"Uncivilized!" "Little better than barbarians!"¹ This is how Patrius, an otherwise anonymous writer, described the "savages" scattered throughout the dark forests of Pennsylvania's borderlands. Years later, another Philadelphian, Dr. Benjamin Rush, picked up where Patrius left off, and denounced the people of Pennsylvania's marchlands as "rude", "licentious," and "half-civilized."² Outlandish in their habits and habitations, strange in their appearance, such savages were an abomination requiring immediate attention. Immediate attention indeed, for these were not just any savages, they were white men. It is well known that one of the main justifications used by European elites in their conquest of the world was that they were "civilized" while those they encountered were "savages" and "barbarians."³ Yet these men were writing neither about Indians nor Africans; these barbarians where members of Patrius and Rush's own culture, poorer frontier dwellers of European descent who revealed their backwardness by resisting market integration and the expansion
of commerce. But they did much more. Distant though they were from the *salon* culture of Paris, Edinburgh, and Philadelphia, rustics actively participated in the transnational exchange of ideas—the Enlightenment—operating within and against the framework of European progress, and enlightened notions of commerce.

Commerce mattered deeply to authors like Patrius and Rush, for it was inextricably linked to human progress. Across the Atlantic, and motivated by issues little different from those broached by the two Philadelphia's empiricists like Hume, Robertson, and Ferguson had turned their quills to the study of human society and material progress. Like Patrius and Rush’s Pennsylvania, their Scotland was in the midst of transformation, as traditional economies were giving way to capitalist forms, and as a new set of actors—“merchants and traders”—were translating their economic power into political and social influence. But they shared more than context. Like the Scots, these Philadelphians were actively involved in the categorization of people, nature, and society. In a sense then, Patrius and Rush wielded terms like civilization and barbarism as weapons with which they might correct and subdue an obstinate frontier culture and promote the type of progress vital to national interests. Yet beneath Patrius and the good doctor’s confident logic persisted a vexing problem. More than a mere participant in the Enlightenment’s grand republic of letters, Patrius and Rush were self-conscious authors whose very act of writing was a defense against the oppositional discourse the emanated from Pennsylvania’s frontier.

Such is, to say the least, an uncomfortable merger of divergent historiographies. Certainly, social historians have done much write common people back into the major events that shaped the eighteenth century Atlantic. Though assailed by critics, Robert Darnton’s claim that “Grub Street hacks” produced the “Low Enlightenment” that made the French Revolution survives as a powerful admonition to see the Enlightenment from the “bottom up.” Be that as it may, Darnton’s Enlightenment was urban; and while the frontier has been increasingly woven into the fabric of the Atlantic world as a site critical to American development, it is probably the last place we would look to understand something so “advanced” as the Enlightenment. That story is a decidedly erudite and metropolitan affair; made by Europeans, the Enlightenment was “passively consumed” by everyone else.

Merging the narratives of frontier and Enlightenment makes little sense. Certainly it would have made little sense to any of those Enlightenment figures
to whom human society was divisible into levels or types of civilization, and for whom such divisions could exist within not just between societies. That was a point Voltaire made all too clear. As Voltaire surmised, man’s ability to partake in the Age of Reason was premised upon his literal and figurative geography: his physical proximity to a “regular form of government” and his location along the line of progress. Here, Voltaire’s musings on the nature of history in *Essai sur les moeurs* prove instructive. Writing on the link between rationality and history, Voltaire draws a decisive line between those with the rational capacity to write the “plausible” past and those who produce mere fable.10 “Truth,” as Suzanne Gearhart suggests, was not Voltaire’s ultimate test for rational historiography; rather it was whether the historical fact “was worthy of being treated by the historian” who lived in an age of “modern political systems.”11 Indeed, for Voltaire it is only those people who had the benefit of modernity that can claim rationality. Anything else, Voltaire suggested, “all those little, obscure, and imaginary facts written by obscure men from the depths of some ignorant and barbarian province,” cannot be called history.12 Given that most assumed the frontier to be just such a “barbarian province,” it is safe to assume that “true” history, let alone the structural or intellectual bases for reason, was not to be found there. As Jonathan Israel makes clear, “Voltaire entertained grave doubts as to whether the enlightenment … should, or could, be extended to the common people.”13 Even rational figures who hailed from questionable geographies, “bastard Gaelic [men]”14 like Adam Ferguson, produced a similar division between the urban and the rural. Following his continental counterparts, Ferguson at once sees man as “a rational being,” but also asserts that the most rational men are those who have secured property, commerce, and of course, the industrious and profitable application of their labors—advancements folks like Patrius and Rush found lacking in Pennsylvania frontier.15 On terms less philosophical, too, rural folks are written off. Rustics as a rule were uneducated—many were illiterate—and rare was the *philosophe* whose Enlightenment credentials were not accompanied by academic credentials. In short, there was little room for those in the rural periphery.16

Even the latest scholarly attempts to wrest the Enlightenment from the metropole continue to marginalize rural actors. Until recently the place of the rural world in the Age of Reason received only limited mention, finding its most detailed examination in Henry S. Commager’s *Empire of Reason*. Yet, while Commager maintains that the American Enlightenment was of “predominately rural character,” he bases his reasoning not on the role played
by rustics, but on the absence of a capitol. Far more focused on geographic rather than conceptual rurality, David Jaffee and John Fea offer interpretations that ostensibly move the story of the Enlightenment to the periphery. Indeed, at the heart of both their arguments is an effort to bring marginal people into the transnational story. For Jaffee, rural peoples entered into the Enlightenment by direct participation in the early modern information revolution, creating and sustaining a market for “consumer commodities in print form.” Likewise, Fea, opting for a more micro-level approach, helps to reveal the tensions between cosmopolitan and rural, enlightened and not, through the intellectual and social development of a New Jersey Presbyterian minister. Still, neither Jaffee’s rustics nor Fea’s rural philosophe were directly conversing in the Enlightenment; and neither effort comes to terms with what Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra describes as the oft-overlooked “intellectual creativity in the colonial peripheries.”

Thus, the purpose of this piece is to undermine the traditional narratives, and bring the rural periphery into the Age of Reason. By following Mikuláš Teich in arguing that the Enlightenment must be understood as part “of the long-drawn-out transition from feudalism to capitalism,” this essay suggests that it was around that process that rural peoples could and did contribute to the Enlightenment. I maintain that the rural world was not indissolubly isolated from the Enlightenment. Though to a different and lesser degree than their metropolitan counterparts, rural peoples were partaking in the intellectual exchange fostered by the Age of Reason. Putting the words of Patrius and especially those of Benjamin Rush in conversation with rather prolific frontier ruffian by the name of James Smith, I argue that the Enlightenment was cosmopolitan in the truest sense of the word—international, multi-ethnic, and broad-based—and in spite of their insularity, rural folk actively contributed to the Enlightenment by contesting its categories and especially its equation of progress with capitalism.

The analysis that follows develops in five parts. It begins in part one with a closer examination of Patrius and Rush’s ideas on frontier barbarity. Section two demonstrates the ways in which the life of James Smith appears to epitomize the ideas and concepts at the heart of Patrius and Rush’s musings on barbarity and markets. In the third and fourth sections, I undertake a close reading of Smith’s published tracts in order to place him in conversation with the enlightened notions and demonstrate Smith’s entrance into the transnational debate over markets and modernity. The essay ends by placing Smith into “the republic of letters,” in direct conversation with Adam Ferguson.
In so doing, we bring rural folks into a traditionally urban narrative, weave them into the Atlantic paradigm, and more importantly, put them into a narrative from which they have been and continue to be silenced. Indeed, if Israel’s recent recasting the Age of Reason rescues the Enlightenment from the destructive and “relativist” forces of postmodernism, or the “meaningless” and “distracting” belief in a multiplicity of “Enlightenments,” it likewise produces an elitist creation story for the liberal tradition that silences popular voices and radical ideas. Expanding the notion of the “Age of Reason” to encompass a multitude of places and actors enables historians to recognize the truly radical possibilities of the Enlightenment.

The Nature of Rustic Barbarity

His sobriquet well chosen, Patrius is a fugitive figure that provides few clues to his identity and only limited exploration of the causes and solutions to frontier barbarity. The same cannot be said of Benjamin Rush. Doctor, revolutionary, moral crusader, abolitionist, and avid letter-writer, Rush is hardly and enigma and his ideas far from incomplete. Still, Rush and Patrius were not very different. Almost twenty years apart though they were, the anonymous Patrius and the highly visible Benjamin Rush had much in common. Both men saw the frontier as the site of conflict between the modern and the savage. They shared in the Enlightenment’s pedantically optimistic belief in human progress. Both men saw commerce as an engine of progress. And they both betrayed a rather unsettling disdain for rural peoples. Such commonalities require closer examination, for they get to the very heart of how both men sought to civilize their barbarous interior.

Neither Patrius’ nor Rush’s vision of the frontier as the site of struggle was all that original. Far from developing in situ, that discourse was as old as the colonial enterprise itself. And if by the time both men pit quill to paper such an idea had been thoroughly refashioned by the Enlightenment, neither of their efforts can be understood outside the context of a deeper-rooted discourse of European—modern, Christian—conquest. In short, both men were the products of and mouthpieces for the ideology that underwrote European empire building and continued to carry the standard of Christian conquest: to “subdue” the earth. Moreover, since the sixteenth century, Europeans had viewed the Americas, especially its darkest interiors, as a battleground. As Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra has convincingly shown, both
Iberian and Puritan settlement viewed the very act of colonization as an epic struggle against Satan and saw the ‘wilderness’ as “false Eden” in dire need of Christianization.24 That neither Patrius nor Rush was overtly wedded to demonological discourse does not hide the fact that they simply gave new life to an age-old narrative: replacing faith in God with faith in reason, and demonic indigens with anti-market settlers.

In retrofitting the conquest narrative, Patrius and Rush both turned to the Enlightenment as their source for inspiration. Drawing heavily on the work of the Scottish Philosophers, Patrius and Rush followed closely on the heels of David Hume and Adam Ferguson.25 For Rush especially, the work of Hume and Ferguson proved influential. Two years of study in Edinburgh put Rush into conversation with the debates at the center of the Scottish Enlightenment, exposed him to the writing of David Hume, and formed the intellectual base for his own enlightened studies of the frontier a decade later.26 Scotland’s “new Science of Man,” allowed him to fully comprehend what Patrius’ brief musings could not: the historic processes and contingencies that moved man from rude to modern. Like the Scots before him, Rush saw human development occurring in “certain regular stages which mark the progress from the savage to the civilized life.”27 For Rush, like his Scottish counterparts, the stadial path was one of increasingly complex relations of commerce and protection of that commerce. Social progress, as Ferguson saw it, hinged upon the contention that “being able to exchange one commodity for another, turns, by degrees, the hunter and the warrior into a tradesman and a merchant.”28 Commercial society was the highest stage of man’s development; and that development meant bringing everyone up to speed on the moral, economic, and political expectations of modern society. Where Patrius offered only vague prescriptions, Rush offered a very detailed and organized process for taking commerce to the interior: a country college.

Dickinson College, he hoped, would turn the savage mind civil and the crude farm into a site of scientific husbandry. Before that could happen, however, Rush had to convince rural elites that a college was a good idea, and to do so he would need to travel to the interior. This “Jaunt to Carlisle,” was an edifying experience, proving to Dr. Rush the absolute necessity of the college and providing him ample material from which to forge a scientific study of rustic folkways and economies. And if Rush is to be believed, he had much work ahead of him. Indeed, a few days in Cumberland in the spring of 1784 only reinforced the need for a college, and provided him the evidence crucial for the stadial study of the frontier he would publish in 1786.29 More than
anything, that publication pinpointed Rush's goals for the hinterland, and betrayed his disdain for all things "savage." In Cumberland, even after more than thirty years of settlement, Rush discovered Europeans who fled "the operation of the laws," and fell into a "licentious manner of living." In short, settlers were barbarous because they deviated from the norms of capitalist accumulation: "by no means" did they extract "all from the earth which it is capable of giving." Barbarous men, Rush argued, "raise but little more than is necessary to support their families." A college, he hoped, would "spread the light and learning along the Scots-Irish frontier."

Applying the "science of man" to the frontier, Rush hoped to improve rustics so they might fit better into the new and increasingly commercial American Republic. Like the Scots, Rush saw commerce as a necessary ingredient to civilization. Like Patrius, Rush argued that true "civilization" required cultural and economic cultivation. By increasing the rustic's "acquaintance with books containing and account of the improvements and discoveries in agriculture and rural economy" civilized teachers could help agriculturalist make "the profits of a farm ... that much more considerable." Rush's mission was straightforwardly enlightened. His ideal agriculturalist was then a rational economic actor or, in the Philadelphian's words, a "conqueror." Marching into forests primeval, he "achieved his conquests" with "weapons" that included "the implements of husbandry." Building a college and teaching commerce, Rush hoped to "humanize even the half-civilized inhabitants of the western counties."

Rush's description of his fellow creatures as "half-civilized" is instructive, for it pinpoints something else he and Patrius shared: an unsettling disdain for rural peoples. Such seems at odds with the tenor of the Enlightenment. Indeed, racialist though they often were, most philosophers accepted the idea that all men were capable of improvement. Moreover, the chances for that progress were heightened when the subject for improvement was of western European extraction. That said, the same enlightened men who preached improvement did not give a second thought to bemoaning the backwardness of their less cosmopolitan neighbors. Voltaire did it; and so too did Patrius and Rush. More importantly, all colonizers did it. Indeed, if the Philadelphians held out hope for rustics, they nonetheless denied frontiersmen their full humanity. And there were good reasons for doing so. In order to civilize the frontier and its population, both landscape and people had to be rendered "uncivilized." Patrius performed this act not only by labeling frontier folk as barbarous and savage, but also by denouncing rural peoples' flagrant sedition, ignorance of
commerce, and underdeveloped appreciation for private property. Rush, as we should expect, offered a much more thorough study of rural backwardness. Echoing so many of his predecessors, including those sixteenth and seventeenth century commentators on the Scots Highlands, Rush enhanced the otherness of his rural neighbors thus making the civilizing mission all the more necessary.

To denigrate his neighbors and render them prime candidates for improvement, Rush turned to the three interrelated tropes of geography/temporality, ethnicity, and hybridity. The first trope was age old, and the simplest: geographic distance signaled a temporal distance; people separated by space were also separated by time. Rural folks, because of their geography were little different from other “colonized people” in that they “[did not] inhabit history proper but exist in a permanently anterior time within the space of the modern empire.” It was a complaint common in the history of the British Isles. Commentators looked to northern climes as the places out of time, as haunts of savage anteriority: medieval ‘historian’ Gerald of Wales used it against the Irish and the Welsh; sixteenth century scholastic John Mair followed a geo-temporal pattern to describe the “indolence” and war-like tendency of the Scots highlanders. Geo-temporality, though, was but the tip of the iceberg. Indeed, spatial and temporal models of marking difference gave way to the second trope, ethnic difference.

Like his predecessors, Rush, too, located difference in ethnic heritage. Traveling the countryside in 1784, Rush placed frontier settlers into distinct camps: economically advanced German agriculturalists, and crude-living, savage, Scots-Irish folk. There was nothing inherently new to this ethno-economic model. For decades, Scots-Irish proved a useful container for all those who defied legal and cultural norms. Provincial Secretary, James Logan had made the point innumerable times. Largely Ulster immigrants, the residents of Cumberland County were the effluvia of empire time and again. Their marginalization began at the Scots-English border, where, for centuries, lowland Scots quietly and violently resisted the imposition of English rule. During the reign of James I, recalcitrant Scots were rounded up, re-settled en masse in Ireland—another of England’s colonial holdings. Subject to poverty, religious intolerance, and enclosure, Scots arrived in Ulster only to leave in the face of a depressed linen market, and annual famine. As the Ulster Scots poured into the backcountry, they brought with them their barbarous identity.

Rush, however, added yet another layer to this trope of barbarity and tool of internal colonization. It was not merely European barbarity at work in
the backcountry; rather, he fretted over the hybridization of European and Indian. If almost four decades earlier Richard Peters wrung his hands over "the mischief" that would come when the "abandoned people of the province" mingled with the Native Americans, Rush made the point all too clear. For too long, Rush's candidates for civilization had fled to the frontier only to blend their existing backwardness with a strong "tincture" of Indian-ness. They devolved into Indians. Pennsylvania's borders teemed with men and women thoroughly barbarized by their suspect ethnicity and their life away from civilization. But Rush's observations hinted at something much more dangerous to the early American mind: they hinted at issues of biological mixing. Already marginal, settlers only enhanced that marginality when they intermingled with Indians.

James Smith: Barbarian at the Gates

Had either Patrius or Rush sought a poster-child for their musings on frontier barbarity, they might have turned to James Smith. In him, it seems, were located all the signs and symbols of a frontier in dire need of civilization. Born in 1737 into an otherwise unassuming Chester County Scots-Irish family, Smith was lucky enough to gain formal education at the New London Academy. That changed when his father died. At that point, his family relocated to Cumberland Valley settling in a diminutive cabin on un-cleared land near Fort Loudon (present-day Franklin County). At eleven, Smith quickly exchanged the Academy for the rough education of the borderlands. Seven years later, in May 1755, an eighteen-year-old James joined three hundred other laborers to cut a supply road for the ill-starred Braddock Expedition. Captured by Indians, he spent the next five years as a "white Indian." After his escape in 1759, Smith returned to the frontier to inveigh against merchants and the well-heeled.

None of this, however, marked Smith as uncivilized; nor did he consider himself as such. By his own account, he could claim whiteness, civility, and deep devotion to crown and republic alike. He was a staunch defender of his frontiers, a colonel in the Pennsylvania Line, and a willing participant in the Braddock Campaign, Pontiac's War, and Dunmore's War. He was a man who sanctioned the scalping and desecration of Indian bodies. He was, it seems, well-liked by regional elites. Cumberland bigwigs like Colonel Armstrong considered him "exceedingly fit," to serve the Revolutionary Cause. Some
Philadelphia's nabobs called him esquire. He was a landowner and model citizen woven into the very fabric of colonial and post-colonial governance. He served on the Bedford Board of Commissioners; denounced his neighbors for their insolent refusal to pay taxes; he served the cause of liberty; helped create the Pennsylvania Constitution; and when he moved to Kentucky, he spent his remaining years in and out of the State Assembly.

But if his own words told the story of a man who shaped and was shaped by the forces of his world into the very image of American respectability, there was clear evidence that Smith was every bit as barbarous as his tax-evading neighbors or those red enemies who haunted civilization's borders. No kind word or approving letter, no amount of land, and no empty title could mask Smith's recent past or how most elites really felt about him: he disturbed George Washington; the Penn family thought him dangerous; Indian Agent George Croghan blamed him for irreparably damaging the tenuous Anglo-Indian Peace; a chorus of traders, officers, and Philadelphia merchants called Smith a villain and a rascal; Virginia officials labeled him an imposter; and one author lapsed into demonological and color discourse to render Smith "Black as Satan."47 James Smith was all of these things, because he was at once marginal, medial, and monstrous, and he was representative of deep gulf that lay between the Atlantic metropoles and their rural interiors. Though Smith would in time become a member of the rural elite, it is important to note that he maintained both cultural and social connections with his less well off neighbors. Moreover, while can be argued that he was never truly 'barbarous,' it is instructive to note that many of Pennsylvania's leading men nevertheless described him as such. Thus, whatever caveats there may be, Smith gives human form to the ways in which cosmopolitan thinkers described the frontier. Though, it is important to note, he also rendered problematic those very idea by revealing how shallow and short the gulf between urban and rural really was.

Clearly both Patrius and Rush saw the frontier as a landscape wracked by lawlessness, ethic difference, and hybridity. Read through the lens of such enlightened fears, James Smith's biography overflows with examples. If Patrius saw lawlessness and anti-market tendencies as a signs of backwardness, Smith could demonstrate them both. Indeed, in two separate instances Smith combined distinctly anti-market tendencies and lawlessness to undermine elite attempts to bring order and modernity to the Pennsylvania frontier. It happened first in 1765. On the heels of the French and Indian War and Pontiac’s War, acquisitive Philadelphia merchants joined forces with
Indian-traders to extend their trade connections beyond Fort Pitt into Illinois Country. Ignoring settlers' post-war anxieties and the Proclamation of 1763, Indian Agent George Croghan and his Philadelphia counterparts gathered blankets, knives, and hatchets, and sought "Corner the early Market" by initiating a "clandestine Trade with the Savages, under the cover of presents." Distraught by Indian depredations, frontier residents responded first with pleas, and later, under Smith's leadership, with direct action. On a cold March day in 1765, Smith and a band of frontiersmen donned Indian garb, blackened their faces, and took to the trees. Near Sideling Hill, Smith's and his "Black Boys" spread forty-rod" beneath the trees, waited for the arrival of a pack train, loaded with some £20,000 of trade goods. Smith and his Black Boys ambushed the trade party, set fire to the goods and sent a message to the eastern merchants. In the months that followed, Smith, his brother-in-law, and a large number of settlers captured British soldiers, laid siege to Fort Loudon, blocked roads, and made themselves the unofficial inspectors of all pack trains. And if that were not enough to make the elite shudder, the Smiths seemed ready to turn Cumberland upside-down: renaming their frontier hideouts "Hellstown," and offering to "fill ... Belly's with Liquor and Mouth[s] with swearing," promising "free toleration for drinking, swearing, Sabbath-breaking and any outrage" imaginable. More than "ignorant and misled rioters," Smith and his boys struck at the very heart of enlightened order: "property publick and private." Smith's subsequent activities proved equally unsettling to his metropolitan neighbors.

After a brief tour of the southern frontier, Smith resurfaced in 1769, to become the nominal head of a new band of black boys, who "took the alarm ... collected, destroyed and plundered" traders along the Juniata River, and led a daring daylight raid on Fort Bedford. And Smith was just the tip of the iceberg. As Smith neighbors' violent and lawless reaction to his arrest made clear, he was but a singular representation of all the lawless and improperly civilized folk inhabiting the 'middle landscape' between civilization and savagery.

Smith had other qualities. If Rush complained about the mixing of Indian and European folkways, James Smith had that covered too. Here Smith's time as an Indian captive is instructive. That Smith never admitted to intercourse with his Indian brothers and sisters was of little merit to the elite. The result was plain; men like Smith "manifest[ed] all the arts which characterize the Indians." Surely, Smith's captivity among the Indians was evidence of this. Smith had not only turned barbarous, he had become hybrid—a dangerous
combination of Scots-Irish and Indian. His "head done off like a red-headed
woodpecker," Smith was the embodiment of barbaric hybridity. His skin was
darker and rougher from the summer sun and winter wind. His nose and
ears were pierced. He was dressed in the most savage manner—breechcloths,
moccasins, and a long woven shirt. He walked stealthily, listened intently.54
Smith even fought like an Indian, using tactics learned while among his
captors against civilization and the market. Here was proof enough that
Smith had "acquired a strong tincture of their manners."55 Thus, if his adop-
tion into Indian society and subsequent ritual dunking at the hands of Native
Women was an attempt to wash "every last drop of white blood ... out of
[his] veins," then, his Native Sisters had partially succeeded.56 Some part of
Smith, however small, was Indian; and the greater part of him, though white,
was still barbarous.

Rustic Enlightenment

The New Science of Man, it seems, could easily categorize men like Smith.
Since his return from Indian captivity in the 1759, Smith had resided, liter-
ally and figuratively, in the interstices between barbarity and civilization.
Ethnically barbaric, lawless, crude, Indianized, and economically back-
ward, he was a roadblock to progress. Few rustics made better candidates
for enlightened education than did James Smith. Yet, few rustics were as
conversant in the themes of the Enlightenment as Smith. If Smith was the
poster-child for the problems of an uncivilized frontier, he was likewise sym-
bol of exactly how civilized that frontier truly was. In short, Smith as much
symbolized the fears held by enlightened reformers as he rendered problem-
atic their entire project.

Lacking true credentials or even a defined philosophy it seems difficult
to weave Smith into the Age of Reason. That said Smith shared much with
his more erudite counterparts, especially those responsible for a specific-
ally "American" brand of Enlightenment.57 In style and substance, Smith
shared much with the members of the American Philosophical Society
(APS)—Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Stanhope Smith, Thomas Smith Barton,
Thomas Jefferson, and Benjamin Rush. Clearly all of these men of letters bore
the mark of the European Enlightenment, drawing ideas political, economic,
historical and scientific from the panoply of thinkers across the Atlantic.
And yet they were different. If men like Rush and Samuel Stanhope Smith

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bore the mark of Hume and his Scots counterparts, if they demonstrated the skepticism at work in France, many of these American Philosophes found it impossible, and illogical, to break with religion. Religion, far from mere superstition proved a vital component in many an APS members’ enlightened endeavors. At once scientific and traditional, the members of the APS provided a distinctly American balance to the extremes of Enlightenment, offering at best a deistical view that God had created nature “for the use and edification of man.” James Smith, too, treads an uncomfortable course between the New Science of Man and religion, seeing the spread of reason to the savage interior as progress for and by God. Such similarities tell on part of the story. Smith’s credentials were far more impressive than his frontier upbringing might otherwise suggest.

In short, Smith was conversant in the Science of Man. Whether such ideas filled the books he read during and after his captivity or not, Smith assimilated and readily applied enlightened language and models, and built his own conception of civil society. Smith had a skeptical mind, and he regularly turned that skepticism into empirical observation and argumentation as skilled as anything produced by Benjamin Smith Barton. Like Barton, Smith took it upon himself to undermine received knowledge, to discover the truths about the natural world. Nowhere is this more obvious than with the case of the ‘carnivorous beaver.’ European books, the very kind Rush hoped to employ, had convinced Smith that beavers built dams to catch fish. His Indian brother Tecaughretanego laughed heartily and suggested otherwise. Convinced of Europe’s superior knowledge, Smith resorted to the application of the scientific method—observation and experiment—to learn that ‘the man who wrote that book knew nothing about the beaver.’ For Smith, like many any enlightened man, observation of nature was the doorway to knowledge and improvement.

Smith was like the Philadelphia philosophes in another way, too. He wrote. Like Darnton’s obscure “Grub Street” writers or Darrin McMahon’s Counter-Enlightenment “hacks,” Smith, too, produced a literature fired by a “genuinely radical sentiment.” Indeed, from 1799 until 1811, Smith published four major pieces: Remarkable Occurrences, Shakerism Discovered, Shakerism Detected, and finally, a study of the Indian mode of warfare. The first, published in 1799, was a sort of autobiography and captivity narrative, which stretched from 1755 to roughly 1799. Smith’s two anti-Shaker tracts were published in 1810, and used his family’s dramatic encounter with religious enthusiasm as a springboard for a more
nationalist study of the dangers threatening the young republic. His final publication extracted from his captivity narrative to provide a close study of Indian society in an effort to, once again, ensure the progress of the young nation. What follows is a brief exegesis of Smith writings, particularly his captivity narrative and Shaker tracts. Together, these pieces reveal not only “rural enlightenment,” but also, more directly, an intellectualized critique of the merger of market and modernity. Neither Radical Enlightenment, nor Counter-Enlightenment, Smith produced something from the periphery, something in-between.

Smith’s writing is best understood as an evolutionary process. Essay on the History of Civil Society, Smith’s Remarkable Occurrences is not. There is little doubt that Smith’s early writing lacked the coherence and intellectual sophistication present in the erudite publications of Patrius or Rush, let alone Ferguson or Hume. Lacking refined theory, Smith’s study of Indian society and Indian country is nonetheless filled with meditations on the nature of knowledge, on the diffusion of “reason,” on the role of property, religion, and government, and built squarely on a stadial model. Wrapped in a rough autobiography persists a complex ethnographical study of Indian folkways that rivaled Ferguson’s second-hand accounts.

Smith entered captivity with clearly defined notions of his captors; Indians served as the barbarous referent for his own civility. Indeed, and in many ways, Smith echoed Ferguson. If Ferguson could draw parallels between Greece, Rome, Medieval Europe and Native America, Smith could too, going so far as to compare an aged Indian to “Socrates in the Ancient heathen world.”

In another fashion, however, Smith moved beyond his Scottish counterpart. Rather than relying on the observations of Jesuit missionaries like Fathers lafitau or Charlevoix, Smith applied his own, direct, experience to create his image of the “savage.” Like Ferguson, Smith pinpointed savagism in physical as well as politico-cultural attributes; though unlike Ferguson, and like Rush, Smith gave special importance to Christian religion. Native Americans, no matter how “exceedingly kind,” were inferior. “Their religious traditions,” Smith concluded, “are vague, whimsical, romantic and many of them scarce worth relating, and not any of them reach back to the creation of the world.” In love and courtship they are “immodest,” in marriage “their frequent changing of partners prevents propagation, creates disturbances, and often occasions of murder and bloodshed.” “Much addicted to drinking,” his captors “become basely intoxicated,” and utilize “any means” to “obtain spirituous liquor.”
Yet, by and large, it was around the issue of property that Smith defined his difference with his Indian brethren. Rush, Patrius, and, more eloquently, Ferguson championed property as a matter of progress. It is, as Ferguson claimed, “a principal distinction of nations in the advanced state of mechanic and commercial arts.”69 And where Indigenous Americans were concerned, European property rights were lost on a society in which “the field in which they have planted, like the district over which they are accustomed to hunt, is claimed as a property by the nation, but is not parcelled [sic] in lots to its members.”70 Backed by a simple, sexual division of labor, “savage nations . . . mix with the practice of hunting some species of rude agriculture,” the fruits of which were shared in common, “divided into shares for the maintenance of separate families.”71

Echoing the principles and notions offered by his more erudite counterparts, Smith agreed. To his European eyes, Indian economic institutions were thoroughly underdeveloped, if not entirely backward. “The extremes they run into in dividing the necessaries of life are hurtful to the public weal; though their dividing meat when hunting may answer valuable purpose . . . but their carrying this custom to the town or agriculture is striking at the root of industry, as industrious persons ought to be rewarded, and the lazy suffer for their indolence.”72 Smith premised his own modernity on a division of labor and a work ethic, and followed Ferguson in decrying those traits that “retard[ed] progress in extending the notion of property.” And if his captors were not willing to look to their landscape with a keen eye for profit, Smith was. Indeed, while busily examining his captors, Smith studied his surroundings, describing the land, noting its soil quality, fertility, and access to navigable waters.73 Smith was reading the landscape in order that it might be put to proper use; or, as God commanded, “s subdued.” Something the Philadelphia pair demanded of any educated agriculturalist.

Yet Smith did not end his study there. His was not some rudimentary regurgitation of Enlightenment thought. Thanks to his proximity to Indian society, Smith used savagism as a means for reflecting on his own society’s progress. Close, empirical study of Indian society had given Smith a new set of tools for examining modernity in ways his enlightened counterparts never dreamed.

Smith’s reflection came quite early; for no quicker was he adopted into his new Indian family, than he was handed over to Tontileaugo for education and training. And it was Tontileaugo that demonstrated to Smith the sheer paucity of Europe’s superior knowledge. In Native Americans he saw something quite admirable: their methods of war and the ways in which
“extremes” of equality carried over into all facets of life—something his own society had failed to accomplish. As time wore on, and settlers, traders, and armies drove further into Indian Country, Smith also recognized that Native Americans did not hold the patent on cruelty; in fact they probably did not even come close to matching the barbarity of their white enemies.74 They were communal, selfless, intelligent, and polite. Additionally, when he compared their culture and “civil government” to his own, he found Native ‘government’ far superior. What his captors lacked in economy and religion, they made up for in their legal system; public ridicule, and in extreme cases, revenge killings, marked the extent of Native “penal laws,” and they had nothing approaching the injustice and cruelty of the “Bloody Laws of England.” 75 Something to which, even Ferguson agreed: even savage societies, “Without police or compulsory Laws,” were orderly. 76

If most of his pages had been given over to shoring up European civility, his last pages turned to undermining it. If Smith chided his captors for their seemingly backward economic patterns, he could reflect on the dangers inherent in his market society. On paper, in a form and structure with which his urbane counterparts could understand, Smith provided the theoretical basis for his resistance to the spread of capitalism three decades before. Expropriation cast a pall over any of the supposed “advantages which mankind derive from commerce.”77 Commerce, as Smith intoned, allowed “splendid villains [to] … make themselves grand and great upon other people’s labors.” 78 Ferguson was correct, in arguing that commerce signaled the onset of modernity, because it necessitated the construction of legal order. But he failed to notice that it enshrined a system of “legal robbery,” through the manifold and “state erected money-making machines.” And it exposed the rustic to all the “unjust and cruel” laws that maintained the market.79 Certainly, as the product of a long line of farmers, Smith understood the importance of the market, and even saw it as vital to the rural way of life. But it was not the sine qua non of modernity, and deviation from it was not tantamount to barbarity. Barbarity was, for Smith, what underpinned the unfettered principles of market society.80

The Ills of Capitalism Discovered

Thus the point at which Smith differed from his counterparts was not merely on the issue of property, but rather, on the nature of what Israel identifies as a classically Spinozan, (and therefore ‘radical’) understanding
of private interests as competing forces that ultimately provide for the common good. Smith shared no such vision. Much like Mandeville, Smith understood that private interest wrapped in the cloak of public virtue, is at bottom, self-serving. Yet, in opposition to Mandeville, Smith argues that self-interest in the commonweal’s clothing is much more than hypocrisy; it is destructive to civil society. Thus, as Smith’s writing matured, so too did his attack on private interest and private profit become more announced and forceful.

Nowhere should this be more obvious than with Smith’s Remarkable occurrences lately discovered among the people called Shakers of a treasonous and barbarous nature, or Shakerism developed. That said, the context in which this tract develops and its subject matter tend to cloud the underlying principles. Indeed, Shakerism Developed was precipitated by the arrival of evangelical revivalism in frontier Kentucky. Sometime in 1805, “three Shakers viz. Isiacher Bait, John Mitcham, & Benjamin Young” came to Kentucky and “seduced” his son. For James, “the feelings on his heart” were too much to bear. His “dutiful son,” “once kind and affectionate,” had renounced his worldly possessions, renounced his wife, Polly, and removed to a Shaker settlement near Turtle-Creek, Ohio. Though Smith attempted to reason with his son, and even went so far as to take up the Shaker lifestyle in order to better understand young James’ decision, Smith feared his son irretrievably lost. Guided by the loss of his son, Smith made it his project to critically examine the theological and sociological dynamics of Shakerism.

Shakerism had its roots in the home of James and Jane Wardley, two Manchester Quakers, who, upon Jane receiving revelations of Christ’s return, attempted to convert the people of Manchester and prepare them for the Second Coming. Wardlelyism—or, the United Society of Believers In Christ’s Return—was prophetic and enthusiastic in form, and saw rapturous dancing, tremors, singing, and glossolalia (speaking in tongues) as outward signs of the inner light. By the 1770s, one adherent, an illiterate factory worker named Ann Lee claimed Jesus’ spirit merged with hers. This New Messiah in female form quickly replaced the Wardleys as head of the Shakers, and in the midst of persecution, removed the small sect to New England, and eventually settled near Albany, New York. In short, the United Society of Believers was a radical departure from both the evangelical Protestantism and the materialistic forces of a modern industrial society that were taking root in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century America. Though Ann led a number of proselytizing missions throughout New England, Shakers did not follow Robert
Finney's traveling revivalist lead. They instead turned inward, establishing small endogamous communities. In these frontier utopias, Shakers "turned the world upside down" as they dedicated themselves to work and celibacy, and awaited the second coming of a feminine Christ.  

Different though the Shakers might have been to Smith, they were far from "barbarous." Indeed, outside the doctrinal controversies that sprouted in the wake of the Cane Creek Revival, there were few ostensible sources for Smiths ire. Nevertheless, Shakerism Developed is anything but a cool-headed, scientific study. In short order, it appears to collapse into little more than wild-eyed polemic with a cast of characters ranging from bloodthirsty Indians, scheming Tories, and the fearsome "Pope David." Though relying on informants and description gleaned from first-hand experience, Smith's Shaker study was far from objective. Smith's study has a specific goal in mind, and ostensibly that goal is to discredit Shakerism. Indeed, at first glance, Shakerism Developed operates only at the level of "anti-literature." Like Shaker apostate Mary Margaret Dyer in Elizabeth A. de Wolfe's fine case study, Smith appears to be deploying the language of family, liberty, and republicanism to wage an attack on Shakers in specific, and difference in general—social, political, ethnic and racial groups undermining postcolonial America. Such conclusions are only partially true.

In his efforts to label Shakerism as "a poisonous worm gnawing at the root of the TREE OF LIBERTY," to establish the anteriority of the Shakers, Smith might have turned to any number of tropes. That he turned to capitalist exploitation to undermine the religion is telling. Not only was Smith writing anti-literature, but he was doing so by locating in Shakerism all the evils that came with commercial civilization. In short, Smith paints Shakerism the barbarous other to American civilization, by arguing that it is founded on the systematic expropriation of labor, building his attack on three interrelated and exaggerated claims about the Shaker community: 1) that the Shaker Commune is little more than profit-generating system for a Shaker elite, namely Elder David; 2) that process of enriching the elite forges two distinct classes—leaders and "labourers," and 3) tantamount to slavery, and though employing violent means, Shakerism is positively Gramscian in its ability to "conceal" its base economic principles from the "lower class." Indeed, Smith works diligently to paint Shakerism as a "wonderful money-making scheme," a profit-oriented system of exploitation for the enrichment of the Shaker
“elite.” In so doing, he deploys the language of exploitation, the very exploitation he argued to be at the heart of the “civilizing market.” Thus by grounding his attacks in economic terms, Smith consciously imbeds his tracts in the enlightened discourse of commerce as progress, and produces texts as focused upon economic transformation as they are upon Shakerism.

In Smith’s hands, Shakerism paints on a small canvas the larger traumas associated with commercial society. Like the modern market-driven world outside it, the Shaker commune produced and reproduced class distinctions. Such divisions were made manifest by the visible inequality in diet, habitation, and especially habits of the two classes. While those at the bottom subsist on paltry rations, the “leaders live in luxury, in wine, and women.”

While common folk abstain from alcohol, Shaker Elders “stored up liquor for their own use” without the slightest hint of hypocrisy. While those at the top can “live sumptuously on their money,” those of “the lower class” endure “hard labor and low living.”

More importantly, Smith argues that the entire structure of the commune aims to keep common folk under “the grievous yoke” of bondage. Using both carrot and stick, the Elders forge a system in which salvation and terror reduce members to “bondage,” enslaved “by the fear of hell or the terror of the whip.” Indeed, as Smith claims, Shaker “proselytes” were “whip[ped] … severely” for the commonest offenses, and are subject to “arbitrary authority and hard usage.” As Smith would argue in his second treatise on Shakerism, the infallibility of the leadership and the “implicit” obedience of the followers was a “corner stone of [Shakerism’s] political, despotic money-making building.” In opposition to a republic that continues to cast off deference, “the working hands … pull off their hats and shoes on entering Elder David’s Chamber because they are told that the place where he is, is holy ground.” Thus it was that common folks were brainwashed and transformed into a lower class whose labor was exploited, and whose surplus value filled the treasury. Through these means, the poor built the “affluence” of those at the top of Shaker society. Smith’s “Shakerfied” son confirmed that. James Jr. had been transformed into “a machine, even as much so as a spinning wheel,” a tool used and deployed by the greedy Shaker elite. Enriched through exploitation, “receiv[ing] all” that the working class “can make by their work,” the elders transform “money” into “power and influence” beyond the walls of the Shaker settlement.
Smith, no doubt, had an axe to grind with Shakers; but for our purposes, it is equally important to recognize how this text, like his captivity narrative from a decade earlier, served as an unflattering mirror for his republic. And it was to the idea of the republic Smith clung. Indeed, in the face of Shaker Richard McNemar's harsh rebuttal that dredged into Smith's barbaric past, the frontier philosophe offered a positively enlightened response. Viewing the history of frontier violence, revolution, and even his present activities under the light of reason, Smith turned to human liberty. It was despotism and bondage Smith feared; liberty of conscience allowed all, "Mahometans, Pagans or Roman Catholics's" to worship God in their own way. Political liberty allowed them to participate as equals in a society. Liberty, however, also had an economic connotation demonstrated by Smith's constant reference to "bondage" as building block for and result of economic self-interest. Economic self-interest created inequality; it allowed the elite to live "sumptuously" on the labor of others. Capitalist social relations implied, for Smith, a form of bondage incompatible with human liberty. The two, Smith argued, mixed about as well as "fire and water." Through Shakerism, Smith could lay bare the negative consequences of market culture. And while his venom was particularly aimed at the Shakers, the reflexivity of his work is hard to ignore. Smith was writing in a language and on a subject with which his early republican audience knew well—in terms inseparable from average Americans' own experiences. And for his elite counterparts, Smith just proved what they implicitly knew: true freedoms and true rights would always be "perverted" by those "with base purpose."

An Enlightened Conversation

Ostensibly, there was no baser purpose than "a wonderful-money-making scheme." It debased and commodified labor while it produced despotism. Those were points with which even Adam Ferguson could not quibble. Though James Smith's contemporary, Ferguson was by far, the greater of the two. Professor of Moral Philosophy at Edinburgh, Ferguson was the symbol of the Scottish Enlightenment, consciously imbedded in the very discussions that made up the Age of Reason. That much is evident in his Essay on the History of Civil Society, a lengthy discussion of social evolution that drew as much on the historical past as it did on the work
of French travelers, missionaries, and Ferguson’s own circle of Friends and enlightened compatriots. Succinctly, the Essay was a masterpiece of history and social theory. Built squarely on a stadial conception of history, Ferguson believed that the rise of legal institution protecting property rights, commercial relations, and especially the ever-improving division of labor, worked together to produce “liberal society.” More importantly, his ideals proved influential across the Atlantic—introduced and reshaped by men like Patrius and Rush.

Suffice it to say, then, Adam Ferguson and James Smith were poles apart. Educated and well-known, Ferguson was among an elite, and he wrote for an elite audience whom he “pitied” far more than “the poor.” If so much of Smith’s work attacked the division between producers and parasites, inequality was, for Ferguson the natural course of civilization—some were destined to work, while others were “above the necessity of labor.” Yet, should Ferguson and Smith have met they would have found much in common. Indeed, if the distance that separates Ferguson and Smith appears insurmountable, the points at which the barbarian and the philosopher find agreement are much greater. Highlander, and the “only Gaelic-speaking member of the Scottish Enlightenment,” Ferguson hailed from a past and position nearly as barbaric as Smith’s. Though Ferguson was, as Patricia Nordeen observes, deeply “self-conscious” about his own civility, he was also deeply influenced by that past. Thus, if the Scots Highlander left his own “barbaric” past behind him, he had not, as Adam Smith would later do, break, from an organic view of society. Indeed, while so many philosophers followed Hobbes and Locke in accepting without critique the “state of nature,” Scots like Ferguson and Hume saw man as a “social animal” that built his socio-political order upon the deep connections forged between people. And it was here that the frontier rustic and the Scots philosopher could find commonality. Different though he was, James Smith’s tracts traced out the very “pathogens” that came with “modernity” and market. In short, if Smith built his treatises around the dangerous and despotic products of civilization, he was only amplifying what Ferguson had said decades earlier. Succinctly, the two came into conversation over the market, and, despite their vast geographical and educational differences, would have found common ground over three deeply interwoven themes—the division of labor, exploitation, and despotism—each of which represented the darker side of modernity.
The market, though the driving force of modernity, was also its undoing. As Smith and Ferguson knew, market society rested on a process of alienation, deskilling and exploitation, and could, if left unchecked, prove fatal to human liberty. Eschewing totally the rationalizing and liberating force of Adam Smith's "invisible hand," James Smith and Adam Ferguson, understood commerce a motor of progress requiring "unwavering attention." Smith knew firsthand of its dangers, and Ferguson ruminated on its implications. Those implications were clear to Ferguson—as a commercial society matured, it perfected the division of labor. Indeed, what Ferguson called "the subdivision of the arts and professions," was at once necessity and evil. Clearly as, David Kettler has suggested, Ferguson found "much intrinsic value" in the division of labor, recognizing that in the rationalization of the labor process came a higher degree of efficiency. That said, Ferguson, likewise recognized the alienating implications of professional "subdivisions," arguing that "Manufactures prosper most where the mind is least consulted, and where the workshop" operates as an "engine, the parts of which are men." Certainly, this "is not," as Nordeen suggests, "an outright denunciation of commercial activity, but rather a description." Indeed, as Nordeen rightly asserts, Ferguson's brand of civil society, was premised on much more than the market, and therefore could allow "for men to be cogs in the wheel, as long as they have other opportunities to express their humanity."

Nonetheless, as James Smith revealed, increased attention on profit has the propensity to remove those other outlets, and transform man into the mere machine for the production of another's profit. And, at some level, Ferguson agreed; for, he admitted all too easily that, "the genius of the master ... is cultivated while that of the inferior workman lies waste." As Smith demonstrated in his Shaker tracts, so Ferguson admitted that the perfection of market society, or rather the singular focus on individual interest, proved "more debasing than slavery," and led, in words little different from Smith's to a market driven society that "depresses the many" as it builds the "exaltation of the few." In short, the two shared in Ferguson's fear that "the desire of profit stifles the love of perfection" Distance and differences aside the rural world was never isolated from the metropolitan. Should elites have listened and heard they would have found a wealth of creativity at their borders, producing a set of ideas not so different from their own.
Conclusion

In a seemingly elite Age of Reason, James Smith produced some remarkable texts that called into question the very meaning and consequences of his counterparts’ idea of commerce as progress, and prefigured many of the ideas that would find their most scientific exploration under Marx. In short, Smith appears to have a place among the vast transnational exchange that was the Enlightenment, and even more, appears to pull this story to the very edges of the eighteenth century Atlantic. Yet, such conclusions rarely fit the traditional narrative of the Enlightenment.

Indeed, that narrative, whether drawn from the period or from today, too often ascribes rural folks like Smith a place of inaction, and transforms rustics into the subjects of rather than participants in, the Age of Reason. There has been and remains little room for the rustic in that great eighteenth century moment of intellectual flowering. For too long our studies have privileged the elite of Europe and America while consciously or unconsciously marginalizing those at the borders and edges of this movement. Even self-described “radical” texts approach the Age of Reason with geographical and methodological blinders, and as such elide as much as they reveal. Even the most Herculean of these efforts produce histories every bit as narrow as they are broad. Thus, if recent and groundbreaking studies of the Enlightenment have forced historians to change the way we write and teach “The Enlightenment,” they have also succeeded in adding yet another wall between the masses and “high culture” intellectual history.

Still, that wall was neither as high nor impenetrable as our traditional histories tell us. Calling for a truly cosmopolitan understanding of the “Age of Reason,” this essay has moved the story to the very periphery of the eighteenth century Atlantic world. There, James Smith’s ethnographies, like his studies of the economic foundations of society, proved every bit as reasoned as his metropolitan counterparts. Far from simply aping his betters, however, Smith used his setting, experience, and the tools of rational scholars to produce a very different Enlightenment. Whether it was moderate, radical, or counter-Enlightenment, Smith’s entrance into the Age of Reason demonstrates how transnational the eighteenth century world really was, and provides common people yet another part in the making of the modern world.
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BARBARIAN PHILOSOPHE


12. Voltaire, Essai sur les moeurs, Oeuvres Completes 11–13 (c. 1740), chaps. cxc, cxcvii; quoted in Gearhart, The Open Boundary of History and Fiction, 35.

13. Israel, Enlightenment Contested, 361.


16. There were obvious exceptions, including Benjamin Franklin.


22. On the sometimes complimentary and sometimes conflicting relationship between the rationalizing impulses of the Enlightenment and Christian faith—and more importantly how both served as props for colonialism—see Kidd, *Forging of Races*, chap. 2.


26. Rush was in Scotland from 1767–69. There he furthered his education taking courses in Chemistry, Anatomy, and, of special interest, Natural Philosophy taught by Adam Ferguson’s successor, James Russel. We know from his letter to David Ramsay dated November 5, 1778, Rush was familiar with and fond of the writing of another Scottish Philosopher, David Hume. See *Letters of Benjamin Rush*, 1:30, 219.


36. Rush to Richard Price, October 26, 1786, in Butterfield, ed., Letters of Benjamin Rush, 1:406. Education was, after all, one of Rush's favorite causes. As Henry E. May writes, "[Rush] hoped for the development of a state system, in which children would be trained ... according to a modern system emphasizing governmental science and aiming at producing 'republican machines.'" In Enlightenment in America, 210.


40. Giraldus Cambrensis, Topographia Hibernica (1188) and Descriptio Cambriae (1194). For more on Gerald, see Jeffrey Jerome Cohen, Hybridity, Identity, and Monstrosity in Medieval Britain: On Difficult Middles (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).


44. Devolution, a popular theme in Ferguson's study of the impact of the division of labor, takes on a different form in Rush's hands. See, for instance, Rush to David Hosack, September 25, 1812, Letters of Benjamin Rush, 2:1165, in which he argued that progression was never linear; in fact it often worked in reverse. For the Philadelphian, the best example might have been Mississippian Culture. Most unscientifically, Rush "adduced" that the strange "marks of civilized ingenuity and labor," namely, the mounds of the pre-Columbian Mississippian, were built by Chinese ancestors to the modern Indian. It was for the good doctor a simple case of regression, settlers from some "Eastern country" arrived, built a marvelous civilization, and digressed into savagery. Because its people found life in North America effortless, people traded their complex hierarchies and institutions for a more unpolished way of life.


47. On the various ways in which colonial elites described Smith, see Smith, Remarkable Occurrences, 134; and Barsotti annotations. Specifically, George Washington did not like the idea of "white men turning Indians." Other colonial elites had less racialist fears. Governor Penn to Sir William Johnson, May 23, 1765, Sullivan, Johnson Papers 11: 746; Penn to General Gage, June 28, 1765;


53. Smith, Remarkable Occurrences, 133.

54. Smith, Remarkable Occurrences, 120.


Recently, Israel has suggested that even French *philosophes* like Voltaire found traditional religion—minus the "clerical pretensions to control the independent-minded"—was critical to "upholding the social and moral order." *Enlightenment Contested*, 361.

Smith alluded to reading several torn and tattered books during his captivity.

For a detailed analysis on Smith's framing of self in reference and opposition to Indian society, and a slightly different interpretation of the beaver story, see Ed White, *The Backcountry and the City: Colonization and Conflict in Early America* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 97.


Smith does not fit clearly into either the Enlightenment or Counter-Enlightenment tradition. On the latter term see Isaiah Berlin, "The Counter-Enlightenment," *Against the Current: Essays in the History of Ideas* (New York, Viking Press, 1980). Recent work by McMahon, meant to expand upon Darnton's study, is of some help here. Situating his study in directly in the midst of the French Revolution, McMahon's study of "low-life literature" pivots on the ways in which conservative writers attacked the *philosophes* for undermining traditional society. To an extent, that was what Smith was doing too; yet, he also operated within the general framework of the Enlightenment. Much like his counterparts in the American Philosophical society, Smith blended both conservative and radical elements. See McMahon, "The Counter-Enlightenment and the Low Life of Literature."

For specific references to the quality of land, forests, and game, see Smith, *Remarkable Occurrences*, 42, 70-71.

Here it is important to examine the concepts of agrarian capitalism and the agrarian capitalist. As the work of Ellen Meiksins Wood suggests, capitalism had rural roots; for "The transformation of social property relations was firmly rooted in the countryside, and the transformation of English trade and industry was result more than cause of England's transition to capitalism." For
Wood, it seems, farmers were the cutting edge of capitalism, and therefore, as Wilma Dunaway's study of Appalachia suggests, 'capitalist by association.' Such a point also rings true among other students of the transition question. Indeed, Christopher Clark offers that, especially in the case of New England, the very nature of colonization—free hold title and colonialist desire for profit, for example—provided the backdrop American economic transition in the nineteenth century. Still, we should pay careful attention to the ideas long offered by Michael Merrill: that farmers were concerned with use value not pure exchange value, and agriculturalists could be at once market-oriented and non-capitalist. Thus while Smith and his neighbors were operating in a fashion that was "capitalistic," they were not necessarily "capitalists." Ellen Meiksins Wood, "The Agrarian Origins of Capitalism," *Monthly Review* 50:3 (1998); Wilma Dunaway, *The First American Frontier: Transition to Capitalism in Southern Appalachia, 1700–1860*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Christopher Clark, *The Roots Rural of Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780–1860* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999); Michael Merrill, "Putting 'Capitalism' in Its Place: A Review of Recent Literature," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., vol. 52, no. 2 (1995): 315–26.


85. Here it is important to note Smith's own conversion experiences. According to his biographer, Smith too, was influenced by revivalism. Thomas Price Smith, *Frontier Patriot*, 74. For a time, Smith had fallen under the sway of the Presbyterian-turned-revivalist, Barton W. Stone. At once the product of a Great Awakening Princeton education, the rough-hewn backcountry style, and the jubilee-preaching of Samuel Davies, Stone brought together many threads, some of them quite radical. Moving to Kentucky and participating in the Cane Ridge Revival, Stone was eventually forced to sever his ties to the Kentucky Synod, but not before joining his fellow evangelists in penning a remarkable statement of politicized faith: *The Last Will and Testament of the Springfield Presbytery* (1804). This work was
important on a number of levels. Clearly, it retrieved and revived a premise at the heart of the first Awakening, as well as the radicalism of the seventeenth century—the unity of all believers. Secondly, in arguing that some parishioners had "wished to make the Presbytery … their king" Stone joined his fellow awakeners in blasting the formal and authoritarian structure of organized religion. Finally, The Last Will and Testament spoke a language of hope and jubilee. Describing themselves as heretics, Stone and his fellow authors hoped that all like-minded heretics be cast out of the Synod so that "the oppressed may go free, and taste the sweet gospel of liberty." Religious though the document was, it had more than a touch of radicalism in it. That Stone's constellation of friends soon came to include the likes of Rice Haggard, a font of Samuel Davies eighteenth century antinomianism, would only add fuel to the fire out of which Smith honed his own ideology. Moreover, it is important to note another of the Last Will and Testament's signers, Richard McNemar, converted to Shakerism, and was the principle author to respond to Smith's accusations about the Shaker faith. On Stone, see Sydney Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972): 445–46; and Richard Thomas Hughes, Reviving the ancient faith: The story of Churches of Christ in America (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W. B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1996): 11, 92–117.


87. Smith, Shakerism Discovered, 18.
88. Smith, Shakerism Discovered, 14.
89. Smith, Shakerism Discovered, 21–22.
90. Smith, Shakerism Discovered, 14.
91. Smith, Shakerism Discovered, 22, 23.
92. Smith, Shakerism Discovered, 8.
93. Smith, Shakerism Discovered, 18.
94. Smith, Shakerism Discovered, 7.
96. Smith, Shakerism Detected, 31.
97. Smith, Shakerism Detected, 10.
98. Smith, Shakerism Detected, 35, 36.
100. Smith, Shakerism Detected, 35.
101. Smith, Shakerism Detected, 35.
102. Smith, Shakerism Detected, 36.
103. Ferguson, Essay, 394.
104. Ferguson, Essay, 96.
105. Ferguson, Essay, 358.
111. Ferguson, Essay, 277.
114. Ferguson, Essay, 278.