

AN ADVERSE PATRON: LAND, TRADE, AND
GEORGE CROGHAN¹

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In 1749 when Governor-General of New France, Roland-Michel Barrin de La Galissonière, ordered Pierre-Joseph Céloron to the Ohio Country to rid the region of the growing British influence, it signaled the onset of a series of events dramatically alter the development of North America. The ensuing Seven Years' War and what has been termed "Pontiac's Rebellion" has attracted considerable scholarly attention. Also referred to as the *guerre de la conquête*, the conflict that raged for over a decade on North American soil decisively sealed the fates of many European and indigenous empires. The purpose of this investigation, however, is not to revisit the rich military history of the Seven Years' War or the Indian uprising. Rather, the following observations are primarily concerned with the story of an individual, whose life when set against the backdrop of continental struggle to 1764, underscores the complex political and cultural meandering that characterized the fringes of empire in the eighteenth-century northeastern borderlands. Few life stories better illustrates the freedom to which

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a fortunate few were able to repeatedly pursue self-enrichment in blatant disregard for Crown initiative than that of Crown agent, Pennsylvania trader, and manic speculator, George Croghan (b.172?, d.1782).

Croghan's commitment to uphold colonial and British influence in the Ohio region during the Seven Years' War was less of a personal motive than his financial concerns. The records that remain detailing Sir William Johnson's senior Deputy of Indian Affairs life illuminate a career steeped in personal politics. This should be no surprise to any scholar concerned with the history of go-betweens in early America. That said, the essential question to ask when using Croghan's life as a point of entry to borderland history is why would so many powerful people repeatedly entrust important missions to a known scoundrel? To answer that question is to comprehend the breadth of self-enrichment as a factor in development of Indian affairs in North America. Perhaps more intriguing, the answer also accentuates the reliance of imperial policy makers, and thus the development of empire, on the capriciousness of those who sat and smoked at council fires deep in Indian country. In the end, those who dealt with Croghan were aware of the hazards of relying on such a "vile Rascal," as provincial secretary Richard Peters remarked in 1756.² Yet, given the circumstances of the mid-eighteenth century Pennsylvania and New York borderlands, Croghan was about the best Whitehall and the colonial governors could expect to recruit. For those who wanted to influence and profit from the frontier but avoid venturing beyond the clearing, Croghan was the solution.

Interpretations of Croghan have changed in conjunction with the values of the historical profession and additional research. Thus considered, accounts of Croghan's life mark the evolution of studies on colonial America. In 1923 Albert T. Volwiler described Croghan as "one of the leading exponents of the westward expansion of the Anglo-Saxon race during the generation before 1776."³ The implication of racial triumph reflected the period's historiography, but the claim for Croghan's significance was not misplaced. In 1959, in light of a series of manuscripts that had resurfaced which detailed a number of the Indian agent's ventures, historian Nicholas Wainwright revisited Croghan's contribution to the eighteenth-century borderlands.⁴ Subsequently, historians have largely passed over Croghan; they have concentrated on his refined superior, the "feudal lord" of eighteenth-century Mohawk frontier, Sir William Johnson.⁵ The scarcity of assessments about Croghan's many activities in the northeastern borderlands is surprising considering he helped maintain British influence west of the Susquehanna River. Recently, Croghan's speculative interests have been highlighted to

counterbalance a history that has tended to portray Croghan as a dedicated Crown agent.⁶ Herbertis Cummings deemed him a “Rogue, dishonest trader in furs, always suspect merchant, wild and overweening speculator in lands, player for acreage in Pennsylvania.”⁷ Alan Taylor suggests that Croghan “was the most avid, indeed manic, land speculator in colonial North America.” Together with a hunger for fine food, drink, and women, Croghan’s insatiable appetite for land was unparalleled.⁸ In fact, the veteran Indian trader often merged the Crown’s interest with his own ambitions. He sought to acquire land and fortune at the expense of those who trusted him; and the lengths Croghan went to pursue his own interests are well worth observation. By detailing the complicated web of self-interest, it is clear that Croghan defined the direction of significant colonial events during the two decades that preceded the American Revolution. While his life is well worth lengthy study, it is the first chapter of Croghan’s scheming that remains the focus of the following essay; an entry into the annals of the eighteenth-century north-eastern borderlands to 1764.

According to Alfred Cave, “the story of Anglo-American Ohio begins with George Croghan.”⁹ Born in Ireland during the early 1720s, Croghan immigrated to British North America in 1742 likely due to hardships.¹⁰ Within a few years he had acquired almost twelve hundred acres of land in the Condigwinet valley with Indian trader William Trent, and organized Pennsborough Township in Lancaster County, in the Province of Pennsylvania.¹¹ Not content with the prospect of a storekeeper’s life and small land holdings, Croghan soon ventured into the Pennsylvania backcountry with aspirations of gaining a fortune in the Indian trade. By the fall of 1744 he had established a trading house at the Seneca village at the mouth of the Cuyahoga River (present-day Cleveland, OH).¹² For the next decade Croghan traded goods with the Ohio Indians and acted as an unofficial agent for the province of Pennsylvania. During this time he forged a trading relationship with the Indian populations of backcountry Pennsylvania, learning how to converse in a number of indigenous languages and dialects. Similar to earlier traders and ‘cultural brokers’ before him, Croghan wed an Indian daughter of a Mohawk chief (Nicolas). The union gave him further access to trade.¹³

Pennsylvania traders, led by Croghan, established a trading network that extended farther west than meaningful colonial authority. His post at the mouth of the Cuyahoga River challenged French claims to the trade of the region, and to their alliances with the region’s villages. Croghan realized that a permanent trading post would detach the Indians from the

French “commercial orbit.”¹⁴ According to fellow Pennsylvanian trader, John Patten, Croghan relentlessly urged the Indians to destroy the French, but “self-interest was his sole motive in every thing he did ... [as he tried] to engross the whole trade.”¹⁵ If Croghan intended to use colonial diplomatic and commercial backing, it is also true that Proprietary interests found his aggressive spirit useful. There were risks and prospects for all. Often employing Haudenosaunee middlemen, Pennsylvania traders threatened French influence in the area.

The Haudenosaunee also attempted to utilize growing English presence in the region. European goods arriving from the British empire were made available in Indian villages, such as Pickawillany. These villages had “half king” magistrates loyal to the Confederacy. Despite outward appearances, the Onondaga council could not project hegemony over the region. In fact, rumor had it that even Shamokin Delawares were “open to a “favourable opportunity to throw off the Yoke ... and to revenge the Insults that had been offered them at Philadelphia but two years before.” If the Six Nations decided to take part in war, they knew they risked open conflict with the Shawnees and Delawares.¹⁶ The Ohio Indians, however, had to worry about the military might of the English. As a result of the temporary ascendancy of the British, between 1744 and 1754, the Six Nations and the Ohio Indians jockeyed for position by engaging in a series of treaties in an attempt to bury the hatchet with the Crown, and the Crown endeavored to formalize authority over the Ohio Country and its inhabitants.

On July 4, 1744, in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, the Six Nations met with representatives from Virginia, Maryland, New York, and Pennsylvania. In return for the resolution of land disputes in Maryland and Virginia, the Crown reasserted Six Nations’ claims to overlordship of the Ohio River valley.¹⁷ By recognizing Six Nations’ authority, the Crown and Pennsylvania’s proprietors announced an interest in Indian trade and future land cessions in the region. However, in order to minimize the threat of conflict, in November 1747 the provincial authorities welcomed direct negotiations with the Ohio Indians. Fearful that an Indian alliance with the French would devastate provincial trade and threaten borderland security, the province offered the Ohio Indians eight hundred pounds worth of gifts in return for a pledge of their allegiance.¹⁸ The negotiations ushered in an era of extensive Pennsylvania-supplied trade, extending English influence deep into the Ohio and Illinois Counties. Central to the supply of goods was the Philadelphia firm of Baynton and Wharton. By 1748 Pennsylvania exports in fur to England surpassed New York.¹⁹

With increased trade, however, came increased abuses. Drove of settlers followed close behind the advance of trade.²⁰

By the early eighteenth-century, the sale and acquisition of land began to dominate treaty negotiations throughout the northeastern borderlands. Indian ideas of land ownership and use were complex and varied between nations. Nevertheless, the "intercultural" exchange of property occurred. Conquest and sale were two of the ways Indian land could change ownership. Both methods were often shrouded in ambiguity, confusion, and deceit. As a result, by the mid-eighteenth century, a generation of disputes over the settlement and use of land in the heart of Haudenosaunee homelands created mistrust which spilled across the Susquehanna River. Both Crown and indigenous representatives often insisted on having multiple written records of land transfers, transcribed and certified by the marks of the participating Indians and colonial representatives. While both colonial and indigenous representatives attempted to make appropriate negotiation adjustments over the first half of the century to curb points of contention, the continuous push of frontier settlers threatened to undercut Indian-British relations.

By late 1749 the organization of Cumberland County and continued settlement west of the Susquehanna created mistrust with the local indigenous residents.²¹ Croghan, appointed justice of peace and common pleas in the region in 1748, was chiefly responsible for the removal of the squatters from the land beyond the Blue Mountains and in the Juniata Valley.²² Realizing the potential for gain, Croghan met with an Onondaga representative in an informal council in 1749. According to Croghan's memorial addressed to the Lords of Commission for Trade and Plantation fifteen years later, it was at this council that a 200,000 acre tract of land was given to him by a grateful Onondaga Chief for addressing the problem of illegal squatting in the region.²³ Croghan quickly capitalized on the squatting on Onondaga land. As the Crown's agent and as the JP Croghan countered settlement, while Croghan the opportunist arranged a personal reward whose payoff could only come with settlement.

Meanwhile, the mutually advantageous arrangement that Pennsylvania Proprietors and Ohio Country traders had in the Indian trade, and in the diplomacy of influence, began gradually to erode French prestige in the region. "The English are more active than ever, not only spreading themselves over the Continent both in the direction of Louisiana and in the interior of the Canadian territory which unites the two colonies but moreover in exciting the different Nations of Indians against us."²⁴ In response, when the governor

of New France ordered Céloron to the Ohio to rid the region of the growing British influence, he initiated a series of events that dramatically altered the political balance in the region. By reasserting control over the Ohio with the use of a military presence, the Canadian governor had decided on an aggressive course of action. By claiming the soil in the name of the French king, Céloron's expedition "introduced European land ownership and sovereignty to the Ohio."²⁵ After the French captured a Virginia-built fort at the forks of the Ohio, English and French scurried more zealously than ever for Indian favor in the region. Tensions mounted over the next three years.²⁶

By 1750, with French goods increasingly difficult to procure in the Ohio country, a bounty was offered as a reward for the scalp of Croghan. William Johnson noted in a message to Governor Clinton that the French had been concerned with Croghan's escalating influence. On September 25, 1750, Johnson reported that following the escape of two Pennsylvania traders who had been taken prisoner by Indians, he was informed that "that the French at De Troit and thereabout, have offered and given Some Indians great presents to go and take or destroy one Mr. Croghan . . . [who holds the] most Influence on all Indians living there about." Johnson continued: "Should they succeed therein it would certainly be a great Step towards their gaining them Indians, who are as yet very Strongly attached to the British Interest, and Double the Number of the five Nations."²⁷ By 1750, although threatened by French awareness of his presence, Croghan not only maintained the thin English presence in the region, but also a near monopoly on Indian trade.

Croghan sought to gain a deeper influence in the Ohio Country. His diplomacy, however, might be better understood within the context of personal financial gain rather than Crown initiative; and Crown reliance on him paints a vivid picture of the precarious British position on the fringes of empire. In January 1751, Croghan announced to provincial representatives in Philadelphia that the Indians of Logstown expressed a keen interest in having a trading house constructed in the area. Sent back to confirm the claim in April, Croghan also delivered gifts on behalf of the Pennsylvania governor to the Ohio Indians for recently purchased lands located on the west side of the Susquehanna. Croghan later claimed that following a separate meeting with a number of chiefs, including Tanaghrisson (the Half King), he decided to deviate from the speech written by Conrad Weiser to the Indians. Instead of seeking an agreement related to the construction of a small trading post, Croghan pursued negotiations to further his own trading prospects at the forks of the Monongahela, stating that the Indians now requested a

"Strong House." As James Merrell reminds us, "Croghan ... longed for the protection a garrison could provide."²⁸ After news of his private initiative reached Pennsylvania's assembly, Croghan received considerable criticism. His response to charges that he distorted policy remained suspect. He stated that the Half King told him that the building of a house "had been agreed on between them and the Onondaga council." But, the memorial of provincial interpreter, Andrew Montour, denied any knowledge of the agreement.²⁹ The Ohio Indians offered land to opposing English and French representatives at varying times in order to promote the rivalry in trade that the two imperial powers had begun in the Ohio Country. Croghan had attempted to strike a deal with the Ohio Indians without government approval. He would have profited from the construction of a post as it promised to secure more Indian trade and land speculation. The trader's actions bypassed Crown protocol that demanded that such matters be addressed through the Six Nations.³⁰

The French, who had marched soldiers up and down the Ohio valley during 1749 burying lead boundary plates along the way, enjoyed little success in discouraging British trade. As a result, the governor of New France authorized an expedition against the Indian village of Pickawillany. The village was a stronghold of English influence and the home of La Demoiselle, a Miami chief also known as Old Briton. Within a year, the French and their allies sacked Pickawillany, seized most of Croghan's trading goods, and captured or killed his trading agents. The English Crown did little about these affairs. By 1753 Croghan's trading enterprise on the Ohio was ruined. He had little choice but to accept a role in public service because as the French and English moved toward an undeclared war in the region, his capacity for manipulating the fragile tools of government and commerce granted to him had vanished.

Historians have suggested that Croghan's "knowledge of western savages," and interest in checking French domination opened a career in public service for him. In fact, his back was to the wall. Nothing shows better the English form of dealing with a frontier region on the cheap than Croghan's retreat from free-wheeling agent to public servant. So long as there was peace, or the looming threat of an Indian war, both the government and Croghan could use each other. This was imperial outreach by free enterprise. Both the government and the individual found this arrangement advantageous, but risky. The self-interest of the shrewd individual could go too far; the commitment of the government could be too tepid. With a war, a scope for such jockeying also existed, and Croghan often found it. The problem

was the government's expectations of their social inferiors during war. He had delivered presents to the Ohio Indians on behalf of the Pennsylvania government in 1748, and again in 1751 to western Indians, but Croghan's commitment to the Anglo cause rested with his many storehouses and the continuation of trade. Loyalty did not draw Croghan into public service, circumstance dictated he must adapt; and the Crown had few other options but to look the other way.

By 1753 European presence in the Ohio Country had increased rapidly. The Ohio nations, with whom Croghan had forged strong trading alliances, were caught between two competing empires.³¹ Croghan's attempts to invigorate trade in the region were quickly snuffed out when hostilities erupted in 1755.³² The resulting Indian wars forced Croghan to abandon the Ohio campaign and return to his trading post at Aughwick. By March 1756, excessive expenditure in the public service forced Croghan to resign his captaincy. Rumors of disloyalty and accusations that he was secretly a Roman Catholic did not help matters, but little evidence supports them. By the fall of 1756 the former master of English trade in the Ohio River valley stood indebted and penniless without a trade network. With creditors in Philadelphia, Croghan moved to New York, where his fortune soon changed.³³

On April 15, 1755, Sir William Johnson received the appointment of Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the northern department. In 1756, shortly following his introduction to Croghan, Johnson appointed the ex-trader as one of his deputies with the hope of consolidating British influence throughout the northeastern frontier.³⁴ In early 1757 Johnson dispatched him to conduct peace talks held between the government of Pennsylvania and the Delawares. Animosity had been increasing between Pennsylvania proprietors and a number of Indian nations as a result of contentious land claims, most of which had stemmed from the infamous Walking Purchase scandal of 1737.³⁵ Writing to Johnson in March 1757, Croghan remarked on the state of affairs. "There is good understanding between the Governor and me, as well as most of the gentlemen of the place, and every one seems fond of an inquiry being made into the Complaints of the Indians; except some of the Proprietary Agents."³⁶ Croghan's relationship with the Pennsylvania proprietors had deteriorated since the 1744 Lancaster treaty. Thomas Penn, in particular, loathed Croghan's betrayal of Crown protocol.³⁷ Now Croghan was about to have a falling out with the Delawares too.

Croghan's insistence that Delaware "King" Teedyuscung be given a forum in the forthcoming negotiations further strained his relationship with Pennsylvania proprietors. In fact, in the summer of 1757 Croghan sought to strengthen his alliance with Quakers and Teedyuscung. If the proprietors' land claims were recognized, it would make it very difficult for Croghan to patent the Indian deeds he held, not to mention hinder his continued interest in the future acquisition of lands in the Ohio Country. Yet Croghan's plan to situate himself on the side of Teedyuscung during a council held in late August, 1757, backfired. During peace discussions between Lt. Governor William Denny and Teedyuscung, the Delaware Chief surprised Croghan by asking Denny to relinquish English claim over an Indian deed signed in 1718. Croghan, who not only possessed the deed in question, but claimed a number of tracts included in the survey, insisted the deed must be copied and could only be invalidated only by William Johnson. Enraged, Teedyuscung called Croghan a rogue, severing the ill-fated alliance.³⁸

Croghan returned to Pennsylvania in 1758 to conduct treaty negotiations at Easton. Cave remarks that the 1758 Treaty of Easton "partially neutralized France's Indian allies and paved the way for General John Forbes' successful occupation of the forks of the Ohio." Maybe so, but he may have gone too far when suggesting that Croghan had planned to marginalize Teedyuscung and that this was instrumental in pacifying the backcountry. According to Cave, Croghan's decision to secure revocation of a controversial 1754 Indian deed single-handedly won over the Haudenosaunee representatives and paved the way for English occupation of the Ohio forks.³⁹ Croghan perhaps had little choice but to trivialize Teedyuscung's claims given their recent encounter.

When Croghan arrived at Easton, Teedyuscung and two hundred Delaware Indians waited for him. Before negotiations began, Teedyuscung demanded a personal clerk.⁴⁰ Denny turned to Croghan to solve the problem. Wainwright maintains that the Quakers did not trust Croghan's minutes and persuaded the Delaware "King" to obtain an assistant. In fact, Teedyuscung distrusted Croghan. Nevertheless, the suspicion and innuendo of his duplicity as an interpreter angered Croghan and marked a rift between Croghan and his Ohio first nation acquaintances.⁴¹ When Easton concluded the land grievances of the Delaware remained largely unaddressed. The Quakers blamed Croghan for this situation alleging that he kept Teedyuscung too drunk to negotiate. Other evidence documents that the Delaware Chief did not need much help.⁴² Whether or not it was Croghan's strategy, Teedyuscung remained isolated during the negotiations. Abandoning old allies from the

Ohio villages, Croghan had now accepted Crown protocol while dealing with the Ohio Indians in hopes of securing land and fortune west of the Allegheny range. Like his patron Sir William Johnson, Croghan began to tout Six Nations authority over the region.

The war and Philadelphia debts had ended his independence and made him beholden to a new patron. For this new master he had to adjust his affiliations with Ohio Indians. In order to prove his new found commitment, Croghan promised Denny and General Forbes that he would outfit fifty warriors in preparation for the planned march against Fort Duquesne. He secured 150 pounds to do so before he left Easton.⁴³ Croghan's change of tongue regarding the Six Nations' claims over the Ohio territory did not occur as a re-education or revelation. He wanted allies with clout who could improve his claims on western land. When Forbes' forces occupied the forks of the Ohio on November 25, 1758, they encamped on land Croghan had held in Indian deed. Croghan's commitment to Crown was selective. He rightly saw that the war had turned and he could get back into the land game in his old region, but he now had new patrons and had alienated old friends, allies, creditors, and Pennsylvania government employers.

The prospect of English advances west of the Allegheny range spurred the Pennsylvania Assembly to announce a stronger Indian trade act in 1758. As the Assembly attempted to regulate Indian trade by banning the sale of liquor to Indians and naming commissioners to supervise trade, Croghan did his best disregard Pennsylvania laws. The act's implementation proved impossible because the finances for strict enforcement were unavailable. At the same time that he faced hostility from Pennsylvania authorities, he also had to deal with new rivals. Israel Pemberton, with direct permission from Forbes, opened a post near Pittsburgh. Croghan responded to this incursion on "his" territory by setting his own trading prices, issuing trading licenses to those whom he deemed fit, and eventually again entered trading himself. Still officially an Indian agent, he extended his trading network by holding conferences with Wyandots on July 4 and 11, 1759, and the Delaware leader, Beaver, on August 7 of the same year.⁴⁴ He also built a house near Fort Pitt to entertain and maintain his interests in the region. Pemberton complained of Croghan to Generals Forbes and Stanwix, but the clever Indian agent kept Denny convinced of his irreplaceable position on the Ohio, and in return, the Lt. Governor turned a blind eye to Croghan's side operations. Attesting to Croghan's perceived ability, Edward Shippen wrote to William Allen in 1759. "As a private person I have no reason to say anything in favour of

Mr. Croghan . . . [but] if he could not bring them in, no man on the continent could do it. I don't except Sir William Johnson himself you see."⁴⁵ Croghan's meetings with the Ohio nations, however, failed to bury the hatchet. His trading enterprise may have benefited, but scalping and raids directed at English settlers and soldiers continued throughout 1758–1759. By the close of the decade, English presence in the region remained precarious. But at least, from Croghan's perspective, he was back with strong sponsors.⁴⁶

In 1759 Governor Denny was replaced by James Hamilton, threatening Croghan's position on the Ohio.⁴⁷ Hamilton avoided bartering with the Indian agent and initially empathized with Pennsylvania's proprietors. This did not deter Croghan from trade and speculation in the Ohio region. In early 1760, in defiance of General Jeffery Amherst's penny-pinching Indian policy, he exhausted the Crown supply of Indian goods to outfit a number of Shawnee warriors in a raid against the Cherokees. Although the Crown had instructed Croghan to do his part in solidifying *peace* between the southern Indians and the Ohio Indians, he appeared more inclined to comply with the needs of the Shawnees whom he wanted in his trading orbit. On May 16, 1760, Croghan entered into a secretive partnership with William Trent, Joseph Simons, David Franks and Andrew Levy. Apparently, the replenishing of Fort Pitt would not occur without some form of Croghanesque kickbacks. He also informed on Indian trader John Langsdale for selling liquor to Indians, even though he actively traded in spirits. In all likelihood, he acted against Langsdale to advance William Trent's trading house in which Croghan held an interest. James Kenny, Langdale's clerk, wrote "all sceaimes subtilty can invent . . . were used by Croghan to direct business to Trent."⁴⁸ Contrary to the regulations for Indian agents, Croghan did his best within a year of settling near Fort Pitt to involve himself in trade.

By the early 1760s, Croghan's presence at Fort Pitt not only marked the western limits of the British empire, but also his personal outpost in a lucrative but vulnerable trading enterprise. In April 1761, with the French in North America defeated, the Indian department cut costs throughout the northeastern borderlands. Croghan discharged six employees at Fort Pitt. However, now that his government service had helped return him to the backcountry, he could again focus on commerce. Croghan managed to side-step creditors, fight lawsuits, forge new business alliances, and spend heartily.⁴⁹ In early 1762 he entered into surreptitious partnership with the Baltimore wholesale house of Buchanan, Hughes, and Smallman; he set up a trading house at Fort Pitt, and placed his cousin, Smallman, in charge. Smallman

had little experience in trade, less on the fringes of empire, but their post enjoyed great success. "Any thing we do here" James Harris, Smallman's clerk, observed in 1762, "is promoted by the influence of Mr. Croghan." The same year Croghan entered into another clandestine trading union with Theodorus Swaine Drage. Maintained by Drage but financed by Croghan, the trading house opened before year's end at Bedford and kept the western garrisons floating in liquor.⁵⁰

Once again plunging headlong into prohibited activity, Croghan tried as he had in the past to calm the storm by scouting and purchasing tracts of land near Bedford for Colonel Henry Bouquet and other colonial officials in May 1762. So lucrative had Croghan's trading networks and land speculation practices become, that Edward Ward of the Indian department resigned in late 1762 to take up full-time employment to manage Croghan's affairs. Business had gone well during a lull in tensions in the borderlands, but an increase of Indian hostilities towards the English in the Ohio region brought back anxieties like those that had earlier driven him from the region.⁵¹

Those who spent the winter and spring of 1763 with Croghan near Fort Pitt enjoyed a gluttonous beginning to the new year. "Beset by cold and fleas" writes Wainwright, the residents of Fort Pitt spent the winter in the bottom of a barrel. Immorality reigned. Most of the inhabitants kept company with Indian women, Croghan and the garrison preacher included.⁵² As keen as ever, Croghan planned to use gains from the last two years of illegal trade and speculation, not to settle debts, but rather sail to England in hopes of gaining restitution for a number of traders' losses from 1754–1755, and also, more importantly, confirming a 200,000 acre Indian deed he held in the Mohawk Valley.⁵³ Within months the northeastern borderlands would be engulfed in what historians have termed "Pontiac's Rebellion" and, at that time of crisis, Croghan was nowhere to be seen.

In February, English trader Alexander McKee informed the Shawnees that the French had given up all claim to the continent to the English. Angered at the notion their previous "father" had given up claim to something he did not own, a delegation of Shawnees arrived at Fort Pitt in April to express their frustration. Tensions ran high. Throughout 1762 and early 1763 Croghan sent Amherst and William Johnson a number of warnings about the increased disaffection of western nations towards the English.⁵⁴ His actions during the outbreak of the Indian uprising, however, speak volumes in terms of Croghan's interest in his personal fortune and the Crown's reliance on such an unpredictable character.

While the Treaty of Paris concluded English-French hostilities on the continent, it did not end European-Indian tensions. On May 7, 1763, hundreds of Indians led by Pontiac encircled and attacked British forces at Fort Detroit. Within weeks the infectious fervor of the Indian attacks spread to the Ohio Country. Meanwhile, with the French defeated, many old and new claimants did not want to miss their chance at western lands. Deputy Indian agent George Croghan pursued such ends. On May 2, 1763, as tension mounted on the frontier, Croghan departed Fort Pitt and began a lengthy journey for London, leaving Alexander McKee to administer local Indian affairs. Croghan sought, among other things, to clear title to thousands of acres of land he held in Indian deeds and gain compensation for trading losses incurred during the onset of the Seven Years' War. At Harris' Ferry Croghan received word from General Amherst to return to Fort Pitt. The Indian uprising had begun.⁵⁵ Despite direct orders to return to Fort Pitt and address Indian hostilities, a determined Croghan sought the first opportunity to sail for London. He excused himself from service on the grounds of poor health, resigned his position as deputy Indian agent, and continue his push east.⁵⁶

News of Croghan's departure unleashed a barrage of attacks on his character. "One can not but regret that powers of so great importance to this country" Colonel Bouquet later remarked, "should in this instance have been trusted to a man so illiterate, imprudent and ill bred."⁵⁷ Neither a gentleman nor an officer, Croghan, and his borderland dealings did not still well with many Crown officials. But, few could ignore the fact that he remained perhaps the only man capable of moving freely beyond the Mohawk frontier. In fact, it appears that Johnson could do little to deter Croghan from a hasty departure.⁵⁸ Thus, Croghan's private ambitions took precedence. His decision to leave for London may have caused ramblings and led to a few officials cursing Croghan's name, but his mission, for the moment, went unhampered.

On December 7, 1763, Croghan met with eleven men at the Indian Queen Tavern in Philadelphia to discuss the reparation strategy of those who lost heavily in trade during the onset of the Seven Years' War. Among the concerned were a few of his oldest creditors and friends.⁵⁹ Making Croghan their agent, they decided to lobby the Board of Trade for 200,000 acres of land in lieu of their combined losses in 1754.⁶⁰ They gave Croghan and David Franks 210 pounds and a memorial on behalf of the "Suffering Traders" which William Trent and Samuel Wharton drew up.⁶¹ Unofficially, Croghan secured the trust of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan by offering them a

monopoly on trade. Decades later, an embittered Morgan recalled the appeal of Croghan's scheme.

By and through him we were to have an exclusive contract to supply with Goods not only all the Natives within the District, to our immense Profit on the Skins and Furs we should receive in Payment, but also to furnish the prodigious Quantities of Merchandise which would be wanting by Sir William Johnson and Col. Croghan to conciliate the Affections of the Savages to the English and also supply all the back Posts with provisions . . . I frequently lamented to him the unhappiness of Mr. Whartons disposition in regard to airy schemes, and his affectation of aiming at the great merchants, without attending to his real business; I pointed out to him the shameful situation of their books and may needless expenses.⁶²

The Sufferers were not the only collection of speculators seeking to cash in on the fact that French claims had been removed and Crown reaction to the rebellion. promised to solidify British control in the region. With time being of essence, Virginia claimants and New York speculators too began to stir the pot.

On April 21, 1763, a startling New York advertisement had been reprinted on the pages of the *Pennsylvania Gazette*. It proposed the establishment of an Ohio colony, "New Wales," that included all of present-day Illinois and Indiana and most of Kentucky with parts of Wisconsin, Missouri and Ohio. The advertisement suggested that every family that decided to settle in the colony would be granted three hundred acre lots, and 40,000 acre allotments should be sold to "Gentlemen Proprietors." All of the land was to be granted in patents. British officer and Methodist preacher Thomas Webb topped the list of supporters. Although swiftly withdrawn within a week by order of General Amherst, the message created a stir.⁶³ The speculative onslaught did not cease. In June, land speculators from Maryland and Virginia, George Washington included, formed the Mississippi Company. The company sought two and a half million acres on the Mississippi River and directly petitioned the Crown.⁶⁴ While the Royal Proclamation of 1763 temporarily halted any immediate plans to settle west of the boundary, speculators queued in anticipation of an opportunity. Shortly after Croghan left Fort Pitt in May 1763, Virginia claimants too prepared to lobby the Crown to recognize Ohio lands that had been promised to soldiers by Governor Dinwiddie in 1755. By July 1764, Lieutenant Colonel Mercer, in London on behalf of the

Ohio Company of Virginia, petitioned the Crown for patents to lands granted by the King prior to the Seven Years' War.⁶⁵ The rush was on.

While in London, Croghan courted the interests of the President of the Board of Trade, Lord Hillsborough. When his initial overtures appeared unsuccessful, Croghan addressed the Board of Trade and submitted "The Memorial of the Merchants and Traders relative to the Losses in the late and former Indian Trade."⁶⁶ In addition to pleading his own case at the Board of Trade, Croghan did his best to encourage the board to reconsider the structure of the Indian Department and ultimately the boundary established by the Royal Proclamation of 1763.⁶⁷ As Yoko Shirai points out, Croghan knew that the establishment of a new boundary "would be the first and indispensable step for land speculation on the Ohio and Mississippi."⁶⁸ The Crown would block confirming private sales on Indian land until then, but once the land was Crown land, the governors could confirm title. Croghan hoped to capitalize. On February 24, 1764, Croghan wrote Johnson, keeping his patron apprised of the board's deliberations concerning Johnson's restructuring proposals.⁶⁹ Meanwhile he waited anxiously to hear back any news regarding his land petitions. Two weeks later he sent a letter expressing his impatience to his superior, indicating among other things that the pressure he has placed on the Board for over a month has been to no avail. "The peple hear spend thire time in Nothing butt abuseing one a Nother & striveing who shall be in power with a view to serve themselves & thire friends, and neglect ye. Publick."⁷⁰ Restless and frustrated, Croghan arranged to deliver a message to the Board of Trade in late March 1764 outlining reasons for reconsidering the Indian policy.⁷¹ Before the complete disaffection of the Indians, Croghan cautioned, the Crown must take the appropriate measures to restore peace throughout the backcountry before the Indians "cut off our frontier settlements, and thereby lay waste a large Tract of Country." Croghan then refreshed the memory of the Board by stating that "in the space of four months the last summer in Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania and the Jerseys . . . [the Indians] killed and captivated not less than two thousand of his Majesty's subjects, and drove some thousands to Beggary and the greatest distress." Croghan maintained that the Indians had murdered numerous traders and plundered over 100,000 pounds of their goods. "If the upper Senecas and few other Tribes settled near Detroit and Miscelemackena with the Shawnees and Delawares settled on some branches of the Ohio were able to effect this in part of a summer" he warned, "what must His Majesty's

subjects dread from a general defection of the Indians?"⁷² Johnson's deputy quickly offered suggestions.

"First" Croghan argued, "a natural boundary should be made between them and us across the frontiers of the British middle Colonies from the heads of the River Delaware to the mouth of the Ohio where it empties into Mississipi." Annual favors and good custom and policy must also take place Croghan warned, "rather than enter into a general Indian War, which may be a consequence of a neglect on our side ..." He continued. "[T]he lands west of such a line should be reserved for the Hunting grounds of the Six Nations ... as they are the original Proprietors of that Tract of Country for all the lands East of such boundary."⁷³ Conveniently, most of his 200,000 acres in Indian deed would fall within the new purchase, a fact Croghan undoubtedly knew very well. To get the Board to reconsider a new boundary marked only his first step. Croghan also pressed the members to liberate the Indian Department from military control, which would alleviate great strain between the Crown, colonists, and Indians.⁷⁴ The Crown's provision of money and gifts to buy Indian interests remained central to Croghan's message. When informed in April that his Indian deeds would not be confirmed by the Crown, Croghan's anger grew along with his interest in the establishment of a new boundary. He wrote Johnson: "I am Sick of London & harttily Tied of [the] pride & pompe of the Slaves in power."⁷⁵

Johnson's acceptance of Croghan's departure for London should be brought under further scrutiny. Croghan may have lured Johnson with promises of land before he departed Philadelphia in 1763 (after all, the initiatives of both men fit together quite well), but as Croghan continued to write progress reports to Johnson he touted his own interests. Croghan's effort to gain Crown approval for land Johnson held in Indian deed came a distant second on his list of things to accomplish while away. By early April word reached Johnson that the King's council would not authorize the transaction because it stood contrary to the Royal Proclamation. Instead of issuing additional instructions to his estranged deputy to push the matter further, Johnson followed proper procedure and wrote Cadwallader Colden.⁷⁶

If Johnson sought to traverse the regulations that bound expansion, he did not want to begin by challenging the power of the governor's office. He had little choice but to seek the support of those who could petition on his behalf. Not until mid July did Croghan receive word on the reorganization of the department and his other failed attempt to gain compensation

for the traders' losses of 1754. Discouraged, he again sent word to his superior. "They Make very Light of [the] Indian Warr ... [the] pople hear think you are Rich aNouffe and they heat to hear of any amerrican being Either popler or welthey." Moreover, Croghan complained, Hillsborough believed that "No Indian Agent Should Make any Contracks with Indians fer Lands or be Concern[ed] in Trade & no More than twenty thousand acres to one person fer which Grant there is to be paid hear a Summe of Money besides the Fees to the Governer." He explained to Johnson that neither his land claims, nor Johnson's recent 20,000 acre Indian deed from the Mohawk would be granted until a new Indian boundary could be established. Finally, Croghan noted that he had done everything in his power respecting the Mohawks complaints about the "Cayaderrussera patent" and the ministers agreed that if the New York assembly does not "Disanul them patents," they will force such action by act of parliament.⁷⁷ But there were other developments that may have pleased Croghan.⁷⁸

When it became clear that he would not be granted a special act of parliament to address his grievances, "the boundary negotiations became the vehicle through which a reparations grant was sought from the Indians."⁷⁹ The 1763 Royal Proclamation divide restricted speculation and mass settlement but failed to curb unregulated trade or the irritating stream of European squatters undaunted by Crown restrictions. Scores of renegade settlers persisted in seeking a livelihood along the edge of empire much to the dismay of the Indian inhabitants and speculators like Croghan unable to secure clear title and profit from land sales.⁸⁰ Croghan knew if the boundary could be readjusted, he could settle debts and make a fortune on land sales. As a result, as historian Dorothy V. Jones suggests, Croghan acted separately from Johnson in his push for a new boundary while lobbying London.⁸¹ That said, it is clear he had much to gain by supporting Johnson's plans of reorganization when he first arrived in London.⁸²

Croghan departed without an answer from the Board of Trade regarding Indian affairs, but had been writing Johnson optimistically on that head since March. As usual, he also included commentary on the prospect of settling an Illinois colony if all unfolded as planned.⁸³ By July the Plan of 1764 appeared to be on the verge of confirmation. When an elated Croghan arrived back in New York from London in August, William Johnson, in what became a regular occurrence, disregarded Croghan's earlier resignation and re-offered him the position. Croghan, short on resources and reluctant to face angry creditors, resumed his role as Deputy to the Superintendent of

Indian Affairs. As reviewed earlier, during the 1763 uprising Croghan's trading enterprise west of the Susquehanna had been ruined by Indian hostilities. By late 1764, records indicate that Croghan owed over 4,400 pounds to the firm of Baynton, Wharton, and Morgan alone, and had lost an unidentifiable amount from the trading post of Trent and Smallman at Fort Pitt. Croghan did not receive official confirmation of his Indian deeds or compensation for trading losses incurred in 1754 during his visit to London. As a result, his future, and fortune, depended on the readjustment of the Indian boundary.⁸⁴

* * *

Perhaps as suspected, the story of George Croghan does not end with his timely trip to London. For the next two decades, the determined Deputy Indian agent wildly speculated in lands and trade on the periphery of empire. An active player for acreage during the Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768, he all but sold his soul in 1774 when he turned his back on his long-time Pennsylvanian patrons and welcomed the marauding Virginian armies under Lord Dunmore. By the mid 1770s, however, Croghan's various attempts to secure tens of thousands of acres in the Ohio and Illinois had failed miserably. The American Revolution snuffed out any remaining hopes of the western colony of Vandalia, and, with that chimera finally gone, Croghan's attempts to secure riches were all but extinguished. From 1775 to 1780, the aging Indian agent periodically had to reside on the edge of empire to avoid imprisonment over his outstanding debts. The last two years of Croghan's life were spent in Philadelphia, impoverished and dependent on the assistance of old acquaintances. When he died in 1782, his creditors quickly ravaged what was left of his possessions.

In 1893 William M. Darlington wrote that George Croghan should be considered the "most conspicuous name in Western Annals, in connection with Indian Affairs for twenty five years preceding the Revolutionary War."⁸⁵ The brief account of Croghan's backcountry jockeying during the era of the Seven Years' War does much to illustrate Darlington's claims. Croghan sought to benefit from his employment in a manner fit for colonial governors by utilizing the tactics of a hardened frontiersman. Without question he sought to guide Crown policy in the northeastern borderlands to meet his own favor. Yet, historians have all but forgotten the life of Croghan. Like

the multitude of Indian voices that continue to provide further insight into early American history, those attempting to trace the web of influence and involvement in backcountry affairs cannot do so without including the story of frontier trader, Indian agent, and manic land jobber, George Croghan.

NOTES

1. The research for this article was made possible with much appreciated assistance from the Pennsylvania Museum and Historical Commission (hereafter cited PHMC), the American Philosophical Society (hereafter cited APS), the Library Company of Philadelphia (hereafter cited LCP), and the Historical Society of Pennsylvania (hereafter cited HSP). The pronunciation of Croghan appears to be as unpredictable as the life of the man who bore the name. Based on a few linguistic observations, Robert G. Crist concludes that given the Gaelic origins of the surname it was most likely pronounced "Crone." This is confirmed in a letter from the Governor of Canada marquis de Vaudreuil to the Minister, August 8, 1756. Vaudriel refers to "George Craon's fort." Sylvester Stevens and Donald Kent, eds. *Wilderness Chronicles of Northwestern Pennsylvania* (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical Commission, 1941), 94. For a more detailed explanation refer to R.G. Crist "George Croghan of Pennsboro," A paper presented before the Cumberland County Historical Society and Hamilton Library Association, May 7, 1964 (Dauphin Deposit Trust Company: Harrisburg, 1965), 3. My many thanks to John Weaver, Alan Taylor, Wayne Bodle, and the anonymous reviewers at PH for their editorial comments.
2. Paul A. Wallace, *Conrad Weiser, Friend of Colonist and Mohawk* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945), 335.
3. Albert T. Volwiler "George Croghan and the Development of Central New York, 1763–1800" *The Quarterly Journal of the New York State Historical Association*, 4 (January 1923): 21. Four years later in 1927, Volwiler published a monograph on Croghan entitled *George Croghan and the Westward Movement, 1741–1782* (New York: AMS Press, 1971).
4. Nicholas B. Wainwright, *George Croghan, Wilderness Diplomat* (University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill, 1959).
5. Studies on William Johnson and his place in early American history are numerous. Listed are a few studies that underscore his primacy in the backcountry and colonial America. Michael J. Mullin, "Personal Politics: William Johnson and the Mohawks" *American Indian Quarterly* 17 (3) 1993; James T. Flexner, *Lord of the Mohawks: A Biography of Sir William Johnson* (Boston: Little and Brown, 1979), and *Mohawk Baronet: Sir William Johnson of New York* (New York: Harper, 1959). For an excellent summary of Johnson's life, see Alan Taylor, *The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution* (New York: Alfred K. Knopf, 2006), 3–15. For a contentious reading of Johnson's life, see Fintan O'Toole, *White Savage: William Johnson and the Invention of America* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).
6. For a description of Croghan as a devoted British Agent, see Alfred A. Cave, "George Croghan and the Emergence of British Influence on the Ohio Frontier" in Warren Van Tine and Michael Pierce, eds. *Builders of Ohio* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 2003); Wainwright, *Wilderness*

- Diplomat*, 3, 6, 9–12; William M. Darlington, “George Croghan,” in Mary C. Darlington, ed., *History of Col. Henry Bouquet and the Western Frontiers of Pennsylvania, 1747–1764* (Arno Press & The New York Times, 1920, 1971) 55. Sewell Slick underscored a similar message in his 1947 study of William Trent (Croghan’s brother-in-law). “Indian traders in general were looked upon as a low, mean unscrupulous lot” Slick noted, “but men like Trent, Croghan and their immediate associates were exceptions to this general rule.” Sewell E. Slick, *William Trent and the West* (Harrisburg: Archives Publication Company of Pennsylvania, Inc., 1947), 10.
7. Quoted from Crist, *Pennsboro*, 5.
8. Alan Taylor, *William Cooper’s Town: Power and Persuasion on the Frontier of the Early American Republic* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 45.
9. Cave, *Builders of Ohio*, 1. For a similar interpretation, see Michael McConnell, *A Country Between*, 67–94.
10. In 1742 Croghan’s name first appeared in the records. He was listed as a transporter of goods from Edward Shippen to Peter Tostee. Crist, *Pennsboro*, 9.
11. Volwiler, *George Croghan and the Westward Movement*, 32; Nicholas B. Wainwright, *George Croghan, Wilderness Diplomat* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959) 9; Crist, *Pennsboro*, 9.
12. Cave, *Builders of Ohio*, 2; Crist, *Pennsboro*, 9–10.
13. Richard Hockley to Thomas Penn, February 15, 1749/50(?), Penn Family Papers (hereafter cited PFP), Official Correspondence, 4, HSP.
14. Cave, *Builders of Ohio*, 3. The same line of argumentation is noted in Volwiler, *Westward*, 21, and Crist, *Pennsboro*, 10–12.
15. Quoted from Yoko Shirai, “The Indian Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania, 1730–1768: Traders and Land Speculation” (Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsylvania 1985), 11.
16. Only two years before at a council in Philadelphia, Canasatego of Six Nations belittled the Delaware representative, Nutimus, by ordering his people to disperse from the Walking Purchase lands to either the Wyoming (present-day Wilkes-Barre, PA) or Shamokin (present-day Sunbury, PA). The Shamokin sect, led by Teedyuscung, maintained a friendly but tentative relationship with the English. For further reference, see C.A. Weslager, *The Delaware Indians* (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1972) 190–92. Quote from Charles Thompson and Jasper Yeates, “Causes of the Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese Indians” Fort Pitt Museum Collection, MG 193, Box 1, [n.d., c. 1759], PHMC.
17. Also see conference between Lt. Governor Clarke and Six Nations, Albany, August 16, 1740, *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York* (DRCHSNY). Edited by E.B. O’Callaghan and B. Fernow. 15 Vols. Albany, N.Y.: Weed, Parsons and Co., 1856, 1887. 6: 173–99.
18. Thompson and Yeates, “Causes of the Alienation of the Delaware and Shawanese Indians.”
19. John Baynton (b.1726–d.1773) was at various times a member of the Pennsylvania Assembly, Provincial Commissioner (1756), and the Board of Trustees for the State House and Trustee of Provincial Island. In 1757 he partnered with Samuel Wharton (b.1732–d.1800). The firm engaged in global trade, primarily exchanging local products like hay, onions, cord wood and lumber for rum, sugar, bottled beer and gunpowder. Their trading network was extensive, reaching Quebec, Detroit, Fort Pitt, West Indies, Portugal, London and even China. Gradually, the firm traded Indian

- goods. George Morgan married John Baynton's daughter Mary, and partnered with the firm in 1763. See the introduction to the Baynton, Wharton and Morgan Sequestered Papers, PHMC.
20. Shirai, *Indian Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania*, 12–13.
 21. Volwiler, *George Croghan and the Westward Movement*, 32. Sewell Slick notes William Trent was the appointed Justice of Peace of Cumberland County in 1749. See Slick, *William Trent and the West*, 10.
 22. Darlington, *George Croghan*, 55.
 23. PFP, File 16, Penn Lands, 1749–1809, HSP. Wainwright suggests that this land cession as evidence of his influence among the natives. However, he does not look at the validity of the cession to confirm its strength. Also see Daniel P. Barr, "Contested Land: Competition and Conflict along the Upper Ohio Frontier, 1744–1784" (Ph.D. dissertation, Kent State University, 2001), 157.
 24. DRCHSNY 10: 159.
 25. R. Douglas Hurt, *The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the Old Northwest, 1720–1830* (Indiana University Press, 1996), 35–36.
 26. DRCHSNY 6: 842; Gregory Evans Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815* (The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), 23–25.
 27. James Sullivan, et. al., eds., *The Papers of Sir William Johnson* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1921–1963), 1: 302–4 (hereafter cited WJP).
 28. James H. Merrell, *Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier* (W.W. Norton and Co., 2000), 208.
 29. DRCHSNY 2: 267–69.
 30. Wainwright, *Wilderness Diplomat*, 41.
 31. DRCHSNY 6: 797–804.
 32. Jane T. Merritt, *At the Crossroads: Indians and Empires on a Mid-Atlantic Frontier, 1700–1763* (University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 174.
 33. Cave, *Builders of Ohio*, 4; Wainwright, *Wilderness Diplomat*, 108–10.
 34. Cave, *Builders of Ohio*, 3; Volwiler, *George Croghan and the Westward Movement*, 21; Crist, *Pennsboro*, 10–12.
 35. Walking purchase details see Francis Jennings, "The Scandalous Indian Policy of William Penn's Sons: Deeds and Documents of the Walking Purchase" *Pennsylvania History* 37(1) 1970: 19–39.
 36. Croghan to Johnson, Philadelphia, March 14, 1757, DRCHNY 7: 266.
 37. Cave, *Builders of Ohio*, 6.
 38. PFP vol. 3, 'At a Council held in Philadelphia, Tuesday, August 30, 1757' HSP.
 39. Cave, *Builders of Ohio*, 7.
 40. Wainwright, *Wilderness Diplomat*, 129–30.
 41. DRCHSNY 7: 322–23.
 42. Anthony F.C. Wallace, *King of the Delawares: Teedyuscung, 1700–1763* (Salem, New Hampshire: Ayer Co. Publishers Inc., 1949, reprint 1970); Weslager, *The Delaware Indians*, 235–47.
 43. Wainwright, *Wilderness Diplomat*, 151; WJP 2: 752–54.
 44. Delaware 'Beaver' was the successor of Shingas.
 45. Quoted from Crist, *Pennsboro*, 7.
 46. Wainwright, *Wilderness Diplomat*, 162–65.

47. John W. Raimo, *Biographical Directory of American Colonial and Revolutionary Governors, 1607–1789* (Westport, Connecticut: Meakler Books, 1980), 336.
48. Quoted from Wainwright, *Wilderness Diplomat*, 175–76. For secret partnership, see Slick, *William Trent*, 86–87.
49. The case of Isaac Norris underscores the frustration of many creditors of whom Croghan owed money. In a letter to Ben Franklin, Norris complains about the nature of the Irishman: “the meanness of his former course of life, & his present involved situation, all probably, contributed to induce him to conduct himself as he did on this occasion, in opposition to his former repeated promises to me, before it came to trial.” Norris to Franklin, October 17, 1757, Isaac Norris Letter Book, 1756–1766, 80. HSP.
50. Wainwright, *Wilderness Diplomat*, 191.
51. The mutually advantageous relationship between Croghan and Bouquet is somewhat exposed in a 1762 letter in which Bouquet wrote to Croghan “I think it very convenient to find that you have a house wherever I go.” Quoted from Wainwright, *Wilderness Diplomat*, 192.
52. Wainwright, *Wilderness Diplomat*, 192–93.
53. Croghan planned to confirm patent over 200,000 acres in the Mohawk Valley in exchange for an Ohio Valley Indian deed. Volwiler, ‘George Croghan and the Westward Movement’, 167.
54. For report of Shawnees at Pitt, see Slick, 109–25. For Croghan reports on Indian Affairs, see WJP 3: 964–65 (1762); 4: 62, 97–99 (1763).
55. Wainwright, *Wilderness Diplomat*, 199–200.
56. WJP 10: 823–25, 4: 208.
57. Quoted from Cave, *Builders of Ohio*, 9.
58. Testifying further to Croghan’s self interest were actions in Philadelphia on his way to London. Croghan lost no time in engaging a number of shady deals to finance his trip to London. He sold thirty thousand acres in Cumberland County that he held in Indian deed only to Daniel Clark, his cousin, and Richard Peters of the Land Office. Croghan arranged to accept one thousand pounds as a down payment and an additional two thousand pounds within twelve months. Clark and Peters agreed to pay Croghan 17.10.0 pounds per hundred acres of the tract. The land he sold, however, was from an Indian deed released to him by Thomas Penn for the sole purpose of selling and repaying outstanding funds Croghan owed merchant Richard Hockley. Even more scandalous was the fact that two thousand of the acres were of the highest quality, previously owned by Hockley and deeded to Croghan for the purpose of luring in potential buyers. Most of the other land was worthless for agricultural purposes, and Hockley would have to wait almost twenty years before receiving payment. In August 1763, he sold additional lands, then at the heart of the Indian uprising, to his long-time creditors, and erstwhile friends, John Baynton, Samuel Wharton and George Morgan. Wainwright, *Wilderness Diplomat*, 200–201.
59. Present at the tavern meetings was David Franks, Jeremiah Warder, Samuel Burge, George Croghan, John Coxe, Abraham Mitchell, William Trent, Robert Callender, Joseph Spear, Thomas McGee, Philip Boyle, and Samuel Wharton. See ‘Proceedings of a Meeting of Traders’ WJP 4: 264. Also, see Slick, 128.
60. It is important to note that the focus of the Suffering Traders was shortly thereafter centered on the losses incurred from the events of 1763. This decision was made by the primary investors (Baynton, Wharton, Croghan and Trent) who had more to gain seeking restitution for losses in 1763 rather than 1754.

61. T. P. Abernethy contends Croghan's trip to London was financed by New Jersey Governor William Franklin. See Abernethy, *Western Lands and the American Revolution* (New York: Russell and Russell, Inc., 1959), 54. This connection is challenged by William Herbert Mariboe's Ph.D. dissertation "The Life of William Franklin, 1730(1)–1813, Pro Rege et Patria" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1962), 278. Both authors fail to provide any evidence to support their claims. What is known is that some money – the exact amount was never disclosed—was secured by Croghan from the Burlington Co. of New Jersey, which Franklin held interest. See William Byars, ed. *B and M Gratz, Merchants in Philadelphia, 1754–1798* (Jefferson City, Missouri: Lewis, 1916), 762.
62. Baynton, Wharton and Morgan: 1763–1768, "George Croghan Papers", d. 1782 1754–1808 Croghan Papers, Section 10, Regarding BWM relationship with Croghan.—Written by Morgan [n.d.] p.2, HSP.
63. For the text of the proposal see *Pennsylvania Gazette*, April 21, 1763. For colonial reaction see Shirai, *The Indian Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania*, 193; and DRCHSNY 7: 959.
64. Clarence W. Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics: A Study of the Trade, Land Speculation, and Experiments in Imperialism Culminating in the American Revolution* 2 vols. (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark, Co., 1917) Vol. 1: 94–95.
65. Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley*, 1: 94–95; Barr, *Contested Land*, 198–200.
66. WJP 4: 267–69. "A Traffick with the Savages, being entirely in the way of Barter without the Use of Books, renders it very difficult, To furnish Accounts with that regularity, which may be expected by the Lords of Trade, We would therefore recommend to you, To prevail [upon] their Lordships, if they should induce his Majesty to grant us Redress, To appoint Commissioners in this Government, To exam[ine] and liquidate the respective Traders Accounts.—perhaps, They may be influenced, to name Gentlemen in this City; If they can, Mr Croghan will recollect such, As will be proper ... We beg leave to request, That you will will all Dispatch After Mr. Croghans arrival, converse with as great Number of Merchants, trading to this city & New York, As possible, and explain to Them How essentially their Trade is interested, in supporting Our Memorial to the Lords of Trade & what Advantages will result to Them, By having it favourably received." 270–71. 'A Memorial of Merchants' Philly, December 12, 1763, "To the right Honorable The Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations." Memorial of Merchants from Pennsylvania.—"The natives have most barbarously murdered many of the said Traders and seized and robbed Them of their Effects and expelled The Remainder from their Country." Signed, Baynton and Wharton, Franks Simons Trent & Co., Abr. Mitchell, Philip Boyle, Robert Callender, Joseph Spear, John Ormsby, Dennis Crohorn. HSP.
67. Shirai, *The Indian Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania*, 157–58.
68. Shirai, *The Indian Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania*, 158.
69. WJP 4: 339–41.
70. WJP 4: 362.
71. Croghan lobbied Mr. Rice, a member of the Lords of Trade. On April 14 he sent word to Johnson updating his superior on the state of affairs. He indicates to Johnson that his recent efforts have not been in vain and the Lords of Trade appear happy with the news of Johnson's efforts against the Shawnees and Delawares. In addition, Croghan misleadingly assures Johnson that he is working tirelessly for his benefit, stating he has "Don Nothing in My own affairs as yet Nor Do I See any

- Greatt probability of getting any thing in Restitucion for ye. Greatt Loss My Self & others Sustained. ye. Beginning of ye. Late War." WJP 4: 396–98.
72. DRCHSNY 7: 602–5.
 73. DRCHSNY 7: 602–5.
 74. Shirai, *The Indian Trade in Colonial Pennsylvania*, 158.
 75. WJP 4: 399 Also see Croghan to Johnson, May, 11, 1764. "P S: yr. Honour was plesd. To Write Me that if you Could you wold Take part of ye. Goods from Baynton & Wharton wh. I Menshond. To you in My Leter by Mr. MaKee wh. If you Can will greatly oblige Me." WJP 4: 422.
 76. Johnson first learned his Indian deed did not meet with favor in London in early April 1764 via Croghan. On April 6, the superintendent sought advice on the tract of land he was given by the Conajoharees in 1760. "Altho this Tract is as a free Gift from the Indians" Johnson wrote Governor Colden, "yet I gave them above 1200 Dollars after Signing & delivering me the Deed ... Who from thence forward consider it my property." The Superintendent asked Colden to accept his proposal to remit 10 000 acres of patent fees and deemed it necessary to have another meeting with the Indians "previous to taking out the Pattente ... as I understand the Proclamation, Affairs of this Nature remain with each governour & consequently can be soon Settled." Johnson to Colden, April 6, 1764. WJP 4: 386–88.
 77. Croghan to Johnson, July 12, 1764. WJP 4: 462–66.
 78. The Plan of 1764 was issued on July 10, 1764.
 79. Dorothy V. Jones. *License For Empire: Colonialism by Treaty in Early America* (The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1982), 78.
 80. Woody Holton, *Forced Founders: Indians, Debtors, Slaves, and the Making of the American Revolution in Virginia* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 4–36. Calloway, Colin. *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 93.
 81. Jones, *License For Empire*, 78. This interpretation challenges Barr's view of Croghan's time in London. See Barr, *Contested Lands*, 195.
 82. McConnell confirms this point by firmly entrenching initiative with Johnson. *A Country Between*, 237.
 83. WJP 4: 363.
 84. Wharton-Willing Papers, Box 1, 1669–1766. 2014, 73:24. HSP. Marshall indicates in "*Sir William Johnson and the Treaty of Fort Stanwix*" that Croghan's debts ranged from eight thousand pounds to twelve thousand pounds following the 1763 uprising. 161.
 85. Darlington, George *Croghan*, 55.