

Early Mine Workers' Organizations In The Anthracite Region

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Anthracite mine workers, a local editor wrote in 1890, "are patient and long suffering."¹ It is possible to dispute the validity of this observation. No one could argue that hard coal miners enjoyed a life of luxury. Indeed, the conditions of their employment placed even a comfortable life beyond their grasp. The hard coal industry paid low wages. In 1884, for example, anthracite mining ranked 34th among the 58 industries reporting average weekly wages in Pennsylvania.² Unfortunately, the mine workers were unable to realize the income potential of this low wage rate. Organized as a cartel after 1873, the industry restricted production to maintain prices. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century it averaged 172 days of work per year.³ Long periods of compulsory unemployment bit deeply into the expected pay of the mine workers. In 1884 the theoretical (based upon full time) annual income for a contract miner was \$842. The actual average income, however, was \$460.⁴

Deductions further eroded the low pay. Miners supplied their own tools, oil and powder which they purchased from their employers at inflated prices. Coal companies also deducted store bills, rent, doctors' fees, and, in some cases, church tithes from their employees' checks. It was not uncommon for mine workers to receive a "snake"—a statement that total deductions equaled wages—on his pay envelope. Some even discovered that a month of hard labor had put them in debt!⁵

Working conditions placed the mine workers' meager income always in jeopardy. The anthracite mines were among the most dangerous in the world. During the decade from 1887 to 1896 2.7 hard coal miners were killed for every bituminous miner killed in Pennsylvania while 2.6 men were injured in the anthracite mines for every injury in the soft coal mines. Most non-fatal accidents affected the limbs.⁶ In many cases, given the state of medical technology in the nineteenth century, amputation was the only treatment for badly smashed arms and legs. Accidents, perhaps, had one positive attribute. They were abrupt.

Working conditions slowly sapped the health of the mine workers. Lifting and pushing in the mine's cramped damp quarters contributed to back disorders. Lumbago and rheumatism were common among employees.⁷ Parasitic infections were also common. Since the mines did not contain toilets, the workers deposited

their excreta wherever convenient. Mules and rats patrolled the gangways littering the floors with their droppings. The men walked in this combination of muck and filth, climbed ladders in the manways of their workplaces, and handled materials which had laid on the ground. They could not wash their hands before eating lunch. Lore had it that a miner ate a wheelbarrow of dirt per year.⁸ But he ingested more than dirt. Hookworm and other parasites were prevalent among the mine workers.⁹

Respiratory diseases, however, were more common. Miners suffered from pneumonia and tuberculosis.¹⁰ But the most terrible disease was black lung. Coal dust impregnated the lungs and, over time, indurated the tissue rendering breathing difficult until the victim finally suffocated.

Those who survived the mines could find little solace in their old age. Most miners were unable to accumulate a sufficient sum to fund an extended retirement. Some employers offered their elderly workers a pension in the form of free housing and fuel.¹¹ Others rewarded long and faithful service with permission to remain at work. "There were good feelings toward the men. As we made money out of them, we do not want to push them away."¹² In this way a mine operator explained why he had hired several men over eighty years of age to pick slate.

Anthracite mine workers did not endure their distress and pain with quiet submission. They repeatedly sought to improve their condition throughout the nineteenth century. Sensing that the individual would have little or no impact upon the industry, they relied upon the group to tackle their occupational problems.

Economic geography, ethnocentrism, and work organization, however, were obstacles to united action. Transportation lines subdivided the four anthracite fields into three geo-economic regions. The Schuylkill or southern region sent most of its production through Philadelphia. Both the Lehigh and the Lackawanna or northern region shipped to New York and the west. Identifying their region's welfare with their personal well-being, mine workers suspected the motives of their counterparts in other regions.

Successive waves of different immigrant groups produced pressures that disintegrated the social structure within each region. Each group developed a support infrastructure of church and benevolent associations that provided a separate identity long after they ceased to be differentiated by language and dress.

The anthracite industry organized its labor force into functional groups. Laborers, for example, held grievances against miners. Miners complained about mule drivers.¹³ It was against this backdrop of divisiveness and animosity that the mine workers struggled to achieve a collective response to their problems. Not surprisingly, the first steps toward unity were tentative.

One of the first instances of united action by mine workers occurred in 1842.

In July a group of men at Minersville in the Schuylkill region walked off their jobs protesting the company store and demanding higher wages. Hoping to spread the strike, they marched to nearby Pottsville. There they confronted a company of militia and promptly disbanded.¹⁴

Four years later an Englishman, John Bates, began to organize a union throughout Schuylkill County. Claiming a membership of 5,000 men and boys, the new union sent a list of demands to the operators in 1847. Management responded with a lockout and the union dissolved amid charges that the founder had absconded with the funds.¹⁵

Courtesy of Historical Society of Schuylkill County.



A mine at work in the Anthracite coal fields, ca. 1900.

Anthracite mine workers continued to organize on a local basis during the 1850s. In 1853, for example, miners at the Delaware and Hudson Company in the Lackawanna region won a small increase in the price paid per ton of coal. But their success was unique.¹⁶ As in 1842, mine operators in Schuylkill County called upon the police power of the state to overawe their disgruntled employees. In 1857 a sheriff's posse broke up a strike of Irish miners in Cass Township. And, the following year a posse reinforced by militia ended a strike in the northern section of the county by arresting its leaders.¹⁷

Civil War inflation spawned a revival of collective activity in the hard coal fields. Some of the new organizations took advantage of the increasing demand for coal to wrest higher wages. Miners in the Pittston area in the Lackawanna region even secured formal recognition in the form of a written contract from their employer.¹⁸ Mine operators in the Schuylkill region, however, were unwilling to surrender their "rights." They quickly identified labor agitation with treason against the United States. Charlemagne Tower, Provost Marshall of Schuylkill County and a mine operator, agreed. He skillfully used the federal army to undermine labor unions in that area.¹⁹

A series of disastrous strikes during 1865 stunted the growth of labor unionism in the other regions. Employees of the Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company ended a three month strike in March by accepting the company's terms.²⁰ Miners in the Lackawanna region agreed to a 20 percent cut in wages when they were unable to secure support for their strike from local unions in the Lehigh and Schuylkill regions.²¹

The fledgling labor movement in the anthracite coal regions was in complete disarray by 1866. Surviving local unions were too weak to resist pay cuts. But the end of the year wages plummeted below their 1857 level.²² Mine operators gained an effective instrument of police control when the legislature gave them the privilege of maintaining a private police force. Nominated by the coal company and appointed by the governor, the Coal and Iron Police enjoyed the same authority as the city police of Philadelphia. A heavily armed livery force would become a prominent feature of future strikes.²³

In 1868 the Pennsylvania legislature provoked a strike by defining the legal working day as eight hours unless a contract specified otherwise. Mine workers in the Schuylkill region requested the eight hour day. Operator refusal to comply sparked a spontaneous strike in the Mahanoy Valley. Strikers marched throughout the coal fields attempting to shut down mines. The marchers were successful in the Lehigh region, but the miners in Lackawanna refused to join a strike until their southern brethren formed an organization which would represent more than a single colliery.²⁴

The strikers attempted to meet this condition. Meeting at Mahanoy City in

August, they resolved to form county wide unions. In March, 1869 representatives of the county unions met in Hazleton and established a loosely organized confederation, The General Council of the Workingmen's Associations of the Anthracite Coal Fields of Pennsylvania.²⁵ Better known as the WBA, the first industry-wide union committed itself to a policy of maintaining high wages by regulating production. It adopted a sliding pay scale, known as basis system, to achieve its goal. Under the plan a basic wage level would be established for a benchmark price of coal. Wages would increase as coal prices rose, but they could not fall below their base level. Thus management would be forced to either suspend operations or face a strike if overproduction caused a decline in prices.²⁶

The WBA called a strike in May, 1869 to implement its policy. The new union successfully installed the basis system in the Lehigh and Schuylkill regions, but the Lackawanna operators rejected the concept. To allow their employees to participate in the setting of prices, they argued, would be tantamount to admitting them into partnership. They dismissed the idea as ridiculous! Although supported financially by the county unions in the two southern regions, the men of Lackawanna returned to work on August 31, without the sliding scale.²⁷

At the end of the year operators in the two southern regions proposed that the sliding scale be continued, but that the base wage level be decreased. The WBA responded by ordering a suspension of work to begin in March, 1870. The unions in the Lackawanna region, however, disobeyed. Angered, the General Council severed all connections with the northern organizations. Although its solidarity was shattered, the WBA continued the strike until July when it accepted a contract which allowed wages to fall below their base level.²⁸ It was widely understood that the disunity caused the defeat. Mine workers were advised that they could enjoy success only by "being true to themselves and each other."²⁹

The prospect of labor unity increased at year's end. Desirous of exploiting the divisions within the house of labor, the Lackawanna operators announced a wage reduction of twenty percent in December. Sensing a protracted battle ahead, the northern unions sought allies. They promised to pay their back dues and obey all orders if they would be readmitted to the General Council. The WBA reinstated the "prodigal sons" over objections from some representatives of the Schuylkill region unions. Upon readmission, the Lackawanna delegates to the General Council successfully moved that a strike be called for January 10. Mine workers in all regions walked off their jobs on the appointed date.³⁰

Management's attempt to reopen the mines prompted violence. In April a group of strikers stormed a "scab" boarding house in Mount Carmel. After shooting into the bedrooms, they exploded a keg of blasting powder on the first floor. Fortunately, no one was seriously injured. Numerous attacks on strike-breakers in Scranton caused Governor John W. Geary to order a company of

militia to that city. The strikers disarmed the soldiers. Geary ordered another company of the militia to Scranton. The second company fired into a group of strikers killing two and wounding several others.³¹

The protracted and increasingly violent strike caught the attention of the Pennsylvania legislature. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary General investigated conditions in the anthracite fields. Although the committee substantiated labor's charges of low wages and miserable working conditions, the investigation had little impact upon the strike. The committee concluded that workmen had the right to form a union and refuse to work, but it failed to offer legislation which might insure that right.³²

The committee's failure to act cannot be attributed to the WBA's ignorance of the legislative process; it proved to be an effective lobby. The union secured a mine safety act for Schuylkill County in 1869.³³ The following year it won a more detailed law that entailed the entire hard coal industry. The 1870 act also required mine operators to maintain a lighted and heated bath house for their employees and prohibited the employment below ground of boys under 12 years of age.³⁴ Another act passed in 1870 incorporated the Miner's Hospital and Asylum of Schuylkill County to provide free care to injured miners. Internal bickering, however, prevented the implementation of that act.³⁵

Courtesy of Historical Society of Schuylkill County.



Internal discord also weakened the WBA during the strike of 1871. Bitter quarrels between miners and laborers all but destroyed the union in the Lackawanna region. Fights between ethnic groups eroded the strength of the local unions in the two southern regions. Its treasury empty and torn by infighting, the General Council authorized each county union to set its own terms for resuming work. The last union returned to work on June 21 for a ten per cent reduction in wages.³⁶

The WBA never recovered from the debacle of 1871. It practically ceased to exist in the Lackawanna region. County unions in the Lehigh and Schuylkill regions conducted annual parades but each year the number of marchers declined. And they gladly accepted a continuation of the 1871 contract in 1872 and 1873.³⁷

After a two year hiatus, however, the WBA seemed to rebound in the Schuylkill region. In 1874 the Schuylkill County union conducted a short strike and won a restoration of a pay cut. But it was a pyrrhic victory for it alienated a very powerful person, Franklin B. Gowen.³⁸ President of the Philadelphia and Reading companies, Gowen recently had organized mine operators into a price fixing pool. A resurgent labor union which insisted on linking wages to coal prices could nullify his scheme. The imperious Gowen would not be denied; he vowed to destroy the union.³⁹

During the remainder of 1874 the Reading mined and shipped coal without a break. Even after it filled its Philadelphia coal yards to capacity it continued to mine. It stored the excess product by diverting loaded railroad cars onto sidings. In November Gowen announced that the Reading would close its collieries for the remainder of the heating season. The other operators in the Schuylkill and Lehigh regions followed the Reading's lead. A month later the operators declared a ten per cent reduction in wages effective upon the resumption of work.⁴⁰

The county unions in the two southern regions responded with a strike call. By January it was obvious that the struggle would be climactic. Heavily armed Coal and Iron police protected strikebreakers. Union men responded by side tracking railroad locomotives, overturning loaded coal cars and setting fire to preparation plants (breakers) and other buildings. In April a "riot" at Hazleton prompted the governor to send 500 militia into the region.⁴¹

Confronted by a violent strike, the Pennsylvania legislature investigated the problem. The WBA attempted to have the committee focus upon the power and actions of the Philadelphia and Reading. Undismayed, Gowen invited the committee to hold its hearings at Atlantic City at the Reading's expense. The committee accepted. After a thorough investigation the committee concluded the issues should be deferred to the courts.⁴²

The war of attrition continued in the coal fields. By late May the WBA and its local organizations were unable to provide strike relief. The hungry men began

returning to work. On June 15 the WBA accepted management's terms and officially ended the six month strike. An unknown minstrel sang, "Well, we've been beaten, beaten all to smash."⁴³

Although beaten, the mine workers refused to concede defeat. In July, 1877 employees of the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western mines near Scranton struck for higher wages. They followed the traditional method of marching to spread the strike. They encountered a special police force commanded by W. W. Scranton on one of these marches. The police force fired into the parade killing 6 and wounding 54. Immediately 5,000 members of the national guard were sent into the region.⁴⁴

The strike spread despite the presence of troops. The mine workers in the southern region, however, refused to walk off their jobs. The Lehigh strike was short; in mid-September the men returned to work after being promised that wages would be increased as soon as the price of coal rose. The Lackawanna men capitulated on October 17.⁴⁵

Courtesy of Historical Society of Schuylkill County.



A quiet moment in the Anthracite region, ca. 1900.

The strikes of 1877 again demonstrated the need for an organization which could function in all three regions. The Knights of Labor appeared capable of meeting that need. The Knights entered the hard coal fields in 1871, but failed to enroll many miners, most of whom preferred to remain in their established unions. The collapse of the WBA made the Knights more attractive. On July 3, 1876 miners in Scranton formed Local Assembly 216 which provided some leadership during the 1877 strikes. The new union quickly spread throughout the coal fields after the strikes. Within a year local assemblies flourished in the Schuylkill region. On July 23, 1879 an estimated crowd of between 10,000 and 15,000 attended a Knights of Labor picnic at Shenandoah.⁴⁶

Not all, however, agreed with the Knight's philosophy of accepting all producers into a single organization. During February 1879, mine workers in Hazleton moved to establish a more exclusive union by forming the Workingmen's Protective Association of the Lehigh Region. The Association invited all coal miners to a convention in Hazleton to consider the possibility of an industry-wide union. A sufficient number of delegates attended the convention to establish an Executive Committee composed of one representative from each county. The new organization called a strike for March 15. Unfortunately, no one responded to the call.⁴⁷

Despite the embarrassment, efforts to create an exclusive union of mine workers continued. A futile effort to revive the WBA occurred in 1880. Four years later a union of bituminous miners, the Amalgamated Association of Miners of the United States, sent an organizer, George Harris, into the hard coal fields. By November the new union, now called the Miners and Laborers' Amalgamated Association, had established locals in both the Lehigh and Schuylkill regions. Loosely organized by an Executive Board consisting of one delegate from each local, the Amalgamated recruited English, Welsh, German and a few Polish mine workers. Irish miners, however, were more at home in the Knights. Overcoming ethnic animosities, the two unions abandoned competition in late 1885 and formed a joint Committee to coordinate efforts.⁴⁸

Labor compiled an impressive legislative record during this era of reorganization. In 1879 it secured funding for a state hospital to provide free care to injured miners. The hospital was located near Ashland in the Schuylkill region. Two years later workers successfully lobbied for the passage of a law requiring operators to provide an ambulance at every mine. And, in 1885 the legislature passed a major revision of the Anthracite Mine Safety Code. Finally, workers helped obtain a second miners' hospital. It was the last successful action of the Joint Committee.⁴⁹


In 1887 the Joint Committee requested a fifteen per cent increase in wages. To add force to this request, it called a strike against any operator who refused to either grant the demand or negotiate by September 10. Reaction to the call varied

from region to region. The Lackawanna region remained working. Mine workers and operators in the Schuylkill region agreed to an eight per cent wage increase which would continue to January 1, 1888. But 20,000 miners in the Lehigh region walked out.⁵⁰

Lehigh remained on strike alone until January when the mine workers in the Schuylkill region joined them. The prolonged strike once again caught the attention of politicians. A congressional committee investigated the problem. But, as with the legislative committees, the investigation did little but reveal the harsh working conditions in the anthracite mines.⁵¹

The operators' primary strategy was to wait until hunger forced their employees back to work. Mine workers began returning to their jobs in February, 1888. The local unions in the Schuylkill region accepted defeat on February 23 and on March 4 the Lehigh men surrendered.⁵²

Courtesy of Historical Society of Schuylkill County.



Guards for the Smitt Myers Coal Company during the 1902 miners' strike.

Both the Knights of Labor and the Amalgamated were unable to recover from their defeat. Local unions continued to function, but they could not coordinate activities on even a regional basis. Other organizations endeavored to fill the void. The Miners National Progressive Union conducted an unsuccessful organizational drive in the hard coal fields during 1889. In June, 1892 men in the Shamokin area formed a local branch of the United Mine Workers of America. The UMW, however, experienced sporadic growth. It practically disappeared for a number of years.⁵³

In 1897 a spontaneous localized strike against an autocratic superintendent, Gomer Jones, at Audenried provided impetus toward greater organization. The striking miners marched throughout the Hazleton area closing mines. On September 10 they confronted a posse at Lattimer. The posse opened fire killing 19 of the unarmed immigrant strikers. Shocked by the Lattimer Massacre, mine workers in the two southern regions began to join the United Mine Workers of America.⁵⁴

The editor quoted earlier in this article was quite mistaken about the patience of the anthracite mine workers. They did not endure their suffering with quiet submission. Rather they formed unions and fought to improve their working conditions. But, in a sense, the mine workers were their own worst enemies. They were unable to transcend the regional and ethnic obstacles to their unity. At least one region remained working during each major strike. Conflicts between ethnic and occupational groups weakened local organizations within each region.

It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss the early unions as failures. The mine workers did enjoy slightly higher wages when organized. On a more permanent basis, the unions proved capable lobbyists securing the passage of important legislation to improve safety in the mines and provide care for injured mine workers. Their strikes awakened public interest in working conditions in the coal fields. As the repeated attempts to establish an effective industry-wide organization demonstrate, the experiences of the nineteenth century convinced the hard coal miners a union was "for our own good."

Notes

1. Pottsville *Miners' Journal*, October 15, 1890.
2. Pennsylvania, Secretary of Internal Affairs, *Annual Report, 1884*, Part III, *Industrial Statistics*, 39.
3. Pennsylvania, Mine Inspectors, *Annual Reports, 1875 to 1890*.
4. Pennsylvania, Secretary of Internal Affairs, *Annual Report, 1884*, Part III, *Industrial Statistics*, 4.
5. In the southern region the statement was known as a "bobtail check." Peter Roberts, *The Anthracite Coal Industry* (New York, 1901), 148.
6. Pennsylvania, Mine Inspectors, *Annual Reports, 1887 to 1896*.
7. United States Anthracite Strike Commission (1902), *Proceedings of the Anthracite Coal Strike Commission*, (Washington, 1902-1903), 911.
8. Interview with William Generos, August 14, 1978.
9. As late as 1911 ten per cent of the anthracite mine workers were infected with parasites.
10. A twentieth century study discovered that the tuberculosis rate among anthracite miners increased in geometric progression as one advanced through age cadres. Hard coal mining was the only occupation to have this progression. Pennsylvania, Bureau of Industrial Standards, *Anthro-Silicosis: A Preliminary Report of a Study made in the Anthracite Coal Regions of Pennsylvania by the United States Public Health Service*, 41.
11. Anthracite Coal Strike Commission, 5634.
12. United States, House of Representatives, Select Committee on Existing Labor Troubles in Pennsylvania, *Labor Troubles in the Anthracite Regions of Pennsylvania, 1887-1888*, Report 4147, 50th Congress, 2nd Session, 377.
13. Miners hired laborers to fill coal cars and do other difficult tasks. Laborers complained that miners left work early and did not pay well. Miners felt that mule drivers were not fair in their distribution of cars to the various work places.
14. *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, July 15, 1842, 1. George Korson, *Black Rock: The Way of Life in the Coal Fields* (Evanston, 1941), 136.
15. Edward A. Wieck, *The American Miners' Association* (New York, 1940), 62-63. Clifton K. Yearly, *Enterprise and Anthracite: Economics and Democracy in Schuylkill County, 1820-1875* (Baltimore, 1961), 178.
16. Thomas Murphy, *Jubilee History of Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania* (Topeka, 1928), 384-385.
17. Grace Palladino, *Another Civil War: Labor, Capital, and the State in the Anthracite Regions of Pennsylvania, 1840-1868* (Urbana, Ill., 1990), 58-59.
18. Manuscript Coal File 3. Wyoming Geological and Historical Society. Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.
19. Palladino, *Another Civil War*, 140-165.
20. Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company, *Annual Report, 1865*, 8.
21. Roberts, *Anthracite Coal Industry*, 176.
22. Yearly, 180-181.
23. Hyman Kuritz, "The Pennsylvania State Government and Labor Controls from 1865 to 1955," (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1954), 43-45. J. P. Shallo, *Private Police* (Philadelphia, 1933), 59.
24. *Pennsylvania Laws, 1868*, 60. *Miners' Journal*, July 18, 1868; July 25, 1868; August 8, 1868; August 15, 1868. *Wilkes-Barre Record of the Times*, August 8, 1868. *Shamokin Herald*, July 16, 1868.
25. *Record of the Times*, March 24, 1869.
26. Charter of the Workingmen's Beneficial and Benevolent Association. *Miners' Journal*, December 1, 1868.
27. Miners' Benevolent Association of Archbald, Minute Book, Meeting of May 31, 1869. *Shamokin Herald*, June 10, 1869; June 17, 1869; June 24, 1869; July 22, 1869. *Record of the Times*, September 1, 1869.
28. *Miners Journal*, March 12, 1870; May 8, 1870; July 2, 1870; July 26, 1870.
29. *Shamokin Herald*, March 3, 1870.
30. Pennsylvania, Secretary of Internal Affairs, *Annual Report, 1880-81*, Part III, *Industrial Statistics*, 295. *Shenandoah Herald*, December 22, 1871. *Daily Miners' Journal*, January 5, 1871; January 10, 1871; January 12, 1871.

31. *Shamokin Herald*, March 9, 1871. Roberts, 180.
32. *Report of the Committee on the Judiciary General of the Senate of Pennsylvania in Relation to the Anthracite Coal Difficulties with Accompanying Testimony*.
33. *Pennsylvania Laws*, 1869, Law Number 845.
34. *Pennsylvania Laws*, 1870, Law Number 1.
35. *Ibid.*, Law Number 848. *Shenandoah Herald*, April 18, 1874.
36. *Daily Miners' Journal*, March 2, 1871; April 26, 1871; April 28, 1871; May 8, 1871; May 12, 1871; June 23, 1871. *Shamokin Herald*, April 20, 1871; May 11, 1871; May 28, 1871; June 22, 1871.
37. *Miners' Journal*, January 13, 1872; January 20, 1872; January 20, 1873; *Record of the Times*, August 6, 1873; *Shamokin Herald*, May 29, 1873. *Shenandoah Herald*, May 29, 1873.
38. *Philadelphia Public Ledger*, January 23, 1874; January 26, 1874.
39. See Marvin W. Schlegel, *Ruler of the Reading: The Life of Franklin B. Gowen* (Harrisburg, 1947).
40. *Pennsylvania Legislature, Testimony Before the Committee to Investigate the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad and the Philadelphia and Reading Coal and Iron Company* (Hereafter *Reading Investigation*), *Legislative Documents*, 1876, IV, 1087. *Daily Miners' Journal*, November 29, 1874; December 7, 1874; January 4, 1874.
41. *Reading Investigation*, *passim*. *Shenandoah Herald*, April 3, 1885.
42. *Reading Investigation*, *passim*.
43. George Korson, *Minstrels of the Mine Patch* (Philadelphia, 1938), 225.
44. Samuel C. Logan, *A City's Danger and Defense, Or Issues and Results of the Strike of 1877* (Scranton, 55-79. *Scranton Republican*, July 26, 1877; July 26, 1877.
45. *Record of the Times*, August 3, 1877; September 3, 1877; September 10, 1877. *Scranton Republican*, October 16, 1877.
46. Norman J. Ware, *The Labor Movement in the United States, 1860-1898: A Study in Democracy* (New York, 1929), 32. *Weekly Miners' Journal*, May 10, 1878; February 28, 1879. *The Mountain Beacon* (Hazleton), July 10, 1879; July 31, 1879.
47. *Evening Bulletin* (Hazleton), February 13, 1879; March 3, 1879. *The Mountain Beacon*, April 24, 1879. *Weekly Miners' Journal*, March 26, 1879.
48. *Weekly Miners' Journal*, March 5, 1880; March 12, 1880; July 18, 1884; November 7, 1884; December 5, 1884. Roberts, 182-183.
49. *Pennsylvania Laws*, 1879, Law No. 167. *Pennsylvania Laws*, 1881, Law No. 21. *Pennsylvania Laws*, 1885, Law No. 170. *Pennsylvania Laws*, 1887, Law No. 264.
50. *Daily Republican*, September 12, 1887; September 16, 1887. *Wilkes-Barre Telephone*, September 24, 1887.
51. *Select Committee*, *passim*.
52. *Select Committee*, 174. *Daily Republican*, January 18, 1888; February 4, 1888; February 6, 1888. *Shamokin Herald*, February 23, 1888. *The Plain Speaker* (Hazleton), March 6, 1888; March 12, 1888.
53. *Daily Republican*, January 19, 1889; April 13, 1889; February 11, 1890; June 4, 1890; June 21, 1892; January 24, 1895; June 15, 1895.
54. Edward Pinkowski, *The Lattimer Massacre* (Philadelphia, 1950).