

THE MACHINE, THE MAYOR, AND THE
MARINE: THE BATTLE OVER PROHIBITION
IN PHILADELPHIA, 1924–1925

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Abstract: The Republican machine, the mayor of Philadelphia, and the head of public safety all had input with regard to the enforcement of Prohibition in Philadelphia in 1924–25. W. Freeland Kendrick, a member of the Philadelphia machine, had won the mayoralty overwhelmingly in 1923 because he was the choice of machine head William S. Vare. The Republican machine did not support Prohibition and Vare expected Kendrick to turn a blind eye to the Prohibition laws. Kendrick, however, decided to appoint a Marine brigadier general, Smedley D. Butler, as the head of the Department of Public Safety. It was Butler's belief that all laws had to be upheld, including the Prohibition laws. Butler's methods of Prohibition enforcement were not popular with either the machine or the populace. Kendrick found himself between Vare and Butler. The result was that Kendrick fired Butler, and the machine destroyed Kendrick's future in politics.

Keywords: Prohibition; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; police; Smedley D. Butler; W. Freeland Kendrick

Philadelphia during Prohibition was a wide-open city run by the Republican machine, or Republican Organization, as it was known.¹ In 1923 William S. Vare, the head of the Organization, chose W. Freeland Kendrick, the Philadelphia receiver of taxes,

as his choice for the Republican mayoral nominee. Kendrick, a likeable man, had been active in the Organization since his twenties, but he “is not a reformer, nor even a distinguished machine politician. As an inveterate ‘joiner’ of secret societies, he owes much to his famous smile.”²

With Vare’s backing, Kendrick got the nomination and went on to win the mayoralty. Most everyone expected him to be a front for Vare’s policies, but Kendrick did not fulfill this expectation. Instead, he became known for his appointment of Marine Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler (1881–1940) as his head of the Department of Public Safety.³

Upon winning, Kendrick declared that one of his major foci would be to clean up this department, which included the police bureau in charge of enforcing the Prohibition laws. Butler agreed to take the position with the stipulation that he would have free rein to run the department as he saw fit. For Butler, this meant running it according to marine conventions and upholding the Prohibition laws:⁴

Whether a law is right or wrong, all law has got to be enforced. And if you do not want law enforced, do not call upon a marine to help you out. The tradition of our service is one of absolute law enforcement. . . . Philadelphia policemen will not be permitted to question any law. Banditry and bootlegging are going to stop. It may be necessary to discharge the entire police force. But it is silly to say that laws cannot be enforced.⁵

The machine, however, was not a proponent of Prohibition. This was made clear when the Vare delegation, along with other local leaders, met with Republican Gifford Pinchot who was running for the governorship of Pennsylvania. The *Bulletin*, a conservative paper, reported that while they threw their support behind most of his program, they did not endorse his call to close all the saloons in the state.⁶

The result of the disparate positions between Butler and Vare forced Kendrick to maneuver between the two. This became especially galling to Kendrick when the newspapers and reformers lauded Butler, often treating Kendrick as Butler’s sidekick. Problems between the two men began to emerge. Kendrick, a Shriner and machine player, was a consensus builder. Butler, a marine general who loved the limelight, was an autocrat. The result was a clash of values and management style. Kendrick, however, was not the ultimate political force in Philadelphia; that was William S. Vare. A consummate politician, he decided,

after two years, that he had had enough of Kendrick's reforms and orchestrated events that led to the end of Kendrick's political career. As a side bonus, they also forced Kendrick to fire Butler.

The Machine—The Republican Organization

In the late 1800s, northern politics often vacillated between the Republican and Democratic parties. The Republican Party generally represented the moneyed and business classes, while the Democratic Party ordinarily comprised immigrants and the underprivileged. This frequently translated to Republican-run state governments and Democratic-held city and local administrations.

Philadelphia did not follow this pattern, however; it was a Republican city through and through. While reformers were Republican, so were machine politicians. The Republican Party acted as an umbrella that covered



FIGURE 1: Left to right: William S. Vare, W. Freeland Kendrick, and Charles B. Hall, September 1924. National Photo Company Collection, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress, LC-DIG-npcc-12094.

disparate groups vying for power. Often several “bosses” competed for control, factionalizing the city, while the city’s Republican reformers formed their own organizations, such as the Independent Republicans, to battle the machines.⁷

The development of the machine as a fully organized entity in Philadelphia had much to do with Matthew Stanley Quay (1803–1904). He had helped push through the Bullitt Bill of 1886, which many reformers had believed would rid the city of machine politics. Instead, it centralized power into its grip. Quay, a US senator, had helped create the law, but knew it was not enough to consolidate his position as “the new proprietor of Pennsylvania.” He concluded that the way to cement his position would be as the conduit between the national and state legislatures, and business. He devised a path to power through the management of state legislative allotments and legislation. This depended on his ability to keep state government party aides in check. He was able to do this through patronage and money, which he got through the allocation of national resources and the manipulation of state funds. With his leadership assured, Quay chose several men to serve in city government. Among them was Boies Penrose, who became the heir to Quay, both as a US senator and as state Republican leader.⁸

Quay’s choice for Philadelphia Republican party leader was Israel (“Iz”) Durham (1855–1909), who had been Penrose’s campaign manager. When Durham retired, he left the management of the Organization to “Sunny Jim” James P. McNichol (1864–1917). McNichol, however, never controlled all of Philadelphia the way Durham had because by then the Vare brothers were on the rise.⁹

The Republican Organization of the 1920s owed much of its structure to Iz Durham. As party leader in the late 1890s, he transformed the way the Organization worked. First, he made party, not ward, membership the prime unit in the organizational structure. Instead of having ward representatives elected at the ward level, he broadened the pool to include all public officeholders and party workers. That is, he took ward leadership out of the wards they were supposed to represent and gave it to those who were Organization partisans. Second, he changed the Republican Party’s rules so that the Republican City Committee and ward committees were in charge of the right to issue admission tickets to the Republican convention. Because the ward committees now consisted of Organization members, the Organization was able to select who would be the nominees of the party.¹⁰ Third, Durham systemized and centralized party revenues. If businessmen or corporations needed legislative privileges from the city government, the

requests would be channeled, along with their “contributions” (routine graft, considered the oil that kept a machine humming) to the office of the city “boss,” adjacent to City Hall.¹¹

The Organization was also able to levy “political assessments” on patronage holders. This practice was called “macing” and existed throughout Pennsylvania. In the first decade of the twentieth century, almost 95 percent of all city employees paid assessments to the Republican Organization even though this was against the law. These “contributions” were based on a progressive system of taxation, which graduated from 1 to 4 percent of a person’s salary. The lowest-paid employees, those who made \$900 a year or less, had to pay 1 percent of their salary twice a year, while those who earned \$6,000 or more paid 4 percent. An additional sum of half the total they had donated to the city committee was the suggested added sum to be laid out for the workers’ ward committees. These contributions were often deducted directly from wages.¹²

Fourth, Durham changed the way payments were issued to those who staffed the party apparatus. Before the Bullitt Bill of 1886, the majority of the thirty separate government agencies responsible for city services reported to the Common and Select Councils. Political appointments were handed out to all councilmen on an individual basis. The Bullitt Bill was supposed to reform city government and integrate its unruly structure by consolidating all of these agencies under the mayor. Under the new structure, the mayor, in consultation with and with advice from the heads of his eight newly established departments, became responsible for formulating the rules that would prescribe a singular and systematic method to select and promote city officials. Many reformers had believed that this new framework would break the hold of the machine, but it did not. They hadn’t factored that the mayor, himself, was often an Organization man. He now had unprecedented power, including the authorization to appoint the civil service examining board. The Organization’s control of civil service introduced a new criterion for job distribution. Positions were now distributed according to the number of votes a ward leader could produce. Thus, a major reward for loyalty coupled with longevity to the party became public office.¹³

Besides routine graft, the Organization used what was known as the “strike bill.” In Philadelphia it was also called “macing.” This would be a bill that would be so detrimental to a corporation or public utility that officials of that business would pay politicians large sums of money to stop it. Lincoln Steffens described it as high blackmail. Again, the Bullitt Bill’s centralization

of Philadelphia government into the hands of the Organization meant that it could effectively quash all veto threats to any bill.¹⁴

The complete hold the Organization had over city and political positions led to the recruitment and promotion of men who were quite different from pre-Bullitt Bill leaders. Careers in local politics became low-risk ventures as unlimited tenure in office was virtually assured. This changed the type of men sought after and who would be elevated in their positions. Independent thinkers were weeded out, their places taken by those who blindly followed the party line. Party membership was distinguished by its most striking quality, that of loyalty.¹⁵

This was the reality in the 1890s, when the three Vare brothers began their political careers. As natives of South Philadelphia, they began their rise to power there. George, the eldest, served as a state representative and then a state senator. His brother Edwin, three years younger, followed in his footsteps. William, the youngest, was consecutively a member of the city select council, the recorder of deeds, and a member of the US House of Representatives. He was also US senator-elect from Pennsylvania, but was never seated. Ed became active in the Republican Organization under Durham and also started a construction company. In 1911, as their power grew, they decided to run Bill for mayor.¹⁶

Iz Durham died in 1908 and had bequeathed the Philadelphia Republican party to "Sunny Jim" McNichol. As the Vares' power in South Philadelphia expanded, McNichol found his fiefdom shrinking to the northern sections of the city. This left McNichol with two problems: first, he did not want Bill Vare to become mayor and consolidate his power over the entire city; and second, he, like Ed Vare, owned a construction company, and both competed against each other for business. McNichol believed that a Vare mayoralty would effectively shut him out of city contracts. He appealed to Penrose to find another mayoralty candidate, and the two settled on George H. Earle. This caused a rift in the Republican Party, with the result that both Vare and Earle lost the election. The entire affair caused a rift between Penrose and the Vare brothers.¹⁷

With the death of Penrose in December 1921, Ed rose to the top leadership position of the Organization. When Ed died, less than a year later, the *Evening Bulletin* ran an editorial entitled "The End of a Dynasty," ending: "Apparently, the party will wait, for an indefinite time, for another 'boss' like Ed Vare."¹⁸

By 1923, Bill Vare was beginning to consolidate his dominance. That July 4 he was elected a member of the Republican City Committee from the

Twenty-sixth Ward. The next day Vare paid a visit to Kendrick to discuss the latter's mayoralty bid.¹⁹

The Mayor—W. Freeland Kendrick

In 1923, however, the vacuum left by Ed Vare was still evident. The *Evening Ledger*, a Republican-leaning newspaper but decidedly anti-Organization, described Philadelphia as “a congeries of little principalities in the shape of



FIGURE 2: W. Freeland Kendrick, *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, November 7, 1923. Special Collections Research Center, Temple University Library, Philadelphia, PA.

wards ruled by petty princes yclept ward leaders,” and while several among this group would have liked “to head a confederacy of these principalities, otherwise wards and districts,” that was currently not possible because of rampant personal jealousies. Instead, “the ward leaders have ‘sworn in’ to Kendrick under the pledge that every one of them is to get a square deal and everything that is coming to him.”²⁰

Kendrick’s road to the mayoralty did not begin in politics, however. It began when, at twenty-one in 1895, he joined the Masons, an affiliation he kept throughout his life. Kendrick rose fairly quickly through the Masons’ ranks and in 1906 was elected the Illustrious Potentate (head) of the LuLu Temple. He was then re-elected four times, serving in that capacity until 1918. Then, in 1919 and again in 1920, he was elected Imperial Potentate, the chief executive officer for the Shriners International. Kendrick had long wanted to involve the Shriners in a worthy cause and he got his wish when, in June 1920, at the Shriners Imperial Session, he initiated the idea of a network of Shriners Hospitals for Children.²¹

Although a Masonic Order was not a political institution per se, many of that day’s politicians were members and it was through those connections that he transitioned into the Organization. His name was continually part of the Organization’s speculative lists of possible candidates for mayor or governor. Perhaps the reason for this, opines historian T. Henry Walnut, was Kendrick’s personality, which Walnut described as one that “attracts the average man” with a smile that was “one of the city’s points of interest . . . like Niagara Falls.” Kendrick’s response to these entreaties was always the same, that he had given no thought to the matter. This changed in 1923 after he spoke with Vare.²²

Kendrick ran on a platform of reform. It included construction of the Broad Street subway, the construction of the Sesqui-Centennial International Exposition, improvement of the water supply, sewage, and hospitals, and a major cleanup of the police, all of which were considered vital to the commercial viability of the city. He declared that his administration would be clean, would not tolerate vice or crime, and would be free from the domination of contractor bosses. While he did not mention the name of William S. Vare, his political sponsor and now the head of the Vare Construction Company, he implied that Vare should not expect any special treatment with regard to city contracts. Thus, with his feet planted firmly in the Republican Organization, Kendrick ran on a platform of change.²³

Reform Under Blankenburg

Kendrick said he would model his administration on that of reform Mayor Rudolph Blankenburg (1912–16), considered the gold standard of reform government in Philadelphia from the Gilded Age through World War II. In 1911 Blankenburg was voted into office on the independent Keystone Party line, composed of a small group of reform Republicans against machine rule. This was the election that was supposed to be the political coming out of Bill Vare as mayor. But with the opposition of McNichol and Penrose to his nomination, and their support of George H. Earle, III, the Republican vote split. The result was a Blankenburg win.²⁴

Blankenburg's reforms, with regard to the Department of Public Safety, began with the appointment of George D. Porter, whose goal was to remove the police from politics. To do this, he wanted to cut the ties of police to ward politicians, stop ward leaders from evaluating the performance of officers, and terminate the practice of making officers obtain permission from their ward leaders to change districts. Porter's plan was fairly radical, since police retained and held their positions through political appointments, which were obtained through the civil service. Kendrick decided he needed someone like Porter, and with the advice of Charles B. Hall, the president of the city council, chose Marine Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler.²⁵

Republican opposition to everything Blankenburg tried to implement beset his one-term tenure as mayor. While he had tried to initiate many reform ideas, most of those requiring action by the legislature did not get through. A second problem Blankenburg encountered was the desertion of Keystone party members who had elected him. He had run on a platform of nonpartisan government, adhering to the reform principle of professionalism. In keeping that pledge, however, he had alienated Keystoneers who had assumed that he did not actually mean this and would continue the spoils system for their benefit. The result was a Republican Party sweep of all important city posts in the 1913 election. This signaled to many local businessmen, who had been part of the rise of independent parties in Philadelphia, that it was time to rejoin the GOP. Reform was put on the back burner, and conservative conformity returned with a vengeance as the country entered World War I.²⁶

"Sound Business Practices"

Another promise Kendrick made was to run his administration on "sound business principles." In 1913 Kendrick had campaigned for the Office of Receiver of Taxes with the same pledge. He had repeated this message at every meeting he attended during that campaign. Thus, the *Philadelphia North American*, a major voice for progressivism and the only newspaper in the city to support reform, decided to investigate just what Kendrick meant by this, publishing the results in a series of articles that began on October 21, 1913, and ran through October 31, 1913.²⁷

The newspaper focused on two of Kendrick's businesses: the American Assurance Company located in Philadelphia, which the *North American* called "the graveyard of a dozen insurance promotion swindles," where Kendrick was fourth vice president and special stock selling agent; and the Monaton Realty Investing Corporation of New York, which the newspaper described as "a bare-faced stock and bond swindle," where Kendrick was the Philadelphia manager.²⁸

The American Assurance Co. was incorporated in 1903 and, after the first year, continually ran deficits while still managing to pay 8–10 percent dividends. Insurance companies can be held legally responsible for their actions and are liable to policyholders. Therefore, insurance swindlers shielded themselves from prosecution by transferring their policies to other companies. American Assurance had "reinsured" policyholders of sixteen different companies involved in this business, paying them dividends for the privilege. This was known as "buying the business." Because of these practices, the company was now in grave financial trouble.²⁹

To deal with this problem, the managers of the American Assurance Co. decided to make Kendrick, Illustrious Potentate of the LuLu Temple of the Shriners, its fourth vice president. Kendrick had already begun using his name and position for commercial ends, and the managers proposed that if he agreed to allow the company to use his name and position to float new worthless stock issues (which would be sold to his Shriner friends at double par), he would be guaranteed commissions of not less than \$10,000 a year. When questioned about this later, Kendrick agreed that he did have such a contract with American Assurance, saying that the company was "a good, straight, healthy, growing Philadelphia institution."³⁰

Kendrick's relationship to the Monaton Realty Investing Corporation, however, was a different story. He completely denied that he had ever worked for it, saying he had never sold any stock or security, never advised anyone

to buy anything, and that he knew nothing of the business practices of that company. According to the *North American*, Kendrick's protestations were not true. They found that Kendrick had worked for Monaton Realty part of 1910, all of 1911, and part of 1912, where he was a manager with his name on his office door and on the company's engraved stationery. There was also documentation of original receipts for money Kendrick collected for the company.³¹

The investment swindle consisted of selling stock, "profit sharing certificates," "gold certificates," "industrial accumulative profit-sharing certificates," and "six percent coupon exchangeable certificates." The money obtained was supposed to be invested in New York City apartment buildings, expected to yield income both from rent and increases in property values. The company did invest some of the money it received in real estate. But it took title through straw men, transferring the titles to its own books at highly inflated prices. This meant that Monaton took out mortgages for more than the actual value of the properties. When the company would take nominal title of the property, it would not pay off the mortgage. Instead, like American Assurance, it would pay out 8-10 percent dividends. After a time, however, investors began to demand the surrender values of their buy-ins. This was now less than what they had put in originally, and the company had to acknowledge it had cheated and defrauded them.³²

The *North American* claimed that the Shriners were targeted in both schemes as possible marks because of Kendrick's importance in the Organization. But the Shriners did not believe these allegations. As Henry Walnut chronicled, the person described in the newspaper was not the person they knew and so they continued to support and vote for him.³³

Although this exposé had not worked in 1913, Kendrick's opponent, Powell Evans resurrected it during the 1923 Republican primary. It had as similar a result in 1923 as it had in 1913. Kendrick won the primary and went on to win the mayoralty. His election on November 6, 1923, shattered all previous aggregate votes of Republican mayoralty candidates. He won by more than 200,000 votes, carrying every ward in the city. He received 286,350 votes to the Democratic candidate's 37,019, while a third-party nominee got only 2,739. The entire Republican slate won top-heavy majorities over Democrats, including all twenty seats on the City Council. Nineteen of the twenty were Organization Republicans. Democrats won seven offices, including two magisterial places and a county commissionership allotted to them by law. The other four positions were one Common Pleas and

three municipal court judgeships, which were given to Democrats but only through endorsements by the Republican Organization.³⁴

The Marine—Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler

The machine used the police as an integral part of its operation. Reformers knew that the only way to rid the city of the machine was to control the police. Therefore, they devised a plan: they established commissions to study crime, and used scientific studies to support their argument that the police function should be that of law enforcement, not of order maintenance. This was important, for it changed job requirements from that of membership in the machine to one with reform-related prerequisites, such as physical ability and age limits. It also necessitated a model of policing from which to work. During the 1920s, the most popular model for reformers was the military.³⁵

In compliance with this interpretation, Kendrick decided on Marine Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler to be his head of public safety. Butler was a very fiery, bold figure. At forty-two, he held the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, two Congressional Medals of Honor, the Marine Corps Brevet Medal, and five medals for heroism. Although he was of Quaker descent, he had seen military action in China, the Philippines, Central America, the Caribbean, and France in World War I. One of his nicknames was the “Fighting Quaker.” He had a reputation for blunt, honest talk, complete honesty, impatience, and an insistence on discipline. At the time of his death in 1940, he had attained the highest Marine rank at that time, that of major general, and was also the most decorated Marine in US history up to that point.³⁶

Butler had reservations about the public safety position because he presumed that the two big political bosses of Philadelphia, Congressman William S. Vare and President of the City Council Charles B. Hall would block any reform effort on his part. He knew that the Republican Organization would never allow the police to be separated from politics. Kendrick assured him this would not be the case, probably because Hall had recommended Butler.³⁷

Regardless, Butler’s disdain of the city council was rooted in reality. Reformers began to realize that the Bullitt Bill gave the mayor the power to appoint the three-member civil service commission, allowing him to control it and all civil service positions. To change this, they passed the Philadelphia City



FIGURE 3: Smedley D. Butler, *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, November 1, 1924. Special Collections Research Center, Temple University Library, Philadelphia, PA.

Charter of 1919. This stipulated that the civil service commission would consist of three commissioners elected by a majority vote of the city council members, with each commissioner holding office for a term of four years. The commissioners would elect a president and a secretary. These changes were supposed to

rectify the problem of machine control. Actually, they resulted in no functional difference, since the councilmen were also loyal to the Organization.³⁸

By the beginning of December 1923, however, Butler was reported to be willing to assume the position, provided Kendrick agreed to specific conditions: (1) that he have the power to hire and fire policemen; (2) that police salaries be increased and the force enlarged to 10,500; (3) that he be independent of the mayor, with the ability to enforce the law without interference; (4) that he be allowed to retain his military rank; and (5) that if the mayor were to revoke any of Butler's orders or interfere with his enforcement of the law, he would immediately resign and return to the Marines. Kendrick had wanted Butler to resign from the Marines, but agreed to these conditions.³⁹

Butler wanted to retain his rank because he was to be promoted to the rank of major general the following April. He made it clear to Kendrick that he considered himself a Marine first, and would only consider taking the position if ordered to by his superiors, in his case Secretary of the Navy Edwin Denby, and the president of the United States, Calvin Coolidge. He had no intention of asking for a leave of absence. On December 13, Denby and Coolidge announced they had agreed to grant Butler a one-year leave of absence, which would allow him to stay in rank. He took up his new position on January 7, 1924.⁴⁰

Butler was energized by the task of Prohibition enforcement. Since he interpreted the duties of the city police to be comparable to those of a country's soldiers, he aggressively undertook a campaign to save Philadelphia from its criminal enemies. This meant all-out war on bootleggers. His battle plan was a frontal attack on saloons, hotels, cafés, and clubs. He also planned to keep breweries under police surveillance to insure compliance with the Volstead Act. At the same time he had to guard his rear flank, as his officers often took their orders from the Organization. Upholding prohibition laws became a war on two fronts.⁴¹

Butler lost no time in beginning his fight. He was sworn in on January 7, 1924 and by that Friday, January 11, newspapers reported that he had closed 973 saloons out of a reputed 1,200 in the city. On January 16, he outlined a second forty-eight-hour intensive drive. In all, Butler conducted 484 raids in his first week in office. He made it clear that if this cleanup was not effective enough to solve the liquor problem, he would inaugurate continuous, seven-day-a-week drives. He then ordered 100 raids a week. These raids continued throughout his first year as head of public safety.⁴²

Raids were not enough to contain the liquor problem. Therefore, by November, Butler tried to get legislation passed that would allow the police to padlock saloons, cafés, and other similar establishments. He based his request on the grounds that certain establishments violated the common nuisance clause of the state prohibition law, and decided to begin slowly, only padlocking five saloons, to assess the feasibility of using that provision.⁴³

Butler's request was granted and he continued to padlock saloons into 1925. The problem was not the law, it turned out, but the internal obstacle of police resistance. Judge Harry S. McDevitt of Common Pleas Court number 1, one of Butler's staunchest supporters, responded to this by ruling that padlocked saloons or other establishments must have yellow signs placed on their doors to indicate they were closed. He then sent a padlock violator to jail for contempt of the court order and warned police to start showing more interest in these actions and involve themselves in the court prosecutions. If they did not take the witness stand, he said, he would postpone the entire list of liquor law violators for several months.⁴⁴

By May 1925 Butler had brought injunctions against 130 establishments, including saloons, drugstores, cigar stores, restaurants, and a grocery. He also set a quota of 300 raids for July and 500 for August. An underlying problem surfaced, however, when the *Inquirer* reported that they knew of at least one saloon that had been raided six times over a two-week period. Again Judge McDevitt intervened and ordered that those businesses that had been padlocked would now also have bars and chains installed to keep them closed. These efforts did little to stem the liquor trade, however. As the Special Grand Jury of 1928 would show, many of the police who were involved in the raids also tipped off the proprietors beforehand.⁴⁵

Butler took a different tactic with the managements of hotels, clubs, and cafés. Early in March 1924 he warned them of serious consequences if they did not stop evading Prohibition laws. He thought he had their backing when he received a letter from the Philadelphia Hotel Association stating that it had formed a committee to cooperate with him.⁴⁶ Hotels had their own detectives whose powers equaled those of the police, so Butler made plans to use his men as an auxiliary force. Together with Kendrick, he conceived of the idea to create a special squad of detectives attired in full evening dress who would be located in hotels, cafés and clubs. These men would be picked "on a basis of their good looks and the ease with which they can grace a lamp-shaded table without fretting over a boiled shirt and long coat tails." The mayor suggested placing cards on every table that read: "Transportation

or drinking of liquor at (name of establishment to be inserted) is prohibited by law and is not permitted. Guests are warned that violations subject them to immediate arrest." The results were not very effective.⁴⁷

Butler soon realized that hotel detectives were not following his injunction on liquor. Hotelmen declared they were. Butler stated publically that he did not doubt their words, but the public had to understand that the law was the law and that he would not play favorites. In response, managers of twenty Philadelphia hotels held a closed-door meeting to protest what they deemed to be Butler's "unreasonable attitude." Butler's answer was a plan to keep the hotels under continual surveillance by detectives armed at all times with search-and-seizure warrants, ready to make an arrest or seizure at any moment. This action incensed the hotelmen and led to further agitation.⁴⁸

Beer and breweries were another major headache for Butler. He was as determined to keep beer out of the public domain as he was alcohol. His war on beer stemmed from the Volstead Act, which made it mandatory to strip the alcoholic content of beer from 5 percent to 0.5% or less, the arbitrary amount the law decreed. This new brew, called "near" beer, was made by brewing real beer and then extracting the alcohol from it. Philadelphia was home to several breweries, and Butler stationed officers around each, to make sure they were complying with the law. He also organized a special secret squad of "ginks" to spy on these policemen in case they were crooked, in order to use them to turn state's evidence against those higher up in the illegal operations.⁴⁹

Somehow, while officers guarded the "real" beer to make sure it was not distributed, its alcoholic content disappeared, leaving only "near" beer in its place. Butler's investigation found that, in several breweries, the real beer was loaded on trucks and then driven out in the middle of the night, sometimes through secret exit tunnels, for distribution. The trucks then returned to the brewery and, when tested, contained "near" beer. Truckloads of real beer disappeared in this fashion. Police collusion was the obvious interpretation.⁵⁰

On May 16, 1925, Butler announced the conclusion of a year and a half long undercover operation tracking police irregularities. Part of this investigation involved the police guarding the breweries. Almost 400 officers were implicated. By the end of May 1925, Butler thought he had enough evidence to indict these men and launch a major police scandal. The result, which Butler had expected to be a "bombshell," turned into a "dud." The June

grand jury only charged five officers with taking money from bootleggers and distributors.⁵¹

Butler and the Organization

The problems between Butler and Organization politicians began early on. This was exacerbated by his announcement in late March 1924 that he was going to revise the entire system of police districts. Police district boundaries coincided with those of the wards. This structure was used to tie the district police to their specific ward leaders. Like Porter, Butler wanted to cut the cord between police and ward politics. His solution was to change district boundaries so that sections of four, five, or even six wards would meet in one new police district. Accordingly, he submitted a redistricting plan to Mayor Kendrick, the members of Kendrick's cabinet, and the members of the city council, in the beginning of May. In June, Kendrick approved Butler's plan to close twenty of forty-two districts and reapportion the rest.⁵²

By this time, Butler was actively not getting along with Charles B. Hall, president of the city council and major Organization player. Butler therefore tried to work around him whenever possible, especially with regard to the police district issue, since control of the police was a major tool the Organization used to sustain its authority. Butler's argument to the members of the council was that, in the opinion of City Solicitor Gaffney, the sole power of redistricting lay with the director of public safety, under the act of May 11, 1867. This act allowed the director to change the boundaries as he saw fit in order to achieve the most conducive structure. The approval of the council was only needed in the event the department wanted to sell or lease the abandoned stations. The council did not respond positively to these arguments. Redistricting effectively ended any truce Butler had with the Organization.⁵³

By July 1924 Butler's interaction with the Organization had further deteriorated. The *Record*, the solo Democratic-leaning newspaper in Philadelphia, reported that there was "smoldering animosity" between the leading members of the city council and Director Butler. Kendrick, however, decided to ignore the situation in his review of the first six months of his administration. All he would say was that there existed "some differences of opinion" in the way the department should function. He praised Butler's performance and maintained his support of the director who, he said, had been doing

impressive work as seen by the decrease in crime and the rise in arrests for criminal offenses. He also credited Butler with keeping the police out of politics and underscored how important it was for the executive and legislative branches to work together. He then announced, a little prematurely, that he had ended "the old so-called politically controlled system."⁵⁴

The following day tempers flared anew, and Kendrick now found himself in the role of peacemaker between Butler and Hall. Allegations flew. Allegedly, Butler accused Hall and other councilmen of having an interest in crap games. They retaliated by intimating that Butler's raids had been directed against them personally. Hall denied he had been the political sponsor of a lieutenant who had been threatened with dismissal by Butler the week before, and added that he had been authorized by the mayor to say, "that he [the mayor] would not allow any department official to criticize the council in which were many of his old friends."⁵⁵

This state of affairs did not alleviate, and several weeks later Kendrick felt impelled to state that he would not get rid of Butler. Pennsylvania governor Pinchot also weighed in on the controversy, saying he was sure Kendrick would not drop Butler, who was not only doing great work, but was also a national figure in law enforcement. Addressing the immediate problem with Hall, he said: "Butler had little dangerous opposition before he tried to break up the old-time alliance between the police and the liquor gang politicians."⁵⁶

Butler also had difficulties with the Civil Service Commission. In February 1924, while following through on his drive to wipe out liquor, he announced that any policeman found intoxicated would be dismissed from the force. To implement this, he went to the Civil Service Board and pressed his case. He had the backing of Clinton Rogers Woodruff, the former head of the Civil Service and current special assistant city solicitor. Woodruff argued that since the enforcement of prohibition was a main focus of Butler's, all proven cases of police intoxication should result in dismissal from the force. Woodruff had the support of the new head of the commission, Alfred H. Kreider, who made it known that there would be no leniency for any officer who was found to have deserted his beat or traffic post. Like his initial read on the hotel management dispute, Butler thought that the commission had sided with him.⁵⁷

By September, Butler realized that what the commission said and what it did were not synchronized. Angered by the Civil Service Commission's indiscriminate reinstatement of policemen who had been dismissed by previous administrations, and the absurd clemency given officers with alleged political connections, Butler broke with the agency. In an order, acting on the advice

of Edwin M. Abbott, counsel for the police department, Butler directed that all trials be taken out of the hands of the commission and instead be heard by the boards of inquiry of the respective departments in which they occurred. These departments would then recommend punishment to the director, who would impose it. The defendant would go before the commission only when the charges called for summary dismissal because, under the city charter, this was the exclusive province of the commission. Assistant Superintendent of Police Souder would preside at the trials of accused police.⁵⁸

Arthur Eaton, the secretary of the commission, expressed surprise at Butler's action, emphatically denying that the body had been swayed by political influence. Butler ignored Eaton's comments and began personally fining twenty-six policemen \$100 each, threatening to increase the penalty by \$900 more. He then fixed a schedule of fines that he thought would ensure sobriety. A first offender would be fined thirty days' pay or about \$150. The second offense would increase to the amount to such an extent that the officer would, in effect, be surrendering the rest of his year's pay. The officer's alternative would be to resign.⁵⁹

Added to this were Butler's problems with magistrates. Originally, all but one (Magistrate Carney) had pledged to cooperate with Butler's efforts to enforce the dry laws, but this pledge lasted for only four days. Incidents where magistrates released those arrested for drinking became commonplace. For example, on January 20, 1924, four detectives at the Hotel Lorraine reported that there was drinking on the premises. However, only four patrons were charged with illegal possession, and only a half of a half pint of whisky was found. Magistrate Holland, who heard the case, released everyone on insufficient evidence.⁶⁰

Magistrate Carney, who was known to have "declared open war" on Butler, began to involve himself in the cases of other magistrates. In one such instance, Magistrate Pennock discharged three of four defendants for lack of evidence, while the fourth, a waiter, was held in \$500 bail awaiting a further hearing. He was alleged to have sold the detectives the drinks. Magistrate Carney decided to hear the evidence, too. He then protested the arrests on the basis that a search-and-seizure warrant was not a process warrant and did not give the police the right to arrest, unless the person had custody of liquor. The battle lines had been drawn between Butler and the magistrates by the second month of Butler's tenure.⁶¹

Judge Harry McDevitt, incensed at this behavior, gave notice that he would sit as a committing magistrate to counter those who refused to cooperate

with Butler. While the judge gave no names, it was clear he was referring to Magistrate Carney. It was Carney who often pointed out the legal defects in the search warrants. They failed to say: that the crime was committed within three years; that it was committed in the County of Philadelphia; or that the offense was in violation of a particular act of the Legislature, which needed to be quoted by name and number in the warrant. According to Carney, there were several hundred arrests and searches that had been made using defective warrants. If tested in the courts, he said, the defective warrants might result in the quashing of indictments or the need for new trials.⁶²

Butler's answer to the problem of magistrates leaking information about forthcoming raids and then dismissing charges was to issue a peremptory order that all search-and-seizure warrants be obtained from Magistrate Violet E. Fahnestock, the only female magistrate in Philadelphia, and the only magistrate Butler trusted. Judge McDevitt contended that not only did many of Philadelphia's twenty-eight magistrates disagree with Butler's campaign, they actively sought to disrupt it. To stop this practice, he ordered that Common Pleas judges would preside over the trials. None of the magistrates criticized McDevitt's comments. Perhaps this was because, as strong as McDevitt's pledge was, it did little to dampen the liquor trade in Philadelphia. The judge was out of step not just with the magistrates, who did not support Prohibition, but also with many Philadelphians who served on juries. By the middle of 1925, the April grand jury had refused to indict in 171 liquor cases, while the May grand jury ignored 114 cases and declared itself opposed to prohibition. McDevitt, frustrated, called the juries' handling of these cases "traitorous" and order them to pass on the facts of the cases, which should rely solely on the law, and not mix "maudlin sentiment" into their verdicts.⁶³

Problems between Kendrick and Butler

In the middle of September 1924, late on Friday afternoon, the *Philadelphia Inquirer* broke the news that the long-threatened confrontation between Kendrick and Butler would occur the following Monday. Matters had come to a head when Butler declared that he had no support in City Hall and that the only reason he had not been fired was because he had the backing of the people of Philadelphia. Hedging its bets, the paper reported that some rumors claimed it would result in Butler's resignation, but that others had it that the two men would come to an understanding.⁶⁴




FIGURE 4: Political cartoon from the January 13, 1924, issue of the *Philadelphia Inquirer*. Used with permission of *Philadelphia Inquirer* Copyright © 2014. All rights reserved.

Kendrick was incensed by this statement and said that it was Butler who had created “an intolerable situation.” He already had someone in mind to take Butler’s place, but would not disclose whom at this time. However, that person would not be a politician, and that the Republican Organization would have no hand in his selection. “I am the most disappointed man in Philadelphia,” he said. “Harmony was the keynote of my platform. I wanted my cabinet officers to be harmonious with me. Yet I feel I have been viciously attacked.” With all of his posturing, however, Kendrick did not make any fast moves to oust Butler because he had been advised that if he did, many Philadelphians would be upset and his political future destroyed. And if the truth were known, Kendrick’s chief grievance with Butler was that Butler ignored him. “I am Mayor, but I am less informed of what is going on in the Department of Public Safety than any other man. That shows how much I have been interfering with General Butler.”⁶⁵

On Wednesday, September 24, the *North American* clarified what Kendrick meant when he had alluded to the “intolerable” situation Butler had caused.

The previous Saturday, Butler had raided both the Union Republican Club protected by Big Tom Cunningham, and the Washington Square Social Club protected by Bruce Burke. Cunningham and Burke represented the Boies Penrose faction of the Republican Party and, while now not as strong as Vare's Organization, still held power in certain districts. Cunningham had been the president of the Republican Alliance and did not have warm feelings for Kendrick for several reasons. During the period when Kendrick had been the receiver of taxes, he had employed a group of Cunningham's division workers and had selected several of them to take political instructions from a Vare lawyer. The men, pledged to Penrose, refused to do this and were fired. A second situation occurred later on when a Cunningham lieutenant requested a job under Kendrick. Negotiations began and seemed to be going smoothly until Kendrick said he was powerless to ratify the appointment. Cunningham took this as an insult and charged that the Vare organization, having a 50-50 patronage arrangement with the Penrose faction, was not playing fairly. This grew into a personal feud between Cunningham and Kendrick.⁶⁶

Bruce Burke had not had run-ins with Kendrick, but he had operated many different gambling joints in the Eighth Ward under the guidance and protection of Penrose leader Edward "Buck" Devlin. Devlin's motto was: "Clean up the city of vice and gambling but leave the Eighth Ward alone." The Penrose faction of ward leaders had maintained a hands-off policy with regard to Director Butler since the beginning of the Kendrick administration. It had been careful to say that it was Mayor Kendrick and Council President Charlie Hall who had brought Butler to Philadelphia and his retention or dismissal was their business, not that of the old Republican Alliance leaders. With Butler raiding such Penrose machine strongholds as Big Tom Cunningham's Tenth Ward Union Republican Club, and Bruce Burke's Washington Square Social Club, however, the old Republican Alliance leaders were beginning to demand that Butler leave. Vare supporters, under no such stricture, had felt free to continually attack Butler since he was installed as department head. This "situation" had actually existed for three months and was well documented in the press, but Kendrick had not called the situation "intolerable" until now. Butler said that forty-eight hours after he had accepted the position of director, he began to suspect that he was being used as a "fancy front." According to the *North American*, the mayor's statement that he had never interfered with Butler was greeted with laughter from those who knew how Kendrick had recently attempted to force Butler out.⁶⁷

The split did not occur. Butler sent an expression of regret over the turn of events to Kendrick and promised that he would keep Kendrick apprised of his (Butler's) actions. Kendrick stated that it was his policies that his directors were to carry out. Both agreed that since they did not often cross paths, even though Butler's office was down the hall from Kendrick's, others had kept the mayor informed about Butler's activities and had made them sound insubordinate. To rectify the situation, they decided to hold frequent meetings. Butler said he would take any information about the department or himself to Kendrick personally. Despite the intentions, the conflicts between the two continued.⁶⁸

Butler's Departure

At the end of 1925 questions again surfaced about whether Butler would stay or go. Kendrick announced that he would ask the president to extend the general's leave of absence for the remainder of Kendrick's term. Coolidge said no. Butler had two years to straighten out Philadelphia, and it was now time to turn the reins over to someone else. Butler had to return to the Marines.⁶⁹

Meanwhile, Butler continued his prohibition enforcement without any letup. In the beginning of December, he asked for padlocks for 150 establishments, including three private homes. This was the largest number of padlocks Butler had ever sought and the first time padlocks were requested for private residences.⁷⁰

Then, a defining event occurred. Butler ordered his counsel, Edwin A. Abbott, to bring padlock proceedings against the Ritz-Carlton Hotel. This action came in response to a report made by Magistrate Carney with regard to a raid he made on the hotel during the evening of December 2. On December 3 Carney, accompanied by his clerks Hugh McLoon and John Muldoon, called on Butler and gave him their affidavits of the preceding evening's events. Carney said he had learned around 8:30 p.m. that there was to be a coming out party in rooms 201 and 202, that there would be drinking, and that socially prominent people would be present. When pressed about the time he first called the police, he said he had first called Lieutenant Beckman at the detective bureau but had not reached him. Then time had "drifted on" while Carney was "locked in room 201 with liquor." He had not contacted the police for a while, he said, because he feared what the people at the party would do to him if he did, but finally called the Electrical Bureau

(which was part of the Department of Public Safety) at around 1 a.m. Shortly afterwards a police wagon came. Butler was very excited by this turn of events. He thanked Carney and made ready to padlock the entire hotel. The manager of the Ritz-Carlton was arrested and held on \$1,000 bail. For Butler, this would be the beginning of a new chapter in prohibition enforcement, one where he would go after the big hotels and fashionable clubs for violations.⁷¹

The raid on the Ritz-Carlton energized Butler and he announced his intention to continue his "military stance" against crime and vice until he left office on December 31. Meanwhile, he traveled to Washington, DC, to meet with Major General John A. Lejune, Commandant of the Marine Corps, at the Navy Department to discuss his new position as head of the Marine Corps base in San Diego, California. and to complete arrangements for moving there.⁷²

This all changed on December 22. Butler announced that he had sent a letter tendering his resignation from the Marine Corps to Washington the previous evening and would stay in Philadelphia, at least until the end of the Kendrick administration. Kendrick immediately demanded Butler step down as director. The reason Kendrick gave was that he wanted an active Marine, not a resigned officer, in his cabinet. Perhaps more to the point, Kendrick said that Butler's resignation showed his disdain for the mayor by not discussing the matter with him first. If Butler would not step down from his position as director of public safety and return to the Marines, Kendrick said, he should consider himself fired. Butler blasted back that he was staying to show his men that if they stood with him, he would stay with them.⁷³

Why the Mayor does not wish me as a resigned officer is beyond my comprehension, as I am the same person. I am being dismissed from public service because I am making the greatest sacrifice any Marine can make, and I should, without any other ties, be of more service to the city of Philadelphia than I was before. . . . The Mayor has suspended me from duty and I will obey his order.⁷⁴

Butler did not go quietly. He demanded a letter from Kendrick explaining why he was dismissed, and then replied to it in print, accusing Kendrick of pandering to his Organization friends and not having the moral courage to ensure objective law enforcement. For its part, the Marine Corps rejected Butler's letter of resignation. It then became known that Butler's letter had not been mailed on December 21, but rather December 22, after he had been

fired. Public speculation had it that Butler knew his resignation would not be accepted and was just posturing.⁷⁵

Philadelphians were stunned by this sequence of events and Butler began losing the support of the newspapers. While they had lauded him throughout his tenure, none came to his defense for this last raid. The *New York Times* even editorialized that Coolidge had been very shrewd in realizing that Butler “was not saving Philadelphia and his work was not reflecting credit on the Marine Corps.” Rather, having a senior marine officer outflanked by an urban machine was an “indignity.”⁷⁶

Almost a year and a half later, in May 1927, Magistrate Carney agreed to talk to Kendrick about the raid on the Ritz-Carlton, which had effectively ruined Kendrick’s political future. Carney said that Vare, now US senator-elect, and his closest lieutenant, Recorder of Deeds James M. Hazlett, instigated the raid. According to Carney, Vare had played Butler against Kendrick. Everyone knew about the rows between the two and how much Butler wanted to “shut off the booze” in the big hotels. A raid such as the one on the Ritz-Carlton would put Kendrick in a difficult political position with many people. It was all a political stratagem ordered by Vare to destroy Kendrick’s gubernatorial ambitions, which it did. While Carney had no proof that Vare was complicit in the order, he doubted that Hazlett would have requested the raid on his own. He also said that Vare had left Hazlett’s office minutes before Carney arrived. The reason why Carney was now talking to the press, he said, was that: “It was all a political frame-up and they used me to pull their chestnuts out of the fire. . . . That put Kendrick in the soup, which was what the Vare crowd wanted. Incidentally, it cooked Butler’s goose, because it was the one thing that induced the Mayor to fire him as Director of Public Safety.”⁷⁷

Elliott was sworn in as the new director of public safety on December 23, 1924, and promised to continue Butler’s policies, but ward politics continued much as it had been. Elliott rehired some of the officers Butler had fired, the Civic Service remained a bastion of agency jobs for the machine, and Vare retained his position as head of the Republican Organization. The new director under the following administration restored the old police districts.⁷⁸

While Kendrick had asserted that his administration would be free of contractor dominated politics, between 1924 and 1928 Vare was able to amass between \$15 and \$20 million in construction contracts that went to the GOP city committee. All in all, the Organization had the final say.⁷⁹

NOTES

1. The newspaper articles from the *Evening Bulletin*, the *Philadelphia Daily News*, *Philadelphia Record*, *Public Ledger* and *North American*, and the photos of W. Freeland Kendrick and Smedley D. Butler, are from the "George D. McDowell *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin* News clipping Collection," n.d., Urban Archives, Temple University, Philadelphia.
2. T. Henry Walnut, "Our American Mayors: VII. W. Freeland Kendrick of Philadelphia," *National Municipal Review* 16, no. 5 (May 1927): 302.
3. "Kendrick Carries City by More than 200,000 in Republican Sweep," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, November 7, 1923; Walnut, "Our American Mayors," 304; Samuel Walker, *A Critical History of Police Reform* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977), 66–67.
4. Ellen C. Leichtman, "Smedley D. Butler and the Militarisation of the Philadelphia Police, 1924–1925," *Law, Crime and History* 4, no. 2 (2014): 48–52, 59–69.
5. "Butler Pledged to Enforce Law, Right or Wrong," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 15, 1923.
6. "G.O.P. Leaders Here Shy At Supporting Prohibition," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, October 26, 1923; Christopher Wink, "Philadelphia Evening Bulletin History: 'Nearly Everybody Read It,' a 1998 Book from Peter Binzen," <http://christopherwink.com/2012/01/23/philadelphia-evening-bulletin-history-nearly-everybody-read-it-a-1998-book-from-peter-binzen/> (accessed February 22, 2014).
7. Peter McCaffery, *When Bosses Ruled Philadelphia: The Emergence of the Republican Machine 1867–1933* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993), 48–55.
8. *Ibid.*, 43–44, 72–82.
9. Lloyd M. Abernethy, "Progressivism: 1905–1919," in *Philadelphia: A 300-Year History*, ed. Russell F. Weigley (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), 545, 551.
10. McCaffery, *When Bosses Ruled Philadelphia*, 82–86.
11. "Israel W. Durham: New President and Principal Owner of Philadelphia National League Club," *Sporting Life Magazine*, March 6, 1909; McCaffery, *When Bosses Ruled Philadelphia*, 88.
12. McCaffery, *When Bosses Ruled Philadelphia*, 88–89; Abernethy, "Progressivism," 539; Kenneth J. Heineman, "A Tale of Two Cities: Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and the Elusive Quest for a New Deal Majority in the Keystone State," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 132, no. 4 (October 1, 2008): 331, doi:10.2307/40543376. There are articles that describe the practice of involuntary contributions, but that do not call it "macing." Karl de Schweinitz, "Philadelphia Striking a Balance between Boss and Business Rule," *The Survey*, January 17, 1914, 460; Stefano Luconi, "Italian Americans and Machine Politics: A Case-Study Reassessment from the Bottom Up," *Italian Americana* 15, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 123–42; Alfred L. Morgan, "The Significance of Pennsylvania's 1938 Gubernatorial Election," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 102, no. 2 (April 1978): 192.
13. *The Bullitt Bill*, 1886, Pennsylvania Legislature, 1885, Councils of Philadelphia 1886, 8; McCaffery, *When Bosses Ruled Philadelphia*, 89–91; Albert A. Bird, "The Mayor of Philadelphia," *The Citizen* 1, no. 10 (December 1895): 234–35.
14. Lincoln Steffens, *The Shame of the Cities* (New York: McClure, Phillips and Co., 1904), 222; Gary J. Miller, "Confiscation, Credible Commitment and Progressive Reform in the United States," *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift Fur Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft* 145, no. 4 (December 1989): 688; Joseph Gyourko, Robert A. Margo, and Andrew F. Haughwout,

- "Looking Back to Look Forward: Learning from Philadelphia's 350 Years of Urban Development," *Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs* (2005): 18–19.
15. John T. Salter, *Boss Rule: Portraits in City Politics* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1935), 36–40; McCaffery, *When Bosses Ruled Philadelphia*, 93–95.
 16. McCaffery, *When Bosses Ruled Philadelphia*, 99; Samuel J. Astorino, "The Contested Senate Election of William Scott Vare," *Pennsylvania History* 28, no. 2 (April 1961): 187–201.
 17. Abernethy, "Progressivism," 551.
 18. McCaffery, *When Bosses Ruled Philadelphia*, 99; Astorino, "Contested Senate Election of William Scott Vare"; "Ending a Dynasty," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, October 17, 1922.
 19. "Vare Asks Leaders to Work for Peace," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, October 30, 1922; "Vare Smiles at Glendinning Boom," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, February 5, 1923; "Vare on Ward Committee," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, July 5, 1923; "Hint Pact as Vare Calls on Kendrick," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, July 5, 1923.
 20. "Kendrick 'Consents' to Run for Mayor," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, June 13, 1923; George Nox McCain, "Combine Solid for Kendrick in Secret Pact," *Philadelphia Evening Ledger*, July 11, 1923; McCaffery, *When Bosses Ruled Philadelphia*, 142.
 21. "LuLu Shriners," http://www.lulushriners.org/our_history.html (accessed January 29, 2014); "History of the Shriners Hospitals," <http://www.shriners22.org/about-the-shriners-hospitals-for-children/history-of-the-shriners-hospitals> (accessed January 31, 2014); "Shrine Membership: Shriners Dictionary," <http://www.araratshrine.com/membership/faqs/dictionary/> (accessed January 29, 2014).
 22. Walnut, "Our American Mayors," 303–4; "LuLu Shriners"; "History of the Shriners Hospitals"; "Shrine Membership: Shriners Dictionary."
 23. "Kendrick Declares Against Boss Rule," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, September 22, 1923; Donald W. Disbrow, "Reform in Philadelphia under Mayor Blankenburg, 1912–1916," *Pennsylvania History* 27, no. 4 (October 1960): 379; "Kendrick Pledges Wide Improvement," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, August 18, 1923; Walnut, "Our American Mayors," 302; Arthur P. Dudden, "The City Embraces 'Normalcy' 1919–1929," in *Philadelphia*, ed. Weigley, 570–71.
 24. Abernethy, "Progressivism," 550–53; Disbrow, "Reform in Philadelphia under Mayor Blankenburg," 380–81.
 25. Disbrow, "Reform in Philadelphia under Mayor Blankenburg," 385; Schweinitz, "Philadelphia Striking a Balance between Boss and Business Rule," 460; "Breaks with Mayor Mark Butler Term," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 23, 1925.
 26. Disbrow, "Reform in Philadelphia under Mayor Blankenburg," 379–95; Abernethy, "Progressivism," 555–556; McCaffery, *When Bosses Ruled Philadelphia*, 183.
 27. This contrasts with the *Evening Bulletin*, which was very conservative, the *Public Ledger* and the *Inquirer*, which conformed to Republican thinking, while the *Record* was the solo Democratic-leaning newspaper. Wink, "Philadelphia Evening Bulletin History"; Margaret B. Tinkcom, "Depression and War: 1929–1946," in *Philadelphia*, ed. Weigley, 628; Dudden, "The City Embraces 'Normalcy,'" 587; Historical Society of Pennsylvania, "The Philadelphia Record," <http://digitalhistory.hsp.org/bnkrtr/org/philadelphia-record> (accessed February 22, 2014).
 28. "Kendrick Local Manager of Big Realty Swindle, His Denial False," *Philadelphia North American*, October 27, 1913.
 29. "Kendrick Hired Out to Unload Losing Stock on Shriners," *Philadelphia North American*, October 24, 1913.

30. "Kendrick Concern Paid Fake Profits from Stock Sales," *Philadelphia North American*, October 22, 1913.
31. "Kendrick Local Manager of Big Realty Swindle"; "Kendrick Trims, Admits He 'Decided to Join' in Monaton, the Realty Swindle," *Philadelphia North American*, October 28, 1913.
32. "Candidate, Swindlers (part of title is missing)," *Philadelphia North American*, October 21, 1913; "Kendrick Local Manager of Big Realty Swindle."
33. Walnut, "Our American Mayors," 304.
34. Ibid.; "Evans Quizzes Kendrick Again on the Monaton Co.," *Philadelphia North American*, September 11, 1923. The election results for Kendrick may be found in the article "Kendrick Elected: 286,350 Total Vote Shatters Record," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, November 7, 1923. For works on the Democratic party during this period, see Irwin F. Greenberg, "The Philadelphia Democratic Party, 1911-1934" (PhD diss., Temple University, 1972), and for specifics on the way "kept minorities" functioned, see 233-80. Charles Ashley Hardy III, "Race and Opportunity: Black Philadelphia during the Era of the Great Migration, 1916-1930 (Volumes I and II)" (PhD diss., Temple University, 1989), 479-569. The major study on the way votes were controlled in Philadelphia is David H. Kurtzman, "Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia" (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1935). Other studies include Clinton Rogers Woodruff, "Philadelphia's Election Frauds," *The Arena* 24, no. 4 (October 1900): 397-404; *Report of the September, 1940, Grand Jury for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania: Relative to the Possible Existence of Violations of the Laws of the United States Pertaining to Elections*, Grand Jury (Philadelphia, PA, 1940).
35. The literature on this is extensive. For classic overviews of this see Robert M. Fogelson, *Big-City Police* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977); Walker, *Critical History of Police Reform*. From a reform perspective see Raymond B. Fosdick, *American Police Systems*, Patterson Smith Reprint Series in Criminology, Law Enforcement, and Social Problems 53 (Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, 1920); Nathan Douthit, "August Vollmer," in *Thinking about Police: Contemporary Readings*, ed. Carl B. Klockars and Stephen D. Mastrofski, 2nd ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 1991), 101-14; Gene E. Carte and Elaine H. Carte, *Police Reform in the United States: The Era of August Vollmer, 1905-1932* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). Many crime commissions were commissioned during this period. One major commission is (first) Cleveland Foundation, *Criminal Justice in Cleveland: Reports of the Cleveland Foundation Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in Cleveland, Ohio*, ed. Roscoe Pound and Felix Frankfurter (Cleveland, OH: The Cleveland Foundation, 1922).
36. "Butler Accepts to Make Force Best in World," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, December 5, 1923; Fred D. Baldwin, "Smedley D. Butler and Prohibition Enforcement in Philadelphia, 1924-1925," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 84, no. 3 (July 1960): 353.
37. "Kendrick Wants Gen. S. D. Butler as Safety Chief," *Public Ledger*, December 2, 1923; Lowell Thomas, *Old Gimlet Eye: Adventures of Smedley D. Butler* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1981), 264-.
38. "Philadelphia City Charter" (Greater Philadelphia Movement, 1919); McCaffery, *When Bosses Ruled Philadelphia*, 181; Kurtzman, "Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia," 55-56.
39. These five conditions were reported in the "Gen. Butler Accepts Safety Directorship Upon His Own Terms," *North American*, December 4, 1923. The previous day, the *Evening Bulletin* had listed two conditions: that he would not be interfered with in his administration of the department, and that he be allowed to resign when he wished.

40. Ibid.
41. Leichtman, "Smedley D. Butler and the Militarisation of the Philadelphia Police"; "Butler May Tackle 'Big Guys' Himself," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, January 9, 1924; Baldwin, "Smedley D. Butler and Prohibition Enforcement in Philadelphia," 353; "Butler Gets Help of US Dry Agents in Clean-Up Drive," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, January 11, 1924.
42. "Butler Padlock on 973 Saloons By First Drive," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, January 12, 1924; "New Drive Against Mockers of Law Is Ordered by Butler," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, January 16, 1924; "Butler Now Wants 200 Raids Weekly," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, September 22, 1924.
43. "Saloons Here Face Padlock Campaign," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, November 26, 1924; "Butler 'Padlocking' Campaign to Begin," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, November 29, 1924; "Butler Requests 11 Liquor Padlocks," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, December 13, 1924; "4 More Padlock Requests Granted," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, December 18, 1924.
44. "McDevitt's Boom for Bench Killed," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, May 10, 1922; McDevitt had been a reporter, day city editor, and political editor of the *Philadelphia Press*. He studied law while a newspaperman and was admitted to the bar in 1913. He was appointed the private secretary to Pennsylvania governor Sproul when Sproul took office, and was appointed by the governor to the bench in June 1922. At thirty-seven, he was one of the youngest judges ever to serve and was said to have looked "extremely youthful" at his swearing in on July 1. He became actively involved in the city's antidrug crusade and was threatened with bodily harm and the destruction of his new home that fall. Harry S. McDevitt Appointed Judge," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, June 30, 1922; "McDevitt in Office as Youngest Judge," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, July 1, 1922; "30,000 Drug Users Menace City, Court Tells Grand Jury," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, September 11, 1922; "Police Guard Home of Judge McDevitt," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, October 4, 1922; "Judge Threatened in War on Dopers," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, November 3, 1922. "McDevitt Scores Police Lethargy in Padlock Cases," *Philadelphia North American*, March 15, 1925; "Won't Put Padlock on the Globe Café," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, March 14, 1925.
45. "23 More Padlocks Sought by Butler," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, May 19, 1925; "McDevitt Grants 7 More Padlocks," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, June 19, 1925; "Butler Crusaders Begin August Raids," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, August 2, 1925; "Butler's Men Raid Saloon Sixth Time," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, August 15, 1925; "Locks and Chains Ordered for Bars," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, August 28, 1925.
46. "Hotel Men Pledge Support to Butler," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, January 21, 1924. The content of the letter: "I am instructed to inform you that the Philadelphia Hotel Association, at its annual meeting last Saturday, appointed a committee to co-operate with you in the enforcement of the law and rules prescribed for acceptable hotel operation in this city. This committee will promptly inform you of any infraction of the law and the rules coming to their knowledge in the hope you will speedily correct the evils reported."
47. "Get Busy or Go, Detectives Hear," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, February 6, 1924; "Continual Liquor Guards at Hotels," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, March 4, 1924; "Butler Details Police to Keep Bal Masque Dry," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, March 4, 1924.
48. "Continual Liquor Guards at Hotels."
49. Thomas R. Pegram, *Battling Demon Rum: The Struggle for a Dry America, 1800-1933* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1998), 149; "Butler Ready to Explode Big Police Bomb," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, May 28, 1925.

50. "Beer Waxes 'Near' as Police Guard It," *Public Ledger and North American*, June 10, 1925; "Kendrick Supports Butler Beer Probe," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, June 10, 1925.
51. "Suspended Police Facing Demotion," *Public Ledger and North American*, May 19, 1925; "Butler Starts Big Shake-Up by Suspending 40," *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, May 16, 1925; "Butler Ready to Explode Big Police Bomb"; "Police Graft Bomb Is 'Dud' to Butler," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, July 12, 1925.
52. "Butler Plans New Ward Boss Battle," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, March 27, 1924; "Butler Routs Bank Criminals and Cuts Down Auto Thefts," *North American*, May 7, 1924; "'Clean Up or Quit' Says Butler as He Redistricts Police," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, July 3, 1924.
53. "Butler Plans New Ward Boss Battle"; "'Clean Up or Quit' Says Butler as He Redistricts Police"; "Butler Routs Bank Criminals and Cuts Down Auto Thefts."
54. "Mayor Ignores Split in Review of His Work," *Record*, July 6, 1924.
55. "Butler Called Spoiled Child by Councilman," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, July 7, 1924; "Kendrick Settles Hall-Butler Row," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, July 7, 1924; "Kendrick Puts Lid on City Hall Row," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, July 7, 1924.
56. "Mayor Gives Hint Butler Will Stay," *Evening Bulletin*, July 23, 1924. Pinchot was a Progressive Republican who was Pennsylvania governor, 1922-26 and 1930-34; see M. Nelson McGeary, "Gifford Pinchot's 1914 Campaign," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 81, no. 3 (July 1957): 303-18; M. Nelson McGeary, "Gifford Pinchot's Years of Frustration: 1917-1920," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 83, no. 3 (July 1959): 327-42.
57. "Demand Drunken Police Be Ousted," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, February 11, 1924.
58. "Butler and Civil Service Body Split," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, September 16, 1924.
59. Ibid.
60. "Magistrate Frees Lorraine Manager," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 5, 1924; "Magistrates Pledge Aid in Clean-Up," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, January 18, 1924.
61. "Spent \$40 on Food to Obtain Evidence," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, May 9, 1924; "Butler-Carney 'Go' Over Bums Near Fisticuffs," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, March 8, 1924.
62. "Judges May Sit as Magistrates," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, February 11, 1924; "Butler Slips Back and Jars Bonifaces," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, February 6, 1924; "Butler Refuses to See Girl Dance," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, March 22, 1924; "Butler-Carney 'Go' Over Bums Near Fisticuffs."
63. "Warns Grand Jury of 'Traitor' Acts," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, June 1, 1925; "June Grand Jury Warned by Court to Recognize Law," *Public Ledger and North American*, June 2, 1925.
64. "Butler Declares Public Backs Him," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, September 19, 1924.
65. "Will Fire Elliott When Butler Goes," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, September 22, 1924.
66. Joseph Barton, "Kendrick Yields to Gang to Save 'Protected' Joints," *North American*, September 24, 1924.
67. Ibid.
68. *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, October 1, 1924.
69. "Pepper to See Coolidge about Butler Today," *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, October 15, 1925; "Kendrick's 'Fight' Praised by Butler," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, October 21, 1925; "Coolidge Hints Butler May Not Stay," *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, October 31, 1925.

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70. "Butler Will Ask 150 More Padlocks," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, December 3, 1925.
71. "Butler Orders Quick Action Against the Ritz," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, December 3, 1925; "Butler Seeks Padlock Ban on Ritz-Carlton; Rum Row Ring Seized," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 4, 1925; "Butler Hints Suits for Other Hotels," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, December 5, 1925; "Provan Under Bail as Result of Raid on Dance at Ritz," *Public Ledger*, December 9, 1925.
72. "Butler Is Cheered at Oak Lane Dinner," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 8, 1925; "Butler Meets Lejeune and Discusses Return to US Marine Corps," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 10, 1925; "Butler Certain to Quit Police January First," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 11, 1925.
73. "Butler 'Quits' Today with Parting Blast at Wide Open Town," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 23, 1925; "Mayor Orders Butler to Quit; He Refuses; Accepts 'Suspension,'" *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, December 23, 1925; "Gen. Butler Is 'Fired'; Impugns Mayor's Aim; Elliott Takes Office," *Public Ledger*, December 24, 1925.
74. "Butler 'Quits' Today with Parting Blast at Wide Open Town."
75. Ibid.; "Mayor Orders Butler to Quit; He Refuses; Accepts 'Suspension';" "Butler 'Quits' Today with Parting Blast at Wide Open Town"; "Butler Harpoons Kendrick as He Accepts Dismissal; Elliott Takes Directorship," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 24, 1925; "Butler to Leave for Marine Post Late in January," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, December 24, 1925.
76. Hans Schmidt, *Maverick Marine: General Smedley D. Butler and the Contradictions of American Military History* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1987), 158; "Temperamental General Butler," *New York Times*, December 23, 1925 (first paragraph missing).
77. "Mayor Will Quiz Carney on Vare," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, May 27, 1927.
78. "Elliott to Disband Butler's Unit no. 1, New Squad Planned," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, January 1, 1926; "Elliott Promotes Men Demoted Under Butler," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, March 17, 1926; "Elliott Restores 3 Reduced by Butler," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, August 1, 1926; "Elliott Reopens 2 Police Stations Closed by Butler," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, October 23, 1926; "Elliott Regime Rapped by W.C.T.U.," *Philadelphia Evening Bulletin*, November 18, 1927; "Butler Police Districts Held Spur to Crime," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, January 18, 1928.
79. John T. Salter, "The End of Vare," *Political Science Quarterly* 50, no. 2 (June 1935): 215; Dudden, "The City Embraces 'Normalcy,'" 583.