A DRESS REHEARSAL FOR THE MODERN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: RAYMOND PACE ALEXANDER AND THE BERWYN, PENNSYLVANIA, SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASE, 1932–1935

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n the front cover of the October 1, 1957, issue of the Philadelphia Tribune, an African American newspaper, is an article on Arkansas's Governor Oral Faubus's attempt to prevent nine black children from desegregating the all-white Central High School. African Americans across the country were outraged by state officials' opposition to the enforcement of the United States Supreme Court 1954 Brown v Board of Education decision and by the threat of violence implicit in the white mob gathered outside of the school. Jazz great Louis Armstrong, was quoted in the Philadelphia Tribune that "The way they have been treating my people in the South the government can go to hell. It's getting so a colored man hasn't got any country."1 Last October, the nation celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Little Rock Nine. Conferences highlighted racial progress and the end of de jure segregation. Scholars, journalists, and politicians discussed the impact of the Civil Rights Movement on school desegregation. As occurred during the 50th anniversary of the Brown decision in 2004, the racial progress made since the end

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of de jure segregation and the heyday of the civil rights movement will likely be contrasted with the grim facts of continuing de facto segregation and the failure of many urban schools to provide an adequate education to children of color.

Most Americans still think about Jim Crow and civil rights as a southern and not a national problem. When Americans reflect on the Civil Rights Movement, they immediately think of the 381-day bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama; the struggle to integrate Little Rock's Central High School; and Birmingham, where Bull Connor turned fire hoses and police dogs on children and protestors filled the jails rather than pay bail. Few Americans realized that racial segregation and the civil rights movement have a long history in the North. Fewer still are aware that northern civil rights activists protested school segregation with boycotts and jail-ins during the 1920s and 1930s.²

According to C. Vann Woodward's seminal work on racial segregation, *The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, "One of the strangest things about the career of Jim Crow was that the system was born in the north and reached an advanced age before moving South in force."³ In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, as northern states gradually abolished slavery, the free black population increased. In order to keep black citizens marginalized, whites prohibited black people from living in white neighborhoods and attending white schools. De jure and de facto segregation in the north continued through the Civil War and Reconstruction and was intensified in the wake of the first Great Migration of African Americans from the rural south to the urban north.

The mass movement of African Americans to northern cities in search of expanded economic opportunities and greater personal freedom reached a peak around World War I. In 1916 alone, four hundred thousand African Americans migrated to the North. The Great Migration changed race relations in the north forever. Prior to 1890, the black population in the North was small and posed no threat to white political and economic power. However, as the black population increased, whites were determined to segregate African Americans and restrict their access to city and state resources. Woodward says that "the trend toward racism in the North was amply illustrated in the years immediately following the First World War." Racial violence escalated across the country, in ushering in what historian John Hope Franklin pronounced "the greatest period of interracial strife the nation had ever witnessed." A race riot erupted in Philadelphia in 1918, and in 1919, twenty-five race riots erupted in the nation; James Weldon Johnson called this "Red Summer" because of the widespread urban conflagrations.⁴

The Great Migration also affected the suburbs. During the 1920s, many middle-class whites moved to the suburbs to escape the working class and poor people who lived in central cities, increasing numbers of whom were African-American. While the deteriorating conditions that attended urban concentration were exacerbated by white flight, not all suburbs remained white enclaves. African Americans migrated to the suburbs looking for employment opportunities. Black men worked as unskilled laborers in transportation and small factories, and black women served as domestic servants for white suburbanites. By the 1920s, African Americans had established a presence in some suburbs across the country.⁵

Nationally, the 1930s was a significant decade for the civil rights struggle. By the onset of the Great Depression, both whites and blacks in the North were cognizant of the rapid expansion in black communities and the potential power of the black vote. Harvard Sitkoff observes that during the Depression and New Deal, the labor and civil rights movements catapulted into the mainstream, as masses of Americans mobilized for change and major policy innovations were considered at the federal level. Nikhil Singh argues that by the 1930s, the black elite had developed a "black public sphere" that provided critical forums and networks for civil rights activity, sustaining local organizations, and building momentum from one community to another. All these developments stimulated new struggles over civil rights, as much by fueling opposition as by promoting democracy.⁶

By the time large numbers of black migrants arrived in the early twentieth century, large northern cities such as Chicago and Philadelphia had institutionalized school segregation, a pattern that continues to exist today despite court rulings and legislation overturning de jure segregation. In Jim Crow Moves North, Davison Douglas asserts that northern states routinely violated state equal rights laws that prohibited segregation. Most northern suburbs initially had integrated school districts, but as the black population increased, some of these districts also started to segregate students. According to August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, during the Great Depression, eleven school districts in small northern towns had constructed segregated schools as a result of "the migration of Negroes." 7Schools emerged as an area of contention between blacks and whites in both large cities and small towns. A civil rights struggle to desegregate northern schools began in the 1920s and continued through the 1930s in response to the intensification and expansion of segregation. According to Douglas, the Great Migration, black political activism, and World War II enabled the overt legal segregation of northern school systems to be overturned, a campaign that finally succeeded by 1954.

In the 1930s, an African-American attorney and metropolitan Philadelphia's black community led an exemplary struggle against the imposition of school segregation in a Philadelphia suburb that triggered reforms in Pennsylvania state law. Reconstructing this dramatic story of school desegregation and civil rights protest illuminates the legal and political strategies of the northern civil rights movement as it emerged in cities and suburbs during the period after the Great Migration.

On July 13, 1933, Raymond Pace Alexander, an African-American attorney from Philadelphia, wrote a letter to Walter White, the executive secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) stating, "the National Association has given to other cases involving lynching and the defense of men accused of murder and other crimes and nothing has been given for the litigation of a case involving human rights and a fight to save the self-respect of our race of people"8 The "case involving human rights" to which Alexander called attention was the Berwyn, Pennsylvania, school desegregation case. During the 1920s and 1930s the NAACP devoted the majority of its financial and legal resources to eradicating Jim Crow in the South. As a result, African-American attorneys spearheaded the fight against segregation in the North, often without direct material assistance from the national civil rights organization. With a strong base in the local black community and the growing black vote in urban areas, they were able to desegregate a number of schools and put civil rights on the agenda of northern state governments.

Raymond Pace Alexander, born and raised in Philadelphia, graduated from the University of Pennsylvania and Harvard Law School, and spent his entire life in the North. He lived in Philadelphia, New York City, and Boston. In each of these cities, he experienced racism and segregation.⁹ Alexander was a contemporary of better-known black attorneys, such as Charles Hamilton Houston, the first black lead counsel of the NAACP, William Hastie, the first black federal judge, and U. S. Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall, associated with the modern civil rights movement.¹⁰ Alexander and other black lawyers worked with the local and national office of the NAACP and used their national and local bar associations to fight for equality. According to historian Darlene Clark Hine, black professions created "parallel institutions" such as the National Bar Association (NBA) which provided "safe havens, sustained relationships and wove networks across communities served." These lawyers and their organizations laid the foundation for the modern civil rights movement.¹¹

In spite of all of Alexander's personal and professional accomplishments and the recognition he enjoyed among his contemporaries, there is no scholarly account of his contributions to the civil rights struggle in Philadelphia or Pennsylvania. The majority of research on Alexander examines his contributions to the development of the black bar.¹² Black community studies chronicle the rise of a "New Negro" professional class and briefly mention the activities of lawyers in civil rights struggles in northern cities. Robert Blakely's *Earl B. Dickerson: A Voice for Freedom and Equality* is the only detailed biography and local study of a local black attorney in a northern city. Dickerson, a colleague of Alexander, was in the forefront of the civil rights struggle in Chicago.¹³ In addition to his contributions to the legal profession, Alexander was at the forefront of the civil rights struggle in Philadelphia from the 1920s to 1960s. The lack of scholarly attention to Alexander's civil rights activity is attributable to the southern focus of the modern Civil Rights Movement.

During the past decade, civil rights scholarship has expanded its focus from the 1950s and 1960s to the New Deal, World War II, Cold War, and from the South to the North. Moreover, "local people," the working class, and black women are at the center of current civil rights scholarship.¹⁴ A growing number of monographs examine the post World War II "origins of the urban crisis," analyzing the economic and social-structural forces that concentrated impoverished African Americans to the inner cities. These scholars point to racial exclusion in housing and discrimination in the labor market, along with deindustrialization and suburbanization, as important factors in producing racial inequality. Historians have begun to explore local civil rights organizing in northern cities as well. Most scholarship on the movement in the urban north uses the same periodization as scholarship on the southern movement in order to present civil rights activity on a national scale.¹⁵

The northern school desegregation movement of the pre-World War II period, which was marked by legal cases, mass protests, and legislative initiatives in Philadelphia and Pennsylvania, remains relatively unknown. In bringing suits against segregation in schools and public accommodations, African Americans in the North relied on their own resources. Alexander's civil rights activity in the Berywn case was a microcosm of a broader civil rights struggle in northern cities that started during the 1920s. School segregation was a national problem, not only a southern problem. The white backlash associated with the *Brown* decision occurred in the aftermath of the Great Migration in many northern cities. Meier and

Rudwick state that "...black resistance in many communities was vigorous and at least fourteen experienced school boycotts in the 1920's and 1930's."¹⁶ While the struggle against school segregation in Berwyn did not spark a mass movement, it did involve a boycott, jail-in, planned protest march, and court litigation four tactics that are associated with the modern civil rights movement. Alexander's legal challenge to school segregation forced the state to enforce the 1887 Pennsylvania Equal Rights Law and led to the passage of the stronger 1935 Pennsylvania Equal Rights Act. The goals and tactics of the Berywn school desegregation case spearheaded by Philadelphia's most eminent black lawyer made this struggle a dress rehearsal for the modern civil rights movement.¹⁷

A Philadelphia Lawyer Challenges School Segregation in Berwyn

Born in Philadelphia in 1898, Alexander resided as a boy in the Seventh Ward, made famous by W.E.B. DuBois's seminal 1899 study The Philadelphia Negro.18 He attended the prestigious all-male Central High School, the second oldest high school in America, and took the Latin Scientific course, a new curriculum that added contemporary courses to classical academic subjects. As diplomas, degrees, and credentials gained in importance, American educational reformers stressed "professionalization." In 1917, Alexander enrolled in the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Finance. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the majority of African Americans obtained their bachelors degrees from black colleges and universities based in the South. According to the sociologist Charles S. Johnson, between 1920 and 1933, the number of blacks who graduated from northern colleges increased sharply from 156 to 439. Attending one of the most prestigious universities in America enabled Alexander to continue his acculturation into the dominant, white, middle-class culture and his aspiration to join the growing black professional class.¹⁹

By the 1920s, all professions, including law, had raised their standards and increased their prestige by requiring formal training and examinations for entry. When Alexander began Harvard University Law School in 1920, there were approximately thirty black graduate and professional students on campus. Alexander recalled that at Harvard as at the University of Pennsylvania, the "social life between the white law student body and the blacks was totally non-existent."²⁰ He held a full-time job during his matriculation at Harvard, but did

not have to work in his final year. Alexander graduated with his class and on July 2, 1923, and passed the Pennsylvania Bar the next day. Geraldine Segal states that from 1908 to 1920, "not one single African American passed the Pennsylvania Bar" and black applicants were excluded again between 1933 and 1943. When Alexander entered the bar, he was one of thirteen black attorneys in Philadelphia and quickly took his place among the younger generation of "New Negro" lawyers. During the next nine years, he won a number of public accommodation desegregation cases, as well as personal injury suits against the Philadelphia Transit Company. Initially Alexander's law office was located in the Seventh Ward, but he used a white colleague to relocate to downtown Philadelphia, which did not rent office space to African Americans.²¹

The racial discrimination that African Americans encountered in Philadelphia at that time varied from subtle insults to overt segregation and exclusion. Employers, landlords and real estate agents, public and private schools, hospitals, theaters, restaurants, hotels, public parks, amusement parks, the police, and the criminal justice system all discriminated against African Americans. In 1950, Alexander recalled the segregation that prevailed in the city when he was starting his legal career:

Excepting only the restaurants in the John Wanamaker store and the Broad Street Station, a Negro in 1923 could not be served in the restaurant or café of any first class hotels in Philadelphia, nor could he obtain food in any of the Central City restaurants...I know it will surprise you to know that was the rule even in such great restaurants as Horn & Hardart chain, Lintons, Childs and the like the only place he could obtain food in central Philadelphia was in the Automats, were color blind.restaurants away from the central section and those in the suburban area were even worse. Their method of refusal sometimetook the form of violence²²

During the 1920s and 1930s, Philadelphia was a northern city with southern race relations. Alexander's civil rights work encompassed the desegregation of public accommodations as well as police brutality and injustice in the courts.

Berwyn, Pennsylvania, located in Chester County, was a middle-class suburb outside of Philadelphia. Although it was predominantly white, it had a significant black minority. Chester County contained numerous small industrial centers as well as residential suburbs, and by 1920 it had 7125 African American residents.²³ Gender as well as race determined employment

opportunities in the county; the majority of black men worked as unskilled laborers, and most black women worked as domestics. In Chester County, as in other small northern school districts, the school boards responded to the growing black presence amid the increasing suburban population by deciding to segregate black students for the first time.

In March 1932, the Eastown Township school district built a new \$250,000 elementary school in Berwyn, Pennsylvania. The Tredyffrin school district closed its old school and decided to send their white students to the new school in Eastown. The districts agreed to keep the old Eastown elementary school open in order "for the instruction of certain people-" those were the code words for black children. An editorial in the *Philadelphia Tribune* stated that Norman J. Green, a southerner, who recently had been elected president of the school board, would exclude black students from attending the new school in order to "maintain the high standards. Green stated that the school board decided having "Six grades of Negro children in one room!" was acceptable and did not violate the states Equal Rights Law. Neither academic achievement nor the presence of black students had been an issue before 1932, but Green used standards as an excuse to justify racial segregation. Previously, all of the elementary schools in Chester County had black pupils.²⁴

The school board's decisions and Green's comments infuriated the black community and were met by a major protest. In June 1932, 212 African-American students boycotted the schools in Eastown and Tredyffrin townships.²⁵ African Americans from the two townships met at the Mount Zion A.M.E. Church in Tredyffrin to plan the protest. Essie Brock, recalled that her father, Primus Crosby, declared, "I came from a segregated school in the South. I'll not stand for it."²⁶ O.B. Cobb, the African-American president of the Bryn Mawr chapter of the NAACP, filed a law suit against the Chester County school board, and then hired Alexander as its prosecuting attorney. In August, Alexander asked Robert Bagnall of the NAACP to obtain information about "school cases of this sort" and to provide "any opinions or citations in your own office covering these cases." One month later, in a letter marked "SPECIAL DELIVERY," Roy Wilkins, the Assistant Secretary of the NAACP, provided information about nine school desegregation cases being filed outside the South.

When the school opened in September, African-American parents brought their children to the new school, but the "district officials refused to enroll the children."²⁷ Alexander filed petitions representing plaintiffs in each township. According to the *Main Line Daily Times*, Alexander's petition stated that in March 1932, Priscilla Temple and other African-American students had tried

to enroll in the white school but were refused, despite the fact that the white school was closer to Temple's home than the black school. The plaintiffs argued that "mixed schools have been maintained for 50 years," and since the new school was financed by their taxes the children had a right to attend the school. Alexander obtained a writ of mandamus that required the townships to justify why they prohibited black students from attending the new school. The boycott continued in September of 1932.²⁸

In October, Judge J. Frank E. Hause filed the writ of mandamus, which gave the school board two months to come up with a reason that justified segregation. According to Alexander, the school board "filed motions to quash the mandamus writs." Since the plaintiffs had accused the school board of discrimination, Pennsylvania's Attorney General, William Schnader, had to add his name to Alexander's petition for the case to go forward. But Schnader sided with the school board's decision stating that this was a local matter.

That fall, white liberal supporters of interracial understanding tried to mediate the conflict between black parents who were boycotting the schools and white school board members who advocated segregation. Members of the school board attended the meetings of the Committee on Race Relations (CORR). Formed by members of the Society of Friends (Quakers) in 1929, the organization was designed to expose "white Friends to educated Negroes" by discussing methods to improve race relations in Philadelphia. CORR held monthly meetings in Philadelphia that addressed issues such as race relations, housing discrimination, and anti-Semitism. In December 1932, W.T. Vandevere and Mr. Wentzel, two Tredyffrin School Board members attended the meeting and according to Pauline Cheney, CORR secretary, "explained in detail the reasons why the school board felt justified in their recent action of segregation. The notes of the meeting do not provide details, but Cheney noted that Wentzel wanted to use CORR to "act as mediators to help get the children back into school," in other words, to ask CORR to convince the black parents to end the boycott. Cheney stated that CORR "refused to be used as a means of getting the children back first," before the issue of segregation was decided. CORR offered to organize a meeting with Schnader, members of the school board, and the black parents in order to find "an interracial aid in helping to heal the bitterness of both groups."29

Alexander maintained that after Schnader refused to add his name to the suit, the school board proposed a compromise. It would agree "to admit to the schools...the two children of the two petitioners" and "would entertain applications on behalf of individual children for admission to the white

schools," while reserving the power to decide which black students qualified. Alexander and the parents vehemently rejected this settlement offer.

During the boycott, Alexander remained in contact with the national office of the NAACP. Walter White, the executive secretary of the NAACP, informed Alexander that all Pennsylvania branches of the NAACP should send a letter to Schnader to "stop postponing the Berywn School case, and try it at once." In spite of the letter-writing campaign, Schnader still refused to add his name to the suit. In March 1933, the NAACP assistant secretary, Roy Wilkins, told W.W. Hines, the secretary of the Bryn Mawr Branch of the NAACP that, "the school board members whom you are fighting are probably the meanest and most vicious enemies that we have run across in many months. I do not feel that it is any longer necessary to be polite. If they want war, let's have war." Wilkins's comments highlight his frustration with the school board's decision to create a segregated school in the North. By June 1933, the school boycott was a year old.³⁰

As the defendants continued to delay the trial, legal fees increased, and the national office of the NAACP became concerned about whether Alexander and the Byrn Mawr branch had the resources to continue the fight. In June, White asked Alexander, "what in your opinion, is the next step to be taken?" During the first year of the boycott, Alexander and the Bryn Mawr chapter of the NAACP raised all of the funds for the legal fees, but Schnader's actions forced White to consider using the NAACP's Legal Committee which had been responsible for litigating the organization's nationally known civil rights cases. Alexander replied that the Berywn school districts' policy "is a direct blow at mixed schools in the North. The case should really be given more publicity." Alexander's letter to White highlights the wider issues involved in this local struggle. If they lost, other northern cities might segregate black students. But the national office of the NAACP did not have the resources to fund every single law suit. As Alexander put it wryly, "we have given thousands of dollars worth of time, but I am afraid we will have to charge this to our racial interest."³¹

Debates Over Strategy Among Black Activists

By September 1933, radical organizations offered support for the Berywn plaintiffs, but this development worried national leaders of the NAACP. Left-wing groups that rallied to the Berwyn cause included the International Labor Defense (ILD), Philadelphia Committee for the Defense of Political

Prisoners (PCDPP), and The League of Struggle for Negro Rights (LSNR). Liberal organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Educational Equality League (EEL) also decided to assist Alexander and his clients. Founded by Floyd Logan in 1932, the EEL sought to eliminate racial segregation of students, promote black teachers, and remove racist textbooks from Philadelphia schools.³² On September 20[,] the ILD and PCDPP held a meeting at the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel in downtown Philadelphia. Saul Carson, the secretary of the PCDPP wrote that "fifty or sixty armed men turned out to break up that meeting" and he "was stoned and narrowly escaped a probable attempt at a lynching." According to Reverend W.L. Johnson, a member of the NAACP executive committee "five hundred or more Negroes and perhaps two hundred whites" had attended the meeting and formed a "joint action committee." The committee was designed "to create public sentiment, by holding monster mass meetings, and to give the greatest and most far reaching publicity about this case" by using the media and "parades and such other peaceful demonstrations as was employed in the interest of the Scottsboro case."33

In 1931, nine African American men, ages thirteen to twenty, were aboard in a train in Alabama and were accused of raping two white women. Initially, the NAACP lawyers did not get involved in the Scottsboro case and many working-class blacks were upset and questioned the NAACP's commitment towards civil rights. In order to increase the number of African Americans to join radical organization, the ILD lawyers defended the men. The ILD lawyers appealed the state's decision and their appeal reached the U.S. Supreme Court who ruled in *Powell v Alabama* (1932) that all citizens are entitled to a fair trail. During the trial the ILD used publicity, such as mass demonstrations to gain support for the Scottsboro case. During the Berwyn case, the NAACP feared that the left-leaning Joint Action Committee might ruin the case because the committee contained communists.

After the joint action committee was formed, Roy Wilkins wrote to Cobb, that "these organizations are affiliated, some loosely and some closely, with the Communist Party." In spite of Wilkins's concerns about communist influence, the Bryn Mawr branch joined the radical Joint Action Committee. Since Alexander was not associated with the national office of the NAACP, he had the autonomy to associate with left-wing organizations such as the ILD and PCDP. These radical groups provided the publicity that this case needed. The Bryn Mawr chapter of the NAACP felt it could not fight this case alone. Cobb replied to Wilkins that the local chapter of the NAACP and Alexander had handled the case for the past year and a half, but the mounting financial

costs forced Cobb "to ask the national office NAACP to kindly take charge of the Berywn school case at once."³⁴

Just as controversy between the local branch and national NAACP over the participation of left-wing supporters was heating up, the boycott met legal opposition from the state. On October 20, Alexander informed White that Schnader had "ordered the prosecution of the parents and yesterday four of them were sent to jail for failure to send...their children to a segregated school." 35The parents refused to pay bail and remained in jail in order to protest Jim Crow education in Pennsylvania. Against Alexander's wishes, the NAACP paid the fines of the parents who did not want to participate in the jail-in. According to the Philadelphia Tribune, Alexander believed that paying the bail sanctioned segregation.³⁶ The NAACP's rationale for paying the bail illustrated the organizations concern with respectability. The NAACP's strategy was based on convincing whites that these black parents were law-abiding citizens who deserved to be treated fairly. If the parents remained in jail, they feared public opinion would condemn the parents as criminals or political opportunists who were not concerned about their children's education. The NAACP believed that this racist stereotype must be avoided at all costs. After the police arrested the parents, Roy Wilkins called an emergency meeting at Cobb's home to which he invited Alexander, major NAACP figures, such as Isadore Martin, member of the National Board of Directors, and E. Washington Rhodes, attorney and editor of the Philadelphia Tribune.

The meeting turned on the decision of the Bryn Mawr chapter of the NAACP to join the Joint Action Committee alongside radical organizations. Wilkins wrote a four-page summary that captured the mounting tensions and concerns of the parents and NAACP leaders. In spite of White's and Wilkins's unease about the Joint Action Committee, most of the parents agreed that the Byrn Mawr branch of the NAACP "should not have withdrawn from the Joint Committee." One parent mentioned the "constant pressure from white public opinion because of their stand on the school question." The majority of the parents were "at the mercy of their employers" but, in spite of economic repercussions, they had "whispered and grumbled affirmation" of the Joint Action Committee. On the local level, the parents had agreed with Alexander, but the national NAACP leadership was concerned with the white backlash that might result from working with a radical organization.³⁷

Wilkins reported that in August 1932, the Reverend W.L. Johnson, a member of the NAACP's Executive Committee, had asked NAACP members "to recruit

new groups to stir up the masses." Despite 700 people in attendance at the September 20 meeting at the Bellevue Stratford Hotel, only \$35 was raised for the case, and they could not even pay the \$65 fee to rent the hall at the hotel. Johnson and Alexander wanted the Joint Action Committee to raise funds for the case, but Cobb vehemently denounced the Bryn Mawr chapter for joining it. Wilkins noted that Cobb described the members of the Joint Action Committee as "a racket of cheap, unemployed white agitators, who had no jobs and nothing to do but stir up trouble and try to make a few dollars out of it." At the end of the meeting, Cobb officially withdrew the Bryn Mawr branch from the Joint Action Committee, but Alexander had convinced the other men at the meeting that the committee would serve as "a contributing and supporting agency in the fight…"³⁸ Alexander was committed to working with a wide range of organizations and individuals if the Joint Action Committee could get publicity and raise money for the case, he thought these radicals should be allowed to participate.³⁹

At the same time that Alexander was criticized by national NAACP leaders for encouraging support from the left, some African Americans on the left were criticizing the litigation strategy as an ineffective method of obtaining equality. James Watson, a journalist for the radical Harlem Liberator, wrote a long commentary on the Berwyn case. His critique of Alexander and the NAACP voiced black leftists' dissatisfaction with only relying upon the legal suits rather than conducting mass organization campaigns. The first portion of his essay places the history of the Berwyn case in the context of the racial politics of the depression. Watson dwell on the social and economic suffering of African Americans "unemployed Negroes were arbitrarily stricken from the relief rolls, Negro domestics and other workers were fired from jobs...." for supporting the school boycott. Southern whites used this tactic during the civil rights movement to intimidate African Americans who were seeking civil rights through legal means. The ILD and the LSNR had written a letter to parents that criticized the Bryn Mawr branch of the NAACP for resigning from the Joint Action Committee. At the end of his article, Watson voiced his frustration with Alexander: "Experience should convince the parents of Berywn that neither the pussyfooting and kneebending leadership of the NAACP or EEL, nor the clever legalism of Attorney Raymond Pace Alexander will win victory." Watson believed that "militant united action" was the only way to end segregation.40

Watson's critique of Alexander was inaccurate because Alexander would not have joined the left-wing League of Struggle for Negro Right (LSNR), but he advocated "militant united action." In January 1934, two months before Watson castigated Alexander's civil rights tactic and legalism, Helen Bryan of

the Committee on Race Relations (CORR) was planning a "Seminar on Segregation" in Philadelphia. Concerned that "recently various members of our committee have heard the policy of segregation defended by certain outstanding Negroes," Bryan sent a survey to the best-known figures in black America, including Alain Locke, a philosophy professor at Howard University, Sadie Alexander, attorney, and Max Yeargan, the first black professor hired at New York City's public colleges. Bryan's letter asked them to list "those aspects of segregation which you think are in need of careful analysis at this time." Charles Hamilton Houston, black attorney, and Ralph Bunche, black scholar, listed education, public employment, and housing in that order.⁴¹

In January 1934, W.E.B. DuBois authored the controversial editorial in *The Crisis* titled "Segregation." Making a case for collective organization and autonomy in the quest for equality, DuBois maintained that the "thinking colored people of the United States must stop being stampeded by the word segregation." African Americans should not be reluctant to work together separately from whites, and "there should never be an opposition to segregation...unless that segregation does involve discrimination." DuBois is recognized for initiating the national controversy over segregation within the black movement and especially on the left. When Bryan organized an interracial conference about the issue, surprisingly, she did not invite DuBois. The CORR seminar demonstrates that DuBois was not the only black thinker redefining the term segregation, the debate was national. There was a growing feeling among some black leaders that an all black environment may be more nurturing for African Americans.⁴²

Alexander attended the seminar, which was held on January 26, 1934, during the school boycott's nineteenth month. During the afternoon session, Alexander declared:

Some kind of resistance is necessary as the opposition put up by the parents against segregated schools in Berywn. We need more active resistance, the use of political force, demonstrations to embarrass public officials, the resources of the law. We need more than a discussion of ills and resolutions; we need a more beligerant (belligerent) plan of action, such as newspaper publicity, the support of prominent citizens, effective demonstrations.⁴³

Alexander's comments did not sound like the "pussyfooting and kneebending" that Watson criticized in his article a few months later. Alexander was frustrated

by white resistance to ending school segregation and advocated a synthesis of litigation and mass demonstrations. However, during the conference, Alexander did not address segregation or what DuBois referred to as "segregation without discrimination." As a lawyer, it was very unlikely that Alexander would have supported DuBois's definition of segregation.

The NAACP's civil rights strategy relied upon legalism and publicity in The Crisis. During the 1920s and 1930s, marches and demonstrations emerged as another form of protest. For example, during the 1920s, Pullman porters organized a labor union and used protest politics to obtain better pay and working conditions. During the Scottsboro trial, local leaders in Philadelphia held protest meetings, and in 1933 demonstrators held a "March on Washington" to demand justice for the case. The drive for desegregation arose from the most basic quest for equal rights: discrimination prohibited African Americans from purchasing homes, attending white schools, and receiving adequate resources for black schools, and joining unions and working in well-paying, stable positions. At the same time, the sense of solidarity and collective action for change that fueled the black freedom movement arose form the all-black organizations that formed within a segregated society. Most successful African Americans had attended all-black churches, high schools, and colleges and were accustomed to working in predominantly black organizations. As a member of the "New Negro" generation, however, Alexander had both a base in the black community and experience in the dominant society. He participated in all-black organizations, but attended integrated schools. In his quest to overturn segregation in education and public accommodations, he brought legal cases before whitedominated courts. Most important, he supported mass demonstrations alongside litigation as a strategy for change. In Beth Tompkins Bate's terms, Alexander was part of "a new crowd" of black leaders such as Abram Harris, a Marxist black economist at Howard University and NAACP Board member, who advocated "direct, mass-action tactics" in his 1934 Harris report. However, the NAACP removed any mention of mass protest from its annual report. Alexander was not a Marxist, but similarly to Harris he believed that direct action protest was a viable tactic for the civil rights struggle.44

Protest and Politics

By 1934, the school boycott had entered its twentieth month with no victory in sight. In February 1934, the EEL organized a protest march in Philadelphia.

Lania Davis, the EEL secretary, mailed letters to all of the Berwyn supporters and declaring March 11, 1934, as "Berwyn School Segregation Protest Day," and encouraging everyone to sign a petition addressed to Pennsylvania's Governor Gifford Pinchot. According to EEL's president Floyd Logan, "it is our purpose thorough silent public demonstration" to place the school desegregation issues before the people of the city and state. However, the EEL informed the governor that in order "to resolve the situation" they needed a "police escort" so as "not to be molested by any radical group." Logan feared that racist whites might have harassed the demonstrators. Police commissioner Joseph LeStrange said he had "no objection to the proposed parade" as long as there was no music or interference with traffic. The police had to approve the demonstrators sign before they marched. Some of the slogans stated "Keep Scottsboro out of Pennsylvania," "Down with Jim Crow Schools," "Schnader, Will you be the King of Right," "Slave of Segregation," and "Segregation is Un-American." The police permit stated that below any proposed slogans there would be "no personal names" and "no red lettering" could be used (red connoted communism). Some organizers did not want the ILD to participate in the protest march, but Alexander welcomed the radicals' support in order to obtain more publicity for the case. The protesters proclaimed they were "anti-segregation, pro-democracy, 100% American, and anti-Communist."45

The *Philadelphia Tribune* reported that more than five thousand people were expected to participate. Fearing disorder, the Philadelphia police chief, LeStrange, refused to issue the permit. However, the mere threat of a demonstration proved effective, given the political importance of the issue. In April, Wilkins informed attorney Herbert Millen that since "Mr. Schnader is a candidate for Governor, it would seem that this is an opportune time to effect a settlement of this case." ⁴⁶ In November 1933, African Methodist Episcopal minister W.L. Johnson wrote an editorial in the *Philadelphia Tribune* warning Schnader that if he failed to side with the black parents, he would lose "500,000 votes," in the upcoming election.⁴⁷ Johnson reminded Schnader how the NAACP had prevented Judge John Parker, a white southerner who opposed black voting rights from becoming a Supreme Court justice. This was an election year, and both parties needed the black vote in order to ensure a victory. Black leaders were cognizant of black political power and used it whenever the opportunity presented itself.

In March of 1934, Schnader, who was running for Governor of Pennsylvania, promised Alexander that he would add his name to the desegregation suit. In good faith, Alexander advised the parents that the children should return to

school, but the white school officials still denied their admission. The following month, Schnader appointed Herbert Millen and Harry Cheatham, two black attorneys from Philadelphia, as special Deputy Attorney Generals and finally added his name to the lawsuit. Schnader declared in the *Philadelphia Tribune* that he always advocated "equal opportunities for all people, regardless of wealth, creed or race" and that all children deserved an equal education.⁴⁸ Schnader's new found enlightenment was a direct result of civil rights activism and the growing African-American political power in Pennsylvania.

On May 1, 1934, the *Philadelphia Record* stated that Alexander had met with the Special Deputy Attorney Generals and they had settled the Berywn case outside of court, after a boycott lasting "two years and one month." The national office of the NAACP congratulated Alexander and his staff, and Alexander extolled the commitment of the parents. In a letter to Wilkins, Alexander wrote

This case has been the best example of fortitude, courage, willingness to sacrifice against all odds on the part of colored people, especially the ordinary class of working people who are willing to undergo the greatest hardships and the imprisonment of mothers and fathers of young children in order to stand up for the deep-seated principle of equality educational opportunity in the same buildings and through the same methods of teaching along with white children....⁴⁹

According to Davison Douglas, during the 1920s and 1930s, black parents and lawyers fought segregation in many northern school districts, and they all encountered three major obstacles; the inability to find an attorney, fear of economic retaliation by whites, and white resistance to "compliance with court orders requiring integration." Of these three aforementioned obstacles, only one did not apply in Berywn: the parents found an exceptional attorney Alexander. The other two obstacles existed but did not stop the movement. Most of Alexander's public accommodation desegregation cases involved members of the black middle-class, but the Berwyn case, like the modern civil rights movement involved "ordinary people doing extraordinary things." In spite of their lack of economic resources and independence of white employers, these working-class African Americans, whom historian John Dittmer refers to as "local people," had sustained a two-year boycott. These were working-class African Americans who in most cases lacked the economic independence to remain committed to a two year boycott had succeeded.⁵⁰

After the legal victory, controversy continued in the black press. The settlement occurred near the end of the school term, and the new Berwyn school now faced overcrowding. Alexander's critics correctly concluded that the only reason Schnader added his name to the suit was to win black support in his campaign for governor. Alexander's critics argued that the state had not been forced to enunciate a policy that prohibited discrimination. Some African-American students attended the new school, but according to the Philadelphia Record, "the old Berwyn school will be used for about 80 backward white and Negro children." Isadore Martin suggested to Walter White that the Berywn "settlement was a complete sell-out on the part of Raymond Alexander." Eustace Gay in the Philadelphia Tribune wrote "no permanent settlement has arrived..." and he believed that "the townships...may resegregate, AFTER the present official political campaign is over." 51 An editorial in the Philadelphia Independent described Alexander's compromise as a "partial victory for this little band of Negroes.... This editorial wanted the two townships to pass a "resolution prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of race or color."52

In November 1934, the Republican Schnader lost the election to the Democrat George Earle. At the time, in the depths of the Great Depression, a number of African Americans who were hopeful about the New Deal started to vote for Democrats and vacated the Republican Party. Schnader's late conversion to racial equality had lost him the black vote and perhaps, cut into his support among white voters as well.

The 1935 Pennsylvania Equal Rights Act

Those who faulted the Berwyn school settlement for failing to address the larger policy issue at the state level carried the civil rights struggle from the local community into state politics and then took legislative action. During the 1930s, African-American leaders in northern states took advantage of their expanding political power and used it to pass stronger Equal Rights Laws. In January 1935, African-American state representative Hobson Reynolds, from Philadelphia introduced House Bill No. 67, "An act to provide Civil Rights for all people regardless or race or color." According to Alexander, unlike the 1887 civil rights law that remained on the books but meant little in practice, this law had "some nasty, sharp-edged teeth": it included all types of public accommodations, such as schools, libraries, theaters, swimming pools, and ice cream parlors. The law was designed to "curb Honorable James Crow's activities in

Pennsylvania." Any person convicted of violating the law would receive a penalty from \$100 to \$500 or ninety days in jail, if the "persons refuse to come up with the dough." The Pennsylvania bill was modeled on New York's 1918 law that allowed lawyers to sue businesses that practiced segregation. In April, when Pennsylvania State Senator Samuel Salus introduced the Equal Rights Bill to the Senate, more than twenty state branches of the NAACP expressed their support. A month later, newly elected Democratic Governor George Earle promised to sign the bill. In May, the Democratic-controlled House and Senate passed the act, demonstrating the power of the black vote. Governor Earle signed the Equal Rights Bill in June 1935, and it became effective on September 1. The Philadelphia Tribune reported that some whites condemned the measure as "special legislation," designed to benefit a particular group, in this case African Americans. Before Earle signed the bill, some hotel managers in the state sent him letters asking him not to sign it. The managers feared that black customers would ruin their business and contented that it violated their rights to run their business.53

In August 1935, the *Philadelphia Tribune* printed a letter by the White Crusaders, a white group from Ellsworth, Pennsylvania approximately "45 miles outside of Pittsburgh located by a small cluster of violently anti-Negro communities." The group formed as a reaction to the new Pennsylvania Equal Rights Act. The White Crusaders passed out a leaflet that declared they were going "to chase the n__ (nigger) out of Pennsylvania." The White Crusaders rhetoric sounded similar to Ku Klux Klan's white supremacist statements:

We were honest, law-abiding citizens until the n—used his influence To have a so-called Equal Rights bill passed by a group of selfish Politicians. We did not want to discriminate against the n—Every-One seemed to be satisfied, but we must have treated the n—too good. He wants the same privileges as the white man, especially with the white woman.⁵⁴

Although southern whites are most closely identified with virulent hatred of black people, many northern whites also held such attitudes, repeating the charge that black men are a sexual threat to white women which was used to justify lynching. In addition, the White Crusaders did not want African Americans to have the same privileges as whites. The Crusaders encouraged whites to join and "help move the Mason-Dixon line north of Pennsylvania."⁵⁵

Six days after the Equal Rights Bill went into effect, Alexander informed Charles Hamilton Houston of the NAACP that it was better to wait for a test case to develop than to play into the hands of the white press, which had predicted that immediately after midnight on September 1 African Americans would flood the hotels and file frivolous law suits. Alexander told Houston, that the black community should wait at least one or two months before they tested the law, but Alexander did not need to wait because racial discrimination continued in Philadelphia. In September, Catherine Belton went to the Doris Theatre, but the white manager Charles Shields refused to sell her a ticket unless she sat in the "Negro section." In October 1935, Mamie Davis and Ruth Jones went to Stouffer's Restaurant. According to Alexander, the clients did not meet with "an outright refusal"; they were seated, but the waiter "deliberately adulterated the food with thick layers of salt." The two women went to the restaurant again, accompanied by Robert Smith, a reporter for the Baltimore Afro American and they again received "salted food." In Horn and Hardart, two white secretaries received proper service, but the two black women entered the restaurant and were served food that was extremely salty and "unfit to eat." In January 1936, Alexander took all three cases, Doris Theatre, Stouffer's, and Horn and Hardart, to court to test the new Pennsylvania Equal Rights Bill. Alexander's clients in the Horn and Hardart and Doris Theatre cases won and the businesses paid the fine. For the Stouffer's case Alexander was not victorious, before the case he believed the judge would have interpreted their extremely salty food "as a positive refusal." However, The Philadelphia Tribune reported that the all white jury ruled that Stouffer's did not refuse to serve the clients. Some white storeowners circumvented the law by providing salty food or taking a long time to serve black patrons. Some white judges did not enforce the law by interpreting lousy service or highly salty food as a violation of the new law. Alexander brought these landmark cases under the new law and signaled the beginning of the end of segregation in Philadelphia and across the state.⁵⁶

The Berywn, Pennsylvania school desegregation case demonstrated a number of civil rights tactics and tensions that are associated with the modern civil rights movement: a boycott, jail-ns, mass meetings, interracial cooperation, threats of mass protests that were effective even when they did not occur, tensions between local and national civil rights leaders, alliances with and fear of the left, and white backlash. Throughout the 1930s, Alexander worked with the International Labor Defense. Unlike Walter White and Roy Wilkins of the

NAACP, he had both the inclination and the independence to work with radical organizations. In the spring of 1932, Alexander gave an address to the Washington Bar Association, in which he discussed his work with the ILD. Alexander declared that it was "not the radical side of the program in which the lawyer's services are used, but in the intelligent management and execution of the plans." What Alexander meant by the term "radical side" is not entirely clear, but Kenneth Mack suggests that by the 1930s, Alexander's "professional identity...made him."...sympathetic to the radicals' argument." I share Mack's view that Alexander combined "legalism and mass protest into a new civil rights paradigm." Alexander did not reject working with radicals, or using radical tactics such as mass demonstrations. During the 1930s, he formed functional coalitions with the left in order to get support for his civil rights work. The Berywn school case not only addressed the imposition of segregation in a local community but also assisted with the passage of the 1935 Pennsylvania Equal Rights Act. A vibrant civil rights struggle existed in the North long before the 1960s rebellions and Black Power movement. Esther Long, a sevenyear old participant in the boycott, said she had "never forgotten it." All of the tactics that the protestors used in the Berywn case were later used during the southern struggle. Local lawyers such as Raymond Pace Alexander and local people such as the black parents of Berywn have always been the backbone of the civil rights struggle in America.57

NOTES

- 1. Philadelphia Tribune, October 1, 1957. For more on Louis Armstrong and jazz musicians during the Cold War, see Penny M. Von Eschen, Satchmo Blows Up the World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004).
- 2. August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, "The Origins of Nonviolent Direct Action in Afro-American Protest: A Note of Historical Discontinuities," in *Along the Color Line: Explorations in the Black Experience*, ed. Meier and Rudwick (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1974), 312.
- 3. C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 17.
- Ibid., 114; V.P. Franklin, "The Philadelphia Race Riot of 1918" Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 99 (Fall 1975): 336–50; John Hope Franklin and Alfred A. Moss, From Slavery to Freedom, 6th edition. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1988), 313–15.
- 5. Andrew Wiese, Places of Their Own: African American Suburbanization in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). In addition to suburban towns with small factories, Wiese classifies semi-rural places populated by workers who commuted to urban factories as "industrial" suburbs.

- 6. Harvard Sitkoff, A New Deal for Blacks: The Emergence of Civil Rights as a National Issue (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978); Nikhil Singh, Black is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 69.
- 7. Davison M. Douglas, Jim Crow Moves North: The Battle over Northern School Segregation, 1865–1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 11. Meier and Rudwick, "The Origins of Nonviolent Direct Action in Afro-American Protest" in Meier and Rudwick, Along the Color Line, 312. On page 313, the authors list fifteen northern cities in which school boycotts occurred from 1922–1940.
- Raymond Pace Alexander to Walter White, July 13, 1933, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Legal File, Cases, Supported Berywn School, July-December 1933, Box 48, Folder 7. I will refer to these papers as NAACP Legal File Box and Folder.
- 9. James D. Mclendon to Municipal Court of New York to Raymond Pace Alexander, Box in Raymond Pace Alexander Papers UPT 50 A 37 R Box 6 Folder 1 in the University Archives and Record Center at the University of Pennsylvania. I will refer to Alexander's papers as RPA Box and Folder number. In 1921, Alexander went to Madison Square Garden to use the pool. When he arrived, the white employee did not allow him to enter. This violated the 1918 New York State Equal Rights Law. After the incident, Alexander hired James McClendon, an attorney, and sued Madison Square Garden for \$500.00, the maximum penalty. There is no record of the court's decision on the case. However, the July issue of *The Crisis* reported that four African Americans in New York City "were awarded \$100.00" in a racial discrimination suit against a coffee house in Manhattan.
- 10. Genna Rae McNeil, Groundwork: Charles Hamilton Houston and the Struggle for Civil Rights (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Gilbert Ware, William Hastie: Grace Under Pressure (New York: G.P. Putnam's and Son, 1984); Juan Williams, Thurgood Marshall: American Revolutionary (New York: Times Books, 1998). Alexander was considered for the position on the federal bench to which Hastie was appointed.
- Darlene Clark Hine, "Black Professionals and Race Consciousness: Origins of the Civil Rights Movement, 1890–1950" The Journal of American History 89 (March 2003): 1280.
- 12. These texts discuss Alexander's training and role in the history of the black bar. Fitzhugh Lee Styles, Negroes and the Law (Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1937); Henry W. McGee, Jr. "Black Lawyers and the Struggle for Racial Justice in the American Social Order," Buffalo Law Review 20 (Winter 1971): 423–34; Walter J. Leonard, Black Lawyers, Training and Results, Then and_Now (Boston, Senna Shih,1977); Geraldine R. Segal, Blacks in the Law: Philadelphia and the Nation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); J. Clay Smith Jr., Emancipation: The Making of the Black Lawyer, 1844–1944 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); Kenneth Mack, "Law and Mass Politics in the Making of the Civil Rights Lawyer, 1931–1941," Journal of American History 93 (June 2006); 37–62; On the history of black women lawyers, including Sadie Tanner Mossell Alexander see, J. Clay Smith, Jr., (ed) Rebels in Law: Voices in History of Black Women Lawyers (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998).
- 13. Kenneth Kusmer, A Ghetto Takes Shape: Black Cleveland, 1870–1930 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1976): 248–250. Harry E. Davis and Chester K. Gillespie were New Negro lawyers in Cleveland. Joe William Trotter, Jr. Black Milwaukee: The Making of an Industrial Proletariat, 1915–1945 (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1985),122–6. George DeReef was a New Negro lawyer in Milwaukee. V.P. Franklin, The Education of Black Philadelphia: The Social and Educational

History of a Minority Community, 1900–1950 (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1979), 139–141, briefly examines Alexander and the Berwyn school case. Robert J. Blakely's, *Earl B. Dickerson: A Voice for Freedom and Equality* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2006).

- 14. Singh, Black is a Country; John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1995); Mary L. Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Jeanne Theoharis, Groundwork: Local Black Freedom Movements in America (New York: New York University Press, 2005); Chana Kai Lee, For Freedom's Sake: The Life of Fannie Lou Hamer (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1999): Barbara Ransby, Ella Baker and the Black Freedom Movement: A Radical Democratic Vision (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003).
- 15. Thomas Sugrue, The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995); Douglass S. Massey and Nancy Denton, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Martha Biondi, To Stand and Fight: The Struggle for Civil Rights in Postwar New York (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 2003): Jeanne F. Theoharis, ed, Freedom North: Black Freedom Struggles Outside the South, 1940–1980 (New York: New York University Press, 2003); Matthew J. Countryman, Up South: Civil Rights and Black Power in Philadelphia (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).
- 16. Meier and Rudwick, "Origins of Nonviolent Direct Action" Along the Color Line, 307
- 17. Mark Tushnett, *The NAACP'S Legal Strategy against Segregated Education*, 1925–1950 (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1987).
- 18. Raymond Pace Alexander, UPT 50 Oversized Scrapbook, "A Brief Sketch of the Life of RPA" n.d.
- 19. Charles S. Johnson, *The Negro College Graduate* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1938), 9; STMA Box 1 Folder 6; RPA Box 1 Folder Penn.
- 20. Alexander, "*Blacks and the Law*" Verdict 6 (September 1970): 1, RPA Box 99 Folder 66; RPA Box 7 Folder 20
- Segal, Blacks and the Law, 29; Alexander's civil rights victories and national status "Noted Philadelphian Has Had Brilliant Scholastic and Legal Career in Establishing Negro's Rights" Journal Norfolk and Guide, September 17,1932.
- 22. "The Struggle Against Racism in Philadelphia From 1923-1948" 2, RPA Box 97 Folder 19
- 23. Wiese, Places of Their Own, 51.
- 24. Philadelphia Tribune, August 28, 1932.
- Alexander, "Outline of the School Situation in Eastown and Tredyffrin Townships," October 18, 1933; NAACP Legal File, Box 48, Folder 8; *Philadelphia Tribune*, October 13, 1932; *NAACP Annual Report 1932* (New York, 1933), 27.
- 26. Philadelphia Inquirer, May 16, 2004, A 22.
- Main Line Daily Times, October 12, 1932, NAACP Legal File, Box 48, Folder 5; Philadelphia Record January 1, 1933, NAACP, Legal File, Box 48, Folder 6; Philadelphia Tribune, November 24, 1932; Philadelphia Tribune, December 29, 1932; Philadelphia Tribune, January 5, 1933.
- Alexander, "Outline of the School Situation, (October 18, 1932), 2. NAACP, Legal File, Box 48, Folder 8; Philadelphia Yearly Meetings of the Religious Society of Friends Committee on Race Relations, Series 1 Box 1, December 20,27, 1932; February 21, 1933. Swarthmore College.

- 29. Alexander, "Outline of the School Situation, (October 18, 1933), 2. NAACP, Legal File, Box 48, Folder 8; White to RPA, February 17, 1933; White "Memorandum to the Pennsylvania Branches of the N.A.A.C.P." February 21, 1933; Roy Wilkins to W.W. Hines, March 10, 1933, NAACP Legal Files, Box 48 Folder 7.
- White to RPA, June 2, 1933; RPA to White, June 5, 1933, NAACP Legal File, Box 48, Folder 7;
 Wilkins to RPA, November 15, 1933, NAACP Legal File Box 48 Folder 8.
- 31. The Communist Party organized the LSNR in 1930 as a successor to the American Negro Labor Congress and was active in the Scottsboro Defense. The LSNR opposed police brutality and supported the creation of an independent black nation in the South. It was dissolved with the Communist Party's shift to the Popular Front policy in 1935 and was succeeded by the National Negro Labor Congress.
- 32. The Harlem Liberator, August 11, 1934.
- 33. W.L. Johnson to Walter White, October 12, 1933; Wilkins to Cobb, September 28, 1933; Cobb to Wilkins, October 4, 1933 in NAACP Legal Files, Box 48, Folder 8.
- 34. RPA to White, October 18, 1933; NAACP Legal File, Box 48, Folder 8; NAACP Annual Report (New York, 1933), 27.
- 35. Philadelphia Tribune, October 13, 1932
- 36. Wilkins, "Memorandum on the Berywn School Case," October 2, 1933. NAACP Legal File, Box 48, Folder 8.
- Wilkins, "Memorandum on the Berwyn School Case, October 2, 1933; Wilkins to Bryan, October
 25, 1933; Wilkins to Lucille Milner, November 3, 1933, NAACP Legal Files, Box 48 Folder 8.
- 38. Wilkins, "Memorandum on the Berywn School Case, October 2, 1933.
- 39. Harlem Liberator, March 24, 1934.
- 40. Helen Bryan, January 6, 1934, Committee on Race Relations, Series 2 Box 2; Ralph J. Bunche and Charles Hamilton Houston, "Seminar on Segregation" Survey CORR, Series 2 Box 2. Swarthmore College.
- 41. DuBois, "Segregation" *The Crisis*, January 1934 in David Levering Lewis, W.E.B. DuBois: A Reader (New York: Henry Holt, 1995), 557
- 42. Alexander, "Minutes of the First Seminar on Segregation, January 26, 1934, 10. CORR, Series 2, Box 2.
- 43. Bates, Pullman Porters and the Rise of Protest Politics in Black America 1925–1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). For the Philadelphia Protest Meeting and March on Washington for the Scottsboro case, see Philadelphia Tribune, April 20, 1933; Philadelphia Tribune, March 20, 1933; Philadelphia Tribune, January 26, 1933; Philadelphia Tribune, February 2, 1933; Philadelphia Tribune, February 16, 1933; Philadelphia Tribune, April 13, 1933; Philadelphia Tribune, April 27, 1933; Philadelphia Tribune, June 1, 1933; Bates, "A New Crowd Challenges the Agenda of the Old guard in the NAACP, 1933–1941" American Historical Review 102 (April 1997): 354.
- 44. W.A. Richards to Patrick H. Jeffries, May 6, 1933 in Floyd Logan Papers, Temple University Urban Archives, Folder 1, Box 2; May 11, 1933; *Philadelphia Tribune*, June 22, 1933.
- 45. *Philadelphia Tribune*, February 10, 1934; Davis to Dear Friend, February 17, 1934, Logan Papers, Folder 1 Box 1; Logan to LeStrange, February 23, 1934, Logan Papers, Folder 1 Box 2; LeStrange to Theodore White, February 26, 1934, Logan Papers, Folder 1 Box 2; *Philadelphia Tribune*, March 1, 1934; *Philadelphia Tribune*, March 8, 1934; Wilkins to Millen, April 27, 1934, NAACP Legal File Box 48, Folder 9.

- Philadelphia Tribune November 23, 1933; Kenneth Goings, The NAACP Come of Age: The Defeat of Judge John J. Parker (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1990).
- 47. Philadelphia Tribune April 19, 26, 1934; Franklin, The Education of Black Philadelphia, 141.
- 48. RPA to Wilkins, May 10, 1934, NAACP Legal File, Box 48 Folder 9.
- Philadelphia Tribune, May 3, 1934; Philadelphia Record, May 1, 1934; Wilkins to RPA, May 7, 1934;
 Wilkins to Cobb, May 5, 1934; NAACP Legal File, Box 48 Folder 9; Davison, Jim Crow Goes North, 210–11; Dittmer, Local People (1995).
- 50. Philadelphia Record, May 1, 1934; Philadelphia Tribune, May 10, 1934.
- 51. Philadelphia Independent, May 6, 1934, NAACP Legal File, Box 48, Folder 9.
- Philadelphia Tribune, April 11, 1935; Philadelphia Tribune, May 2, 1935; Philadelphia Tribune, May 9, 1935; Philadelphia Tribune, June 6, 1935; Philadelphia Tribune, June 13, 1935; McBride, "Mid-Atlantic State Courts and the Struggle With the 'Separate But Equal:' Doctrine: 1880–1939": Rutgers Law Journal 17 (Spring 1986): 580–82.
- 53. Philadelphia Tribune, August 22, 1935.
- 54. Racial discrimination see *Philadelphia Tribune*, April 2, 1935; *Philadelphia Tribune*, April 18, 1935; Thomas Gates to RPA, April 5, 1935, Box 9 Folder 3. Gates apologized to Alexander because the University of Pennsylvania prohibited Howard University Law students from staying on campus during a conference. H. Viscount Nelson, "Race and Class Consciousness" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1969), 335–37: NAACP Annual Report 1935 (New York, 1936), 32.
- 55. RPA to Houston, September 7, 1935; RPA Box 9 Folder 2; RPA to Wilkins, October 23, 1935; RPA Box 9 Folder 2. "Stouffer's Incident," *Philadelphia Tribune*, November 14, 1935; *Philadelphia Afro American*, December 21, 1935. Discrimination see, Philadelphia Tribune, November 21, 1935; Doris Theater Case, *Philadelphia Tribune*, December 19, 1935; *Philadelphia Independent*, December 22, 1935; *Washington Afro-American*, December 21, 1936; *Philadelphia Tribune*, January 23, 1936; NAACP Annual Report 1935, (New York, 1936), 23, reported that "The Quarter Sessions Court of Allegheny County, PA., declared the Pennsylvania civil rights law of 1935 constitutional in a decision handed down in October in Pittsburgh restaurant discrimination case originating in January. The owner was given a suspended sentence and a fine."
- 56. Kenneth W. Mack, "Law and Mass Politics in the Making of the Civil Rights Lawyer, 1931–1941" The Journal of American History 93 (June 2006): 93; Philadelphia Inquirer, October 24, 2004, B 05. Alexander, "The Negro Lawyer and His Part in a Reconstructed Race Program" RPA Box 95 Folder 21.