the ceremonies at cultural face-value, the author shows the theatrical nature of the displays and interprets the intentions of the actors, both Indian and white. As in the case of the Treaty at Greenville of 1795, the United States paternal political relationship with Northwestern Indians “was to be a provider and mediator, not a punisher of wrongdoers” (176). Equally as important, Nichols recognizes the mutual misunderstandings stemming from such conferences and the bloody conflicts that ensued. Rather than using indigenous people as passive critiques of western society, this book incorporates Native Americans as integral and dynamic players without demonizing or generalizing non-Indians.

There is something for all readers interested in early republic and Native American history. Nichols’ discussions are broad enough to explain the development of the early American republic for an introductory course and detailed enough to produce graduate level discussions. The only limitation was the lack of useful maps. The one general map showed where treaty conferences were throughout the time period but maps detailing the effects of treaties, especially land cessations, would be a very useful addition, especially for non-specialists. The narrative binds together the patch-work quilt of events and characters on the frontier into an exciting and easily understood whole. Nichols’ work is breath-taking in its cogent and insightful explanations that are as well-crafted for undergraduate students as for seasoned professors.

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In this work’s first chapter, Wayne Bodle writes “the ‘King’s friends’ always seem to be one big book away from popular critical mass, or at least historiographical redemption” (19). While The Other Loyalists might not be this “big book,” it is certainly an important step in the right direction. As the book’s subtitle indicates, Joseph S. Tiedemann and his fellow editors focus on non-elites in the middle colonies to offer new perspectives on loyalty and those who espoused it.
In an introduction that sets the rest of the book into context, Tiedemann and the late Eugene R. Fingerhut develop a number of broad themes. They argue that Loyalists in the middle colonies were disorganized, and ultimately weak, because they depended on British officials to enforce laws and maintain order. Therefore, as British power faded, Loyalists proved unable to organize as effectively as the Whigs. The editors also assert that their subjects had “varied and complicated” reasons for choosing loyalism, and these were often “personal or local rather than imperial in nature” (10). A final theme that links many of the seven essays that compose the heart of the book is a growing cycle of retaliatory violence.

*The Other Loyalists* is divided into three sections, the first of which is “Places.” “The Ghost of Clow” provides an interesting account of a failed April 1778 loyalist uprising on the remote Delmarva Peninsula. Noting the paucity of sources, a common problem when researching ordinary royalists, historian Bodle perceptively suggests that its alleged leader, China Clough, may not have actually organized this movement. Instead, Whigs might have attributed it to him because of “the American compulsion . . . to be able to put a name and a face to a mysterious evil” (37). Regardless, local militia, working with Continental authorities, quickly suppressed this insurgency but its memory persisted. Clough was not executed until a decade later, and others attempted to clear their names of any involvement in the uprising into the 1790s and beyond. In the section’s companion essay, David J. Fowler gives a horrifying account of the “predatory kind of war” that raged between New Jersey Whigs and Loyalists (58). As on the Delmarva Peninsula, regular British troops played little or no role in this fighting, but that did nothing to diminish the violence and may have actually increased it. Rather than treating captured Loyalists as legitimate combatants, Whig forces routinely executed them, whether they were soldiers, brigands in search of loot, or those engaged in illicit trade with the British. Loyalists then retaliated with a vengeance that is usually associated with the Southern Campaign. Collectively these two essays show the varied nature of the Revolutionary War and loyalism in areas frequently overlooked in other works.

“Groups,” the book’s strongest section, offers the broadest look at the loyalist experience. African Americans in the Mid-Hudson Valley took advantage of the revolutionary unrest and the presence of British forces in the area to undermine slavery. Like whites, however, many blacks remained neutral until circumstances made them choose a side, and in some cases they stayed loyal to their masters. Still, three thousand slaves left with the British when they
evacuated New York City in November 1782. A. Glenn Crothers provides an excellent account of the Revolution’s impact on Quakers in Northern Virginia. Although they initially supported the Americans’ resistance to Parliament’s enactments, the growing violence and moral questions about toppling a legitimate government eventually alienated many members of the Society of Friends. When internal unrest and British forces threatened Virginia in 1777 and 1780/81, Whig authorities interpreted Quaker non-participation as loyalism. They forced some Quakers to serve in the military, and distrained property and levied fines on others. Most Quakers stayed true to their principles, however, and used the experience to strengthen and purify their beliefs. Crothers argues that in the future Virginia Quakers advocated manumission and abolition, and attempted to help Native Americans and others who were in need. In the section’s concluding essay, Robert W. Venables asserts that the Revolution was a civil war for the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois), just as it was for whites. Although they initially hoped to remain neutral, most Iroquois, who saw themselves as “allies” not “subjects,” sided with Britain. Similar to the retaliatory violence in New Jersey, Venables argues that initially the Iroquois usually did not kill non-combatants but eventually did in response to repeated American outrages. Like many white Loyalists, large numbers of Iroquois settled in Canada after the war ended. Although this essay does not offer any startling new insights, it provides a good overview of Iroquois involvement.

The Other Loyalists last part, “People,” is a microscopic look at specific individuals and demonstrates the importance of economic motives. According to Doug MacGregor, John Connolly sought land grants at the falls of the Ohio River (modern-day Louisville, Kentucky) and resorted to any means to achieve his goals. He precipitated Lord Dunmore’s War in 1774 and then planned attacks on the American frontier to protect his claims, before he was captured. The experiences of Herman Zedtwitz, a Continental Army officer, closely parallel those of Benedict Arnold. Wounded in the failed 1775 assault on Quebec, the pathetic Zedtwitz repeatedly blamed others for his own problems. In Summer 1776 he corresponded with the British in a feeble attempt to collect a £2,000 debt which he believed he was owed. Like Connolly, he was quickly arrested and imprisoned. During his confinement, Zedtwitz went mad, writing bizarre stories about secret agents who both tortured him with an electronic machine and helped him escape. Eventually, his wife won his release, and he died in obscurity, similar to Arnold. While Connolly’s and Zedtwitz’s stories may not typify all or even most Loyalists, their stories put a human face on a wider movement.
Overall, *The Other Loyalists* is a welcome addition to Revolutionary historiography. With its broad array of people, groups, and geographic locations, it helps demonstrate the breadth and complexity of loyalism. It also offers some insights into why Loyalists failed. Finally, the essays will serve as useful starting points for comparative studies on others in both the middle colonies and elsewhere.

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*Dry Manhattan: Prohibition in New York City* by Michael A. Lerner has accumulated a number of accolades since its release in 2007, ranging from a glowing review in the *New York Times* to a *Slate Magazine* Best Book of the Year distinction. The author holds a Ph.D. from New York University and presently serves as the Associate Dean of Studies at Bard High School Early College in New York City. Lerner’s book is refreshingly straightforward; it is a monograph analyzing the prohibition era in New York City, with a central argument that the nation’s “noble experiment” failed miserably (2).

Lerner’s book is well organized and functions in a classic case-study format: analyzing a localized aspect in detail, but applying its historical lessons at a broader level. In *Dry Manhattan*, the author studies New York City and applies the lessons to American prohibition in general. Lerner begins his book by emphasizing the political roots of prohibition and briefly discussing the unique environment which allowed its inception. Lerner adheres to his formula by focusing on the Anti-Saloon League lobbyist efforts in NYC, specifically the arrival and effectiveness of New York State Superintendent William H. Anderson. However, in Lerner’s opinion New York had a larger importance, stating that “Anderson’s success or failure in New York would prove critical to the national campaign for Prohibition. . . . While New York was only one state, it loomed larger than most in the battle for a dry United States” (8). The Anti-Saloon League believed that New York would serve as a symbol for the larger movement—the idea being that if the League could succeed in the nation’s most notable “ethnic city,” a point which made it...