business and labor history and particularly the intellectual debt owed to Jefferson Cowie’s *Capital Moves: RCA’s Seventy Year Quest for Cheap Labor* (1999). What is less clear, however, is the extent to which framing the story narrowly in order to simply demonstrate “that many of the strategies of late-twentieth-century capitalism had precursors earlier in the century” provides an adequate foundation for the complex and synthetic story he wishes to tell (6). Some scholars might see his decision to avoid a more sustained analysis of the relationship between the company, its workers, and the community during the postwar period as a missed opportunity. Others may wish for more than the tantalizing glimpses provided in the existing text of the many connections between Campbell Soup and the broader American political economy.

Despite these concerns, the book represents a fine merger of business and labor studies that, while remaining sympathetic to the working-class men and women laboring on the factory floor, successfully locates their experiences within a broader social historical framework. Sidorick argues persuasively that the “lean production” strategies adopted since the 1970s to keep costs low and ensure high profits for investors have a long history in American business. In addition to class, the author pays careful attention to issues of race, gender, and ethnicity as he paints a compelling case study of workplace politics. Alongside *Capital Moves* and Howard Gilette’s *Camden After the Fall* (2005), *Condensed Capitalism* fills an important niche in the history of the mid-Atlantic and of the relationship between workplace decision-making and the decline of the industrial city.

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James L. Sundquist uses the Foreword to this book to praise Renée Lamis for her contribution to the realignment genre, namely, the uncoupling of the notion of realignment from that of critical elections. David Mayhew has
made a case for this in his recent critique of the realignment paradigm. But minus the idea of critical elections, what is left of the realignment genre? The answer is, just the type of analysis provided by Lamis in this book: an investigation of electoral change over time, putting election data into its historical context. Such a study reveals that there is a process of change in the electorate, with one party gaining over time. In the case of Pennsylvania since 1960, “the increasing Democratic consistency of the Philadelphia metro area, the decreasing Democratic strength in the Pittsburgh metro area, the declining Democratic vote in the southern border counties except for Lancaster, the rise in Democratic voting in the rapidly growing northeastern counties in the region of the Pocono Mountains, and the relative partisan stability of the northern and central regions” (169). Lamis makes an excellent case for this thesis in the book on Pennsylvania from 1960 to 2008, and one can agree with Sundquist that “We finish the book feeling that we truly understand what happened in that time and place” (xxi). However, do we understand why it happened?

There is reason to doubt that we do. Lamis is right that there has been partisan shifts in Pennsylvania since the 1960s, and that there is a new set of political issues since that time, the cultural issues like abortion, school prayer, and now gay rights. Her book has three theses, then. The first concerns statewide partisan change, the second the emergence of new crosscutting cultural issues, and the third, and much stronger, thesis is that the new crosscutting issues are responsible for the partisan change, that the partisan change is a “culture-wars realignment.” But this last thesis is not argued for in any systematic way, much less proved. In lieu of an argument, there is instead in the first chapter a string of quotes from John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira on the politics of the “ideopolises,” which here means Philadelphia and its surrounding counties. The story goes that white professionals there tend to support the Democrats because they are attracted to their positions on cultural issues, or because they are turned off by Republican emphasis on them.

This type of argument is too simplistic. Elections are about many different things. Political parties strategically pursue victory in elections, and if there are trends in the issues that are important to a segment of the electorate, they will adapt. Lamis herself explains why Republicans can do so well in statewide elections despite the Democratic trend of the state: “Pennsylvania Republicans have been exceedingly savvy at adjusting and accommodating themselves to the partisan realities they confronted” (150). Elections are a lot
more complicated than an answer to a public opinion question, as is borne out by the plethora of details in Lamis’s excellent two-chapter narrative of Pennsylvania’s tight electoral competition.

By Lamis’s own classification, most of the victorious Pennsylvania politicians for Governor or United States Senator since 1960 have been moderate or conservative on social issues. On the presidential level, even Bill Clinton, as Lamis points out, “went to great lengths to distance himself from what he viewed as the losing Democratic stances of the culture-wars realignment” (15). If emphasizing one’s social liberalism were an unalloyed electoral benefit, then successful state politicians would not hesitate to do so, but instead most successful Pennsylvania politicians have downplayed their differences on these cultural issues. It makes sense that politicians would want to deemphasize very divisive issues. But if they are playing down the big issues of the day, then elections are not primarily to be understood as ideological contests, but rather as struggles between politicians who use policy positions to motivate people, along with other things which are perhaps more important, like personality, image, valence issues and symbolism. Politics is an art. Of course politicians claim in their election-night speeches that their election was a victory for their ideas, but scholars of politics must be more sophisticated than this.

If elections are not primarily about ideology, then shifts in partisan strength between elections over time cannot easily be attributable to ideological change. This is not to deny any ideological change in the electorate, but only to say that the parties will adapt to it, so that it cannot be measured by looking at election results. Voters are mostly ill-informed and not ideological anyway, as is strikingly illustrated by anecdotes Lamis provides: for example, Robert E. Casey, a nobody who ran to replace Robert P. Casey for auditor general, won the Democratic primary as a result of voter confusion. Perhaps one can get a better sense of the ideology of the electorate from opinion polls and exit polls (assuming, pace James Stimson, that the latter do actually measure voter reasons and not merely post hoc rationalizations), but Lamis does not present public opinion survey results that buttress the claim about social liberalism driving Democratic Party support in the Philadelphia suburbs. There were more self-identified conservatives than liberals in the Philadelphia suburbs in 2004, and more Republicans than Democrats.

Reading too much into election results was always the weakness of the realignment paradigm. Partisan change was supposedly provoked by cross-cutting issues, yet the new identification was then supposed to stabilize,
even to the point where the whole reason people supported the party in the first place becomes unclear. Such stabilization in partisan support can only describe valence issues, in which the hatred of the party that had mismanaged government is gradually forgotten with the increase of outrage at the shortcomings of the new party in power, and not well-defined ideological conflicts.

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