THE "PEACEABLE KINGDOM" DESTROYED: THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BACKCOUNTRY.

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When William Penn first contemplated establishing a colony on the banks of the Delaware River he sought to establish a society of tolerance and understanding, a "peaceable kingdom" in the American woods. Less than a century later Penn's vision had been shattered. Nearly all studies of colonial Pennsylvania note the transformation of the colony from one initially approximating Penn's utopian vision to a society divided by internal disputes and conflicts. Most of these studies, however, have stressed long-term rather than short-term trends in the transformation of the colony. If historians have sought a single point of transformation, most often this point has been the Revolutionary War. When scholars have considered the impact of the Seven Years' War on the region it has often been principally as a precursor to the later Revolutionary Crisis. Even Fred Anderson's recent excellent study of the war, *The Crucible of War*, views the Seven Years' War in many ways as the context for the following Revolutionary Crisis. While many historians have noted the broad role of the Seven Years' War in generating hostility and antagonism

towards Indians, and thus in generating frontier violence, few have noted the complex and diverse ways in which the war transformed the backcountry of Pennsylvania.[1]

Many studies of the backcountry in early America have depicted backcountry society as dominated by frequent interracial violence and brutality. This was to a great extent true of backcountry society in New England and of the Carolina backcountry. In New England, violence came from external forces. From the 1670s onward, the French had equipped and encouraged Indian war parties to attack the colonial frontier and the frequency of imperial wars meant that the New England frontier was the scene of almost continual warfare.[2] In the Carolina backcountry, violence stemmed more from pressures within society, both from the Indian slave trade which was important in the region from the 1680s to the 1720s and generated conflict with neighboring Indian tribes, and also from internal conflicts within white society which most notably erupted into the Regulation Movements of the 1760s and 1770s. The mid-Atlantic frontier, particularly the frontier of Pennsylvania, did not share the same history but would ultimately share the same fate.[3]

In its early years Pennsylvania had served as a haven for religious and political refugees from across Europe. Pacifist Quakers from England and German Mennonites struggled to create a tolerant and benevolent society. It was this open and tolerant society which Voltaire praised so highly in his *Lettres philosophiques* published in 1734. However, in their recent study of crime and violence in eighteenth-century Pennsylvania Jack Marietta and G.S. Rowe have questioned the extent to which this peaceable kingdom existed and have suggested that by the middle of the eighteenth-century crime and violence was becoming increasingly widespread. The high rates of immigration of Ulster Scots combined with the Quaker founders' liberal attitude to crime and punishment, Marietta and Rowe argue, created a dramatic surge in crime from the 1720s onward. Certainly, the mid-eighteenth-century Pennsylvania elite viewed those settlers who began to crowd into the backcountry, especially those from Ulster, with suspicion and distaste. James Logan, for instance, maintained that "a settlement of five families from the North of Ireland gives me more trouble than fifty of any other people."[4] In an attempt to secure lands along the disputed boundary between Pennsylvania and Maryland, the proprietors had encouraged Scots-Irish settlers to move into southwestern Pennsylvania. As they moved into this region the Scots-Irish frequently clashed with settlers from Maryland. Not only did they clash with

Marylanders but they were soon also brawling with German planters and arguing amongst themselves.[5]

The Scots-Irish may have been boisterous neighbors but there is also evidence that while they may not have had the same regard for authority and deference as many earlier settlers, they were not the uneducated and violent individuals portrayed by many of the elite. Scots-Irish settlers, as well as those of other nationalities in many backcountry communities, sought desperately to establish a more orderly society. In planning communities, such as Carlisle or Yorktown in southwestern Pennsylvania, in constructing churches, courts, and jails, they attempted to bring order and authority to the frontier.[6] Settlers worked together to build their farms and to exchange their produce and services, not only within their own ethnic group but across ethnic boundaries. They cooperated in what has been termed a local exchange economy, exchanging goods and services with their neighbors in an economic network that spread throughout the community. While the local exchange economy drew settlers together, its limited nature meant that settlers had comparatively little desire for personal economic gain. As Warren Hofstra has demonstrated in the Virginia backcountry, what backcountry families principally sought was "self-control over their economic affairs" rather than great wealth and personal riches. Within this local political and social structure disputes remained largely contained at a local level. While settlers may have squabbled amongst themselves, while the residents of York County, for instance, may have rioted at the elections in 1749 and 1750, such disputes remained largely internal and local in nature.[7]

They remained largely local because before the Seven Years' War most backcountry farmers lived with relatively little direct interference from outside their local neighborhood. While many of the products of backcountry farms would eventually enter the Atlantic economy, and much of the surplus flour and meat produced on backcountry farms would eventually reach Europe or the West Indies, backcountry settlers themselves had little direct contact with this broader Atlantic economy. Their day-to-day lives were shaped principally by a relatively small local community. Settlement patterns limited connections with a wider society. Backcountry settlements were generally formed of small independent communities or "open-country neighborhoods," with farmsteads located about half a mile apart most often along rivers or streams. Farms and plantations, or at least the lands granted to individuals, were often quite large and, combined with the need to select the best lands, resulted in farmsteads located at least a half-mile from one another. This relative isolation was

reflected in low population densities. In Cumberland County the population density averaged less than ten people per square mile; east of the Susquehanna, Berks and Northampton Counties averaged fewer than twenty people per square mile. The tendency of settlers to settle and associate in ethnic groups further insulated backcountry settlers from the influence of the broader society of their county or of Pennsylvania as a whole.[8]

The isolation of backcountry settlements was further reflected by the relative remoteness of government. For a settler in parts of Cumberland County, a return journey to Philadelphia could easily take the better part of two weeks. For many settlers, Philadelphia was thus rather removed from their day-to-day lives. Local government was also more removed than in older-settled counties. Backcountry counties tended to be much larger than older counties, and distance alone made county government somewhat removed both physically and psychologically from the day-to-day life of settlers, certainly compared to those in other parts of Pennsylvania or in other regions of the British colonies. There was a government structure below the county, the township, but the township had little political autonomy and was merely a convenient subdivision of the county for administrative and tax purposes. Indeed, the only elected officer was the pound keeper who managed the pound for stray horses. All these forces tended to mitigate the wider effects of discord and discontent.[9]

If mid-eighteenth-century Pennsylvania was not still quite Penn's peaceable kingdom in terms of the internal relationship between settlers, it was still very much a peaceful society in other ways. In other North American colonies the principal sources of violence and discontent were external, in particular attack by Indians or hostile European powers. However, unlike other North American colonies Pennsylvania had managed to retain a relatively peaceful relationship with its Indian neighbors and had escaped unscathed through the imperial wars of the early eighteenth-century. Indeed, the period before 1750 has been described by many historians as the "Long Peace." While there were some disputes between the colony and its Indian neighbors, and violence between Indians and colonists was certainly not unknown—indeed, in the words of James Merrell the frontier was certainly "less peaceful than legend would have it"—it was still extremely peaceful when compared to other regions.[10]

Several forces unique to Pennsylvania served to build and maintain ties between Pennsylvania's Indian neighbors and the growing numbers of colonists. Not least of these was the involvement of the Quakers in the colony's

affairs. Unlike many of their Euro-American contemporaries, Quakers were convinced that Indians were rational beings who were the intellectual equal of Europeans and with whom fair treatment would ensure friendship. Indeed, even during the height of Indian raids on the colony's frontier in 1756, the Quakers still maintained that "they are not void of a large share of natural Understanding; have in many Cases clear Sentiments of Justice and Equity, and have, from the first Settlement of this Province, till a few months past, manifested their Friendship to us."[11] While Quaker influence in the colony was on the wane before the beginning of the Seven Years' War, the Quakers still held a position of influence out of all proportion to their numbers and before the Walking Purchase of 1737 had ensured that the colony's relations with the Delawares had been remarkably even-handed. The Quakers were not alone in believing in the fundamental equality of their Indian neighbors. The Moravian communities that sprung up along Pennsylvania's frontier welcomed Indians as full members and many Moravians built close personal ties with the many Christian Indians who populated these communities, often serving as God parents and taking other kinship roles. These kinship networks tied the Moravians to leading Delaware families such as that of headman Teedyuscung and to a wider Delaware world outside the missions. Both Quakers and Moravians sought to ensure that all settlement on Indian lands took place with Indian consent and that the Indians were fully compensated for their lands. The Quakers and Moravians ensured that Pennsylvania had followed a rather different path in terms of its relations to its Indian neighbors than other colonies.[12]

If religion and the religious disposition of some settlers were forces binding Indians and Europeans together that were relatively unique to Pennsylvania, trade was another force that, while certainly not unique to Pennsylvania, was particularly important in the colony. During the 1740s Pennsylvania's fur trade grew steadily. In the mid-eighteenth-century, the colony's fur trade reached new peaks. 1746 and 1748 saw Pennsylvania exporting its highest levels of skins and furs which made up over forty-four percent of the colony's exports to London. While the expansion of the Pennsylvania fur trade in the mid-eighteenth-century was part of a general expansion of the British fur trade which resulted in a glut of skins and furs in British markets in the early 1750s, Pennsylvania traders seem to have weathered the storm remarkably well and the colony's fur trade remained buoyant. This trade drew Indians economically into the transatlantic trading network, and often drew them physically into backcountry settlements to trade.[13]

Trade of course did not guarantee friendly relations and disputes over trade could on occasion lead to conflict. The Reverend Michael Schlatter traveling in western Pennsylvania commented that the Indians he encountered in the Conococheague Valley were friendly "when they are not made drunk by strong drink." When unlicensed peddlers and traders from western Pennsylvania threatened to break in on the fur trade in the wake of King George's War which ended in 1748, they alienated traders and Indians alike with their cheap supplies of whiskey and grog. Indian headmen who traveled to conferences in Philadelphia and Lancaster complained again and again about the activities of these unlicensed traders. Pennsylvania authorities listened to these complaints and made continual attempts to regulate the fur trade. In Cumberland County the métis Andrew Montour led efforts to halt the trade and several unlicensed traders were brought before the county court and prosecuted. Such attempts to regulate the trade, though rarely successful, demonstrate the extent to which Pennsylvania authorities could still listen to Indian concerns in the years before the Seven Years' War.[14]

It was not only missionaries and traders who formed close relationships with Indians. Across the Pennsylvania frontier Indians and white settlers lived cheek-by-jowl. On the western and northern frontiers of Pennsylvania, multiethnic communities of Delawares, Shawnees and Senecas, often accompanied by smaller communities of peoples such as Nanticokes and Conestogas, lived alongside white settlers. Around Shamokin, at the forks of the Susquehanna River, many different Indian peoples lived alongside German and English settlers. Within and around these multiethnic frontier communities, interaction between Indians and colonists seems to have been commonplace. When John Toby stopped at the house of Robert Hunter in February 1751, for instance, Hunter himself felt no compunction to remain at home with his wife and children to protect them from the Indian. The presence of an Indian in a backcountry household was seen as neither unusual nor threatening. Interaction was even more frequent in the Moravian mission towns located on the frontier, such as Gnadenhütten. Here colonists and Indians lived, died, and were buried side by side. It was not only in Indian or missionary communities that Indians and colonists lived side-by-side. In 1748, on the western frontier of Pennsylvania the Reverend Michael Schlatter reported that he discovered amongst the white settlers in the Conococheague Valley there were "still many Indians, who are well disposed and very obliging." Around Easton, at the Forks of the Delaware River, many Delawares remained on their lands as

white settlers moved in around them. Indeed, Presbyterian missionary David Brainerd recorded on several occasions preaching to mixed assemblies of both Indians and colonists around Easton.[15]

However, by the eve of the Seven Years' War relations with Pennsylvania's Indian neighbors were coming under increasing strain. Particularly, in the wake of the Treaty of Lancaster in 1748 when Iroquois headmen surrendered "their" lands in Pennsylvania—lands which the Delawares and other tribes actually occupied—to Pennsylvania authorities, the Delawares and Shawnees became increasingly suspicious of the activities of Pennsylvania. As white settlers moved onto these lands, tensions grew steadily. Yet, while Indians may have felt that their relationship with Pennsylvania settlers was becoming strained, and while there were sporadic episodes of violence, it did not become widespread in the early 1750s. In part this was because provincial authorities were still prepared to listen to some Indian complaints. The year after the Lancaster Treaty in the summer of 1749, for instance, several separate parties of Indians from the Pennsylvania backcountry came to Philadelphia to complain to Governor Hamilton that "white People had begun to settle" their lands and begged "that they may be made to remove instantly with all their Effects, to prevent the sad Consequences which will otherwise ensue."[16] Hamilton assured the Indians that as quickly as was possible he would send out a part of magistrates and "their Plantations [will be] broke up & destroy'd." Hamilton was true to his word. In the spring of 1750 a party of Cumberland County magistrates traveled into Sherman's Valley, the Tuscarora Valley, and the Path Valley accompanied by several Indian headmen, and evicted a number of squatters, burning their settlements.[17] Here the stark contrast to later years is most apparent. In the 1760s such actions would cause bitter opposition and violence, but in 1750 squatters largely cooperated with the provincial authorities. Settlers, magistrates, and Indians alike simply milled around as the magistrates set fire to the cabins, the settlers merely informing them that "You may take our Land and Houses and do what you please with them... but we will not be carried to Goal." Similarly, when Pennsylvania's Indians encountered the colony's judicial system they were often treated more leniently than white offenders. For instance, Louis Waddell has noted a clear tendency to acquit Indians accused of assault where the assailant was clearly drunk and the victim suffered no permanent injury. Similarly on several occasions Pennsylvania authorities followed Indian traditions in settling cases of assault and even murder, to the extent of allowing the payment of compensation to the victim's family.[18]

On occasion Indians moved to take the law into their own hands, but even in these cases violence was rare. In October 1750, for instance, on the northern frontier of Bucks County four surveyors were accosted by Indian headmen as they attempted to mark the boundaries for new settlements. However, the Indians and the intruders on their lands merely exchanged heated words before the surveyors withdrew; no blood was shed. Before the outbreak of the Seven Years' War, while settlers and Indians may have frequently exchanged harsh words they rarely exchanged blows.[19]

A decade later in the second half of the 1760s, however, the Pennsylvania frontier was a very different place. Now settlers and Indians rarely exchanged words but frequently exchanged blows. In the spring of 1766 alone, Sir William Johnson, the British Superintendent for Indian Affairs in the northern colonies, claimed that at least twenty Indians had been murdered on the frontier between New York and Virginia. Meanwhile Governor Henry Moore of New York bewailed the "violences and murders among the Indians" all along the frontier.[20] Interracial hatred did not die down as the memories of war receded. In 1767 Johnson was still lamenting that "Numbers of the Frontier Inhabitants of *Pensilvania, Maryland, Virginia,* &ca Animated with a Spirit of *Frenzy* under pretext of revenge for past Injuries tho' in Manifest Violation of *Brittish faith* and the Strength of the Late *Treatys* attacked, robbed, and Murdered Sundry Indians of Good Character, and Still continue to do so, Vowing Vengeance against all that come their Way."[21]

Violence was not limited to Indians. In western Pennsylvania, squatters from Redstone Creek south of Pittsburgh, skirmished with British troops as they sought to evict them. Across Cumberland County groups of settlers formed themselves into armed bands and skirmished with British troops. When British troops finally withdrew from the region in 1772 matters grew even worse as Virginia and Pennsylvania disputed possession of the region. Virginians claimed the region as part of Augusta County, while Pennsylvanians countered by organizing Westmoreland County and sending agents, surveyors and even militia into the region. By the early 1770s Penn's peaceable kingdom was but a distant memory in western Pennsylvania.[22]

The role of the war in generating hatred of Indians is well-known, but there were several other important ways in which the war transformed the former peaceable kingdom into an image more resembling the "wild west." First, the war served to transform the relationship of backcountry settlers both to their neighbors and to provincial and imperial authorities. The Seven Years' War destroyed the relative isolation of backcountry communities. It forced

backcountry communities to cooperate with imperial authorities and placed the backcountry at the heart of the imperial struggle. At the start of the war settlers had cooperated principally with each other to provide places of refuge and defense. In Cumberland County in 1755 a mass meeting of the inhabitants decided to build five forts across the county to provide a shelter for their families. These forts were to serve as places of safety for the county's women and children while their husbands either worked in the fields or patrolled for the enemy. Across the frontier, communities cooperated in building small blockhouses in which local residents could shelter during raids and by the end of 1756 there were almost fifty such posts on the Pennsylvania frontier. Some of these such as McDowell's Fort were relatively substantial structures which could withstand a determined attack, but most were little more than well defended farmhouses with strongly shuttered windows.[23]

Frontier settlers also banded together to form impromptu military organizations. When Indian raiders descended on Berks County, in November 1755, for instance, a meeting of the county freeholders agreed to raise and pay 150 men to scout along the county's frontier to offer some protection. Such spontaneous action failed to offer meaningful protection, and as raids continued through the winter of 1755–56, widespread, anger spread through the backcountry. The justices of Berks County wrote desperately to Governor Morris from Reading informing him that "We are all in uproar, all in Disorder... We have no authority, no commissions, no officers practised in War." They warned that "if we are not immediately supported we must not be sacrificed, and therefore are determined to go down with all that will follow us to Philadelphia, & Quarter ourselves on its Inhabitants and wait our Fate with them."[24]

Soon backcountry residents were forced to cooperate with both provincial forces and then the British Army. Initially, the Quaker-dominated provincial assembly was reluctant to provide military forces to defend the frontier and this compelled local communities to look to their own defenses. Only as the Indian assault on the frontier continued and when backcountry settlers prepared to march to Philadelphia in protest, did the governor and assembly agree to set aside their differences and raise a new provincial army, termed the Pennsylvania Regiment.[25] However, rather than bringing backcountry communities closer to the provincial and imperial government, cooperation between settlers and military authorities often proved difficult. Some settlers complained bitterly about the billeting of troops in their farmhouses and barns, even though these troops were being used to protect the very farms in

which they were quartered; most refused to provide these same troops with provisions and supplies. Indeed, during the winter of 1757 one detachment of the Pennsylvania Regiment in Northampton County was so short of provisions that the men were forced to attack the local inhabitants to force them to provide supplies. There were some sound reasons why so many back-country settlers were reluctant to cooperate with provincial and imperial authorities. Many settlers who had provided supplies and wagons to General Edward Braddock's ill-fated expedition in 1755 had never received payment after Braddock's accounts were lost on the Monongahela.[26]

There were other, less tangible, reasons why some settlers found coopera-tion difficult. Different ethnic and religious communities, for example, were often reluctant to fight alongside each other. In August 1756, for instance, a mutiny broke out at Fort Allen, when German and Irish troops refused to serve with each other. Such ethnic prejudices were not limited to the rank and file. German Captain Jacob Orndt and Irish Lieutenant Miller ended up brawling in front of their men. Orndt was quite clear of the cause for Miller was a "wery heard Roman Catholic" Captain George Reynolds wrote in Miller's defense that Orndt was "using his utmost Endevour to make things worse on the Lieutenant's Side than it is."[27] Soon Reynolds and Orndt were themselves involved in a bitter squabble. Orndt accused Reynolds and his Irish soldiers of being a "Company [of] Dirty Idle [fellows.]" and maintained when they were posted to Fort Allen "they found it something nasty... [and] not so clean."[28]

Despite these internal disputes, the creation of the Pennsylvania Regiment provided a modicum of protection for the backcountry. However, the Regiment could not halt the raids completely and as the devastation of the backcountry continued, it soon came to the attention of the imperial admin-istration in Whitehall. It was not long before provincial forces were supple-mented by British troops and backcountry settlers found themselves face to face with the agents of British imperial power. By 1758 British Prime Minister William Pitt had committed almost two thousand regular troops to the Pennsylvania frontier. If relations between backcountry settlers and provincial troops had been awkward, relations with regular troops were often distinctly hostile. When Swiss-born British officer Colonel Henry Bouquet arrived in Pennsylvania in December 1756 he related how while riding "at the head of the battalion, a farmer rogue mounted on a nag lashed at me with his whip, which missed me fortunately for him. He was at once beaten up and taken to prison." Bouquet added that this was "the third incident of this kind to occur." Seeing such hostility from the local populace Bouquet denounced

them as "riffraff" and added "I hope we shall succeed in inspiring them with fear of the red coats. Everything most abominable that nature has produced, and everything most detestable that corruption can add to it, such are the honest inhabitants of this province." Such attitudes from British officers doubtless served to increase tensions between the army and Pennsylvanians. Meanwhile, pacifist Quakers and German Mennonites and Scottish Highlanders who had witnessed the brutal suppression of the Jacobite rebellion may have had their own reasons for feeling unease at the presence of British troops. However, the extent of opposition to the British Army in the backcountry surprised many both in the army and in the provincial government.[29]

With settlers displaying such widespread hostility towards regular troops, many local justices were reluctant to assist the British Army. If forced to requisition supplies or wagons, justices often would offer planters relatively good terms, much better than those to which the army had previously agreed, and would leave army officers to wrangle with angry settlers. Bouquet became particularly aware of such practices after he discovered leading Pennsylvanian Edward Shippen participating, and he wrote ruefully to General John Forbes that "the truth of all this is that everyone wishes to be popular, and build his career at the expense of the government." After the war it was hardly surprising that imperial and provincial authorities should view backcountry settlers with more than a degree of suspicion.[30]

Rather than backcountry communities naturally drawing together with provincial and imperial authorities in their own defense, several countervailing forces encouraged the growth of dissension within and between these communities. Central in this development was the presence of the British Army and the provincial forces which shaped backcountry society in several ways. In particular, the arrival of the army served to transform the nature of the backcountry economy. The presence of so many British and provincial troops and their demand for supplies and labor caused the prices of many commodities to rise sharply. In Winchester, Virginia, for instance, beef which had been selling for only ten shillings per hundredweight in September 1755 had reached fifty shillings by August 1760. These higher prices offered new economic opportunities for those who remained in the backcountry during the war.[31]

Equally important was the army's demand for laborers of all kinds. The army required large numbers of wagoners to transport supplies, and to keep the horses moving they also required blacksmiths and farriers. To operate the frontier posts the army needed "Carpenters, Joyners, Bricklayers, Masons, Oven

Makers, Sadlers, Millrights, Coalmakers, Coopers, Tin Men, Sawyers, [and] Mealmakers," who were all well rewarded. It was not only men who could benefit from the demand for labor for the army also required women to serve officially as nurses, cooks, and washerwomen. Other women arrived to operate taverns and ordinaries or to sell goods and services to the troops. Indeed, so great were the opportunities for these women that both provincial and regular forces were compelled to issue repeated orders limiting the number of women present in army camps and at frontier posts.[32]

This huge demand for provisions and labor ensured that the army's forts and posts served as a focus for white settlers who flooded west. Around army posts such as Fort Stanwix and Fort Ligonier, and of course most notably Fort Pitt, thriving garrison towns developed. Settlers were quick to take advantage of the new opportunities these posts offered not least in meeting the seemingly insatiable demand of the troops for liquor. In garrison towns settlers jostled to open taverns and ordinaries to sell liquor to thirsty provincial and regular troops. Some of these operated within the law; most did not. Nearly a third of all the cases which came before the magistrates of Cumberland County between 1757 and 1760 involved the illegal operation of "tippling" houses in the country. Justices even colluded in this illegal activity. Local Justice of the Peace Allen Gillespie even offered to sell licenses to county residents allowing them to open tippling houses for the troops in direct contravention of military orders. In more isolated locations where troops could not get to tippling houses, settlers were prepared to transport liquor directly to the troops. In the spring of 1757, although the soldiers at Fort Augusta were cut off from the rest of Pennsylvania by Indian raiding parties, settlers still managed to transport large quantities of liquor to them.[33]

The demands of the provincial and regular army for supplies, labor and liquor all served to change the nature of production in the backcountry. Warren Hofstra has estimated that the British Army spent at least eighteen thousand pounds on the Virginia frontier and expenditure in Pennsylvania must have been even higher. No longer did settlers have to sell their produce and labor in a local exchange economy, instead they could engage directly in a transatlantic cash-based economy. The war served to transform the economy and fortunes of backcountry towns such as Carlisle and Yorktown. This transformation was further assisted by the dramatic improvements in the backcountry's communication network. The army constructed a network of roads to move supplies and troops across the backcountry and west to the

Ohio River. Once the war was over, these roads provided backcountry settlers with access both to eastern markets and western lands. Indeed, Virginia and Pennsylvania had squabbled bitterly over the route that Forbes's Army was to take to the Ohio in 1758, knowing that the route would serve as a future highway to the Ohio River. Soldiers, and particularly officers, in western garrisons also directly facilitated the spread of the "consumer revolution" which was sweeping through the British Atlantic world. Seeking to replicate their lifestyle in Europe, the men in these garrisons consumed a wide array of consumer goods from fine china to delicate fabrics, from tea to worsted breeches. Many of these items soon found their way into the backcountry economy and began to transform the lifestyles of backcountry settlers.[34]

The service of backcountry settlers in the west, whether as recruits in the British Army or the Pennsylvania Regiment, or as laborers and wagoners, also served to transform settlers views of the west and to inform them about the potential of the west. Having seen the good bottom lands waiting for the first settler to claim them and the woods teeming with game, many Pennsylvanians began to contemplate moving west. Some sought to establish farmsteads in the west, others attempted to establish themselves in the fur trade. This enthusiasm for migration to the west became so widespread that in 1767 the Board of Trade complained that "the profits made by a few induced such Numbers to embark in it, amongst Whom were the very Dregs of the people, such as discharged *Provincial Soldiers, Batteaumen* &ca." Wartime experiences thus directly encouraged westward expansion.[35]

As well as increasing economic opportunity, however, the war itself also heightened economic competition. As the consumer economy expanded, and as demand for goods and labor increased, the relatively limited prewar desire for economic competence and independence was replaced by a broader desire for economic improvement, for wealth and land. Settlers began actively to quest for profit and gain.[36] In addition to the opportunities to profit from increased demand, the war also offered settlers opportunities to profit from each other. Abandoned farms and plantations offered a tempting prospect to those who remained behind in the backcountry and risked life and limb to protect their property from both Indian raiders and their unscrupulous neighbors. Indeed, while French and Indian raiding parties killed hundreds of settlers, many thousands more fled their homes. By the end of 1757 John Armstrong estimated that in Cumberland County alone settlers had abandoned nearly one thousand plantations. The numerous abandoned plantations offered many opportunities. Squatters could take over cleared lands; if the

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rightful owners were dead or had fled to the Carolinas, who would protest at their illegal occupation? Cattle, corn, abandoned property, all lay open for plundering; who would know whether an abandoned farmstead had been plundered by enemy Indians or neighboring settlers? In the fall of 1756 frontiersmen in Lancaster County complained bitterly that their neighbors had "dishonourably drove from their Walks... a Number of Horses & Mares said to belong to the poor Scatter'd Inhabitants." In May 1756 the *Pennsylvania Gazette* reported that several plantations had been burned "by some White People, for the sake of Plunder." In April 1758, a detachment of the Pennsylvania Regiment tracked down two "Indians" who had been raiding in Cumberland County. When the men were cornered and shot they discovered that one was Jacob Lane and the other James Cox. "They were both painted and dressed so like Indians, even to the Cut of their Hair, that their most intimate Acquaintances could not distinguish them."[37] By transforming the nature of the backcountry economy, by injecting thousands of pounds of specie, improving transportation, and offering new opportunities for economic gain, the war served to generate economic competition and created new tensions among backcountry settlers themselves. The great rewards for those who remained ensured that many settlers began to place individual safety and gain ahead of the interests of the community as a whole; individualism began to outweigh community interests.

It was not only in transforming the economic mentality of the backcountry and in creating economic competition that the Seven Years' War transformed the frontier. The war also had other more direct effects in "arming" the frontier. Perhaps the most immediate impact of the war was that it physically brought guns to the Pennsylvania backcountry and taught people how to use them. While Indians across North America seem to have been heavily armed, and while settlers in other regions of North America may have possessed arms in relative abundance, there is substantial evidence that during the early stages of the war many Pennsylvania backcountry settlers lacked a familiarity with arms. At the start of the war, certainly in comparison to other British North American colonies and to later periods, arms were relatively scarce in Pennsylvania.[38] Shortly after the first raids on the frontier, for instance, Pennsylvania Governor Robert Hunter Morris wrote to Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts begging him to send some weaponry, for "the Province is in the utmost Distress for want of Arms, the few we have being miserably bad." Over the following months Morris and his successor William Denny made many repeated requests for more arms and ammunition with

which to defend the colony. However, more than two years later matters had still not improved. Upon his arrival in Pennsylvania in the spring of 1758 General John Forbes lamented that in Pennsylvania "there is a great Scarcity of Arms" and wrote desperately to his Commander-in-Chief James Abercromby begging for more. Indeed, as the Pennsylvania troops mustered alongside British units, Colonel Henry Bouquet reported that only "half... have their own Arms, the rest Walks with Sticks."[39]

Before the Seven Years' War there had been comparatively little reason for settlers to use or even possess arms. Many of the early settlers were pacifist Quakers or Mennonites who would refuse to use a gun under any circumstances. For those settlers who were not pacifists there were still comparatively few pressing reasons to own a gun or to be skilled in its use. In the early eighteenth-century a gun was an expensive item and would only be purchased if there was a clear need for its use for hunting or self-defense. Some backcountry settlers did rely on hunting to supplement their incomes and did participate in the fur trade. A few, such as George Croghan, were substantial traders. However, most backcountry settlers who participated in the fur trade did so not by heading out west with their trusty gun but instead exchanged agricultural surpluses, particularly alcohol, directly with passing Indians. These small-scale trading activities were not encouraged, particularly when they involved as they often did the exchange of alcohol, and the Pennsylvania authorities made repeated attempts to regulate liquor traders. Despite such attempts, the small-scale trade remained widespread and involved hundreds of families. While these families may have been involved in the fur trade, there was no need for them to own a gun. Before the Seven Years' War in Pennsylvania most did not hunt the fur-bearing animals themselves, nor during the Long Peace did they need guns for protection from the Indians who came to trade.[40]

Settlers who sought to hunt principally to put meat on their family's table may also have found more effective means of providing food than hunting with a gun. Before the widespread availability of what would become known as the Kentucky Long Rifle, which was a hand-crafted and expensive item not readily available before the Seven Years' War, most settlers would have only had access to a musket. Muskets might have been of some use in hunting larger game, such as deer or bison, but for the smaller game, which most settlers might have hunted in the Pennsylvania backcountry, muskets were of somewhat limited use. Muskets were heavy, had a very short range, and the noise and smoke would scare away any game for miles. Except perhaps for

those settlers who lived on the furthest western fringes of settlement where larger game was more abundant, if a poor backcountry farmer sought to hunt to put food on his family's table it was far more cost-effective to trap small animals and birds or to fish rather than to attempt to use an expensive gun in search of small game.[41]

The lack of frontier conflict, the absence of military involvement, and the limited nature of the fur trade, all mitigated the need to own guns and backcountry settlers' familiarity in their use. However, this does not provide direct evidence for the relative lack of arms in the backcountry before the Seven Years' War.[42] The lack of guns may simply reflect settlers' unwillingness to report for duty carrying a very valuable item which was likely to get lost, stolen, or broken, or their unwillingness to sell such weapons to the government in time of war. However, officers not only complained about the settlers' lack of weapons, but they also complained about their inability to use them. Most British officers seem to have presumed that backcountry settlers would be skilled in the use of guns. Upon his arrival in Pennsylvania in 1758 General Forbes wrote to Governor Denny, "I am informed that the Inhabitants upon the Frontiers of your Province, being much used to hunting in the Woods, would consequently make good Rangers."[43] However, Forbes was disappointed. Despite the myth of the backcountry woodsman, most backcountry settlers do not seem to have made good soldiers. Virginia's Governor Robert Dinwiddie complained that the backcountry settlers' "Ignor'ce of Arms and Cowardly Disposit'n, makes the raising of Men very difficult." In Pennsylvania, Governor Morris claimed that backcountry settlers lacked the basic skills for defending themselves, while Henry Bouquet complained that the soldiers he had recruited in the colony knew so little about how to use their guns that "the arms are absolutely ruined."[44]

Such comments could be viewed as archetypal statements from haughty British officers and officials who frequently insulted the colonists they found around them. Indeed, British officers were infamously dismissive of the abilities and the discipline of colonial troops. General Forbes, for instance, dismissed the Pennsylvanians as an "extreme Collection of broken Innkeepers, Horse Jockeys, & Indian traders... nor can it well be otherwise, as they are a gathering from the scum of the worst of people in every Country, who have wrought themselves up, into a panic at the very name of Indians."[45] However, when British officers made such comments they nearly always reinforced existing stereotypes. All British officers believed that American colonists were their

inferiors, particularly in matters martial, but they did expect backcountry
settlers to know how to use guns and anticipated that they would make pass-
able rangers if not regular soldiers. That their expectation was *contradicted* by
what they discovered in Pennsylvania is significant.

Indeed, it was not only British officers who commented on the inability of
backcountry settlers to use arms and the general scarcity of arms, but also
colonists themselves. George Washington complained bitterly at his men's lack
of hunting and tracking skills. Instead, of ranging quietly through the woods
in search of the enemy, they would dash "whooping" and "hallooing," warning
the enemy of their presence. In Northampton County, Pennsylvania, William
Parsons, an officer in the Pennsylvania Regiment, complained even more fer-
vently that his men had great difficulty in using the guns he had provided for
them and were "generally as much afraid to fire them, as they would be to meet
an Indian." Joseph Shippen, another Pennsylvania Regiment officer, com-
plained that the men he assembled in Lancaster County possessed few martial
skills and the few who had brought guns had brought ones "as bad as you can
conceive them to be, one fourth of them split." Even Benjamin Franklin com-
plained that the men he tried to assemble in Berks County brought guns which
were so bad that instead of training the men he spent all his time "exchanging
the bad arms for good."[46]

However, after the Seven Years' War many more settlers were skilled in the
use of arms. By the time of the Revolutionary War the town of Lancaster had
become the principal center for the manufacture of rifles and settlers in
western Pennsylvania and Virginia had gained a widespread renown as sharp-
shooters with the "Pennsylvania Rifle", (a rifle which would later, because of
its widespread use in the early west, gain the alternative name of the
"Kentucky Rifle.") Indeed, the Kentucky Rifle and the rifleman became
synonymous with the early west.[47]

The Seven Years' War served to arm the frontier in several different ways.
The war directly provided settlers with guns and taught them how to use
them. Unlike other British colonies, before the Seven Years' War, Pennsylvania
had no militia or any martial tradition. At the height of the war, however,
Pennsylvania had over two thousand men under arms and during the entire
course of the war Pennsylvania authorities and the British Army together may
have recruited as many as eight thousand men, almost one-in-five of the white
adult male population. Many were former indentured servants or recent
immigrants who would not in other circumstances have had reason or
opportunity to own or use a weapon. These troops returned home at the end

of the war, or the end of their term of service, with a knowledge of musketry and often with a musket purloined from provincial authorities. Military service alone served to provide thousands of Pennsylvanians with a familiarity with the use of arms.[48]

The nature of the Seven Years' War in the Pennsylvania backcountry also meant that once armed settlers had every reason to continue using their arms and to encourage family members to practice in the use of arms. Indian raiding parties struck deep into the Pennsylvania backcountry. These parties often sought not military targets but lightly guarded plantations where there were many potential captives, women and children. Raiders would attempt to avoid battle if possible, and would try to surprise any guards before descending on the plantation itself, quickly seizing captives and plunder before retreating. In November 1755, for instance, a raiding party led by Delaware war-captain Shingas, raiding Cumberland County, attacked only plantations where there were few adult men and consciously avoided more heavily defended locations. Consequently, during the Seven Years' War every backcountry settler had good reason to be armed and to be skilled in the use of weapons. With the opportunity to acquire arms through military service, and with every reason to use arms to defend their homes, backcountry settlers quickly armed themselves.[49]

The direct arming of the backcountry quickly transformed Pennsylvania. However, as important in this transformation, was also the manner in which the war served to transform the image of Indians in the eyes of backcountry settlers. The experience of war, in particular the fear generated by traditional Indian war practices such as scalping and the conscious use of psychological warfare by Indian war parties, led to the widespread "demonization" of Indians. This demonization of Indians, who had previously been viewed in a relatively positive light, in turn served to fuel an increasingly brutal pattern of interracial violence.

The Indian war parties that descended on the Pennsylvania frontier from 1755 to 1758, and again in 1763 and 1764, did not attack frontier settlers because of what colonists often interpreted as some "Savage Fury." Most Indian . raiders sought to avenge often very specific wrongs. Many Delawares who lived on the upper branches Susquehanna River consciously sought out those settlers who had seized their lands to the south and much of the violence may have been intensely personal and against former neighbors. The Ohio Indians fought for similar reasons, to protect their lands from the flood of Anglo-American settlement portended by the machinations of the Ohio Company.

Silenced for nearly two decades by the powerful alliance of the Iroquois and British imperial authorities, the Ohio and Susquehanna Indians desperately grasped this last opportunity to protect or regain their homelands.[50]

Backcountry settlers whose relatives had been killed by raiding parties or who had been driven from their homes, however, were unlikely again to view Indians in a positive light once the war had ended. Even for those who did not suffer directly, fear and hatred were spread further by the often lurid reports of Indian attacks which were published in the colonial press and read avidly by many colonists. The *Pennsylvania Gazette* frequently reported in gruesome detail upon the victims of Indian attacks. In June 1756, for instance, the *Gazette* carried reports of a raid on Cumberland County in which John Wasson "was killed, and mangled in so horrid and cruel a Manner, that a Regard to Decency forbids describing it." Wasson was fortunate if the *Gazette*'s accounts were to be believed. Three months later the *Gazette* carried the account of another settler who had escaped from captivity. He reported how his captors had "made an example of one Paul Bradley, whom they, agreeable to their usual Cruelty, beat for half an hour with Clubs and Tomahawks, and afterwards fastening him to a Post, cropt his Ears close to his Head; after which an Indian chopped off his Fingers, and another, with a red hot Iron, burnt him all over his Belly... then they Shot him full of Arrows, and at last killed and scalped him." If such reports were not enough to convince readers of the *Gazette* of Indian barbarity, another report assured them that the Indians at Fort Duquesne "roast a Prisoner out of every considerable Party that they take. Our Women are allowed a full Moon, to choose the Embraces of an Indian or a Tomahawk."[51]

While the *Pennsylvania Gazette* and other colonial newspapers, in a manner not too dissimilar from the twenty-first-century media, often sought to depict sensational or graphic details to entertain their readers, such reports were not totally without basis. Indian warriors do seem to have resorted to an unusually violent pattern of warfare and one which digressed from common Indian traditions of warfare. One element of Indian warfare on the Pennsylvania frontier seems to have been the conscious use of what might be termed "psychological warfare" as a tactic in demoralizing British and provincial forces as well as the civilian population. Perhaps the most obvious examples came during combat with regular forces. During Braddock's campaign, for instance, small Indian parties captured stragglers from the main British column. The Indians then pinned the soldiers' scalps to trees in the line of march warning what would happen to any other men they captured.

Similarly, when Forbes's army neared the forks of the Ohio in 1758 they found the heads of some of the men from Grant's Highlanders, who had recently been captured outside the post, displayed on stakes with their kilts pinned below, flapping in the breeze.[52]

Such tactics were also applied to the civilian population, particularly in the region on the northern frontier of Pennsylvania, between the Susquehanna and Delaware Rivers. In an attack in mid-November 1755 on Northampton County, raiding parties seem to have specifically scalped women and children and left their bodies in locations where they would certainly be seen by those who returned. Some men had their skulls split open and their "brains... beat out"; one had "his privities cut off and put into his mouth." Accounts described the widespread "horror and desolation, populous Settlements deserted, Villages laid in Ashes, Men, Women and Children cruelly mangled and Massacred, some found in the Woods very nauseous for want of internment, some just seeking after the hands of the Savage Slaughterers, and some haggled and covered all over with Wounds." Such violence, as well as being an element of psychological warfare, may also have been partly symbolic, as Jane Merrit has demonstrated. The killing of women and children in their homes and the gruesome mutilation of women's breasts and men's "privities" may have been a symbolic emasculation of settlers, often settlers who were known to their attackers, who had forced the Delawares out of their ancestral homeland on which these attacks occurred.[53]

The actions of Indian raiding parties, and the even more sensational and blood-thirsty accounts that appeared in the colonial presses, could not fail to stir up hatred and fear of Indians. Such sentiments were further fuelled by the rhetoric of the proprietors and their supporters during the war. Throughout the war the bitter political disputes between the proprietors and their supporters and the anti-proprietary faction in the assembly resulted in a willingness to blame all Indians for the colony's woes. Pennsylvania's declaration of war provided a taste of the florid rhetoric which was to follow. Governor Morris stressed that the Delawares had attacked the frontier and "in a most cruel, savage and perfidious Manner, killed and butchered great Numbers of the Inhabitants, and carried others into barbarous Captivity." He continued with a demand that "all his Majesty's Subjects of this Province... [should] embrace all Opportunities of pursuing, taking, killing, and destroying the Delaware Indians and all others confederated with them."[54]

The entreaty to kill and destroy all Indians soon had additional weight. Lacking any effective military organization at the start of the war,

Pennsylvania had to find any means possible to encourage its inhabitants to attack the Indians. To this end, in the spring of 1756 the colony offered to pay $130 for the scalp of every male Indian aged over twelve, and $50 for each Indian woman's scalp. There was of course no way of determining whether the scalp was of a hostile Indian or one of the many Christianized Indians who lived on the Pennsylvania frontier. The scalp bounty thus encouraged an open season not only for killing all Indians but also the brutal scalping of the victims. Slaughter and bloodshed had all but become tools of government. For a colony which had previously prided itself in its equitable relations with its Indian neighbors, this was an alarming step.[55]

The frontier raids may also have ensured that images of violence became deeply entrenched in the minds of many who would later settle the western frontier. The earliest childhood memories of many frontiersmen were of being shut inside a small fort or blockhouse, terrified to venture outside in case of Indian attack. Many witnessed first-hand the scalping of relatives or friends by Indian raiding parties. The reminiscences of the early western settlers interviewed by John Dabney Shane in the early nineteenth-century contain many examples of settlers who as children had witnessed such violence. Indeed, children on the Kentucky and Ohio frontier were warned by their parents to go to sleep at night "or the Shawnees will catch you." Such experiences left an indelible mark on the minds of these people that was frequently manifested in anti-Indian hatred.[56]

Pontiac's Rebellion in 1763 in particular served to further intensify the image of Indians as "untrustworthy savages." By 1763, as British troops occupied the last French posts in the west, most Pennsylvanians were rejoicing in the "successes" of British and Anglo-American arms and viewed the neighboring Indians as a subjected people. The Indians, particularly those in the upper Ohio Valley, saw matters rather differently. It was the French who had been defeated not them. Following their occupation of the French posts in the Ohio Valley, the Ohio Indians had attempted to negotiate with the new British garrisons in their midst. However, the British had replied by abandoning the old diplomatic protocols of gift exchanges and refusing to provide arms and ammunition. In negotiations with the Ohio Delawares in the fall of 1758, while the French were still entrenched at Fort Duquesne, the British had promised that once the French were driven from the Ohio Valley they would leave. Now the French were gone, but towns around British garrisons like Fort Pitt continued to grow. As Indian headmen traveled to the fort they questioned whether the British "designed to Build

another Philadelphia on their Lands." For Indians it was the British who had reneged on their promises. However, as Indian war parties once more descended on the Pennsylvania backcountry, to most settlers it was the Indians who had again proved untrustworthy neighbors.[57]

The start of Pontiac's Rebellion was the signal for the release of pent-up hatred against all Indians which had built up through the Seven Years' War. In Lancaster County, news that the provincial government was providing shelter and protection to several hundred Christian Indians who had fled to Philadelphia while Indian raiders devastated their homes, angered desperate frontiersmen. Unable to attack the Indians in Philadelphia directly, the frontiersmen turned their attention to the nearest available Indians at Conestoga. A party of fifty-seven "volunteers," popularly called the Paxton Boys, rode from Paxton in Lancaster County to nearby Conestoga where they butchered six Conestogas. Not content with murdering six Conestogas, the Paxton Boys returned a week later to massacre all the survivors of the raid who had taken shelter in the county jail.[58]

Violence against Indians was not limited to Lancaster County Pennsylvania, and similar scenes were repeated along the frontier. John Penn wrote in May 1764 to his brother Richard, "The people... are... Inveterate against the indians."[59] It was not only Indians who faced such attacks. In March 1765, a convoy carrying several thousand pounds of gifts and trade goods for the Indians was attacked by angry frontiersmen, calling themselves the "Black Boys," at Sideling Hill near Fort Loudoun. Not content with merely attacking the convoy the Black Boys proceeded to fire on its military escort and even upon the fort itself. Across·Cumberland county groups of frontiersmen formed their own extra-legal militias to monitor trade and travel to the west. As the violence continued, Benjamin Franklin bemoaned that "our Frontier People are yet greater Barbarians than the Indians."[60]

The violence of the Seven Years' War and Pontiac's War which followed intensified the sense of racial division between Indians and colonists, between Indians and Whites. Gregory Knouff has argued that the Revolutionary War on the Pennsylvania frontier was responsible for generating such a clear distinction.[61] However, by the end of the Seven Years' War Pennsylvanians had already begun to fashion a racial construction which made clear distinctions between "White" and "Indian." A report on the outbreak of Pontiac's War from the *Pennsylvania Gazette* in 1763, for instance, maintained that while there had been "on the Frontier frequent Alarms, and several Skirmishes with the Indians, in which the White People always beat the Enemy... it is

worth remarking, that... there has not been one Engagement in which the Indians got the better of our People." The following winter, the Paxton Boys made no distinction between enemy or friend in their massacre of peaceful Conestoga Indians, and in their defense spoke in strident terms of the "Enemy Indians" who threatened all the "white people." At the same time, surveying the horror of the Paxton Boys' massacre, Benjamin Franklin questioned how "*Whitemen* and *Christians*" could behave in a manner which made them merely "CHRISTIANS['] WHITE SAVAGES." White and Indian, civilized and savage, had already emerged as a clear strand of thought for most Pennsylvanians by the end of the Seven Years' War. While the Revolutionary War may have served to crystallize further such distinctions, the Seven Years' War had generated much of the anti-Indian hatred and left the backcountry as a locus of violence and disorder against all Indians.[62]

Indian-hatred was able to degenerate even further into violence because of the breakdown in authority in western and northern Pennsylvania, which was also a direct result of the Seven Years' War. The war had caused mass movements of settlers as they fled from Indian attacks. Ties of community had been strained and the elite in particular often found their authority challenged. War also blunted the powers of the provincial government in the west. The war had witnessed the bitter struggle between the proprietors and their opponents for control of Pennsylvania, while the Quakers, fearing that their pacifism could turn them into scapegoats for the colony's early military failures, also largely withdrew from government. Consequently, the two main constraints on the growth of tension with the Indians—the proprietors' desire to protect their income and the Quakers' desire to maintain good relations with the Indians—were both diminished after the war. In their place was a more aggressive, expansionist assembly, dominated by men like Benjamin Franklin who had a deep interest in expansion into the west.[63]

Perhaps most importantly however, in the aftermath of the war there was no clear judicial authority in much of the west and north of Pennsylvania. In an attempt to assuage Indian fears, in May 1763 the Earl of Egremont, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, responsible for colonial affairs in North America, suggested that the government should adopt a clear policy "of conciliating the Minds of the Indians... by protecting their Persons & Property &... guarding against any Invasion or Occupations of their Hunting Lands."[64] The resulting Proclamation of 1763 made the Appalachian Mountains the formal boundary between British settlements and Indian lands. However, the proclamation created an unexpected problem; because

western territories were placed outside any colonial jurisdiction, there was no direct way of enforcing the law, nor was it clear which laws, if any, applied in the west. While martial law could be applied to the troops in the west at army posts, under normal circumstances it could not apply to civilians. This issue would not be fully resolved until the Quebec Act of 1774 attempted to place the western territories under the authority of the government of Quebec. The lack of judicial authority in the west allowed crimes to be committed with impunity: traders could defraud their customers, squatters could seize lands, and murderers could kill. To resolve this problem, two years later the board issued a more detailed "Plan for the future management of Indian affairs." This plan proposed, among other things, a network of agents at frontier posts who would be empowered to act as Justices of the Peace in the west to supervise the administration of justice and hear all trials. The plan, which was never enacted because of budget constraints, would have allowed criminals to be brought speedily to trial in the west. The failure to enact the plan left much of the west without formal judicial authority throughout the 1760s.[65] Even if murders did take place within colonial jurisdiction, it was still all but impossible to convict any of the murderers, for as General Gage confided to Earl of Shelburne, "it is a Fact that all the People of the Frontiers from Pennsylvania to Virginia inclusive, openly avow, that they will never find a Man guilty of Murther, for killing an Indian. These People must of Course be impannelled upon every Jury, the Law directing the Tryal to be held, where the Fact is committed." Indeed, one murderer openly declared that "he thought it a meritorious act to kill Heathens, wherever they were found" and Sir William Johnson believed "this seems to be the opinion of all the common people."[66]

The lack of judicial authority in the west, as well as allowing criminals to escape justice, also allowed a flood of settlers to enter the region despite the imperial administration's desire to limit westward expansion. Between 1763 and 1774 an estimated fifty thousand settlers crossed the Appalachians to enter the upper Ohio Valley. In particular, around Redstone Creek in western Pennsylvania, settlers established thriving communities on lands which still belonged to the Indians. Indian headmen desperately sought to turn back this tide of settlement. Indian warriors seeking to protect their lands soon clashed with surveyors and squatters while the squatters drove off surveyors and squabbled with one another; violent clashes became common-place. Despairing of ever bringing order to these burgeoning and illegal white settlements, General Gage authorized his subordinates to allow the Indians to take matters into their own hands. He informed one post commander that "it's to be wished that

the Indians could apprehend the murtherers and put them to death without further ceremony." To make his wishes quite clear he added that if the Indians did put white murders to death "you are by no means to retaliate."[67]

On Pennsylvania's northern frontier, on the borders of Northampton County in the Wyoming Valley, matters were equally complicated. Here settlers from Connecticut attempted to establish settlements outside Pennsylvania's jurisdiction, claiming authority from Connecticut's original colonial charter which extended the colony's bounds to the Pacific Ocean. The dispute between the two colonies, which often erupted into armed conflict between contesting bands, simmered for nearly three decades. With no clear authority in the region, the northern frontier of Pennsylvania also degenerated into violence and lawlessness. Settlers killed Indians and other colonists with little compunction.[68] Indeed, Jack Marietta and G.S. Rowe have demonstrated that while reported rates of crime were rising throughout Pennsylvania from the 1720s onward, the 1750s seems to have witnessed an even more dramatic rise in crime. Between 1733 and 1754 only 2 Pennsylvanians in every 100,000 had been accused of murder; between 1765 and 1775 that number more than doubled to 4.9 per 100,000. This rise was also reflected in a general rise in the rate of all crimes and the general crime rate appears to have been about fifty percent higher in the years 1750 to 1770 than in the years 1720 to 1750.[69]

While tensions between settlers and Indians may have been growing before 1754, and while the new settlers flooding into Pennsylvania from Ulster may have had an increasing propensity to crime and violence, the Seven Years' War provided the spark to light this combustible combination. By the late 1760s government authority had all but evaporated in the Pennsylvania backcountry and the region had been overwhelmed by disorder and violence. Settlers attacked and murdered Indians; Indians attacked and murdered settlers; settlers attacked and murdered one another. Military commanders and judicial officers all despaired of halting such activities and even in some ways condoned them. These traditions of violence would soon become enshrined in backcountry customs such as eye-gouging and in broader frontier traditions of violence. At no point in the future would it be possible to associate the frontier with peaceful coexistence between different communities.[70] Many contemporaries realized this. When the Moravians began rebuilding their missions in the wake of the Seven Years' War and decided to build a new Gnadenhütten to replace their old mission community, they did not rebuild it on the Pennsylvania frontier. Instead, they

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selected a site on the headwaters of the Tuscarawas River in the Ohio Country, far from any white settlements.[71]

The Seven Years' War had thus transformed Pennsylvania, and in particular the backcountry, in several distinct ways. This transformation went far beyond merely generating anger amongst frontier settlers at the actions of Indian war parties. The war did generate a deep-seated distrust and fear of all Indians, but it also provided a racial context for this fear. Further, by infusing specie into the backcountry, raising the wages of laborers and improving transport, the war had reshaped the economy of the backcountry bringing settlers into a more competitive economic environment and generating personal competition amongst settlers. These economic changes, and some of the new opportunities offered by the war, in turn facilitated a transformation from a communal to a more competitive mindset and served to increase existing tensions within and between backcountry communities. By undermining the powers of government, both provincial and imperial, the war blunted attempts to create or restore order in western settlements, especially as settlers poured onto previously unsettled lands. By providing settlers with arms, training them in their use, and providing a reason to remain armed, the war gave settlers the means to escalate violence to a new level.

While many scholars have noted the role of the Seven Years' War in generating Indian hatred on the frontier the impact of the war was far more complex than this. By arming the frontier, the Seven Years' War had provided the means for violence; by stirring up interracial hatred it had provided the motive for violence; by limiting administrative control of the west it had provided the opportunity for violence. The Seven Years' War had thus provided an often literally lethal combination of changes. The war and the changes it wrought ensured a final end to Penn's peaceable kingdom and replaced it with the more familiar frontier where violence predominated and settlers and Indians exchanged many blows but few words.

NOTES

1. For examples of works which have stressed long-term themes see Jane T. Merritt, *At the Crossroads: Indians & Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700–1763* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003). James H. Merrell, *Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1999). Peter C Mancall, *Valley of Opportunity: Economic Culture Along the Upper Susquehanna, 1700–1800* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). William Pencak and John B. Frantz, "Introduction: Pennsylvania and Its Three Revolutions," in *Beyond Philadelphia: The American*

Revolution in the Pennsylvania Hinterland, ed. William Pencak and John B. Frantz (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), ix–xxv. For the Seven Years' War as precursor to the Revolution see Lawrence Henry Gipson, "The American Revolution as an Aftermath of the Great War for the Empire," *Political Science Quarterly* 65 (1950). Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000). Gary B. Nash, *The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986). Marc Egnal, *A Mighty Empire: The Origins of the American Revolution* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). Eric Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). A notable exception to this view is Colin G. Calloway, *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).

2.   Richard I. Melvoin, *New England Outpost: War and Society in Colonial Deerfield* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988). Guy Chet, *Conquering the American Wilderness: The Triumph of European Warfare in the Colonial Northeast* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003). John Grenier, *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

3.   Alan Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670–1717* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002). Marjoleine Kars, *Breaking Loose Together: The Regulator Rebellion in Pre-Revolutionary North Carolina* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002). See also Ronald Hoffman, Thad W. Tate, and Peter J. Albert, eds, *An Uncivil War: The Southern Backcountry During the American Revolution* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1985).

4.   quoted in Maldwyn A. Jones, "The Scotch-Irish in British America," in *Strangers within the Realm: Cultural Margins of the First British Empire*, ed. Bernard Bailyn (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), 297. Jack D. Marietta and G.S. Rowe, *Troubled Experiment: Crime and Justice in Pennsylvania, 1682–1800* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 17, 63–106, 263–73. Joseph D Illick, *Colonial Pennsylvania: A History* (New York: Scribners, 1976).

5.   Paul E. Doutrich, "The Evolution of an Early American Town: Yorktown, Pennsylvania, 1740–1790" (Ph.D. diss., University of Kentucky, 1985), 15–16, 25–27.

6.   Ned C. Landsman, "Border Cultures, the Backcountry, and 'North British' Emigration to America," *William and Mary Quarterly* 48 (1991): 253–59. Jones, "Scotch-Irish in America," 284–313. George. Franz, "Paxton: A Study of Community Structure and Mobility in the Colonial Pennsylvania Backcountry." (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1974). Judith Anne Ridner, "'A Handsomely Improved Place': Economic, Social and Gender-Role Development in a Backcountry Town, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 1750–1810" (Ph.D. diss., College of William and Mary, 1994). Paul E. Doutrich, "York County," in *Beyond Philadelphia: The American Revolution in the Pennsylvania Hinterland*, ed. William Pencak and John B. Frantz (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998), 85–106.

7.   Warren R. Hofstra, *The Planting of New Virginia: Settlement and Landscape in the Shenandoah Valley* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 204. Doutrich, "The Evolution of an Early American Town", 24–25. James T. Lemon, "The Agricultural Practices of National Groups in Eighteenth-Century Southeastern Pennsylvania," *Geographical Review* 56 (1966): 467–96. Robert D Mitchell, *Commercialism and Frontier: Perspectives on the Early Shenandoah Valley* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1977). James T. Lemon, *The Best Poor Man's Country: A Geographical*

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9. James Kirby Martin, "The Return of the Paxton Boys and the Historical State of the Pennsylvania Frontier," *Pennsylvania History* 38 (1971): 117–33. Robert D. Mitchell, "'From the Ground up': Space, Place, and Diversity in Frontier Studies," in *Diversity and Accommodation: Essays on the Cultural Composition of the Virginia Frontier*, ed. Michael J. Puglisi (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1997), 28. Franz, *Paxton*, 28–29.

10. Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 152–54. Merrell, *Into the American Woods*, 35–37.

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