

THE BALTIMORE RIOTS, APRIL, 1861

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ACCORDING to twentieth-century historians of the Civil War, Pennsylvania would not qualify as a border state, for today the term border state denotes slave states that remained loyal to the Union. However, in sources contemporaneous with the Civil War, Pennsylvania is often referred to as a border state. The reasons for this were many: in the early phases of the war Pennsylvania's western border was adjacent to a seceded state, Virginia; it abutted upon the two slave states of Delaware and Maryland which for a time had indeterminate political affiliations; its southern counties had powerful dissenting groups similar to those of Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri, so that pro-Southern sentiment conflicted with pro-Union feeling; and its location made it vulnerable to Confederate invasion. In other words, Pennsylvania in the beginning had many of the elements of a borderland. To corroborate these facts the newspapers of the day and Governor Curtin's messages to the state legislature consistently delineated Pennsylvania's problems as those of a border state.

Pennsylvania's military position evolved in the early weeks of the war. At this time it became a guardian for Washington and served as a link that connected the North to the nation's capital by railroad. Throughout the Civil War Pennsylvania was looked upon by the authorities at Washington as a reserve line backing up the capital. The emergency forces called out by the state when invasion threatened had the primary function of protecting Washington. Thus the state's border in the crisis of invasion was practically unprotected. This in part explains the relative ease with which the Confederates made their thrusts into Pennsylvania in 1862, 1863, 1864. So weak did its defense become that Governor Curtin, after the Confederates' burning of Chambersburg in 1864, started the recruitment of soldiers for a private state army for the defense of the border, with implicit instructions that this army

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was never to leave the state; only General Sheridan's successes in the Shenandoah Valley ended this plan.¹

One can understand why the authorities in the early weeks of the war were in a panic over the safety of Washington. Unprotected as the capital city was, with inadequate fortifications, with an atrophied military system, with Confederate flags flying across the Potomac, Washington might have been seized by Beauregard before Union troops arrived and defensive outposts were prepared.

It was evident that Washington was a small island of Federalism surrounded by a sea of secession or pro-Southern sentiment. The very existence of the capital was dependent on the tenuous railroad link from Washington to Baltimore to Pennsylvania, and the rest of the North. Therefore, of necessity, the capital of Pennsylvania became a keystone in the defense of Washington. This state sent the first Northern troops to Washington and endeavored to relieve the isolation of that city by maintaining troops along the railroad tracks leading south.

In some parts of Pennsylvania, before the start of the war, militia organizations had begun to drill regularly in anticipation of rebellion. As early as January 21, 1861, Major General William H. Keim of Reading had advised Captain James McKnight to keep his Ringgold Light Artillery in readiness for immediate service. Other units followed this example. Such was the case in Pottsville, Allentown, and Lewistown; indeed, by February several units were organized and ready for their marching orders. On the morning of April 16, 1861, Governor Curtin sent orders to the Ringgold Artillery, one hundred and eight men, to entrain for Harrisburg with their four six-pound field pieces. That evening the unit was in Harrisburg; here it was joined by the National Light Infantry and the Washington Artillery of Pottsville, the Allen Infantry of Allentown, and the Logan Guards of Lewistown. After a delay of two days these five companies left Harrisburg, passed through Philadelphia and Baltimore, and reached the nation's capital at ten o'clock at night.²

¹ Message to the Legislature, August 9, 1864; A. W. Bradford and A. G. Curtin to Abraham Lincoln, July 21, 1864, in *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Series, VIII, 596-597, 606-607; *Journal of the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania*, August 9, 17, 1864, 1097 ff.; *Annual Report of the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania, 1864* (Harrisburg, 1865), 18-19. Governor Curtin called this state army the "Minute Men."

² *Philadelphia Press*, April 17, 18, 20, 1861; *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, April 17, 18, 19, 1861; *Harrisburg Pennsylvania Daily Telegraph*, April 16, 17, 1861; *Harrisburg Patriot and Union*, April 17, 1861; *Pennsylvania*

These troops were the "first military aid from the loyal States."³ So quickly had the Pennsylvania troops come that no adequate preparations had been made to receive them; for this reason they were quartered in the House of Representatives on the evening of April 18. Back at Harrisburg Governor Curtin was making every endeavor to receive more troops and prepare them for travel to Washington. The governor telegraphed to his old arch-enemy Simon Cameron on April 17:

Volunteers are arriving, many of them without arms, and most of those in use unfit for active service. We have no ammunition. I wish to march them in large bodies and prepared to defend themselves. Shall I order the Philadelphia regiments to start?⁴

In Philadelphia, on the evening of April 18, the Sixth Massachusetts was received with open arms and escorted to the Continental Hotel, where supper awaited them; later that evening they were lodged in the Girard House. By midnight reports reached Philadelphia that the passage of the regiment through Baltimore would be resisted. Early the next morning the Sixth Massachusetts took up its journey. With it went ten companies, parts of two regiments of the Washington Brigade of Philadelphia, commanded by General William F. Small. These Pennsylvania troops, numbering about eighteen hundred, were devoid of uniformity or discipline; even their officers had not been commissioned. To make things worse, they were unarmed and without uniforms. From all indications it would seem that the Pennsyl-

Archives, 4th Series, VIII, 723; Moore, *Rebellion Record*, I, 27-28; *New York Times*, April 17, 1861; *New York Tribune*, April 17, 18, 1861; *Pittsburgh Gazette*, April 17, 1861; Governor Curtin said that 460 men comprised these five companies, but the following resolution of the House of Representatives on July 22, 1861, gave another figure:

Resolved that the thanks of this House are due, and are hereby tendered to the Five Hundred and Thirty Soldiers from Pennsylvania who passed through the mob at Baltimore, and reached Washington on the Eighteenth of April last, for the defense of the National capital.

Galusha Grow
Speaker of the House

See *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Series, VIII, 723; July 22, 1861, *Cong. Globe*, 37 Cong., 1 Sess., 303-304.

³ *Pennsylvania Archives*, 4th Series, VIII, 723.

⁴ *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1880-1901), Series III, I, 82. (Hereafter listed as *O.R.*)

vania troops were traveling with the Sixth Massachusetts to be protected, since the Bay State unit was armed with rifles.⁵

To understand the riots that occurred in Baltimore one needs a knowledge of the transportation facilities of that time. One railroad system, the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore, extended from Philadelphia to Baltimore. Travelers went by train to Perryville on the eastern bank of the Susquehanna, boarded the large steamboat *Maryland*, were carried across the river to Havre-de-Grace, then went by rail to the President Street depot in Baltimore. There the locomotive was detached, and the cars were drawn by horses through the city to the Camden Street depot of the Baltimore and Ohio.⁶

It was three o'clock in the morning of April 19 when the Sixth Massachusetts and the Pennsylvania troops left Philadelphia; by noon they reached Baltimore. Horses were hitched to the passenger cars, and they were driven to the Camden Street station. Nine cars loaded with men of the Sixth Massachusetts made the trip without incident, but as the tenth passenger car was coming over the Pratt Street bridge, some Baltimore plug-uglies piled stones and dumped sand on the track, and even dragged anchors from the Gay Street wharf, to block the passage of any other cars. The tenth car was forced to return to the President Street station. Here a council of war was called, and two alternatives were presented: the troops could either return to Philadelphia or march to the Camden Street station to entrain for Washington. The troops decided on the latter course, and as they marched out of the depot, the mob closed in, hurling stones and bricks. Fence posts provided the mob with additional weapons.

Meanwhile, back at the President Street depot, the unarmed Pennsylvanians were no longer protected by the Massachusetts troops. These soldiers without uniforms were driven from their cars and scattered by the mob. Fortunately their civilian dress enabled them to blend into the mob; yet of this group three were killed, more than a score wounded, and two hundred were temporarily missing. Of the Massachusetts troops four were killed, thirty-nine wounded, and one hundred and thirty were not to

⁵ "Small's Report," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 23, 1861; *O.R.*, Series 1, II, 7 ff.; *New York Tribune*, April 18, 19, 20, 1861.

⁶ *O.R.*, Series III, II, 7 ff., 578; *Philadelphia Press*, April 20, 1861; Governor Hicks to the people of Maryland in Moore's *Rebellion Record*, Documents II, 181.

be found.⁷ It should be noted that Mayor George William Brown of Baltimore and Marshal George P. Kane, Chief of Police, acted with great courage, getting themselves and the police between the soldiers and the mob, which did not attack the police. The attack on the Pennsylvania troops continued for more than two hours. Only through the efforts of Marshal Kane were these troops placed in cars ready to return to the North. The main body of the Washington Brigade returned on the night of April 19, reaching the depot at Broad Street at eleven o'clock.

On the evening of April 19, 1861, the Baltimore mobs had stirred secession feelings to a frenzy, stifling the Union sentiment of the city. So great was the commotion that state and city militia were ordered into service to help the police keep order. In Monument Square a secession meeting assembled and vociferously denounced any attempt to coerce the Confederacy. Frantic telegrams were sent to President Lincoln and Secretary of War Cameron, "The excitement is fearful send no more troops here." Similar messages found their way to Samuel M. Felton of Philadelphia, president of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad. Rumors spread like wildfire. A report circulated that more troops were coming.

Marshal Kane and Mayor Brown came to the decision that the salvation of Baltimore from further bloodshed was to be found in burning the bridges on the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad, and on the Northern Central which went to Harrisburg. They consulted Governor Thomas H. Hicks, and he gave his reluctant approval to this course, and the order for destruction was given out at midnight of April 19. That night a mob lay in waiting at Canton, near Bush River, for the train from Philadelphia and stopped it. The secessionists compelled the passengers to leave the cars, occupied the train, and forced the engineer to take them toward Baltimore, burning bridges as they went. The crowd set fire to the draw of the Canton Bridge and waited till

⁷ *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 23, 1861; *O.R.*, Series 1, II, 709; Moore, *Rebellion Record*, II (Docs.), 181; *Congressional Globe*, 37 Cong., 1 Sess., 201; *New York Tribune*, April 19, 20, 22, 23; George William Brown, *Baltimore and the 19th of April* (*Johns Hopkins University Studies in History and Political Science*, Extra volume III), 20 ff.; *New York Times*, April 20, 1861; Fletcher Pratt, *Ordeal by Fire* (New York, 1948), 11, says that one hundred dead were left behind.

that portion was burned.⁸ It must be emphasized that law enforcement agencies in Baltimore and in Maryland did everything in their power to restrain violence. On April 18 Governor Thomas Hicks had issued a proclamation counseling the people to abstain from force and promising that he would strenuously exert his powers to preserve peace. This was no idle boast, for on April 19 Governor Hicks called out the military forces of the state. The city officials led by William G. Brown, the police commissioners (Charles Howard, William H. Gatchell, Charles D. Hinks, and John W. Davis), and Marshal George P. Kane worked diligently night and day to break up mob action, but their efforts were in vain. The highly disciplined city police force of three hundred and ninety-eight men proved too small to cope with mass demonstrations of such magnitude.

The riots continued in Baltimore. Mobs fired railroad stations and threw locomotives into the river. Somebody got off a message asking Jefferson Davis for Confederate troops to preserve the city's liberties. All communication with Havre-de-Grace was severed. The Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad was still intact to Perryville at the mouth of the Susquehanna River only because of the ingenuity of an engineer on the road who had prevented Baltimore raiding parties from passing beyond the river at Havre-de-Grace.⁹ The railroad bridges of the Northern Central Railroad were fired.

Two days later a mob completed Baltimore's isolation by cutting down the wires and telegraph poles on all lines which gave communication with the North.¹⁰ Washington had all telegraph lines down, with only the single Boston regiment and the five Pennsylvania companies at hand to meet Beauregard's South Carolinians; briefly, Washington was cut off, and Baltimore was blazing with secession sentiment right across the path for help. Rumors per-

⁸ *Philadelphia Press*, April 20, 1861; Moore, *Rebellion Record*, I, 33, 35; *Baltimore Sun*, April 20, 1861; *O.R.*, Series 1, II, 13-15; Testimony of Kane and Howard, in *O.R.*, Series 2, 1, 630; Festus P. Summers, *The Baltimore and Ohio in the Civil War* (New York, 1939), 52-53; George P. Kane to Charles Howard, May 3, 1861, *O.R.*, Series 2, 1, 630, 569, 570; *O.R.*, Series I, I, pt. 1, 330-331; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, extra, April 19, 1861; Hesselstine, *Lincoln and the War Governors*, 155; *Philadelphia North American and United States Gazette*, April 20, 1861; *Journal of the Senate*, 1861, extra session, 8-9; Doylestown *The Bucks County Intelligencer*, April 23, 30, 1861; *Washington Reporter and Tribune*, April 25, 1861.

⁹ *House Report*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 2, pt. II, 681-682.

¹⁰ Testimony of Kane and Howard, *O.R.*, Series 2, 1, 630.

meated the nation's capital. The latest paper was three days old, a volunteer corps of clerks drilled on the White House lawn, and rumor had it that the New York Seventh had been cut to pieces by the plug-uglies of Baltimore. Many people took up a hegira of fear; others remained in Washington to see the end. General Scott was busy having trenches dug around the Capitol and planting artillery on the southern banks of the Anacostia River.

Back in Pennsylvania the Baltimore riots became a war cry. Fearing reprisals against his railroad, the Northern Central, Simon Cameron on April 19 dispatched Major Fitz-John Porter, the new Assistant Adjutant General in the War Department, to Harrisburg with orders to muster the Pennsylvania militia into the federal service and place them on guard duty along the line of the Northern Central.¹¹ Cameron's business sense took precedence over everything else in this situation. Furthermore, to protect all railroad facilities leading to Washington from the North, he extended the limits of the military department of Washington beyond the District of Columbia and the state of Maryland to include the states of Pennsylvania and Delaware.¹² Major General Robert Patterson, then in Harrisburg, assumed command of this department and was ordered by Cameron to place soldiers at proper points to protect the railroads in that area. Thus, by these measures Harrisburg became the key position in the defense of Washington.

On April 19, 1861, a consultation was held at the house of General Patterson in Harrisburg. Present were Governor Curtin, Samuel M. Felton, J. Edgar Thompson, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, a Mr. Hazelhurst, and Mayor Alexander Henry of Philadelphia. On the morning of April 19 Curtin had sent Morrow B. Lowry of Erie to Baltimore to watch the progress of events and keep the state authorities informed. Lowry was witness to the attack on the Massachusetts and Pennsylvania troops, and described his actions in the following manner:

I telegraphed to the authorities at Harrisburg and Philadelphia to send no more troops, as ample prepara-

¹¹ Fitz-John Porter to Lorenzo Thomas, May 1, 1861, in Simon Cameron Papers; another copy Fitz-John Porter to Col. Lorenzo Thomas, May 1, 1861, *O.R.*, Series I, LI, pt. 1, 345-351.

¹² General Orders No. 3, April 19, 1861, *O.R.*, Series I, II, 579; J. Edgar Thompson to Simon Cameron, April 17, 1861, *O.R.*, Series I, LI, pt. 1, pp. 327, 330, 331.

tion existed in Baltimore to send them to bloody graves. Towards evening the railroad bridges on the Northern Central, as well as the Philadelphia and Baltimore Railroad were fired and I was thankful to see the flames which would prevent the approach of more victims.¹³

When Governor Curtin and his friends met at the home of General Patterson, it was to discuss the means of getting troops to Washington. Even before word was received that the bridges had been burned, Curtin, Patterson, Felton, Thompson, Hazelhurst, and Alexander Henry had decided to use the Perryville route, and a method was adopted to procure boats to ply between Perryville and Annapolis, thus bypassing Baltimore.¹⁴ The ferry boat *Maryland* which operated occasionally between Perryville and Annapolis was pressed into service with other transports to open a line of communication by water between the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad and the Annapolis and Elk Ridge line, which connected with the Washington Branch of the Baltimore and Ohio below the Baltimore and Annapolis Junction.¹⁵

Benjamin F. Butler and the Eighth Massachusetts Infantry proved the success of this route on April 20. By April 25 the road to Annapolis Junction was repaired by the Eighth Massachusetts and Seventh New York Regiments, and the New York troops proceeded to Washington. Thus, an unobstructed route was opened between Annapolis and Washington. General Butler remained in command at Annapolis and forwarded succeeding regiments of reinforcements to Washington. Back in Pennsylvania, Governor Curtin issued an order that all state troops should be thoroughly armed and equipped before going South. Furthermore, Simon Cameron requested that the regiments organized in Pennsylvania be clothed, subsisted, and transported at the expense of the state.

Meanwhile Washington was in a state of panic. Young men, afraid that the whole male population would be impressed for the capital's defense, fled North or South; panic even seized office-seekers, who fled North to sanctuary. On April 22, 1861, General

¹³ Samuel P. Bates, *Martial Deeds of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia, 1876), 128.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 128.

¹⁵ Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad Company, *Twenty-Fourth Annual Report*, 1861, p. 7; *House Report*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., no. 2, pt. II, 689-693.

Scott said, "This place is now partially besieged, threatened, and in danger of being attacked on all sides in a day or two or three."¹⁶ Tuesday, April 23, passed by and no soldiers came. Lincoln, pacing the floor of the executive office, exclaimed in tones of anguish: "Why don't they come! Why don't they come!"¹⁷ Finally, on Thursday, April 25, the New York Seventh and the Massachusetts Eighth came swinging up Pennsylvania Avenue. Baltimore was quiet again, the plug-uglies beaten down. Pinkerton's plain-clothes men had marked out the ringleaders and the police had clapped them in jail. Thus, the actual arrival of troops from the North denoted that, after all, a route from the loyal North to its capital was open, and Washington's safety was insured.¹⁸ On April 27 Seward wrote, "Ten thousand of our troops are arrived here, and the city is considered safe."¹⁹

On April 19, Fitz-John Porter, Cameron's emissary to protect the Northern Central Railroad, had arrived in Harrisburg, met Governor Curtin, Thomas A. Scott, manager of the Pennsylvania Central Railroad, and J. D. Cameron of the Northern Central. He informed these men of his mission: to forward Pennsylvania troops to Washington and to protect the Northern Central lines. That day an officer was detailed to muster regiments into service as fast as they were offered. Porter describes the situation in the following manner:

The disturbances in Baltimore excited everyone to activity. In large numbers men rushed into the city seeking service and eager to be enrolled. Within three days some four thousand men, fully organized, were reported to me ready for service. . . . The absence of arms, ammunition, and equipment of all kinds could not have been worse had it been premeditated. The state had no arms whatever or equipment even for cooking purposes, and the troops at Carlisle were as deficient, and I had to use the names of the Secretary of War and of the General-in-Chief to procure supplies from the arsenals at Governor's Island, Frankford, and Pittsburgh, and of the quartermaster's department at Philadelphia, and I had to

¹⁶ *O.R.*, Series I, II, 587.

¹⁷ See R. Fuller to Chase, April 23, 1861, Salmon Portland Chase Papers (in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania).

¹⁸ Theodore Winthrop in *Atlantic Monthly*, June, 1861; letter of Fitz-James O'Brien in *New York Times*, May 2, 1861.

¹⁹ Frederic Bancroft, *The Life of William H. Seward* (New York, 1910), II, 560.

resort to extraordinary expedients of hotels and restaurants to feed the men till the commissary department could be organized.²⁰

Thomas A. Scott backed Porter by his pleas to railroad officials at both Pittsburgh and Philadelphia to speed up the transportation of the ammunition and military supplies which had been ordered from arsenals in those cities by Major Porter.

On Saturday evening, April 20, the First, Second, and Third Regiments of Pennsylvania Volunteers, then encamped at Camp Curtin, were ordered to proceed by way of the Northern Central Railroad to Washington. The brigade reached Ashland Station, near Cockeysville, Maryland, on the following morning. At this point the bridges destroyed by the Baltimore mob interrupted further railroad travel, and the troops were marched to a position one mile from the station, where they encamped. The camp at Cockeysville was about fourteen miles from Baltimore. About thirty-four hundred men comprised this unit; it possessed arms and ammunition, but was dependent on agents at York for provisions. The stay of this force was short-lived. Major Porter received the following instructions:

Headquarters of the Army
Washington, April 21, 1861

The obstructions in the railroads within Baltimore and its neighborhood, and still more, the unhappy excitement temporarily existing in that city have induced the President (to avoid collision and bloodshed) to direct that those volunteers return to Harrisburg and take the route via Susquehanna, thence to embark in steamers for Annapolis and to proceed down the Delaware and through the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal in sufficient tugs or other crafts to Annapolis, as Major-General Patterson shall direct.

Winfield Scott²¹

As the troops withdrew from Cockeysville on Tuesday, April 23, guerillas from the environs of Baltimore followed them at a safe distance and destroyed all the remaining bridges between Baltimore and the Pennsylvania line. At York Porter's men were

²⁰ F. J. Porter to Col. Lorenzo Thomas, *O.R.*, Series I, LI, pt. 1, 345-347.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 350-351.

quartered in the fairgrounds of the Agricultural Society, to be known shortly thereafter as Camp Scott.²² Thus, the attempt to reopen, by force, communications with Washington through the Northern Central Railroad was thwarted at this time. The question arises as to why this change of orders occurred so quickly. First of all, the Cockeysville incident brought continued appeals from Governor Hicks and Mayor Brown not to antagonize Baltimore;²³ second, the arguments of Hicks and Brown impressed upon Lincoln the belief that a strong Union sentiment prevailed throughout northern and western Maryland, which, if allowed time for expression, might save that state for the Union.²⁴ Another effort of a different sort was made to establish communications with Washington. Thomas A. Scott tried to open a line of telegraphic communication with Washington by way of Chambersburg, Hagerstown, and the Potomac Valley. However, this proved impossible because of the general lack of telegraphic facilities over the entire route.

In Baltimore and Maryland the opposition to the efforts of the national government to bring troops by train to Washington did not last for a week after the fateful April 19; from the date of the arrival of the New York Seventh at Washington it began to subside.²⁵ "The Union sentiment gets stronger and stronger," wrote Reverdy Johnson.²⁶ The damage done to the bridges of the Northern Central was estimated at \$117,000. On April 22, 1861, one hundred and fifty carpenters from Pennsylvania protected by detachments of Pennsylvania troops were dispatched to repair the bridges of the Northern Central.²⁷ On May 9 federal troops on

²² *Harper's Weekly*, May 25, 1861, p. 331; *Pittsburgh Gazette*, May 2, 1861; *New York Daily Tribune*, April 22, 1861; *Easton Daily Evening Express*, April 20, 1861; *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 23, 1861; Alexander Hays to Mrs. Hays, May 26, 28, June 17, 1861, in *Life and Letters of Alexander Hays* (Pittsburgh, 1919), 92, 96, 102.

²³ O.R., Series I, II, 7 ff., Moore's *Rebellion Record*, I (Docs.), 123; *Congressional Globe*, 37 Cong., 1 Sess., 201.

²⁴ Carl M. Frasure, "Union Sentiment in Maryland, 1859-1861," *Maryland Historical Magazine* XXIV, 210-223; Lincoln to Hicks, Hicks to Cameron, Brown to Hicks, all April 20, 1861, Simon Cameron to "Officer," April 21, 1861, O.R., Series I, II, 580, 584.

²⁵ *New York Courier and Enquirer*, April 28, 1861; *Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia*, 1861, p. 446.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 446.

²⁷ *New York Times*, April 23, 1861; *New York Daily Tribune*, April 23, 1861; George H. Burgess and Miles C. Kennedy, *Centennial History of the Pennsylvania Railroad Company* (Philadelphia, 1949), 149; *Washington National Intelligencer*, May 16, 1861.

their way to Washington passed unmolested through Baltimore; these were brought by transports from Perryville.

The work of reconstructing the bridges of the Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Baltimore Railroad was commenced with a large force of workmen on May 10, 1861. Three days later repairs on the bridges were completed, and two passenger trains passed through Baltimore during the day and evening. Shortly afterwards regular railroad communication with the northern cities, for passengers as well as for the military, was re-established. Previously, on April 26, 1861, news had been received in Philadelphia that the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad between Baltimore and Washington had been put in condition for travel.²⁸

It was the patience and wisdom of Lincoln in pursuing a conciliatory, but firm, policy that won Maryland to the Union. In a different sense it was the craftsmanship of Pennsylvania railroaders rebuilding bridges and relaying track that bound Maryland firmly into the Union. The importance of holding Maryland was clearly understood at the time:

The possibility, I think of the government holding Washington depends upon Maryland's remaining in the Union. . . . Many of those men in the border states whom it will be so expensive to kill, can be gained by a few speeches, a little music, a good deal of hurrahing . . . and ten glasses of bad whiskey.

Better buy so cheaply than conquer at such expense—one drop of honey catches more flies than a barrel of vinegar. . . .²⁹

After the Baltimore riots of 1861 Pennsylvania almost completely lost its status as a border state. A new plan was formulated for transporting troops through Maryland, so as to avoid arousing secession fervor in Baltimore. Loyal sentiment elsewhere was given a chance to assert itself. The defenses of Washington were bolstered with Northern soldiers and materials of war. Maryland was kept in the union, and hereafter Maryland, rather than Pennsylvania, was the border state.

²⁸ New York *Daily Tribune*, April 29, 1861.

²⁹ John Rodgers to Alexander Henry, April 11 [?], 1861, Alexander Henry Papers (in the Historical Society of Pennsylvania).