what is notable about the Civil War is not its violence but the opposite: "the remarkable restraint of the people and the president who had organized and mobilized such vastly powerful and potentially destructive armies" (197).

Overall, Neely presents a strong case, but at times it seems forced, such as when he parses the war's fatalities compared to other conflicts, such as World War II. The book's organization also poses some problems. The author moves forward and back in time throughout the book and within individual chapters, and he includes a number of personal asides. At times, this tends to break the book's flow and dilutes its arguments. Still, *The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction* is a thought-provoking work that is sure to generate additional research and debate.

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In this book the ubiquitous Terry Madonna offers the timely and fascinating story of modern presidential politics in Pennsylvania. Even though Pennsylvania has only ever produced one president, James Buchanan, it has become important in presidential general elections since Franklin Roosevelt. Today, it is a basic axiom of Electoral College math that whichever presidential candidate wins two out of the "big three" states—Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Florida—wins the White House. Pennsylvania is a focus for presidential campaigns because it is big (21 electoral votes) and a swing state (for the past three decades the margin of victory has been less than ten percentage points). In recent presidential politics the Keystone State is reminiscent of the nineteenth century before the civil war, in which Pennsylvania was for the most part in the hands of the Democratic Party and was known as the "key stone in the democratic arch." The Democrats today have not won the Presidency without Pennsylvania since Harry Truman in 1948. In that same period, however, only Republicans Richard Nixon (1968) and George W. Bush (2000, 2004) have won without the commonwealth's electoral votes.

The first part of the book covers the New Deal realignment in Pennsylvania's presidential politics. The 1932 election was the beginning
of the end of Republican dominance: Hoover won Pennsylvania, but only by five points. The Republicans could no longer take the commonwealth for granted, and indeed lost the next three presidential elections to FDR. The Republican Party was revitalized during the 1940s, however, and it took a second stage of realignment in the 1950s to get Pennsylvania back to Democratic column in the 1960 presidential election. Most of those gains were in the first part of the decade. As Madonna points out, the conversion of Pittsburgh into a Democratic city in the mid-1930s found a counterpart in Philadelphia’s takeover by reform Democrats in 1951, which finally made the commonwealth a true two-party, competitive state.

The rest of the book chronicles the rise of the commonwealth’s importance for presidential candidates in the general election, with a decline in importance over the same period regarding candidate selection. The Democratic Party rule changes for choosing presidential nominees in 1972, as a result of the McGovern-Fraser commission, was the watershed event. This led to the end of the brokered convention, the rise of primaries as the method of picking a presidential candidate, and the end of Pennsylvania’s influence on the selection process. Prior to the 2008 matchup between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, the Pennsylvania primary had not mattered since 1976, when a win in the Pennsylvania primary secured Jimmy Carter’s nomination against Scoop Jackson.

Before the McGovern-Fraser changes, Pennsylvania partisans had more influence in the presidential selection process. Pennsylvania Democrats were in the thick of things in the 1932 nomination of Roosevelt, the 1940 selection of Henry Wallace as FDR’s running mate, and in the nomination of Adlai Stevenson in the last multi-ballot convention in 1952. Pennsylvanian Republicans also exerted influence on their party’s nomination, but often without success. Party boss Joe Pew could not stop Wendell Willkie from getting the nomination in 1940, nor could Governor James Duff stop Thomas Dewey from being the party’s nominee in 1948. In 1952, Republican Governor John Fine was pictured on the cover of Time with a story entitled “President Maker,” since the delegates Fine controlled could very well flip the nomination to either Dwight Eisenhower or Robert Taft. Fine silently preferred the former and wanted to deliver the votes at the crucial juncture, but that role was taken by Minnesota, and Fine was humiliated.

One error in the book bears correction. Madonna credits Pennsylvania Republican Senator Hugh Scott with the 1972 line that George McGovern was the “Three A candidate—acid, amnesty, and abortion” (71). The Time
magazine article that Madonna cites does not mention the line or Scott. The actual quote, “The people don’t know McGovern is for amnesty, abortion and legalization of pot,” caused a stir when it was reported in a Robert Novak column as coming from a “liberal Senator.” The dark horse McGovern had just won the Massachusetts primary by 31 points, finally finishing off the race’s presumptive favorite Edmund Muskie. McGovern’s surge was reviving the campaign of Hubert Humphrey, and the “Triple-A” line, which misrepresented McGovern’s positions, became Humphrey’s rallying cry. Novak respected the confidentiality of the Senator who gave him the quote for thirty-six years, but in his 2007 memoir he revealed it to be Thomas Eagleton, McGovern’s star-crossed running-mate. On Meet the Press in the summer of 2007, Bob Shrum (who wrote McGovern’s convention address) said to Novak: “Boy, do I wish he would have let you publish [Eagleton’s] name. Then he never would have been picked as vice president.”

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