

**CONTESTED ELECTION LAWS:
REPRESENTATION, ELECTIONS, AND PARTY
BUILDING IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1788-1794**

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*I*n preparation for the 2012 presidential election, members of the Pennsylvania GOP have been considering changing the way the state awards its electoral votes. Under the current system, the candidate who wins the greatest number of votes statewide receives all twenty of the state's votes in the Electoral College. In recent years, heavy Democratic voting in urban areas such as Philadelphia and Pittsburgh has offset Republican victories in rural parts of the state. In order to build on their strength in the less-populated areas, Republicans are considering having Pennsylvania award electors based on a district method. While this approach is technically constitutional, political commentators have been quick to condemn the proposal as unethical and potentially dangerous.¹ This is not, however, the first time a political party has attempted to change election laws to their advantage. The manipulation of election law dates back to the first elections under the Constitution.

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Concern over the lack of representation in the British Parliament was one of the major reasons the colonists decided to declare independence.² The Revolution established the principle of actual representation—that all regions of a state or the nation ought to be represented in the legislature, and that federal representation ought to be apportioned by population in the House of Representatives—but there were still many questions about what that meant in practice. As the country went through the process of establishing a government, representation remained a divisive subject. Specifically, there was disagreement over how to elect a federal representative and whether the electoral votes a state cast for president ought to be divided by district or given completely to the statewide winner.

Historians who have discussed representation and election law in the early Republic tend to focus on ideology. The standard narrative is that Federalists supported at-large elections because only the most qualified, well-known candidates had a chance at winning. Additionally, large election districts ensured that no single interest group had too much influence. Anti-Federalists, and later Republicans, advocated district elections to ensure that representatives remained tied to local interests. Whereas Federalists wanted the “best” men to serve in office, Anti-Federalists and Republicans believed a representative should be one of the people.³ There is certainly truth to this account, but a straight ideological explanation fails to explain why Pennsylvania changed the way it elected representatives four times in the first four congressional elections even though Federalists held a majority in the state legislature the entire time.

The federal Constitution left it to each state to select a method for electing representatives. In 1788 the Pennsylvania legislature passed a law providing for at-large elections for the commonwealth’s allotted eight seats in the House of Representatives. Each voter wrote the names of eight different men on a piece of paper, and the eight men receiving the greatest number of votes were elected. Although Federalists remained in control of the state legislature, an election law passed in 1791 divided the state into districts for elections to the Second Congress. Then, in 1792, the legislature narrowly voted to return to at-large elections. Finally, in 1794, the state settled on a district system. While Federalists and Anti-Federalists/Republicans clearly had ideological disagreements, a review of the debates surrounding the framing of election laws reveals that political strategy played a decisive role in the decision to select a particular mode of electing representatives. Strategically, Federalists favored the at-large system because, while they had a numerical

advantage over their opponents, most of their supporters were concentrated in the more populous eastern part of the state, in and around Philadelphia. Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, favored a district system because their supporters were dispersed throughout the state. Federalists could easily dominate at-large elections, but a state divided into election districts could lead to the election of a number of western Anti-Federalists.

In addition to illuminating the ways in which partisans manipulated election laws to get the upper hand, a close study of the change between at-large and district elections sheds light on the development of political parties in Pennsylvania. Parties emerged from the crucible of ongoing electoral experimentation, geographic tensions, and shifting attitudes toward the federal government. The process of switching back and forth between at-large and district elections forced politicians to develop communication networks throughout the state, hone methods of nomination, and devise new ways of campaigning.

After losing the majority of seats in the first elections, opponents of the Federalists began to organize. Their efforts led to the legislature dividing the state into districts for the second congressional elections and the defeat of a few Federalists. Due to confusion over the number of seats allotted to Pennsylvania in 1792, the state returned to the at-large system for the third congressional elections. Despite preferring districts, Republicans used this opportunity to dramatically increase intrastate cooperation and improve their methods of campaigning. This party building resulted in a number of gains throughout the state. The realization that they were not equipped to compete with the Republican organization led Federalists to abandon at-large elections in 1794. There is, therefore, a clear relationship between the state's election laws and the rise of political parties.⁴

The Seeds of Conflict: East-West Divisions and the Ratification of the Constitution

The fault lines that would divide Federalists from Anti-Federalists and later Republicans date back to long-standing geographic and socioeconomic tensions. On the eve of ratification, Pennsylvania was a socially and economically diverse state. With a population of 28,522 according to the federal census of 1790, Philadelphia was the second-largest city in the country and home to a diverse group of merchants, manufacturers, laborers, artisans,

and a few slaves.⁵ It was a center of both economic and intellectual life and very much a part of the larger Atlantic community. The eastern counties of Philadelphia, Bucks, Chester, Berks, York, and Lancaster tended to vote with the city. Overall, the eastern parts of the state were ethnically diverse, with the largest groups being English and Germans. Those who lived west of the Alleghenies tended to live in isolated, rural areas. Despite encompassing more than half of the state's size, only 75,000 people, less than 20 percent total population, resided in the western counties of Allegheny, Fayette, Westmoreland, and Washington. Most westerners engaged in agricultural pursuits, although a few of the larger towns had attorneys and artisans as well. Populated primarily with recent immigrants, the two largest ethnicities were Scots-Irish and English.⁶

The United States experienced a painful economic downturn at the end of the War for Independence, and Pennsylvanians from all walks of life were in desperate need of relief. Many farms in the west were devastated during the war; the price of land bottomed out, leaving westerners on the brink of ruin. The east suffered as well, just for different reasons. A surge in British imports in 1783 and 1784 drove down the price of goods, crippling many merchants. Laborers and artisans found themselves out of work for the first time in years. Rising taxes threatened to break people throughout the state.⁷

These conditions help explain some of the disagreements over the ratification of the federal Constitution. Although not a monolithic group, Philadelphia merchants believed the Constitution offered a solution to their economic woes. Similarly, many of the urban laborers and artisans favored ratification as a way to bring about fiscal stability. A strong central government could ensure the collection of taxes and provide protection against foreign markets. Many in the west disagreed. The proposed Constitution, they believed, only favored the merchants and the rich. Farmers and small merchants feared the imposition of heavier taxes and worried that a stronger federal government would weaken state and local institutions. Although patches of Federalism existed in the west, the vast majority of westerners sided with the Anti-Federalists.⁸

With the majority of Philadelphia and its environs supporting the new Constitution, Federalists clearly had the upper hand. Most of the state's wealth and nearly two-thirds of the population resided east of the Alleghenies. Even with this advantage, Federalists were not willing to leave anything to chance. During the ratification debates, Pennsylvania Federalists proved well organized and easily outmaneuvered their opponents.

In fact, the majority of the debate surrounding the Constitution took place after the state convention had ratified the document.⁹ Federalists moved with such precision and speed that Anti-Federalists, whose supporters were dispersed throughout the west, were simply unable to mount an effective opposition in time. Anti-Federalist leaders in Philadelphia did their best to stall ratification (including hiding to prevent the calling of a quorum in the convention), but on December 12, 1787, Pennsylvania became the second state to ratify the federal Constitution.¹⁰

After the necessary nine states ratified the Constitution, both sides turned their focus to the first federal elections. Pennsylvania Federalists had the momentum, but they did not take success for granted. In the late summer of 1788, Thomas Fitzsimons, a well-known Federalist and wealthy merchant from Philadelphia, decided that his party needed to seize the initiative. He wrote to a friend on August 20 that “the representation of this state in the new Congress will in a great measure depend upon the plan that may be adopted for choosing them. A good mode might now, I believe, be obtained, which in another Assembly would not be practicable.”¹¹ Federalists outnumbered the Anti-Federalists thirty-seven to twenty-seven in the 1787–88 General Assembly.¹² Federalists, therefore, had the numbers to pass an at-large election law that favored the more populous, Federalist, eastern part of the state.

In the Assembly, the Federalist-sponsored bill providing for at-large elections came up for discussion on September 24, 1788. William Findley, a leading Anti-Federalist from Westmoreland County, led a weak effort to promote district elections, arguing that they were the only way “that eight men could have a particular knowledge of the local and common interests throughout the state.” He saw it as “almost impossible in so large a state as Pennsylvania, to have an actual representation in Congress.” James McLene, an Anti-Federalist from Franklin County, was the only other member to express support for the district method, but both McLene and Findley acknowledged that such a bill had no chance of getting passed. Findley did, however, manage to ensure that the language of the at-large bill did not apply to future elections. Clearly he viewed this debate as the first battle in a longer war. After Findley withdrew his measure, the at-large representation bill passed without a recorded vote.¹³ Elections were set for November 2, 1788.

At-large elections for representatives were not part of the national Federalist program. Instead, Federalists supported the mode of election

most likely to ensure a Federalist majority. Pennsylvania Federalists supported at-large elections because they had a numerical but not geographic advantage.¹⁴ In South Carolina the situation was reversed. Low country Federalists supported district elections because of the large number of Anti-Federalists residing in the backcountry.¹⁵ Likewise, although Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists supported district elections, their counterparts in other states fought for at-large elections. Though ideology certainly mattered, it appeared that modes of election were often contingent on political conditions.

A Federalist Triumph: The First Federal Elections

Both Pennsylvania Federalists and Anti-Federalists held nominating conventions in preparation for the first federal elections. These coalitions were not parties in the modern sense of the word. In 1788 Federalists and Anti-Federalists had organized for one purpose—either to support or oppose the federal Constitution. The first federal elections were an extension of this conflict. Although the Constitution had been adopted, Anti-Federalists held out hope that members of the First Congress would adopt structural amendments to weaken the central government. For this purpose, a group of Anti-Federalists from across the state met at Harrisburg in early September 1788. Although the primary motivation was to draft a set of amendments, the men also agreed on an eight-man ticket to run statewide in the upcoming election. The convention occurred a month before the election law passed, suggesting that Anti-Federalists knew beforehand that the state would not be divided into districts. The ticket included a mixture of loyal Anti-Federalists, moderates, and two Federalist-leaning Germans.¹⁶ Four of the candidates came from the eastern counties and three resided in the west. Designed to appeal to a broad base, this eclectic group of candidates hailed from a variety of different social and economic backgrounds.

At first, Federalists responded to the Harrisburg convention with outrage. According to one Federalist writer, the goal of “*the Antifederal conclave*” in creating a ticket had been to “save all the trouble of *free elections* in the future.”¹⁷ Federalists claimed the Anti-Federalists were attempting to deprive the people of Pennsylvania the right to vote for whomever they pleased. Despite their public outcries, some Federalist leaders were concerned that the Harrisburg ticket would prove successful and decided to hold their

TABLE 1. Winning Candidates: First Congressional Elections (1788)									
	Federalists					Anti-Federalists			
	F. A. Muhlenberg	H. Wynkoop	T. Hartley	G. Clymer	T. Fitzsimmons	T. Scott	J. P. Muhlenberg	D. Hiester	
City of Philadelphia	1774	1743	1726	1699	1714	1718	821	796	
Counties:									
Philadelphia	812	786	776	769	764	766	495	495	
Bucks	682	658	656	658	657	651	259	226	
Chester	901	904	903	890	900	895	211	209	
York	1492	1497	1497	1482	1488	1486	205	203	
Berks	187	27	24	26	7	5	450	458	
Lancaster	771	656	655	642	652	649	320	348	
Cumberland	285	283	285	287	268	281	1553	1559	
Northampton	311	271	256	260	267	261	406	419	
Dauphin	367	349	311	320	321	308	300	286	
Montgomery	121	91	96	85	86	79	486	498	
Northumberland	196	198	197	195	199	197	355	355	
Franklin	373	375	374	363	363	365	545	541	
Huntington	134	139	134	131	138	138	70	65	
Bedford	97	92	91	93	92	90	214	212	
Westmoreland	145	137	133	137	118	118	426	426	
Luzerne	16	17	17	17	17	17	1	1	
Washington	33	28	32	33	35	44	298	306	
Fayette	29	29	28	29	30	28	50	52	
Totals	8726	8280	8191	8116	8116	8096	7465	7455	

Source: DHFFE, 378–79.

own convention in Lancaster on November 3, 1788. The ticket Federalists adopted at Lancaster was less varied than the Harrisburg ticket. Half of the men nominated by the Federalists resided in or near Philadelphia, and only one lived in the west. Because the vast majority of their supporters lived in the eastern parts of the state, Federalists had little incentive to nominate men from the west.

Geographic voting in the first election led to a decisive victory for Pennsylvania Federalists. The Federalists' statewide election strategy worked perfectly. Even with members of the Harrisburg ticket outpolling the Federalists almost six to one in some western areas, only two of the state's eight seats went to Anti-Federalists.¹⁸ Federalist majorities in the heavily populated eastern counties more than offset whatever advantage Anti-Federalists had in the west. The two Anti-Federalists elected, Daniel Hiester and J. Peter Muhlenberg, were of German heritage and likely owed their victory to the tendency of Pennsylvania Germans to vote as an ethnic bloc. William Findley later recalled that, in effect, the 1788 election had been "carried wholly by one side of the state."¹⁹

Anti-Federalists did not put much effort into the first federal election.²⁰ During the campaign season, backcountry leaders focused more on the upcoming fight over the state Constitution than on the election of federal congressmen.²¹ Besides the Harrisburg convention, no evidence exists that the Anti-Federalists made any concerted attempts to organize. Because the majority of their support was in the west and rural areas, without at least some organization the Anti-Federalists simply could not compete with the Federalists.

Second Congressional Elections: District Elections and the Campaign Learning Curve

Because the election law of 1788 applied solely to that year, the second set of federal elections could not occur without new legislation. But even as other states took steps to conduct elections in 1790, the Pennsylvania legislature was mired in debates over a new state Constitution and showed no signs that they were thinking about federal elections. With elected officials distracted, the debate over the means of electing representatives moved into the public sphere. Hoping to generate a discussion, William Irvine had penned a series of articles under the pseudonym "Juniata Man" beginning in January of 1790.²² A native of Ireland, Irvine moved to Cumberland

County in 1764. Elected to the Confederation Congress in 1786, he allied himself with the conservatives and emerging Federalists. Although he had endorsed ratification of the federal Constitution, Irvine became disenchanted with the Federalist administration during the 1790s and drifted toward the Republican camp.²³

Irvine's political journey is reflective of a larger phenomenon. The new national government had inherited a fiscal disaster. During the Revolutionary War, the government lacked specie and had to pay soldiers in promissory notes. These notes quickly depreciated in the years following the Treaty of Paris. Poor veterans sold their notes to speculators for a fraction of their face value. The majority of the national debt was therefore owned by a small number of people. States also carried significant debt from the Revolutionary War. In 1791 Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton proposed that the federal government fund the notes at their original value, assume state debts, create a national bank, and levy excise and custom duties. The plan clearly benefited speculators, many of whom lived in the east, at the expense of veterans. Assumption of state debts and the establishment of a national bank pointed to a centralized, powerful national government. The direct taxes Hamilton proposed on distilled spirits fell particularly hard on poor western farmers who were still struggling to recover from the downturn after the war. The end result was that Hamilton's plan drove many moderates and lukewarm Federalists to the opposition and convinced the former Anti-Federalists of the need to organize.²⁴

In the "Juniata Man" letters, Irvine warned that the next Congress was about to "fund an immense public debt" and "will have a power to impose direct taxes." The next congressional delegation, he insisted, must consist of men who would have the people's interest in mind. He argued that district elections were the best way to achieve this goal. Irvine blamed much of the state's problems on the men of Philadelphia who had been "in the habit of nomination at least, if not appointing, every officer of note." In the last "Juniata Man" letter, which appeared on April 17, 1790, Irvine lashed out at the men in the east. "Let them rant, rave, or assume an air of gravity," he sneered. "It is high time for the people of the middle and back countries to take themselves out of leading strings—Let the *drones* of Philadelphia, Bucks, and part of Chester, now Delaware, sip the honey they have made in welcome—but do not suffer them to put a gall into your cup."²⁵

Despite the absence of an election law, some politicians took concrete steps to prepare for the next elections. Notably, many former Anti-Federalists

started organizing to avoid a repeat of 1788. Federalist leader Thomas Fitzsimons fretted to Benjamin Rush in early March 1790 that the next elections “will be in districts and in that case I think it highly probably that the Commerce of Pennslya. May be without a Single Representative.”²⁶ In June members of an emerging Republican coalition already had sketched out a ticket.²⁷ By August Fitzsimons had heard reports that “the Western people [word deleted] Mean to Carry things with a high hand. . . . Nothing less than a total Change of the Present Representation in Congress, and that in future the City shall have but one Representative.”²⁸ On September 2, 1790, the state adopted its new Constitution, potentially leaving time to hold elections. However, the Assembly adjourned the next day without passing an election law and the new House of Representatives did not begin discussing the second congressional elections until December of 1790, months after most states had already held their elections.²⁹

When the legislature convened in December, a coalition of westerners and former Anti-Federalists narrowly succeeded in passing a district bill in the Pennsylvania House by a vote of thirty-two to thirty-one. The bill included a compromise provision that allowed districts to elect men who resided in other parts of the state.³⁰ Only three Federalists sided with the bill, and just two Republicans voted against its passage. In addition to a partisan split, the voting also showed a clear geographic split with the representatives from the west favoring the bill and those from the east opposing it. Before party lines hardened, sectional interests often trumped partisan.³¹ In the Senate, the bill passed nine to eight, with all the nays coming from Federalists in the south-eastern counties.³²

Because the elections were held in districts, neither party needed to hold a state nominating convention. Candidates were selected in a haphazard fashion, oftentimes with a few politically influential figures making the decision, a situation that led historian Harry Tinkcom to declare that “in comparison to the campaigns that preceded and followed it, the congressional race of 1791 was dull and unexciting.”³³ This may be the case when just looking at the actual elections, but when the battles over election laws are factored in, the elections are just as interesting and pertinent as any other.

The results of the second congressional elections were not as disastrous for the Federalists as Fitzsimons had feared, but the opposition did gain ground. Of the eight seats, Federalists won five, Republicans two, and one independent or moderate was elected.³⁴ All of the Federalists victories came in the eastern part of the state. Despite Republicans winning a few eastern counties, the only Republicans elected came from the far western part of




FIGURE 1

the state. Moderate Daniel Hiester ran unopposed in the Fourth District, composed of Berks, Luzerne, and Northampton counties.³⁵

The results of the second congressional election point to a few conclusions. First, the state was still geographically divided, with the eastern sections voting Federalist and western areas siding with former Anti-Federalists and emerging Republicans. The outcome also suggests that opponents of the Federalists had started to organize. Unlike the first election, western leaders like William Findley put more time and energy into the second congressional elections. Overall, the elections demonstrated that most Pennsylvanians remained Federalists. Republicans had shown their strength in the west, but the densely populated eastern areas were still securely in the Federalist column. It would take more than a change in election law for the Republicans to win a majority of the congressional seats.

Third Congressional Elections: At-Large Elections and the Emergence of the Republicans

Because the second congressional elections were held so late, only a short time remained before the Pennsylvania legislature needed to draft an election law for the third congressional elections. But before they could do so, they

needed to find out how many representatives Pennsylvania would be sending to Congress. The Constitution requires a decennial census to help insure the allotment of federal representatives fairly reflected population. Having tallied the 1790 census results, the federal Congress spent much of the spring of 1792 debating the apportionment of representatives. The census reported that Pennsylvania had a population of 434,373, making it the second-largest state behind Virginia.³⁶

The U.S. House and Senate passed a bill on March 28, 1792, that would divide the total population of the country by 30,000 and then assign the states' representatives based on their population, with one representative for every 30,000 people. This calculation would have translated into fourteen congressional seats for Pennsylvania. Working under the assumption that this bill would become law, the Pennsylvania legislature launched discussion of a new election law. On March 30 Albert Gallatin, a Republican representative from Fayette County, made a motion to once again divide the state into districts. Every representative from the west and all but one Republican voted in favor, but it was not enough. Republicans and supporters of the district method had lost seats in the Pennsylvania House since 1791, and Gallatin's motion was defeated by two votes. The state seemed to be heading toward at-large elections.

At-large elections became even more certain on April 5 when President George Washington vetoed a proposed federal reapportionment bill. Supporters of at-large elections seized upon this ambiguity and forced a vote on the election law knowing that, with the exact number of representatives still uncertain, at-large elections were the only feasible option.³⁷ The final vote on the bill providing for an at-large election in the Pennsylvania House was thirty-one to sixteen. In the Senate, Republicans and Westerns made a spirited attempt to pass a law requiring district elections. But the defection of Republican senator John Hoge from the Washington-Fayette district resulted in an eight-to-eight tie that was broken by the speaker, Samuel Powel of Philadelphia, who supported at-large elections.³⁸

At-large elections meant that Republicans would have to increase their intrastate cooperation significantly. Faced once again with the possibility that eastern Federalists would select the majority of Pennsylvania's representatives, Republicans set out to build an at-large campaign organization. Westerners William Irvine, William Findley, and Albert Gallatin kept in constant contact with Philadelphia Republicans James Hutchinson and Alexander Dallas. In addition to the exchange of letters, newspapers helped link western and eastern sections of the party. Journalists Phillip Freneau

of the *National Gazette*, Benjamin Franklin Bache of the *General Advertiser*, and John Dunlap of the *American Daily Advertiser* supplied Republicans with plenty of space to communicate their message to the broader public. These communication networks proved crucial in the process of party building.³⁹

Most of the drama surrounding the election of 1792 stemmed from rival methods of nominating candidates. Most Federalists advocated a caucus whose members were referred to as “conferees,” while the majority of Republicans, or “correspondents,” favored sending out a circular letter to their supporters asking for suggestions for nominees. Federalists preferred the caucus method because it was more controlled. Only a select few men, usually those with money, could afford to take time off work and travel to attend. Republicans, on the other hand, were making an effort to create a popular base. The circular letter could reach people who would otherwise be blocked from participating. Just as important, the circular helped build communication networks that could be utilized in future efforts.⁴⁰

These different means of selecting candidates emerged following a strategy on which both parties agreed: that town meetings were the way to obtain support in Philadelphia. The passionate response to these meetings demonstrates that the people of Philadelphia were well aware of the significance of federal elections.

On July 30, 1792, Republicans assembled in the State House Yard to develop an election strategy. In advertising the meeting, they made a special appeal to Philadelphia’s mechanics, artisans, and tradesmen. The meeting was set for 7:00 p.m. in order to accommodate their schedules. By the time the meeting convened, more than two thousand people had flooded into the State House Yard, making it the largest public gathering in Pennsylvania since 1779.⁴¹ Thomas McKean, a moderate Federalist and Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, was selected to the chair the meeting.⁴² The group agreed to a series of motions that established a nonpartisan committee to draft and send a circular letter to “collect information of the sense of the people in different parts of the state, respecting the characters proper to be nominated as Members of Congress.” Those selected to draft the letter included Republicans Hutchinson, Dallas, and Wilson, and Federalists McKean and Jared Ingersoll, one of the state’s foremost attorneys. On August 3, 520 copies of the circular letter were distributed. The letter’s stated goal was “to obtain a list of the various characters whom citizens, of every denomination and in every part of the state, deem to be qualified.”⁴³ This was a far cry from Anti-Federalists’ weak effort in 1788.

Federalists responded by holding their own meeting the following day, July 31. The meeting was scheduled to begin at 3:00 p.m., a time Republicans claimed was designed to prevent mechanics and tradesmen from attending. In response, Republicans blanketed the city with handbills and broadsides that called on their supporters to leave work early. Enough Republicans turned out that when the meeting convened Federalists were unable to muster enough votes to elect a chairman. As the afternoon wore on, more and more Republicans poured through the gates. Realizing they would soon be outnumbered, a group of Federalists retreated to the western part of the yard, a few hundred feet from the crowd and proceeded to select Federalist Robert Morris as the presiding officer. Republicans quickly caught on and rushed the Federalists. A riot nearly ensued, and in the mayhem the officer's chair and table were smashed. When order was restored, both parties withdrew from the yard. A witness recounted that "it was with difficulty *violences of a more serious nature* were prevented."⁴⁴

The meeting clearly demonstrated that Republicans were better equipped to mobilize popular support, so Federalists simply announced that there would be a nominating caucus in Lancaster on September 20, 1792. Only nine of the state's twenty counties and the city of Philadelphia ended up sending delegates. York was the only western county represented, highlighting the fact that the Federalists were almost exclusively a party of the east. Though the group nominated candidates anyway, the "Conferee Ticket" reflected a growing awareness of the danger in not appealing to all parts of the state. In an attempt to appeal a broad geographic base, five of the candidates nominated on the Conferee ticket came from western counties.

The results of the Republican circular letter were published on September 26 and 27. It included forty-four men and a mix of Federalists and Republicans. From this list, Hutchinson and a few other influential Republicans created the final Republican ticket known as the "Rights of Man Ticket."⁴⁵ Notably, the ticket included seven men that the Federalists had also nominated: William Findley, Frederick Muhlenberg, William Irvine, Thomas Hartley, John Kittera, Daniel Hiester, and J. Peter Muhlenberg. The overlap between the two suggests that parties were still in flux and had not yet completely polarized. It also points to the fact that both sides were more concerned with nominating men who could win than they were in putting forth candidates that adhered to a specific set of beliefs. Thus both the Lancaster and the Rights of Man tickets included moderates mixed with partisans. Despite the fact that William Findley referred

to the Conferee ticket as “the aristocratic ticket,” there were a number of candidates both parties nominated.⁴⁶ The Rights of Man ticket was made up of four western partisans and eight eastern moderates. Hutchinson regretted that more prominent Philadelphia Republicans were not running but he felt that “on the whole we have done tolerably well, and the ticket . . . will meet with Active support in this part [Philadelphia and environs] of the state.”⁴⁷

The next step was to circulate the ticket to Republicans throughout the state. Party organizers focused most their attention on the west. Much of the work fell to Albert Gallatin, an immigrant from Switzerland and one of the Republicans’ chief operators in the west. As the congressional election approached, Republican congressmen William Findley spelled out what was at stake and implored Gallatin “not to therefore disappoint us when we had reason to expect the greatest strength.” In another letter Findley described his own activities and again pleaded with Gallatin to ensure that the ticket be publicized. “I have within this few days seen a number of people from both ends of that County [Allegheny] and have supplied them with tickets. I have got some tickets into Washington County, but not a sufficient number. . . . Your attention to Washington is still necessary, at least with respect to information—I have wrote to Bedford County with tickets but our friends there are much scattered, the Glades I trust to you.” Along similar lines, from Philadelphia James Hutchinson wrote, “The election for the representative from this side of the mountains in the first congress under the federal constitution under a [illegible] law is not forgotten here. . . . Please exercise all the influences you can so that we do not suffer through another two years like those.” Alexander Dallas reminded Gallatin, “The opportunities of communication [between east and west] are so rare . . . we must rely on your giving way respecting information to the Committees.”⁴⁸ Clearly, the west was vital to Republican hopes for success.

The results of the third election reveal a changing political landscape. The seven candidates that both parties nominated were easily elected. Although chosen by both parties, Republican leader William Findley received the most votes statewide, suggesting that the political pendulum was swinging toward the Republicans. Rounding out the delegation were three Republicans and three Federalists. The Republicans sent two well-known partisans and one moderate. The three Federalists elected resided in the east and were committed party-men.⁴⁹

Western voters had turned out in droves for the Rights of Man Ticket. Heavy ticket-voting in the west suggests that Gallatin did a good job

TABLE 2. Winning Candidates, Third Congressional Elections (1792)

	Republicans						Federalists					
	W. Findley	W. Irvine	J. P. Muhlenberg	A. Gregg	W. Montgomery	J. Simile	F. A. Muhlenberg	D. Hiestor	J. W. Kittera	T. Hartley	T. Fitzsimmons	T. Scott
Philadelphia City	2179	2190	2084	915	950	816	2194	2137	2190	2189	1378	1379
Counties:												
Philadelphia	1140	1096		683	705	653	1150	1140	1139	1144	506	511
Bucks	1215	1194	796	188	303	286	1197	1113	1106	1172	973	916
Chester	2003	2011	950	321	262	261	2034	2009	1999	1973	1843	1787
Lancaster	1243	1237	1213	137	112	134	1257	1232	1237	1240	1170	1132
York	4818	4912	4914	32		55	4931	4909	4884	4919	4880	4840
Cumberland	3097	3123	1130	2899	2917	2870	3150	3054	3125	2977	194	298
Berks	1466	1330	1226	713	1248	659	1460	1474	1442	1467	1332	294
Northampton	800	813	735	372	454	508	762	800	812	727	339	394
Bedford	1158	1182	699	797	832	807	1173	918	523	798	369	159
Northumberland	1172	1012	517	1174	1077	950	945	1129	1124	1139	383	353
Westmoreland	2054	2006	1778	1935	2005	2009	2007	1958	875	53	181	237
Washington	1863	1563	1587	1335	1368	1613	1600	1643	1070	813	272	451
Fayette	778	767	769	767	773	787	728	779	713	677	17	28
Franklin	786	779	460	416	608	505	785	700	745	251	305	254
Montgomery	1550	1228	1062	1039	745	723	1240	1559	1490	1466	875	936
Dauphin	936		1017	847	428	311	1023	1110	1118	1115	714	991
Luzerne	308	305	284	60	46	86	327	290	327	305	319	314
Huntington	552	130	86	441	125	107	553	162	465	541	479	25
Allegheny	1274	1250		176		614	1223	1239	853	824	822	503
Mifflin	2064	1780	1701	2065	1963	1963	1952	2049	1904	1998	61	51
Delaware	702	530	437	60	27	27	650	714	694	703	585	274
Totals	<i>33,158</i>	<i>30,968</i>	<i>21,784</i>	<i>17,372</i>	<i>17,019</i>	<i>16,754</i>	<i>32,341</i>	<i>32,147</i>	<i>29,835</i>	<i>28,493</i>	<i>17,997</i>	<i>16,657</i>

^a*Claypoole's Daily Advertiser*, November 2, 1792. Candidates listed in italics were nominated by both parties. The author would like to thank Philip Lampi for generously sharing his research on the election returns.

distributing and promoting the Rights of Man ticket. Republicans did particularly well in Cumberland, Northumberland, Westmoreland, Fayette, Bedford, and Mifflin counties. Although the eastern section of the state remained primarily Federalist, Republicans made significant inroads in Philadelphia City and County. Federalists dominated Bucks, Chester, Lancaster, and York. But the geographic division that had characterized the first two elections began to blur. The fact that Republicans were able to overcome a method of electing congressmen that favored Federalists attests to their efforts to build a statewide party.⁵⁰

Overall, Republican leaders were pleased with the outcome. Hutchinson even believed that Republicans could have swept the elections if Republicans “in every part of the state [voted] a solid ticket.” He also regretted that some of the candidates and other prominent Republicans attended a meeting in Pittsburgh in late September that had condemned the federal excise. Federalists seized on the meeting as proof that the Republicans were encouraging opposition to a federal law. Hutchinson claimed the meeting “lost us the Majority in the Counties of Berks and Dauphin.” Despite these setbacks, Hutchinson felt proud that despite “the strong opposition we had a majority in Philadelphia County for the whole, and were close on the heels of our Opponents in the City.”⁵¹ Even Thomas Jefferson took note of the Republican successes. He commented to a friend that “in this State the election has been triumphantly carried by the republicans . . . and the vote of this state can generally turn the balance” on questions relating to major national issues such as Hamilton’s fiscal plan.⁵²

Even though Republicans had proven their ability to compete statewide, many had not given up fighting for district elections. A month before the election, Hutchinson condemned “the unjust and impolitic law that has deprived this State of district Elections for representatives in Congress.” The problem with the law was that “Except in their own neighborhood the great body of Electors are unacquainted with the persons much less with the abilities and integrity of candidates that must be voted for.” He concluded that “the various interests of so great a State can only be represented properly by a district representation.”⁵³ Hutchinson was not alone in this sentiment. On September 17, 1792, a group of citizens met at Redstone Fort in Fayette County to condemn the practice of at-large elections. “To call such election free,” they declared, “is an insult to common reason.” The battle lines were drawn for the framing of the next election law.⁵⁴

Fourth Federal Election: Triumph of the District and the Party

Not until February of 1794 did the Pennsylvania House of Representatives broach the topic of the fourth congressional election. Although the composition of the House had changed little since the previous vote in 1792, the district method had clearly gained support in the interim. A Republican-sponsored bill proposed to divide the state into twelve districts based on population. The counties of Bucks, Northampton, and Montgomery would elect two representatives and the rest of the districts would elect only one. As had been the case in 1790, the districts could elect men who resided anywhere in the state. When the final vote was called on February 27, 1794, the bill passed forty-five to eighteen. It passed the Senate without a recorded vote. Among those voting in favor of dividing the state into districts were staunch Federalists Cadwallader Evans (Montgomery), Gerardus Wynkoop (Bucks), and John Chapman (Bucks). These men had been in the House in 1792 and voted against districts. Representatives from the eastern counties of Bucks, Chester, and Lancaster also sided with the bill for the first time. Clearly something had changed in the way some Federalists approached the issue.

The eighteen who voted against the measure remained committed to the at-large system and issued an official dissent explaining their reasoning. They argued that dividing the state into districts “tends to disunite interest that ought to be common,” promotes local interests over state ones, was not requested by the people, and went against the spirit of the U.S. Constitution. These were essentially the same arguments that supporters of at-large elections had been making for years. The only new argument proffered was that since “the Governor is chosen by general suffrage and yet is not of half the consequence with the election of a member of that body [the U.S. House of Representatives]” it made no sense to divide the state into districts.⁵⁵ That the other representatives who had previously opposed the district method did not join the dissent suggests something more than ideology motivated their change of heart.⁵⁶ The turn away from at-large elections by the majority of the Federalists reflects a change in political strategy. The results of the previous election demonstrated that Federalists could no longer count on their numbers for success. Not only was the number of Republicans growing, but they had clearly done a better job at organizing. Beginning in 1793, opponents of the Federalists throughout the state organized Democratic and Republican societies that were tasked

with guarding against government abuses and mobilizing supporters.⁵⁷ Federalists may have recognized that there was a legitimate possibility that Republicans could pick up more seats if another at-large election was held. With district elections Federalists assumed that they could at least count on winning the eastern districts.

With no need to hold statewide conventions, each district adopted its own method of nominating candidates. Most districts left the job to party leaders, and neither party exhibited a strong desire to include the general public in their decisions. The sole exception occurred in Montgomery County, where a group passed a resolution requesting that delegates be appointed from Bucks and Northampton to attend a nominating meeting. No evidence confirms such a meeting actually took place, but the counties would meet in this manner in later elections.⁵⁸

Although the next Congress would face important issues such as defining America's role in the most recent British-French War, how to respond to British impressments of American sailors, and frontier defense, newspapers reflect a certain degree of voter apathy. "The election is at hand," bemoaned a correspondent to Benjamin Franklin Bache's *General Advertiser*, "yet our citizens appear totally unmindful of the all important period. The importance of the present crisis led everyone to suppose that we would have a warmly contested election, but unless matters are working in secret it would appear as if there would be no election."⁵⁹ The only contest to generation any significant interest was between John Swanwick and Thomas Fitzsimons in Philadelphia.⁶⁰

As the state geared up for the vote, the political situation in the western counties took a turn for the worse. Disgruntled farmers, whom some people claim were urged on by the Democratic and Republican societies, took up arms in protest against the national excise on whiskey. Tensions had been rising since the law went into effect in 1791, but in the summer of 1794 a series of attempts by the local courts to force payment led to calls for action. Protesters sacked the house of tax inspector General John Neville and burned it to the ground. Gaining in strength, the rebels prepared to march on Pittsburgh. The federal government took no chances with the situation and responded by federalizing the militias of Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, and New Jersey. The force, led by Washington and Hamilton, swelled to nearly 13,000. Not only did the Whiskey Rebellion distract many voters from the campaign, but many of the men who might have voted were otherwise engaged on election day.⁶¹

Though the Whiskey Rebellion and George Washington's subsequent condemnation of certain "self-created societies" killed the Democratic and Republican societies, other, unintended, consequences may have helped Republicans. Philadelphia Republicans, for example, used the Rebellion as an opportunity to prove their loyalty to the Constitution and demonstrate a support of law and order. In the west, heavy-handed reprisals and Federalist attempts to deprive some areas of representation in the state legislature galvanized moderates and propelled people to the polls.

When the votes were tabulated it became clear that Republicans had made inroads across the state. In the First District of Philadelphia, John Swanwick upset incumbent Thomas Fitzsimons. James Madison celebrated Swanwick's victory and believed it represented "a stunning change for the aristocracy."⁶² Federalists discounted the significance of the victory and argued it had more to do with "resentment against Fitzsimons than [Swanwick's] own merits." Without doubt, some people voted against Fitzsimons for personal reasons, but it is no coincidence that the candidate who ran the better campaign won the election. Swanwick represented a new type of Republican in Pennsylvania and was the first Republican to win a congressional race in Philadelphia, a critical development in the party's quest to be competitive statewide. Much of his success owed to his ability to mobilize Republican supporters and




FIGURE 2

still appeal to the city's wealthy men. Members of the gentry traditionally sided with Federalist candidates and, because of their tendency to vote in large numbers, prevented any Republican candidate from gaining a foothold. Through a combination of public rituals and fêtes designed to galvanize lower- and middling-class Philadelphians, along with moderate rhetoric to assuage members of the elite, Swanwick provided a blueprint for future Republicans in urban areas.⁶³

Overall, Republicans won eight of thirteen seats.⁶⁴ Along with the First and Fifth districts, Republicans won every seat in the west. Federalists won in the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eighth districts, which were all east of the Alleghenies. The election in the Fourth District, which selected two congressmen, was contested. Federalist Samuel Sitgreaves easily won one of the seats with a vote of 2,954. Only three votes separated the second- and third-place winners: James Morris, a Republican received 1,648 votes and Philadelphia County's justice of the peace John Richards, a Federalist, got 1,645. Richards challenged the election results, and Governor Thomas Mifflin refused to issue an election certificate. The issue was settled when Morris died in July 1795.⁶⁵

By 1794 the Republican Party had developed an effective statewide party system and could compete in any part of the state, but the Federalists remained a potent force. Though they lagged behind Republicans, Federalists also began to take steps toward party building. Federalists may not have had the same popular base, but they had large sums of money, the power of patronage, and a network of loyal journalists.⁶⁶ The outlines of the first-party system in Pennsylvania were now clearly established. The election of 1794 thus marked both the end of at-large elections for states with more than one or two representatives and the beginning of a new epoch in American politics characterized, at least in Pennsylvania, by the competition of two well-organized parties.⁶⁷

Conclusion

Though the battles over the method of electing a federal representative were surely influenced by ideology, political strategy was clearly a driving factor. Federalists went from voting overwhelmingly in favor of at-large elections in 1788 to accepting a district system in 1794. As has been shown, the ideological justifications for at-large elections remained the same throughout this period. What changed was the political situation on the ground. Opponents

of the Federalists built a statewide organization in order to be able to compete in an at-large election. Had the congressional elections been conducted in districts the whole time, there would have been less incentive for Republicans in Philadelphia to build communication networks with partisans in the west.

Parties developed in Pennsylvania earlier than they did in most other states. Pennsylvania had a long history of partisan conflict and closely contested elections.⁶⁸ The seeds of conflict were sown deep in the nation's most ethnically and economically diverse state. With Philadelphia serving as the seat of federal government, local, state, national, and even international politics became intertwined. All of these factors need to be taken into account when studying the politics of the 1790s. As these findings suggest, it is also important to take into consideration the "rules of the game" such as election laws. Politicians then, as now, were more than willing to exploit opportunities that might tip the scales in their favor.

NOTES

The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their input, the First Federal Congress Project for sharing their resources, Philip Lampi for providing election returns, and Sebastian von Cuervo for assistance with the maps.

1. Nate Silver, "Pennsylvania Electoral College Plan Could Backfire on the G.O.P.," *New York Times*, September 15, 2011, <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/pennsylvania-electoral-college-plan-could-backfire-on-g-o-p/> (accessed April 11, 2012).
2. Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic, 1776–1787* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1969), 164.
3. Rosemarie Zagarri believes that the differences between supporters of a district system and those who backed at-large elections can be boiled down to a division between large and small states. Large states supported a district system and small states supported at-large elections in large part because it was not practical to hold at-large elections in large states. Though she admits that some states, such as Pennsylvania, did not immediately fit this pattern, she offers no real explanation for why the state switched back and forth between modes. Rosemarie Zagarri, *The Politics of Size: Representation in the United States, 1776–1800* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). Harry M. Tinkcom acknowledges that there may have been a strategic reason for supporting one method of election over another but he does not see a connection between the changing methods of electing Congressmen and the development of parties. Harry M. Tinkcom, *The Republicans and Federalists in Pennsylvania, 1790–1801* (Harrisburg: Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, 1950). For an example of the traditional narrative, see Saul Cornell, *The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788–1828* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 147–52.
4. For the sake of clarity I have simplified party terminology. Parties were in their infancy in the early 1790s. Labeling a particular group "Federalist," "Anti-Federalist," or "Republican" should not be

taken as meaning these factions were rigidly defined. Those who supported the federal Constitution and members of the later political party are termed *Federalists*. The term *Republican* was used as early as 1790 to describe members of the opposition even though there were no formal parties, and is used here in preference to *Democratic-Republican*. The term *moderate* is applied to those who supported both Federalist and Republican measures.

5. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Population of 24 Urban Places: 1790," <http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twps0027/tab02.txt> (accessed March 16, 2011). Unless otherwise stated, Philadelphia refers to the city, not county, of Philadelphia.
6. Tinkcom, *Republicans and Federalists in Pennsylvania*, 20.
7. See Terry Bouton, *Taming Democracy: "The People," the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
8. Owen S. Ireland, *Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics: Ratifying the Constitution in Pennsylvania* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).
9. Jackson Turner Main, *The Antifederalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781–1788* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961).
10. See Ireland, *Religion, Ethnicity, and Politics*.
11. Thomas Fitzsimons to Samuel Meredith, August 20, 1788, in *The Documentary History of the First Federal Elections, 1788–1790*, ed. Merrill Jensen and Robert A. Becker (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976), 1:253–54 (hereafter *DHFFE*).
12. Unless otherwise noted, party designations in the Pennsylvania state legislature come from the Wilkes University Election Statistics Project, "Pennsylvania Election Statistics," <http://staffweb.wilkes.edu/harold.cox/index.html> (accessed March 5, 2011). Although the rationale behind applying labels is suspect, the terms are useful when taken as generalizations.
13. Assembly Proceedings, September 29, 1788, in *DHFFE*, 291–92; Pennsylvania Election Law, October 4, 1788, in *DHFFE*, 299–302; John Caldwell, *William Findley: A Politician in Pennsylvania, 1783–1791* (Gig Harbor, WA: Red Apple Publishing, 2000).
14. For further evidence that the Federalists in Pennsylvania were supporting the at-large method for strategic reasons see Thomas Hartley to Tench Coxe, March 3, 1788 (RC, Coxe Papers, Tench Coxe Section, Historical Society of Pennsylvania), in *DHFFE*, 272 n. 6; and Benjamin Rush to Jeremy Belknap, October 7, 1788, in *DHFFE*, 302. Originals of Coxe and Rush papers at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia.
15. For information on the first federal elections in South Carolina see *DHFFE*, 147–226. As mentioned, Zagarri contends that these differences can be explained by viewing representation through the lens of the large/small state divide. Though she is correct that conflicting views of representation were an important element in the fights between large and small states, it overlooks the importance of partisan strategy in states like Pennsylvania. See Zagarri, *Politics of Size*, 105–18.
16. "Proceedings of the Harrisburg Convention, September 3–6, 1788," in *DHFFE*, 258–59. The proceedings published in the newspapers said nothing about candidates for the upcoming elections. Private letters, however, suggest that there was discussion of a ticket. When the slate was finally published on November 7 in the *Federal Gazette* it was referred to as the "Harrisburg Ticket." For a discussion of the candidates see Tinkcom, *Republicans and Federalists in Pennsylvania*, 22–23.
17. *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 3, 1788, in *DHFFE*, 265. For other examples of Federalist condemnations of the Harrisburg convention, see "A Federal Centinel," *Pennsylvania Gazette*, September 10, 1788, in *DHFFE*, 267–69.

18. Anti-Federalists elected: Daniel Hiester and J. Peter Muhlenberg. Federalists elected: George Clymer, Thomas Fitzsimons, Thomas Hartley, Frederick Muhlenberg, Thomas Scott, and Henry Wynkoop.
19. William Findley, "An Autobiographical Letter," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 5 (1881): 445.
20. Russell J. Ferguson, *Early Western Pennsylvania Politics* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1938), chap. 5.
21. Pennsylvania's 1776 state constitution weakened the executive power, preserved the colonial unicameral legislature, opened suffrage to males over the age of twenty-one, expanded the number of assembly seats to favor the west, and limited assemblymen to four years' service out of seven in the nation's first experiment with rotation in office. Conservatives and Federalists had made a number of failed attempts to draft a new constitution.
22. The River Juniata is a tributary of the Susquehanna located in central/western Pennsylvania and considered a major link for opening up a water route westward. The pseudonym is therefore a clear geographic reference.
23. *DHFFE*, 418–19.
24. For a good discussion of Hamilton's fiscal plan and how it related to party formation see, Gordon S. Wood, *Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 95–103.
25. *Independent Gazetteer*, March 13, April 10 and 17, 1790.
26. Thomas Fitzsimons to Benjamin Rush, March 7, 1790, privately owned in 1983.
27. James Hutchinson to Albert Gallatin, April 1, 1790, Gallatin Papers, New-York Historical Society.
28. Thomas Fitzsimons to Tench Coxe, August 20, 1790, Coxe Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
29. Thomas Fitzsimons to Arthur St. Clair, 1790 cited in Tinkcom, *Republicans and Federalists in Pennsylvania*, 45.
30. *Journal of the First Session of the First House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Anno MDCCXC, and the Fourteenth Year of Independence of the United States* (Philadelphia: Hall and Sellers, 1790), 151–52. Federalists outnumbered their opponents 36 to 33 during this session. The discrepancy in number of votes cast reflects the fact that a number of representatives were absent.
31. The final bill passed the House on February 1, 1791, by a vote of thirty-three to twenty-eight. Seven Federalists, five of whom resided in the west, voted in favor of the measure.
32. *Journal of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Anno MDCCXC and the Fourteenth Year of Independence of the United States* (Philadelphia: Hall and Sellers, 1790), 124–25, 143–48.
33. Tinkcom, *Republicans and Federalists in Pennsylvania*, 47.
34. Federalists elected: Thomas Fitzsimons (First District); Frederick A. Muhlenberg (Second District); Israel Jacobs (Third District); John W. Kittera (Fifth District); Thomas Hartley (Seventh District). Republicans elected: Andrew Gregg (Sixth District); William Findley (Eighth District).
35. Daniel Hiester began his career in Congress as a Federalist and slowly migrated to the opposition. The exact timing of the switch is unclear but by 1795 he was firmly in the Republican column.
36. First Census of the United States, 1790, Pennsylvania U.S. Census Bureau; <http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1790.html> (accessed December 20, 2011)

37. This was George Washington's first use of the veto. An apportionment bill was finally adopted on April 10, 1792. The country's population was divided by 33,000, which meant Pennsylvania would receive thirteen seats in the House of Representatives. Edmund J. James, "The First Apportionment of Federal Representatives in the United States," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 9 (1897): 1–41.
38. *Journal of the First Session of the Second House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia: Bailey and Lane, 1792), 284–85; *Journal of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Commencing on Tuesday* (Philadelphia: Bailey and Lane, 1792), 236–42.
39. For more information on the importance of the newspapers in Pennsylvania parties see Jeffrey Pasley, *The Tyranny of Printers: Newspapers Politics in the Early America Republic* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2003). The exchange of newspapers and information was, in large part, facilitated by the burgeoning postal system. See Richard John, *Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to Morse* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
40. Richard G. Miller, *Philadelphia—The Federalist City: A Study of Urban Politics, 1789–1801* (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1976), 45–47.
41. *General Advertiser*, July 30, 1792; "Freedom of Election," *General Advertiser*, August 1, 1792; Tinkcom, *Federalists and Republicans in Pennsylvania*, 56.
42. Like many "moderate" Federalists in Philadelphia, Thomas McKean would later join the Republicans.
43. "Freedom of Election"; *General Advertiser*, August 4, 1792.
44. James Hutchinson to Albert Gallatin, August 19, 1792, Gallatin Papers. For the sake of clarity I have simplified party terminology. Parties were in their infancy in the early 1790s. Emphasis in original.
45. There is some evidence that the entire circular letter was a scam and that Hutchinson had already decided on a ticket before getting the results. Hutchinson had sent Gallatin a list of candidates who matched the final ticket a month before he heard back from the various counties. Various Federalist authors attempted to prove this point during the election. Even if Republicans knew who they were going to nominate, they still went through the motions of involving a large section of the electorate. For Federalists' attempts to expose the circular letter see, for example, "Cerberus," *General Advertiser*, September 5, 7, and 14, 1792.
46. William Findley to William Irvine, September 28, 1792, William Irvine Papers, Historical Society of Pennsylvania.
47. James Hutchinson to Albert Gallatin, September 14, 1792, Gallatin Papers.
48. All in the Gallatin Papers: William Findley to Albert Gallatin, August 20, 1792; William Findley to Albert Gallatin, September 27, 1792; James Hutchinson to Albert Gallatin, September 14, 1792; Alexander J. Dallas to Albert Gallatin, September 25, 1792.
49. Both tickets: William Findley (R), Thomas Hartley (F), Daniel Hiester (I), William Irvine (R), John W. Kittera (F), Frederick A. Muhlenberg (F), and J. Peter Muhlenberg (R). Republicans elected: Andrew Gregg, William Montgomery, and John Smilie. Federalists elected: James Armstrong, Thomas Fitzsimons, and Thomas Scott.
50. *General Advertiser*, October 30, 1792; *Dunlap's Daily Advertiser*, November 1, 1792; *Claypool's Daily Advertiser*, November 2, 1792. All three of these papers claim that the results published came from

“official” sources, yet there are slight differences between them that do not change the overall conclusions drawn.

51. James Hutchinson to Albert Gallatin, October 24, 1792, Gallatin Papers.
52. Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph, November 16, 1792, in *Writings of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. H. A. Washington (Washington, DC: Taylor and Maury, 1853–54), 3:491.
53. Hutchinson to Gallatin, September 14, 1792, Gallatin Papers
54. Citizens at Redstone Fort to Committee of Correspondence at Philadelphia, September 17 1792, Gallatin Papers.
55. *Journal of the First Session of the Fourth House of the Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*, (Philadelphia: Bailey and Lane, 1793), 163–70, 225–27.
56. It is also worth noting that, when a similar debate over whether the state should select presidential electors by districts or at-large occurred in 1796, Federalists vehemently defended at-large elections as the only way to ensure the state was properly represented. See Tinkcom, *Republicans and Federalists in Pennsylvania*, 163–64.
57. Though not overly aligned with the Republican Party, many prominent Republicans such as John Swanwick, Alexander James Dallas, and Benjamin Bache were members and the two groups shared many common goals. Hutchinson was a prominent member of the Philadelphia Democratic Society. See Eugene Perry Link, *Democratic-Republican Societies, 1790–1800* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942); Marco M. Siolo, “The Democratic Republican Societies at the End of the Eighteenth Century: The Western Pennsylvania Experience,” *Pennsylvania History* 60 (1993): 288–304 Albrecht Koschnik, “The Democratic Societies and the Limits of the American Public Sphere.” *William and Mary Quarterly* 58 (2001): 615–36
58. Tinkcom, *Republicans and Federalists in Pennsylvania*, 140.
59. “From Correspondents,” *General Advertiser*, September 4, 1794. The “present crisis” is a reference to the Whiskey Rebellion, which will be discussed below. The best history is Thomas P. Slaughter, *The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
60. *Gazette of the United States*, October 11, 1794. For more information on the election of 1794 see Richard Baumann, “John Swanwick: Spokesman for ‘Merchant Republicanism’ in Philadelphia, 1790–1798,” *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 97 (1973): 131–82; Baumann, “Philadelphia’s Manufacturers and the Excise Taxes of 1794: The Forging of the Jeffersonian Coalition,” *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 106 (1982): 3–39. Miller, *Philadelphia—The Federalist City*, 65–69; Tinkcom, *Republicans and Federalists in Pennsylvania*, 138–42.
61. There are some returns listed as being from “the army” but they amount to a mere fraction of the men who were sent to put down the Rebellion.
62. Madison to Jefferson, November 14, 1794, in *Letters and Other Writings of James Madison* (Philadelphia: U.S. Congress, 1865), 2:19.
63. William Bradford to Elias Boudinot, October 17, 1794, Wallace Collection, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 2:101. Baumann, “John Swanwick”; Baumann, “Philadelphia’s Manufacturers and the Excise Taxes of 1794.”
64. Republicans elected: John Swanwick, Daniel Hiester, Samuel Maclay, Andrew Gregg, David Bard, William Findley, and Albert Gallatin. Federalists elected: Frederick Muhlenberg, Richard Thomas, Samuel Sitgreaves, John Richards, John W. Kittera, and Thomas Hartley.

65. According to "A New Nation Votes," Richards received 1,791 votes and Morris 1,776. This tabulation includes the votes from the army, something the state does not appear to have counted until some months after the election. "A New Nation Votes: American Election Returns, 1787–1825," http://elections.lib.tufts.edu/aas_portal/index.xq (accessed December 20, 2011)
66. See Todd Estes, *The Jay Treaty Debates, Public Opinion, and the Evolution of Early American Political Culture* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2006).
67. Both David Waldstreicher and Albrecht Koschnik see 1794 as a key turning point. David Waldstreicher, *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); Albrecht Koschnik, *"Let a Common Interest Bind Us Together": Association in Philadelphia, 1775–1840* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007).
68. For a general discussion of the politics of the 1790s see James Roger Sharp, *American Politics in the Early Republic: The New Nation in Crisis* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993). For an overview of electioneering practices in Philadelphia, see Mark Winston Brewin, "A History of Election Day in Philadelphia: A Study in American Political Ritual," PhD diss., University of Michigan, 2002.