The long history of the struggle for equality in education in the United States entered into a new stage after the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) won the Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka decision in 1954 and Brown II in 1955.¹ Firmly ensconced in the civil rights liberalism of the period, the NAACP's strategy rested on the assumption that as long as black children were separated from white children they would receive an inferior education. Whether segregation was the result of statutory preclusion or of school districts' policies mattered little. The mere fact that black children could be placed in separate schools or classes subjected them to inferior conditions.

Following Brown, organizers in many northern and southern communities demanded school desegregation. At some southern schools, such as Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957, African-American children were met with open hostility by racist mobs. Similarly, in open defiance, the Prince Edward County, Virginia board of supervisors closed the public schools for
five years between 1959 and 1964 rather than integrate them. Many southern school districts, however, practiced a more obstructionist version of segregation, choosing to keep schools segregated through "freedom of choice" and "pupil placement"; such plans created an appearance of compliance by creating the impression that blacks and whites chose to go to different schools. The school desegregation struggle in the North during the same period, 1954–1965, has received less scholarly attention. Instead, scholars focused on the white mob resistance to busing in the North during the 1970s. With this historical focus on the South in the 1950s and 1960s and on the North in the 1970s, students of school integration might conclude that no one demanded school integration earlier in the North or, more possibly, that the northern schools were not segregated. But this limited focus belies a long record of activist protest in northern cities. The struggle for social and racial justice was taking place throughout the nation, not simply in one region. Recent scholarly research attests to a history of activism above the Mason-Dixon Line: black and white activists in many of the largest northern cities demanded school desegregation and educational equality in the 1950s and 1960s. Such scholarship provides solid ground for rethinking our understanding of the school desegregation struggle and of the civil rights movement.

Emboldened by the Brown decision, activists tried to desegregate the schools in many northern cities, including New York, Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia. In Confronting the Color Line, Alan B. Anderson and Charles W. Pickering detail an active struggle in Chicago from 1957 to 1967. The Coordinating Council of Community Organizations, a coalition of civil rights and community groups formed in 1961, struggled for school desegregation by using the full spectrum of tactics from persuasive arguments to sit-ins and boycotts.

Two important studies bring to light the desegregation efforts in New York City. Clarence Taylor’s biography of the Reverend Milton Galamison, Knocking at Our Own Door: Milton A. Galamison and the Struggle to Integrate New York City Schools, provides a unique window into the northern school desegregation movement in the period immediately following the Brown decision. Taylor’s documentation of Galamison’s resistance to anti-Communist tactics illuminates the way in which such tactics were used against the school desegregation movement. In “Exposing the ‘Whole Segregation Myth’: The Harlem Nine and New York City’s School Desegregation Battles,” Adina Back emphasizes the leading role of African-American women in the neighborhood school boycotts in the 1950s.
Recent studies of two smaller northern cities in the post-*Brown* years reveal activists demanding an end to racism in the schools through multiple strategies. Jeanne Theoharis's essay “I'd Rather Go to School in the South: How Boston’s School Desegregation Complicates the Civil Rights Paradigm” shifts the historical interpretation of the schools’ struggle in Boston from the white resistance in the 1970s to the struggles of blacks from the early 1950s. In *More Than One Struggle: The Evolution of Black School Reform in Milwaukee*, Jack Dougherty recounts the changes in the African-American schools’ struggle in Milwaukee from the 1930s through the 1990s.

No similar study has been written for Philadelphia, the City of Brotherly Love, where school segregation increased in the ten years following *Brown*. In Philadelphia, as in New York, Chicago, Boston, and Milwaukee, civil rights activists organized and demanded equality in schooling and desegregation of the schools. Although the struggle for school desegregation in Philadelphia from 1955 to 1967 was not militant, the activists, black and white, were persistent in the face of a steadfast bureaucracy whose drawing of school boundary lines, establishment of transfer policies, assignment of students and teachers, and placement of new school buildings manifestly created segregated schools. The desegregation movement in Philadelphia was hampered by limited funding and little activity at the grassroots level. The impetus toward desegregation failed for a number of reasons: the limits of federal law, a recalcitrant school board, city officials opposed to busing, and white residents who organized against busing.

Philadelphia had a history of protests against the color line in education. In the nineteenth century African Americans employed a range of tactics, from demanding integration to accepting segregated schooling as long as their children had black teachers. In the first half of the twentieth century, the Educational Equality League (EEL), chaired by Floyd Logan, led several campaigns to further equality for African Americans in the School District of Philadelphia. In the 1930s the protests of EEL brought about several significant changes in the color line. An African American was appointed to the school board and racially separate teacher-eligibility appointment lists to elementary schools were eliminated, allowing African Americans to compete for positions in the public secondary schools. Nonetheless, segregation of students and teachers increased with the growing black enrollment in the public school system.

During and after World War II, the racial composition of many northern cities, including Philadelphia, was transformed by black migration from the rural South and white movement to the suburbs. Between 1940 and 1950, 90,635 blacks migrated to Philadelphia; between 1950 and 1960, 64,974
migrated. In the decade from 1950 to 1960, Philadelphia’s non-white population increased 41.2 percent while the white population declined 13.3 percent. Between 1950 and 1970 Philadelphia’s black population increased from 18 percent to 34 percent. The city was undergoing a large-scale racial transformation.

With this change came the rapid expansion of the black ghetto. North and West Philadelphia became virtually all black. Compared with 15 percent in 1950 and 11 percent in 1940, blacks inhabited 22 percent of the city blocks completely or almost completely in 1960. Between 1930 and 1970, the index of black isolation in Philadelphia rose from 27.3 percent to 75.6 percent.

This rapid increase in housing segregation was matched by racial segregation in the schools. The total African-American student enrollment grew from 20.4 percent in 1940 to 30.2 percent in 1950. In 1960 African Americans made up 47 percent of the total school population. In elementary schools blacks were a majority, 51 percent of all students. Fully 92 percent of black students but less than half of the white students, 48 percent, were enrolled in public schools—the majority of white students attended private and parochial schools. Because the school district maintained no official records of the racial make-up of individual schools until the mid-1960s, official statistics that could document the extent of school segregation are not available. Nonetheless, the overall housing patterns and student assignments to neighborhood schools clearly indicate that racial segregation in schools was increasing. Advocates for racial equality in schooling who observed these changes began making demands on the school board.

Following the Brown decision the school board, under pressure from the Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP, responded to a rising tide of support for school desegregation. On July 8, 1959, five months after a delegation of African-American leaders presented a petition, the school board passed a nondiscrimination resolution that stated in part, “the official policy of [the] Board of Public Education, School District of Philadelphia, continues to be that there shall be no discrimination because of race, color, religion or national origin.” But the wording of the resolution, which merely reiterated the board’s previous policy, was calculated to quell the increasingly vocal support for school desegregation.

The school board had been receiving requests from numerous community groups and religious organizations to change the policies and procedures that segregated schools. These organizations were located primarily in racially changing neighborhoods in the western and northwestern sections of the city.
The most prominent groups were the Emlen Federation of Civic Organizations, the Committee on Schools of the Religious Community Council of Stenton, the Committee on Schools of the Germantown Community Council, the Ogontz Area Neighbors, the East Mt. Airy Neighbors, and the West Philadelphia Schools Committee. During these early years, the groups limited themselves to issuing statements and meeting with school personnel.

The Emlen Federation of Civic Organizations, the first group to take concerted legal action, organized a meeting on June 5, 1956 of twenty-two civic, community, and religious organizations in the northwestern section of the city with District Six School Superintendent Edward T. Myers "to discuss ways in which to develop well integrated public schools in our community and to reverse a trend toward segregated patterns." The group focused on three school district practices—drawing boundary lines, assigning teachers, and allowing student transfers—all of which affected the Emlen School. Although the neighborhood was integrated, the school had become almost all black. In 1952 Emlen was 64.4 percent black, but just three years later it had become 86.1 percent black. When boundary lines were redrawn after the nearby Day School was built in 1953, Day became an almost all-white school and Emlen an almost all-black school. When black teachers were appointed to the Emlen School, white parents surmised that Emlen was being designated a black school. Although the practice of listing teachers by race had been eliminated in the 1930s, black teachers were still appointed only to predominantly black schools. In addition, the transfer policy contributed to segregation by allowing white parents to transfer their children to any school with vacancies. The representatives of the Emlen Federation requested of Dr. Myers that the Emlen-Day boundary lines be redrawn, the transfer policy be abolished, and teacher assignments be integrative.

Myers defended the school district's policies on all counts. He argued that other neighborhood schools would become segregated if the student transfer policy were eliminated, that the school population reflected the make-up of the neighborhood, and that changing the Emlen/Day boundaries would be forcing integration. He observed that the few students bused from Emlen would have a small effect on the racial percentages and claimed that he did not favor placing African-American teachers in schools simply to advance integration. In spite of the contradictions inherent in his arguments for both neighborhood schools and the transfer policy, Myers stood firmly in support of the school district's policies.
Increasing frustration with the school board’s decisions at the Emlen School motivated the filing of a lawsuit in federal court.26 The Emlen Federation of Civic Organizations approached the Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP for assistance when the school district decided to relieve overcrowding by placing temporary mobile class units, called “portables,” at the Emlen School instead of redrawing boundary lines or busing students. The case, *Chisholm v. Board of Public Education*, was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania on June 7, 1961.27

The complaint provided a clear description of what actions were being taken in order to intensify racial segregation:

[B]y assigning minor plaintiffs and the members of said class to racially segregated public schools within the School District of Philadelphia, . . . on the basis and classification of their race and color, and changing school boundary lines in a manner to create, continue and intensify racial segregation in said School District, and by controlling transfers from school to school within said School District, in a manner to create, continue and intensify racial segregation, and by assigning teachers to teach the plaintiffs . . . on the basis of the teachers’ race and color and the race and color of the plaintiffs . . . in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.28

The remedies sought included a desegregation plan that would eliminate the racial segregation of pupils and the racially discriminatory assignment of teachers. Additionally, the school district was called upon to establish school boundaries “for the purpose of creating and perpetuating positive racial integration patterns, rather than perpetuation of racial segregation patterns.”29

The leading attorney for the plaintiffs, A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., who was president of the Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP (and later became Chief Judge of the Third U.S. Court of Appeals), said, “The critical question was how they did the boundaries.”30 The boundary lines for the newly built Day School were drawn along an east-west axis rather than a north-south axis. The east-west axis maintained Emlen as a segregated black school and Day as a predominantly white school. Had the boundaries been drawn on a north-south axis, both schools would have been integrated.

According to Higginbotham, federal law at that time required only evidence of a segregative statute as was generally found in the South but rarely
found in the North. Higginbotham described the dilemma faced by the lawyers as follows:

What was ... insidious was that you had declarations by the school board saying that they opposed segregation ... so that therefore you could not try what I call a ‘document case’ in the traditional sense where you have what we call in evidence ‘a smoking gun’. ... So what we tried to do is determine: How do you set up a case to demonstrate to a court that the way in which boundaries are chosen [is] not a matter of pure coincidence? ... And, therefore, the whole argument in the northern cases would be that after you have established a prima-facie case of administrative policies, intentionally designed to preclude normal integration of students, that is the equivalent of a statutory preclusion.31

According to Higginbotham, the case was recognized by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund as an exemplary northern school desegregation suit, and he was invited to present it at a national conference.

In 1961 when *Chisbolm* was filed, school desegregation case law was in its early stages. During the decade from 1955 to 1965, the *Briggs v. Elliott* ruling dictated the way in which a school board’s desegregation responsibility was interpreted: school districts could not discriminate but neither were they required to integrate.32 Not until 1968 did the Supreme Court, in *Green v. New Kent County School Board*, explicitly rule that school boards had an affirmative duty to integrate their schools.33 It was not until 1973 that the Supreme Court, in *Keyes v. School District No. 1*, issued an opinion that blurred the distinction between *de facto* and *de jure* segregation.34 In *Keyes* the Court declared, “We emphasize that the differentiating factor between *de jure* segregation and so-called *de facto* segregation ... is purpose or intent to segregate.”35 Frank T. Read, a legal authority on school desegregation, clarified this statement as follows:

A close reading of *Keyes* reveals, however, that the “*purpose or intent to segregate*” need not be shown by proof of actual and specific declarations of segregative intent, but may be *inferred* from the various actions of the school board.36

According to counsel for the plaintiff, it was the actions of the School District of Philadelphia from which segregative intent could be inferred. This
was the heart of the *Chisholm* case, which was filed in 1961, twelve years before *Keyes*. However, *Chisholm* would eventually flounder in the gray area of legal indecision, the morass of school district obfuscation, the assault upon integration by racist forces, and the confusion arising out of political differences in the civil rights movement.

On January 21, 1963, when Judge Harold Wood ordered that a hearing be held in the *Chisholm* case, school desegregation became one of the major civil rights issues in Philadelphia. The Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP and the legal team in the case were in transition because A. Leon Higginbotham Jr., who had been leading the team, withdrew as co-counsel on December 6, 1962 after he was appointed to the Federal Trade Commission. All of the original attorneys for the plaintiffs withdrew from the case in the spring of 1963 and left it in the hands of Isaiah Crippens, a close associate of Cecil B. Moore, newly elected president of the Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP.

When Crippens took over the case, he was under pressure from the court to have completed discoveries and interrogatories. However, it turned out that the case was neither as thoroughly researched nor as comprehensively prepared as the attorneys had initially intended. As William L. Akers, one of the original attorneys in the case, revealed to Judge Wood, the Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP had been unable to conduct a “very extensive survey and detailed study of the school system [because] [t]he method of doing this . . . was beyond the plaintiffs’ means to supply, and at one time we had thought that this could be done by the [national] Association. However, this is not the present plan.” The local NAACP was unable to fund the research necessary to build a strong case and could no longer expect the national association to do so.

It is not surprising, then, that Crippens, whose rhetoric was resolute, turned out to be well disposed to compromise when he addressed Judge Wood:

> We think that integration is a positive educative factor. Now, what we are after is the best educational opportunity for each and every child. The Board officially changed its policy from this so-called non-discrimination [policy] . . . to state that now they are going to foster integration. We felt that in an atmosphere of friendliness we might make use of the studies and discussions by citizens’ groups and at last come up with an amicable solution or come up with such a narrowing of issues that the Court could dispose of the matter quite speedily and save more
time by letting the Board do some exploring in good faith, which they seem to be doing now, than it would be to call in a lot of experts and spend $100,000 or $150,000 that both sides could well use for some other purpose. . . . So I thought that in an atmosphere of friendliness maybe we could sit down and work out something agreeable to both sides, and that is this attempt here.40

Crippens’s statements indicate not only a willingness to wait until board-appointed bodies submitted their reports, but they also imply a trust that the findings and the board’s subsequent actions would bring about justice and an end to segregation. On February 6, 1963, the same day that Judge Wood delineated the guidelines in *Chisholm*, the Special Committee on Nondiscrimination of the Board of Public Education was appointed to review the board’s policy on non-discrimination and to formulate a policy statement on integration for board consideration. The Lewis Committee, as it became known, was directed to prepare guidelines for the development of programs to further integration.41 Thus, the board appeared to be addressing the issue of school integration.

Perhaps Crippens’s decision to await these findings was more directly a result of the NAACP’s limited funds, which Akers had earlier revealed to Judge Wood. Indeed, when the case received recognition after Higginbotham was asked to present it at a national NAACP conference, the Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP may have hoped that *Chisholm* would be funded as a precedent-setting northern school desegregation case.42 However, it was not.

Perhaps Crippens was willing to wait because public sentiment for school integration was influencing the school board to assume an affirmative responsibility to integrate the schools. A broad spectrum of the civil rights movement, including African Americans, liberals, labor movement representatives, many Jewish groups, and several religious organizations, had formed the Coordinating Council for School Integration (CCSI) in March 1963. CCSI played a decisive role in defining the strategic issues at each step of the desegregation campaign and in generating public support for them. Sylvia Meek, the Education Director of the Philadelphia Urban League, who served as CCSI’s secretary-treasurer, was the organization’s motivating force and chief organizer. Her energetic, committed, intelligent, and articulate leadership of CCSI may have been decisive in the prominent role played by the group.

Meek described as follows the influential role of CCSI after the appointment of the Lewis Committee and during the spring when the committee held public hearings:
During the next few months the Coordinating Council played an increasingly important leadership role in sharpening the issues and in the involvement of more organizations in the school integration movement. It helped to create a climate of concern for integration before the full impact of the social revolution was felt in Philadelphia. The Council and its affiliates mobilized local neighborhood groups into participation on the district level during meetings and hearings initiated by the Special Board Committee. . . . Many of our neighborhood-based affiliates participated on this level. On a city-wide level, again we were directly responsible for stimulating organizations to testify at public hearings.43

Representatives from eleven of the groups that formed the core of the liberal and African-American alliance presented testimony at the public hearings. Four recommendations received general agreement. The school board should (1) adopt an affirmative policy of racial integration; (2) create one department to implement the school integration policy for students and another for personnel; (3) select new school sites to further integration; and (4) extend the compensatory programs that included the Great Cities School Improvement Program, funded by the Ford Foundation.44 The African-American and liberal representatives did not see compensatory programs and school desegregation as mutually exclusive—both were viewed as improving education for African Americans. The school board eventually acted on each of these recommendations with one exception: it did not consistently select school sites to promote integration. Although the board expanded the membership of the Lewis Committee, in response to requests from civic groups to include a broad range of people advancing the cause of school integration, school district personnel, particularly school administrators, continued to dominate the membership.45

In another responsive decision, the board changed its non-discrimination policy, at the request of the Lewis Committee, to an affirmative policy. On June 25, 1963, it passed the following resolution:

That the 1959 policy of nondiscrimination because of race, color, or national origin now be expanded to state explicitly that integration of both pupils and staff be the policy of The Board of Public Education. The Committee appointed to review the policy of non-discrimination should be instructed to conduct its study and to report the facts with
recommendations for such other or further action that may be necessary or advisable in fostering integration of all schools and the technical, professional and non-professional staffs.46

This resolution was not enough to mollify Judge Wood, who was ready to go to trial, and, if necessary, prepare a plan in case the school district did not develop an acceptable plan of its own by September 23, 1963.47 One of the most powerful organizations of civil rights advocates in Philadelphia, the Four Hundred Ministers, put pressure on the school board at this time. During the summer, the ministers, who had been leading the successful effort to end private-sector hiring discrimination known as the Selective Patronage Campaigns, became active in school affairs.48 The ministers demanded that the school district raise the standards of the sixty-five predominantly African-American schools to that of the predominantly white schools in the system. In a closed-door meeting in July, the ministers requested immediate action in providing an equal distribution of books and materials, the same teaching methods, the same courses, and the same number of certified teachers to these schools. They expressed concern about failure to promote African Americans to administrative positions and resistance to filing a desegregation plan with the court. Not satisfied with the progress report they received, the Reverend Joseph T. Kirkland, spokesperson for the Four Hundred Ministers, announced to the board at its meeting on September 10, 1963, “We are embarking upon a campaign of direct action which shall continue until our grievances have been dealt with to our satisfaction.”49

The school board in Philadelphia was undoubtedly aware of the potential disorder created by open confrontation that had occurred in other cities, such as New York, Chicago, and St. Louis.50 Indeed, it had already encountered demonstrations at the Strawberry Mansion school construction site led by civil rights leader and Philadelphia NAACP chapter president Cecil B. Moore that very spring.51 Consequently, the board responded to the ministers by approving the Educational Improvement Program designed to upgrade the first grades in about sixty schools in the African-American community.52 These improvements, such as ending part-time classes, assigning certified teachers, and reducing class size, were generally standard conditions in the predominantly white schools at that time. However, after only three years, the program, which was considered successful in raising achievement in reading and math, was eliminated.53 Although the Four Hundred
Ministers stepped into the background on school issues in late September when the school district presented a plan acceptable to the court, the entrance of the ministers into school issues nonetheless appeared to have had a powerful impact on the school board, whose members had witnessed their successful selective patronage campaigns.

On September 26, 1963, Judge Wood accepted the school board's implementation plan and granted a continuance on the condition that both parties submit a report every six months. The plan later became the basis of the Lewis Committee's recommendations, which aimed to foster integration by reviewing school boundaries, sites for new buildings, and school feeder patterns. Busing children to underutilized facilities would alleviate part-time attendance and overcrowding, although the plan did not specify the number of children who were to be integrated nor was busing a major part of the plan.

Within a month, however, Crippens filed a motion asking Judge Wood to order the school board to comply with the agreement. At the hearing, he argued that the issue of part-time classes had been addressed by simply assigning students to overcrowded classes within the same school rather than by sending the students to underutilized, predominantly white schools. However, Judge Wood ruled that the board was acting in good faith. His ruling seems to have curtailed Crippens's efforts to achieve further legal redress, as he filed only one additional motion two years later, in May 1965, requesting a conference, which the judge refused to grant.

The school integrationists quickly applied direct action tactics in an effort to secure compliance with the implementation agreement. After the principal at the Meade Elementary School announced that children would be bused to another segregated school to relieve overcrowding rather than to a school that would further desegregation, the Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP led 150 picketers in front of the school. In response, the administration sent questionnaires to parents asking if they wanted their children bused to another school or placed in a special team-teaching arrangement at Meade. Cecil Moore charged that this questionnaire was simply a tactic to seek parental approval to avoid integration. The parents, he asserted, had not been informed that this team-teaching arrangement meant there might be as many as one hundred children in a classroom. The school district retreated with a promise to transfer 160 students to the Jefferson Elementary School by November 18, 1963. This promise was not exacted until half the students boycotted one day, with Moore unleashing a scathing attack upon the board.
and its administrators, calling them "a bunch of hypocritical liars" and threatening them with a citywide boycott.\textsuperscript{58} Afterward the school district made certain to inform the press of the effectiveness of another transfer of ninety students from the Cleveland Elementary School to the Steel Elementary School.\textsuperscript{59} In an interview, Judge Wood praised the implementation plan and publicly castigated the Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP for threatening to picket.\textsuperscript{60}

While plaintiffs did not seek further legal redress, direct-action skirmishes continued to flourish. Demonstrations at the Gaston Church prompted two different minor fissures within the desegregation movement: one between the Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP and a group of black parents and the other between the chapter and a white liberal. In December, the Social Action Committee of the Antioch United Church of Christ, with the assistance of the chapter, demanded that two classes from the overcrowded Clymer Elementary School that had been placed in rented rooms in the Gaston Presbyterian Church be sent to the nearby, predominantly white Jefferson Elementary School with its five hundred empty seats. After twelve picketers were arrested for blocking the students' entrance to the church in February, picketing at the church became a regular activity. Although the Lewis Committee recommended the students be removed from the Gaston Church and another, the Cornerstone Church, the school board voted to keep them there, after instructing the superintendent to plan the move. The decision to keep the children in the church proved divisive for the anti-segregation liberal-black alliance. After Maurice Fagan, the executive director of the Philadelphia Fellowship Commission, a leading liberal and civil rights organization, voted as a member of the Lewis Committee to keep the children in the church, Cecil Moore and the Reverend Marshall Lorenzo Shepard, Jr., resigned from the executive board of the Philadelphia Fellowship Commission. In addition, it appears the Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP did not organize among the parents whose children were taught at the church because many of those parents objected to the move so late in the school year. After picketing at the homes of the board members who voted against the move, the chapter brought closure to these protests by picketing at the two churches on Easter Sunday, an action that offended many churchgoers. Although African Americans may have overwhelmingly supported school desegregation, they were not always in agreement about tactics. Contributing immeasurably to this confusion and dissension was the school district's planning, which appeared to be designed to create confusion and animosity.\textsuperscript{61}
The year 1964 marked the occasion of two important events in Philadelphia school desegregation history: the completion of the Lewis Committee report and the rise of organized opposition to any form of busing. In the summer of 1964, the Lewis Committee presented its long-awaited report to the board. The committee’s recommendations were neither extraordinary nor cataclysmic. Instead, the report asserted a moral commitment to the idea of desegregation with recommendations that reflected the political expediency of accommodating segregation. The body of the report offered a plan to provide compensatory education with suggestions of methods to integrate the student population at some future date. The recommendations included developing a plan to redraw some school boundaries and accelerating a new capital program with site selection planned to foster integration.62

On July 23, 1964 the school board accepted the report in principle and referred it to Dr. C. Taylor Whittier, the incoming superintendent, who stated that he would make his assessment of the report’s long-range proposals by February 1, 1965. His recommendations included many compensatory and remedial educational measures, but no desegregation measures other than maintaining a coordinator of Intergroup Relations and Integration and creating a Citizens Advisory Committee.63 With these first steps, the school district established its carefully measured response, one that avoided challenging the social milieu of racial division and animosity.

On January 7, 1964, the board approved a progress report for the court that embodied measures designed to hasten voluntary school integration. Included was the decision to bus pupils for no more than thirty minutes of travel time, and not for the purpose of the “compulsory interchange of pupils.”64 Instead, busing of students was intended primarily to relieve overcrowding and only secondarily to foster school integration.

Even before the board announced this policy, the CCSI, in the following special notice, alerted its members to the growing polarity:

A number of events have occurred before and since the adoption of the [integration] policy [on June 25, 1963] which point up the need for the school system to move swiftly to implement its policy and to provide strong leadership within its ranks and to the community-at-large. We offer our support and aid to the school system in the implementation of integration. We do so fully cognizant of the fact that because community education and strong leadership have been
lacking, increasing polarization is occurring which bodes unnecessary conflict and confusion.⁶⁵

Organizations affiliated with the CCSI endeavored to lay the groundwork for successful integration of the schools by holding neighborhood town meetings.

In its progress report to Judge Wood on April 2, 1964, the school board included plans to realign the boundaries of 96 of the city's 198 elementary schools to "ease overcrowding and foster integration."⁶⁶ The elementary school revisions would change the racial ratios at 35 schools. Additionally, the board indicated that similar plans were being developed for the secondary schools.

Resistance to the board's plans quickly formed. Although white parents at the receiving schools claimed they were not hostile to the black students who were to be bused, two anti-busing groups were organized in May to oppose the transporting of fewer than three thousand pupils in September.⁶⁷ The two groups quickly merged into one, the Parents' and Taxpayers' Association of Philadelphia (PAT). Joseph Frieri, a lawyer from Roxborough, a white working-class neighborhood, was its president.⁶⁸ Speaking at meetings throughout the city, Frieri argued for the neighborhood school because it "had served this country well ever since its founding."⁶⁹

Two key political leaders in the city, Mayor James Tate and City Council President Paul D'Ortona, did much damage by fostering antagonism in such racially fertile soil: they demanded an end to busing. Calling upon white citizens to "storm City Hall," D'Ortona vociferously campaigned against busing, agitating in white sections of the city throughout the spring.⁷⁰

African-American leaders arose in outraged opposition to D'Ortona's incendiary remarks. Cecil Moore warned that D'Ortona was "sowing the seeds of a race riot."⁷¹ Only after meeting with a delegation from the Four Hundred Ministers late in June did D'Ortona clarify, but not alter, his position. He claimed he was not against busing as an emergency measure to relieve overcrowding, but he was against busing for integration.⁷²

After the Mayor's Citizens Advisory Committee on Civil Rights endorsed the school board's busing plan in July, official opposition ceased completely.⁷³ In September, the school board's plan went into operation without physical threats to children or buses.⁷⁴ Philadelphia's white residents did not engage in open violence against black students as did so many of their counterparts
in the South. But white politicians such as the mayor and city council president who had fostered racial polarization by leading opposition to busing did not seek to end racial antagonism by taking a stand in favor of school integration.

In the spring of 1965 white opposition to busing—designed only to relieve overcrowding, not to desegregate—became more dramatic and vocal. The most significant opposition came from two predominantly white sections of the city, South and Northeast Philadelphia. In the fall of 1965, approximately seven thousand students were bused, five thousand of whom were black. Fifty South Philadelphians, members of Save Our Schools South Philadelphia Civic Association (SOS), pledged to picket the school administration building and threatened to boycott schools if blacks were bused to South Philadelphia. In a dramatic testament to their beliefs, they carried into a school board meeting a coffin symbolizing the death of the neighborhood school.75

Joining SOS's demonstrative and menacing behavior was the Neighborhood Schools Association (NSA), members of which threatened to lie down in front of buses.76 Jerry Miller, president of the NSA, claimed the organization had groups in ten sections of the city and the ability to mobilize one thousand pickets.77 The NSA announced plans for a massive anti-busing march on the school administration building on September 9, 1965. After a meeting with the Philadelphia Human Relations Commission, the NSA agreed to cancel its demonstration, but five hundred of its members went on to disrupt a school board meeting on September 9th.78

Whites were anything but united on the issue of busing, however. Although the NSA continued to organize protests (in late fall, it commenced regular picketing of the Birney School in Logan against alleged incidents involving bused-in students), busing proceeded in the fall of 1965 without any significant incidents.79 In fact, many whites joined blacks in organizing for school integration in the northwestern and western sections of the city. Parents in several of the schools receiving bused children organized to welcome the children and assure their safety. Because the NSA had shallow roots in the school community, it was not able to maintain opposition among parents who were not threatened by a few black children being bused into their schools. The leadership of neither PAT nor NSA had children in the schools; rather, the leaders hoped to leverage the issue of busing into increasing their own visibility among constituents who harbored deep-seated, racist views.80 In similar fashion, while the mayor and city council president no
longer publicly opposed busing, they along with the organized white opposition continued to foster a climate of resistance that gave the school board tacit permission to resist large-scale school integration. Instead, the board continued to commission studies and appoint committees, deploying them as delay tactics as any promise of desegregation was repeatedly left for future plans.

Impatient with the school board's failure to desegregate the schools, on February 4, 1966 the president of the Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP, Cecil Moore, basing his action on provisions in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, asked the federal government to withhold all aid to education in Philadelphia until the schools were fully integrated. He also announced that the Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP would seek to reopen Chisholm to obtain a legal ruling mandating school integration. On both counts, Moore was unsuccessful: federal funds were not cut off; Chisholm was not reopened.

The final rallying cry of the school desegregation forces was the call for "educational parks." These parks were the most prominent and seemingly reasonable solution to desegregating schools in a city with residential segregation and organized opposition to busing. Each park was to accommodate from 15,000 to 20,000 students, with two high schools, four middle schools, and eight elementary schools, which, with a wide range of facilities and personnel, could provide the most up-to-date educational services and technology. Traffic patterns were outlined. Most of the land proposed for educational parks was at that time zoned for light industrial use and was available at approximately $100,000 per acre. The Ad Hoc Committee for Educational Parks argued in its plan that if the schools were reconstructed as educational parks they could be integrated, despite the segregated neighborhoods throughout the city. By creating educational parks, the school board could desegregate schools without placing the burden on any group, without changing the neighborhoods racially and without busing any child a long distance. The promoters of educational parks waged a relentless campaign to change the direction of the school district's building plan from scattered-site and segregated neighborhood schools to integrated educational parks. They introduced the idea in 1964 and developed a well-researched plan, slides, and an architectural model that they used at city-wide meetings to develop support for the parks. They vociferously advocated for the educational parks until their eventual rejection by the school board in 1967.

The Community Resources and Development, Inc. (CORDE) released a report on January 30, 1967 supporting rejection. The primary reason given
was that the parks were designed to integrate a system that was projected to have a non-white majority by 1980. In other words, at great expense and upheaval, the redesigned system would still be segregated. Shortly after the hearings on the CORDE Report the school board released a scattered-site building plan for 1967–1973.

The school board's release of the capital building program marked the defeat of the educational parks plan, the final large-scale effort of the school desegregation forces of the 1960s. Robert Rutman, a professor at the University of Pennsylvania and one of the leaders in the educational parks campaign, viewed the defeat from the political perspective of those who opposed it when he observed, "The overriding political considerations were all parochial: Politicians were worried about losing their political base. . . . The net effect of [the educational parks plan would have been] to begin to destroy gerrymandered politics and regional politics." Segregated scattered-site school buildings allowed local politicians to keep their political base and to lobby for rewards for their constituents and supporters. Michael Marcase, Director of School Planning in the School Facilities Division and later superintendent of schools, offered a key insider's interpretation:

[T]he parks never materialized because, I think, people . . . were reluctant to make the hard decisions to actually assign children from these various backgrounds to those parks. So they killed it. . . . Politics entered into it and resistance from city agencies—[the City] Planning Commission and others that would be lethargic in moving these projects forward because they were really getting their orders, if not directly, indirectly from members of [city] council [and] the mayor's office.

Each of these participants described a political structure designed to maintain the status quo. Politicians feared losing their local political base built upon ethnicity and locale. The change from scattered-site schools to centralized educational parks would have required a massive movement with powerful political support to effect such a change, a movement that did not exist.

Furthermore, the integrationists were not in a political position to bring about such a dramatic change. They did not organize, and may not have had the support to mobilize, any action outside the established political process such as demonstrations or boycotts. Richardson Dilworth, the school board president, tactically outmaneuvered the integrationists by arranging a study of the educational parks as they were beginning to mobilize a "no" vote on
the school bond issue, which would authorize the issuing of bonds for the scattered-site building program. William Phillips, a leader in the educational parks campaign, observed that the educational parks advocates lacked sufficient political support. He speculated that if the Four Hundred Ministers had "put on a couple of coordinated efforts, right at that particular moment and said, 'We're going to proselytize against passing the bond issue,' we might have had another story. . . . [Y]ou [have] to have somebody who has unquestioned political authority, as a person, to put something like this together."\(^89\)

Were the educational parks a utopian ideal that would have been too dramatic a change in the organization and funding of schooling? Or did they simply pose too much of a threat to local political arrangements? Certainly the CORDE report did not reject the parks because of outrageous costs or impossible organizational changes. According to Phillips, the expenses would have been reasonable since the school district planned to begin a massive building campaign. Of course, the school district would have faced large-scale organizational changes, which may have seemed overwhelming after the educational charter change in 1965 that altered the method of selecting the school board and shifted fiscal responsibility for the school district from the state legislature to the city council.\(^90\) Furthermore, the Odell Survey, after conducting a two-year comprehensive survey of the school district, suggested among its many recommendations a reorganization of the central administration.\(^91\) Any other organizational change may have been difficult to bring about without years of planning. In fact, the school board had already accepted the recommendations of its school-planning consultant Harry B. Saunders for a ten-year, scattered-site building plan, which virtually ignored the recommendation of the Lewis Committee that site selection be planned to foster integration. It had decided to build individual schools in 1965 with a long-range building plan approved in principle.\(^92\) The school board must have felt a good deal of pressure—there was no doubt that more schools were needed, and quickly. On the other hand, had the school board been committed to school integration it might have more seriously considered building one educational park at a time, since the organizational change would have been piecemeal and the construction of much-needed schools would have been under way.

Local politics played a critical role in the decision to build new schools. Enormous amounts of money were allotted by the school board to school construction making the stakes high indeed for politicians who influenced the selection and purchase of sites, and hiring of contractors, and then

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received the glory that comes with a fabulous new school in the district. The intimate arrangements of local political wheeling and dealing seem to have precluded such a dramatic change in building schools. The local political process was a shifting terrain of alliances that required constant attention. School Board President Dilworth, a consummate politician who had been given his position in exchange for a promise not to run for mayor, had no intention of building educational parks, according to William Phillips.93 The advocates of educational parks were not in positions of local power. As outsiders with little grassroots support, they were unable to bring serious consideration of the educational parks into the political arena.

In March 1967, the school board announced a six-year scattered-site plan that the City Planning Commission observed did not conform to the major policy concern of racial integration.94 The 1967–1973 building plan included twelve new high schools, twenty-four middle schools, and twenty-nine elementary schools. Local residents began lobbying for schools in their neighborhoods as soon as the school board decided on new construction for each successive year. At the public hearings held April 17–21, 1967 on the 1967–1968 budget, opposition from both the integrationists and the segregationists prompted no budgetary change. The debt increase needed to fund the budget with its scattered-site building program was approved by the electorate despite the fervent opposition and “Vote No” campaign of the Coalition for Integrated Quality Education.95

The decision to build schools on scattered sites in 1967 marked the last major defeat for the integrationists who had struggled for school desegregation throughout the 1960s. Sylvia Meek, who had been the driving force in the movement, resigned from her position as education director of the Philadelphia Urban League in early 1968.96 Without Meek’s leadership the CCSI at its fall 1967 meetings searched for a new direction and decided to disband in May 1968.97 Meek, a politically astute woman, undoubtedly recognized that Black Power was replacing civil rights liberalism strategically in the struggle to end racism and chose to move into another political arena after she became a lawyer.98

In the meantime, the school board continued to file progress reports every six months for the federal court in the *Chisholm* case; the only other filing from the plaintiffs was on February 15, 1966 when Crippens withdrew as counsel.99 The Philadelphia chapter of the NAACP, which itself was divided into five branches, no longer pursued the case. In 1971, Judge Wood dismissed the suit, without prejudice, leaving the way for either side to
reopen it. In that same year the struggle in Philadelphia moved to the state level when the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission took the School District of Philadelphia into Commonwealth Court to require school desegregation. In 2004, over thirty years later, that case is still in the state courts.

School desegregation struggles in the North during the 1950s and 1960s are testament to a long history of struggle for educational equality and school integration. The Philadelphia story joins those of Chicago, New York, Boston, and Milwaukee in reshaping our understanding of the school desegregation movement. The full story encompasses much more than white resistance in the South during the 1950s and 1960s followed by black demands for community control and Black Power accompanied by white resistance to busing in the North in the late 1960s and 1970s. Opposition to school desegregation in Philadelphia was organized at the same time as opposition to the Civil Rights Bill flourished in 1964. White political leadership in Philadelphia behaved in much the same manner as did their southern counterparts in so many cities. Several leaders whipped up racist hysteria against busing, and no white politician publicly supported school integration. Like many southern school boards, the Philadelphia school board avoided desegregating the schools even though it had actively contributed to the segregation of those schools by drawing boundary lines, assigning teachers, and allowing student transfers. And like their southern brothers and sisters, Philadelphians struggled to end the racist discrimination against African-American children in the public schools. They firmly believed that Brown was meant for them in the North too.

NOTES


17. Massey and Denton, American Apartheid, 23, 48. The isolation index is an average of the percentage of blacks in a ward. The higher the value the more likely that blacks will have only other blacks as neighbors.

18. Franklin, Education, 188.


A HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

Archives Center, Temple University Libraries, Philadelphia, PA (hereafter UAC); Add B. Anderson to the Members of The Board of Public Education, January 21, 1959, Box 1, Folder: General Correspondence 1959, Floyd Logan Papers; and Petition, February 10, 1959, Box 2, Folder: Governor's Committee on Education, 1960, Floyd Logan Papers, UAC. The petition was presented to an executive session of the school board rather than an open meeting as Logan would have preferred. See Floyd L. Logan to Leon J. Obermayer, President, Board of Public Education, June 17, 1958, Box 1, Folder "General Correspondence, 1959," Floyd Logan Papers, UAC; Journal of the Board of Public Education for the Year 1959 (Philadelphia: School District of Philadelphia [1959]), 240.

23. The files of these organizations are in the UAC and the CHR, Files, 1950–1971, Record Series 148.2, PCA.

24. Report of meeting, June 5, 1956, Box 13, Folder 36, Committee on Schools, 1956–58, Germantown Community Council Papers, UAC. District Six was one of the eight subdivisions of the School District of Philadelphia.

25. “Groups Ask Integrated Schools, Staffs,” Germantown Courier, June 14, 1956, Box 13, Folder 36, Committee on Schools, 1956–58, Germantown Community Council Papers, UAC.


28. Ibid., 4.

29. Ibid., 6.


31. Ibid.


35. 413 U. S. at 208.


41. Report of the Special Committee on Nondiscrimination of the Board of Public Education of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (School District of Philadelphia: [Philadelphia, 1964]), 1. The committee was dubbed the Lewis Committee after its chair Ada Lewis, a member of the school board.


45. Thomas D. McBride to General J. Harry LaBrum, February 8, 1963, PFC Papers, UAC. For a complete list of members see the *Report of the Special Committee on Nondiscrimination*, 190–91.

46. *Journal of the Board of Public Education for the Year 1963*, 221. The wording of this resolution in the *Journal* differs slightly from the wording in the Special Committee’s *Report*, 36–37.


48. The Selective Patronage Campaigns were directed at employers with few African-American employees. The ministers would ask their congregations not to buy the company’s product until the company agreed to the ministers’ hiring demands. Between 1959 and 1963, an estimated two thousand skilled jobs were opened directly and thousands more indirectly as a result of the twenty-nine successful selective patronage campaigns.


Minutes of the Meeting of the Curriculum Sub-Committee of the Citizens Advisory Committee to
the Superintendent on Integration and Intergroup Education, June 18, 1965, Folder: EPPC, C.A.C.
on I and I.E. Minutes, Box 24, PFC Papers, UAC.

53. "A Statistical Evaluation of the Educational Improvement Program of the Philadelphia Board of
Education for the School Year 1964–1965," September 30, 1965, Folder: EPPC, Reports, Box 26,
PFC Papers, UAC. See John Palmer Spencer, "Caught in Crossfire: Marcus Foster and America's
Urban Education Crisis, 1941–1973" (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 2002), 104–81, for a thorough
discussion of the compensatory education program.

54. Transcript of Hearing before Hon. Harold K. Wood in Chambers, September 23, 1963, Filed
September 24, 1963; and September 26, 1963, Filed September 27, 1963, Chisolm, Civil Action
61–29706. Mark Bricklin, "NAACP Wins as School Board Bows to Demands," Philadelphia


56. Transcript of Hearing, Plaintiffs' Motion for Compliance with Agreement, November 26, 1963;
Filed 6 December 1963, Chisolm, Civil Action 61–29706; "Crippens Asks Writ Against 2

57. Lou Potter, "Meade School Principal Is Target of Picketing Mothers," Philadelphia Tribune, October
12, 1963.

"Meade Pupils Start Classes at Jefferson," Evening Bulletin, November 19, 1963; Mark Bricklin,

59. Lawrence M. O'Rourke, "Ninety Pupils Shifted by Bus to Mixed Class," Evening Bulletin, November
6, 1963.

60. Henry W. Messaros and Lawrence M. O'Rourke, "Judge Wood Urges Public Support of School

61. Bill Alexander, "Sparks Fly At School Discussion of Teaching Pupils in Uptown Church,"
Philadelphia Tribune, February 11, 1964; Mark Bricklin, "Vote is 11–1 As Group Ignores 2 Comm.
Reports," Philadelphia Tribune, March 14, 1964; Chet Coleman, "Shepard, Moore Resign From City
Rights Unit Post," Philadelphia Tribune, March 10, 1964; Mark Bricklin, "Gaston ‘School’
Cornerstone Hit By Marchers," Philadelphia Tribune, March 31, 1964; "Wetter Won't Take Pupils
to Remove Pupils From Gaston Church," Evening Bulletin, March 5, 1964; "Shepard Quits Rights
To Keep Pupils in 2 Churches," Evening Bulletin, March 24, 1964; "12 Cleared in Picketing of School

62. Report of the Special Committee on Nondiscrimination of the Board of Public Education of Philadelphia,

63. Journal of the Board of Public Education for the Year 1964 (Philadelphia: School District of

64. Ibid., 5.
65. Special Notice, CCSI Steering Committee Meeting, December 23, 1963, Box 3, Folder: Coordinating Council on School Integration, Citizens Committee on Public Education in Philadelphia Papers, UAC.


77. No organizational files could be located for the NSA. However, from the newspaper files on the organization’s activity, it appears that the NSA was an all-white group located in predominantly white sections of the city. “Group Plans Protest March against School Busing Plans,” Evening Bulletin, July 22, 1965.


80. Joseph Frieri, who had been a Republican, ran for mayor of Philadelphia on the Constitution Party ticket. He claimed that he took enough conservative votes away from the Republican candidate, Arlen Specter, to re-elect the incumbent Democrat, James Tate. Frieri unreservedly aligned himself with the most conservative political elements. Frieri interview.

81. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 required that federal monies be withheld from any institution that excluded persons based on race, color or national origin. In 1965 the Elementary and Secondary School Act allotted massive amounts of federal money to schools. Together these acts were potentially powerful tools in desegregating schools.


83. *Evening Bulletin*, February 13, 1966. The U.S. Commissioner of education Harold Howe announced that federal funds would be cut off only if the school board acted to segregate. His decision was undoubtedly the result of the federal government’s unsuccessful confrontation with Mayor Richard J. Daley the summer before in Chicago. See Anderson and Pickering, *Confronting the Color Line*, 178–81, for a detailed account.


87. Rutman interview.


89. Phillips interview.


93. Phillips interview.


99. Motion to withdraw appearance, and petition to withdraw appearance, and Order of Court withdrawing appearance of Isaiah W. Crippens, Esq., for plaintiffs, Filed: February 15, 1966, Docket for Chisholm, Civil Action 61–29706.