In July 1862, during the second summer of the war, a lone recruiting officer made his way to the scattered settlements of northern Jefferson County in search of fresh volunteers. The situation was a marked contrast to the previous year, when recruiting was brisk. Though not hopeless, the war dragged on without sign of immediate northern victory, sapping northern morale. The urgency of his patriotic enlistment appeals met with a chilly response. The Brookville paper reported that in one community his speeches "failed to arouse the patriotism of the young men, until a number of young ladies, ashamed to witness the tardy response of the former... stepped forward and signified their willingness to enlist, if the gentlemen were afraid to go, and put their names on the enlistment papers." Despite this emasculating peer pressure, only six young men volunteered. The editor of the Brookville Republican used this as an object lesson. "We wonder what plan could be get to work to induce enlistments in Brookville, where there are enough young men to form half a company, and who
have no reason why they should not at once respond.” What did it mean that at least fifty of the town’s young men were still civilians a year after the conflict had begun? In mid-1862, a number of Pennsylvania newspapers editors and public leaders bemoaned the sorry state of patriotism. After traveling along the West Branch through Lock Haven, Jersey Shore, and Williamsport, one observer remarked, “the apathy of the people seems somewhat strange when we compare it with the intense excitement which prevailed in every community during the war fever of last spring and summer.”

How do we characterize such a visible “war fever” if it dissipated so quickly? Standard narratives of the war's opening months emphasize an intense outburst of patriotism. These portrayals are based on contemporary accounts and the selective memory of local commemorations. After the attack on Fort Sumter, voices of doubt were lost in the reporting of exuberant public celebration. Induced by military pageantry and emotion-stirring speeches, local men volunteered by the score in defense of the Union. Years after the last guns fell silent, local histories memorialized community sacrifice in a clichéd narrative of collective patriotism. Many of these accounts reached the melodramatic heights of one such example.

When, in 1861, the iron lips of Moultrie's guns spelled upon our sky in letters red as blood, 'civil war,' the sons of Clearfield, breathing a spirit of patriotism as pure as the atmosphere of the hills around them, rushed to the Nation's capital to uphold the honor of the flag, and preserve intact the republic.

In the postwar period, local citizens collected donations and placed monuments in towns throughout the North to honor those who had served and died. Their commemorations reflected a view of the communal past as they wanted it to be remembered. Gone from this public narrative were the stories of violent opposition, of the murder of military officials, and of communities bitterly divided over their support of the war.

This sacred and formulaic text obscured the profound ambivalence felt by many Pennsylvanians during this period of enthusiasm. Beneath an exterior marked by military pageantry and visible patriotism lurked the potential for hesitancy, doubt, and despair over the meaning and cost of war. Despite the thousands of enlistments during the first year, the historical record suggests that there was not a universal rush to the colors. As members of a democratic society, Americans have always reacted ambivalently to conflict and war, and
the Civil War was no exception. In Pennsylvania, the *rage militaire* touched off by the onset of war encouraged some young men to join the cause. While patriotic motivations drew them into the armies, others remained aloof or cautious. Patriotic ardor evaporated quickly as expectations for an easy victory disappeared and the public cost of war mounted.

From the war’s outset in April 1861 through early March 1862, more than 130,000 Pennsylvanians left their homes as soldiers. These initial volunteers made up more than a third of the 344,408 enlistments from the state that contributed the second highest number of soldiers to the Union army. The volunteers of 1861 and 1862 were in many ways the most crucial northern soldiers of the war. According to James M. McPherson, soldiers forced into the army by later drafts and bounties lacked the ideological conviction and martial fortitude of their predecessors. Early recruits did more fighting and their letters and diaries suggest a strong sense of duty and republican principles. Nevertheless, nearly two-thirds of Pennsylvania’s wartime volunteers hesitated to join the ranks. According to the 1860 census, the state held over 555,000 men of military age, yet only one in four volunteered during the first year. More importantly, throughout the war nearly 40 percent of the state’s military age population chose not to serve.

Why did so many men remain aloof in the opening months of the war? No simple answer adequately addresses the motivations of such a large and disparate group. Pennsylvanians weighed a complex spectrum of social, economic, and political factors that varied by location. Conflict created an economic depression that made many urban wage workers temporarily unemployed. In the countryside, however, farm labor was needed to plant and harvest crops during the summer and fall. Many farmers also had practical concerns for the welfare of home folks when breadwinners joined the army. Throughout the state, editorials encouraged farmers to plant extra food, urging it as a patriotic alternative to military service. The ranks of initial volunteers swelled for a time with skilled tradesmen but fewer farmers. Despite Lincoln’s appeal for volunteers in a war to preserve the Union, political views gave many Democrats pause. The editorials of Democratic newspapers blamed Republican abolitionism for causing the war and expressed serious misgivings about coercing southern states back into the fold. In votes by Pennsylvania soldiers in 1861, Republicans outnumbered their political opponents nearly four to one, suggesting a serious political imbalance in the army. Volunteer enthusiasm was also sapped by more mundane causes. Military authorities placated the democratic heritage of citizen-soldiers by allowing them to elect their
lower ranking officers. The passion for command fostered competition and rumors of mistreatment. Magnifying these imagined concerns for a soldier's welfare were very really short-comings caused by an ineffective mobilization system. State and federal authorities were unable to adequately feed, clothe, and equip such a large-scale volunteer force. Reports of hungry and ill-clothed soldiers dampened eagerness on the home front. The impact of other forces cannot be measured, including the shock of Union defeat at Bull Run. These ambivalent responses at the war's beginning illuminate more pronounced rifts in public opinion that developed over time. The enormity of the war effort only intensified the economic, political, and social pressures on residents of the state. Voices that remained silent in the early months of war were raised in opposition by the summer of 1862.

War Fever in the Keystone State

After the outbreak of war in April 1861, the sound of martial pageantry reverberated across the state. In the sparsely populated mountains of McKean County, the editor of the Smethport newspaper described the mood of the town's several hundred citizens. "The usual quiet of our village has been somewhat broken, and for two weeks we have been surrounded by the excitement incident to the recruiting and mustering [of] military companies into the country's service." In a pattern repeated throughout the state, enthusiastic Union meetings raised seventy recruits from five surrounding townships of McKean County. These first soldiers from the county swore their loyalty oath, ate a hearty breakfast, and suffered one final round of speeches before departing eagerly for the "seat of war." "You are of a people who love the pursuits of peaceful and quiet life. Why have you now donned the habiliments of war, and prepared yourselves to make your fellow countrymen bite the dust? The flag of our country has been assailed." The one-hundred and twenty men of the Washington Cadets left the town of Clearfield with a full stomach, carrying their hand-sewn flag and bibles given by the local bible society. Similar poignant scenes played out in other counties of the state. Public meals, hand-made flags, ceremonial speeches, and token reminders of home reflected the intimate bonds between soldiers and their community. National affairs impelled their service but soldiers ultimately represented their neighborhoods, marching, fighting, and dying surrounded by the folks from home.
Newspaper accounts of war fever highlighted the most visible patriotism and obscured the invisible narrative of doubt and hesitancy. These early reports accentuated the experience of town-dwellers, whose responses occurred under the watchful gaze of urban journalists. Events from the countryside filtered into newspapers as second-hand retellings of the rural response. In Pennsylvania's towns, more than in the countryside, citizens could be seen putting aside their regular lives in a frenzy of militarism. Regardless of location, public military pageantry seemed to read from the same script. The national colors blossomed in abundance from buildings and public spaces. Local notables ascended festooned stages to deliver fiery patriotic speeches. Young men took on the garments and accoutrement of soldiers and filled the air with the sounds of marching and military music. Ladies did not blush in their support but played prominent roles in the theater of patriotism. They sewed uniforms, blankets and flags, cooked meals for departing soldiers, and took active part in public ceremonies where they represented virtue and feminine ideals. Though innocent of war's harsh reality, many citizens responded enthusiastically with a conspicuous patriotism.

Organizational Chaos

In an odd way, the beginning of the Civil War was cathartic of sectional tensions that had been building for years. While sober-minded citizens composed jeremiads predicting death and destruction, others felt a constructive release from the dread of the secession crisis. When Confederate forces opened fire on Fort Sumter in April 1861, months of tension gave way to an outpouring of patriotic enthusiasm. With the Confederate banner flying atop Sumter, Union President Abraham Lincoln sent out the urgent call for 75,000 militiamen to suppress the rebellion. In cities throughout the North, citizens staged clamorous Union meetings in an orgy of filial piety to the nation.

For the many who did not embrace military service, the causes varied. An organizational chaos in the system of mobilization discouraged untold numbers. Many expressed universal concerns about the welfare of soldiers in arms while other factors were more acute in rural regions. Residents there were affected more by the distance from state training camps and rural isolation. These geographic conditions magnified the distinctions between the local community and outsiders.
The flood of Pennsylvania volunteers taxed state resources to the breaking point, raising alarm over the treatment of soldiers. The Republican newspaper of Clearfield lamented the shoddy condition of state uniforms and equipment. "It appears that much dissatisfaction exists at the miserable way in which the Pennsylvania troops have been supplied with clothing and food under the State authorities... In truth, it is said that the Pennsylvania troops are the most miserably clad, of all volunteers called into the service." Despite the best intentions of government leaders, newspapers were justly concerned about the shortcomings of money, material, and experience. State officials hurriedly established initial rendezvous points for incoming soldiers at Harrisburg, Pittsburgh, and Philadelphia. The War Department set Pennsylvania's quota at less than fifteen thousand, but nearly twenty-one thousand volunteers responded in the first ten days. Feeding, clothing, and housing this huge mass of untrained soldiers was a nightmare of administration and shortages of food, uniforms, and blankets prompted outrage throughout the state. The mood in camp became despondent, particularly for those men wondering whether the governor would accept their service under the current quota. Some soldiers deserted their initial companies to join more promising outfits or to return home. An anonymous member of the Washington Cadets reported to hometown papers that several men of the company had deserted their camp of instruction in early June. The stalwart remnant shook it off, asserting, "Fortunately those who left us were the least worthy members of the company, and we are well rid of them."

Infrequency of pay added to the misery of the state's three-month volunteers, sparking a near riot at the capital in late July. Having received no wages, thousands of three-month volunteers arrived penniless in Harrisburg at the expiration of their enlistment term. The War Department quickly mustered them out of service without first paying their wages. Denied the means of returning home and lacking food and shelter, the men slept anywhere they could find space and waited for federal paymasters to arrive. Days passed before the first troops started receiving money, and the process went slowly. The weather was uncharacteristically hot and many soldiers resorted to stealing to eat. On July 27, a crowd of soldiers gathered at Market Square and set fire to an effigy labeled "paymaster" strung up on a lamppost. They intended to seize weapons from the armory before a regiment from Camp Curtin arrived to quell the disturbance. Curtin wired Secretary of War Simon Cameron frantically: "The paymasters are threatened with violence,
and the people in the town much alarmed.... Something must be done. We have not force to protect the town and property here." Tensions subsided as the men began receiving back pay. One Democratic editor considered the incident disastrous to public patriotism. "This failure on the part of the government to pay and dismiss the three months volunteers will seriously affect the prompt re-enlistment of the men." 

For the potential recruits in more isolated rural areas, poor transportation and the distances to training camps magnified anxiety over the treatment of soldiers. As one commentator remarked, "Much fear exists in the minds of the recruits of falling into the hands of persons who are unable to provide for them." Rumors circulated that the government mistreated soldiers at the large camps. Articles reported that schemers and sharps preyed upon the uncertainties of these men, inducing or tricking many to desert their units and join other companies. Communities were concerned for the physical welfare of their loved ones and eagerly read soldier letters describing conditions in camp. Entering into a regiment of strangers seemed perilous and isolating. In an effort to exert more control over these recruitment shortcomings, community leaders from throughout the state wrote to government authorities requesting that training camps be placed nearby. Joshua Howell of Uniontown, Fayette County, argued, "If you only had your camp fixed soon at Uniontown ... I have no doubt we could get enough men in this county to make three companies." 

Patterns of settlement had a unique impact on enlistment, discouraging men from the countryside from joining companies with strangers. In thinly populated areas, small neighborhoods often lacked enough men to fill an entire company of one hundred. Though drawn by patriotic motives to volunteer, many men hesitated to join up with outsiders. When a recruiter visited St. Marys, Elk County, in August 1861, he reported "all sorts of obstacles and opposition." He was exasperated to find "most of the young men in the county formed into small companies, just large enough to keep them from going—and it seems that no offer or arrangement could induce the officers to come to such terms as would effect a union and send one full company." Two men swore an oath that they had been bribed $5 each "if they would not go to the rendezvous" after enlistment. Faults in the system caused a native of Clarion County to grieve: "The result must and will be disheartening and dispiriting to the patriotic uprising of our hardy population, for all future military purposes." An Armstrong County man described the state of recruiting there: "Every hamlet and neighborhood contains [a company] of
20 to 30 men who will not join an unaccepted company because they naturally prefer their own.”

Rural isolation also prevented thousands of volunteers from being accepted for service in three-month regiments. In the first ten days of mobilization hysteria, hastily formed companies raced to rendezvous points hoping to claim the honor of being the first to respond. Newspapers paid homage to the eager young men who flocked to the colors, and postwar histories memorialized them as the state's “First Defenders.” Proximity to the central rendezvous points at Harrisburg, Philadelphia, and Pittsburgh played a key role in the initial rush to enlist. State authorities accepted soldiers as quickly as they arrived, and communities along the state's railroad network had a clear advantage. Counties astride the Pennsylvania Railroad, as well as those on the branch lines into the northeastern coalfields, had a higher proportion of men accepted in the initial quota of three-month volunteers. Although news of Sumter and Lincoln's call for troops traveled quickly throughout the state, distance delayed volunteers from reaching muster-in points.

Ultimately, it was easier for urban areas and counties with denser populations to coordinate volunteers, creating a bias in enlistments. After leaders filled the initial state quota, volunteer companies from throughout Pennsylvania continued to arrive at camps of instruction. Curtin implored the legislature to enlist these additional soldiers at state expense as defenders of the Commonwealth. In mid-May, the state assembly authorized the formation of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps, composed of thirteen infantry regiments, as well as one of artillery and one of cavalry. When the federal government made requests for more troops to serve longer three-year terms, Curtin proudly offered the Pennsylvania Reserves. Although soldiers of the Reserve Corps originated more broadly throughout the state, small counties like Forest, Sullivan, Porter, and Fulton were not represented and lagged behind in contribution.

In fairness to Pennsylvania military officials, the state militia system was in shambles and ill prepared to fill the state quota effectively. Before the incident at Charleston, Curtin had urged the state legislature to revitalize the militia. He argued that during its long peacetime tenure it had “become wholly inefficient.” Shortcomings in men and serviceable equipment plagued its chaotic administration. He implored legislators to update state weaponry, create a military bureau, and revise militia laws in preparation for the impending national emergency. In quick response, state authorities fashioned an ad hoc system of mobilization, solving some problems but creating others.
In the spectrum of factors limiting mobilization, imperfect administration hindered volunteerism. State and federal government ineptitude likely dampened early war enthusiasm. A historian of Pennsylvania mobilization asserted that men were plentiful and war sentiment high, thus "it must be concluded that the Federal government let the enthusiasm of the northern states wither away." It is doubtful, however, that officials caught in the emergencies of war could have remedied the faults in the system. Direct control by the federal government was both unprecedented and unfeasible. Curtin faced the challenge of placating the entire population of the state. Citizens from every corner beleaguered his office with requests for military commissions or access to the state's paltry military equipment. Many complained of unfairness and appealed to his sense of equanimity while a number of Republican colleagues asked frankly for special consideration.

The Heritage of Democracy: Elected Leadership and Volunteer Competition

Civil War historians have praised the political engagement of northern volunteers while overlooking the problematic consequences. To the dismay of professional Union officers, the North's citizen-soldiers never abandoned their democratic traditions to embrace military discipline. These men were not able to disengage soldiering from politics, and volunteering was a clear political statement in support of the war. On the one hand, it is well argued that deeply held political ideologies about republican government motivated men to enlist and sustained them through the conflict. But as others have noted, the decision to avoid enlistment or to desert the armed forces could also be a political action rooted in deep-seated ideology. Choices of service not only reflected a soldier's view toward the cause but also about its leadership and administration. Citizens held ideals of leadership and demonstrated their concerns for good officers by vigorously defending their right to elect them. At the beginning of the war, military authorities accommodated democratic tradition by allowing the men to elect their own leaders. Military discipline was alien to these democratic-minded citizens and tensions arose when their traditions of civic autonomy clashed with military order. In a thought-provoking essay, David Donald mused that the Confederacy "Died of Democracy." He wrote: "The real weakness of the Confederacy was that the Southern people insisted upon retaining their democratic liberties in
wartime." While many have taken issue with his statement, scholars have not stressed enough that a heritage of democracy challenged the northern war effort as well. The election of officers influenced decisions to enlist and created an unsavory competition for rank with negative ramifications.

The War Department sparked dissatisfaction when it proposed guidelines for elected officers. On May 3, Lincoln issued a proclamation calling for over 42,000 three-year volunteers, marking the inception of the first three-year troops. In a circular letter to northern governors dated May 22, Secretary Cameron reminded them of their right to appoint all regimental officers but counseled "the necessity of an absolute adherence in your appointments to the following suggestions." In an effort to promote "sound health," lieutenants could not be older than twenty-two and captains could not be older than thirty years old. He further required that all regimental field officers, namely majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels, be West Point educated "or known to possess military knowledge and experience." The War Department guidelines interfered with the tradition of electing officers. Those older than the prescribed age asked: "Are we to understand from said order that companies raised are not to have the privilege of electing their own officers.... It may make a vast difference with the result of our efforts if we are not to have the privilege of indicating our own officers to take the command." 

Soldiers considered the election of officers as a sacred extension of their democratic society and felt justified to leave the service when denied that right. In late June, two companies from Pittsburgh deserted their camp of instruction after their chosen officers were passed over. The companies had gone to New York State to enlist and complained of the poor care they received. "Our troubles began on the Pennsylvania Road, when Captain B. failed to furnish us with the provisions as he had promised. On arriving at the Camp, we were fed on bread and drugged coffee. We received no clothing. The climax was topped by our officers being superceded, whereupon we resolved to leave the Camp, when the General drew his pistols, put on a treble guard, and threatened to shoot the man that would offer to go, without first refunding his passage money." 

The tradition of electing officers created intense competition for soldiers, adding an unsavory layer to the process of volunteerism. Recruiters were motivated men for whom patriotism and personal ambition served complementary roles. A man who could gather others to the cause might be rewarded with a captaincy or better. The wise potential leader used paternalism to cement bonds with his men. Officers with financial means sometimes spent
their own money to feed and clothe their soldiers until accepted into service. On arrival in Harrisburg, the Raftsmen’s Guard of Warren County praised the generosity of their Captain Roy Stone, the son of a successful lumberman. After Stone arranged a breakfast of hot coffee, sandwiches and cakes, a private wrote back to the Warren newspaper, “Long may he wave; and may his shadow never grow less.”31 The Washington Cadets paid tribute to their leader in a letter to the hometown newspapers. “All that we have yet received has been through the kindness of our Captain and the citizens of your town.”32

Predictably, the frenzy for leadership also created opportunities for corruption and deceit. For a brief period, competition was intensified when both state and federal officials authorized recruiters to raise troops in Pennsylvania. On July 25, Congress called for 500,000 three-year volunteers, counting among them 75,000 more Pennsylvanians. Simon Cameron, the federal secretary of war from Pennsylvania, authorized regular army officers to commence recruiting directly into federal service. These federally recruited units were designated “independent regiments,” autonomous of state control. Cameron’s federal recruiters enticed volunteers with guarantees of acceptance and all the necessary equipment and arms. They counseled listeners that soldiers waiting in the state camps lacked proper food, clothing, and equipment and lived in unhealthy quarters. By August, Cameron appointed regiments outnumbered Pennsylvania regiments two to one.

Alarmed by the state of recruiting, Curtin implored President Lincoln to intercede. Recent acts of the state legislature made it unlawful for volunteers to leave the state without the governor’s consent. Curtin reported that in the twenty-six days since the congressional call, Pennsylvania had not raised one complete regiment, only fragmented companies. He complained that federal mustering officers were refusing to muster in anything less than a complete regiment, making the independent regiments more attractive. The War Department’s authorization of at least fifty-eight individuals resulted in “nothing but continued embarrassment and confusion.”33 Cameron defended his actions on the belief that “the State had already enrolled the number of men which the Governor had been called upon to furnish.” Simmering beneath the surface of this exchange was a long-standing political rivalry between the two. Both men were leaders of Republican factions within the state and the tension between them reflected their opposing ambitions. Cameron conceded on this occasion and resolved the issue by a special order from the War Department, placing all independent recruiters under authority of the Pennsylvania governor. State authorities were instructed to confirm the
existing War Department commissions after the men had filed their muster roles with Pennsylvania officials. Cameron did not designate any more Pennsylvania officers, nor would he remove those he had already authorized.\textsuperscript{34}

State leaders received numerous complaints illustrating the deceit employed by some army recruiters. Officers commissioned by the War Department were guaranteed their rank, denying enlisted men the right to elect their captain. An officer from Perry County wrote that the practice "is intended to brake down the military spirit if it should go on [and] for this reason the men say they want something to say in reference to who shall command them." Enterprising men scoured the state in search of recruits, sometimes employing underhanded tactics, such as lying about the men's chances of being accepted or by disparaging state handling of troops. Some did not consider it unethical to entice men to leave a unit to join their own. A man from Wilkes Barre, Luzerne County, claimed that "there is too many officers or (would be's) in this county and it is difficult to keep the men from being stolen." In Clarion County, a man told the governor that officers in independent regiments cheated him twice by stealing away his men. The recruiters had argued that "men going out under the patronage of the state administration were and would be so meanly fed, clothed and armed that they would be a disgrace in the army."\textsuperscript{35} These reports likely dampened enlistment fervor in immeasurable ways.

The Economic Considerations of Volunteering

Despite the intensity of war fever, many residents of Pennsylvania thought deeply about the economic consequences of military service. Unmarried men without business prospects were prominent in the first wave of volunteers.\textsuperscript{36} For some men, masculine duties to family and country pulled them in opposing directions. Those who supported families imagined the results of their absence and often gave priority to the needs of loved ones. Men who felt obligated to serve their country sought other means to express their patriotism. In many parts of the state, married men joined unofficial home guard units as an alternative to serving at the front. Fearing the loss of agricultural labor, newspaper editorials also encouraged farmers to stay home and produce food as a vital act of patriotism. Still other men weighed military service in light of their immediate economic prospects. The opening of hostilities interrupted Pennsylvania's normal trade and manufacture for a time, leaving many skilled workers and wage laborers without steady work. Facing a dim
economy, these men enlisted in greater numbers than farmers and farm laborers, who were vital for summer planting and harvesting.

In poorer communities, residents held extra concern over the welfare of family and friends. The Republican newspaper of Clearfield carried a letter from several local soldiers detailing the plight of their loved ones. A number of the men were alarmed by rumors of uncharitable treatment. “We are all poor men,” wrote a local soldier, “and our families depended upon our labor for their support. We thought we could trust those who made these promises [to help our wives and children]... Since then, in every letter received, our wives complain of ill treatment... When in need of anything, they say they are told to pay money or do without it.”

Four soldiers from a small community feared that their homes would be seized and sold to pay store debts. In their letter to the newspaper, they appealed to communal civic virtue against the store owner, who became a colonel in the army. “We had enlisted in the service of our country, and intended to pay all our just debts as soon as we could command the means. But without waiting to give us an opportunity of arranging them, he meanly sued us after we had been sworn into the service, and we suppose if he can get judgments against us in our absence, he will be mean enough to sell any little property we have left behind.”

To overcome these financial concerns, one earnest man suggested that the government give him a lump sum of $1000 to encourage volunteers on the spot at $10 apiece. He counseled the state: “we have plenty of men I say plenty of good reliable men but why have tha not gon becaus tha cant leave their famleys just as comfortale as tha wish.”

At this early stage of the war, not everyone gauged patriotism solely by enlistment. Men with family obligations could show their love of country in alternate ways. The abundance of laborers who volunteered caused many northerners to worry about the upcoming harvest. Many farmers postponed enlistment and newspapers contributed to their hesitancy. Editors counseled agriculturalists to view growing food as an act of patriotism, in which everyone contributed their own effort to the war. Fearing that the loss of farm workers would cause a shortage of foodstuffs and subsequent high prices, the editor of the Brookville Republican urged his readers: “Let every man plant and sow every available acre of ground within his reach.” Such labor, he counseled, was both patriotic and profitable.

The Democratic newspaper in Clearfield considered the hesitancy of farmers a widespread but temporary condition. “The country papers say that after harvest volunteers will flock to the various regiments now forming in all parts of the Northern States by thousands. At present most of the young men are engaged in gathering the crops.”
The economic trauma of war affected urban wage workers differently than farm laborers. With the eruption of secession, the uncertainty of national economic affairs created a temporary depression that hit wage earners hardest. Large numbers of coal miners, iron workers, and day laborers of all sorts were unemployed. In the lumber region of northern Pennsylvania, the market for timber was ruined in the spring of 1861, leaving hundreds of lumbermen without work. In early June, a correspondent from Blair County urged the governor to accept a company of these Clearfield rafters with sound reasoning. "Accepting of them, would save our agricultural districts, upon which I fear too large drafts have been already made. These men are out of employment, owing to the want of a market for lumber, because of the condition of the country." The economic downturn affected urban workers most. Writing in late May from Brownsville, Fayette County, a man argued, "It is quite a mistake, to take, or enlist men from the rural districts, while there are so many good Mechanics totally out of employment; for the farming interests are not suffering."

The occupations of early volunteers reveal a predominance of men with uncertain economic prospects. Phillip Shaw Paludan implied a parallel response between city and countryside, asserting that "the rural North echoed the patriotic enthusiasm that resounded after Sumter." Yet while even meager pay attracted unemployed wage workers, laborers from rural areas were needed on the home front. An examination of 10 percent of Pennsylvania's three-month soldiers supports this pattern. Among the earliest recruits, farmers and farm laborers were under-represented while skilled and unskilled workers were more numerous.

Farmers and farm laborers comprised nearly forty-three percent of the northern male population, but accounted for only slightly more than seven percent of the enlisted men of this sample. Over time, farmers embraced the cause in a proportion roughly equal to their numbers but their initial hesitancy reflected at least three factors. May and June were critical months in the agricultural year requiring maximum labor. Units enlisted after the harvest show a higher proportion of volunteer farmers. Poor communication and scattered settlement also made it more difficult to organize recruiting in the countryside. Unless they lived reasonably close to town, farmers often missed the patriotic parades, flag waving, and oratories that influenced town dwellers to join the army. Lastly, newspaper editorials made it plain that raising food was its own form of patriotism, made crucial by the large number of laboring volunteers.
In contrast to agriculturalists, wage laborers enlisted in large numbers. Unskilled workers joined at a rate more than three percent greater than their proportion of the population. The most striking category was skilled workers, who constituted a quarter of northern male workers but amounted to sixty percent of the Pennsylvania sample. Some of the earliest regiments accepted by the state included coal miners from the anthracite region of northeastern Pennsylvania. Among the ten most common occupations were miners, carpenters, blacksmiths, shoemakers, painters, lumbermen, tailors, clerks, printers and puddlers. For these primarily urban skilled-workers, the immediate bleak economic surroundings accommodated their idea of a short and glorious war.

Home Guards and Pennsylvania as a Border State

Because Pennsylvania bordered the slave states of Virginia (before West Virginia became a state) and Maryland, men of the Keystone State could fulfill patriotic duties by joining local militias known as home guards. While these units were more common in the southern border counties, they appeared as far north as Pittsburgh and the lumbering counties. As Michael C. C. Adams has described, many northerners were convinced that the South had long been making military preparations and held well-trained legions of soldiers poised to strike northward. The independent home guards offered a solution to the military safety of the Pennsylvania home front. Although these companies patterned themselves on those in federal service, the organization and equipment of guardsmen varied by location. Along the border, citizens might coordinate individual companies through committees of safety. Allegheny County created an impressive array of committees to administer soldier relief, military mobilization, and guardsmen. The Committee on Home Defense was a model of coordination. It solicited contributions from area businesses, banks, and residents, employed agents to procure arms and uniforms, maintained rolls of area companies, and petitioned the state for legislative and financial assistance. The smaller communities of the state could not match the efficiency of Pittsburghers but attempted to mobilize and equip men for their own protection.

Evidence suggests that certain types of individuals were considered more properly suited to home guard companies than to active service. The cheaply maintained home guards allowed men to express patriotism while looking after their families and livelihoods. Community moral opinion did not
discriminate at first against older men, men with families to support, or certain skilled workers who chose not to enlist. Men older than the military limit of forty-five yet still physically able, for instance, joined home guards. Pittsburgh newspapers reported home guard companies composed of firemen and foundry workers, and others whose occupations seemed more vital to civic maintenance or wartime production. Extremes of wealth or poverty were also factors of membership in home guards. Men of wealth often considered their service best measured in financial contributions and visible patriotism. Concerns for family were paramount among married men yet the tug of masculine duty urged them to serve. While the young men of Clearfield joined up for active soldiering in May 1861, married men formed the Rolins Infantry “intended for home service for the time being.” A local man described the home guards of Allegheny County in April.

Although Allegheny County has responded nobly to the call for Volunteers, yet there are many men who are placed in positions that it is impossible for them to unite with the troops who are now flocking to the support of our flag. These men are all married and have families and are poor and of course can not leave them yet they do not wish to be idle. We are near the line of Virginia — There is the Allegheny Arsenal here and other government stores that need protection. And these men want to start a ‘Home Guard’ to be equipped and drill, so that if necessary they can repel any attempt at an invasion.

In statements taken from newspapers, home guard service was not initially looked upon as less patriotic than service in a field regiment. Newspapers reported occurrences that might have presented opportunity for criticism but did not. Home guard units often took prominent places in civic rituals honoring volunteer soldiers and escorting them to points of departure. When Pennsylvania’s three-month men returned after their enlistments were up, home guards in formations of respect often met them at the train stations.

Ethnic versus National Identity

Pennsylvania was home to large numbers of foreign-born residents, among whom ethnic identity complicated the issue of patriotism by nurturing competing loyalties. Outsiders often stereotyped ethnic communities, such as
the Catholic Germans of St. Marys or the Anabaptist German sects of Lancaster, as clannish and self-absorbed. Many longer-settled northerners wondered if they would contribute their fair share in the fighting, and early reports were typically pessimistic. In truth, ethnic identity imperfectly predicted wartime responses. Records indicate that men of foreign birth, notably Germans and Irish, made up a sizeable portion of the Union army. Members of the German community at St. Marys, for example, served as both officers and enlisted men in Pennsylvania regiments. Nevertheless, German names made up a small portion of the three companies attributed in whole or part to Elk County. The county's first company became part of the famed “bucktails,” but only a dozen of them were German. There were even fewer Germans in company F of the 58th regiment, raised in the fall of 1861. The only Elk County company that had more German names was in the 172d Regiment, a nine-month militia company drafted in August 1862. It was telling that nearly as many of the county's Germans appeared in a drafted unit as in all the three-year volunteer regiments combined.

Scholars of nationalism have explored how ethnic identity can be a powerful bond of commonality among a people, differentiating them from outsiders. National movements have been built on the power of ethnic solidarity, often in the face of oppression or alienation. From the founding of the American state, however, white male citizenship was not differentiated by ethnic background or religion but by adherence to forms and ideals of government. Sense of ethnic identity did not insure a weak attachment to the American nation or opposition to the Union war effort. The number of volunteer companies composed, in large part, by men of Irish, German, and other descent, offer proof.

Nevertheless, some communities felt alienated from the Union cause for reasons of ethnic attachment or religion. Pennsylvania was well-known for its population of conscientious objectors, including German pietists and Quakers, who looked upon all warfare as morally wrong. Many German settlements had reinforcing social and cultural features that made them stand apart from other rural Pennsylvanians. They could be distinguished not only by ethnicity and religion but through persistence of German culture and language. Outsiders negatively stereotyped them as “the Dutch,” further reinforcing their sense of uniqueness. The peculiarities of Pennsylvania German settlements received critical attention during the Gettysburg campaign, when observers from both North and South described them as unwelcoming or aloof. As federal officials would discover during the war, the ethnic
communities of Pennsylvania presented a challenge to mobilization. After the federal government took control of recruitment, citizens of St. Marys were notorious for their opposition to the officer in charge.

**The Waning of War Fever**

War fever dissipated quickly as the conflict entered its second year, revealing undercurrents of opposition that grew stronger over time. A number of contemporary observers lamented the decline of visible patriotism. Voices of protest arose as early as the fall elections of 1861, when some Democrats took bold steps to condemn the Lincoln administration and the war. With waning enthusiasm, like-minded community members had more freedom to express antiwar opinion. Community sentiment could alternately fuel or quench the fires of patriotism. In time, friends and family who opposed the war actively supported evasion of service or desertion from the army.

Such resistance was not a rejection of the American nation and its ideals, but a reflex of localism. Members of rural communities were accustomed to controlling their own social and civic affairs and resented the intrusion of outsiders. The sparse communities in the mountains of Pennsylvania were even more insulated from distant authorities and tended toward vigilantism in maintaining social order. Recent decades had proven to mountain residents that state officials were more interested in exploiting the timber wealth of their region regardless of the cost to local people. Their localism and sense of economic marginalization reinforced wartime patterns of opposition.

Given traditions of rural localism, it is no wonder that some soldiers' families expressed dissent before the three month enlistments had expired. Historians have often ignored how vulnerable family members exerted pressure upon some soldiers to avoid re-enlistment or to desert the army altogether. In a letter to his brother in the army, one Pennsylvanian pleaded, "we are glad that your time is so near out that you can come home and pap says you must not minde what any one says. You must not [enlist any longer you must come home." A wife sent a similarly plaintive letter to her husband. "I hear that your regiment has gon[e and re-enlisted] for three years but hope you have not done the same.... Mother sens her love to you and says to come home as soon as your time is up." These were only a couple of more than one-hundred letters intercepted by General George Cadwalader, on the grounds that they were demoralizing to his troops. Historian Edward G. Longacre
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considered them to be symptoms of eroding enthusiasm which "did not survive their three-months enlistment." 56

As the cost of the war escalated, dissatisfied family members made more forceful appeals asking soldiers to desert the cause. After the initial wave of enlistments, the War Department requested volunteers to serve arduous three-year terms. The period of sacrifice lengthened considerably. It is impossible to estimate the amount of discouraging mail from home or its effectiveness. In the spring of 1863, gloomy letters from home were reaching epidemic proportions in some regiments. The morale of northerners had shifted dramatically because of battlefield losses and the policies of emancipation and conscription. While the army lay immobile in Virginia, the commander of a Pennsylvania regiment received an anonymous letter warning him to an alarming situation. Friends and families back home were helping soldiers to desert by supplying them with civilian clothes through the mail. He ordered subordinates to search the mails and in a single day they discovered two packages of civilian clothes accompanied by letters from relatives encouraging desertion. His superior officer wrote to the Corps commander, "The lieutenant-colonel of the One hundred and thirty-second Pennsylvania is of opinion that many men are assisted in this matter through the Government mails, and I deem it of such importance as to request a reference where the evil can be corrected." 57 In future, all parcels from home were required to show an invoice of their contents, with orders to intercept contraband clothing. While only representing a portion of one regiment, this incident was indicative of a larger narrative of war opposition.

Conclusion

Generations of historians have often described the opening months of the Civil War as a period of tremendous patriotic outpouring throughout the North. Contemporary accounts suggest that in this moment of innocence war fever swept like wild fire through communities large and small. Civic rituals of patriotism took on a formulaic shape, expressing a genuine affection for the American nation. It seemed as if everyone played a role in the theater of patriotism. Community pillars led the way in acts of charity, exhorting friends and neighbors to support the war. Women fulfilled their position of civic virtue through patriotic toil. Young men put aside the routines of daily life to take up arms in defense of the nation. When the guns fell silent, communities
honored the sacrifice of their heroes and ingrained an image of loyalty in the public memory.

Despite the seductiveness of this narrative of universal patriotism, a more complex reality hid beneath the surface. Newspaper accounts of the period highlighted the patriotic rituals repeated across the North yet ample evidence exists that even in this flush of patriotic enthusiasm there were doubts and hesitations. Many poorer men placed the needs of family before country and chose to defer enlistment or avoid service entirely. As members of a border state, many Pennsylvanians worried about the possibility of invasion and preferred military service as home guards. Patriotism in this early period was an elastic concept. The charity of the wealthy and the labors of the farmer and industrial worker all fell under the category of patriotism. Ultimately, many men had more mundane reasons for a hesitancy to enlist. The chaotic administration of the mobilization process coupled with concerns over the character of officers contributed to this doubtfulness. A powerful rhetoric of patriotism urged citizens to become soldiers, yet in Pennsylvania, many residents were pulled in conflicting directions by obligations to self, family, and community.
FIGURE 1 Geographic distribution of three-month volunteer companies

Indicates approximate path of the Pennsylvania Railroad

FIGURE 2 Geographic distribution of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps

Source: The county of origin for each company of the Pennsylvania Reserves Corps appears in Sauers, *Advance the Colors*, vol. 1, 254–257.
### FIGURE 3 Occupations of Pennsylvania three-month soldiers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Category</th>
<th>10% Sample of Pennsylvania 3-month soldiers (%)</th>
<th>Union Soldiers, U.S. Sanitary Commission Sample (%)</th>
<th>Union Soldiers, Bell Wiley Sample (%)</th>
<th>All Males, 1860 Census (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmers &amp; farm workers</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>47.5</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>42.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skilled workers</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White-collar &amp; commercial</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous &amp; unknown</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For this sample, I entered the occupational data of 2,663 three-month volunteers into a database. The total number of three-month volunteers from Pennsylvania was 20,979 making the sample nearly 10 percent. The selection process looked at companies from throughout the state, representing both urban and rural areas. The selection process was influenced by the extant of regimental documentation. Not every three-month regiment had the necessary paperwork on file to easily determine occupations, and those regiments missing files were excluded. The regiments and companies selected include: 2A, 2B, 2C, 2D, 2E, 2F, 2G, 2H, 2I, 2K, 8L, 8K, 10A, 10B, 10F, 10G, 14A, 14B, 14C, 14D, 14E, 14F, 14G, 14H, 14I, 14K.

FIGURE 4 Prominent occupations of Pennsylvania three-month soldiers

Note: Laborer was the most common category and presents the challenge of ambiguity. Laborers could be agricultural workers or day-laborers living in urban areas. Based on the indication of residence on enlistment papers, most of the laborers in this sample came from urban areas including Harrisburg, Chambersburg, Bloomsburg, and Duncansville.

Source: This chart is derived from the data of figure 3 and lists the occupations from the 10 percent sample that were most abundant.
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NOTES

5. According to the State Adjutant General's report of 1866, 344,408 soldiers were furnished by Pennsylvania over the course of the war. This figure is undoubtedly higher than the true number of enlisted men because it does not take into account re-enlistment of three month men into new three year units. A convenient summary of enlistment statistics can be found in Richard A. Sauers, Advance the Colors! Pennsylvania Civil War Battleflags, vol. 1 (Harrisburg: Capitol Preservation Committee, 1987), 247. Census officials considered "military age" to be white males between the ages of 18 and 45. Although the number of men truly fit for military service would be a fraction of these figures, I cite them for reference purposes. Joseph C. G. Kennedy, comp., Population of the United States in 1860; Compiled from the Original returns of the Eighth Census, Under the Direction of the Secretary of the Interior (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1864), xvii.
6. What the actual imbalance was is difficult to judge. The practice of soldier voting is murky for lack of evidence. The total number of votes cast by soldiers was only a fraction of the total number of men in arms, leaving one to wonder about the discrepancy. Summaries of the 1861 Pennsylvania soldier vote appear in Tribune Almanac and Political Register for 1863 (New York: Tribune Co., 1863), 63. Under "Votes of Union Soldiers" the editors wrote: "The average proportion of Republican Unionists and Democrats, taking the States together, vary but slightly - the ratio of the whole is about four to one; and this is doubtless true of the entire force under arms." The Pennsylvania soldier vote in 1861 was: 11,351 Republican; 3,173 Democrat.
7. Untitled, McKean Democrat, 2 May 1861.
8. "Departure of McKean County Troops," McKean Democrat, 2 May 1861.
9. "For the Seat of War," Clearfield Republican, 8 May 1861; and untitled, Raffstman's Journal, 1 May 1861.
13. Correspondence to Simon Cameron, the secretary of war, blamed the officers of the second regiment who "urged them on to riot." The regiment consisted primarily of men from south-central Pennsylvania but also included a company of men from Bellefonte. Records do not indicate whether the near riot involved men from other commands, but there were at least a half-dozen other regiments waiting in Harrisburg to receive pay. James D. Cameron to Simon Cameron, 27 July 1861, Official Records, ser. 3, vol. 1, 359. James D. Cameron, the son of the secretary of war, supervised the transportation of Union troops over the Northern Central Railroad.
16. G. Blight Brown to Craig Biddle, August 28, 1861 in Pennsylvania State Archives, RG 19, Records of the Department of Military and Veterans’ Affairs, Office of the Adjutant General, General Correspondence, box 9 (hereafter PSA, AG, GC).
20. Figure 1, “Geographic distribution of three-month volunteer companies.”
21. Figure 2, “Geographic distribution of the Pennsylvania Reserve Corps,” indicates a broader origin among initial enlistments, after the wave of “First Defenders.”
27. For comments on the influence of civic associations in the lives of soldiers see, Reid Mitchell, *The Vacant Chair: The Northern Soldier Leaves Home* (NY: Oxford University Press, 1993): p. 23; Mitchell also addresses soldiers’ lack of discipline in *The Vacant Chair,* pp. 23–25 and also in his classic study *Civil War Soldiers,* 57–59.
State because of negligent treatment. Twenty-seven men signed a letter to the *Pittsburgh Post* on 27 June 1861 stating their grievances. The point of officer elections is further illustrated in Mark H. Dunkelman, “A Just Right to Select Our Own Officers: Reactions in a Union Regiment to Officers Commissioned from Outside Its Ranks,” *Civil War History* 44, no. 1 (March 1998): 24–34. Dunkelman evaluated the phenomenon in relation to the paternalism of officers rather than a heritage of democracy.


35. J. R. Dunbar to E. M. Biddle, 1 May 1861 in PSA, AG, GC, box 6; J. R. Lynch to Craig Biddle, 27 August 1861 in PSA, AG, GC, box 9; Robert Thorne to Andrew G. Curtin, 3 September 1861 in PSA, AG, GC, box 9.

36. Martin Crawford observed this socioeconomic distinction between recruits from rural Virginia in 1861 and 1862. *Ashe County's Civil War: Community and Society in the Appalachian South* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001), 90–94

37. "Letter from Camp Johnson," *Raftsmen's Journal*, 29 May 1861. The letter was dated 20 May 1861. A response to these charges was printed in the paper on June 5. The author, under the name "Guelich," denied that soldier's families were mistreated and praised the work of the local relief committee to supply all needy families with flour, molasses and meat, among other things. "Letter from Smith's Mill," *Raftsmen's Journal*, 5 June 1861.


41. *Clearfield Republican*, 14 August 1861.

42. As an example, Bingham Duncan described the dire economic consequences of secession on the iron industry of Lawrence County. Duncan referred to it as a serious depression resulting in significant out-migration in 1860–61. Unemployed industrial workers were prominent among early volunteers. Bingham Duncan, "New Castle in 1861–62: A Community Response to a War Crisis," *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine* 24, no. 4 (December 1941): 251–260.

43. Rafting timber was a traditional method for farmers to transport wood to markets. Rafts plied the rivers of Pennsylvania from the early 1800s into the post-Civil War period.

44. A. B. Clark to Andrew G. Curtin, 4 June 1861 in PSA, AG, GC, box 7; Henry J. Rigden to Andrew Porter, 21 May 1861 in PSA, AG, GC, box 6.


46. Figure 3, "Occupations of Pennsylvania three-month soldiers." See figure 3 "note" for an explanation of sampling methods and categorization methods.

47. Puddlers were skilled iron-workers who made wrought iron from molten "puddles." Figure 4. "Prominent occupations of Pennsylvania three-month soldiers." It was not unusual that lumbermen appeared prominently in this sample of early enlistees. The occupation "lumberman" covered a
spectrum of individuals including well-to-do lumber entrepreneurs, small land-owning farmers who engaged in rafting, and young unmarried men who did winter wage-work in the forests. The majority of the lumbermen listed in muster rolls were the last category of young men. Newspapers along the major rivers reported the abysmal state of the lumber trade that spring. For men without family to consider, enlistment would have seemed an attractive option.


49. Archibald Stewart, esquire, of Indiana County found a unique way to contribute money and stimulate improvement of the Pittsburgh home guards. He gave funds to purchase a six pound Dahlgren cannon to be used as a prize in drill contests. The “Champion Gun” was awarded to the best drilled company. (Pittsburgh Post, 28 May 1861)


53. As American historians have emphasized, the egalitarian model of white male citizenship did not initially apply to Native Americans, black people, or women. Even when citizenship was extended to black Americans, residents of the west coast were beginning a campaign that systematically excluded Chinese immigrants from the rights of citizenship. James M. McPherson summarized the distinctions between ethnic and civic nationalism in Is Blood Thicker Than Water? Crises of Nationalism in the Modern World (NY: Vintage Books, 1998), 30–37. McPherson overlooked the fact that national identity and ethnic identity are not mutually exclusive or inherently competitive.


55. In her Reflections on Political Identity, Anne Norton focused on the plight of “liminal” people within the nation. Though she referred specifically to “frontier” regions, her categorization fits well for residents of the Pennsylvania Appalachians. She described that allegiance to the state is often weakest among those distant from the sources of political and economic power. In Norton’s essay, frontiersmen are the epitome of liminal Americans. She considered their individualism and contempt for authority a product of their distance “from institutions and relations that would integrate them firmly in structured economic, social, and political hierarchies.” The mountains of Pennsylvania shared characteristics of frontier existence, but conforms to another category of social and economic liminality. Norton argued that a similar conflicting identity often occurs “among the inhabitants of regions poorly integrated into the political or economic structures of the nation.” This is largely because “their lack of a material infrastructure integrating them in structures of exchange with the

56. These letters never reached their recipients and lay unopened until 1939 when they were discovered among the George Cadwalader papers at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. Edward Longacre published a small sampling of them under a “Notes and Documents” piece entitled “'Come home soon and don't delay': Letters from the Home Front, July, 1861,” *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 100, no. 3 (July 1976): 395–406. In assessing their meaning, Longacre wrote, “they present a deeply disturbing picture of northern homefront morale in dissolution at a period preceding the days when the hardships and discomforts of war were manifest on a national scale.” Longacre was no doubt trying to correct an historical oversight in which “little attention has been paid to a powerful psychological factor in their refusal to remain with the colors.” (396–97) Cadwalader’s troops were primarily from Lancaster, Franklin and Dauphin Counties.
