

the part of the publisher to use a capital I instead of a 1 in any numerical entries. Taken as a totality however, this is the best account of the Germantown to Valley Forge portion of the 1777 campaign currently in print.

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Terry Bouton. *Taming Democracy: "The People," the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. vii, 332, illustrations, notes, index. Cloth, \$35.00; Paper, \$21.95.)

Taming Democracy might fairly be called a bold book. Author Bouton sweeps across Pennsylvania's history from the end of the Seven Years' War in 1763 through John Fries's Rebellion in 1799. Two interrelated subjects dominate the rise and decline of democracy and of economic equality. Bouton asserts that Pennsylvanians reached a consensus by 1776, if not before, that their revolution should achieve the "twin goals of economic and political empowerment," what he calls "the 'vision of '76,' the ideal at the heart of what most Pennsylvanians thought the Revolution was about" (32). Above all else, their objective was to break free from imperial Britain's stifling economic constraints, including the squelching of a land bank to provide easy loans and a provincial paper currency to conduct everyday business. In turn, they adopted a new state constitution in 1776 designed to encourage the full development of their democratic, equalitarian vision.

So far, so good, asserts Bouton, but then rapacious evildoers came along, none more prominently than the wealthy, proto-capitalist merchant Robert Morris. Apparently, the focus of "Financier of the Revolution" Morris, who served as the Continental Congress's Superintendent of Finance (1781–1784), had little to do with finding the means to fund the new nation's war debt. According to Bouton, Morris's actual purpose was to enrich himself further through the Bank of North America (BNA), chartered by the Continental Congress late in 1781. As such, Morris and the BNA only made loans to other wealthy persons, those with the best credit ratings, while also squelching any plans for a Pennsylvania land bank that would make low interest loans to cash-starved farmers and urban working persons (often lacking in good credit). What Bouton does not explain is how Morris garnered such amazing power over the actions, or lack thereof, of the Pennsylvania

legislature when he was not then serving in that body. Nor does it bode well for the author's argument that the legislature repealed the BNA's state charter in 1785 but still failed to adopt programs to alleviate the financial problems facing Pennsylvania's middling and poorer sort.

No problem for Bouton. Having identified a truly nefarious malefactor of wealth in Morris, the author next presents an engaging analysis of what he describes as seven "rings of protection" that rural Pennsylvanians employed to stop state officials from making these struggling farmers pay their debts and taxes, even to the point of seizing and selling off the property holdings of delinquents (145–67). Bouton then carries his story forward to the Whiskey Rebellion and Fries's Rebellion, which he prefers to call "regulation" movements. He states that "[f]or more than 200 years, historians have misinterpreted this protest" by using the word rebellion. Rather, those who rose up "believed that they were trying to 'regulate' their government to act on behalf of the ordinary many rather than the wealthy few" (217–18).

What these regulators really wanted, if we choose to follow Bouton's logic, was wealth redistribution so that everyone, not just Robert Morris and his ilk, could realize the Vision of '76. Not surprisingly in this kind of interpretive framework, the federal Constitution of 1787 came about because the wealthy few wanted to make sure they could contain the democratic excesses of the people. In its intent, then, the Constitution was little more than another powerful "barrier against democracy" more or less forced onto the good folk of Pennsylvania, who could not get organized quickly enough to stop the hasty ratification movement by the state's ever-manipulating Federalists (171).

In sum, according to Bouton, "before 1776, elite and ordinary folk united behind the belief that only an equal distribution of wealth would protect freedom and keep democracy healthy." However, corrupt despoilers like Robert Morris, backed by a bunch of self-aggrandizing proto-capitalists, not only tamed but defeated that vision and apparently even had it "removed from public memory" (257–58). In reality, Bouton presents little evidence to support his oft-repeated assertion that Pennsylvania's Revolutionaries favored such a vision, especially in terms of wealth redistribution. Nor does he at any point carefully define his conception of democracy, a term that historians have long since demonstrated did not have the same meaning during the Revolutionary era that it does in our own time. In addition, Bouton's analysis of Robert Morris and the Bank

of North American begins and ends with the assumption that capitalistic greed was the Financier's only motivation, when, as many careful scholars have pointed out, Morris was wrestling with the very serious challenges of how to fund a massive war debt and establish a decent credit rating for the emerging American republic.

Indeed, this book is bold. At the same time, some might describe Bouton's interpretations as farfetched if not wholly fanciful, perhaps reflecting his own vision for the United States rather than an accurate assessment of what historical reality was like at the time of the dawning American Revolution. Those who read this volume will need to decide whether to accept Bouton's assertions and conclusions, just as Bouton did for himself in this currently fashionable era of post-modernist historical constructions.

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Kenneth Warren. *Bethlehem Steel: Builder and Arsenal of America*. (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2008. Pp. xix, 322, illustrations, tables, appendixes, notes, bibliography, index. Cloth, \$45.00.)

Why did Bethlehem Steel, headquartered in eastern Pennsylvania, grow to become the second-largest steel producer in the world after the United States Steel Corporation during the twentieth century? Even more important, why did this titan of industry, whose products helped build and arm the United States during its "American Century," ultimately collapse? Instead of simply seeing Bethlehem's incredible growth (and decline) as somehow inevitable, the product of great men's genius (and later failure), Kenneth Warren pays careful attention to numerous economic, historical, and individual factors as crucial, shifting variables that shaped and determined Bethlehem Steel's fortunes over the course of its history: regional, national, and global market forces, access to raw materials, technological change, competition among industrial firms, the burden of company infrastructure, and the limited ability of company leaders to anticipate market shifts and nimbly respond to changing technologies and new competition. Using sources such as company records, trade periodicals, newspapers, and government documents, this fine study is a welcome contribution to the history of the steel industry, as well as economic and business history in general.