influence, social mobility, and apparent embrace of Pope’s *Essay on Man*. What processes happened in other communities in the Atlantic World, and how were colonists able to speak a common language of emotion during the Revolution if they had separate experiences?

Eustace may also be open to criticism from those who see emotional expressions as purely rhetoric and without real significance. But to those critics, Eustace marshals persuasive statistical data that demonstrates shifts in word usage that coincide with broader societal changes that she links to the rise of the individual. For instance, sympathy became a far more widely used term in public in the 1760s and onward, replacing compassion. Sympathy emphasized individual and equalitarian emotion, while compassion signaled more communal and hierarchical feelings (peers feel sympathy, superiors feel compassion). In this and in other ways, Eustace’s work has opened up a new field of inquiry for early Americanists. Scholars will be hard pressed to interpret documents without paying close attention to the imbedded signals of emotional expressions.

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The Battle of Brandywine left Washington’s army bowed but not beaten. With his flank turned, Washington and his subordinates fought a successful delaying action that allowed the army to escape destruction. Nonetheless, it had been a close thing. A more aggressive general than General William Howe might well have smashed the Continental army and forced an end to the two-year-old rebellion, but what might have been was not what was, and the American army lived to fight another day.

Thomas J. McGuire addresses the campaign that followed Brandywine in the second volume of *The Philadelphia Campaign*. The focus is on Washington’s attempt to reverse the decision at Brandywine with an audacious night attack on British positions in and around Germantown. The author then ably describes the move toward winter quarters at Valley Forge.
In the spirit of the first volume, the second features lively prose and varied
perspectives ranging from generals to privates as well as the civilians caught
up in the maelstrom of war. It is a work more focused on key leaders than
the first volume. Despite his intellect and insight, General William Howe’s
tragic flaw was that he was willing to hesitate at just the right moment to
allow his opponent opportunity. Washington appears to be a man growing in
his job, able to find the advantage when offered to ensure that there would be
a tomorrow for the army he led. The war eventually proved that Washington’s
ability to sustain an army in being for years eventually exhausted the British
government and its people.

The days following the American defeats at Brandywine and Paoli could
have been psychologically devastating for the American cause. Philadelphians
watched powerless as British troops marched along the streets of William
Penn’s city. Fort Mifflin, along with the small Pennsylvania Navy, kept the
Delaware River closed to British warships, but it seemed clear that this was
but a temporary stay. Washington sought a solution to the disintegrating
civil-military solution by attempting something he had not yet done, an
attack on the main British army. In the past, he had limited himself to the
defensive, allowing his foe to come to him. The victories at Trenton and
Princeton had been against an exposed garrison or a rear guard action, not
main force engagements. Washington understood that his army was not the
equal of its foes, thus he sought to leverage circumstances to compensate for
the inexperience of his soldiers.

Washington’s solution was to have his army carry out a night attack
employing four different avenues of approach to the British encampment at
Germantown. On the wings of his army he placed militia, while Continental
regulars under John Sullivan and Nathanael Greene held the center. If all went
according to plan, the Continental army would fall upon its foe in the early
morning light of 4 October 1777 in a double envelopment. Unfortunately,
Washington’s plan exceeded the capabilities of his army. Night marches
and limited visibility attacks are some of the most difficult operations for
highly skilled soldiers using modern communications equipment, let alone
an eighteenth-century army of relative novices. The frictions of war overcame
Washington’s best intentions.

Washington’s men had to cover roughly sixteen miles between their
assembly area and the British/Hessian encampment on a moonless night.
Continental cavalry had not clearly marked the routes causing moments of
confusion and delay. The right wing, consisting of militia, arrived first, fired
a few shots at Hessian units and then without orders, withdrew. Sullivan’s column moved down the Germantown Road encountering resistance from British forces barricaded in the house of John Chew, a substantial stone construction. Sullivan, at the insistence of Henry Knox, elected to reduce the house rather than bypass it. Fog delayed Greene although most of his men did arrive to drive British forces back along the Limekiln Road. One regiment, however, became confused and took the wrong road (Meetinghouse Road) which caused it to collide with Anthony Wayne’s soldiers with disastrous results as the two American units engaged each other in the early morning light.

The battle grew in fury as the plan of attack disintegrated. Neither infantry assaults nor artillery bombardment forced the surrender of British forces in the Chew house and the delay took the pressure off British forces in front of Sullivan. Greene after experiencing some success pressed his advantage too much for circumstances. Believing British forces close to collapse, he ordered the 9th Virginia regiment to attack. The timing was not opportune and cost Greene the regiment as British forces surrounded it forcing its surrender. With British reinforcements coming in from Philadelphia, Washington found himself with little choice but to withdraw his army. This time the road from battle led westward to Valley Forge and winter quarters. Within weeks, Fort Mifflin fell opening the Delaware to British resupply and marking the end of the campaign season.

Operationally, the campaign was a failure. William Howe’s army spent the winter in the easy confines of Philadelphia while Washington’s men shivered through the winter months in the Spartan surroundings of Valley Forge. However, seen on an international level, American victories at Saratoga, Fort Stanwix, and Bennington, combined with the audacity of Washington’s efforts against the British main army in the Philadelphia campaign of 1777, did much to convince the French that intervention on behalf of the Americans promised to reshuffle the balance of power in Europe.

As with McGuire’s first volume, this is narrative history at its best. The prose moves quickly with vivid descriptions of the men and places that form the story. The problems with the second volume are those of the first. His maps are good but not great. If a second edition of these two volumes occurs, the author should consider a different cartographer. The publisher should add topographic information to the maps and colorize them similar to those found in the *West Point Atlas of the American Wars*. There are still a few minor irritants in the printed copy, not the least of which remains the decision on
the part of the publisher to use a capital I instead of a 1 in any numerical entries. Taken as a totality however, this is the best account of the Germantown to Valley Forge portion of the 1777 campaign currently in print.

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Taming Democracy might fairly be called a bold book. Author Bouton sweeps across Pennsylvania’s history from the end of the Seven Years’ War in 1763 through John Fries’s Rebellion in 1799. Two interrelated subjects dominate the rise and decline of democracy and of economic equality. Bouton asserts that Pennsylvanians reached a consensus by 1776, if not before, that their revolution should achieve the “twin goals of economic and political empowerment,” what he calls “the ‘vision of ’76,’ the ideal at the heart of what most Pennsylvanians thought the Revolution was about” (32). Above all else, their objective was to break free from imperial Britain’s stifling economic constraints, including the squelching of a land bank to provide easy loans and a provincial paper currency to conduct everyday business. In turn, they adopted a new state constitution in 1776 designed to encourage the full development of their democratic, equalitarian vision.

So far, so good, asserts Bouton, but then rapacious evildoers came along, none more prominently than the wealthy, proto-capitalist merchant Robert Morris. Apparently, the focus of “Financier of the Revolution” Morris, who served as the Continental Congress’s Superintendent of Finance (1781–1784), had little to do with finding the means to fund the new nation’s war debt. According to Bouton, Morris’s actual purpose was to enrich himself further through the Bank of North America (BNA), chartered by the Continental Congress late in 1781. As such, Morris and the BNA only made loans to other wealthy persons, those with the best credit ratings, while also squelching any plans for a Pennsylvania land bank that would make low interest loans to cash-starved farmers and urban working persons (often lacking in good credit). What Bouton does not explain is how Morris garnered such amazing power over the actions, or lack thereof, of the Pennsylvania