
Jeffery M. Dorwart's *Invasion and Insurrection: Security, Defense, and War in the Delaware Valley* is an intriguing look at the impact of "homeland security" on Pennsylvania and New Jersey from the earliest European settlements through the War of 1812. Dorwart focuses on the conceptual and organizational origin and roots of the concept of homeland security, contending that it is not something that originated following September 11, 2001, but instead began in 1621 when the Dutch first began to settle in the Delaware Valley.

The Delaware Valley was a region that was hotly contested during the colonial period. Native Americans, particularly the Lenni Lenape and the Minqua (Susquehannocks), both fought for control of the valley—against each other and the European invaders. The charter that created the Dutch West India Company
provided the rationale for the first comprehensive establishment for security and defense in times of war, but the Dutch fort at Swanendael (Lewes) and the Swedish Fort Christina (Wilmington) were not enough to protect their settlements from the natives, nor from the English, who occupied the Delaware Valley in the 1660s.

When the English conquered New Netherlands (and took control of the Delaware Valley) in the early 1660s, English, Swedish, Finnish, Dutch, and German settlers coexisted among the native populations. The main threat was protecting the fledgling settlements against native attacks, although the Konigsmark insurrection by the Swedes in 1668 and the reestablishment of Dutch rule during the Anglo-Dutch War (1673) also challenged English control of the region. Fellow Englishmen, too, were perceived as threats, most notably Quaker settlers in New Jersey and Maryland’s proprietors, whose land claims led to boundary disputes in the region.

The greatest challenge to “homeland security,” according to Dorwart, would be the establishment of Pennsylvania. William Penn, the “antiwar Quaker proprietor [who] opposed raising militias for internal security” (52) questioned the need for a separate army to defend the colony. As the son of an admiral, Penn thought that the British Navy could best defend the province and that the region’s natural geographic defenses would prevent external attack. Penn also developed a policy of conducting diplomatic negotiations to pacify the natives, rather than arm the colony in preparation for battle.

The War of the League of Augsburg from 1689 to 1697 had little impact on the Delaware Valley, other than a fear of French Huguenots allying with the French. When war with France broke out again in 1701, the Quaker Assembly, for the first time, authorized expenditures for the defense of the province by appropriating funds to construct watchtowers at the mouth of Delaware Bay. The threats renewed during King George’s War in the 1740s, with Benjamin Franklin taking the lead and advocating “security, defense, and war to boost a sense of community identity and public spirit” (71).

The French and Indian War marked a turning point in the Delaware Valley’s approach to homeland security. Attacks along the frontier following the defeat of Braddock’s army intensified the need for protection in the area. The need for a militia to defend the frontier led to a power struggle within the Pennsylvania government, with Franklin particularly using the issue to attack the power of the proprietors. One result was the construction of Fort Mifflin, a stone fort on Mud Island designed to protect the entry
to the Delaware River from foreign attack. In New Jersey, meanwhile, the
government began a policy of “total war” against the natives, who were the
final obstacle to land development.

During the 1760s and 1770s, the politics of security, defense, and war
influenced the colony’s response to British policies. Colonists became
concerned that the British might try to close the Delaware River and the
port of Philadelphia following the passage of the Boston Port Bill in 1774.
With the onset of the War for Independence, the security of the Delaware
Valley became important once again. Residents in Pennsylvania formed a
Committee of Safety and Defense to coordinate the protection of the region.
Probably the biggest concern, however, was the weather, as the river was
prone to freezing over in the winter, preventing access to the valley.

Following the overthrow of the proprietary government in 1776, the new
Pennsylvania government considered the security of the Delaware Valley
to be a priority. This homeland security structure, however, was unable to
prevent the British occupation of Philadelphia during the winter of 1777–1778.
Following the departure of British troops, British cruisers based in New York
attacked shipping in the Delaware Bay. In addition, New Jersey continually
faced internal problems with the threat of invasion from nearby Staten Island.
The evacuation of the British army from New York in June 1783 did not lead
to complete security in the Delaware Valley, although the threats were now
internal instead of external. The Yankee-Pennamite War in the Wyoming
Valley, for instance, continued to affect security in the upper Delaware Valley
throughout the 1780s.

With the establishment of the new government and the temporary
relocation of the nation’s capital to Philadelphia, security issues in the
Delaware Valley temporarily dissipated as the conflicts shifted westward to
the Ohio Valley. Between Native American insurrections and the Whiskey
Rebellion, western Pennsylvania and Ohio were more prominent challenges
to national security. The Federalists’ security became threatened again in
1799 with tax protests that led to Fries Rebellion, but the reaction was
isolated in one region of the Delaware Valley and did not seriously threaten
Philadelphia. The book concludes with the role of the Delaware Valley in
the War of 1812, when, once again, the Committee of Safety emerged to
protect the region from potential British attack.

Jeffery Dorwart’s Invasion and Insurrection effectively demonstrates the
importance of the security of the Delaware Valley to Pennsylvania and
United States history. From the Dutch and Swedes to the British and
Americans, the Delaware Valley was a hotly contested area, and control of the Delaware Valley was important for colonial empires to succeed in North America. The author introduces each chapter with quotations either from prominent political leaders such as Sir Edmund Andros and New Jersey Governor William Livingston or from extracts of laws and town council minutes. He used published primary documents, papers, and archival collections, online document collections, and appropriate books and academic journal articles when preparing this book, although there are no manuscript materials identified in the bibliography. The volume also includes three maps to aid in visualizing the geography of the region in the security and defense of the Delaware Valley. Not much attention, however, is given to Washington’s crossing in December 1776 prior to the Battle of Trenton, which only merits one sentence and consequently must not have been important in the Valley’s security and defense (while more than two pages addressed Shays’s Rebellion in Massachusetts). In many ways, the Delaware Valley proved to be a premier location to test Dorwart’s thesis that homeland security was not a new concept following the attacks on September 11, but one that had been employed for almost 400 years in the Delaware Valley.

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This is a very good book. Thoroughly researched, deftly written, and persuasively argued, Benjamin L. Carp’s Rebels Rising: Cities and the American Revolution is certain to be a landmark work. The author proposes a clear, yet complex thesis: “city dwellers coalesced into civic communities, defined the boundaries of their community, and contended with the challenges inherent in social and political change. Revolutionary mobilization contained within it new challenges to local authority, as well as the broader challenge to imperial authority. These various forms of urban mobilization during this period helped make the Revolution possible” (5).

Expanding upon the works of Carl Bridenbaugh and Gary Nash, Carp notes that cities possessed great political and economic influence, along with close