


**“A ROAD FOR WARRIORS:”
THE WESTERN DELAWARES AND THE
SEVEN YEARS WAR**

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*D*uring the Seven Years' War, Delaware Indians living along the western Pennsylvania frontier, referred to here as the western Delawares to differentiate them from their eastern cousins living along the Susquehanna River, raided and pillaged throughout the backcountry settlements of Pennsylvania.¹ The damage and suffering they imposed upon the Quaker colony from 1755 to 1758 nearly brought Pennsylvania and its citizens to their knees, yet western Delaware motivations, goals, and strategies for waging war have been afforded limited attention or have been misunderstood. Too often the western Delaware experience has been packaged together with that of neighboring Shawnees and Mingos (Ohio Iroquois), merging the western Delawares into an artificial union that often takes some manifestation of "Ohio Indians."² Moreover, the western Delawares have generally been reduced to French auxiliaries or at best enthusiastic French allies during the military phase of the conflict.³ While the western Delawares, Ohio Shawnees, and Mingos endured common threats to their

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lands during the Seven Years' War era, attended numerous treaty councils together, and in some cases even lived amongst one another in multi-ethnic Indian villages, there is abundant evidence to suggest that the Delaware experience during the era of the Seven Years' War era was unique. The attitudes and animosities that drove the western Delawares to war were in many regards separate from those of other native peoples, while the strategies and goals they adopted for the war were distinct from those of the French or anyone else.

This essay seeks to separate the western Delawares from the Ohio Indians and banish notions that they were loyal French allies by demonstrating that the western Delawares had a war of their own, fought occasionally with Shawnee or French assistance but consistently guided by western Delaware agendas. Careful examination of western Delaware activities preceding and during the war reveals that these Delawares had a structured, goal-oriented approach to the conflict that was shaped by past experiences and tailored specifically to meet Delaware demands. Their participation in the Seven Years' War was not the byproduct of concerted action among "Ohio Indians" or part of a formal alliance with the French. Instead, the western Delawares were driven by a triangular pattern of resentment, in which they blamed the Iroquois Confederacy, eastern Delaware leaders, and ultimately, the Pennsylvania colonial government, for the loss of Delaware lands in the east. Distrust of these entities combined with fear of forced removal from their new homelands in western Pennsylvania—not the least of which derived from French encroachment—to spur the western Delawares into the war. Thus, to fully comprehend the western Delawares' role in the Seven Years' War, we must look back to the decade immediately preceding the conflict. It was then that the attitudes and animosities were born that would propel the western Delawares into and through the conflict. In addition, we must carry the story to its conclusion late in 1758, where the terms of the Treaty of Easton testified to the success of western Delaware war aims and validated the motivations that had carried the nation through the turbulent era.

The best place to start any story is at the beginning, which in this case can be traced to the westward migrations of Delaware peoples in the wake of their removal from their traditional lands along the Delaware River. As eastern Pennsylvania became crowded with European newcomers seeking cheap and available land during the early decades of the eighteenth century, many Algonquian-speaking Lenapes, more commonly referred to as Delawares, peacefully negotiated the transfer of their lands in southeastern Pennsylvania

and migrated to the Susquehanna River region. Some Delawares, however, decided to move further west, joining Shawnees and other native peoples in a multifaceted migration to the watersheds of the Allegheny and upper Ohio Rivers. Each of these migrant groups arrived in western Pennsylvania with their own set of past traumas and ordeals, although the majority shared a desire for relief from encroachment onto their lands and to obtain security for their traditional way of life. Along the Allegheny-Ohio watershed, the newcomers met, and in some cases merged with, groups of separatist Iroquois peoples, commonly referred to as Mingos. Primarily Senecas, the Mingos had drifted away from the council fires of the Iroquois Confederacy in central New York to seek their own destinies along the western Pennsylvania frontier. Thus, relatively speaking, all the native peoples who came to the western Pennsylvania frontier were newcomers, refugees who had left behind familiar homes and lives for a new start in a new place.⁴

Such was the case with the western Delawares, who reached the Allegheny River in the 1720s hoping to rebuild their communities and start life anew, free from Euro-American entanglements. The center of the Delawares' new world was Kittanning, a sprawling town situated on both sides of the Allegheny River about forty miles north of present-day Pittsburgh. Kittanning would become the largest Indian village in Pennsylvania west of the Appalachian Mountains, and as early as 1731, an Indian trader reported that the town had fifty families of Delawares comprising a total population of three hundred people. Approximately 150 of these were men, a figure that seems to indicate a disproportionately large number of warriors at the town. This perhaps was due to the diffusion of Delawares in the region. Although Kittanning was the western Delawares' principal settlement, their population was not concentrated there. Indeed, the number of Delaware people living at Kittanning appears to have ebbed and flowed as new migrants arrived at the town and older residents moved to new villages further west, keeping the overall population of the town rather modest. Thus, a 1755 report estimated there were between three and four hundred Delawares settled at Kittanning, including men, women, and children, scattered among seven distinct clusters of lodges, a figure quite similar to that recorded some twenty years earlier. Yet all along the Allegheny River and its tributaries, the Delawares spread out and established a series of smaller settlements, such as Kuskuskies (modern New Castle) on the Shenango River or Saucunk (modern Beaver Falls) on the lower Beaver River. There exists no complete census account to gauge the total western Delaware population in the region, but a 1730 report indicated

there were 296 adult male Delawares of fighting age in the Allegheny Valley. Twenty years later, a 1750 estimate guessed that the western Delawares could muster upwards of 500 fighting men from their various towns and villages. Taken together, these accounts provide fair indication that the Delaware population in western Pennsylvania was formidable.⁵

The western Delawares quickly discovered, however, that they had not completely escaped the reach of European colonization. Indeed, colonial explorers and traders may have reached the western Pennsylvania frontier at the same time or perhaps even before the first Delaware migrations. French traders had been active in the Ohio Country since at least 1680, and American colonial traders from New York and Pennsylvania canvassed the region as early as the 1720s. As Delaware migration increased, so too did the number of traders who frequented the Allegheny region, and a brisk commerce quickly developed in which Delaware hunters exchanged deerskins for European commodities. While commercial exchanges were not unwelcome, the relationships that accompanied trade were not always amicable. Both Delawares and colonial traders sought to manage commerce for their own best interests, occasionally leading to hard feelings and animosities. Alcohol was a major point of contention. In their transactions, colonial traders sometimes tried to substitute rum and other liquors for manufactured goods, a practice many western Delaware leaders disliked. Early on, Delaware leaders at Kittanning petitioned the Pennsylvania government to restrict the alcohol trade, requesting that Governor Patrick Gordon "suppress such numbers of them [traders] from coming into the woods and especially from bringing such large quantities of rum." Gordon saw little need for action, and instead he lectured the Delawares to "behave themselves, soberly like men of thought and understanding," adding that the Indians themselves must be accountable for their love of rum, "of which you are so fond that you will not be denied it."⁶

Gordon's response reflected prevailing attitudes toward the western Delawares, whom Pennsylvania colonial authorities viewed as childlike dependents with no authority to speak for themselves. In Gordon's estimation, the western Delawares were still beholden to Delaware headmen living along the Susquehanna River, leaders who themselves were subject to Iroquois overlordship as result of the Six Nations' alleged conquest of the Delawares in the seventeenth century. Indeed, Pennsylvania officials recognized the Iroquois as stewards over all the native peoples who migrated to the Allegheny and upper Ohio valleys, a belief that many Iroquois leaders encouraged to strengthen their negotiating power with Pennsylvania and other British

colonies. Together, the Iroquois Confederacy and several American colonies formed a diplomatic alliance known as the Covenant Chain, which, among other things, forwarded the understanding that native peoples settled along the Allegheny and Ohio Rivers were under the dominion of the Six Nations. To further this belief, as well as facilitate its control over the migrants, the Iroquois Confederacy sent emissaries, known as “half-kings,” to direct and supervise native affairs in western Pennsylvania. For the western Delawares, the Iroquois appointed a Seneca named Tanaghriison as regent, and he relocated to the mixed-Indian village of Logstown near the forks of the Ohio River to better guide his supposed subjects.⁷

Although Tanaghriison derived his authority from the central Iroquois council at Onondaga in New York, he quickly discovered that maintaining influence and importance among his Delaware “nephews” meant publicly aligning himself with his charges, even if his decisions did not always adhere strictly to the dictates of the Iroquois council. As events would demonstrate, the western Delawares did not consider themselves beholden to the Iroquois, who had often supported Pennsylvania land claims against Delaware opposition. During the 1720s, Pennsylvania Governor William Keith worked to secure an alliance with the Six Nations that might ease Indian relations in his colony and smooth the way for the transfer of native lands to Pennsylvania. The Six Nations had acted as representatives or spokesmen for native peoples living along the Susquehanna River since 1710, when they began offering asylum in the Susquehanna Valley to numerous refugee groups. These refugees, who included some Delawares and Shawnees, were in the way of Pennsylvania expansion, and Keith hoped to forge a deal with the Iroquois that would undercut refugee claims to the land and secure their orderly removal further west. To accomplish its goal, the government of Pennsylvania created the fiction, as least in legal terms, that the Iroquois were not only spokesmen for the refugee Indian nations along the Susquehanna, but in fact their political masters. The Pennsylvanians then expanded upon this precedent to assert that the Iroquois held political control over all native peoples inhabiting the colony of Pennsylvania as far as its western border might reach. Delawares and Shawnees denied that they fell under the jurisdiction on this imaginary Iroquois empire, but Pennsylvania authorities insisted that “the Five Nations [Iroquois] have an absolute authority over all our Indians, and may command them as they please.” For Pennsylvania, it was a pleasant fiction, as this construction of Iroquois power simplified matters greatly by allowing the colony to formulate its Indian policy and secure land transfers

through a single entity, the Iroquois Confederacy, rather than having to negotiate with various refugee nations one at a time. Similarly, the Iroquois accepted their elevated status in the alliance as a means of perpetuating their power and authority over the people and lands of the Susquehanna Valley and the Ohio Country.⁸

The arrangement was never accepted by all the Delawares, and for those who opposed Iroquois hegemony, the infamous "Walking Purchase" of 1737, in which Pennsylvania officials and Iroquois representatives defrauded the Delawares out of a vast tract of land along the Delaware River, hardened their resentment. Scores of Delawares went into the west in protest after the Iroquois sachem Canasatego confirmed the legality of the Walking Purchase in 1742. In an antagonistic speech, Canasatego informed Delaware leaders that "We [the Iroquois] conquered you, we made women of you, you know you are women . . . for all these reasons, we charge you to remove instantly. We don't give you the liberty to think about it. You are women; take the advice of a wise man and remove immediately." Although the Walking Purchase did not start the Delawares' westward migration, it was a crucial episode in fomenting western Delaware distrust of Pennsylvania colonial officials and their allies, the Iroquois. Indeed, even Pennsylvania's colonial leaders recognized that the western Delawares were intent upon escaping the shadow of Iroquois dominance. In 1752, Governor James Hamilton informed members of the Penn family that "the Six Nations [Iroquois] consider the western Indians not as councilors but hunters, and would take it amiss to have them treated in any other manner than as a people dependent upon them." "On the other hand," he continued, "the western Indians look upon it, as the truth is, that they either are, or soon will be, as numerous and powerful as the Six Nations at Onondaga, and therefore will not be content to take the law from them."⁹

Pennsylvania and the Iroquois Confederacy were not the only entities the western Delawares blamed for their forced migration. Indeed, animosity toward Iroquois interference in land disputes intersected with a distrust of eastern Delaware leaders who had allowed so much territory to slip from their grasp. What little is known about the Delaware migration to the Allegheny River suggests that many of the Delawares who went west thought Allumapees, also known as Sassoonan, the headman whom Iroquoian and Pennsylvania authorities recognized as "king" of the Delawares, was far too accommodating in his dealings with the Pennsylvania government. By the 1740s, the once great headmen had been reduced to little more than a

drunken puppet, a pawn easily manipulated by the Iroquois and Pennsylvania officials. It is uncertain how many Delawares recognized Allumapees's authority over their mostly autonomous villages, but Pennsylvania and the Iroquois maintained that he spoke for all the Delaware people, and thus expected the Delawares to accept any land deed which he endorsed. That did not sit well with some Delaware headmen, who removed to the Allegheny region in open defiance of Allumapees's authority. Among these were the influential leaders Shannopin and Menakihikon (Captain Hill), who left the Susquehanna settlements without ever seeking the approval of Allumapees, the Iroquois, or Pennsylvania. At the behest of his masters in the Pennsylvania government, Allumapees decreed that the migrants must return to the Susquehanna. They refused, effecting a bifurcation of the Delawares that would last until the American Revolution and sending a clear signal that the western Delawares intended to pursue an independent course from their eastern cousins, the Pennsylvania government, or the Iroquois. Among those who joined the westerners along the Allegheny were Allumapees's own nephews—Shingas, Pisquetomen, and Tamaqua—who rejected the legacy of their family status after Pennsylvania Provincial Secretary James Logan interfered in Delaware politics to block the choice of Pisquetomen as Allumapees's successor, fearing that Pisquetomen would prove far more difficult to manipulate than his uncle. Convinced that the Pennsylvanians could no longer be trusted to act honestly or honorably, the three brothers went into the west to find common cause with Delaware factions already disinclined towards Pennsylvania and the Iroquois. Within a decade, all three would rise to influential positions as warriors, negotiators, and peace-makers among the western Delawares.¹⁰

Regardless of whether Delaware migrants came west in clans, as families, or individually, once they reached the Allegheny watershed they forged a collective determination never to become migrants again. The pervasiveness of their position was recorded by a Pennsylvania fur-trader named Thomas Kinton, who in the 1740s observed a curious ritual during a visit to a western Delaware village near the intersection of the Allegheny and Monongahela rivers. Kinton watched in amazement as the village's inhabitants killed an unwelcome intruder that they discovered lurking in their village—a rat. While the extermination of the rodent seemed commonplace enough to Kinton, the reaction of the western Delawares to the rat's presence in their village struck the trader as extraordinary. Many of the Indians "seemed concerned" over the appearance of the rat and its potential significance. These

"antians," as the trader called them, approached Kinton and sternly informed him that "the French or English should not get that land [the Allegheny River basin] from them, the same prediction being made by their grandfathers on finding a rat on [the] Delaware [River] before the white people came there." For the western Delawares, the presence of rats and bees, or "English flies" as many eastern woodlands Indians referred to them, were telling portents of impending troubles, as they were the products of ecological changes wrought upon the environment by the advancing tide of Euro-American settlement. For the western Delawares, the discovery of the rat was an ominous sign that a struggle for their lands was about to ensue. Moreover, the execution of the rat was symbolic of the attitudes that prevailed in western Delaware society. If Euro-Americans sought to take up possession of the Delawares' new lands in western Pennsylvania, they could expect to share in the rat's fate.¹¹

Thus, it is not surprising that the Seneca regent Tanaghrisson comes across the pages of the past as such a complex and intriguing figure. His was a difficult road, a thin path that wound its way tentatively between two distinct worlds, always pulled this way or that by the designs of the Iroquois or the antagonisms of the western Delawares. It is perhaps a testament to his skills as a politician that Tanaghrisson exercised any influence over the western Delawares, given their bitter feelings toward the Iroquois and dislike of native leaders who consorted too closely with colonial authorities. Yet during the decade preceding the start of the Seven Years' War, when pressures began to mount on the lands at the forks of the Ohio River, Tanaghrisson emerged as the spokesman for the western Delawares during negotiations and councils with colonial diplomats. His status most likely stemmed from his important role in trade negotiations. As the Iroquois regent for the western Delawares, colonial officials sought to work through Tanaghrisson, whom they respected as the Iroquois governor of the region. Colonial acceptance of Tanaghrisson's position allowed him to become a *de facto* middleman in trade negotiations. At council meetings with the colonies, he often accepted and distributed presents and trade goods among Delaware leaders, who in turn passed them on to their constituents. Thus, the western Delawares seem to have been content to recognize Iroquois hegemony when it benefited them, such as allowing Tanaghrisson to represent them during council negotiations, but Tanaghrisson's authority likely extended no further than that of a mouthpiece. Despite his own glorified pretensions to power—in 1752 he sought to impress Virginia trade commissioners by barking at the western Delawares that "you belong

to me and I believe you are to be ruled by me”—there is little evidence to support the idea that Tanaghrisson exercised any real political authority over the western Delawares.¹²

Tanaghrisson's role as spokesman for the western Delawares often placed him at the center of controversy, especially when Pennsylvanians and Virginians began to pressure the western Delawares for land cessions in the early 1750s. It was trade that first fixed the gaze of American colonials upon the headwaters of the Ohio, but it was land that held it there. Through a combination of deliberate scheming and innocent innuendo, Indian traders opened inroads into the trans-Appalachian West that heightened the awareness of eastern colonial elites to the bounty of western Pennsylvania lands. As the traders' vast commercial enterprises expanded, interest in native lands intensified. Indeed, during 1748 trade negotiations at Logstown, Conrad Weiser, Pennsylvania's foremost Indian negotiator in the years prior to the Seven Years' War, was quite taken with the "extraordinarily rich" lands around him, lamenting that "such a large and good country should be unsettled." Like other colonial entrepreneurs, Weiser recognized the immense profits to be had in land speculation. Not surprisingly, soon after the conference he urged Pennsylvania authorities to "purchase that part of their province from the Indians."¹³

Weiser was not alone in his interest in the Ohio forks. Wealthy land speculators from Virginia, most visibly represented by the union of economic resources and political power known as the Ohio Company, also began moving to secure possession of the lands around the forks of the Ohio. The Virginians believed that the region was part of the colony of Virginia, based upon their interpretation of the 1744 Treaty of Lancaster. The treaty conference had been called to address the grievances between the Iroquois Confederacy and the colonies of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland, primary among these being the killing of several Virginia colonists by an Iroquois war party traveling through the Old Dominion to attack the Catawbas and Cherokees in the Carolinas. To appease the Virginians, the Iroquois signed a document renouncing their confederacy's claims to "the lands within the said colony [Virginia], as it now or hereafter may be peopled." But the Virginians believed their colonial charter gave them possession of lands in what is now western Pennsylvania, and with the Iroquois relinquishing their claim, the Ohio Company saw no further obstacles to selling lands in the region. However, the authority of the Iroquois to make such a cession was questionable, and there was much dispute as to the exact nature of the agreement, as the

Iroquois would later maintain that they agreed only to allow the Virginians to use the land, not take possession of it.¹⁴

Nonetheless, the Virginians forged ahead. In 1752 they arranged a conference at Logstown, where they hoped to remove any remaining native opposition to their taking possession of the Ohio forks. When the western Delawares, Shawnees, and other upper Ohio Indians at the meeting were informed by the Virginians of the Lancaster Treaty, they angrily "blamed them [the Iroquois] much for keeping it private" and asserted that the Iroquois "never told them they sold further than the warrior's road [along the Appalachian Mountains]." They were not prepared to cede any part of their new homeland to Virginia. Indeed, Christopher Gist, the agent sent by Virginia to arrange the conference reported that "they began to suspect me, and knew I was come to settle their lands." Threats were made against Gist's life, and only the timely intervention of the well-known and respected Indian trader George Croghan prevented Gist's death. Tanaghrisson, present as the chief spokesman of the western Delawares, was caught in a difficult position. The Delaware position was clear, yet Tanaghrisson's path was not so easy, for the Virginians held a seemingly legal treaty ratified by his superiors in the Iroquois Confederacy, a document not easily ignored by an Iroquois viceroy. Tanaghrisson's actions at Logstown betrayed his dilemma. Publicly, the western Delawares' spokesman denied the validity of the Lancaster deed. Then he tried to forestall making any ruling by asserting that he understood the treaty to grant Virginia only the lands on the eastern side of the Appalachian Mountains, adding that until confirmation came from the Iroquois, "we cannot give you a further answer." Privately, however, Tanaghrisson admitted that "he spoke with the sentiments of others [the Delawares] and not his own." After intense cross-examination by the Virginia negotiators, he relented and recognized the Lancaster deed as valid, even granting explicit permission for the Virginians "to construct a stronghold [fort] at the fork of the Monongahela to keep such goods as powder, lead, and necessities as shall be wanting."¹⁵

Tanaghrisson's actions at Logstown have long been characterized by historians as self-serving and duplicitous, yet the Seneca "half-king" appears to have pursued the only practical course of action available to him.¹⁶ He could not openly break with the western Delawares, yet he also could not defy an Iroquois-brokered treaty. While there is some evidence that Tanaghrisson may have been bribed by agents of the Ohio Company to allow recognition of the Lancaster Treaty, this must be considered within the context of other

factors. No doubt the Virginians' promise of a steady flow of gifts and trade goods was influential in Tanaghrisson's acquiescence, but it did not lead to a betrayal of the Delawares. It is important to note that he agreed only to "a settlement or settlements of British subjects on the southern or eastern parts of the River Ohio." Aside from a few hunting camps, there is no indication that any western Delaware settlements were situated on these lands, which meant that the core of Delaware territory had not been violated, an important distinction that may have allowed Tanaghrisson to save face with his charges. Moreover, at the conference, Tanaghrisson formally recognized Shingas as "king" of the western Delawares, a measure the Iroquois viceroy had for some time resisted. To the assembled Delawares present, Tanaghrisson stated that he *now* thought it "proper to give you Shingas for your King, whom you must look upon as your chief, and with whom all public business must be transacted between you and your brethren, the English." His timing and choice of venue could not have been coincidental. Tanaghrisson's gesture, accepted by Tamaqua, who stood as proxy for his brother Shingas, formally recognized that the western Delawares had their own voice, independent of their Iroquois "half-king," that must be heard in any discussions regarding land considerations. Understanding that he could not directly contradict an Iroquois agreement, Tanaghrisson ratified the Lancaster deal, but in the process he restricted the Virginians from the crossing the Ohio River into western Delaware territory and established a new protocol in which the colonists would have to deal with the Delawares directly.¹⁷

An additional impetus for Tanaghrisson's recognition of Shingas and western Delaware autonomy may have come from the recent actions of the French, who had begun to assert their own claims to the Allegheny River region. In 1749, a French expedition under Captain Pierre Joseph Celoron de Blainville visited numerous western Delaware villages, where the French asserted their dominion over the region. In 1751, Philippe-Thomas Chabert de Joncaire, a Frenchman with strong ties to the Senecas, appeared in Logstown to reiterate French claims and warn away Anglo-American traders. Then, during the summer of 1752, a large force of French-allied Indians and Canadian militia sacked Pickawillany, a large Piankashaw (Miami) Indian village in central Ohio, where they subdued the pro-British population of the town and, for dramatic effect, killed and ate the Piankashaw headman La Demoselle. The attack came about in part because of the intrusion of Pennsylvania traders into French commercial enclaves during the 1740s, but it revealed only a fraction of the French resolve. In early 1753, two thousand French-Canadians

and their Indian allies were already moving toward the western Pennsylvania frontier, intent on building a string of forts along the Allegheny River to forcefully assert their political and economic control over the region.¹⁸

Tanaghrisson was violently anti-French. He had been perhaps the most outspoken of all native leaders as the French ramped up their efforts to exercise power in the upper Ohio Valley, having confronted Joncaire in 1751 “with the air of a warrior” to deny French claims to the region. While this increased his attractiveness to the Virginians, who also desired to keep the French out of the region, Tanaghrisson’s stance made him a likely target for reprisal if the French invaded the western Pennsylvania frontier. The Iroquois regent also was troubled by what reactions the western Delawares in the region might have to the appearance of the French army. Would they follow his lead and resist, or would they acquiesce and seek accommodation with the French? If the French were allowed entry, Tanaghrisson realized his position of authority in the region would be doomed, as it would be unlikely that the French would work through the Iroquois regent in imitation of the Pennsylvania-Iroquois alliance. Tanaghrisson’s position as spokesman for the western Delawares may have already been weakening, as the absence of Shingas from Logstown in 1752 may be an important indication that at least some western Delawares no longer desired Tanaghrisson as a mediator. Such considerations would have been a powerful additional motivation for the public recognition of Shingas as “king” of the western Delawares. By acknowledging the authority of Shingas, it seems Tanaghrisson hoped to gain a powerful ally, one who would support his floundering role as spokesmen and commit the western Delawares to a strong stance against the French invasion.¹⁹

Regardless of the motivations or machinations behind Tanaghrisson’s recognition of Shingas, the western Delawares were an important people who could not be ignored by anyone interested in the Allegheny frontier. Fittingly, western Delaware agendas would play an important role in the Seven Years’ War on the western Pennsylvania frontier. Yet even as the shadow of war darkened their communities, the western Delawares did not seek to cut off all Euro-American contact. They encouraged trade, so long as it remained within defined parameters, but the question of land was another matter entirely. During councils and meetings in Pennsylvania and Virginia, the western Delawares delineated a policy that welcomed trade but strongly opposed settlement or land acquisition. As a concession to the looming French presence, the western Delawares lukewarmly acquiesced to fortified trading houses near their territory, but they emphasized that these forts

would be for their benefit and that they would determine their locations, making it clear that they would “not like to hear of their lands being settled over Allegheny Mountain.” Despite their diplomatic efforts, colonial claims against their territory only increased, as Pennsylvanians and Virginians alike schemed to deprive the western Delawares of their lands. Motivated by the region’s tremendous potential for economic development, land speculators in Virginia and merchant firms in Pennsylvania attempted to intertwine trade agreements with land contracts, hoping to manipulate the Delawares’ economic needs into a land cession.²⁰

The colonists’ duplicity angered western Delaware leaders, but so too did the belligerent stance of the French, whose invasion of the Allegheny River corridor posed a serious threat to native sovereignty. This was not lost on Delaware leaders like Tamaqua, who wondered aloud “where the Indians’ lands lay, for that the French claimed all the land on one side of the River Ohio and the English on the other side.” Messengers were dispatched to the French from the Delaware town of Venango warning the French not to enter Delaware territory, but the warning was ignored. A second message from the Delawares produced similar results. Finally, after the vanguard of the French force reached Presque Isle (present-day Erie) and began moving inland, Tanaghrisson personally traveled to the French camp to treat with the French commander, Captain Paul Marin de la Malgue. Curiously, Tanaghrisson addressed the French in language more akin to a western Delaware warrior than an Iroquois viceroy. He informed Marin that “The river where we are belongs to us warriors. The chiefs who look after affairs [the Iroquois] are not its masters. It is a road for warriors and not for these chiefs.” He further declared to Marin that “you must go off this land,” clarifying that neither the British nor the French were welcome and warning the French commander that “I shall strike at whoever does not listen to us.” Tanaghrisson’s speech openly denied the authority of the Iroquois Confederacy and asserted the rights of native peoples living along the Allegheny River, namely the western Delawares. Marin, however, was not impressed. “I despise all the stupid things you said,” he replied to Tanaghrisson, adding that “I shall continue on my way, and if any persons are bold enough to set up barriers to hinder my march, I shall knock them over so vigorously that they may crush those who made them.”²¹

Despite Delaware warnings, Tanaghrisson’s pronouncement, and even a polite but pathetic eviction notice served to the French by a naïve George Washington in late 1753, the French made good on Marin’s promise by

advancing down the Allegheny River in the spring of 1754. The French easily captured the forks of the Ohio River and then beat back an attempt to retake the forks by Virginia militia units under Washington. In the wake of Washington's defeat, some native peoples allied themselves with the French, but western Delaware leaders, wary of engaging their people alongside any European imperial power, adopted a more cautious approach. Shingas, in particular, was not yet prepared to tolerate, yet alone embrace, the French. Indeed, most western Delaware leaders opposed the French presence, but they had not yet settled upon a unified response. Nor could one be arrived at easily, as economic considerations complicated the natives' political stance. French soldiers had driven away the remaining Pennsylvania traders, leaving the western Delawares without immediate access to European manufactured goods. The French, now busily constructing Fort Duquesne at the Ohio forks, offered to replace the Pennsylvanians as the Delawares' primary trade partners, but they paired economics with diplomacy. The French would supply the Delawares only if they agreed to renounce their economic ties with the Pennsylvania traders. And the tone of negotiation was far from cordial. If the Delawares refused, the French promised to "prevent their planting and thereby render them incapable of supporting their families." In short, if the western Delawares refused to accept French hegemony over the region, the French would drive them from their lands. Accordingly, western Delaware leaders resolved to neither openly accept nor oppose the French presence until a clearer course of action presented itself.²²

The western Delawares' neutrality did not sit well with all native leaders in the region. Tanaghrisson was particularly disappointed. His decision to openly acknowledge Delaware autonomy had not produced the results he intended, as Shingas had not rallied the Delawares to a virulent opposition of the French. By all accounts, Shingas opposed the French invasion, but he refused to commit his people to war against the French until he could better gauge the developing situation. Thus, he kept the western Delawares neutral and simply ignored Tanaghrisson's increasingly desperate calls for action. In 1753, for example, when Tanaghrisson commanded Shingas to accompany George Washington on his mission to warn away the French, the Delaware leader paid no attention to the directive. As the French occupation progressed, Shingas repeatedly refused to answer Tanaghrisson's summons to councils. With the Delawares proceeding very cautiously and the Virginians defeated at Fort Necessity, Tanaghrisson's list of allies grew thin. Bereft of authority and broken in spirit, the once proud Seneca "half-king" was

literally reduced to tears, prompting a French official to note that “this chief who went like a lion roaring out destruction came back like a lamb.”²³

Tanaghrisson’s plan to rally the western Delawares against the French failed in part because of divisions within Delaware leadership regarding how to respond to the French threat. Delaware leaders were determined to remain on their lands, but there was a difference of opinion regarding how best to accomplish this goal. For those western Delawares whose villages lay closest in proximity to the French invasion route, accommodation, even if temporary, seemed the most logical choice. Marin reported to his superiors that Delawares from Venango, under their headman Custaloga, had assisted the French by portaging supplies from Presque Isle to the Allegheny River. Yet the Delawares did not propose an alliance and they proved to be unreliable employees. Indeed, Custaloga’s Delawares infuriated the French by stealing most of the supplies they had been paid to deliver down the Allegheny River. Other Delaware leaders sought to use diplomacy to blunt the French menace. In September 1754, Tamaqua led a western Delaware delegation east to the Juniata River to meet with Tanaghrisson, who had fled the Allegheny region after Washington’s defeat at Fort Necessity. Tamaqua beseeched the former spokesman to seek Iroquois intervention in the crisis. “We have hitherto followed your directions and lived very easy under your protection, and no high wind did blow to make us uneasy,” remarked Tamaqua, “but now things seem to take another turn and high wind is rising. We desire you, therefore, Uncle, to have your eyes open and be watchful over us, your cousins, as you always have been heretofore.” Tamaqua was part of a faction that wanted to revive the Delawares’ traditional status of “women,” a status bestowed upon the larger Delaware nation by the Iroquois after they allegedly conquered the Delawares in the seventeenth century. Being designated as “women” implied that the Delawares were not warriors, but rather Iroquois-sponsored negotiators who applied diplomacy to conflict resolution rather than military force. It is unlikely Tamaqua truly saw the western Delawares as subservient to the Iroquois; rather his appeal more likely derived from his desire to avoid a potentially costly war, a conflict whose outcome even the most far-sighted leaders could not see clearly.²⁴

Tamaqua’s desires notwithstanding, it was too late in the game for old traditions to return to prominence. By migrating to the Allegheny-Ohio River watershed and denouncing the leadership of eastern Delaware leaders, the western Delawares had rebelled against Iroquois hegemony and laid aside their former status as “women.” Certain linkages still existed between the

"A ROAD FOR WARRIORS:"

two peoples, evidenced by the western Delawares' assertion in August 1753 that they "looked upon them [the Iroquois] as their rulers and they were ready to strike the French whenever they bid them," but the Delawares could no longer be considered "women." They might accept the fiction of Iroquois dominance to gain allies against the French, but even in so doing the western Delawares asserted themselves as warriors, something the Iroquois did not look upon kindly. Indeed, on more than one occasion Iroquois spokesmen angrily informed colonial officials that they considered the western Delawares to be "young and giddy men and children; [and] that they [the Iroquois] were their fathers, and if the British wanted anything from these childish people, they must speak to their fathers." Not surprisingly, the Iroquois offered no assistance to Tamaqua.²⁵

The actions of Custologa's followers and Tamaqua's appeal to the Iroquois illustrate that what most concerned western Delaware leaders was the prospect of fighting the French alone. The example of Pickawillany was still fresh in their minds, and few Delawares appeared anxious to share in the Miamis' fate. Indeed, some western Delawares thought it better to negotiate with the French or perhaps even accommodate them rather than fight. Even the bellicose faction, headed by Shingas, was not prepared to fight unassisted. Late in 1753, Shingas, Tamaqua, and Pisquetomen traveled to Winchester, Virginia, and Carlisle, Pennsylvania, to stand beside Shawnees and Mingos who had come to seek support against the French. They were disappointed, as their pleas for military aid were brushed aside. In response, the western Delawares supported the decision of Scarouady, the Iroquois spokesman for the Shawnees, to revoke the Logstown agreement of 1752, and together they informed the Virginians that "we now request that you not build that strong-house, for we intend to keep our country clear of settlements during these troubling times." Similarly, when Pennsylvania officials at Carlisle refused the natives' request for guns and ammunition, Scarouady expressed the Delawares' and Shawnees' desire that the Pennsylvanians "at present forbear settling on our lands over the Allegheny hills" and warned the colonial officials to "let none of your people settle beyond where they are now." Similar pleas for colonial assistance in 1754 were also rebuffed. The colonials, greatly dismayed by Washington's defeat at Fort Necessity, refused to make any effort to dislodge the French and instead encouraged the Delawares to take matters into their own hands. This posture struck a cord with the western Delawares, who, according to British Indian agents, now believed "what the French tell them of their brethren is too true, that is that the English are afraid of the French."²⁶

Colonial officials in Pennsylvania may have been reluctant to aid the western Delawares against the French, but that fear did not prevent them from continuing their quest to obtain western Delaware lands. During a 1754 council held in Albany, New York, Pennsylvania diplomats secured a massive land grant from the Iroquois that awarded the colony possession of "all the lands that have been settled by white people, or are now wanted for settlements, on the west side of the river Susquehanna, as far westward as the province extends," territory that included the Allegheny-upper Ohio watershed. It was a calculated maneuver. Pennsylvania officials recognized that the western Delawares would never accede to another Iroquois-brokered land deal, especially one that was perhaps even more controversial and treacherous than the 1737 Walking Purchase. As George Croghan informed his superiors in the Pennsylvania government, "the whole of the Ohio Indians does not know what to think . . . on account of settling the lands, the government may have what opinion they will of the Ohio Indians, and think they are obliged to do what the Onondaga [Iroquois] council will bid them, but I assure your honor, they will act for themselves at this time without consulting the Onondaga council." Although Pennsylvania leaders understood the western Delawares' anger over the Albany cession, they demonstrated no inclination to back away from the deal. Indeed, the Pennsylvania government sent word to the Delawares through its Indian agent Conrad Weiser that the lands along the Allegheny River were "your hunting cabin only," lands leased to the western Delawares by the Iroquois and not territory upon which they had any permanent claim. This ill-timed and tactless declaration would come back to haunt Pennsylvania and its peoples over the course of the next four years.²⁷

Despite the news of the Albany land cession, western Delaware leaders did not act rashly. They had a choice to make, one that seemingly would involve them in a war on one side or another, but coming to terms with the conflict was a weighty matter. Friendship with the French seemingly held certain advantages, especially within the economic realm, but Shingas remained cool to the French alliance, especially after French-allied Caughnawaga Iroquois killed several Delawares during an altercation. When he learned in early 1755 that the British had dispatched a formidable army to dislodge the French from the Ohio Forks, Shingas decided to make one final overture for British aid. Recognizing that his people occupied what was about to become a war zone, and believing the approaching British army to be far stronger than the French force at Fort Duquesne, Shingas decided to seek a military alliance with the British, but only if they agreed to guarantee the Delawares'

rights to the land along the Allegheny watershed. In June 1755, Shingas led a Delaware military delegation to Cumberland, Maryland to negotiate with the British commander, Major General Edward Braddock. As a direct representative of the British crown, Braddock could overturn the Albany agreement and provide some measure of security for western Delaware lands. Shingas offered Delaware support against the French in return for assurances that the British did not intend to drive his people off the land. But the negotiations, and any chance for an alliance, soured when Braddock informed the Delawares that he intended to see their lands incorporated into the colonies. Shingas quickly inquired whether his people "might not be permitted to live and trade among the English and have a hunting ground sufficient to support themselves and their families, as they had no where to flee but into the arms of the French." Braddock's terse reply that "no savage shall inherit the land" so shocked Shingas that the Delaware leader repeated the question, only to have Braddock utter the same dark condemnation. An outraged Shingas promptly led his warriors out of camp, but not before declaring that "if they [the western Delawares] might not have liberty to live on the land, they would not fight for it." At least not on the side of the British.²⁸

Following the encounter with Braddock, Shingas, still wary of engaging his people on the losing side of the upcoming confrontation, labored to keep the majority of the western Delawares neutral. He later recalled that while a few Delawares joined the French, "the greater part remained neuter till they saw how things would go between Braddock and French in their engagement." Although he chose to await the outcome of the battle, the fear that Braddock's army would force his people's removal from the western Pennsylvania frontier led Shingas closer to an alliance with the French. Coming to terms with the French was by no means a popular option, but at least the French had betrayed no intention to seize Indian land, whereas the Delawares' experience with Braddock paralleled that of other upper Ohio Indians, who claimed that the general "looked upon us as Dogs . . . [and] never appeared pleased with us." Faced with a difficult choice, the western Delawares opted for what appeared to be the lesser of two evils. Resigned to the realization that the land aggression shown by the British and their colonists would not be deterred through diplomacy, Shingas and other Delaware leaders opted to wage a war against the British colonies that would parallel that of the French. Braddock's tactless declaration was not the sole cause of this shift in alignment, but rather the capstone on a foundation of distrust long in the making. Memories of their dispossession in eastern

Pennsylvania coalesced with Braddock's ill-timed pronouncement to produce a combustible reaction. As Shingas summarized after the French dispatched of Braddock's army at the battle of the Monongahela, "we the Delawares of Ohio do declare war against the English." "We have been their friends many years," the Delaware "king" explained, "but now [we] have taken up the hatchet against them, and we will never make it up with them whilst there is an Englishman alive."²⁹

Although the initial target of the western Delawares' war would be the British colonies, they never envisioned themselves as French allies. Indeed, most Delaware leaders considered the French as much of a threat to their security as the land-hungry British colonials. But they could not realistically fight both enemies at once. Thus, the western Delawares' war agenda sought removal of the British threat first, and then they would deal with the French. There was no hesitation or reluctance to fight either opponent separately, as Shingas denigrated the British colonists as nothing more than "a parcel of old women," while the Delawares believed that "we may do afterwards what we please with the French, for we have [them] as it were in a sheep den, and may cut them [off] at any time." The Delaware leader Ackowanothic offered a more pragmatic view: the western Delawares needed French assistance to defeat the British colonists because they were "such a numerous people," but once this was accomplished, he believed "we can drive away the French when we please." The western Delawares' sequential plan for the war provides context for Tamaqua's later claims that the western Delawares had never accepted the "French hatchet," but instead had reached an accord with the French-allied Wyandots and Caughnawaga Iroquois. What might seem like a minor clarification is in fact an important distinction when taking into account that the western Delawares never considered themselves allies of the French, and in fact intended to attack the French as soon as the war against the British reached a successful conclusion.³⁰

No matter who they regarded as their enemy, the western Delawares' primary consideration during the war was the preservation of their territory. Maintaining possession of their lands against any and all rival claimants was first and foremost among their goals; all other considerations were peripheral. Independence from the Iroquois Confederacy, an aspiration which played a key role in the eastern Delaware war effort, was not as paramount for the western Delawares, as events prior to the Seven Years' War demonstrate that the western Delawares had asserted their independence from the Iroquois before the war erupted. Nor were French military objectives in the war

"A ROAD FOR WARRIORS:"

particularly relevant to the western Delawares, except in that they sometimes coincided with Delaware agendas. At best, cooperation with the French sprung from mutual convenience: the western Delawares needed French weapons and trade, while the French needed native warriors to maintain their modest military presence in the region. But the western Delawares fought for their own ends, which did not always coincide with French objectives, rendering French participation in their campaigns for the most part limited and advisory. As the violence began on the Pennsylvania frontier, the western Delawares' strategy was to target Pennsylvania and its citizens, in the process revenging themselves upon Brother Onas—the native term for the Pennsylvania government—for the Albany treaty, the Walking Purchase of 1737, and a host of other grievances. The western Delawares thus sought to pound Pennsylvania into submission, a condition by which they might force the colony's leaders to rescind the Albany cession and guarantee Delaware landholdings along the Allegheny against all future colonial encroachments. With such a guarantee in hand, Delaware leaders would then expel the French, securing their lands from all Euro-American interlopers. Throughout the three-and-a-half year war that ensued, the western Delawares held closely to this singular objective.

In the purest sense then, for the western Delawares the conflict was a border war. Their primary objective, upon which all other goals were based, was to use war as a leveraging tool to obtain political concessions from the Pennsylvania government. They believed they could accomplish this goal by targeting the frontier population of the Quaker colony, the very people who inhabited what was once Delaware land and who would pour over the mountains into the Allegheny region if not sufficiently convinced to remain where they were. A careful examination of their raids during the Seven Years' War reveals that they were designed to unleash widespread terror and suffering upon the Pennsylvania backcountry in an effort to force the frontier population to call upon their provincial leaders to make peace with the Indians. The Delawares were adamant that no peace would be concluded without guarantees that their territory along the western Pennsylvania would forever remain free from encroachment, which by definition would involve repealing the Albany purchase. It was a sound strategy, one that the French wholeheartedly supported. The governor of New France, Pierre Francois Rigaud de Vaudreuil, believed that "nothing is more calculated to disgust the people of those colonies and to make them desire the return of peace." The French garrison at Fort Duquesne thus eagerly provided Delaware warriors with weapons and ammunition and

encouraged them to attack the frontier settlements. While some French officials recognized that the western Delaware raids had a life of their own, none fully understood that each Delaware victory brought closer the day when the French would also be expelled from the region.³¹

Western Delaware leaders inherited the task of putting this strategy into effect on the ground level and developing tactics to assure its success. Among those recorded as leading the war effort were both present and future leaders of the western Delawares, including Shingas, Pisquetomen, Killbuck, Delaware George, White Eyes, and Captain Jacobs. The war leaders adopted tactics that focused upon weaknesses prevalent in the Pennsylvania backcountry, where thinly populated villages and individual farms dominated the landscape. Large plantations or densely populated settlements were few and far between. In addition, forts or well-defended homesteads were almost nonexistent, leaving backcountry settlers few places of refuge from determined attacks. Throughout the border war, western Delaware warriors used this isolation to their advantage while waging a war of terror against the frontier population of Pennsylvania. Their raids displayed a sophisticated level of organization. Larger war parties, sometimes in excess of fifty warriors and occasionally accompanied by French advisers, attacked denser settlements or military targets, including forts. Such attacks usually occurred during the planting or harvest season, when stronger settlements were vulnerable because the majority of their male inhabitants were working the fields, leaving the men exposed to attack and relying on women, children, and the elderly to look after defense of the settlements. Shingas's warriors destroyed Fort Granville in Cumberland Country, Pennsylvania, in this manner during July 1756. The majority of the raids during the border war, however, involved smaller groups of warriors, often numbering less than twenty warriors. These far-ranging war parties typically bypassed the few large settlements and forts in favor of attacking an isolated farm or homestead, where they engaged in a sort of lightning warfare. Delaware raiders struck quickly and without warning, killed or captured as many inhabitants as possible, burned the buildings, and withdrew before retaliation could be organized.³²

As a war leader, Shingas excelled at both types of attacks, often during the same raid. In October and November 1755, he led an exceptionally large war party, numbering more than one hundred and fifty warriors, across the mountains to attack the Pennsylvania and Virginia frontiers. His band fell upon the region around Fort Cumberland, Virginia, killing nearly one hundred people in the settlements along Patterson's Creek. The Delawares then

"A ROAD FOR WARRIORS:"

crossed into Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, where Shingas divided his warriors into smaller parties and launched several simultaneous attacks throughout the countryside. They sacked numerous communities in the area, along with many outlying farms. Two-thirds of the inhabitants of the Juniata Valley fled their homes for the safety of the east during the raid, leaving one official to declare that "I am of opinion this county will be lead [left] dissolute without inhabitant[s]." ³³

Speed and surprise were the key elements of the western Delawares' success. Their attacks generally came without warning and often were over before assistance could arrive from neighboring communities. Yet their tactics also demonstrated a merger of traditional native warfare practices with new techniques learned from their European adversaries. On the one hand, Delaware warriors waged a traditional native war of plunder. Hundreds of women and children were taken as captives, farms and homesteads were looted and ransacked, and livestock were stolen and taken back to the western Delaware villages. Tradition, however, was mediated by the incorporation of European concepts of war. One particularly important change was the adoption of the European emphasis placed upon killing the enemy. As Delaware warriors took prisoners and plunder, they simultaneously killed nearly every male colonist they encountered, often going out of their way to escalate the body count. They waged the war in a very personal manner, striking at what they saw as the heart of Brother Onas in retribution for perceived past wrongs. Moreover, the Delawares also employed terror tactics long associated with European conventions of warfare. The bodies of dead settlers often were mutilated and then left prominently displayed for the other residents to view. At Penn's Creek in October 1755, Delaware warriors purposefully burned the lower half of a man in fire and then arranged the body in a sitting position with two tomahawks protruding from his head. Another woman was found with her breasts cut off and propped up by a long stake that had been driven through her body. While mutilation was not uncommon in eastern woodland warfare practices, these actions were inconsistent with the Delawares' traditionally ritualistic forms of torture. Rather these mutilations were part of a psychological terror campaign designed to intimidate and dishearten their opponents, not at all unlike the Massachusetts colonists' mounting of Metacom's head on a pike in Plymouth Colony following King Philip's War. ³⁴

If the objective of the attacks was to create a level of suffering and fear so great that the frontier population would pressure their colonial governments

to make peace with the Indians, the western Delawares achieved a remarkable level of success. Pennsylvania authorities struggled to defend their frontiers against Indian warriors who, according to one observer, "lurk in the woods until they have an opportunity of surprising unguarded settlers." As western Delaware warriors devastated the backwoods settlements of Pennsylvania, terror and paranoia gripped entire communities. "You cannot form no just idea of the distressed and distracted condition of our out inhabitants," commented one local official, "unless your eyes seen and your ears heard their cries." Residents were reluctant to venture outside of their homes or tend to their fields lest they be caught unaware by "Shingas the terrible." One beleaguered victim, who had just experienced a raid, informed his father that "I'm in so much horror and confusion I scarce know what I am writing." Not surprisingly, backcountry inhabitants fled by the thousands as the frontier rapidly retreated eastward under the strain of the border war. In 1756, the Pennsylvania assembly learned that a large stretch of land near the Maryland border "has been entirely deserted . . . [and] the houses and improvements reduced to ashes." Similar situations existed throughout the backcountry, where the populations of the western counties dropped significantly as settlers fled up to one hundred or more miles east to escape the attacks. During the height of the raids in 1756, a French officer at Fort Duquesne bragged to his superiors that Delaware raiding parties could travel two hundred miles to the east through abandoned settlements without finding a single inhabitant.³⁵

The Pennsylvania government was befuddled by the onslaught. Provincial authorities recognized the severity of the situation, but seemed incapable of taking any meaningful action. Political divisions in the Pennsylvania Assembly handicapped efforts to facilitate frontier defense, as the border war divided men of power and influence who could not agree on how best to respond the western Delawares' aggression or come to terms about how public defenses should be financed. On those occasions when action did occur, the results were rarely as desired. Belatedly, the Pennsylvania Assembly raised regiments and constructed fortifications to defend the backcountry, but neither had any meaningful impact on the conflict. Offensive campaigns also proved impotent, as western Delaware warriors eluded or defeated ranger units sent to intercept them and openly attacked thinly garrisoned stockades and forts. Even the one notable exception, Colonel John Armstrong's surprise assault upon the western Delaware village of Kittanning in 1756, failed to produce tangible results. The war leader Captain Jacobs died during the assault—burned alive in his lodge after refusing to surrender—but the majority of the Delawares,

Shingas included, escaped. The failure to capture or kill Shingas, who had a \$700 bounty on his head, rendered Armstrong's raid a political failure, as the Pennsylvanians were unable to eliminate one of their main tormentors. The raid was also a military failure. Seventeen Pennsylvanians died during the western Delawares' counterattack, thirteen were wounded, and another nineteen were captured. Although the liberation of Delaware captives was a principal goal of Armstrong's raid, the Pennsylvanians managed to free only seven prisoners. While the raid served to displace some Delawares further west to the Kuskuskies towns, the destruction of Kittanning had little tangible effect upon the war. Indeed, in reprisal for Armstrong's attack, Delaware raids against the Pennsylvania frontier increased in 1757.³⁶

The Iroquois Confederacy, technically neutral at this time although they would later forge an alliance with the British, also could do little to stop the Delaware onslaught. The Iroquois Council censured the western Delawares for their attacks against Pennsylvania during the border war, informing their supposed wards that "they were drunk and out of their senses, and did not consider the consequences of their ill behavior." The western Delaware responded with an insolence nurtured by long years of resentment. "Say no more to us on that head," Delaware representatives told the Iroquois, "lest we cut off your private parts and make women of you, as you have done to us." The western Delawares similarly rebuked a later Iroquois delegation under the direction of Shickellamy and Scarouady, both of whom at one time served as Iroquois regents over supposedly subservient native peoples. The Iroquois ambassadors ordered the Delawares to cease their attacks against Pennsylvania, to which Delaware spokesmen replied by threatening to kill the two viceroys and asserting that they had "determined not to be ruled any longer by you as women." Iroquois control over the western Delawares, which had always been tenuous at best, appeared very much dead.³⁷

Indeed, rather than look to other native groups for guidance, the western Delawares sought to use the border war as an opportunity to expand their own influence. In October 1755, while Shingas led an attack against Pennsylvania settlements along Penn's Creek, a party of western Delaware warriors, their faces painted black, appeared in Shamokin, the Susquehanna Delawares' principal town. The westerners informed their eastern cousins that they were at war with Pennsylvania, and they urged the Susquehanna Delawares to join in the conflict. The Susquehanna Delawares refused, but Shingas sent another war party bearing a similar invitation to the Susquehanna in November. Not long thereafter, a group of Susquehanna Delawares led by a

war leader known as Captain Jachebus attacked the Moravian community of Gnaddenhutten. The influential headman Teedyuscung soon followed the example of Jachebus, and by the spring of 1756, most of the Susquehanna Delawares had joined in the war. The Susquehanna Delawares certainly had their own motivations for engaging in the Seven Years' War, but the knowledge that their cousins along the Allegheny had struck Pennsylvania seems to have been a catalyst in their own decision to finally go to war.³⁸

In sum, the western Delawares dictated the pace and character of the war, and there was little the Pennsylvania government, its backcountry residents, or its Iroquois allies could do to alter the arrangement. Delaware warriors seemed able to strike at any time and any place without warning and, as intended, terror and paranoia gripped entire frontier communities. Backcountry inhabitants quickly became angry with their elected officials, whom they blamed for failing to protect them. There seemed to be no escape from their torment. The settlers' fears were firmly rooted in the reality of their suffering. During the three years of the border war, as many as 2,000 colonists were killed or captured during the raids, with thousands of uncounted others forced into refugee camps in the east. At their apex in 1756, when the Susquehanna Delawares fully participated in the war, the Delaware raids penetrated deep into eastern Pennsylvania, reaching as far east as Reading, only forty miles from Philadelphia. Understandably, the besieged backcountry population demanded either protection or retaliation. The failure of the Pennsylvania government to secure either only fed their rage, which backcountry folk increasingly directed against the Pennsylvania government. In an early expression of the parochial mentality that would take root along the western Pennsylvania frontier, backcountry residents blamed their suffering on "the negligence and insensibility of the administration, to whose inactivity there are so many sacrifices." Twice their rage boiled over into a state of near rebellion. During the fall of 1755, a mob of nearly 700 people descended on Philadelphia and demanded protection for their families. In April 1756, residents of Cumberland County gathered to make a second march on Philadelphia, although they eventually disbanded before reaching the city.³⁹

This mounting popular pressure, coupled with the total failure of provincial military efforts, finally forced Pennsylvania authorities to explore the possibility of negotiating an end to the conflict. This process began with the eastern Delaware leader Teedyuscung, who was more accessible and more amenable to peace overtures than western Delaware leaders. During negotiations in late 1756 and throughout 1757, Teedyuscung and the Susquehanna

"A ROAD FOR WARRIORS!"

Delawares agreed to a framework for peace. Convincing the western Delawares to follow suit would not be as easy. However, in 1758 two developing factors helped make a peace settlement possible. First, British General John Forbes began amassing a formidable army in eastern Pennsylvania for a campaign against Fort Duquesne. The general preferred to fight the French without also engaging the Western Delawares, so he strongly encouraged Pennsylvania authorities to seek a peace agreement. Secondly, nearly three years of waging war had taken its toll on western Delaware society, and some leaders began to yearn for an end to the conflict. British military successes at sea and along the northern Atlantic coast had severely disrupted French supply lines and brought the western Indian trade to a near standstill. By 1758 the French could barely supply their own western garrisons—Fort Duquesne was “almost starved with hunger”—let alone provide the western Delawares with adequate supplies or ammunition. French economic shortfalls severely strained their relationship with the western Delawares, who began to complain about the lack of supplies and warned that “their usage from the French is ready to make them strike [the French].” Adding to the Delawares’ malaise was the sporadic absence, injury, and deaths of their warriors, which disrupted their seasonal hunting practices and interrupted the normal rhythms of village life, leaving many western Delaware communities in duress.⁴⁰

But these factors alone were not sufficient to guarantee peace between the western Delawares and Pennsylvania, which could only be constructed if Pennsylvania officials took steps to address the grievances of the western Delawares. That meant agreeing to a treaty that would convey to the Delawares exclusive rights to the lands along the Allegheny River. During the summer of 1758, two western Delaware negotiators, Pisquetomen and Keekyuscung, traveled to Philadelphia to investigate rumors that the Pennsylvanians were willing to negotiate. General Forbes, overseeing the commencement of the army’s march toward the Ohio Forks, instructed Pennsylvania governor William Denny to make every effort to secure the friendship of the western Delawares. The Delaware negotiators seemed receptive. They informed the governor that their people “were sorry that they had gone to war against the English” and hoped to reinstate their old alliances, to which the governor ceremoniously replied that they “held the peace belt . . . [and] every offense that has been passed shall be forgot forever.” However, no formal peace agreement was reached. Pisquetomen and Keekyuscung insisted that they had no authority to make such arrangements, although they agreed

to return to their villages and appraise western Delaware leaders of their dealings in Philadelphia.⁴¹

To assure the western Delawares of the Pennsylvania government's good intentions, Christian Frederick Post, a Moravian preacher friendly to the eastern Delawares, accompanied Pisquetomen and Keekyuscung back to the Allegheny Valley. Post quickly discovered that not all western Delawares supported coming to terms with the British or their colonists. Indeed, Delaware society was still fraught with division and uncertainty. Some truly desired peace, while others believed peace but a precursor to the seizure of their lands by Pennsylvania colonists. At the Kuskuskies villages, Tamaqua welcomed Post with open arms, exclaiming that "I am very glad to see you . . . it is a great satisfaction to me." A week later, however, Post entered Shingas's settlement at Saucunk, where he recorded that the Delawares there "received me in a very rough manner . . . I saw by their countenances they sought my death." The issue that divided the western Delawares more than any other was the approach of General Forbes's army. Many Delawares were concerned that Forbes would walk in the footsteps of Braddock, and if successful in driving away the French, the British general would then also seek to deprive the Delawares of their lands. Post labored to convince the western Delawares that the British army intended "only to drive the French away," but he struggled to overcome native apprehension about the loss of their lands. That fear had been at the heart of the Delawares' decision to fight in 1755, and it remained a powerful factor in the peace negotiations.

As Shingas informed Post:

We have great reason to believe you intend to drive us away and settle the country, or else why do you come to fight in the land that God has given us . . . It is clear that you white people are the cause of this war; Why do not you and the French fight in the old country, and on the sea? Why do you come to fight in our land? That makes everybody believe you want to take the land from us by force and settle it.

If peace was the end objective, Delaware leaders questioned, then "what makes you come with such a large body of men and make such large roads into our country?"⁴²

Despite Delaware apprehensions, Post, with considerable assistance from Tamaqua, gradually gained an audience for his message of peace. But even this limited success did not come without difficulty. Post predicated his

message of peace by relaying that Teedyuscung and the eastern Delawares had made amends with the Pennsylvania government. Western Delaware leaders dismissed this news as irrelevant. Post recorded in his journal that "they had never sent any such advice to Teedyuscung," and when he tried to explain the peace treaty ratified by the eastern Delawares, "they presently stopped me and would not hear it . . . they had nothing to say to any treaty, or league, or peace, made at Easton, nor had anything to do with Teedyuscung." The western Delawares' response was indicative of their separation from their eastern cousins and their continued reluctance to take direction from Delawares living on the Susquehanna. Indeed, if anything, the border war demonstrated that the western Delawares considered themselves to be in a position to give advice to their brethren in the east, not the other way around.⁴³

Despite these setbacks, the western Delaware leaders agreed to send a delegation east to continue the negotiations. Upon dismissing Post, Shingas informed the missionary that although he supported a peace settlement, the western Delawares would not yet agree to terms unless their demands were met. Shingas made it clear that concerns about Forbes's intentions remained the sticking point and undermined the missionary's assertions. "You come with good news and fine speeches . . .," the Delaware leader explained, "[but] we do not readily believe you." Shingas instructed Post to return again with better assurances regarding the sanctity of Delaware lands, and he admonished Post for seeking peace and war simultaneously. "If you had brought the news of peace before your army had begun to march," he quietly explained, "it would have caused a great deal more good." Shingas's uneasiness about Forbes's intentions was further underscored by western Delaware participation in two attacks against advanced elements of the British army during the fall of 1758. In September, Delaware warriors fought alongside French soldiers and other native warriors at the defeat of Major James Grant's column near Fort Duquesne, and in October they again assisted the French in a raid against Forbes's forward camp near Fort Ligonier. Although these skirmishes were not sufficient to blunt Forbes's advance, both were costly defeats. Moreover, they clearly demonstrated that the western Delawares would not allow the British to simply replace the French and occupy Delaware territory unopposed.⁴⁴

Western Delaware leaders would accept peace only if Pennsylvania would guarantee their lands and the British army would promise to withdraw. In return, they would abandon the French, whom Delaware leaders believed would soon depart anyway, as their supplies and strength along the Allegheny corridor were waning. Only in this manner could the western Delawares hope

to keep their lands free from all Euro-American entanglements. Yet what they garnered was at best a partial success. Under intense pressure from General Forbes to end the hostilities, Pennsylvania authorities opened a treaty council at Easton to address native grievances, including western Delaware territorial concerns. Pennsylvania officials had long understood that the 1754 Albany land purchase was a major cause of western Delaware resentment. When Pennsylvania expansionists argued that “the French had gained the Delawares and the Shawnees to their interest under the ensnaring pretense of restoring them to their country,” they were in reality commenting on their own culpability in treacherously gaining title to those lands. Many Quakers, who actively championed the eastern Delawares’ land grievances, saw through the façade and called for the repeal of the Albany grant.⁴⁵

Pisquetomen accompanied Post to Easton, where after lengthy deliberations the Pennsylvanians eventually agreed to void the Albany purchase and drop all claims to western Delaware lands. In return for peace with the western Delawares, the Pennsylvania government promised to rekindle the “first old council fire” at Philadelphia, renewing “the old and first treaties of friendship” between the colony and the Delaware nation. Yet the agreement did not implicitly guarantee that the western Delawares would maintain stewardship over the land, as the Treaty of Easton relinquished Pennsylvania’s claims not to the Delawares but rather to the Iroquois Confederacy, who had issued the Albany grant in the first place. To the western Delawares, this must have seemed a small inconvenience, for no major argument was made against returning the lands to the Iroquois. No discussion was necessary since the western Delawares did not recognize Iroquois authority. What truly mattered was that Pennsylvania had given up its claims. Moreover, the Treaty of Easton pledged that no colonists would be allowed to settle west of the Appalachian Mountains unless the British government and the native peoples in question had reached an accord regarding a land cession. But there was no mention of Forbes’s army or its future plans, no guarantee that the British troops would withdraw once the French had gone away. Thus, the Treaty of Easton did not meet all of the western Delawares’ demands, but it provided enough security for Pisquetomen to accept its terms.⁴⁶

Still, a few final obstacles to peace remained. Shingas and other western Delaware leaders would have to accept the Treaty of Easton, which was not guaranteed as long as the issue of Forbes’s army remained unresolved. In November, Post and Pisquetomen returned to western Pennsylvania to bring word of the peace settlement, but they found the situation tense. When Post

arrived at Kuskuskies villages, he found them mostly deserted, as one hundred and fifty men had recently went off to again attack advance units of Forbes's army. As the Delaware warriors gradually began to return over the next few days, Post found them to be "possessed with a murdering spirit" and unreceptive to news of the Treaty of Easton. They continued to express their fear that Forbes's army would deprive them of their lands. "I see the Indians concern themselves very much about the affair of land," Post recorded in his journal, "and [they] are continually jealous and afraid that the English will take their land." The arrival of Tamaqua and Shingas quieted the situation and allowed the serious business of negotiation to begin. After three days of deliberations, Tamaqua and Shingas agreed to accept the terms laid forth at Easton and promised not to interfere when the British army attacked Fort Duquesne. However, they agreed only to peace with Pennsylvania and specifically warned the British "to go back over the mountain and to stay there." If Forbes would agree, then the two western Delaware leaders vowed to personally carry news of the agreement to the other native peoples of the region, whom they were confident would honor the peace agreement. Even then, another Delaware negotiator, Keekyuscung, took Post aside and privately warned him that "all the nations had jointly agreed to defend their hunting place at Allegheny, and suffer nobody to settle there . . . if they [the British] stayed and settled there, all the nations would be against them and it would be a great war and never come to peace again."⁴⁷

Keekyuscung's warning underscored the principal motivation that had led the western Delawares to war: the determination to preserve their lands. Over the previous decade, the Delawares had pursued that goal above all others. While they were not completely successful, the Treaty of Easton was the best deal they could have hoped to get. Pennsylvania had relinquished its claims against their lands, American colonists were forbidden to cross the Appalachian Mountains, and the French were in the process of withdrawing from the Allegheny Valley. The British Army remained at the Ohio forks, which they now renamed Pittsburgh, but the western Delawares believed they would soon withdraw. Thus, Delaware leaders could reasonably look at their situation and believe that they had achieved a fair measure of security for the foreseeable future. Fighting for themselves, and not for the French or other native peoples, the western Delawares had achieved political recognition of their landholdings from their principal antagonist, the Pennsylvania colonial government. Still, the seeds of their success would soon bear the fruits of hardship. Despite their considerable achievements during the Seven Years' War, the

western Delawares' would soon face grave challenges to their territory and autonomy. In the years after the Treaty of Easton, colonial settlers renewed their pursuit of western Delaware lands despite provincial and imperial regulations, British military officials restricted the Indian trade in an effort to subjugate the western Indians, and British troops constructed a major fortification at Pittsburgh to consolidate their presence in the region. Moreover, the Delaware raids against the Pennsylvania backcountry during the war produced a virulent strain of Indian-hatred among Pennsylvanians, who if anything now became more determined to acquire the western Delawares' land and remove them from the colony. All of these developments deeply stressed western Delaware society, and the final result was yet another bloody war. While Delaware reasons for joining in what became known as "Pontiac's Uprising" were varied and complex, a familiar complaint was leveled by the Delaware headmen Tissacoma during the siege of Fort Pitt in 1763: "You [the British] know this is our country and your having possession of it must be offensive to us." Once again, the fear of removal would spur the western Delawares to war.⁴⁸

NOTES

1. Portions of this article, particularly the passages covering Delaware tactics and strategies during the "border war" period of 1755–1758, also appear in Daniel P. Barr, ed., *The Boundaries Between Us: Natives and Newcomers along the Frontiers of the Old Northwest Territory, 1750–1850* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2006). Special thanks to the Kent State University Press for permission to reproduce this material.
2. For versions of unified "Ohio Indians," see Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years' War in America* (New York: Norton, 1988); Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and Michael N. McConnell, *A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724–1774* (University of Nebraska Press, 1992). To be fair, these authors, especially White, on occasion point to differences between the Delawares, Shawnees, and Mingos, but the uniqueness of each peoples' experience remains undeveloped in favor of forwarding the commonality of the "Ohio Indians," a designation that caters much more to the Mingos, or "Ohio Iroquois," especially in Jennings' construction.
3. The military strategy and war aims of the western Delawares have been understudied by historians, at least as a unique manifestation of the Seven Years' War. Although Richard White had correctly noted that "the Ohio Indians opened a parallel war against the British," he does not develop this angle. Nor are the western Delawares afforded specialized treatment, as is to be expected since his magisterial study focuses on a much grander view of native history (See White, *Middle Ground*, 244–245). Even the accepted, albeit rapidly aging, history of the Delawares, C. A. Weslager's *The Delaware Indians: A History* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1972), offers very little

"A ROAD FOR WARRIORS!"

about the western Delawares' war activities. The closest attempt to reconstruct the western Delawares' role in the war is that of Matthew C. Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry: The Seven Years' War in Virginia and Pennsylvania, 1754–1765* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2003). Ward offers more than any other account, but even his otherwise excellent study fails to adequately assess the western Delawares' role in the war, as their track becomes buried under Ward's detailed analysis of the part played by the Susquehanna Delawares.

4. For an excellent overview of the migration of the western Delawares and other native groups to the western Pennsylvania frontier, see McConnell, *A Country Between*, 5–23. On the Mingos, see Daniel K. Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 256.
5. Samuel Hazard, et al, eds., *Pennsylvania Archives*, 9 series, 120 vols. (Philadelphia and Harrisburg: State Printer of Pennsylvania, 1852–1935), 1st series, 1:299, 301–302 [hereafter cited as *Pennsylvania Archives*]; McConnell, *A Country Between*, 5–26.
6. *Pennsylvania Archives*, 1st ser., 1:243–244, 255. For the early Indian trade in the region, see McConnell, *A Country Between*, 5–46; William A. Hunter, "Traders on the Ohio: 1730," *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine* 35 (1972): 85–89; Francis Jennings, *The Ambiguous Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies, from its Beginnings to the Lancaster Treaty of 1744* (New York: Norton, 1984), 221–375; and Paul A.W. Wallace, *Indians in Pennsylvania*, Rev. Ed. (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1993), 108–141.
7. For Iroquois claims on the Ohio Valley and the appointment of viceroys such as Tanaghrisson, see Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 28–35. For additional background on Tanaghrisson, see Lois Mulkearn, "Half-King, Seneca Diplomat of the Ohio Valley," *Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine* 37 (1954): 64–81.
8. Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, 295–298; Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 241–244; Richard Aquila, *The Iroquois Restoration: Iroquois Diplomacy on the Colonial Frontier, 1701–1754* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 159–182.
9. Samuel Hazard, ed., *Colonial Records of Pennsylvania* [*Minutes of the Provincial Council of Pennsylvania*], 16 vols. (Harrisburg, PA: T. Fenn, 1838–1853), 4:579–580 [Hereafter cited as *CRP*]; James Hamilton to Richard and Thomas Penn, Penn Manuscripts: Indian Affairs, Historical Society of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, PA), 2:20 [Historical Society of Pennsylvania hereafter cited as *HSP*]. The best discussion of the Walking Purchase in its full Iroquoian-Pennsylvania context continues to be that found in the work of Francis Jennings; see Jennings, "The Scandalous Indian Policy of William Penn's Sons: Deeds and Documents of the Walking Purchase," *Pennsylvania History* 37 (1970): 19–39; and *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, 309–346. For an examination of the impact of the Walking Purchase on eastern Delaware society, see Steven C. Harper, "Delawares and Pennsylvanians after the Walking Purchase," in William A. Pencak and Daniel K. Richter, eds., *Friends and Enemies in Penn's Woods: Indians, Colonists, and the Racial Construction of Pennsylvania* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004), 167–179.
10. McConnell, *A Country Between*, 22–23, 59–60; Weslager, *Delaware Indians*, 200–202.
11. John W. Jordan, ed., "Journal of James Kenney, 1761–1763," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 37 (1913): 45; James P. McClure, "The Ends of the American Earth: Pittsburgh and the Upper Ohio Valley to 1795" (Ph.D. Diss., University of Michigan, 1984), 3.

PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY

12. Conrad Weiser, "Journal of a Trip to the Ohio, Aug. 11-Oct. 2, 1748," in Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *Early Western Travels, 1748-1846*, 32 vols. (Cleveland, OH: Arthur H. Clark, 1904-1907), 1:36-37, 38-43; "Private Sentiments of Ohio," Correspondence of Conrad Weiser, HSP, 1:18.
13. "Treaty of Logg's Town, 1752" *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 13 (1905-1906): 166.
14. For the circumstances surrounding the 1744 Lancaster Treaty, see Jennings, *Ambiguous Iroquois Empire*, 356-365; and Aquila, *Iroquois Restoration*, 186-193.
15. Lois Mulkearn, ed, *George Mercer Papers, Relating to the Ohio Company of Virginia* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1954), 9-10, 56, 282-284; Randolph Boehm, ed., *Records of the British Colonial Office, Class 5 Files* (microfilm), Part 1: *Westward Expansion*, 12 vols. (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1981), 11: 761-764 [hereafter cited as *Colonial Office Records*].
16. Francis Jennings believed that Tanaghrisson conspired with the Virginians "in the back room" to defraud the western Delawares and other upper Ohio Indians of their lands, while Michael McConnell argues that Tanaghrisson acted to preserve his own power and keep the western Delawares from direct negotiations with the Virginians. Neither possibility seems likely, as Tanaghrisson in reality did not cede western Delaware lands, while his formal recognition of Shingas as the Delaware "king" politically empowered the Delawares in the eyes of the colonials rather than subverted them. See Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 43-44; McConnell, *A Country Between*, 98.
17. Mulkearn, ed., *Mercer Papers*, 282-284; "Treaty of Logg's Town, 1752," 158-159; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 37-45; McConnell, *A Country Between*, 96-99.
18. Donald H. Kent, *The French Invasion of Western Pennsylvania 1753* (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1954), 43-44; Mary C. Darlington, ed., *Fort Pitt and Letters from the Frontier* (Pittsburgh, PA: J.R. Weldin, 1892; reprint, New York: Arno Press, 1971), 21-24, 60-61; Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 49-52; McConnell, *A Country Between*, 93.
19. CRP, 5:535-536. For additional context concerning Tanaghrisson's attitudes toward the French and their role on his decision at Logstown, see Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 37-45; and McConnell, *A Country Between*, 96-99.
20. CRP, 5:440-441; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 1st ser., 2:15, 31; Mulkearn, ed., *George Mercer Papers*, 34, 39. For the Delawares' long and persistent diplomatic efforts, see Weslager, *Delaware Indians*, 173-220; and McConnell, *A Country Between*, 61-112.
21. CRP, 5:666-668; Kent, *French Invasion*, 47-50.
22. CRP, 5:691, 6:46, 130, 140-141; *Colonial Office Records*, 2: 157-158.
23. For the western Delawares' refusal to follow Tanaghrisson's lead in opposing the French, see McConnell, *A Country Between*, 104-112.
24. CRP, 6:140, 150-160, 181; Sylvester K. Stevens and Donald H. Kent, eds., *Wilderness Chronicles of Northwestern Pennsylvania* (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1941), 47; McConnell, *A Country Between*, 102-103.
25. CRP, 5:635, 677; White, *Middle Ground*, 238.
26. *Colonial Office Records*, 11:903, 915-916; CRP, 5:675-685, 6:140, 398-399; Mulkearn, ed., *Mercer Papers*, 18; Beverly W. Bond Jr., ed., "The Captivity of Charles Stuart, 1755-1757," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 13 (1926-1927): 63-64.
27. "Report of Richard Peters on Proceedings at Albany," Aug. 5, 1754, Penn Manuscripts: Indian Affairs, HSP, 2:4-7; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 1st, ser., 2:144-145; E. B. O'Callaghan, ed, *Documents*

"A ROAD FOR WARRIORS:"

- Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, Procured in Holland, England, and France*, 15 Vols. (Albany, NY: Weed, Parson, and Company, 1857), 7:329 [hereafter cited as NYCD].
28. CRP, 6:398–399; Bond, ed., "Captivity of Charles Stuart," 63–64.
 29. CRP, 6:588–589; 659, 683; Bond, ed., "Captivity of Charles Stuart," 63–64; McConnell, *A Country Between*, 119–121; Matthew C. Ward, "Fighting the Old Women: Indian Strategy on the Virginia and Pennsylvania Frontier, 1754–1758," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 103 (1995): 300–301.
 30. "Deposition of John Craig," Penn Manuscripts: Indian Affairs, HSP, 2:78; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 1st ser., 3:147; NYCD, 10:423; John Sullivan, et al, eds., *The Papers of Sir William Johnson*, 14 Vols. (Albany, NY: University of the State of New York, 1921–1965), 2:439; Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., *Early Western Journals, 1748–1765* (Lewisburg, PA: Wennawoods Publishing, 1998), 85–87; Anthony F. C. Wallace, *Conrad Weiser: Friend of Colonist and Mohawk* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1945), 530.
 31. NYCD, 10:413; White, *Middle Ground*, 244; Ward, "Fighting the Old Women," 299–300.
 32. Ward, "Fighting the Old Women," 308–309. Reports of the differing types of Indian raids are found throughout vols. 6–7 of the CRP, as well the May–June 1756 issues of the *Pennsylvania Gazette*. See also C. Hale Sipe, *The Indian Wars of Pennsylvania*, 2nd Ed. (Harrisburg, PA: The Telegraph Press, 1931), 230–303.
 33. W. W. Abbot, et al., eds., *The Papers of George Washington: Colonial Series*, 9 Vols. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1983), 2:72–73; CRP, 6:673–676, 703–705, 736–737.
 34. *Pennsylvania Archives*, 1st ser., 3:633; Sipe, *Indian Wars of Pennsylvania*, 204–216.
 35. CRP, 6:705, 767–768; NYCD, 10:486. For an excellent overview of the raids and their effect on Pennsylvania society, see Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry*, 36–90.
 36. John Armstrong to William Denny, 14 Sept. 1756, Penn Manuscripts: Indian Affairs, HSP, 2:100; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, 23 Sept. 1756; CRP, 6:676–677, 767–768; 7:257–263; Timothy Alden, ed., "An Account of the Captivity of Hugh Gibson among the Delaware Indians," *Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society*, 3rd ser. (Boston, MA: American Stationer's Co., 1837), 4:143; William A. Hunter, "Victory at Kittanning," *Pennsylvania History* 23 (1956): 376–407. Some historians (Hunter, "Victory at Kittanning," 405–407; McConnell, *A Country Between*, 126) have argued that the destruction of Kittanning impeded future Delaware raiding and led to the rise of a peace faction under Shingas's brother, Tamaqua. However, western Delaware factionalism existed prior to the war and reports from the Pennsylvania frontier indicate that raiding did not sharply decline in the wake of Armstrong's campaign but rather intensified. See CRP, 7:302, 356, 399, 459–460, 506–507, 619, 632, 735, 757, 762. For a dissenting view of the Kittanning raid, which considers the campaign as more of a pyrrhic victory, see James P. Myers, "Pennsylvania's Awakening: The Kittanning Raid of 1756," *Pennsylvania History* 66 (1999): 399–420.
 37. CRP, 6:673–674; 7:71, 75, 522.
 38. CRP, 6:615; Weslager, *Delaware Indians*, 227–229.
 39. Penn MSS: Indian Affairs, HSP, 2:52; *Pennsylvania Gazette*, 15 Apr. 1756; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th ser., 2:552; Ward, "Fighting the Old Women," 313–318. The figures presented here are based upon the excellent quantitative compiled in Matthew Ward, "La Guerre Sauvage: The Seven Years War on the Virginia and Pennsylvania Frontier," (Ph.D. Diss., The College of William and Mary, 1992),

- 418–455. Ward offers an exhaustive examination of nearly every existent report of Indian raids along the Pennsylvania and Virginia frontier for this period to arrive at a total of 1217 killed and 755 captured, including at least 89 women and 250 children. As Ward points out, these figures likely represent a low-end estimate of the actual numbers killed or taken prisoner because surviving records are incomplete. Richard White cites French sources that estimated the number killed or captured at “twenty-five hundred British men, women, and children by 1756.” White, *Middle Ground*, 244.
40. CRP, 7:531, 8:145; *Pennsylvania Archives*, 1st series, 3:83; McConnell, *A Country Between*, 127–128. For Forbes’s instructions to the Pennsylvania government to reach a peace settlement, see Alfred P. James, ed., *Writings of General John Forbes Relating to his Service in North America* (Menasha, WI: Collegiate Press, 1938), 126–128, 134–140. For the full context of the events leading to the peace settlement between Pennsylvania and the Susquehanna Delawares, see Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 258–281, 323–348; and Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry*, 132–140, 149–156.
41. CRP, 8:32–35, 144; McConnell, *A Country Between*, 129–130.
42. CRP, 8:32–35, 144; “The Journal of Christian Frederick Post, From Philadelphia to the Ohio . . .,” in Thwaites, ed., *Early Western Journals*, 192–200, 214 [hereafter cited as “Post’s Journal”].
43. “Post’s Journal,” 196–198.
44. “Post’s Journal,” 221–222; Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry*, 174–176.
45. CRP, 6:684–685.
46. The full proceedings of the 1758 Easton Conference can be followed in CRP, 8:175–228. The treaty is discussed at length in Jennings, *Empire of Fortune*, 396–404; and Ward, *Breaking the Backcountry*, 178–182.
47. “Post’s Journal,” 249–278; McConnell, *A Country Between*, 132–135.
48. Indian Speeches at Fort Pitt, July 26, 1763, in Sylvester K. Stevens, ed., *The Papers of Henry Bouquet*, 6 vols. (Harrisburg: The Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1972–1994), 6:333–335. For the construction of Indian-hating in Pennsylvania during and after the Seven Years’ War, see Jane T. Merritt, *At the Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700–1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), and the essays in part three of Pencak and Richter, eds., *Friends and Enemies in Penn’s Woods*. For detailed discussion of the tensions that led to the Indian War of 1763–1764, generally known as Pontiac’s War, and the role of the western Delawares in the conflict, see David Dixon, *Never Come to Peace Again: Pontiac’s Uprising and the Fate of the British Empire in North America* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005).