John Murrin once asked me what I saw as the implications of my work on Pennsylvania politics in the 1780s for our understanding of national politics in the 1790s. This paper, a long-delayed and highly speculative answer, argues that:

1. In the 1780s the Federalists in Pennsylvania learned how to govern a culturally heterogeneous and democratic polity.
2. The ratification of the Constitution in 1788 created a new polity that resembled Pennsylvania. The new United States combined into a single political unit a number of quite different, and often suspicious and sometimes hostile, political cultures.
3. The Washington and Adams administrations failed to the degree that they ignored the lessons learned a decade earlier by their fellow Federalists in Pennsylvania. Indeed, the national Federalists in the 1790s sinned in much the same way that Pennsylvania's Antifederalist had sinned in the 1780s, and with much the same result. Both lost because they equated one particular people with the whole American people, and thus spoke for and to a narrow constituency while alienating all others.

I. Pennsylvania, an Interpretation

In the last half of the 1780s Federalists in Pennsylvania invented American democratic politics and thereby consistently defeated their Antifederalists opponents in popular elections. In 1786 they gained a small majority of the seats in the all-powerful, annually elected unicameral legislature. In 1787 they won a two-thirds majority in the state convention called to consider the proposed United States Constitution. In 1788 they crushed their opponents, and in 1789 dominated the state constitutional convention.

Assumptions about the class basis or bias of Federalists might lead one to see these triumphs as somehow less than popular victories: possibly tainted by hurried elections, constraints on the franchise, or exclusive control of vehicles of communication. None of those, however, was the case.

Federalists themselves had worked to expand the franchise and had effectively increased the total electorate by at least half again. Voter turnout in the late 1780s exceeded the levels of the previous decade by some 200 to 300 percent. The opponents of the Federalists had ample, possibly superior, communication and mobilization vehicles. In short, in Pennsylvania in the late
1780s the Federalists consistently won the free and enthusiastic support of the overwhelming majority of the largest and possibly the most active and the most democratic electorate in the new nation.\(^4\)

They achieved this level of popular support by saying and doing largely what their opponents said and did, plus more. Look first at some of the common elements.

Both Federalists and their opponents recognized and responded to popular demands for support of economic opportunity. Not all constituencies wanted the same thing, however, and these differences heightened popular distrust of government. Tariffs helped some but they hurt others; roads here meant no roads there; the credit needs of capitalist merchants clashed with the credit needs of capitalist farmers; merchants wanted to tax land; farmers, commerce.\(^5\)

Both sides also agreed that the national economy demanded a stronger central government. Federalists, however, said again and again that the United States Constitution neither could nor should annihilate the state.\(^6\) Thus Federalists and Antifederalists recognized that most people distrusted government in general and central authority in particular. They also both understood that people expected government to place few demands on them. Nowhere is this more evident than in popular attitudes towards taxation.

Pennsylvania had long been a volatile polity and its elected officials and its political culture tolerated an extraordinary level of violence, especially against public officials. In the city and in the countryside, both before and after the Revolution, popular outbursts were endemic and largely unpunished.

For instance, in October, 1779, as Professor John Alexander has shown, a crowd exchanged gunfire with men barricaded in James Wilson's Philadelphia home. Although men died, no one was punished.\(^7\)

In the same vein, during the fall of 1787 Federalist mobs in the city repeatedly coerced and intimidated elected officials. On September 29 they broke into an Antifederalist boarding house and dragged two legislators through the streets. Six weeks later, on election night, mobs surrounded Antifederalist residences, yelled, fired guns in the air, stoned buildings, broke windows, and smashed in doors. No one was punished in either case.\(^8\)

On the statewide level, we see a parallel pattern of relatively risk-free popular violence. The Paxton men who in 1763 butchered Native American women and children escaped scot-free. The court eventually released unpunished the men arrested for riot in Carlisle in the winter of 1787-88. In the same vein, Professor Thomas Slaughter's study of Lancaster County between 1729 and 1800 found that even incomplete records indicate a riot there, on average, once every 21 months. In more than half of the cases, no one was punished. Participants in most of the rest paid little more than nominal fines.\(^9\)

This pattern of unpunished, popular violence virtually precluded the timely and efficient collection of taxes. Resultantly, by the late 1780s Pennsyl-
Pennsylvania had a staggering level of unpaid back taxes, possibly the highest in the new nation. The state imposed a yearly tax burden of about £200,000 but seldom collected half of that amount. Back taxes by 1786-87 amounted to well over £600,000 and thereafter probably increased by another £100,000 per year. Comptroller John Nicholson said that it was “dangerous to entrust constables with so many warrants [for collecting taxes] ... [and that the] cost for issuing and serving [these warrants] ... amounts to as much as the tax.” Collecting these taxes all at once would have threatened the property of thousands of freemen. Both Federalists and Antifederalists knew better than to try.10

On a different level, Federalists and Antifederalists had both mastered the technique of democratic electoral politics. They nominated electoral tickets, staged mass popular meetings, manufactured popular endorsements, printed reams of campaign literature, and turned out their supporters on election day. Once in power, each party rewarded the faithful with patronage, and voted with near military precision for partisan and party-building measures.11

Both Federalists and Antifederalists also learned to speak the democratic idiom. Historians have often noted that Antifederalists attacked the proposed United States Constitution as aristocratic. They similarly attacked its supporters as aspiring aristocrats, the self-anointed “better sort.” But scholars have less often noted that Federalists vehemently denied these charges and defended the document as essentially democratic.

Antifederalists gloried in the autonomous individual, liberated from established churches, from the social elite, and from political deference. They demanded respect, opportunity, and autonomy for the morally responsible citizen who cared for himself and met his obligations.12

Federalists agreed, but they carried this argument to extremes in their denial of the elitist or aristocratic implications of the Constitution. They defended it on the grounds of popular sovereignty, majority rule, local autonomy, and limited government. They rejected social distinctions, political privilege and deference to authority. They praised the people. They rested their case on popular sovereignty. They insisted that no higher authority or pre-existing power could restrain or restrict the authority of the sovereign people. They defended the right of all adult male taxpayers to vote. They insisted that the minority must bow to the will of the majority. They castigated those who resisted the will of the people. They explicitly rejected deference, political privilege and distinctions based on wealth and education.13

Some men on each side may have believed this rhetoric, others not. This is irrelevant. The point is that both sides understood and responded to the political reality: Pennsylvanians recognized only one order of men—freemen. And, as one Antifederalist author, “Z”, declared: “A particular advantage of a freeman is that no man is his superior.”14
Although both parties professed to love the people, each defined the people differently. Pennsylvania was a plural polity: a single political unit composed of a number of distinct and self-conscious cultural groups, most of whom did not like each other, and many of whom had reason to fear each other.

Antifederalists had been unwilling, or unable, to accept and deal with this diversity. They had resisted social and cultural pluralism, remained uncomfortable with political ambiguity, regarded political opposition as unprincipled, and defined citizenship in normative terms. They thought of the political community as a unified corporate entity composed of one people which expressed its one will with one voice. That mind-set made them comfortable with the state constitution of 1776 that assumed a single people expressing its political will through an annually elected, all powerful, unicameral legislature.

Such a view of the people as a single corporate body precludes legitimate opposition, views political criticism as seditious, and excludes dissenters from the sacred category of “peoplehood.” Opponents become enemies of the people: they stand outside the community, beyond its protections and excluded from its rights and privileges.

The political behavior of Pennsylvania’s Antifederalists between 1776 and 1789 was consistent with this mind-set. During the Revolutionary War, they punished neutrals and pacifists and attacked the Anglican-led College of Philadelphia. After the war, they perpetuated wartime loyalty oaths and resisted the integration of former dissidents into the political community. Then, in the debates over ratification of the United States Constitution, they defined themselves in opposition to the “other”: dissenters in opposition to Anglicans; Trinitarians in opposition to Deists; Christians as opposed to Jews, Turks, and heathens; and Patriots in opposition to Loyalists, neutrals and trimmers.

Federalists, in sharp contrast, recognized the plurality of Pennsylvania and worked with it. In these endeavors, they revealed that they were more tolerant, more flexible, and more pragmatic; more willing to live with ambiguity and more comfortable with Pennsylvania’s cultural diversity; more acceptant of dissent; and more forgiving of opposition.

During the War for Independence, Federalists had resisted the harsh imposition of loyalty oaths, provided legal counsel to those accused of treason, opposed bills of attainder, and fought against replacing the Anglican-led College of Philadelphia with the Presbyterian-dominated University of Pennsylvania. After the war they pressed for easy integration of dissenters and defined the political community inclusively. This Federalist inclination to recognize and work with Pennsylvania’s diversity was also consistent with their support of a divided government whose complex internal checks would retard the ability of transient and intolerant majorities to impose their will on dissident minorities.
In the late 1780s increasingly large majorities of the voters knowingly, deliberately, and enthusiastically supported Federalists because Federalists had learned how to give these people what they wanted. A decade or more of experimentation with direct and simple democracy had demonstrated to most of the peoples of Pennsylvania that in a diverse, populist polity divided by deep cultural hostilities, no minority was safe and no majority was secure. Autonomy, both personal and group, in a heterogeneous, democratic polity demanded a complex and fractured government that would frustrate the passionate determination of the pure of heart to impose uniformity on all.

The Federalists had won because their personal dispositions and their constitutional principles resonated well with this powerful reality. In time, some of the more politically astute Antifederalists followed suit.21

II: The National Federalists in the 1790s: A Speculation

The ratification of the Constitution in 1788 created a national polity that resembled Pennsylvania in its cultural diversity. Like Pennsylvania, the United States of America combined in one political unit a variety of different, often suspicious, and sometimes hostile cultural groups: most conspicuously, Yankees, Virginians, and Pennsylvanians.22

In the 1780s the Federalists in Pennsylvania had learned how to govern a culturally plural democratic polity. In the 1790s the Washington and Adams wrestled with this same task.

The men in charge of the national government brought with them strong remnants of the particular political cultures within which they had been socialized: the relatively homogeneous and deferential polities of Virginia and New England.23 However, the United States of America was something new: a culturally diverse polity with few commonly recognized natural leaders [beyond Washington himself]. Dealing with this new reality demanded new skills and understandings that the national Federalists struggled to learn.

Looked at in this light, a number of controversies of the Washington-Adams years can be seen as clashes of different sub-cultures, each of which accepted the validity of popular self-government but each of which differed in its expectations about who should govern and to what end.24

Take, for example, Washington's formal levée and Adams's obsession with titles, both relatively minor questions, but of some symbolic significance. Washington, perplexed about how to combine the republican virtues of *simplicitas* and *dignitas*, consulted widely and then settled on holding one formal levée each week. Adams, anxious about popular respect for the highest elected officials in the new nation, pressed for formal titles to enhance popular veneration. Contemporaries, especially Senator William Maclay, at the time a Federalist from Pennsylvania it might be noted, ridiculed what they saw as efforts to restore the trappings of monarchy in America.25
But, seeing America in the 1790s as a culturally diverse polity suggests a different way to understand these initiatives. Both Washington and Adams came from regions in which the natural leaders governed with the consent, often the affirmation, of their peers: freemen who knew and respected them. How else elicit compliance from free people?

But, if the citizens of this new nation would admire, respect and defer only to those men who exemplified the distinctive norms of their own regional culture, how then to unite them, voluntarily, under one leader? Washington personally empowered the office of the Presidency, but few of his anticipated successors, including Adams, could hope to match that.

Formal levées and formal titles might help by adding external symbols to the office, and thus enhance its holder. Such symbols might confer upon incumbents the trans-regional respect they would need but could not be expected to bring to the office. Seem in this context, then, titles and levées take on a different hue. They represent not efforts to create a monarchy or an aristocracy, but rather a means to provide the President with what governors of freemen needed: the respect, and therefore the deference, of the men they hoped to govern.

The popular outcry against these symbols of respect and authority came principally from Pennsylvania. Those who voiced these concerns were neither more democratic nor less aristocratic. They simply came from a regional political culture whose plurality of peoples had precluded the emergence of commonly recognized natural leaders whom most freemen respected.

One could make much the same argument about the Sedition Act of the Adams administration. In the world that had socialized John Adams, freemen saw themselves as parts of a whole, a community. They expected that men with demonstrated ability would promote the community’s economic and moral health in times of peace and protect it in times of peril. Those who verbally abused the community’s natural leaders, therefore, threatened the community by reducing the effectiveness of those in office and by discouraging talented people from assuming public responsibility.

In sharp contrast, Pennsylvania’s pluralism rendered the very concept of sedition irrelevant. Its political culture tolerated, if it did not encourage, fierce competition for office and vicious personal attacks on the intelligence, the integrity, the competence, the motives, and the morals of public officials. Diversity produced a variety of particular goods but no common good. Plurality generated a number of natural leaders, but each earned recognition and respect only within his particular group. Political contests pitted natural leaders of such groups against each other in a competition to advance particular goods at the expense of others.

America’s diversity also scuttled Alexander Hamilton’s effort to advance the common good of the new nation through a comprehensive national eco-
onomic policy. New Englanders defined the common good in one way, Virginians in another, while the people of Pennsylvania had long since lost hope of finding any common good. The bulk of the policy disputes of the early 1790s thus reflect America's diversity; its plurality of cultures and interests; its fractured and divided nature.

The complexities of governing a plural polity can also be seen in the Whiskey Rebellion and Fries' Rebellion. First, in a broad sense, it is no accident that both occurred in Pennsylvania and that both represented popular violence in opposition to internal, domestic taxes. Violence against public officials, and especially against tax collectors, constituted the warp and woof of Pennsylvania's political culture. Nor is it an accident that national political leaders from east of the Hudson River and south of the Mason-Dixon Line precipitated these confrontations. These men brought to the task of governing attitudes quite different from those of the men who had successfully governed Pennsylvania.

Both of these insurrections also reflect cultural conflict on a more immediate and personal level. Look first at the role of John Neville in the Whiskey Rebellion. Thomas Slaughter has argued that "Without this one man . . . the timing and the very nature of the confrontation in western Pennsylvania would have been different." Slaughter also tells us that "Neville's experiences, his wealth, and his opinions were unlike those of his fellow western countrymen." Neville was born into the Virginia gentry, had a brilliant military career, and then erected the first large slave-based estate in western Pennsylvania. "He was brave, principled, and stubborn. He believed himself superior in judgment and capacity to those around him, and he was unyielding in his dedication to fulfilling his responsibilities as patriarch of Bower Hill and as regional inspector of the excise. Whether dealing with his slaves, his tenants, or other inferiors who came within his purview, Neville confidently insisted on pursuing his own lights."\(^{27}\)

In brief, Neville was a member of the Virginia gentry who thought and acted like a member of the Virginia gentry. Unfortunately for many, he acted this way in Pennsylvania where such attitudes and behavior produced not respect and deference but ridicule and resistance. The spark that ignited the violence and death in western Pennsylvania came when the flint of Virginian gentry culture struck the steel of Pennsylvania political culture.

Or take Fries' Rebellion.\(^{28}\) Why did Fries' Rebellion occur in northeastern Pennsylvania? The tax fell on all property holders in the state and most Pennsylvanians shared strong anti-tax sentiments, as well as a proclivity for violence, especially against tax collectors. Why, then, did violence erupt only in one relatively limited area? At least part of the answer may lie in the cultural clashes between the tax collectors and the taxpayers in this region.
The Adams administration, with an almost criminal disregard for the sensibilities of its many supporters in northeastern Pennsylvania, appointed tax collectors from two of the most hated and despised groups in the region: the Quakers and the Mennonites. Both had resisted the Revolution; both had sat out the war; both were thought to have profited from their Loyalism; and both had earned the enmity of their Revolutionary neighbors. Adams appointed Tories to collect the taxes of Patriots. That decision precipitated Fries Rebellion, as well as significant erosion of Federalist electoral support in northeastern Pennsylvania. It also contributed significantly to the defeat of statewide Federalists candidates in 1799.29

In summary, disputes over levées and titles, sedition acts, and national economic policy, as well as the violence of the Whiskey and the Fries' Rebellion reflected conflicts between the contrasting political cultures that made up the new nation. Each regional sub-culture praised republicanism. None advocated monarchy or even an aristocracy of birth. And in each of them a large proportion of adult, white males voted. But, within each of them, voters brought to the political arena a different set of expectations about the kinds of natural leaders they would accept and the tasks they expected their natural leaders to undertake. Successful leaders from New England and successful leaders from the Chesapeake brought their own regional expectations with them to the national arena. There, they tended to act as if the new United States of America indeed, one homogeneous community with a single common good that its natural leaders should pursue. In this, they imitated the Antifederalists of Pennsylvania with equally disappointing, if not disastrous, results.

Ironically, these national Federalists ignored the model developed by Pennsylvania's own Federalists who had discovered how to govern a culturally diverse polity composed of large numbers of different groups, suspicious and often hostile toward each other. Pennsylvania's Federalists had combined democratic rhetoric with grassroots political organization, patronage rewards, and disciplined legislative voting, while quietly advancing the interests of key constituents, providing maximum support and opportunity for individual economic success, and minimizing government demands, especially taxes. They had invented, or possibly discovered, or even stumbled upon, what it took to succeed in a culturally diverse, populist democracy.

How about Jefferson? It would be tempting, but probably not accurate, to say that Jefferson won in 1800 because he, in contrast to Adams, had learned the lessons taught by Pennsylvania's Federalists. What does seem probable, however, is that once in office, the Jefferson administration did, indeed, practice what the Pennsylvania Federalists had learned some fifteen years before. By 1806, the Jeffersonians had effectively extended their political support far beyond their original regional base. They had become our first, truly national party, reducing their Federalist opponents to angry and frustrated impotence.
Notes
1. I presented an earlier version of this paper at the annual meeting of SHEAR, Transylvania University, Lexington, Kentucky, in July 1999. I wish to thank Joseph Tiedemann, Robert Jones, and Emory Evans for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and John Murrin for asking the question that led to it.
2. Two of my colleagues have chided me for neglecting New York: Joseph Tiedemann, History Department, Loyola University and the author of Reluctant Revolutionaries: New York City and the Road to Independence: 1763-1776 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997) and Robert F. Jones, History Department, Fordham University. Both suggest that Pennsylvania's Federalists may not have been the first or the only political leaders in Revolutionary America to succeed at the art of democratic politics in a culturally diverse polity. I concede that the invention of democratic politics in the plural polity of Pennsylvania in the 1780s does not preclude its independent invention elsewhere. We may, indeed, have had multiple inventions occurring more or less simultaneously. Alan Tully's study of the Quaker government in pre-Revolutionary Pennsylvania also suggests an earlier version of what I have described as the Federalists' mode of operation in Pennsylvania in the 1780s. See Alan Tully, William Penn's Legacy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977).
4. Ireland, Religion, Ethnicity and Politics, 217-253. Foster, "Politics of Ideology," Pennsylvania History 59 (1992): 122-44. Turnout increased in Bucks County from an average of 500 in 1779-83 to more than 1700 in 1789, more than a 300 percent increase. In Chester, it grew from about 1300 in 1779 to over 4,000 in 1789, more than a 300 percent increase. Turnout more than doubled in Philadelphia, Montgomery and probably Lancaster counties in the same period. For demands by future Federalists for extension of the suffrage on democratic grounds, see Ireland, Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics, 226-27, 231, 238-251.
5. For resistance to the extension of the vote by future Antifederalists, see ibid., 225-26. For more details on turnout as well as attitudes toward dissenters, neutrals and Loyalists on the part of future Federalists and Antifederalists in Bucks County, see Ireland, "Bucks County," in John B. Frantz and William Pencak, eds., Beyond Philadelphia: The American Revolution in the Pennsylvania Hinterland (University Park, Pa.: Penn State Press, 1998), 23-45.
6. Transportation and credit infrastructure, tariff protection, debt relief, and funding of government debt. See Ireland, "Crux," especially 456-57. For an extended discussion of the complex and conflicting demands for government support, see Ireland, Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics, 155-77.
8. Ireland, Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics, 24-26, 72-73.
11. For examples of Federalist tactics, see Ireland, Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics, 53-56. For examples of party voting on partisan and
party-building issues see Ireland, "Crux," 456-57. As an example of party discipline in popular elections, in the statewide congressional elections (November 1788) Federalists George Clymer and Thomas FitzSimons each polled 8166 votes, while Antifederalists William Findley and Charles Pettit polled 6532 and 6638 respectively. Ireland, Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics, 213.


13. Ireland, Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics, 18-19, 21, 23, 27, 33, 49-50, 59-62, 175, 256, 266, 267, 281. Federalist Benjamin Rush claimed that "the adoption of the [new federal] government [is] agreeable to the will of Heaven, for VOX POPULI-VOX DEI," Ireland, Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics, 105. James Wilson built his defense of federalism [the division of powers between the states and the central government] on the assumption that the sovereign people could delegate authority to whomever they wished, giving some powers to one government and some to others. Ireland, Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics, 94. Not all Federalists spoke this democratic idiom. Those who did not, however, increasingly spoke only to themselves. Hugh Henry Brackenridge, with his Princeton education, his literary pretensions, and his eastern connections, was sure that he was superior to the people of western Pennsylvania and that he was a better man than William Findley to serve in the state legislature. Possibly, Brackenridge was correct. But the people he disdained elected the man he despised and Brackenridge spent much of the rest of his literary career ridiculing the man who had defeated him. Brackenridge served only one term in the legislature. Possibly, Brackenridge was correct. But the people he disdained elected the man he despised and Brackenridge spent much of the rest of his literary career ridiculing the man who had defeated him. Brackenridge served only one term in the legislature. John Antoski, "Hugh Henry Brackenridge," paper prepared for a graduate research seminar, SUNY College at Brockport. See also Daniel Marder, Hugh Henry Brackenridge (Westport, Connecticut: Twayne, 1967); and Hugh Henry Brackenridge, Modern Chivalry, (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, Newlin edition, 1962.) In the same vein, Joseph Foster has also shown us that as late as 1790, some Federalists in Pennsylvania spoke in terms of deference and superiority and did so in public. But successful Federalists knew better. Joseph Foster, "The Politics of Ideology," 122-44.


16. Ibid., 102, 118-25, 128, 267-68, 273. Thomas Slaughter has also noted the simultaneous commitment of some men to individual autonomy and to group conformity; the combination of "An obsessive love for personal liberty and rabid intolerance for cultural, racial, and ideational difference." See his The Whiskey Rebellion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 63.


19. Ireland, "Crux," especially 455-57. These Federalists' attitudes may have derived in part from their religious backgrounds. Many leading Federalists had been denominationally mobile in the past while others were more secular in tone and posture. Many also came from religious denominations that practiced de facto or principled toleration. Practical considerations had also pressed these Anglican-led Federalists to adapt a more open and tolerant stance. They began their political life as a small and harried minority. Their growth and ultimately their success depended upon their ability to build bridges to other groups within Pennsylvania's heterogeneous polity.


21. William Findley and John Smilie, both leading Antifederalists and supporters of the Pennsylvania's unicameral legislature, abandoned that stand in December 1788. See Ireland, Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics, 87. Both men also survived the Antifederalist debacle of the late 1780s and early 1790s.

22. For a recent exploration of the cultural differences between New England and Virginia in the early nineteenth century see Richard Lyman Bushman, "A Poet, A Planter, and A Nation of Farmers," Journal of the Early Re-
public 19 (Spring 1999): 1-14. Bushman focuses on the differences in values, attitudes, assumptions and fears expressed by Timothy Dwight of Connecticut and John Taylor of Caroline County, Virginia in 1805. To the degree that President Dwight of Yale reflected the fundamental cultural values of elite New England spokesmen, and John Taylor those of tidewater planters, an almost unbridgeable gulf separated the cultures of these two major regions of the new nation. 

23. Jack P. Greene argues persuasively that by the middle of the eighteenth century in both New England and in the Chesapeake, "coherent, effective, acknowledged and authoritative political elites with considerable social and economic power" had emerged. In each case the economic and social success of these men "testified to their merit and capacity and gave them a legitimate claim to political leadership". In each area a relatively large and inclusive electorate "exhibited a passive and uncoerced deference toward the governing elite." My argument here is that the cultural diversity of the new nation precluded the emergence in the 1790s of a national elite whose obvious success "testified to their merit and capacity" to govern, and thus "legitimated their claim to political leadership" of the nation. Without this widespread popular recognition of worth, the national electorate refused to give their "uncoerced deference." Washington alone may have commanded wide-spread respect beyond his home area. See Jack P. Greene, Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988) 198-99. 

24. Christopher Grasso's new study of Connecticut confirms Greene's conclusions about the deferential nature of New England's political culture. It also illustrates Bushman's point about the distinctive nature of New England's deferential culture, a culture in which the "Standing order of Godly magistrates and learned ministers" leads God's people. Grasso argues that the "Standing Order" changed in the late eighteenth century as a new elite, defined in more secular terms (lawyers, Revolutionary writers and learned men of Enlightenment ideas) used the proliferating vehicles of print communication to challenge the domination of ministers and magistrates. More to the point here, however, is the persistence of the old in the face of the new as "the public's deference to the speaking aristocracy proved to be an 'insurmountable barrier'" to the new men. See Christopher Grasso, A Speaking Aristocracy: Transforming Public Discourse in Eighteenth Century Connecticut (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the OIAHC, 1999), 1, 14. Election returns confirm Grasso's conclusion. The godly people of the Connecticut River valley supported Federalist candidates for the Presidency every four years from 1796 through 1816. See Charles O. Paulin, Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States (Washington D.C. and New York: The Carnegie Institution of Washington and the American Geographical Society of New York, 1932), Plate 102.


26. See David Hacket Fischer, Paul Revere's Ride (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994) passim, for a description of this shared sense of community, both horizontally among contemporaries, and vertically with predecessors and posterity.

27. Slaughter, Whiskey Rebellion, 151-54.


29. For details of religious-based conflicts in Bucks County during the Revolution, see Ireland, "Bucks County," in Frantz and Pencak, Beyond Philadelphia, 23-45.