ABSCONDING SERVANTS, ANXIOUS GERMANS, AND ANGRY SAILORS: WORKING PEOPLE AND THE MAKING OF THE PHILADELPHIA ELECTION RIOT OF 1742

Michael Bradley McCoy
University of Pittsburgh

About two weeks before the Philadelphia Election of 1742, a weathered seaman named John Spence advised Quaker merchant Thomas Lloyd that a mob of sailors could help the Quakers defeat their political adversaries, the Proprietary Party. “In a jocular Manner,” Spence told Lloyd “that if the Quakers would give him fifteen hundred acres of land, they should have the Election.” After three years of bitter intra-elite division sparked by the War for Jenkins’ Ear, Lloyd probably entertained the offer. Repulsed, however, by the mariner’s audacity, Lloyd quickly retorted, “It was not in...Spence’s power to help or hinder” any party, nor was it his place. Indeed, while laborers like Spence represented a growing segment of the urban population, inadequate taxable wealth meant most could not participate directly within the polity. Likely, maritime laborers represented from ten to and as much as twenty or twenty-five percent of the population, making them the single largest group of wage laborers. Given their mobility, wage fluctuations, and the inconsistency of employment, they
were underrepresented on the city’s tax rolls. Because of their economic situation, “very few” mariners were “worth [the] Fifty Pounds” required for participation in Pennsylvania politics. Yet this year sailors 
would participate, and, wryly, Spence told Lloyd: “If clubs would not do...Cutlasses and Pistols” ought to do the trick. Sailors had grievances, and directed most toward Philadelphia Friends like Lloyd, who grew fat off mariners’ backbreaking labor, decided workers’ fates, and limited privateering because their conscience did not condone participation in war.

If Lloyd brushed off Spence’s statements, it was only because he was accustomed to the riotous rumblings of workers. Yet, neither Lloyd nor his political adversaries could dismiss Spence’s promise so easily. As the election approached, the elite knew all to well that sailors were not alone in their grievances. In 1742, for the first time, Sailors joined Irish and German servants, workers, and farmers to make their voices heard through crowd action. As imperial war had divided the Pennsylvania elite, it also created the crises of which the lower order could seek remedy. It could not have come at a worse time. With the memory of the Stono Rebellion, the New York Conspiracy, and the Antiguan slave plot fresh in their minds, Pennsylvania’s elite faced grave problems. Their workers, too, were restive. Absconding servants and the politicization of agitated sailors and anxious Germans were leading Philadelphia’s finest toward confrontation.

This is a perspective long absent from the narrative of the Philadelphia Election Riot. In the past four decades, historians have viewed the riot through the lens of elite political discord, viewing sailors, servants, and German immigrants as tools employed by their betters. This essay disagrees, and seeks to broaden and deepen the traditional narrative of the riot to include the social and economic concerns of those people traditionally written out of the story. After retelling the story of the riot, this essay expands the chronology to examine the material world of Philadelphia’s elite—looking to the expansion of trade, and accumulation to demonstrate the increasing power and wealth of Philadelphia’s merchant elite in contrast to workers and farmers. The essay then discusses the source of elite division before deepening the investigation to find the roots of politicization among servants, Germans, and sailors long considered drunk, unthinking thugs. Studying their laboring conditions in port and at sea, their wage rates and economic concerns, their anxieties, and their own ideas about wartime finances and labor shortages, reveals how farmers, servants, and especially mariners, were crucial players in the hotly contested election, bringing
important, though not immediate, radical change. Yet, immediate is the operative word. For, if 1742 was but a brief moment of working people’s radicalism, it had long term repercussions. Like the “mobbish” crowds, disgruntled frontiersmen, embattled Native Americans, and restive slaves who fill the pages of Gary Nash’s Unknown American Revolution, the participants in ‘Bloody Election;’ “were acquiring a sense of their importance,” and, slowly, pushing Pennsylvania’s elite to create “a more equitable society.”

The Riot as Seen from the Top Down

Utilizing the depositions taken in the months that followed the election, historians have followed contemporary elites in arguing that the riot resulted from factional, upper-class politics, insisting that the Proprietary party hired the sailors to intimidate the electorate and control the vote—whoever controlled the voting process won the election. Knowing this, Philadelphia’s leading men were preoccupied with the coordination of local laborers and immigrants as Election Day muscle. Thus, Quakers organizing Germans, and Proprietors hiring sailors, hoped to secure a decisive victory and end the partisan divide. This was not the case.

By September 30, electioneering went into full swing, and the port bustled with activity. That night, Philadelphia’s finest Friends gathered at Reese Meredith’s George Tavern, where they negotiated for the political muscle of un-naturalized and naturalized Germans. Voting rights, a shared pacifism, and a preference for naturalization without loyalty oaths united the Quakers and their Palatinate allies, and proved an insurmountable barrier to Proprietary success. Yet, for Proprietors, the German-Quaker alliance was only part of the problem. By 1742, changes in the laws governing elections bolstered the probability of a Quaker victory.

After 1739, and until 1742, city elections followed the rules established by the Election Law of 1739, which created party-specific election inspectors. Thus Proprietary and Quaker partisans could depend on representatives of their own party to collect the ballots. To Proprietors, the election law brought a measure of order to the electoral process; yet it was short-lived. In 1742, the election law was up for revision and reinstatement. Having watched Proprietary men like William Allen and Mayor Plumsted use the law to gain control of the city, Quakers thought it best to let the law fall from the books. Thus, in the fall of that year, Proprietors would have to rely on the voters to
choose election inspectors—putting up for grabs the ability to collect the ballots, and placing their trust in their political rivals. Indeed, without the 1739 election law, the entire affair would turn into a “trial of endurance,” that would force the electorate to traverse the courthouse steps, harried or helped by the Quaker-German faction, who, in years past, controlled the stairs. If successful in running the gauntlet, voters would then put their faith in the honesty of the election inspectors who were chosen informally by the electorate—naturalized or not—on the morning of the election. As staunch Proprietary man Mayor Clement Plumsted saw it, “a Sett of Villains hinder People from voting, by crowding the Stairs and open people’s Tickets, putting others in their Hands or tearing them, as they like or dislike.” In a colony that could boast a level of enfranchisement twice that of England, “hired toughs” and dishonest inspectors propelled elites into office. Electoral politics was a show of force and a display of dishonesty, not a spectacle of democracy—and Proprietors faced an uphill battle.10

Knowing their weaknesses, Proprietors tried to amend the electoral process. Several Proprietary men knocked at the door of the George and made a last-minute plea for changes in the election law, then departed for the Three Tuns Tavern to wait for an answer.11 William Allen and several Proprietary officials had floated a proposal seeking procedural changes without an Assembly vote. Rather than the traditional public choice of election inspectors, Proprietors wished to pre-select eight election inspectors, four for each party, thus ensuring Proprietors a chance to counter the Quaker-German alliance. Across town, the Proprietary men waited for a Quaker response. Quaker John Bringhurst soon arrived with the expected news. The Friends had vociferously voted down City Party requests, making it clear that muscle, not votes, would win the election.12 The Proprietary representatives considered their options and stormed off uttering, “We will offer no affront; nor receive any; let the hardest send off.” Later that night, Proprietary officials secured the labor of Philadelphia’s sailors. Throughout the next morning, they stood idle while sailors prepared to riot.13

Just after dawn on October 1, sailors began to stir, and their hoorahs and rowdy behavior sent trepidation throughout the city. Sailors obtained weapons, crowded local taverns, and wandered the streets. Alarmed and apprehensive, Quaker merchants scrambled to return the sailors to their vessels, hoping to prevent any further mischief. Seeking the aid of city officials, the Quakers went to the house of Mayor Clement Plumsted.
Ardently Anti-Quaker, the Mayor rebuffed their requests to send the sailors back to their ships. A stop at the home of City Recorder William Allen proved equally fruitless. It seemed that German muscle would meet its match, much to the chagrin of local Quaker elites.14

When Quaker James Morris attempted to persuade the sailors to stay away from Market Street and the Courthouse, they replied brusquely, “You are the damned Quakers, you are the enemies to King George, and we will knock you all in the head.”15 As the time of the election neared, Market Street quickly filled with all manner of people, including a mob of sailors. At ten o’clock, when “the People of the City and County...had just begun their choice of [election] Inspectors,” the combustible scene exploded. Just as the electorate nominated Quaker Isaac Norris for inspector, a swarm of nearly eighty sailors dashed up Market Street toward the crowd and the courthouse.16 Jack Tars of all shapes and sizes gathered en masse, “huzzaing” and with clubs in hand, bore down on the defenseless voters.17 Captains Mitchell, Spence, and Redmond yelled orders, cheered their men on, and “clapped them on the shoulders,” as they routed the assembled voters, yelling and swinging their truncheons wildly. Sailors were heard to bellow, “There goes a Parcel of Quaker sons of Bitches; they are the men we want; Men with Broad hats and no Pockets.” Voters and bystanders were thrown into panic; some fled Market Street, others stayed to fight off the sailors.18

While some local authorities attempted to re-establish order, others, like William Allen, laughed and allowed the riot to run its course.19 No one could contain the sailors; any attempt at ushering them back to their ships met with an immediate and violent reprisal. Several times local authorities sought to calm the situation, and each time the angry Jack Tars “fell on [them] with their Clubs...knocking down Magistrates, Constables and all others who oppos’d them.”20 Marching to the courthouse steps, the sailors demanded the immediate release of their captured brethren. “Great stones” were heaved through Courthouse windows as the sailors promised to level the building. Others damned the Quakers and their German allies. Cudgels, sticks, and “butts of hoop-holes,” bloodied their opponents, but voters and bystanders soon recovered and began to retaliate. A melee of sticks, bricks, canes, and even “a rail with Tenter-hooks for the hanging of meat,” pummeled the Tars back to their ships and eventually to jail. Once the ruckus died down, the voting continued. According to Israel Pemberton, Sr., it “was carried on very peaceably the Remainder of the Day,” and Pemberton’s Quaker party trounced the Proprietors, maintaining control of the Assembly.21
Several months later, the victorious Quakers concluded an investigation into the causes of the riot. The depositions said it all. When William Moode asked why the sailors rioted, Tench Francis responded, "I know not...but this I'll tell you, the Gentlemen of this City heard the Country People would use them ill, and these sailors were designed for their assistance." Septimus Robinson was bolder, letting Benjamin Paschall know that the Proprietors "got these sailors to answer the Dutchmen." William Allen was on the "side of Defense;" Clement Plumsted, Tench Francis, Septimus Robinson, and Joseph Turner, the same. Each man reminded the Quakers that the riot was on their heads, for they had turned down the proposal offered the night before the election. Each man stood idle, turned a blind eye, or laughed in quiet amusement, while the sailors beat and bloodied the Quakers and their German allies. For the Quakers, such was sufficient evidence that "Better Sort" called upon the "Lesser Sort" to secure a political victory. Indeed, the sailors—and the Germans for that matter—were but pawns in an elite chess match over local provincial issues. Such is the story "from above."

The Men in Ruffles

The Quaker and Proprietary elites who figure so prominently in the election riot made their fortunes and accrued social and political power from a widening and prosperous Atlantic trade, increasing the volume of their West Indian trade, and transforming trade from "bilateral" to transnational. As the table demonstrates, by the outbreak of the War for Jenkins Ear, Philadelphia's finest had nearly doubled their coastal and Caribbean trade, and increased their volume of trade to Southern Europe by 800 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Destination</th>
<th>Total Destinations</th>
<th>Total Cleared</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1730</td>
<td>1735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N=74)</td>
<td>(N=163)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caribbean</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Europe</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Europe</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Drawn from "Clearing House Reports" in Pennsylvania Gazette.
In this system of regional and Atlantic trade, enterprising merchants rose to success, creating Philadelphia dynasties like the Pemberton family. The Pembertons, vociferous proponents of the Quaker cause in 1742, represent a perfect example of the power and wealth siphoned from the Pennsylvania economy. Beginning with patriarch Phinneas, the Pemberton family established longstanding influence in both provincial politics and the economy. Trained in the Counting House of Samuel Carpenter, Israel, Phinneas’ son, established himself as “one of the wealthiest and best known merchants of the city,” with business ties stretching throughout the Atlantic world, including the West Indies.25 Leaving his familial home, Bolton Mansion, in Bucks County, for Philadelphia, Israel built Clarke Hall, a stately house rising above the surrounding “dingy two-story houses.” Later, when Clarke Hall became too small, Israel purchased some “seventy acres of land, just south of the angle of Twenty-third and South streets,” where he built the grand “Evergreen.”26

Drawing on the productive capacity of Pennsylvania’s agricultural community in places like Chester County, merchants like Pemberton purchased the “surpluses once kept in store or traded locally” and “sold [them] on the Atlantic market.”27 The grain trade, however, was but representative of larger trends. Early on, merchants recognized the importance of expanded trade and redeployed labor accordingly. In 1730, mariners like Arthur Tough and William Annis made their living from the West Indian trade; but, by 1740, they would recognize that Lisbon and Bristol were fast becoming the destinations of choice for men like Pemberton. Indeed, by the fourth decade of the eighteenth century, the shrewd Philadelphia merchant counted on the profitability of trade with Antigua, Barbados, and Jamaica, but knew that a variety of markets made good business sense—something Isaac Norris noticed as early as 1711, when he told Joseph Pike “the trade with Lisbon has been of great Advantage to us.”28

Great advantage indeed, for merchants like Pemberton translated economic success into political clout. After 1718, Israel began a nearly twenty-year stint as representative to the Assembly, as well as holding positions on the Philadelphia Common Council, and a “lifetime” position as City Alderman. Throughout the 1740s, the elder Pemberton was elected to Burgess every year, while at the same time overseeing the purchase and sale of land, property, and trade goods at his store and wharf.29 Pemberton was not alone, others, too found success in the colony’s expanding economy. By all indicators, then, members of the elite seemed to have everything going for them. A prosperous
trade and a ready supply of labor allowed for the expansion of individual wealth and the rise of merchant dynasties.30

Yet, if transatlantic trade had allowed the men in ruffles to accrue greater wealth and influence, it also created the atmosphere in which elite division could grow—and warfare only increased that division. Indeed, the tenor of intra-elite squabbling changed when war broke out in 1739. War rekindled old tensions, reorganized labor supplies, and recast the intra-elite debate. Whether and how Pennsylvania would meet the royal demands and ensure the province's defense now overshadowed all previous battles.

Exploiting the Divided Elite

If trade was advantageous, it was so only because farmers, merchants, and millers had access to cheap labor. As men like Wight Massey understood, the organization and deployment of labor was crucial to success—both his and his counterparts. Increasingly, servants fit the bill. Servitude was a carefully contrived substitute for free labor, comprising “more than one third of the work force.”31 Servitude was labor replacement, and it had been so for a long time. Indeed, like the Chesapeake before it, Pennsylvania's economic growth hinged on a steady stream of coerced labor. Servants were vital component in the growth of the Pennsylvania economy. In cities and towns, they serviced the needs of merchants and artisans alike. In the countryside, they worked fields, furnaces, and forges.32

Reliance on servitude, however, was a risky venture.33 Servants stole horses, clothing, jewelry, tools, and especially themselves, absconding to the port, the backcountry, and the sea. A cooper who relied heavily on his indentured servant, Massey was not a little perturbed when his servant absconded in 1741. What made it worse for Massey was his runaway servant’s destination—into the militia newly formed by Governor George Thomas.

For members of the elite, the problems associated with organizing and deploying indentured labor only increased when the Crown called for military aid. While Proprietors, unencumbered by religious considerations, supported the Crown, the Quakers were unable and unwilling to do so. Thus by the summer of 1740, when Governor Thomas offered freedom to servants who joined the militia, old political rivalries flared anew, and elites divided into two inflexible camps.34 When the Crown called for military aid, Quaker elites scrambled to defend their religious convictions and their own economic
interests. Though Penn hoped to avoid problems, Thomas ran into an almost immediate roadblock. Writing to the Lords of Trade, Thomas complained that he had “used [his] utmost Endevours to persuade [the Quaker Assembly] to a Sense of their Duty to his Majesty, and of their own Danger; and am now left without hope of their doing anything for their security.”

Just two years after his term began Thomas was exasperated; his “Endeavours...to make the principal Inhabitants sensible of the defenceless State of this Province” were fruitless. Unmoved by the realities or War with Spain or the prospect of war with France, “The people called Quakers” remained “tied up by Religious considerations from doing what is so absolutely necessary for the King’s Honour, and the Preservation of their Liberties and Estates.” By 1742, the Governor and London’s Lords of Trade described the Quakers as a “sett of People who oppose all preparations for Defence.” For Proprietors and Imperial officials alike, Pennsylvania was “exposed to any Enemy that shall think fit to invade it.”

Religious tensions and economic considerations prevented militia formation, and left Governor Thomas in an awkward situation, caught between the pacifism of the Quaker Assembly on one side, and the demands of the Penn family and the Crown on the other. Thus, elites divided—neither side willing to budge. Unable to convince the Quakers of the necessity of defense, Thomas took the initiative in forming a militia in service of the Crown and colony. Without the support of the Assembly, and in the midst of a widening war, the Governor offered freedom to servants who would enlist. By 1743, nearly 300 servants had fled the colony.

Absconding from his master in the spring of 1741, a “fresh colour’d,” longhaired Irish servant named John Robison found safe haven in the militia. Robison’s tour of duty was but short-lived; freed from his indenture, he soon “Deserted from his Majesty’s Service,” in search of a new life and better opportunities. Many more would follow Robison’s lead. Voting with their feet, they sided with the Governor and the Proprietary party, in search of their own best interest. For servants, the division within the ruling elite had created an opportunity to escape an abusive and dangerous system of labor; and that they did.

While elite division sparked servant flight, it was the servants’ own experiences which led them to them to flee to the militia. Though we do not know the entire background of individual servants, the often-detailed physical and psychological descriptions recorded in the Pennsylvania Gazette offer a window onto the world of life and work in early Pennsylvania. From
a sampling of runaway advertisements, it is possible to build a composite picture of the servants. Of the 130 runaways ads examined from 1740–1744, nearly 57 percent of the servants were Irish. More telling, however, are runaway totals for the single year of 1742. Of the 27 abscending servants, twenty, or 74 percent, were listed as Irish by birth.

For most, including elites like James Logan, the Irish were a troublesome lot. As early as 1729, he was convinced that the Irish were about to invade the province, “thus crowd[ing] where they are not wanted.”42 To Pennsylvania's English colonists, the Irish were a barbaric race with a history of betraying the English and a recent role in the insurrectionary arsons that rocked New York City.43 Still, labor needs overshadowed any prejudice. The Irish, long considered sub-human, long relegated to the role of forced laborer, were paradoxically unwanted but irreplaceable guest laborers in Pennsylvania’s port city and hinterland economies. However contradictory their position in Pennsylvania or the Atlantic World, there was nothing inconsistent about the indentured labor experience.

A few short vignettes expose the life experience of many indentured servants in the era of the Election Riot. Many servants probably found a life not unlike that of Anthony Hill. Hill was well acquainted with scars, crushed bones, and damaged psyche that accompanied servitude. Less than two months after the election riot, bricklayer Alexander Hickinbottom sought Hill’s quick return. Hickenbottom provided a lengthy description, outlining the distinguishing injuries and abuses of a life of labor. Hill, a sometimes chimney sweep, fled with two sore legs, “the right Leg occasion’d by the Wheel of a cart running over it,” the left, “maimed by the Anchor of a ship.” Moreover, his burnt and bandaged right hand easily identified the hobbling sweep. Hill’s story was anything but unusual. 44 In the most basic of terms, life as a servant was a dangerous and demeaning prospect.

Driven by working conditions and the mental and physical conditions of work, servants in the era of the election riot resorted to violence or flight. Irish servant Robert Jones did both. In July 1742, the twenty-year-old Jones grabbed a spade shovel, walloped his master in the head, and slipped away. Fleeing the dangers and regimentation of work, servants ran; some to the backcountry, but many more, like John Smith, ran to the ports, seeking a new life aboard ship. Three weeks after absconding from the Work House, Smith was nowhere in sight. Though his master urged captains “not to Entertain or carry him away,” he was, in all likelihood, too late. “[I]n Sailor’s Dress,” Smith probably sauntered to the wharf and hopped a merchant ship or privateer for
parts unknown. Utilizing the opportunity provided by Governor Thomas to escape servitude, Robison, Hill, Jones and Smith, decided their own fates and hoped to start life anew. Unfortunately, by taking the Proprietors’ offer, servants widened the rift between Pennsylvania’s divided elite, who now waited for the October election to settle their dispute.

Quakers and Germans/Proprietors and Sailors

Facing a headstrong governor and a stubbornly pro-war opposition, Quakers took the initiative, turning once again to the German people for much-needed Election Day muscle. The Quaker-German alliance was deeply rooted, initiated by a beneficent William Penn and cemented by his successors. In recent years, Quakers such as Isaac Norris bolstered the ties through loans, easy rents, and land grants, and even attempted to rewrite Pennsylvania inheritance law in favor of German widows. By the 1740s, such economic and legislative catering had strengthened a long-standing partnership into an immutable political alliance. As Governor Thomas wryly wrote to the Quaker Assembly, “The Germans have been of Service to you in late Elections and are so numerous, that it is now become necessary to court them to chuse you again.” And “chuse” the Quakers they did.

Turning to the Quakers had been beneficial, and now, amid wartime, and in the face of an unfriendly political opposition, it made good sense. Friends like Norris and Pemberton fought tooth and nail to keep Pennsylvania out of war; they worked even harder to halt military enlistments, fight corvée labor, and return servants to their masters. Moreover, for Germans facing dwindling prospects of land ownership, supporting the Quakers might induce other Friends to follow Norris’ lead. Indeed, Norris’ kindness and the prospect for gaining a foothold in the English colony led Germans like John Lesher to support the Quaker cause.

Lesher was among the mix of “Five Hundred,” german and Quaker artisans, farmers and merchants who gathered at Reese Meredith’s the night before the election. An “unnaturalized” foreigner, Lesher was an up and comer. That year, he, John Ross, and John Yoder began a longterm partnership that would result in the Oley Forge along the Manatawny Creek. Within a decade, Lesher would purchase Yoder’s share, giving the immigrant two-thirds interest in the business that transformed “pigg metal into barr iron.” Though Lesher obviously had wherewithal, he did not have the right status. Nominated by his fellow
partisans for the position of election inspector, Lesher was forced to decline because he was not a citizen. A year after the election, Lesher would solve that problem, and move into county government.50

Still, Lesher was in the minority; few others shared his material or political success. Few of the eighty Palatinate tenants on McCall’s Manor were in a position to engage in risky ventures, much less vote. Like sailors, their lack of property precluded them from participation.51 More importantly, their lack of property highlighted new immigrants’ declining social and material conditions.

In one sense, such conditions resulted from changes within the demographics of the immigrant trade. By the late 1730s and early 1740s, immigration was quantitatively and qualitatively different from what it had been in the five or six decades since the colony’s founding. Quantitatively, there were more immigrants. From 1683 to 1726 only 798 Germans immigrated to Pennsylvania. Philadelphia received almost twice that number in one year, 1739. Thus by the time of the election riot, there were more people vying for land and opportunity. Yet, there were also qualitative differences.

Lured by promising words, Rhinelanders traveled to Rotterdam and then to Pennsylvania, where, during the first quarter of the eighteenth century families and extended kin networks were able to secure land. By the 1730s and 1740s, however, “intergenerational” families were on the decline, and new conscription laws forced “disproportionally [sic] high numbers of twenty-year-old men,” along with a growing contingent of single “eighteen-year-olds” out of the Rhineland.52 Young, sturdy, and poor, these men not only lacked the wherewithal to buy land, but also they lacked the ability to pay for their journey. As Wayland F. Dunaway made clear more than a half-century ago, while “The earlier German immigration to Pennsylvania is largely the story of those German sects who came to America in search of religious liberty,” those that arrived “after 1727, however, came as indentured servants in extreme poverty.”53

Yet, demography is only part of the story. Indeed, the expansion of Philadelphia’s trade and the growing labor needs of the port and countryside coalesced with the shifting patterns of immigration to change the material and social conditions of many migrants. As the number of immigrants swelled, poor single men, and even poor young families, were unable to insulate themselves from the vagaries of the labor market.
For a time, poor immigrants could rely upon a specialized form of indenture that gave them the opportunity to secure a buyer for their contract. Rather than being sold upon arrival, Palatines were given a two-week window in which to find family or friends willing to purchase their labor and (or) the labor of their family. Ideally, this system allowed new emigrants to keep their families intact and maintain important cultural and religious ties. Unfortunately, increased immigration meant more people had to compete for a limited number of German buyers, and, as a result, Pennsylvania’s labor-starved non-German population picked up the slack. Less inclined to buy entire families or maintain cultural ties, English, Scots, and Irish masters exposed many an unlucky immigrant to the vicissitudes of life and labor in early Pennsylvania, leaving an anonymous German couple and Dutch servant lad could be “disposed” of like “a genteel riding chair…and sundry sorts of Household Goods.” Like their Celtic counterparts, these hopeful immigrants were sold like “cattle” to the highest bidder.

By 1740s, servants like Ludowick Katts, Connerd Wead, Catherine Vernon, John Barnhard Biedery, and a “Dutch Servant boy” named Henry Wolff had first-hand knowledge about the implications of demographic or economic trends. The poor, however, were not the only immigrants to recognize the new material conditions taking root in the colony. For those with the wherewithal to establish a farmstead, the situation was equally troubling. By the 1740s, much of the best land in Philadelphia, Chester, and Bucks counties had been purchased. With cleared fields, houses, barns, and outbuildings, “the Land in older areas…was too expensive for most new settlers.” As early as the 1740s, the ability to gain a “competence” was dwindling. Without access to land, many were being forced onto less productive land, into tenancy, wage labor, or servitude. Economic success was not all encompassing; and as James T. Lemon has shown, landlessness was not an intermediate status. “Few” freemen, tenants, inmates, and servants “later possessed land in the same townships.”

Finally, the outbreak of war and the militia controversy were ominous signs that they, too, might face severe hardship. From both a moral and economic standpoint, war was an anathema. For the non-Lutheran sectarian minority, war went against their stated pacifist principles, and was a grim reminder of their own politically and religiously splintered homeland. For most Germans, however, war was a financial issue, which was equally abhorrent. Warfare, at least the warfare supported by the Proprietary men, siphoned off their valuable
farm labor, necessitated high taxes, and was potentially injurious to the trade of their agricultural goods.

While William Allen was convinced that Germans were “a sordid people...very loth to part with their money,” Germans had more than hard-earned money at stake.57 The issues of land ownership and the growth of German indentured labor, coupled with the demands of imperial war meant that freemen might join their less fortunate friends as “hewers of wood and drawers of water,” or worse yet, fall into the ranks of slaves. By the 1740s, neither of these fears was unfounded; war and labor shortages left German immigrants fearing conscription and corvée labor. Whether real or the product of by German-language printer Christopher Sauer and the Quaker faction, the idea that Proprietors had “a design to enslave them, to enforce their young men, by a contemplated militia law, to become soldiers,” was a powerful reminder of the fragility of their political, social, and material freedoms. Germans understood that their fates and interests were tied up in with Quaker political success and “they would come down in shoals to vote.”59

Proprietors’ fear that Germans would turn out en masse was rooted in experience. In 1740 alone, “about 400 Germans,” helped to hedge out the Proprietary Party.60 After their attempt to pack the Yearly Meeting with Moderate Quakers failed, Proprietary partisans once again scrambled to attract the German vote.61 By 1742, Proprietors understood the severity of their situation. Unable to tempt the Germans to their side and having their proposal struck down at Reese Meredith’s, another electoral defeat was imminent. Thus, like their adversaries, Proprietary partisans sought out some much-needed muscle.

Like the Germans, however, sailors had specific reasons for supporting the Proprietary Party. Pence and punch may have bought mariners’ services, but such remuneration was a bonus for men who wanted to let the Quaker gentry know exactly what they thought. Sailors’ words and actions were the articulation of specific experiences and grievances with Philadelphia’s Friends, revealed a deep animosity, and carried a heavy class connotation. In short, sailors resented the Quakers as employers: Quakers were the men who grew fat from their backbreaking labor, men who decided workers’ fates, and men whose consciences could not bear involvement in privateering.62

Though uttered in the heat of the moment, sailors’ word choice helps to pin down their resentments. Quakers were “sons of bitches” because they reaped all the benefits of mariners’ labor. In the decade before the election
riot, the expansion of trade offered the Philadelphia elite a great opportunity to increase their personal holdings. In a boom period, a keen eye for business, risk-taking behavior, and social networking had allowed Quaker merchants like the Pembertons, John Reynell, Joseph Wharton, and John Bringhurst to accumulate capital and to translate that wealth into political power. Yet, their success was not merely the result of hard work, pluck, or running in the right social circles, nor was it simply born of abstract market forces. Rather, merchants owed much of their success to their workers.

Mariners, stevedores, slaves, servants, and wage laborers built the elite. They carried out the work that made the Atlantic port tick; they performed arduous labor and made and moved the products that bought stately homes, servants, slaves, and carriages. And while merchants assumed the financial risks of trade, it ended there. Few laborers would have understood this better than sailors. As historians remind us, the clothes they wore, the way they walked, spoke, drank, and the way their bodies looked made seamen “marked men.” Mariners like Walter Graven looked different because they led different lives: not merely physically demanding, their work was more hazardous than it was for merchants.

Riotous seamen such as Graven had a dangerous occupation and bore the badges of maritime labor: scars, rope burns, bruises, hernias, or impediments caused by shifting cargo and falling objects or the brutal discipline aboard ship. At sea and in port life was dangerous. Myriad misfortunes faced Graven when he signed onto a voyage. On the Atlantic, he faced churning seas, paltry rations, debilitating disease, harsh discipline, marauding Spaniards, impressment, and piracy. On land, whether loading, unloading, lifting, rigging, repairing, or simply loitering, he found the port life unrelenting and unsafe.

The risks of maritime labor touched all those acquainted with the mariner. Though most sailors were young and unmarried, some men such as William West and Peter Hopkins left wives and families at home. West, a mariner who was lost to the Spanish in 1740, left an “indigent wife widowed.” Near poverty, their meager household property was seized in order to compensate a debt of £10, 10s owed for rent. Hopkins died the same year, leaving his grieving wife, Mary, to settle his accounts. Though different, Hugh McClaine’s circumstances were no less troubling. When McLaine returned to the port in 1743, he found that his wife, Ann, had “eloped”—probably into the arms of another man. Though such emotional and financial dangers went with the territory, suitable remuneration did not.
Indeed, sailors’ comments that Quakers were “men without pockets” probably had less to do with the Quaker fashion statement and more to do with the disparity between merchants’ and mariners’ material lives.\(^75\) While Philadelphia’s “broad brims” built grand houses and country homes, mariners had to be content with what their fluctuating and often undependable wages could buy. Sailors like David Franks were paid monthly, and in ideal times, they might find a full years’ worth of work, bunk, and food. Pemberton’s ties the Caribbean gave Franks steady employment, but only so long as weather, crop yields, and the market permitted. “Maritime labor in all English Atlantic Ports was seasonal and often casual,” and given the fact that land-based wage-labor was often equally seasonal, “many mariners were unable to find year-round employment.”\(^77\)

As a rioting sailor named Barnes discovered, merchants were as fickle as the weather. Barnes had “failed” in merchant John Fisher’s employ.\(^78\) Having lost his job and his assured wages, and experiencing the economic shortfalls that came with unemployment, Barnes might have wanted to give his former boss, or those like him, a good thumping. With the aid of Captain Redmond he did just that. When Redmond grabbed the Quaker by his coat, Barnes “fell on” Fisher and “wounded him very much.”\(^79\) Barnes does not represent the experience of all sailors, but his individual story does begin to shed light on the reasons for sailor participation.

Amid wartime and the city’s transformation into a major Atlantic node, mariners found work and pay aplenty in a port with trade connections that carried grain and foodstuffs to Nevis, Jamaica, Lisbon, and Bristol, but subtle changes began to offset greater opportunity and higher wages. One way of illustrating this is to examine the changing nature of work once the ship has arrived in port. Traditionally, the sailors’ work did not end when the ship made landfall. Once in port, Jack’s attention and muscle shifted to unloading and reloading cargo.\(^74\) Ever mindful of their purses, many merchants began to reorganize and rationalize the very processes of shipping, replacing monthly-waged sailors with day-rate stevedores. This process, as Smith suggests, meant that for “slack periods” when the ship was in port for upwards of thirty days, Jack could not depend on extra work to supplement his income. In Philadelphia, Jack could face more than a month without pay or provisions. Coupled with the seasonality of work, merchants’ search for cheaper labor left many Tars in the lurch.\(^75\)

So did the regular abuses of contracts. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century, “fraud and irregularities in…pay were general.”\(^76\) For
many of the sailors who took part in the riot, their wage-labor experience was probably not much different from those men who served under Captain Thomas Jones. Jones and his men worked for Philadelphia merchant Daniel Flexney, shuttling goods throughout the Atlantic. On one particular voyage, from London to Lisbon, Jones found the ship wanting for materials and thus sent men out to acquire these necessities. To the Quaker merchant, these were unnecessary expenses. Accusing Jones of fraud, Flexney refused to repay the men, and in turn, wished to “dispossess” Jones of the ship and end the voyage. Doing so, Jones recognized, would limit severely the ship’s “Freight,” and cut into the “Fund out of which ought to arise the…the Sailors wages.” If Jones was insulted, his men were probably incensed. A long and potentially dangerous trans-Atlantic voyage was offset by the reward, but Flexney failed to live up to his side of the bargain, making him the epitome of the riotous sailors’ vision of a Quaker merchant: a man “without pockets.”

Finally, Quakers were “enemies to King George.” While it is possible that some of the rioters were deeply loyal to their monarch, time aboard the floating factory, or experience—first or second-hand—with impressment and the British Navy—disabused most mariners of any attachment to authority. Resentful of the Quakers, David Franks and Captain Mitchell could call their enemies by such gems as “Low Life Rascals,” or “Broad Brims;” threaten to “kill Pemberton,” and “knock them on the head;” or deny the Quaker gentry’s authority by demanding, “damn you, who are you?” Indeed, if the sailors resented Quakers for the wealth gleaned from their labor, the misled policies of the Quaker merchant politicians were another source of contempt. Quakers were enemies to the King and sailor alike, because they refused to fit out privateers.

“Broad Brims” like “the Pembertons, the Whartons, John Reynell, Isaac Norris II, John Smith and John Bringhurst,” had effectively “shunned” privateering ventures, as a matter of conscience. While Jack Tar could read or hear over two thousand references to privateering in the Pennsylvania Gazette, few were advertisements for local privateering missions. When compared to other ports, privateering in Philadelphia was rare; Quakers could not and would not participate. As a result, Philadelphia would hold but a small share in the number of privateers, privateering missions, berths, and, more importantly, prizes. According to Swanson, from 1739 to 1748 Philadelphia outfitted only 47 yearly privateers, saw only 12 percent of privateer berths, and organized a mere 10 percent of the total privateering missions, compared to New York and Newport which combined for nearly 50 percent.
of all privateering missions. Much to Jack’s chagrin, Philadelphia was but a
minor player, taking in only 7.7 percent of the 829 prizes captured, receiving
but a minor share of the prize value of £7,561,000 (Sterling).81

However religious their objections to war, defense, and privateering were,
it was just another symbol of the ways in which Quakers avoided the risks
that seamen faced on a daily basis. More important, their avoidance of priva-
teeding closed a door to opportunity that might have offset the dangers of
maritime labor. If sailors had good reason to dislike the Quakers, they had
even better reason to support the Proprietors. Proprietary men, such as
William Allen—whose involvement in privateering paid handsomely
through his partial ownership of the George and the Wilmington that netted
several French and Spanish prizes—chartered the majority of privateering
missions from the port of Philadelphia.82 Dissatisfied with the abysmal state
privateering at the port, sailors descended upon the 1741 election, but their
pleas went unnoticed, and the merchant politicians left sailors to stew
another year.83 Thus by 1742, with growing animosity toward Quakers and
the closure of opportunities, the city’s sailors were quite ready to take action
to better their situation. Unable to vote for change, the sailors put their labor
up for sale, bargaining for better opportunity. Sailors, believing that their
chances might be better served under the leadership of the Proprietors,
decided to “vote” the Friends out of office.

Conclusion

This essay has attempted to write sailors, servants and Germans back into the
narrative of the election riot by examining how their actions and decisions
revealed specific and thoughtful responses to their social and material anxieties
and lived experiences. Few historians have been kind to the sailors. Indeed, in
the dozen or so publications that discuss the riot, most have followed contem-
porary elites in claiming that sailors “had no part in the election.” Likewise,
they have passed over the concerns of indentured servants and Germans, and
have said little of the roles played by either group as if they do not matter. And
perhaps they do not matter. If we write history searching for watershed
moments and decisive transformations, then, on the surface, this is not one of
those moments. If Graven, Franks, and Barnes, like their fellow rioters, saw
elite division as their moment to enact political change, they were sadly
mistaken; for angry mariners, “the riot was of little consequence.”84 In the end,
their Proprietary employers were left embarrassed and politically impotent, and sailors’ Quaker employers maintained control of the Assembly. Unfortunately, as Proprietors shrunk into the background, sailors’ hopes of better opportunity disappeared with them.

Yet from another perspective that examines the past for the quotidian and looks for the small changes, the Philadelphia Election Riot was a moment of great consequence for individuals as much as they were of great consequence to it. Indeed, if the riot was not a watershed moment in the history of Pennsylvania or Atlantic world, it was a decisive moment for many of its participants, and stands as a useful reminder that small changes, like radical developments, can have a transformative effect on the people who make and experience them. For people like John Robison, the division within the ruling order provided the opportunity to escape the exploitation servitude and start life anew, and it was men like Robison who led elites closer to confrontation. Similarly, as Palatines exacerbated elite discord, they were able to cement an alliance with a now-dominant Quaker faction and accrue the social and material benefits that could come from their Election Day turnout. Sailors, if nothing else, were able to imbue their employers with a sense of their dissatisfaction.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the making of the Election of 1742 is a reminder of how deeply rooted revolutions really are. Divided though they were, sailors, servants, and Germans were nonetheless united in their efforts to make Pennsylvania more inclusive. Radicalized by their conditions and concerns, the “lower sort” circumvented the socio-economic barriers to politics, and laid the foundation for the working class radicalism of the “revolutionary crisis of the 1760s and 1770s.” Indeed, if during the riotous 1760s “the crowd found its own mind,” it was in the era of the Election Riot that its constituent parts began to think on their own. Sailors, servants, and Germans, if only for a moment, revealed their animosities and concerns to an elite too unconcerned or too blind to see them. In the decades that followed, Pennsylvania’s elite would be forced to hear and see a new, thinking, and radicalized constituency.85

NOTES

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 74th Annual Meeting of the Pennsylvania Historical Association, October 22, 2005. I wish to thank Marcus Rediker, Richard Oestreicher, and Van Beck Hall for being at once mentors, friends, and critics, and for steering this paper from an idea into its final form. Moreover, I would like to thank William Pencak, Paul A. Gilje, and the anonymous reviewer for their

3. Deposition of Thomas Lloyd, Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser. vol. IV, 2960.


6. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to Create America (New York: Viking, 2005), 2, 25–32, 44, and 276. Indeed, as Nash suggests, decades of struggle by those at the bottom culminated in one of Revolutionary America’s most radical constitutions—the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776. Infused with the notion that working people wanted, and deserved to be heard, the document “scuttled” nearly every barricade to popular (white male) franchise, putting white men, except apprentices and the destitute, on that even playing field with the rich men who ruled the colony.

7. Deposition of Richard Edwards, Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser. vol. IV, 2997; Coldwater Evans, Apprentice to Quaker Physician Thomas Bond, testified to the sailors receiving 40 shillings “to drink the first night of their Commitment.” See deposition of Coldwater Evans, Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser. vol. IV, 2986.


9. The meeting at the George was the Quaker Annual Meeting. By the 1740s, the Annual Meeting was a convenient method for organizing the Quaker vote, a point Lieutenant Governor George Thomas made to the Lords of Trade, George Thomas to the Lords of Trade, October 20, 1740 (HSP), 2; in Charles Evans, Early American Imprints 1st series, no. 4613. For information regarding the tenor of the Quaker Yearly Meeting after the outbreak of war, see Thomas Chalkley, A Collection of the Works of Thomas Chalkley, in two Parts (Philadelphia: James and Johnson, 1790), 320, 328–29.

11. Deposition of Wight Massey, Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser. vol. IV, 2978; Richard Hockley to Thomas Penn, 1 November 1742, “Letters from the Letterbook of Richard Hockley, PMHB 28 (1904), 40; see also Penn Papers Official Correspondence, III, 241 (HSP).

12. On the morning of the election, Joseph Morris reported he heard another proprietary man yell, “If you want Mobbing, you shall have Mobbing enough.” Deposition of Joseph Morris, Pennsylvania Archives 8th ser. vol. IV, 2984.


15. Deposition of James Morris, Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser. vol. IV, 3003.


18. Deposition of Preston Carpenter, Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser. vol. IV, 2996; Richard Peters to Thomas Penn, October 17, 1742 Peters Letterbook, 1737–1750, V, 28–32 (HSP). Besides Redmond and Mitchell, at least four other captains were active participants in the riot, including Captain Richard Northover, Captain John Spence, Captain Nicholas Lewis, and Captain John Searle.


21. Ibid, and deposition of John Hyatt, 2962; deposition of Samuel Norris, 2977; Deposition of Israel Pemberton, Sr., Pennsylvania Archives 8th ser. vol. IV, 3009. The Quakers triumphed in Chester, Lancaster, and Philadelphia counties, but lost Bucks County. Of the 5028 votes cast in Chester, Lancaster, and Philadelphia, Quakers partisans secured 4231 votes, over 84 percent of the total. See Pennsylvania Gazette, (Philadelphia), 7 October 1742. Months later Quakers still fumed about the event; see for instance Isaac Norris, Jr., to Robert Charles, June 22, 1743, August 11, 1743, Norris Letter Book, 1719–1756, Norris Family Papers (HSP).

22. Conversation between William Moore and Tench Francis recounted by Joseph Stiles, Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser. vol. IV, 2962.


29. Jordon, Colonial Families of Philadelphia, 286–87. For Israel Pemberton’s election to Burgess see Pennsylvania Gazette October 2, 1740; October 8, 1741; October 7, 1742; October 4, 1744; October 5, 1745; October 9, 1746; October 8, 1747, October 6, 1748; October 7, 1749. For information on the development of Quaker merchant families, see Gary Nash, “The Early Merchants of Philadelphia,” in Richard and Mary Maples Dunn, eds., The World of William Penn (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1986), 337–51.


34. For reference to local political issues dividing the elite before the outbreak of war see for instance: Michal McMahon “‘Small Matters’: Benjamin Franklin, Philadelphia and the ‘Progress of Cities.” PMHB 66 (April 1992), 157–82.
Thomas Penn, “Excerpt of a Message from the Proprietor to the House of Assembly by his Secretary,” August 6, 1740, Pennsylvania Gazette, August 14, 1740.

36. George Thomas to the Lords of Trade, October 20, 1740, (HSP), 1; in Charles Evans, Early American Imprints 1st series, no. 4613.


38. George Thomas to the Lords of Trade, 20 October 1740 (HSP), 1–2; in Charles Evans, Early American Imprints 1st series, no. 4613, “Israel Pemberton and Son of Philadelphia to David Barclay and Son of London, 3 March 1740,” “David Barclay and Son of London to Israel Pemberton and Son of Philadelphia, London 27 April 1740,” in Charles Evans, Early American Imprints.

39. Lieutenant Governor George Thomas to the Pennsylvania Assembly, August 17, 1742 in Pennsylvania Archives 8th ser. vol. IV, 2774.


50. For Lesher’s naturalization see Pennsylvania Archives 2nd Ser. vol. III, 357. For his role in county government see Pennsylvania Gazette, October 6th 1743; October 4th, 1744.


54. Advertisement for the sale of a “Dutch servant man and his wife,” Pennsylvania Gazette June 5, 1740; Advertisement for the sale of “Dutch Servant Lad,” Pennsylvania Gazette, August 16, 1744. Here the standard source is Gottlieb Mittelberger, Gottlieb Mittelberger’s Reise nach Pennsylvania im Jahr 1750 und Rückreise nach Teutschland im Jahr 1754 (Frankfurt, 1756). Mittelberger describes the journey and sale of labor in all its detail. We should, however, pay careful attention to the larger body of literature
to which Mittelberger was reacting. By the middle of the eighteenth century travel narratives and descriptions served as the means of securing German workers for a labor started economy. Filled with tales of success and happiness, works by Frankfurt Land Company operatives like Francis Daniel Pastorius and Daniel Falckner, provided Newlanders the script they required to convince wary migrants to cross the Atlantic. Pastorius; Falckner, Umständige geographische Beschreibung der zu aller-letzten erfundenen Provintz Pensylvania, in denen End-grünten America in der West-Welt gelegen ... (1702).


64. See Deposition of Israel Pemberton, the younger, Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser. vol. IV, 2968, 2969.

65. On the dangers of maritime life on land and sea, see Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, 92–93. For a specific incident, see Pennsylvania Gazette (Philadelphia) October 11, 1739.


68. Pennsylvania Gazette, March 6, 1740.

69. Pennsylvania Gazette, June 16, 1743.

70. Smolenski rightly argues that these comments were an attack on Friends "outward display" of the "inner virtue" they lacked. But, his discussion of sailors' attacks on Quaker clothing does not discuss "pockets," nor does his examination of the riot attempt to place issues of deference and political
Absconding Servants, Anxious Germans

...legitimacy in conversation with working people's material conditions or lived experience. See "Friends and Strangers," 367.

71. Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, 82
73. Deposition of John Fisher, Pennsylvania Archives, 8th ser. vol. IV, 2980.
77. For the advertisement of Daniel Flexney Jr., see Pennsylvania Gazette, April 27, 1738; for Jones' response, see Pennsylvania Gazette, May 4, 1738.
81. Swanson, "American Privateering and Imperial Warfare," 362, and [Table IV: Types and Values of Yearly Privateering Missions, 1739–1748], 364.
83. Throughout the 1742 Election Riot Depositions, the deponents lament the fact that Allen's father-in-law, Andrew Hamilton, was willing to put his life on the line to stop privateers from disturbing the peace; see for instance the deposition of John Reynell, Pennsylvania Archives 8th ser. vol. IV, 2973.
84. Smolenski, "Friends and Strangers," 368.
85. Linebaugh and Rediker, The Many Headed Hydra, 212; Nash, The Unknown American Revolution, 44.