned numerous towns and fields, the Iroquois simply withdrew into territory secured by British military power. This was a pattern established by Armstrong's raid, for in 1756 the Delawares retreated to the protective circle of Fort Duquesne and its satellite posts across the Allegheny River but continued, even appeared to intensify, their frontier attacks. This ulti-
mate, if not immediate, failure that attended retaliatory expeditions against Indian towns may help explain why the Crown was consistently reluctant to participate in costly punitive attacks of the kind typified by Armstrong's and Dunmore's: in the perception of General Frederick Haldiman, "all the settlers on the frontier were not worth what a campaign against the Indians would cost." Not until the French had been defeated and Pontiac unleashed a new kind of concerted, strategically conceived warfare upon the frontier was the Crown willing to reply to the Indian menace somewhat in kind.
Notes

2. Surprisingly, apart from John Armstrong's report (for which see below), contemporary references to Kittanning are few and usually superficial. One potentially rich source, the Burd and Shippen papers, actually offers little because both James Burd and Joseph Shippen were with the Third Battalion of the Pennsylvania Regiment finishing the fortifications of Fort Augusta. James Burd's brief notice to his father in Scotland is typical; see James Burd to his father (transcript), 28 December 1756, the Shippen-Burd Papers, E. S. Thompson Collection, MS Group 125, Box 1, no. 4498, in the Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, Pa. The Burd and Shippen papers located in other archives have to date yielded nothing useful. Former governor Robert Hunter Morris wrote at least two letters on the subject, one of which offers a balanced assessment of the expedition: "Notwithstanding our Coss[t] upon this occasion I think the Expedition will be of great use to the Public as it will Raise the spirits of the People and Serve to Remove that Dread and Panick which has seized the generality of the People" (Robert Hunter Morris to ?, September 1756, Gratz Mss, Case 15, Box 18, Historical Society of Pennsylvania [cited hereafter as HSP]). The other letter congratulates Armstrong (September 1756, *ibid.*). The *Pennsylvania Gazette* (23 September 1756) also offers an account.

20th-century commentators generally pass over the expedition perfunctorily. Although invaluable for background on the conflict within the Ohio valley, Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republicans in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge, 1991), does not refer to Kittanning; and Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America* (New York, 1988) cites the raid as one instance of "counter-terror" resorted to by the English colonies after the French and Indians began their concerted "attacks on the backwoods homesteads" (p. 200). Lawrence H. Gipson, however, stresses that although it was "one act of heroism on the part of the Pennsylvania volunteers [which] lifted the gloom in the summer of 1756," the attack was soon overshadowed by the great French victory at Oswego, as well as other numerous though smaller successes (*The Great War for Empire: the Victorious Years, 1758-1760* [New York, 1949], p. 53. Similarly, the booklet *War for Empire in Western Pennsylvania* (published by the Fort Ligonier Association, n. p., 1993) comments on "the long-term futility of this punitive expedition . . . [for] by 1757 French-Indian raiding had destroyed hundreds of dwellings as far east as the valley of the Susquehanna River" (p. 41). Stephen F. Auth, *The Ten Years' War: Indian-White Relations in Pennsylvania, 1755-1765* (New York, 1989), also offers a negative evaluation: "evidence suggests that Armstrong's raid . . . only served to strengthen Indian morale" (p. 37). Far more positively, Michael N. McConnell, *A Country Between: the Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724-1774* (Lincoln, Nebraska, 1992), feels that "the Pennsylvanians' success, which included killing their Delaware nemesis Captain Jacobs, stunned the Indians. The Kittanning raid had a lasting effect on the Delawares" (p. 126). Robert G. Crist, "John Armstrong: Proprietors' Man," Ph. D. dissertation, Penn State University, 1981, pp. 58-77, offers a balanced assessment within the context of Armstrong's career. The best published discussion remains William A. Hunter, "Victory at Kittanning," *Pennsylvania History*, 23 (1956), 376-407 (cited hereafter as *PH*).


5. For an account of the taking of Fort
10. *Pennsylvania Archives*, First Series, 2:536 (cited hereafter as *PA*).
11. Ibid.
13. For a recent discussion of this action, see Hayes R. Eschenmann, *An Account of the Battle of Sideling Hill, April 2, 1776* (Shippensburg, Pa., 1997).
14. Hans Hamilton to [?], 4 April 1756, *PA*, First Series, 2:536-42; reprinted in *PA*, First Series, 2:611-12, where it is misdated as 9 April 1756.
16. Ibid., p. 391.
20. Colonel John Stanwix commanded a detachment of the 60th Regiment of Foot (the Royal Americans) at Carlisle.
22. Though a dismal failure, Virginia’s attempt to destroy the Indian settlement at Sand Creek may be taken as a precedent for Kittanning. (See note for a discussion of Sandy Creek.)
23. Petition of the Inhabitants of the Town and County of York, Minutes, Provincial Council, Executive Correspondence, 23 January 1756 (microfilm Record Group 21, Roll B6).
25. Instructions of James Hamilton to John Patten [December 1753], *CR*, 5:707.
27. Eavenson, p. 164.
30. Two manuscript maps of the trans-Susquehanna region in the Map Division of the Library of Congress and the Draper Collection, usually dated about the time of the Forbes expedition and in the same style and handwriting, illustrate identical details. The Draper Map carries the penciled-in identification “Armstrong’s map west of Susquehanna.” Consequently, this map, and its look-alike in the Library of Congress, have been attributed to either John or George Armstrong. Still a third may be found in the British Public Record Office. (CO 700). Although often dated about 1758, the maps' shared delineation of Burd's “New Road” (built in 1755) and their common failure to indicate the important supply base Fort Loudon (constructed in 1756) suggest a date closer to the Braddock expedition of July 1755. James P. Myers, Jr., in “Bewitched by Maps: A Caveat,” *PH*, 65 (1998), 203-13; and “Mapping Pennsylvania’s Western Frontier in 1756,” *PMHB*, 123 (1999), 3-29, discusses the provenance of these maps.
38. Thomas Barton to William Smith, 23 September 1756, *Historical Collections Relating to the American Colonial Church*, vol. 2: Pennsylvania...
Armstrong's diction and style unmistakable surprising frequency, this writer detects in dence and the occasional proprietary suspicion tation is John Armstrong's official correspon- diting this general subject.

45. should be considered essential to appreci-

Indians: The Paxton Boys' Legacy," pp. 82-

Vaughn's chapter "Frontier Banditti and the

39. Crist, "John Armstrong," p. 183. Crist traces his "fall from favor" (p. 193), pp. 161-

79; Robert Brunhouse, "The Counter-Revolution in Pennsylvania, 1776-1790 Harrisburg,


40. Thomas Barton to Thomas Penn, 28 Feb-

uary 1757, Penn Manuscripts, Official Cor-

respondence, 8:239, HSP.


43. P4, First Series, 14 September 1756, 2:769.

44. Thomas Barton to Thomas Penn, 28 Feb-

uary 1757, Penn Ms., Official Correspondence, 8:239, HSP.

45. Crist, "John Armstrong," p. 183. Crist traces his "fall from favor" (p. 193), pp. 161-92, focusing on the Paxton Boys' disturbances (1764), the Black Boys' "rebellion" (1766), and the escape of Frederick Stump and John Ironcutter, who having been arrested for the massacre of ten peaceful Indians in 1767, were rescued by a mob while Armstrong was eating breakfast nearby.

carriage of this Expedition, for nothing now but a miracle can bring this campaign to a happy issue. See... how our time has been misspent—behold the golden opportunity lost... How is it to be accounted for? Can... F——s have Orders for this? Impossible: Will then our Injur'd Country pass by such abuses? I hope not. Rather let a full representation of the matter go to His Majesty. Let him know how grossly his <Honr> and the Publick money has been prostituted. I wish I was sent immediately home.... I think without vanity I could set the Conduct of this Expedition in its true colours, having taken some pains, perhaps more than any other to dive to the bottom of it" (The Papers of George Washington, Colonial Series [Charlottesville, 1988], 5:342-3).

48. PA, First Series, 14 September 1756, 2:772.
49. The mistakes made by Braddock were not, of course, lost on Forbes.
51. For Vaudreuil's perceptions, see his letters of 8 August 1756, 12 July 1757, 13 July 1757, 13 February 1758, 10 June 1758, 28 July 1758, and 28 July 1758, The Wilderness Chronicles of Northwestern Pennsylvania, ed. Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent (Harrisburg, 1941), pp. 93-115. For evidence of the Pennsylvanian response to rumors of a large French expedition against Fort Augusta, see Intelligence of Ogaghradaishah Given at Shamokin, 11th October, 1756, CR, 7:281; Edward Shippen to William Denny, 15 October 1756, ibid., p. 294; Council Minutes, 21 March 1757, ibid., p. 453; Minutes, Meeting at John Harris's, 2 April 1757, ibid., p. 512; John Stanwix to William Denny, 14/15 June 1757, ibid., p. 603; Journal of James Patterson, 5 December 1757, PA, First Series, 3:331-2; and Journal of James Burd, PA, Second Series, 1757, 2:770-800, passim.

During the early 1970s, Robert R. Lyman investigated and mapped traces of a road dating from the 1750s, the so-called "Boon Road," in Potter county which he hypothesized the French had cut in preparation for an attack down the West Branch of the Susquehanna; see Robert R. Lyman, Forbidden Land (Coudersport, Pa., 1971), pp. 21-23, and Amazing Indeed (Coudersport, Pa., 1973), pp. 11-14. Lyman's investigations of this road trace need further scrutiny.

56. Frederick Haldiman to Thomas Gage, 12 June 1774, paraphrased in White, The Middle Ground, p. 362. (Although of a rather different order, Bouquet's 1763/4 expedition against the Ohio Indians during Pontiac's War would be a notable exception to the pattern.)