On February 16, 1854, the first passenger train wound its way around the mountain division of the Pennsylvania Railroad, consummating after eight years of construction a direct link between Philadelphia and the Ohio Valley. A few days later, with their route to the west finally complete, Philadelphians celebrated the passage of an act that extended the boundaries of the metropolis to make it in territorial terms the largest city in America. The building of the Pennsylvania Railroad and the annexation of outlying suburbs were each part of an urban imperialist program to make Philadelphia the central place in the nation’s burgeoning continental empire. Arthur M. Schlesinger Sr. coined the term “urban imperialism” to describe the rivalries between American cities as they strove to extend their hinterlands through the construction of turnpikes, canals, and railroads between the colonial era and Gilded Age. But while
several historians have explored the mercantilist ambitions of civic boosters, fewer have analyzed how promoters imagined the impact their labor would have on the built environment. In Philadelphia, though, advocates of the Pennsylvania Railroad promised citizens that once the West had been grappled with “iron hooks” the “tribute” of that ever-expanding market would flow into the metropolitan economy, providing employment to restless mechanics and builders, enriching real estate owners, and embellishing an ever-growing city.

To Sam Bass Warner, whose brilliant middle chapters of *The Private City* remain among the most influential pages ever written on Civil War–era Philadelphia, the men who made the Pennsylvania Railroad and consolidated the city government were the last of a generation of civic-minded generalists who had run American municipalities since the Revolution. He argues, however, that the heirs of men like Thomas Pym Cope (1768–1854), a merchant prince whose role as president of the Board and Trade and involvement in railroad building and political reform made him an archetypal urban imperialist, withdrew from public life to the private world of the counting house before the secession crisis. The new generation of businessmen, Warner suggests, did not have a strong attachment to place, seeing their terrain as the nation rather than the city.

Nearly forty years after its publication, Warner’s work continues to shape the writing of Civil War–era urban history, both in Philadelphia, where the late historical sociologist E. Digby Baltzell bemoaned the private ethic of the city’s Quaker upper class, and elsewhere. Even as new scholarship reveals the persistence of a commonweal tradition in American municipal government and uncovers urban citizens’ enduring belief in an indivisible “common good,” the notion of the mid-century city as a “community of private money makers” endures. Historians, indeed, have located the reign of “privatism” everywhere from the regulation of cesspits and sewers to the inadequate local funding of neighborhood improvements.

A few years after he finished *The Private City*, Warner conceded that he had used privatism as a synonym for capitalism, a force he saw as ever-present in shaping the American metropolis, but one that prior to the mid-nineteenth century had been restrained by the fetters of community in a walking city. The broad outline of his thesis is hard to deny: few historians would challenge the contention that the market and industrial revolutions underlay the transformation of cities in the era. But his caricature of Civil War–era businessmen as motivated solely by the profit ethic misses the enduring...
importance of their public commitment to urban imperialist. In coming
together to build and sustain the Pennsylvania Railroad, Cope’s generation—
and more surprisingly its heirs—sought not only personal enrichment but
also the remaking of Philadelphia’s social and spatial order: the transforma-
tion of the turbulent but tedious city of the 1840s into the London and Paris
of America. The boosters who led the calls for a line to Pittsburgh, indeed,
hoped to build a metropolis characterized not just by commercial dynamism
but also by the urban gentility that historians have argued became so impor-
tant to their identity as a class; in their minds, the one would lead naturally
to the other.8

Railroad building and metropolitan improvement therefore brought
Philadelphia’s real estate owners together in the 1840s and 1850s. Merchants, manufacturers, and professionals might have worshiped in
different churches, split at the polls into Whig, Democratic, and Native
American camps, and divided over their response to the question of slavery
extension, but their ideas about how cities grew and how they ought to func-
tion increasingly converged. Links to the West, they argued, would bring
trade into Philadelphia, which would provide a fund for the kind of embel-
lishment required to make their city more livable and increase the value of
their property. Cope’s successor as president of the Board of Trade, Frederick
Fraley (1804–1901), followed this line. Fraley was trained in the law and
flourished as a merchant, but helped to establish the Franklin Institute for
the Mechanic Arts. By bridging the divide between the city’s commercial
and manufacturing interests he was well placed to lead booster campaigns
to build the Pennsylvania and extend the reach of municipal government.
Other supporters of the Pennsylvania Railroad, like the attorney Eli Kirk
Price (1797–1884) and the newspaper publisher and postwar mayor Morton
McMichael (1807–79), would go on to acquire leadership positions in major
public projects like the Consolidation of 1854 and the creation of Fairmount
Park. Even Jay Cooke (1821–1906), the banker whom Warner identified as
the “private” citizen par excellence, played an active role in shaping the city’s
built environment. Though he was too young to play a significant part in
the creation of the Pennsylvania Railroad, in the years on either side of the
Civil War he joined the Citizens’ Association—an organization established
to improve the cleaning and maintenance of the streets—and participated in
campaigns to create Fairmount Park and turn the central avenue of Broad
Street into an elegant boulevard. Such figures saw a link between capitalist
expansion and metropolitan refinement.9
What Philadelphia’s economic elite did not bank on, though, was the physical toll economic growth would take on urban space. While opposition to private corporations’ use of the streets among working- and lower middle-class Americans in the era is well documented—notably in David Stowell’s impressive work on the strike of 1877 and studies of antirailroad riots in antebellum Philadelphia—less interest has been shown in the response to the steam train of an emerging bourgeoisie of merchants, manufacturers, and professionals in the big cities. Yet on either side of the Civil War the wagons of the Pennsylvania endangered not only the lives of pedestrians on the streets, but also civic boosters’ vision of an imperial metropolis. This presented wealthy Philadelphians with a dilemma. On the one hand, the railroad enriched them as private investors and drew capital to the city that found its way into the real estate market; on the other, its directors’ actions continually undermined boosters’ public designs for the built environment. If, by the eve of the Civil War, the Pennsylvania was proving difficult to rein in, this owed less to the readiness of Philadelphia’s businessmen to embrace the ethic of privatism and more to the collapse of popular support for urban imperialism. Indeed, when pushed to choose between their individual pursuit of profit and their collective interest in a genteel built environment, the economic elite opted with surprising frequency for the latter. Their class identity here was forged in public debates over how the city should look as well as their calculations over private profit, and for them, the Pennsylvania Railroad came to illustrate the problems of giving private corporations the power to pursue public ends.

**Western Expansion and “The Manifest Destiny of Philadelphia”**

The civic boosters who gathered at a series of mass meetings to demand a railroad to Pittsburgh in 1846 believed their city’s future lay in tapping a western market of limitless bounds. Diane Lindstrom’s study of commerce in the Philadelphia region prior to 1850 shows trade with an immediate hinterland was more important than the Ohio Valley to economic growth, but in the aspirations of mid-century promoters, the western market loomed large. The annexation of Texas, Oregon dispute, and troop movements along the Mexican border suggested the nation’s Manifest Destiny would soon be realized, and though Philadelphia’s Whig elite were wary of lending their support to planters’ empire-building projects, many shared Cope’s belief...
“that the Saxon race is destined at some period to spread all over North America.”

They therefore eyed with eager anticipation the rise of western cities and the rolling back of the frontier, agreeing with the aggressively expansionist Jacksonians that the Indian would have to give way before the march of “civilization.”

Promoters of the Pennsylvania Railroad, unlike their western counterparts, saw America’s continental empire as a colonial appendage of the East; the Philadelphia Public Ledger, for example, called the region an “auxiliary to the Atlantic states.”

Philadelphia’s merchants and factory owners, convinced the western economy would remain rooted for years in extractive industries and staple production, envisaged exchanging the manufactured goods their city produced for mineral wealth and foodstuffs. For merchants who had lost most of their foreign trade to New York, and for factory owners who championed a high protective tariff, the destiny of their metropolis lay over the Appalachians.

Boosters believed that if they could make the burgeoning western market “tributary” to Philadelphia, their city would become the “London of America.”

Read backwards from Manhattan’s late nineteenth-century ascendancy such a claim appears fanciful; to contemporaries, however, it did not seem an unreasonable proposition. Institutions like Cope’s Board of Trade, which would expand before the Civil War to represent manufacturers as well as merchants, continually reminded citizens that Philadelphia had once been the largest city on the continent; so too did newspapers like the Public Ledger and North American and United States Gazette, which offered strong support to railroad builders. Only New York’s energetic pursuit of internal improvements, these voices argued, had made her the “Empire City” of the new nation.

By the 1840s, though, the advent of steam power threatened to render the Erie Canal obsolete, and the railroad’s annihilation of space extended the field of competition for northern cities all the way to the “foundation of all empires,” the Pacific Ocean. If citizens on the banks of the Delaware could grasp with an “iron hand” these far-flung regions, their city might yet become the nation’s greatest metropolis. To one newspaper, publishing just a few weeks before the completion of the line to Pittsburgh, such a position was “the manifest destiny of Philadelphia.”

Making Philadelphia the London of the New World, however, only whetted the appetite of her promoters, who argued that a city boasting an imperial trade needed an imperial form to signal its greatness. Here the ambitions of the economic elite encompassed transforming the metropolis into what one
citizen called the “Paris of America.” Well before Napoleon III commenced the rebuilding of his capital in 1852–53, the promenades of the French capital had served New World observers as an exemplar of how a city ought to look and inspired imitation in Philadelphia. In 1838, for instance, a correspondent insisted the central thoroughfare of Broad Street could surpass in beauty the “far-famed Boulevards” which were “justly the pride” of the French capital. Over the next few months wealthy citizens from across the metropolis met to urge the city to transform the street into an avenue worthy of Paris. The pursuit of gentility and refinement that Richard Bushman has traced to the eighteenth century drove mid-nineteenth-century civic boosters in the direction of imitating the form of the French capital. In designs for streets, squares, and parks, wealthy Philadelphians envisaged the reconstruction of their city and a new public culture of ornamentation and display.

Yet if London and Paris provided models of economic dynamism and urban embellishment, they also served as chastening warnings. The recurrent outbreaks of violence, especially in the latter, illustrated the dangers common to all “great cities.” By the 1840s, wealthy citizens had become so accustomed to epidemics of rioting and disease that they were well aware that Philadelphia too was menaced by what one diarist called the “dark masses of ignorance & brutality” that lurked beneath the surface of civilization. Two bloody disturbances in the summer of 1844, which pitted Protestants against Irish immigrants and led to the burning of Catholic churches, suggested the scale of the problem, as did cholera epidemics in 1832 and 1849. As early as the 1840s reformers were beginning to locate the source of these disorders in a degraded urban environment, leading railroad boosters like Cope to press for the construction of parks and public squares as physically and morally cathartic spaces for interclass recreation. To fund these ambitious designs Philadelphians needed to find the capital from public or private sources.

The involvement of merchants, manufacturers, professionals, and real estate owners in movements for a railroad, park, and eventually a consolidated city government, suggests that, as in New York, a vision of spatial and social order and not just the pursuit of profit brought the economic elite together as a class. Whether Democrats, Whigs, or Nativists—scions of old colonial families or upstart businessmen—these men upheld with a surprising degree of unanimity an urban vision that had the dual purpose of civilizing the “mighty tribes of Philadelphia Indians” who found shelter in the courts and alleys of working-class neighborhoods while also providing a genteel playground for men and women of wealth. But perhaps most important, the built environment assumed a symbolic function as physical testimony
Prior to 1854, the boundaries of the city proper extended from the Delaware River, just beyond the eastern (right) edge of the map, to the Schuylkill River in the west (left), and from South (or Cedar) Street to Vine Street. Horse-drawn freight cars carried their loads along Broad and Market, the two widest streets in the city proper. The Pennsylvania Railroad’s depot stood just over the Schuylkill in West Philadelphia, but the corporation spent much of the 1850s trying to find a more direct route to the Delaware waterfront (not shown, east of Third Street). After establishing a freight depot just east of Penn Square in the 1850s, it eventually acquired land below Washington Avenue on the river. Its decision to move to such a southerly location upset civic boosters who wanted the railroad to tunnel under Callowhill Street (one block north of Vine) and erect a grand passenger terminus on Broad. The city’s economic elite by midcentury had begun to move out of the old downtown east of Washington Square to the likes of Rittenhouse Square, Spring Garden (above Logan Square), and over the Schuylkill River in West Philadelphia. Booster journals like Morton McMichael’s *North American and United States Gazette* invested Broad and Market streets—the two widest in the city—with totemic power, seeing them as “the reflex and image of the mighty city in which they are located.” With the avenues cast as a form of symbolic capital, hiding the freight that would fund their embellishment from public view became all the more important.
to the city’s imperial destiny. No one captured this sentiment better than Morton McMichael’s haughty North American, a newspaper that continually championed railroad building and urban improvement before the Civil War. In urging the city to finance the embellishment of Broad Street, the journal reminded its readers that the thoroughfare was “an image of Philadelphia in whose lineaments might be traced the lofty attributes, the proud consequence, the strength, the power, the magnificence, the wealth, and the resources of this mighty aggregation of people” (see fig. 1). Even as they retreated from the turbulent world of partisan politics, then, wealthy citizens constructed a new civic role for themselves as advocates of metropolitan improvement. The urban form by the mid-century indeed had become a matter of public concern to the city’s economic elite. But they would increasingly tie its fate to a private corporation. 

Public Interest and a Private Corporation

The boosters behind the railroad-building frenzy of the 1840s and 1850s argued that all they needed to realize their imperial ambitions were the transportation links to bind Philadelphia to its continental hinterland. “A broad plan of systematic intercommunication is as essential to the requirements of a great city,” proponents of one scheme argued in this vein, “as a wide foundation to the proportions of a towering dome.” In the 1820s, shaken by the success of the Erie Canal, forty-eight Philadelphians led by Mathew Carey established the Pennsylvania Society for the Promotion of Internal Improvements, subscribed $100 each, and launched a propaganda campaign to persuade the state to fund a series of canals and railroads that gave the city a route to Pittsburgh. But the so-called Main Line proved “one of the costliest failures of the antebellum period,” and after the Panic of 1837 the commonwealth failed to meet the interest payments on the debt issued to build it. After the debacle, angry European creditors refused to finance new state improvements while fearful local investors abandoned railroad securities in favor of city bonds and ground rents.

A few years later, however, an attempt on the part of Baltimore boosters to build a railroad to western Pennsylvania stirred Philadelphians into action once more. Unlike Carey’s campaign for the Main Line, there was no small cabal coordinating activity this time, but a broad cross-section of the city’s businessmen: merchants, manufacturers, and professionals.
The public interest of the private city

In December 1845, Cope, Fraley, Price, and the locomotive builder Matthias W. Baldwin were among the hundreds of citizens who signed the call for a meeting at the Chinese Museum to urge representatives in the state capitol to reject the request of the Baltimore and Ohio for a right of way through the state to Pittsburgh. In the next legislative session, their efforts were rewarded when lawmakers chartered the Pennsylvania Railroad to build a line from Philadelphia to the West. The charter was granted, however, on the condition that if $3 million had not been subscribed by July 1847, then the right of way to the headwaters of the Ohio would revert to the Maryland corporation instead. Immediately, then, boosters confronted the problem of capitalizing the enterprise if Philadelphia was to contend for the prize of a western empire.

The question of how to fund the city’s imperial ambitions pushed the railroad’s supporters down a well-trodden mercantilist path that would have been familiar to their Early National predecessors. From the moment of the road’s inception its progenitors understood private capital alone would not sustain the venture. With legislators in Harrisburg unwilling to risk another disaster like the Main Line, boosters turned to the municipal corporation for aid. At a meeting in April 1846, “filled with the wealthiest and most respectable citizens of Philadelphia,” the attendees asked the city council and all the surrounding suburban districts to purchase $4 million of Pennsylvania Railroad stock, well in excess of the amount required to keep the Baltimore and Ohio out of the state.

Although the scale of the proposal dwarfed previous examples of government support for private enterprises, it was hardly an unprecedented request. The public funding of transportation had deep roots in the mercantilist political economy of the early modern European monarchies, with private corporations like the East India Company given monopoly privileges over trading routes in order to further the strategic and economic interests of the crown. These joint stock companies, which often persisted well into the nineteenth century, served as imperial surrogates to their princely creators, establishing trading posts, running distant colonies, and bringing back to the metropole the riches of a far-flung periphery. The use of private monopolies to bolster public power was therefore well established by the American Revolution, and although that revolt hinged in part on colonial grievances with mercantilism, the statesmen of the Early Republic were quite happy to adopt the system themselves to strengthen their new nation. So, too, were states and cities as they devised foreign policies of their own to
control vital trade routes. Urban merchants saw state power as a way to secure a competitive edge on their counterparts in rival metropolitan centers.30

In contrast to state-run ventures like the Main Line and Erie Canal, mixed enterprises—commonplace in America until the Civil War—were chartered as private endeavors but often largely capitalized with public money. Both Pennsylvania and Philadelphia invested in such corporations, as boosters appealed to state and civic pride to realize their ambitions.31 Thus when promoters in 1846 argued that Philadelphia’s future depended on the city stepping in to provide much of the working capital for the railroad, their appeal was far from unprecedented. But whereas the monopoly corporations of early modern Europe were beholden only to the whims of the crown, a railroad created by legislators acting in the name of the sovereign people and funded by an elected municipal body would be forced to negotiate the nebulous terrain of the public interest. Boosters consequently needed to convince an electorate that remained wary of consolidated economic power—as President Andrew Jackson’s successful campaign against the city’s Second National Bank had shown—of the merits of subscribing.

Those in favor of municipal financing for the Pennsylvania therefore drew on the familiar defense of corporate power that private corporations were chartered to work for the public good.32 In a city in which turbulent workingmen, many of whom had struggled to find employment after the Panic of 1837, had proved a constant problem for the weak and divided municipal authorities, the potential economic benefits of railroad building were not difficult to identify. By the mid-1840s, Philadelphia’s Whigs were doing their best to incorporate workers into their party around a defense of the protective tariff. Like import duties, the railroad promised to restore prosperity to the city. “We shall not be troubled by riots or outbreaks of any kind, if our young men are profitably employed,” argued one advocate of public funding.33 Occasional subscriptions to the capital stock on the part of urban artisans, meanwhile, bolstered promoters’ claims that the Pennsylvania was a community endeavor.34

In defining the public interest, boosters emphasized too the beneficial impact of the railroad on the urban form, while warning real estate owners of the consequences of inaction. If the municipal corporation held back from investing in the Pennsylvania, one citizen maintained, the city would be relegated to the rank of a “Lilliputian village,” while the merchant David S. Brown told a meeting that real estate would “depreciate to an extent which even the boldest among us would hesitate to predict.” Men like Brown
deflected fears that the municipal borrowing required to fund a subscription
would increase the tax burden on unremunerative property by suggesting city
lots would be rendered worthless without the railroad.35

Building the railroad, proponents of civic subscriptions argued, would
have quite the opposite impact: in making Philadelphia the London of the
continent the Pennsylvania would generate the surplus to transform it into
America’s Paris, too, a “city of stores and palaces.” Profits secured from the
railroad would flow into the local real estate market, and citizens would
“build and improve” the metropolis with renewed vigor. Correspondents
pointed here to the impact of transportation improvements in New York
and Boston, where grand hotels and “stately houses” had been the fruits of
urban mercantilism. And property owners would reap the rewards. “Every
man who understands the causes that operate on the market value of real
estate,” one argued, “would instantly feel such an increase of confidence in
the future prosperity of Philadelphia.” When the Pennsylvania asked for
further funding in 1849, the North American, reviewing the construction
underway along the city’s business avenues, reminded its readers of what the
line’s bounty would do to their metropolis. The railroad “will induce” other
improvements, it declared, “more extensive and valuable than any yet made.”
Real estate owners would benefit in their public capacity, too. For when the
“obstructions and dust” had cleared, Philadelphians could enjoy in their
evening promenades the “beauty and order” the railroad was already bringing
to the city’s streets.36

Here was an enticing image of public space remade by a private
corporation: a process benefiting individual real estate owners and the city
as a whole. Streets that had languished since the Panic of 1837 would be
lined with mansions, absorbing in their construction the labor of work-
ers left idle by the slump. Merchants and manufacturers would flock to
Philadelphia, bringing with them the capital to fund the city’s expan-
sion, while raising property values yet higher. Burgeoning revenue from
property taxes would enable the municipal authorities to build the parks
and public squares so important to figures like Cope. This virtuous cycle
of public and private investment would continue to extend Philadelphia
outwards and upwards, providing the city’s bourgeoisie with an imposing
monument to metropolitan might, an urban form at once aesthetically
imposing and socially useful, and an appreciating stake in metropolitan
real estate. In the booster imagination, then, urban imperialism and urban
improvement were inseparable.
As they allayed anxieties that the Pennsylvania would turn out to be another “monster” corporation, the railroad’s wealthy supporters pointed to its potential not only to increase trade and employment, but also to remake property and space. The taxpayers and tenants who would ultimately foot the bill for the investment were offered a stark choice between Philadelphia as a village or a metropolis, at the very moment when the Mexican War was making the prize of western trade appear more valuable than ever. Unsurprisingly, they choose the latter. In November 1846 the city government approved an initial $1.5 million subscription to the Pennsylvania. Over the next few years, its investment grew to $5 million, with the municipal corporation investing close to that amount again in other roads that connected to the Pennsylvania’s trunk line. In exchange, Philadelphia’s mayor chaired the annual meeting of stockholders and its councils appointed two directors to the board.

By 1874 the Pennsylvania controlled over 6,000 miles of railroad—more than half the total mileage in France, then the world’s third-largest economy—and boasted a capital stock of nearly $70 million. As the line had grown over the preceding decades it seemed to exceed even the most sanguine predictions of its promoters and became an emblem of the city and commonwealth, leaving the jurist, playwright, and mayor Robert Conrad to wonder in 1854 whether there was anyone in the state “who is not proud of the Pennsylvania Railroad?” The railroad’s vast profits, augmenting stock, and regular dividends certainly appeared to disprove the pessimistic projections of its early critics. The road, moreover, seemed to be fulfilling its principal purpose of spurring economic development. Its backers may have been fortunate that the late 1840s finally saw the local economy recover from the turmoil of 1837, but it was easy for them to attribute the rapid growth of the city, the resurgence of manufacturing—which more than doubled in the decade before the Civil War—and increasing activity in the real estate market to the line’s munificent impact.

Meanwhile, the Pennsylvania’s expansion in the direction of Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago, and St. Louis gave credence to the booster prophecy that the railroad would form the first chain of a transcontinental highway, making Philadelphia the great mart for the trade of the Far West and Pacific (see fig. 2). To the future Radical Republican congressman William D. Kelley, indeed, the road was the “first link to bind the two hundred and fifty millions of Europe with the seven hundred and fifty millions of Asia.” By the end of the Civil War the Pennsylvania had become one of the largest private corporations in the world with one of the world’s largest public corporations—the City of Philadelphia—as its biggest single stockholder.
The public interest of the private city

Figure 2: Pennsylvania Railroad western extensions, 1870s. Leases and acquisitions had extended the network from its initial terminus at Pittsburgh, which had a direct connection to Philadelphia from 1854, to the Mississippi River, where it connected with the nation’s first transcontinental line, and to the shores of the Great Lakes. The Pennsylvania leased a railroad from Pittsburgh to Chicago in 1869, having already invested heavily in the venture over the preceding decade. By 1874, the Pennsylvania controlled directly or indirectly over 6,000 miles of track, and its new president, Thomas A. Scott, had already served a stint running the Union Pacific, which connected the Mississippi Valley to California.

Yet the merchants and manufacturers who had brought the Pennsylvania into being had done so because they were persuaded that it would pursue their vision of the public good as well as their aspirations for private profit. By the mid-1850s, however, the ambitions of city boosters and railroad had begun to diverge as the legislative lynchpins of urban imperialism came under attack. The split began when politicians in Harrisburg repealed a short-lived gauge law that had mandated a single track width for Pennsylvania railroads. This gave out-of-state lines the opportunity to cross the commonwealth without transshipment. Before long, a group of Pennsylvanians allied to the New York and Erie Railroad secured a right of way along the shore of Lake Erie to reach Ohio. Such a move was hardly in the interests of the Pennsylvania Railroad, and one Philadelphia representative in Harrisburg, who boasted of his design to make his city the “grand distributing point of trade for the world,” called Erie “a seat of war” and warned the state was in danger of becoming
“New Yorkized.” Over the following years, the Pennsylvania Railroad’s directors carefully cultivated ties with state political leaders like Simon Cameron to ensure more favorable legislation. Such lobbying bore fruit with the repeal of a tonnage tax on the railroad and the sale at a cut price to the Pennsylvania of its publicly owned competition, the Main Line of State Works.

With Harrisburg under its thumb, the railroad then looked to expand into rival eastern markets, even when this compromised its mission to bring trade to Philadelphia. In the mid-1860s, for example, directors ordered construction of the Junction and Connecting railroads, both subsidiaries of the Pennsylvania, which enabled trains from Baltimore and Pittsburgh to bypass Philadelphia en route to points north. A few years later the Pennsylvania leased most of the New Jersey railroad network and commenced work on a depot across the Hudson from Manhattan. While these developments must have delighted many shareholders—who as the capital stock increased were less likely to hail from Philadelphia—civic boosters were left aghast at the decision of the railroad to make its city of origin a waystation on the route to greater marts. As early as 1853, one citizen had warned that to make “our great road tributary to the grasping enterprise and cunning of New York” would be “suicidal” for Philadelphia. But by the Civil War city councils no longer had the muscle as stockholders to heed his advice.

Over the course of the 1850s and 1860s, then, the Pennsylvania seemed to be cutting itself loose from its metropolitan moorings. Nowhere was this more evident than in its directors’ apparent disregard for the urban form. Boosters had never entirely disguised the demands the railroad would make on the built environment. Several had warned that the trade of a continent flowing through Philadelphia’s streets would place an unprecedented stress on an urban infrastructure in urgent need of modernization. Predicting a commercial torrent “mighty beyond conception” rolling along the tracks of the Pennsylvania, one correspondent of the *Public Ledger* recommended the removal of the market sheds at the heart of the commercial district, the improvement of streets and sidewalks, and the setting aside of space for recreation. “Such, or similar arrangements will be necessary for the dispatch of locomotion,” he insisted.

The coming of the railroad meant that even the grid—a legacy of William Penn’s original city plan—came under critical scrutiny. While the city’s real estate owners appreciated how easily uniform lots could be bought and sold, others complained that the lack of diagonals increased congestion. By the post-bellum era, engineers and boosters expressed cautious support for the
construction of radial avenues, to serve not only as monumental boulevards but also as arteries carrying the immense traffic of an imperial metropolis.\textsuperscript{47} Long before then, the Pennsylvania had enlarged the urban ambitions of boosters. One citizen in 1853, for example, called for “more large hotels, pleasant drives, parks, fountains” and the opening of the city’s public buildings to draw visitors. Railroads, he explained, “have changed the nature of things.”\textsuperscript{48}

A lack of public money, however, meant most of these grand designs went unbuilt. Philadelphians tended to underinvest in what David Harvey has called the “secondary circuit of capital”: the infrastructure of public works that forms a prerequisite for accumulation without ever being directly remunerative itself.\textsuperscript{49} Given the scale of the city’s railroad debt, the rival claims of developers in different neighborhoods, and—prior to the Consolidation of 1854 at least—an anxiety that improvements funded by the two-square-mile city proper would subsidize growth in the outer suburbs, boosters found it difficult to win electoral backing for their plans, despite often enjoying the support of prominent businessmen and the press. Stephen Girard (1750–1831), one of the richest merchants in America, even left a portion of his vast estate to the city for widening a commercial thoroughfare along the Delaware riverfront, but it did little to expedite significantly the flow of goods through the crowded commercial downtown.\textsuperscript{50} Philadelphia therefore remained unprepared for the deluge of trade the Pennsylvania promised to bring.

The construction of municipally owned freight railways through the city offered one solution to the quandary, but this generated its own problems. In the 1830s Cope’s Board of Trade persuaded the city government to lay tracks down Broad and Market, which eventually connected the Reading and Pennsylvania systems to the downtown and port.\textsuperscript{51} Elsewhere in the suburbs the state granted private railroads the right to occupy the streets. This sparked fierce protests. In the industrial district of Kensington, which sat to the north of Center City, workers laying the Philadelphia and Trenton were hounded by angry residents, who resented the handing over of public space to a private corporation. When, following the torching of the company president’s home, the company was forced to back down, citizens processed by candlelight through the streets bearing a banner that bore a stark warning to railroad promoters: “THE CONSTITUTION PROTECTS THE PEOPLE IN THE USE OF THEIR HIGHWAYS.”\textsuperscript{52}

In Center City, however, businessmen tried to persuade citizens that railroads’ occupation of public thoroughfares was in the public interest.
Promoters cast the municipally owned City Railroad along Broad and Market as a crucial artery circulating the life-blood of trade around the metropolis. Bringing railroads “to the outer edges of outer districts,” the Commercial List declared, “is not enough. Their freight must reach the heart of trade, circulating freely and rapidly back and forth, if we would insure growth and vigor to our prosperity.” “To impede railroad communications,” the journal concluded, “is sheer suicide.”

But this calculation presented the economic elite with a dilemma as their private interests and public visions jarred. As the two widest avenues in an otherwise constricted gridiron, Market and Broad streets (see fig. 1 above) were invested with totemic power by civic boosters. To McMichael’s North American, indeed, the streets were destined to become “the reflex and image of the mighty city in which they are located”: Market, a monument to commercial might; Broad, a genteel promenade. Like other critics the paper found the decision to give them over to railroads, no matter how important the connections might have been to Philadelphia’s ascent, hard to justify. Instead of elevating each thoroughfare to the first rank of metropolitan avenues, the tracks visibly impeded their improvement. Anthracite coal carried on the cars of the Reading system found its way along the street railway to yards on Broad, reducing what many thought ought to be Philadelphia’s answer to the Rue de Rivoli to a sooty eyesore. And on Market the unsightly freight cars carrying the bounty of the West that clogged the street undermined the designs of the economic elite for an imposing business avenue. Even after the Civil War citizens who had earlier demanded the municipality subscribe to the Pennsylvania were calling for the removal of the tracks that bore its commerce.

The clash over freight railroads in the streets either side of the Civil War set the stage for a series of conflicts between the Pennsylvania and its Philadelphia creators over the impact the line would have on urban space. Though they never adopted the militant tactics of the Kensington rioters, wealthy Philadelphians drew on surprisingly similar ideas about the responsibility of a private corporation to the public good, and saw the state’s role in regulating the urban environment in far broader terms than merely expediting business. The problems began as early as April 1851, when the Pennsylvania asked the city’s Common and Select councils to lease a portion of Penn Square for use as a freight depot. The square, located at the intersection of Broad and Market on the present site of City Hall, had been one of the five spaces set aside for public use in William Penn’s plan.
for Philadelphia, though little work was ever undertaken to improve the
ground; by the mid-1840s councils mainly used it for growing fodder. In the
aftermath of a cholera epidemic and major riot in 1849, however, bourgeois
citizens were increasingly inclined to see public squares as bulwarks of public
health and urban order. Moreover, they envisaged the city’s green spaces, like
the tree-lined boulevard they hoped Broad Street would become, as part of a
“geography of refinement,” a genteel promenade that would benefit both the
private interests of real estate owners and the public interest of the metropolis
as a whole. By mid-century, wealthy Philadelphians were convinced that
such sites were a social and economic imperative for the city, and that the
municipality, with its revenue swelled by the trade of the Pennsylvania, had
the capital to invest in their embellishment.

When the Pennsylvania asked its largest stockholder for permission
to occupy the square in 1851, then, the question for the city govern-
ment involved more than the pursuit of profit. Within a few days of the
request, a strong opposition movement emerged that drew in many of the
wealthy citizens who had championed the municipal subscription in 1846.
Opponents of the lease quickly contrasted the private interests of the railroad
and the public needs of the city—a distinction rarely present in the earlier
debate. One correspondent to the *Evening Bulletin*, for example, accused the
“wealthy corporation” of thinking only of “dollars and cents” in trying to
obtain Penn Square. He argued the line must not be allowed to appropriate
one of the few recreational spaces accessible to the city’s poor. A remon-
strance signed by subscribers to the railroad, meanwhile, insisted the site was
“a common property and a common privilege” and should not be handed over
for the private benefit of any special interest. Even a correspondent to the
*Commercial List*—a mouthpiece for the city’s merchants—counseled against
the authorities granting the land, warning it would be a mistake to “disfigure
a whole metropolis” by bringing an unsightly depot into the center.

Critics persistently referred to the squares as the “lungs of the town,” an
organic part of the corporate body that breathed life into the whole; even
shareholders and newspapers hitherto fiercely loyal to the Pennsylvania
employed the metaphor. By making the fresh air of Penn Square more
critical to the health and vitality of the metropolis than the railroad itself, the
assumptions that had underlain the subscriptions were undercut. Indeed when
the councils, under public duress, rejected the application from the railroad,
one newspaper—admittedly no great friend of the corporation—welcomed a
decision that saved the space “from tuberculous disease.” Within five years,
the Pennsylvania had gone from being a cure-all medicine for the city’s ills to a sickness that threatened the well-being of the metropolis.

The struggle over the fate of Penn Square demonstrated that when forced to choose between the pursuit of profit and their designs for urban space, businessmen were sometimes willing to opt for their public interests over their private ones. Some did live in the vicinity, as the transformation of the neighborhood around Rittenhouse Square to the west of Broad Street (see fig. 1 above) into an elite residential enclave had begun in the 1840s. More important to them, however, was the symbolic importance of the Broad and Market intersection on William Penn’s original plan. Penn Square’s potential as a genteel plaza—a grand civic space that could serve as fitting symbol of Philadelphia’s metropolitan claims—made the dispute far more than a battle between local property owners and a business corporation. Instead, it demonstrated the need for greater levels of public control over the built environment.

Three years later, indeed, the Consolidation of 1854 Act, drawn up by an early advocate and stockholder of the Pennsylvania, attorney Eli Kirk Price, made it a requirement for the city government to provide parks and squares at taxpayers’ expense. A few months after councils had rejected the railroad’s request, he wrote an extraordinary letter to the North American, which called for the careful planning of suburban extensions around open spaces in a large estate above the city proper that was about to come into market, and also for the protection of unbuilt land around the Schuylkill River from “manufactories, coal wharves and dwellings.” It is hard to believe his ideas had not been influenced by the Penn Square debate. In 1851, with the Pennsylvania still subservient to the city that had given it life, the definition of the public interest men of his class had helped to construct won out. But as the corporate power of the railroad grew, this would not always prove the case.

The shift in the balance of power from the city to the railroad became clear just eight years later. From their earliest meetings the directors of the Pennsylvania knew the line would need an outlet to the wharves on the Delaware River. Initially, they were willing to use the tracks of the City Railroad, but the problems of congestion, accidents, and a municipal ordinance prohibiting the use of steam engines in the downtown frustrated the corporation. With its freight depot located on 13th Street—adjacent to the rejected Penn Square site but over a mile inland from the Delaware wharves—the Pennsylvania lost business as the burden of transshipment and drayage had to be factored into prices. In 1859, having weathered the financial storm
of the recent Panic, the directors commissioned Strickland Kneass—one of Philadelphia’s foremost engineers and the respected city surveyor—to assess the merits of various routes to a new riverfront terminus.53

Most of the locations Kneass set out to investigate were to the north or south of the old “city proper” and well beyond the line of improvements, where potential wharf property was cheaper to acquire. Any scheme that threatened to capture the business of the commercial district, however, worried downtown merchants and real estate owners who had helped to establish the Pennsylvania. In the early 1840s the Reading Railroad constructed wharves about five miles to the northeast of Market Street in Richmond; in doing so, it drew the anthracite trade away from the Schuylkill riverfront at the western edge of the city proper, leading to the rapid depreciation of property in the vicinity. Few boosters in the 1850s wanted to see the directors pursue what one paper called “the suicidal policy of building up a second Richmond,” especially one that might provide an easy link with New Jersey railroads to New York.64 But to bring the Pennsylvania to a central point in the metropolis seemingly involved accepting the chaos and congestion of the City Railroad, and with it the impossibility of ever transforming one of Philadelphia’s widest thoroughfares into a grand avenue. It fell to engineer Solomon K. Hoxie to propose a solution that promised to nullify the contradiction between commercial imperatives and boosters’ urban ambitions.

Hoxie planned to tear up Callowhill Street, running a few blocks north of Market, and tunnel along most of its length between the Schuylkill and the Delaware. Once tracks had been set down, the roadway above it would be repaired, a technique employed in the construction of London’s District and Metropolitan lines a few years later. At the time, it represented a novel innovation: a point that would demonstrate Philadelphia was not “the effete adopter of secondhand principles, but can originate and perfect the new as well as imitate and improve upon the old.”65 The Pennsylvania, after purchasing waterfront land at the end of the subway, would then have its direct outlet to the river, merchants and manufacturers would get the central location for the depot they desired, and the street railways that inhibited the ornamentation of Market and Broad could be removed. Perhaps as important, the tunnel would stand as a subterranean monument to Philadelphia’s power. Hoxie’s design, one newspaper argued, “would be indeed a magnificent enterprise . . . calculated to confer great credit on our city as the seat of such a noble work,” while the North American insisted the enterprise would reflect “lustre upon
our city and age.” The scheme inspired the millionaire locomotive builder Joseph Harrison to propose erecting an imposing passenger depot on Broad Street to complement the tunnel.

In the debate over civic subscriptions to the Pennsylvania, boosters had insisted that the road would be the bedrock of the city’s prosperity. Hoxie found a way to realize the promise of this metaphor by burying unsightly freight beneath the soil. In reconciling the pursuit of private profit with the public interest of metropolitan embellishment, he secured the backing of Philadelphia’s economic elite who wrote to newspapers and distributed pamphlets in support of the scheme. Supporters of the plan lauded both the physical and symbolic impact it would have on the metropolis. If Hoxie and Harrison’s plans were realized, one correspondent argued, the tunnel’s “arched ways,” “magnificent central passenger station at Broad street,” and “shipping depot on the Delaware” would do more “towards giving the city a name and standing in the South, at the West, and at the North, than all the Opera Houses in Christendom.” Without it, though, “injury to the street” was inevitable.

Such lobbying failed to move the Pennsylvania’s directors. While Kneass praised the tunnel plan as “entirely practicable” and far ahead of its rivals in terms of the “advantages” accrued, he concluded “that the location of so magnificent a project, should have its outlet upon ground of such immense value” as to render the entire scheme prohibitively expensive. He proposed instead the construction of a depot at Greenwich Point, some distance below the city’s southern extremities, and the directors eventually agreed. By 1860 Hoxie’s plan was dead, and Harrison—depressed by the failure of his proposal for a monumental hauptbahnhof—took ship for Europe.

The angry response of other wealthy Philadelphians to the Pennsylvania’s decision illustrates the enduring importance of urban imperialism to the way they thought about a private corporation. In keeping with its populist reputation, the Sunday Dispatch argued that the selection of a location for a depot well to the south of the commercial center was a speculative ploy by the directors of the railroad, who, the paper alleged, had invested heavily in the Greenwich Land and Improvement Company, a corporation chartered in 1854 to develop the chosen site. The councilman, real estate speculator, and Board of Trade officer William B. Thomas, however, was able to spot less conspiratorial calculations behind the decision. Though critical of the directors’ choice, he did not accuse them of being “derelict to the interests of a majority of the individual stockholders, many of whom are foreign capitalists.” To him
it was regrettable that the noncity members “should prefer private interests which they were selected to promote, to a policy which would profit the business community, and contribute in no small measure to the progress and prosperity of Philadelphia.”

But the notion that the corporation was bound to follow “the interests of the Company, and those interests alone” seemed anathema to the Philadelphia Press. The paper reminded its readers that the stockholders of the Pennsylvania “are mainly the citizens of Philadelphia in their corporate capacity”—an exaggeration by this point, but not a great one—and “while these stockholders are directly interested in the railroad, they are just as directly interested, and on average to ten times the extent in the business and prosperity of the city of which they are citizens.”

“The subject of a terminus has become a public question,” one merchant argued in 1859, “to which the selfish interests of private corporations must be subordinated.” A newspaper correspondent too stressed the importance of reducing the Pennsylvania “to its right position of subserviency to the public interest, instead of being allowed the mastery over it.” These bourgeois critics of the Pennsylvania, together with their allies in the press and local politics, were fighting a rearguard action over the course of the 1850s to assert the civic obligations of a private enterprise. They inverted the familiar call of reformers for city government to follow the lead of the business corporation by arguing the Pennsylvania was beholden to the will of its municipal creators. Instead of stockholders, it had constituents; in place of the pursuit of profit, it had to chart a course that would offer the greatest returns to the general welfare. The fear of a powerful monopoly subverting the public good might have been a familiar trope in Jacksonian America—indeed critics of the municipal subscription in 1846 compared the Railroad to Nicholas Biddle’s Second Bank—but as the actions of the Pennsylvania increasingly jarred with the urban vision of Philadelphia’s economic elite, many of the city’s wealthiest residents found themselves drawing on this language of protest.

The defense of urban imperialism, though, rested not only on the fear that trade might bypass Philadelphia, but also that the railroad’s actions threatened the designs for urban grandeur and refinement that were so crucial to their class. Emboldened by the passage of the Consolidation Act in 1854, which had united the city and county under one government, boosters like Price and McMichael made the case for an aggressive program of metropolitan improvement in the years leading to the Civil War. By 1860 the city had
set aside land for the first part of Fairmount Park while putting in place plans for the erection of grand new public buildings. Turning to Napoleon III’s transformation of Paris—a massive program of reconstruction that had cleared medieval streets and replaced them with broad, radial avenues—McMichael’s *North American* even claimed that the “order and beauty” the emperor had brought to the urban plan illustrated how “to advance a town.”

Compared to the millions expended on the rebuilding of Paris, the Hoxie plan appeared eminently affordable, especially for a powerful corporation like the Pennsylvania, which would have had few problems finding the capital to undertake the work. The refusal of its board to do so alienated its supporters in Philadelphia and led to a reassertion of the public role of the corporation.

Directors of the railroad had “no right to make themselves paramount to the public,” claimed one opponent of the Penn Square scheme in 1851. A few years later, in urging the removal of the freight rails from Broad Street, a correspondent of the *Evening Bulletin* insisted that “the Pennsylvania Railroad is so entirely a Philadelphia work, that the company ought to do nothing which can retard Philadelphia improvements or disfigure any portion of the city.” The notion of commercial dynamism as a precondition for urban refinement, however, had already been undermined by the actions of the railroads, as a glance at the city’s passenger depots showed. Railway terminals, the *North American* argued, heralded “a new order” in architecture, and the paper confidently predicted 100,000 visitors would arrive in the city to witness the opening of Harrison’s grand central station at Broad and Callowhill. But instead of providing “an ornament, a utility, and a wonder,” Philadelphia’s depots played host to a “vast commerce” in “common looking sheds.” The journal singled out the Pennsylvania especially as an enterprise that had “been housed in a manner utterly unworthy of its capital, business or dignity.” In 1846 boosters had hoped that corporate capital could easily be converted into symbolic capital; few harbored such illusions by the Civil War.

The failure on the part of a corporation created for public ends to transform Philadelphia into a genteel, imperial city, and the increasingly onerous demands the road made on urban space emboldened bourgeois critics to attack the railroad. But by 1859 their influence had waned. While the city government still owned about two-fifths of the capital stock, its directors could not outvote the rest of the board. Meanwhile, influence of the Pennsylvania’s lobbyists in Harrisburg—who needed to forge alliances with country delegates who often had little sympathy for Philadelphia interests—made political redress unlikely. Yet anger at the railroad’s actions...
may have pushed city businessmen toward a position supporting stronger state regulation of private enterprise in what is often regarded as the golden age of laissez faire. Hoxie himself got his revenge for the slighting of his tunnel scheme when he accused the Pennsylvania of rate fixing before a legislative subcommittee in 1867. The _North American_—the voice of the city’s conservative economic elite—had urged citizens to attend the hearing to remind representatives of his earlier plan. Street railroads, it claimed, remained a “great public nuisance.” “Public sentiment” demanded action, and the “managers of these companies, who are so sagacious and enterprising in so many other things,” had proved “so utterly unable to look into the future and recognize the necessity” of following Hoxie’s advice. The paper then turned “to those who have the power to compel action, and who are responsible to the people for their own action.” Its call for public regulation of a private corporation that was no longer acting in the interests of the boosters who had brought it into being anticipated the cry of elite reformers in the Progressive Era, but given the Pennsylvania’s influence in Harrisburg, it was never likely to win a sympathetic hearing.

### The Pennsylvania Railroad and Philadelphia after the Civil War

In 1874 the Pennsylvania announced its intention to use land on the west bank of the Schuylkill to consolidate the city’s stockyards. Hitherto Philadelphia’s abattoirs had been dispersed throughout the metropolis, with the majority (to the disgust of the labor press) situated in working-class neighborhoods. The new central site, however, was flanked by Spring Garden, West Philadelphia, and the West End mansions around Rittenhouse Square—all wealthy enclaves—and stood nearby the grounds of the new Fairmount Park. Residents of these districts, including the Sellers family of machine builders, the banker Clarence H. Clark, and the former mayor Richard Vaux, all strong supporters of the Pennsylvania, sought an injunction to prevent the development from going ahead. The railroad’s actions, the plaintiffs warned, “will carry the offensive effluvia to the handsomest improvements and most highly taxed dwellings in the city,” causing property to depreciate by as much as half. Their attorney argued that those citizens “who by their education and habits of life retain the sensitiveness of their natural organization” are “entitled to enjoy life in comfort as they are constituted.”
If the petitioners here were speaking as a class—the implication that other, less-refined Philadelphians had no problem with slaughterhouses is hard to miss—they also continued to insist the railroad’s actions ran counter to the public interest. The stockyard, its critics argued, would pollute the water supply, “imperil the health and comfort of the citizens,” and place a nuisance of immense proportions at the future center of the burgeoning metropolis. They asked the judges “to save this city from the most awful calamity that ever threatened to fall upon it ” and enable citizens to celebrate the forthcoming Centennial Exhibition of 1876—located in Fairmount Park—without such a grotesque affront to “civil pride” in their midst. One of the organizers of the lawsuit, Henry Charles Lea, was Philadelphia’s pre-eminent liberal reformer, and his attempts to purge the city’s councils of corruption now took him into the realm of regulating private businesses. Despite the petitioners’ pleas, however, the case was thrown out. As the Pennsylvania owned the land, the corporation enjoyed the right to use it as it saw fit, even if it undermined urban order.

Three years later, in May 1877, the Pennsylvania joined other railroads in cutting wages by 10 percent. In July workers on the Baltimore and Ohio struck, and within days the dispute had spread across the nation. On the evening of July 21, 1,000 protestors gathered outside the Pennsylvania’s West Philadelphia depot. Near the railroad’s roundhouse police charged 400 strikers as shots rang out. In reporting events that “vividly recalled the stirring times of the war,” the North American feared “that the scenes of carnage and riot that are disgracing the cities of Baltimore and Pittsburg will be transferred to Philadelphia.” Its publisher McMichael, who more than any other figure had led the campaign for railroad building and urban embellishment, admitted the city was in a “very bad condition of affairs; worse, indeed, than I have before seen here in the course of all my long life.” As it turned out, Philadelphia’s strong police force and the presence of nearby troops prevented the strike from escalating, but nevertheless, the railroad—cast at its genesis as the foundation of urban order and embellishment—had become a fulcrum of conflict in the metropolis.

Earlier that year, the contested presidential election of the previous November was resolved in favor of the Republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes. The deal that secured Hayes the Electoral College votes that he had lost in the popular ballot was brokered in part by the president of the Pennsylvania, Thomas A. Scott. Under Scott’s direction, the Pennsylvania had become the engine of the Union war effort, and after Appomattox, he had
helped to create the transcontinental Union Pacific Railroad while expanding
the Pennsylvania system into the South. Now in 1877, it had fallen to Scott
(a man one of his former employees suggested was “best compared with the
hero of Austerlitz”) to broker an end to that conflict by persuading Hayes to
promise Republican support for a southern transcontinental railroad. Hayes
showed his gratitude by using federal troops against striking railroad laborers
that July. Bourgeois Philadelphians had built the Pennsylvania Railroad not
simply to profit from the dividends but to transform their city into a prosper-
ous, orderly, and imposing metropolis: the London and Paris of America rolled
into one. The railroad, though, had outgrown the public corporation that had
created it. It was the railroad that acquired the imperial dimensions of which
the city dreamed; the railroad that boasted the power to determine elections,
end civil wars, and bind together a continent by iron. When the Pennsylvania’s
managers privileged profits over the pursuit of a refined urban environment,
moreover, the economic elite reluctantly recognized that their private interests
as investors jarred with their public vision of metropolitan space.

The retreat of Philadelphia’s elite before the might of the Pennsylvania
Railroad might be used to confirm Warner’s privatism thesis. By the
1870s, after all, the Pennsylvania was a player in national politics rather
than a weapon in urban imperialism; in 1900, indeed, it would move its
listing from the Philadelphia stock exchange to Wall Street. The age of
the booster in the East had receded, and in contrast to the 1850s, wealthy
citizens like the stockyard petitioners spoke more often as real estate owners
in elite neighborhoods than on behalf of the entire city. A withdrawal to
the counting house—or at the very least into the private world of the club
and parlor—seemed only natural. But the sharp distinction between commu-
nity and privacy Warner and others have tended to draw can be misleading.
When the pursuit of private profit clashed with their genteel aspirations for
public space—as so often happened given the actions of the Pennsylvania—
wealthy citizens invoked the public interest as a language of legitimation,
and returned to the precepts of urban imperialism to rein in the operations
of business. They did so not as disinterested reformers but as a self-proclaimed
enlightened elite of merchants, manufacturers, and professionals pursuing a
collective vision of how their metropolis ought to look and function. Thus
this class came into being not simply in the private world of the counting
house, the gentlemen’s club, the genteel neighborhood, and society wedding,
as Warner and Baltzell suggested, but also in public struggles over the future
of the urban form.
A later generation of middle-class Progressives were well aware of the adverse effect large corporations could have on the built environment. They turned to regulation and planning to ameliorate the smog and filth of the industrial city. But to see the roots of the Progressive impulse to discipline big business it might be necessary to look at the impact of the companies like the Pennsylvania Railroad a generation or two before the rise of Progressivism. Between 1846 and 1877, Philadelphia’s merchants, manufacturers, and professionals learned that their collective interest as a class in an imperious urban form often collided with their individual interests as shareholders in a corporation that, while blurring the lines between private and public, was run in the interests of its directors and stockholders: a group who after the Civil War controlled the largest publicly traded corporation in the world.

NOTES


4. Warner, Private City, chap. 5.


9. On Cooke, see Warner, Private City, 83–84. For his involvement in urban improvement projects, see North American and United States Gazette, May 3, 1866 and July 1, 1870. Historians have tended to emphasize the divisions among Philadelphia’s upper class, especially before and during the Civil War, arguing upstart manufacturers were only incorporated into the “upper class” after the conflict. See for example E. Digby Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of a National Upper Class (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1989); Andrew Dawson, Lives of the Philadelphia Engineers: Capital, Class, and Resolution, 1830–1890 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), esp. chap. 4, which argues antebellum manufacturers were a “subaltern class”; Daniel Kilbride, An American Aristocracy: Southern Planters in Antebellum Philadelphia (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2006); Elizabeth M. Geffen, “Industrial Development and Social Crisis, 1841–1854,” in Philadelphia: A 300 Year History, ed. Russell F. Weigley (New York: Norton, 1982), 330; Gary B. Nash, First City: Philadelphia and the Forging of Historical Memory (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 231–33. While sectional issues certainly exacerbated tensions between haughty first families, who often had strong ties to the South and parvenu manufacturers, I would argue that railroad building, the Consolidation movement, and a common interest in elevating the value of metropolitan real estate—especially after the rioting of the 1830s and 1840s—laid the class for cooperation among wealthy property holders in the two decades before the Civil War.


11. The declining support for state-sponsored internal improvements is well told in Hartz, Economic Policy and Democratic Thought, 122–25.
12. The past decade has seen renewed interest in the cultural aspects of elite class formation in the American metropolis. Along with Scobey, Empire City, see especially Sven Beckert, The Monied Metropolis: New York City and the Consolidation of the American Bourgeoisie, 1850–1896 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Historians have also revisited older debates about corporate power in the Early Republic, most notably Andrew M. Schocket, Founding Corporate Power in Early National Philadelphia (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2007), which makes a powerful argument that the corporate charter offered elites a way to protect their interests in a democratic polity. See also Johann N. Neem, Creating a Nation of Joiners: Democracy and Civil Society in Early National Massachusetts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008).


17. Public Ledger, October 19, 1846; North American, June 30, 1846; Commercial List, December 24, 1853.

18. In this respect the city followed a path broken by New York's bourgeoisie. My analysis of imperial ambitions and city building in this section has been informed by reading David Scobey’s excellent Empire City.


20. M.D., letter to Pennsylvania Inquirer, October 31, 1838; Nicholas B. Wainwright, ed., “The Diary of Samuel Breck, 1839–1840,” Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 103 (1979): 502; Bushman, Refinement of America, 353. If citizens were particularly concerned with urban improvement in the immediate vicinity of their homes, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that bourgeois citizens supported embellishment as a general principle. The post-bellum Broad Street Improvement League, for example, drew citizens from across the entire metropolis to its meetings, and was not limited to local real estate owners.


THE PUBLIC INTEREST OF THE PRIVATE CITY


23. For studies of bourgeois class consolidation in New York that emphasize the role of culture and politics, see Beckert, Monied Metropolis; Scobey, Empire City; and Iver Bernstein, The New York City Draft Riots: Their Significance for American Society and Politics in the Age of the Civil War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); North American, June 1, 1847.

24. North American and United States Gazette, February 6, 1854. On elite withdrawal from politics, see Schocket, Founding Corporate Power, 209. He makes the valuable point that this did not necessarily imply a surrender of power, but rather its transference from the political to corporate realm.


28. Schlesinger, “The City in American History,” 43–66; Curry, Corporate City, chap. 7. On agitation for the Main Line in the 1820s, which was also led by Philadelphia’s civic elite, see Majewski, “Political Impact of Great Commercial Cities,” 5–6.

29. United States Gazette, April 28, 1846.


32. See for example Neem, Creating a Nation of Joiners, 6. Pennsylvania did not pass a general incorporation law until 1873. Until then, incorporators were expected in theory to demonstrate they would be working toward the public interest in seeking limited liability.

34. See, for example, Public Ledger, June 26, 1846, which reported 69 workingmen at the Baldwin Locomotive Works had purchased 155 shares between them. The claim was eagerly repeated in A., letter to North American, June 30, 1846.

35. Public Ledger, May 2, 1849. Cope himself used the village metaphor in his diary. See Philadelphia Merchant, 502. See also anonymous letter to the Public Ledger, June 29, 1846.


46. Citizen of Three-Score Years, letter to Public Ledger, May 22, 1851. See also North American, May 5, 1852; Improved Railway Connections in Philadelphia, 3.

47. North American and United States Gazette, May 31, 1871; [William Russell West], Broad Street, Penn Square, and the Park (Philadelphia: John Pennington and Son, 1871).


52. Feldberg, The Turbulent Era, 70.
53. Commercial List, January 14, 1854.
55. See, for example, M.L.J., letter to Public Ledger, June 4, 1852; North American and United States Gazette, December 16, 1852, and January 7, 1853; X., letter to Evening Bulletin, May 5, 1853.
60. Sunday Dispatch, May 11, 1851.
64. Sunday Dispatch, June 5, 1858.
67. Delaware Terminus for the Pennsylvania Railroad, 27, 50.
69. Sunday Dispatch, June 5, 1858.
71. Delaware Terminus for the Pennsylvania Railroad, 27.
72. Fiat Justitia, letter to Public Ledger, May 7, 1851.
73. A Voter, letter to United States Gazette, June 4, 1846.


81. The stockyards remained until 1927.


83. *Inquirer*, July 23, 1877.


87. In other cities, this segmentation of the city happened much earlier. See for example Einhorn, *Property Rules*, 76.