First embraced by the new nation’s elite, Andreani’s candid (or impolitic) comments about American ladies quickly put him on the outs with Philadelphia society. Trivial as the whole affair seems, it opens a fascinating window on cultural and gender politics in the early republic. Indeed, Andreani’s post-journal saga merits a book of its own in which his journey along the Hudson and Mohawk would be mere prologue.

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Civil War historiography is dominated by studies of campaigns and battles. Generally, however, each battle is analyzed in isolation, without an understanding of how warfare, strategy, and tactics evolved during the four year conflict. Little attention has been paid to the study of overarching strategies, and particularly the development of field fortifications. Edward Hagerman’s American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare (1987), provides a general overview of the evolution of warfare and strategy during the war, but only a cursory analysis of fieldworks. Earl Hess’ Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War: The Eastern Campaigns, 1861–1864, fills the gap in Civil War military scholarship, with a solid analysis on field fortifications.

Hess, history professor at Lincoln Memorial University and a prominent Civil War historian, disputes the popular notion that eastern operations in 1861 through 1863 were dramatically different from operations and strategies in the war’s final years of 1864–1865. Rather, Hess argues that field fortifications were intrinsic to armies’ campaigns and strategies from the beginning of the war and that the difference between fortifications in 1861 with those of 1865 is only “one of degree” (xvi).

Hess analyzes Union and Confederate operations in the eastern theater from Big Bethel (June 1861) through Plymouth (April 1864) and questions “how much and why fortifications played a role in the success or failure of Civil War field armies” (xiii). Accordingly, the belief that early battles were fluid and open, and then suddenly evolved into the stalemate of trench war-
fare, is a “misperception” (xvi). Union and Confederate commanders utilized and relied upon fortifications and natural defenses in every significant campaign since the beginning of the war. He argues that officers, generally at the regiment, brigade, or division levels, and not the general in command or the common soldier, initiated the construction of fortifications.

Through this narrative an evolution of fortifications is demonstrated. Fortifications in 1861 were primitive, a basic trench, while those built in the war’s later years were elaborate constructions of headlogs, traverses, defense-in-depth, and obstructions in front of fortified positions. In addition to traditional field works, Hess provides an analysis of the role of coastal defenses, siege works, city defenses, and railroad and river fortifications.

Hess disputes the cause and effect relationship between increasing use of the rifle and the proliferation of fortifications. He opposes Hagerman’s argument that the rifle led to the escalating use of fortifications, and instead argues that the influence of the rifle has been exaggerated. Dismissing the impact of the rifle, Hess suggests that continuous contact between the armies led to the development and evolution of fieldworks. To reinforce his conclusion, Hess found that soldiers in the early part of the war tended to build fieldworks, not in preparation of battle, but after as a result of the “shock of combat” (312).

The events at Mine Run (November 1863) is the first example of fieldworks altering the tactical outcome of a battle in the eastern theater. Mine Run illustrates the evolution in the appreciation and utilization of fieldworks by General Robert E. Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. Confederate soldiers built elaborate trenches, using headlogs and traverses, and effectively utilized Mine Run as a natural defense to solidify their position. Such an intricate and fortified position deterred a Union assault and forced the Army of the Potomac to abandon the field. On the significance of these fieldworks Hess states, “there are few better examples of how a strongly fortified position can alter a campaign and decide its result” (299).

Field Armies and Fortifications in the Civil War is meticulously researched. In preparation, Hess visited 303 Civil War battlefields, of which 136 were eastern theater battles, and found remnants of earthworks at 94 of these sites. This extensive field research proves invaluable when discussing military events, and allows Hess to better understand, analyze, and interpret the role and effect of field works. In addition to invaluable visits to these battlefields, Hess relies on an extensive collection of sources, including official reports, soldiers’ diaries and letters, archeological studies, dissertations, and conversations with park
rangers. The supplemental maps, historic and contemporary photographs, and drawings complement the written narrative.

A significant weakness of this work is Hess' relapse into a traditional battle narrative, without providing a connection of how the engagement advanced the evolution of fieldworks. The section devoted to Second Manassas and Antietam regresses into battle narrative; neither army used fortifications during the battles, but instead engaged in open-field maneuvers. Hess notes these battles were "notable for the absence of prepared fortifications," leaving questions as to why they were included in this work (150). Notwithstanding this criticism, Hess has produced an essential addition to Civil War military scholarship.

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