

PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY

A JOURNAL OF MID-ATLANTIC STUDIES



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The Pennsylvania Historical Association advocates and advances knowledge about the history and culture of Pennsylvania and the mid-Atlantic region, because understanding how the past informs the present helps us shape a better future. PHA achieves this mission by fostering the teaching and study of Pennsylvania history and culture through:

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ON THE COVER: A Cy Hungerford Cartoon from page one of the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* July 15, 1952 poking fun at Governor John Fine's behavior at the Republican National Convention. Courtesy of the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* archives.

AN ENERGY TRANSITION BEFORE THE AGE OF OIL

THE DECLINE OF ANTHRACITE, 1900–1930

Mark Aldrich
Smith College

ABSTRACT: Anthracite was the first casualty of the great twentieth-century energy transitions from coal to liquid fuels. However, its demise occurred in two stages, for oil and natural gas did not begin to undermine the market for hard coal until the 1920s. By 1900 anthracite had lost its industrial markets and even as a domestic fuel it was besieged. Strikes that led to uncertain supplies and rising prices encouraged consumers to search for substitutes while innovations in production and marketing made coke, manufactured gas, and coal briquettes increasingly attractive alternatives. Anthracite sales peaked in 1917 and declined sharply well before the onset of oil and natural gas. Although its demise might have taken longer, anthracite would have expired even if there had been no age of oil.

KEYWORDS: Anthracite, bituminous, coal, energy transition, resource shortage, smoke ordinances

New England's captains of public policy organized their preparations yesterday for a "war to end war" with the anthracite industry.

—*Boston Globe*, August 22, 1925

We deliver coke in white canvas bags loaded into a white wagon with the driver in white canvas overalls. In muddy weather the wagon is washed . . . every trip. All the coal wagons are painted black [like] a funeral procession.

—*American Gas Institute of 1906*

The National Commercial Gas Association (NCGA) created Nancy Gay as an advertising image who became their public face in 1914. In magazines and a pamphlet entitled "The Story of Nancy Gay," the association explained that she had nearly broken up with her sweetheart, George, because he was

so old-fashioned as to want a coal stove. True love finally won out, for Nancy persuaded George of the wonders of the all-gas kitchen, and the reader learns “what gas provides in the way of domestic service and therefore contentment and happiness.” Nancy so won over George that he wrote his parents—who lived in “Old Fashionedville”—urging them to convert to (manufactured) gas as well.¹


It seems unlikely that anthracite (“hard”) coal producers paid any attention to Nancy Gay, for in 1914 their future must have seemed bright. Although expensive compared to bituminous (“soft”) coal, anthracite was the domestic fuel of choice in the Northeast, especially among affluent householders. Since 1850 output had grown at an average rate of nearly 8 percent a year and the boom of World War I carried production to slightly less than 100 million tons in 1917. In retrospect, this proved to be its highest level ever, and while many worried the nation might soon run of this wonderful resource, no one foresaw it would be lack of demand, not lack of supply, that would lead to the eclipse of the hard-coal business. Nancy Gay, in short, was symptomatic of the changes reshaping energy markets during these years.

While World War I fuel shortages and the great strikes of 1922 and 1925–26 helped propel buyers away from hard coal, these were less important than



FIGURE 1 “Nancy Gay” promoted the all-gas kitchen in a pamphlet titled *The Story of Nancy Gay* distributed by the National Commercial Gas Association beginning in 1914.

AN ENERGY TRANSITION



THE ALL-GAS KITCHEN FOR THE MODERN HOME CONTAINS

- A Gas Range, insuring successful results in cooking, with facility and economy.
- A Gas Water Heater, insuring plenty of hot water for all household purposes. The turn of a faucet operates the Automatic Heater, while the lighting of a gas burner starts the Circulating Heater.
- A Gas Iron, insuring comfort and convenience on ironing day. It heats quickly, stays hot and stays clean.

- A Waffle Iron, insuring four deliciously baked waffles at one time. It turns without lifting.
- A Pancake Griddle, insuring unsurpassed browned pancakes. The heat is evenly distributed over the cooking surface.
- A Toaster, insuring four slices of bread being toasted at one time to a beautiful golden brown.
- An Incandescence Light, insuring a maximum amount of light at a minimum cost for gas.

FIGURE 2 Gas began to drive anthracite from the kitchen by World War I. From *The Story of Nancy Gay*.

innovations resulting in better fuels. Anthracite was among the first—and most serious—casualties of the great twentieth-century energy transitions from coal to liquid fuels. The end of anthracite occurred in two stages, for oil did not begin to undermine the market for hard coal until the middle 1920s and natural gas came even later. Well before that, competition from traditional fuels (bituminous coal and its derivatives) was eroding the market for anthracite.²

Writing on energy transitions has largely focused on the broad shifts among primary fuels—from coal to liquids and gasses—and indeed, the rise of fuel oil was a dramatic, disruptive Schumpeterian innovation at once creative and destructive.³ Yet such a focus can easily blind one to the less dramatic economic changes that were eroding anthracite markets well before the age of oil. The initial move away from anthracite involved many small decisions made by households and businesses. It reflected consumer responses to the rising price of hard coal as well as entrepreneurial actions by producers of coke, manufactured gas (the creators of Nancy Gay), and fuel briquettes, all of which derived from bituminous coal and promised a better combination of cost, convenience, and cleanliness than anthracite could offer. This article begins with a review of the hard-coal industry at the time of World War I. The next section traces the rise of substitutes for anthracite before the dawn

of the heating oil age and looks at their market penetration. The article then traces the belated and ineffective sales and product-improvement efforts of the anthracite producers to win back their eroding markets. The final section offers some conjectures and conclusions.⁴

PEAK ANTHRACITE

Anthracite coal and America grew up together. The industry was almost entirely located in northeastern Pennsylvania and records show it was used locally before the writing of the Constitution. High transportation costs initially precluded wider use, and the earliest data show production of only about 1.3 million tons in 1821. With the opening of canals to tidewater in the mid-1820s, however, production took off. Anthracite not only displaced wood for domestic heat in East Coast cities, but as Alfred Chandler has shown, it also powered the early Industrial Revolution. On the eve of the Civil War, consumption had reached nearly 10 million tons, half again as much as bituminous coal use at that time. Yet if declining costs of transport spread early anthracite use, they ultimately began to constrict its markets as well. The railroads breached the Appalachians in the 1850s and brought a flood of cheap bituminous coal to market. By the 1870s, soft-coal production had outstripped that of anthracite, gradually forcing the latter almost entirely out of industrial uses, while it remained the fuel of choice for domestic heating in eastern homes.⁵

Anthracite came from beds that were pitching, faulted, and deep, and the coal itself was hard, requiring much black powder to loosen it and much labor to clean it, all of which contributed to the expense of underground mining. By World War I, strip mining had made an appearance, accounting for 1–2 percent of output, while companies were also reworking old culm banks of previously discarded coal and dredging coal waste from local rivers. An informal cartel dominated production: there were eight major producers—the railroad coal companies—that typically accounted for about three-quarters of output, and a competitive fringe of around 100 independents. Essentially anthracite was not branded until the 1930s and all companies sold coal by size. Domestic sizes (e.g., “lump,” “chestnut,” “stove”) were for home burning. A second size group, termed “steam coal” (e.g. “Buckwheat #1”), were smaller still. These sold to apartment buildings, utilities, and other large users that had equipment designed to burn the

smaller sizes. Various sizes were produced jointly; all cost the same to mine but market prices roughly reflected size; thus in 1918 the average mine realization for chestnut and stove coal ranged from \$5.87 to \$6.64 per net ton. Steam sizes, essentially a byproduct of production for the domestic market, sold for less because competition with bituminous coal governed their price and so they yielded from \$3.48 to \$3.55 per ton. While such prices for steam coal did not cover average cost, they contributed to revenue to help cover fixed costs.⁶

Companies marketed hard coal using a variety of wholesale and retail arrangements. The railroad companies announced their “circular” prices about April 1 of each year. Discounted in the spring to encourage households to spread purchases through the months, prices otherwise usually remained fixed during the year. Those charged by independents reflected market forces, however, selling at a premium or discount from circular prices depending on market conditions. Transportation by water or rail or both might account for 18–20 percent of the retail price in cities close to producing areas, but in Chicago or St Louis transport costs amounted to 35–40 percent of the final price. Wholesaler and retailer costs of coal included transport fees, while their markups similarly reflected market conditions. Taken together, transport costs and dealer margins ensured that the retail price of coal was usually around twice its price at the mine.⁷

Because hard coal was located in eastern Pennsylvania, while nearly thirty states mined the bituminous product, and because all coal was expensive to transport, anthracite sold in a narrow geographic area. Its major markets were eastern Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, and New England, while cheap water transportation allowed modest sales in the central and lake states as well. Consumers valued anthracite because it was comparatively clean to handle, while burning resulted in a fine ash with fewer clinkers than characterized combustion of its bituminous cousin. Finally, hard coal was expensive, but for heating, hot water, and cooking, it was the fuel of choice for those who could afford it. About World War I, the Bureau of Labor Statistics tabulated use of anthracite and bituminous coal by income level and the data confirm that hard coal was the fuel of the well-to-do who were more willing to pay for its cleanliness than were lower-income households.⁸

In the years before World War I, with Progressives worrying about natural resource waste and scarcity, anthracite was one of the resources they had in mind. In 1907 Chief of the US Forest Service Gifford Pinchot warned

a popular audience that reserves of anthracite would last only fifty years. Members of the US Geological Survey (USGS) also worried that the United States squandered its natural resources. They too thought that anthracite had a gloomy future, reasoning its geographic concentration and the increasing difficulties of mining the deeper seams foreshadowed long-term cost increases, further narrowing the market. Anthracite was becoming “more and more a luxury,” a writer for the US Bureau of Mines claimed in 1911 for he thought, “prices must advance with the increasing cost of production.” The maximum output, the writer concluded, would likely be about 100 million long-tons followed by decline. A decade later the US Coal Commission saw the anthracite problem in nearly identical terms. It also stressed the “increasing natural difficulties” that reduced labor productivity, although the problem reflected as well, the commission believed, a shortage of unskilled labor.⁹

The forecast of 100 million tons proved almost quite accurate (fig. 3), but the Malthusian explanation of scarcity was at best partly correct. Output per worker-hour in hard coal did indeed stagnate in the early decades of the twentieth century, and with rising wages this led to sharply increasing costs. As a




FIGURE 3 Anthracite: Peak and decline, 1900–1950. *Source:* US Geological Survey and Bureau of Mines, *Mineral Resources of the United States* and *Minerals Yearbook*, various years.

result, between 1910 and 1925 anthracite prices rose about 50 percent relative to the price of bituminous coal. Yet this productivity stagnation seems to have reflected company lethargy more than natural scarcity, for beginning in the mid-1920s, as companies invested in better technology, labor productivity began to rise and the fuel's relative price declined. Moreover, even without rising prices, competition from new fuels would have reduced the demand for anthracite.¹⁰

In retrospect, it is easy to see that worries over anthracite shortages were overblown, for while the rise in urban populations raised coal demand, other demographic changes were reducing its growth. Urbanization was shifting people from single-family dwellings to apartments, which were more fuel-efficient and burned the smaller, more available sizes of anthracite. A New York City fuel survey of 1936 pointed out that single-family dwellings had fallen from nearly 32 percent of the total in 1921 to 20 percent in 1936 with the remainder being, of course, multiple-family dwellings. Moreover, the largest apartment buildings used about 24 percent less coal than the smallest buildings to heat a given volume of space. Similar trends were occurring nationwide. These events, the survey concluded, were "most unfavorable to anthracite."¹¹

While they reduced the growth of anthracite sales, such demographic changes could not have resulted in the disintegration depicted in figure 3, for all fuels faced the same problems and some of them experienced sales growth. Rather, the collapse in sales resulted because anthracite had, after 1900, become highly vulnerable to competition. While well aware of the rise of substitute fuels, writers at the USGS and the Coal Commission failed to grasp the magnitude of the threat. Indeed, so powerful was the Malthusian vision that the commission saw substitute fuels as merely a stopgap. "To eke out the inadequate supply of anthracite each year the waning supply must be supplemented by increased use of other fuel," it warned. Yet as a high-priced fuel, hard coal could not defend against lower-cost alternatives, especially if they might duplicate some of its advantages. Because one of its selling points was convenience (less dirt; fewer clinkers), anthracite was susceptible to attack from more convenient fuels. Substitutes would do more than supplement the anthracite market, however. In 1930, well before natural gas or oil had any significant market impact, anthracite sales were off about 30 percent from their wartime peak. The combination of rising prices for hard coal along with largely independent innovations in other fuel markets had put anthracite on the road to oblivion.¹²

THE RISE OF SUBSTITUTE FUELS

The World War I boom in anthracite was an aberration. In fact, anthracite production grew only about 1.5 percent a year in the decade ending in 1917. Substitutes, like mice, had been nibbling away at hard coal markets for years, retarding its growth.¹³ As noted, anthracite had once been an industrial fuel, but by 1900 its bituminous cousin had long since supplanted it for most uses. For buyers of domestic fuel, there were a number of choices, and households of varying incomes and tastes no doubt balanced price against fuel characteristics. With the exception of East Coast cities, most burned cheaper bituminous coal for heat and hot water. Thus, while Boston households used no soft coal around World War I, in Chicago homeowners burned 20 percent more of it than they did hard coal; and in Cleveland 36 percent more, while Cincinnati, Columbus, and St. Louis households burned no anthracite at all. By World War I, kerosene stoves had been competing with anthracite for decades. Although some areas such as West Virginia and southern Ohio used natural gas, in general it provided little competition for anthracite during these years.¹⁴

In addition to direct competition with bituminous coal, by 1900 anthracite faced increasing competition from three other fuels—manufactured gas, coke, and fuel briquettes—all of which derived from its bituminous cousin.¹⁵ Figure 4 presents data on consumption of anthracite and other domestic fuels except for soft coal for which there are no data. For comparison, the figures extend to 1940. “For domestic purposes, coke and gas, the products of bituminous coal, are competing more and more with anthracite in the markets of the larger cities and towns,” the USGS reported in 1907. Manufactured gas was the most important of these competitors. By 1900 every large city and many small towns had a coal gas plant that derived its product from the distillation of bituminous coal. Gas producers also sold the byproduct (gashouse coke) for domestic fuel. Gas from these sources was expensive but as electricity increasingly drove it out of illumination after 1900—and as economies of scale and technological change reduced its cost—manufactured gas became increasingly employed for cooking and in stoves and radiators for heat. By 1905 these sources produced about 108 billion cubic feet of gas, the equivalent of around 2.3 million tons of hard coal.¹⁶

A second source of gas came from the byproduct coke ovens that increasingly supplied coke for steel making. By 1915 producers were selling about

AN ENERGY TRANSITION




FIGURE 4 Anthracite and some of its competitors, 1907–1940. *Source:* These data derive mostly from USBM *Mineral Resources*, part 2, various years. Manufactured gas figures are from Jacob Gould, *Output and Productivity in the Electric and Gas Utilities, 1899–1942*, National Bureau of Economic Research 47 (New York: NBER, 1946). Data on coke and gas prior to 1923 are approximated. Gas and oil are expressed as coal-equivalents. Coal and oil left axis; all others right axis.

27 billion cubic feet of byproduct gas for domestic purposes and the expansion of coking during the wartime boom would soon increase this total. In 1930 manufactured gas from all sources used for domestic consumption totaled 281 billion cubic feet; not all of this displaced anthracite but much of it did, and was equivalent to 6.3 million tons of hard coal.

Coke, as noted above, resulted from the destructive distillation of soft coal. Nearly pure carbon, it was cleaner to handle and burn than bituminous coal, easier to light than anthracite and had roughly the same heating value. Its disadvantages were that it required more tending than did anthracite and, because it was lighter, took more bin space. Gashouse coke had long been available for domestic fuel, typically selling at one to two dollars a ton below anthracite in local markets near the gas plant. Because producers needed to operate byproduct coke ovens full-time, it too began to penetrate the domestic fuel market. Byproduct coke also required educational efforts for it was harder and more difficult to light than the gashouse product. In 1923 domestic coke from all sources amounted to about 2.7 million tons (fig. 4); thereafter sales took off, peaking at nearly 12 million tons in 1933. Most coke

production was in the Northeast; a 1930 Bureau of Mines survey found consumers used 90 percent of domestic coke in the north central or middle Atlantic States, where it competed directly with anthracite.¹⁷

Byproduct coking meshed nicely with Progressive Era ideals about reducing waste of natural resources. It was a far more efficient way to produce coke than was the older beehive process that wasted all the byproducts. The same logic made coke a better domestic fuel than raw coal. The Bureau of Mines explained that its use for domestic heating would “save many valuable by-products that are wasted when [bituminous] coal is used directly in the raw state.” Finally, like anthracite, coke was smokeless. In the years before World War I urban Progressives began campaigns to pass city smoke ordinances and the bureau urged that this too made coke an attractive fuel, and far more widely available than anthracite.¹⁸

Like coke, coal briquettes warmed Progressive hearts as well as their hearths for they too embodied what the Bureau of Mines termed “practical conservation.” Briquettes, which in shape and form resembled modern charcoal briquettes, were made by combining a binder with very fine (slack) coal that would otherwise be wasted, and of which vast mountains existed. Initially, because they used coal tar as a binder, briquettes smoked, making them inferior to anthracite, and they might be expensive. But by 1940 one company marketed “Solorite” that it alleged to be a smokeless briquette. Briquette sales grew rapidly, from almost nothing in 1907 to a half-million tons in 1920 and over a million tons in the last year of that decade (fig. 4). Their natural market was near a cheap supply of fuel, yet protected from coal competition by high transport costs. The lake states of Wisconsin and Michigan fit this profile as their docks contained vast stores of slack.¹⁹

Domestic fuel choices were difficult to change for they embodied both the physical investment in heating plant and the hard-won expertise in the use of a particular fuel. As contemporaries understood, for families to shift to a substitute fuel they first had to learn how to use it. The incentive to learn was the possibility of better or cheaper energy and that motive was ongoing, assisted by articles in women’s magazines and by self-interested suppliers. In 1902 a writer in *Good Housekeeping* stressed one aspect of gas cooking that must have appealed to many housewives: “The woman with a gas stove can economize a good many steps and many minutes by arranging a number of pantry things and cooking aids close by her stove. When one uses coal this cannot be done: dirt and ashes would keep things constantly dirty.”²⁰

Before World War I, only the gas industry engaged in significant sales promotion. Gas producers had strong motives to advertise because the market for illumination faced disruptive competition from electricity, resulting in underused capacity. Gas producers undertook aggressive local promotions and coordinated in national campaigns through trade associations. In 1906 the American Gas Institute polled its members on their various methods of getting new business, and the focus by that time was on expanding gas use for cooking and water heating. The replies provide a glimpse into sales practices of that day. Nearly all employed newspaper advertising, sometimes in foreign-language papers as well. These ranged from the bland to snappy one-liners that played on themes such as modernity and comfort. “Might as well make your own shoes or weave your cloth as use a coal range. Cook with gas.” “Who is afraid of the hot weather with a gas range in the kitchen?”²¹

A theme that runs through company responses was the need for good, efficient, honest service, for a bad reputation was disaster. Indeed, several companies taught meter-reading classes for customers, and because gas was expensive they provided tips on economical use with slogans such as “matches are cheaper than gas.” Bulk mailings were widely employed as well. Most companies offered appliances in addition to gas and the Battle Creek (Michigan) Gas Company sent out a mailing informing its recipients “The price of one cigar a day would buy your wife a [gas] range.” Most companies hired “solicitors,” women who made house calls providing advice, home cooking demonstrations, and free items such as waffle irons or horse blankets emblazoned with “Cook with Gas.” L. C. Graham of the Winona (Minnesota) Gas Light and Coke Company explained why companies favored women for these jobs. “We find lady canvassers are better than men for selling gas ranges. It is possible for them to get in closer touch with the ladies and analyze the situation better and follow up what a man would think a poor prospect and turn it into a sale.”²²

Many gas companies marketing stoves and heaters did so on time and at cost or sometimes at a loss; they might also throw in free installation. The Bedford (Indiana) Heat and Power Company even provided 5,000 cubic feet of free gas for stoves bought in March. There were endless contests: the person writing the best ad might get a free range, or there might be cash for the “lady baking the best loaf of bread, or cake on a gas range.” The Bridgeport (Connecticut) Gas Light Company had women demonstrators in the office baking pastries. Some companies that included gas, electricity, and transit advertised on their trolleys. The Butte (Montana) Gas Light and

Fuel Company's offering, read, "Everybody works but mamma, 'cause she uses a gas range." Mamma's view of this assessment has not been recorded.²³

As the market for gas expanded, utilities producing coal gas inevitably generated an increasing amount of coke. Protected by the high cost of shipping anthracite, coke usually sold in local markets at slightly less than the price of hard coal, but to make the sale companies had to employ many of the techniques they used to market gas. Here again the sales material included a strong dose of information, for—as noted—coke needed to be handled and burned differently than either anthracite or bituminous coal. Rome (New York) Gas and Electric made a virtue of coke's light weight, advertising it as the perfect fuel for "dainty women." That company also emphasized the cleanliness of coke, distributing it in white wagons with drivers wearing white costumes. It claimed that coal wagons, by contrast, were black and dirty and looked like a funeral procession. Albion (Michigan) Gas Light successfully increased coke sales by arranging with local hardware stores to donate a quarter ton of coke with each gas stove sold. In some towns, grocery stores sold coke on commission and offered free samples from the gas company. Fort Dodge (Iowa) treated its coke and gas as complements, not substitutes, offering gas stoves with a side-arm heater to burn coke. In 1913 booming gas demand faced Detroit City Gas Company with the need to double its coke sales, which they accomplished by a stepped-up campaign featuring the usual mix of billboards, trolley ads, and discount coupons.²⁴

There were also industry-wide campaigns to sell gas. As noted above, the National Commercial Gas Association (NCGA) created the character Nancy Gay, who began appearing in advertisements in 1914. About the same time the association also sponsored "Gas Range Week" that featured advertising in major magazines such as *Literary Digest* and *Saturday Evening Post*.²⁵

These various marketing campaigns got an enormous boost from the declining price of gas, which fell steadily in real terms: adjusted for inflation gas prices were 27 percent lower in 1915 than they had been in 1899, while by comparison anthracite prices had been rising. These price declines, along with cleanliness and ease of use, made gas increasingly attractive for cooking and water heating. Gas also steadily encroached on anthracite as a secondary source of heat in room heaters or gas radiators and in the spring and fall when adjusting the heat from coal fires was difficult.²⁶

Still, until World War I, households rarely chose manufactured gas for central heating; the reason was cost. Data on prices and efficiency for 1915 indicate that gas might be five times as expensive as anthracite.²⁷ Yet change

was already underway. In 1917, perhaps because of its access to low-cost coke-oven gas, Consolidated Gas and Electric Company of Baltimore pioneered the introduction of manufactured gas for domestic central heating. After considerable testing and experimentation with rates and heating systems, the company offered gas at \$.35 per thousand cubic feet for purchases in excess of 4,000 cubic feet. With anthracite by then selling at about \$18 dollars a ton, gas heat had finally become economic.²⁸

While the jump in gas prices associated with World War I set back its use for central heating, gas continued to spread slowly during the 1920s. The use of special rates for heating became more common and to avoid the shock that might arrive with January bills companies devised ways of averaging monthly payments. Initially utilities had been unwilling to install gas-conversion burners in existing coal furnaces as they often proved inefficient and therefore expensive to run. Such a policy, of course, raised installation costs and restricted markets. Gradually, however, conversion burners improved and by 1929 their sales outstripped those of gas furnaces and boilers. Because of the expense of gas, utilities also encouraged the use of better house insulation and some offered gas conversion packages that included insulation and weather-stripping. Consumption of manufactured gas for all domestic purposes peaked in 1931, equivalent to about 6 million tons of coal. Its slow decline thereafter reflected the shift from manufactured to natural gas as well as the increasing competition from oil (see fig. 4 above).²⁹

LABOR AND WARTIME DISRUPTIONS

The demographic changes discussed above and the rise of substitute fuels help account for the gradual cessation of growth and then sharp decline in anthracite sales before 1930. Recurrent strikes and the output disruptions resulting from World War I assisted these longer-term forces. The labor disruptions resulted not only in major price spikes, but also in shortages—coal was sometimes unobtainable at any price—and in quality deterioration. These shocks encouraged producers to enter new geographic markets and encouraged consumers to experiment with alternative fuels, thereby speeding up learning.³⁰

Anthracite began the twentieth century with a labor disruption in 1900 but the great strike of 1902, lasting 163 days, was far more important. The *Boston Globe* reported that consumers, in shifting to bituminous coal, were

“learning that they could do without anthracite,” and that some markets were “permanently lost.” In Philadelphia and New York the strike increased the use of bituminous coal and the resulting air pollution resulted in “soft coal eye.” About the same time the *Chicago Tribune* reported large sales of gas and kerosene heaters while anthracite burners were “a drug on the market.” The strike also moved public institutions in that city to shift from anthracite to bituminous coal, allowing the producers of low-volatile “smokeless” bituminous coal from West Virginia to gain a beachhead in Chicago. The USGS also noted that the strike caused use of coke and gas in New York City, while households in Baltimore shifted from hard to soft coal. Users of the smaller sizes (apartment and commercial buildings), the Survey later observed, had been “driven to bituminous coal” by the strike and continued to use it afterwards.³¹

Wartime disruptions after 1916 boomed the demand for gas in Baltimore and per capita use doubled between 1916 and 1922. “Many new homes are built without a coal range in the kitchen so that gas alone is used,” Johns Hopkins University professor of economics Jacob Hollander told the Coal Commission. “Gas water heaters are also coming into common use,” he observed.³² Wartime shortages seem to have yielded quality deterioration in hard coal as well. Individual anthracite producers had developed standards for size and impurities in coal and would condemn shipments exceeding the limits, but the Federal Trade Commission discovered that condemned shipments dropped sharply during the period of shortage in 1916. It seems unlikely that this reflected an outbreak of quality control, for households complained that their coal contained so much stone and slate that some termed it “fireproof.”³³

In 1917 shortages of bituminous coal in the East led the US Fuel Administration to allocate a disproportionate share of 1918 anthracite production to eastern states. This surely accelerated consumer education about alternative fuels in those other states receiving sharply diminished supplies. The federal government also did its part to speed learning about alternatives, for the Bureau of Mines and US Fuel Administration published brochures on that topic. The war immensely expanded byproduct-coking capacity as well, leading that industry to push more strongly into domestic markets for manufactured gas and coke in the postwar years. Koppers, for example, began to market coke in New York City as early as 1919.³⁴

Table 1 presents sales by state of domestic anthracite for 1916 and 1921, two “normal” years. As noted above, use of domestic anthracite was concentrated

AN ENERGY TRANSITION

TABLE 1. Geographic Distribution of Domestic Anthracite Sales, 1916 and 1921

	Net Tons		
	1916	1921	Change
New England	9,938,863 (17.08%) ^a	9,234,675 (19.32%) ^a	-7.09%
Maine	620,808 (1.07%)	614,306 (1.28%)	-1.05%
New Hampshire	352,326 (0.61 %)	398,042 (0.83%)	12.98%
Vermont	349,374 (0.60%)	334,100 (0.70%)	-4.37%
Massachusetts	5,636,662 (9.69%)	5,399,677 (11.29%)	-4.20%
Rhode Island	739,652 (1.27%)	681,185 (1.42%)	-7.90%
Connecticut	2,240,041 (3.85%)	1,807,366 (3.78%)	-19.32%
Atlantic States	31,452,931 (54.05%)	31,176,797 (65.21%)	-0.88%
New York	15,870,681 (27.27%)	15,756,030 (32.96%)	-0.72%
New Jersey	5,320,870 (9.14%)	5,176,250 (10.83%)	-2.72%
Pennsylvania	8,109,089 (13.94%)	8,250,721 (17.26%)	1.75%
Delaware	250,779 (0.43%)	232,805 (0.49%)	-7.17%
Maryland	1,045,557 (1.80%)	954,078 (2.00%)	-8.75%
District of Columbia	590,087 (1.01%)	583,737 (1.22%)	-1.08%
Virginia	265,868 (0.46%)	223,937 (0.47%)	-15.77%
Central States	5,583,395 (9.59%)	4,458,340 (9.33%)	-20.15%
Ohio	649,914 (1.12%)	463,802 (0.97%)	-28.64%
Indiana	512,234 (0.88%)	329,310 (0.69%)	-35.71%
Illinois	2,639,102 (4.54%)	2,252,036 (4.71%)	-14.67%
Michigan	1,782,145 (3.06%)	1,413,225 (2.96%)	-20.70%
Northwest	3,207,805 (5.51%)	2,577,323 (5.39%)	-19.65%
Wisconsin	1,343,953 (2.31%)	1,469,803 (3.07%)	9.36%
Minnesota	1,177,898 (2.02%)	835,933 (1.75%)	-29.03%
Nebraska	177,610 (0.31%)	59,071 (0.12%)	-66.74%
North Dakota	271,509 (0.47%)	105,959 (0.22%)	-60.97%
South Dakota	236,835 (0.41%)	106,557 (0.22%)	-55.01%
Trans Mississippi	864,848 (1.49%)	359,752 (0.75%)	-58.40%
Iowa	469,610 (0.81%)	192,489 (0.40%)	-59.01%
Missouri	197,882 (0.34%)	100,176 (0.21%)	-49.38%
Nebraska	177,610 (0.31%)	59,072 (0.12%)	-66.74%
Kansas	19,746 (0.03%)	8,015 (0.02%)	-59.41%
Total	51,047,842 (87.72%)	47,806,887 (100.00%)	-6.35%

Source: *Mineral Resources*, 1917, 1245; US Coal Commission, part 2, 685.

Note: Includes exports and railroad fuel; excludes steam sizes and coal used at mine. Data are in net (2,000 lb) tons.

^aPercent of total.

in New England and the Mid-Atlantic states. These data also suggest that the wartime changes were important. Anthracite sales had been growing slowly for some time, but they declined about 15 percent from 1916 to 1921. Moreover, the greatest decline was in those central and northwestern states where distance had made anthracite expensive and marginal before the war and that had experienced the greatest wartime shortages. It seems clear, therefore, that anthracite was in trouble long before the two great strikes of 1922 and 1925–26.

Industry problems extended to the smaller “steam” sizes as well. These had been a steadily increasing share of output, rising from about 23 percent of all shipments in 1890 to 33 percent in 1922. Sold at a loss in competition with soft coal as boiler fuel, they contributed to companies’ financial health as long as their sales covered out-of-pocket costs. However, as *Coal Age* reported in 1925, the price spread between domestic and smaller sizes widened even as their market shrunk; the journal also claimed that they rarely sold beyond a 100-mile radius from the mines.³⁵

Two immense strikes—one in 1922 lasted 163 days and another in 1925–26 dragged on for 170 days—also hastened the shift away from anthracite. In the 1922 episode the industry followed wartime precedent and instituted its own geographic allocations and, as in wartime, these disproportionately favored eastern consumers. Moreover, with domestic hard coal scarce and expensive, entrepreneurs saw their chance. Imports of hard coal, much of it from Wales, jumped from virtually nothing to 234,000 tons in 1922. Thereafter, they would range from that figure to as high as 800,000 tons (most of which went to New England) despite a two-dollar-per-ton tariff applied in 1932. The rise of imports was one manifestation of a revolt against domestic anthracite in New England, as the region collectively seemed determined to escape the cycle of strikes and shortages that resulted from dependence on American producers. Massachusetts appointed a fuel administrator with “wartime powers,” who promptly urged consumers to shift to soft coal. In 1923 Boston’s municipal buildings switched from coal to coke for fuel.³⁶

That strike also appears to have reduced product quality. In the summer of 1923 the Bureau of Mines took samples from anthracite stocks at Massachusetts retailers. In one of the steam sizes (“Buckwheat #1) it found impurities (“ash”) averaging 19 percent while some samples of domestic sizes contained as much as 46 percent ash.³⁷

Even before the 1925 strike the *Boston Globe* was reporting, “a very large number of New Englanders have switched from hard to soft coal.” Late that

year *Coal Age* noted a “Bitter Anti-Anthracite Campaign in New England.” The moving force behind the efforts to reduce anthracite use was the New England Governors’ Council and especially Massachusetts governor Alvin Fuller and John Hays Hammond, formerly of the US Coal Commission. Remarkably enough, Hammond at least urged the federal government to stay out of the way, apparently believing that it might interfere with New England’s efforts to punish producers by weaning the region from anthracite. Aside from a publicity campaign featuring a “war to end war” with anthracite, the council’s most important work was to provide information on the availability and use of alternative fuels. It publicized the efforts of the West Virginia Smokeless Coal Operators to gain a foothold in New England markets. When those operators opened an advertising booth to display their wares on Boston Common, Governor Fuller inaugurated the festivities by shoveling the first scoops of coal.³⁸

The Bureau of Mines and the council also tried to educate consumers on the advantages and techniques of burning soft coal as well as coke. In a 1923 report that sounded like an advertisement for the smokeless coals, the bureau concluded:

The “smokeless” Pocahontas [coals] . . . are higher in heat value and usually contain less ash than anthracite; and as a general rule they can be bought considerably cheaper . . . the purchaser actually gets almost twice the amount of available heat for his money.³⁹

By December 1927, with anthracite at \$16.50 a ton on its way to \$18, the Massachusetts Special Commission on the Necessaries of Life underlined the bureau’s claim that adjusted for heating value, the cost of smokeless coal was about half that of anthracite. An assist in these efforts to shift New England away from anthracite came from the Interstate Commerce Commission, which established new, lower joint freight rates on coal from West Virginia to New England. Rising prices again attracted imports, including anthracite from Wales and coke from Scotland. Massachusetts coke sales from all sources jumped from about 270,000 tons 1924–25 to 500,000 in 1925–26.⁴⁰

With local variation, similar events played out in New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and other cities. Noting the increasing availability of coke, the *Chicago Tribune* editorialized “it is the consumer’s chance . . . [for] independence.” Indeed, while consumers in that city used about twice as much soft as hard coal around World War I, by the mid-1930s they used about five times

as much. In New York the state and city began an educational campaign in 1925 to explain to households the proper way to burn soft coal. The *New York Times* reported that Pennsylvania byproduct coking plants were stepping up production for New York markets. Since the 1922 strike, the state's gas plants had added 60 million cubic feet a day of capacity. New York State's coke capacity had risen from 150,000 tons to a million tons a year in the past three years, and Schenectady, Troy, Watertown, Buffalo, Syracuse, Rochester and a number of other cities and towns were now using coke.⁴¹ As figure 4 (above) demonstrates, oil's importance was modest as late as 1930; use of manufactured gas grew steadily down to about 1931 while coke sales grew slowly to 1923, after which time they boomed until the middle 1930s. The strikes and World War I disruptions were important, but they only hastened the diffusion of substitutes for anthracite that had been underway for decades.

The Bureau of Mines summarized the hard-coal situation in 1927 observing, "Over a period of years there has been a gradual downward trend in the tonnage taken by certain important anthracite markets." About that time an editorial in the *New York Herald Tribune* captured the changes. "Just a generation ago coal hods were big sellers in every American city. . . . They were the symbol of anthracite. . . . Today you strain your eyes looking for [one]."⁴²

ANTHRACITE STRIKES BACK

Monopolists are not noted for addressing consumer complaints with alacrity, and the anthracite producers failed to respond to inroads in their sales from other solid fuels and gas until the mid-1920s. In 1922 *Coal Age* reported a large producer that still seemed indifferent to the concerns of its customers. Companies did little advertising. In 1925 the *Age* decried the lack of merchandizing and reported that "from producer to retailer [the industry] has been nothing but an assemblage of order takers." In 1928 it recalled the "dead level of complacent self-sufficiency" that characterized most producers right after the war. Dealer relations were often poor. The industry's trade association—the Anthracite Operators Association—largely focused on labor relations and did no research. There was little coordination with furnace makers.⁴³

Anthracite producers belatedly woke up to the threat, for the first real changes did not begin until 1925 when producers finally adopted industry-wide quality standards.⁴⁴ The companies had rejected standards when the US Coal Commission recommended them in 1923, but apparently reconsidered, as poor quality-control (noted above) resulted in a chorus of complaints

from dealers. “The present lack of uniformity . . . [in] sizing and preparing coal . . . gives rise to much of the criticism, complaint and ill-will on the part of consumers,” the National Retail Coal Merchants Association reported. Moreover, the industry was then trying to interest consumers in smaller sizes of coal and if these contained too much ash they simply would not burn in domestic furnaces. The first standards governed size and percent of impurities. A new inspection service was to ensure compliance. Because they reduced the quantity of marketable output per ton of coal mined, the standards had the effect of reducing productivity and raising costs. They were tightened in 1927, but they did improve quality: a 1935 survey found that impurities in Buckwheat #1 dropped from 18 to about 11 percent.⁴⁵

In 1927 a subgroup of the Operators Conference began the Anthracite Coal Service, to improve dealer relations with an eye to better customer service. Dealers and producers had long been wary allies. In 1925 New England dealers complained that producers sometimes sold to large customers at the same price they gave to dealers, while many dealers returned the favor by carrying coke, bituminous coal, and fuel oil. The Coal Service established regional offices as far west as Minneapolis that offered dealer training in combustion so that they could provide furnace services to customers. By 1929 it had supplied instruction to employees of nearly 1,800 retailers in 111 cities. The Coal Service began *Anthracite Salesman*, distributing about 14,000 copies a year to dealers. Many consumer complaints, dealers discovered, reflected either improper firing techniques by consumers or faulty equipment. Soot buildup on the boiler, for example, was a wonderful form of insulation and might result in skyrocketing coal consumption to maintain comfortable temperatures.⁴⁶

In 1927 the Bureau of Mines described the Mount Carmel Conference as a “united effort on the part of operators, miners, distributors, consumers and all others interested in the economic welfare of the anthracite region.” Resulting in an Anthracite Cooperative Association (later the Anthracite Institute), it focused on public relations, taxes, and freight rates. In 1929 producers also established a credit bureau to aid company sales.⁴⁷

Motivation for these early efforts was competition from other solid fuels and manufactured gas, not oil. In 1925 New England dealers concluded that bituminous coal and its derivatives (coke, electricity and manufactured gas) were “more menacing” than oil. A year later Edward Parker of the Anthracite Information Bureau informed the American Mining Congress that oil competition would “grow less menacing.” Such hopes reflected the pronouncements of a chorus of experts that the United States would soon run out of

oil. As late as 1932, two years after the discovery of the enormous East Texas oil field, the Federal Oil Conservation Board was still warning of a “paradox of a present oversupply in the face of ultimate shortage.”⁴⁸

By 1928 anthracite had belatedly woken up to the threat posed by competition. That year the Bureau of Mines reported that industry was “assisting in the development” of mechanical stokers that would feed smaller, cheaper sizes of anthracite. In 1929 producers formalized an Anthracite Equipment Corporation to encourage technical improvements in furnaces. Mechanical stokers fed coal from a hopper and therefore required much less tending. They might be thermostat-controlled and some came with automatic ash removal as well. Stokers seemed to be the key to meeting gas and oil competition and by 1936 several coal companies manufactured their own, and all encouraged dealers to carry them as well. Stokers reemphasized the need for clean coal, for stone might clog the mechanism potentially breaking a shear pin or causing motor overload. Yet “automatic anthracite,” as companies termed these developments, was a mixed blessing. Bituminous producers also awakened to the need for better marketing and they too began to develop stokers, ensuring that hard coal was unlikely to make sales gains from that direction. In addition, because stokers used smaller, less profitable sizes, unless they expanded the *overall* anthracite market their use might prove suicidal. *Coal Age* pointed out as early as 1925: to induce consumers to purchase, say, Buckwheat #1 if its sales came at the expense of domestic sizes would *reduce*, not increase, profitability.⁴⁹

By the mid-1920s anthracite also had a price problem. In 1924 a representative of the gas industry happily predicted that the higher prices resulting from the 1922–23 strike settlement “will automatically sell . . . over 7½ billion cu. ft. of manufactured gas in New York State alone.” Anthracite prices had been creeping up relative to bituminous coal as well. The average mine price of hard coal had stood about 80 percent above the mine price of bituminous coal before World War I but had risen to 2.5 times soft-coal prices by the middle 1920s. In Chicago anthracite retailed for \$17.19 a ton in October 1925 while soft coal sold at \$8.99.⁵⁰

In response, companies improved testing for size and purity; they employed new flotation methods and began major investments in breakers and washeries to producer cleaner coal (fig. 5). Large producers also speeded up underground mechanization in order to control costs. *Coal Age* began featuring many stories such as “Machines Help Anthracite Regain Lost Markets.” In 1927, the first year the Bureau of Mines gathered such data, about 5 percent of anthracite came from strip mining or was loaded




FIGURE 5 A March 22, 1930, aerial view of the Locust Summit Coal Breaker, Northumberland County, of the Philadelphia and Reading Railroad symbolized coal companies' efforts to mechanize. It was at one time the largest breaker in America. Courtesy: Pennsylvania State Archives, Aero Service Company Photographs (MG-416, #12135).

mechanically underground; by 1940 these increased to about 31 percent of the total. Accordingly, labor productivity (output per worker-hour), which had stagnated between 1903 and 1926, rose about 61 percent between that year and 1940 even as product quality improved.⁵¹

In 1928 the industry held a research conference and soon contracted with Frost Research Laboratory, which undertook investigations aimed at improving stokers, finding new markets for anthracite, and possible uses for coal ash. In the early 1930s a research division of the Anthracite Institute replaced this arrangement and it cooperated closely with scientists at Penn State.⁵²

Anthracite began a marketing campaign about 1927. The Philadelphia and Reading Company inaugurated newspaper and some magazine advertisements. Rather belatedly it proclaimed the smoke-control benefits of anthracite with ads urging, "let a little sunshine in." A number of other producers and dealers combined to advertise "cert-i-fied" anthracite, stressing quality. These early advertising campaigns aimed at anthracite's core market, appearing in East Coast newspapers. They rarely employed humor and visual images were often uninteresting. The campaign soon petered out. There were

trademarking efforts as well; Reading advertised that it had “Fyrewell” coal, a small amount of which would allegedly work wonders when added to the coal pile. Another company included cardboard advertisements in its coal and in 1929 Glen Alden and the Delaware Lackawanna and Western mines began to dye their product and advertise “Blue Coal” (fig. 6). Such a focus,

STOP GAMBLING ON COAL!

AT LAST a way to tell the best coal every time you order

See how blue coal avoids...
Improperly prepared coal here...
See coal is washed free of...
America's finest anthracite is now colored with a...
It is a choice...
No matter how long...
The coal is more...
before you put it in.

America's biggest producers of home fuel now color the finest hard coal BLUE . . .

HOW often you've talked this way, before ordering your winter's fuel, "Coal is coal—I can't tell how good it is by looking at it."

You can now. For the finest anthracite in the world now comes to you actually tinted an unmistakable blue. Its name is 'blue coal.'

'Blue coal' is the famous D. L. & W. Scranton and Wilkes-Barre anthracite which for over 50 years has been the largest-selling home fuel in America—coal that has achieved tremendous popularity because people found from experience that it was the most satisfactory fuel that money could buy.

Then why color it blue, you naturally ask? Here's why—so that you can tell at a glance this high quality hard coal—so that you can be downright sure that you get it every time you order it.

This blue color is your positive guarantee that you are getting full tons of the finest anthracite

from the Northern Pennsylvania hard coal region; Anthracite that has been washed and re-washed by millions of gallons of rushing water to free it of wasteful impurities. Anthracite that has reached a new state of perfection, due to the employment of the most modern and ingenious engineering methods in its preparation.

Not only that, 'blue coal' burns long and evenly and doesn't need an excessive draft which forces most of your heat up your chimney. 'blue coal' furnishes the maximum of useful heat because it burns evenly and completely.

If we weren't proud of 'blue coal' we wouldn't dare trademark it so unmistakably. It's blue because it's best.

The comfort of fewer trips to the cellar—the thrill of getting almost instantaneous response to your draft control regardless of weather conditions, the joy of not having to watch the fire continually will begin for you the moment you fill up your bins with 'blue coal.' Get in touch with your nearest 'blue coal' dealer today.

Copyright, Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Coal Co.

'blue coal'

Better heat for less money

FIGURE 6 Branding coal failed to stem loss of markets to coke, briquettes, manufactured gas, and bituminous coal. Courtesy of *The Brooklyn Daily Eagle* (Brooklyn, NY) February 14, 1933, page 11.

emphasizing one supplier of hard coal over another, seems entirely misplaced in the face of interfuel competition.⁵³

Spokesmen for hard coal in the early 1930s were invariably upbeat, claiming that these measures would soon reverse the decline in anthracite sales. With hindsight, it is clear they did not, for in the 1930s and later, oil and natural gas turned what had been a genteel decline into a rout. In 1917 production had been just short of 100 million tons; in 2015 it was just over 2 million tons.

CONCLUSIONS AND CONJECTURES

In the twentieth century anthracite underwent two energy transitions. The first, before about 1930, was a gradual shift from coal to coal: from anthracite to soft coal, burned either directly in homeowners' furnaces, or as manufactured gas, or briquettes, or coke. The second transition, this one largely to oil and far more rapid, began about 1925, and, in the pre-World War II years, oil stole markets from both kinds of coal. Market forces dominated these energy transitions. Coke, manufactured gas, smokeless coal, and briquette producers all saw opportunity in anthracite's high prices, deteriorating quality, and supply disruptions. Public policies influenced these events at several places. While antismoke regulations had little impact in creating a demand for anthracite, wartime allocations narrowed the markets for hard coal. Requirements for through freight rates widened the area in which smokeless coal could compete, while New England's politicians made a concerted and successful effort to speed that region's transition away from hard coal.

As this article has demonstrated, to focus exclusively on the energy transition to oil and natural gas is to miss much of the story. Ultimately most households did shift from anthracite to oil or natural gas, but these fuels were like the wolves that ate the rabbit *and* the coyote that was about to eat the rabbit. Thus, it is worth speculating on how events might have differed had oil and natural gas not entered the picture as early as they did.

Anthracite's problem was that by about World War I, it no longer had much to sell. Its cost advantage over gas was eroding and even with a stoker it could not match that fuel's cleanliness, convenience, and comfort. Had oil not arrived when it did to pick off higher income households, they would likely have shifted to heating with manufactured gas instead, although perhaps more slowly. Nor was anthracite less smoky than coke or the low volatile bituminous coals, and it was usually more—sometimes much more—expensive. Had oil

not arrived, the rapid growth in coke sales would probably have continued while smokeless briquettes may also have found favor and contributed to the decline in hard coal. Even in the absence of oil and natural gas competition, there would have been no U-turn on hard coal's road to near extinction.

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NOTES

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1. *The Story of Nancy Gay* (New York: National Commercial Gas Association, 1914); “The Smile of Nancy Gay,” *Lighting Journal* 2 (August 1, 1914): 184.
2. Much of the literature on anthracite focuses on the nineteenth century (n. 5) while work covering the twentieth century emphasizes labor issues or the social consequences of the industry's decline rather than the decline itself. H. Benjamin Powell, “The Pennsylvania Anthracite Industry, 1769–1976,” *Pennsylvania History* 47 (January 1980): 3–28, provides a broad overview but says very little about the industry's collapse. The best analyses of the decline of anthracite are Richard Mead, “An Analysis of the Decline of the Anthracite Industry since 1921” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1935) and Benjamin Michalik, “The Decline of Anthracite, 1913–1955” (Ph.D. diss., Fordham University, 1957).
3. On Schumpeterian innovations see Thomas McCraw, *Prophet of Innovation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), and W. Michael Cox and Richard Alm, “Creative Destruction,” *Concise Encyclopedia of Economics*, Library of Economics and Liberty, <http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/CreativeDestruction.html>.
4. Most of the energy transition literature is highly policy focused. For a sampling see Vlacov Smil, *Energy Transitions: History, Requirements, Prospects* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010). Arnuf Grubler, “Energy Transitions Research: Insights and Cautionary Tales,” *Energy Policy* 50 (2012): 8–18.

- Benjamin Sovacool, "How Long Will It Take? Conceptualizing the Temporal Dynamics of Energy Transitions," *Energy Research and Social Science* 13 (2016): 202–15. Peter O'Connor, *Energy Transitions*, Pardee Papers 12 (Boston: Boston University Pardee Center, 2010). Two of the few historically detailed analyses are Martin Melosi, "Energy Transitions in Historical Perspective," in *Energy and Culture: Perspectives on the Power to Work*, ed. Brendan Dooley (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 3–18, and Robert C. Allen, "Backward into the Future: The Shift to Coal and Implications for the Next Energy Transition," *Energy Policy* 50 (2012): 17–23.
5. A discussion of the vicissitudes of the anthracite industry in the nineteenth century is beyond the scope of this article and others have covered the topic well. See, for example, Sean Adams, "Promotion, Competition, Captivity: The Political Economy of Coal," *Journal of Policy History* 18 (January 2006): 74–95, and his *Home Fires: How American Kept Warm in the Nineteenth Century* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014); Frederick Binder, "Anthracite Enters the American Home," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 82 (January 1956): 82–99; Alfred Chandler, "Anthracite Coal and the Beginnings of the Industrial Revolution in the United States," *Business History Review* 46 (Summer 1972): 141–81. Thomas Winpenny provides a skeptical view of Chandler's argument in "Hard Data on Hard Coal: Reflections on Chandler's Anthracite Thesis," *Business History Review* 53 (Summer 1979): 247–55. Christopher Jones, "A Landscape of Energy Abundance: Anthracite Coal Canals and the Roots of American Fossil Fuel Dependence, 1820–1860," *Environmental History* 15 (July 2010): 449–84; Christopher Jones, "The Carbon Consuming Home: Residential Markets and Energy Transitions," *Enterprise and Society* 12 (December 2011): 790–823; Eliot Jones, *The Anthracite Coal Combination in the United States* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1914); Scott Nearing, *Anthracite: An Instance of Natural Resource Monopoly* (Philadelphia: John Winston, 1915). A modern discussion of industry economics is Richard Healey, *The Pennsylvania Anthracite Industry, 1860–1902* (Scranton, PA: University of Scranton Press, 2007).
 6. Contemporary descriptions of industry economics are US Coal Commission, *Report Transmitted Pursuant to the Act Approved September 22, 1922*, parts 1 and 2 (Washington, DC, 1925), hereafter US Coal Commission, *Report*. See also US Federal Trade Commission, *Report on Premium Prices for Anthracite, July 6, 1925* (Washington, DC, 1925). Prices are from US Bureau of Mines (hereafter USBM), *Mineral Resources of the United States 1918*, part 2 (Washington, DC, 1919), 105; prior to 1910 this series was published by the US Geological Survey.
 7. For the breakdown of retail prices see US Coal Commission, *Report*, part 2, table 51.
 8. A reviewer has pointed out that anthracite will clinker, but an early study described its "relative freedom from clinker" as compared with soft coal. See Charles Stuart, "A Report of the Engineer in Chief of the Navy on the

- Comparative Value of Anthracite and Bituminous Coals,” *Journal of the Franklin Institute* 24 (October 1, 1852): 228. Fuel choices by income level are from US Bureau of Labor Statistics (USBLS), “Cost of Living in the United States,” *Bulletin* 357 (Washington, DC, 1924), table E. While both soft coal and coke might substitute for anthracite, the substitutions often required learning on the part of households. See below.
9. USBM, *Mineral Resources 1911*, part 2, 19. US Coal Commission, *Report*, part 1, 53 and 55. Jacob Hollander, an economist at Johns Hopkins University, who authored one of the commission’s studies, dissented from the prevailing views on resource scarcity, ascribing the problem to monopoly instead. See his “Memorandum on Combination and Profits in the Anthracite Industry,” in US Coal Commission, *Report*, part 2, 989–1010.
 10. The forecast was for 100 million long tons while the chart is in net tons so the forecast was about 10 percent too high. The prices discussed in the text are average realizations per ton at the mine. Productivity calculations are the author’s, based on USBM data. They are consistent with USBLS findings in its *Productivity and Unit Labor Cost in the Anthracite Mining Industry, 1935–1947* (Washington, DC, 1948). The best source on coal-mining productivity in these years is Keith Dix, *Work Relations in the Coal Industry: The Hand Loading Era, 1880–1930* (Morgantown: West Virginia University Press, 1977).
 11. “Statistics on Fuel Used for Heating Apartment Buildings in New York City,” *Heating and Ventilating* 37 (July 1939): 60–61. New York City Office of the Coordinator for the Retail Solid Fuel Industry, *A Survey of the Fuel Situation in New York City for the Period 1926–1937 with Particular Reference to Anthracite and Bituminous Fuels* (New York, 1937), 2. For similar analysis see Albert Bemis, *The Evolving House*, vol. 2 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1936), chap. 2. The USBM also noted the impact of apartment living on fuel demand; see its *Mineral Resources 1928*, part 2, 755. These developments harmed bituminous coal as well, but only about 20 percent of its market was domestic.
 12. US Coal Commission *Report*, part 1, 56. About 29 million barrels of fuel oil were burned for domestic heat in 1930. This was equivalent to a little more than 7 million tons of coal but not all of it displaced anthracite. Natural gas did not reach Chicago, Indianapolis, Minneapolis, or Washington, DC until 1930–31, while New York and New England waited until after World War II. See Arlon Tussing and Connie Barlow, *The Natural Gas Industry: Evolution, Structure and Economics* (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1984), chap. 3.
 13. For energy calculations, I have assumed that anthracite coal has 25.4 million btus per short ton following Sam Schurr and Bruce Netschert, *Energy in the American Economy, 1850–1975* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960), 499. The USBM estimated manufactured gas to have about 550 btus per cubic foot (*Mineral Resources 1925*, part 2, 601). Hence 46.18 thousand cuft = one ton of coal. The bureau also assumed that four 42-gallon barrels of fuel oil had the heating equivalent of one ton of hard coal.

14. Figures in the text are from USBLS, "Cost of Living," table E. Wood only accounted for about 4 percent of energy use for urban families about the time of World War I, although in rural areas its use remained surprisingly common. Natural gas competition is from USBM, *Mineral Resources 1930*, part 2, 730.
15. Neither electric heat nor electric stoves provided much direct competition to hard coal during these years, yet electricity use grew explosively. With household expenditures on electricity to run toasters, curling irons, vacuum cleaners, and similar items rising more rapidly than incomes, something had to give. While it is unlikely that families bought less coal so they could afford to run the toaster, they may have switched to a cheaper fuel. Electricity competed in other ways as well. Central power stations located near urban areas might market waste steam for heat to stores or apartment buildings, thereby reducing their demand for coal. Finally, as electricity cut into the market for manufactured gas, generating excess capacity, it spurred gas producers to enter the home cooking and heating market.
16. USBM, *Mineral Resources 1907*, part 2, 168–69. With 550 btus/cubic foot, 108 billion cubic feet * 550 = 59,400 billion btus or roughly 2.3 million tons of coal. For a discussion of the technologies of manufacturing gas and the growth of the industry see the chapters on artificial gas in USBM, *Mineral Resources*, part 2, for 1908, 1912, 1915 and 1919. The 1919 volume has a discussion of economies of scale in gas making. See too Joel Tarr, "Toxic Legacy: The Environmental Impact of the Manufactured Gas Industry in the United States," *Technology and Culture* 55 (January 2014): 107–47.
17. If coke was clean to burn, it was not clean to make. See Tarr, "Toxic Legacy." For a discussion of coke as a domestic fuel see "Coke in a Residence Heater Designed for Coal," *Heating and Ventilating* 14 (May 1917): 19–20. A. C. Fielder, "Why and How Coke Should Be Used for Domestic Heating," USBM *Technical Paper* 242 (Washington, DC, 1920), and Rudolf Kudlich, "Fuels Available for Domestic Use as Substitutes for Anthracite Coal," USBM *Report of Investigation* 2520 (Washington, DC, 1923). For early domestic sales see USBM, *Mineral Resources, 1912*, part 2 (Washington, DC, 1913), 1166. Its geographic distribution is from USBM, *Mineral Resources, 1930*, part 2, 536.
18. Fielder, "Why and How Coke Should Be Used," 5. For the advantages of coke as smokeless fuel see C. G. Atwater, "Smokeless Fuel for Cities: Its Relation to the Modern Byproduct Coke Oven," *Cassier's Magazine* 30 (August 1906): 313–21 and George Perrot and H. W. Clark, "Smokeless Fuel for Salt Lake City," USBM *Report of Investigation* 2341 (Washington, DC, 1923). There is little evidence that municipal smoke ordinances had an important impact on consumers' fuel choices. Anthracite use was widespread before such ordinances became common and, in any event, many regulations exempted households. Nor does modern secondary literature suggest that municipalities seriously considered anthracite as a means to reduce smoke. See Joel Tarr and Carl Zimring, "The Struggle for Smoke Control in St. Louis," in *Common Fields: An Environmental History of St. Louis*, ed. Andrew Hurley (St. Louis: Missouri Historical Society,

- 1997), 199–220; Dale Grinder, “The Battle for Clean Air: The Smoke Problem in Post–Civil War America,” in *Pollution and Reform in American Cities, 1870–1930*, ed. Martin Melosi (Austin: University of Texas, 1980), 83–103; Walter Pittman, “The Smoke Abatement Campaign in Salt Lake City, 1890–1925,” *Locus* 2 (Fall 1989): 69–78; and David Stradling, “To Breathe Pure Air: Cincinnati’s Smoke Abatement Crusade, 1904–1916,” *Queen City Heritage* 55 (Spring 1997): 2–18. See too Noga Morag-Levine, *Chasing the Wind* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003). While New York’s smoke ordinance says nothing about anthracite, the *Wall Street Journal* thought that it prevented apartment buildings in that city from switching away from anthracite during the strike of 1922. See “Simple as Selling Soap in Pittsburgh,” *Wall Street Journal* (August 15, 1922). In fact, as others pointed out however, there were good substitutes so in no sense did municipal smoke ordinances mandate use of anthracite. See “Plenty of Other Coal Available Should Anthracite Be Cut Off,” *New York Times*, September 9, 1923.
19. “Practical conservation” is from USBM, *Mineral Resources 1915*, part 2, 1. “Smokeless Fuel Made from Illinois # 6 Coal in the New Milstadt Carbonizing Plant,” *Coal Age* 45 (May 1940): 33–35.
 20. E[llen] M[urdock], “From Long Experience with Gas,” *Good Housekeeping* 34 (May 1902): 398.
 21. *Report of New Business Methods of the American Gas Institute of 1906* (The Institute, 1906), 121. For a discussion of gas company advertising methods during the 1920s, see Mark Rose, *Cities of Heat and Light: Domesticating Gas and Electricity in Urban America* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995).
 22. *Report of New Business Methods*, 144, 79, and 145.
 23. *Ibid.*, 106 and 84.
 24. *Ibid.*; “A Coke Campaign that Increased Sales Seventy-Five Percent,” *American Gas Light Journal* 101 (September 14, 1914): 166–67.
 25. “Gas Range Week,” *American Gas Light Journal* 102 (April 26, 1915): 257.
 26. Price data are census prices adjusted by the consumer price index. Werner Troesken’s price data for Chicago gas sales for this period are more complete and yield similar results. See table 2.1 in his “The Institutional Antecedents of State Utility Regulation: The Chicago Gas Industry 1860 to 1913,” in *The Regulated Economy*, ed. Claudia Goldin and Gary Liebcap (Chicago: NBER, 2008), 55–80. Consolidated Gas Electric Light and Power Company, *Annual Report, 1910–1916*. “Between-Season Gas Heating,” *Heating and Ventilating* 16 (September 1919): 41–46.
 27. Assuming anthracite had 25.4 million btus/ton and manufactured gas had 550,000 per thousand cubic feet (cuft), about 46,000 cuft of gas was equivalent to a ton of anthracite. With gas retailing at \$.93 per thousand feet, in 1915 it took about \$43 worth of gas to equal the heating value of a ton of anthracite when the latter sold at \$8.00 a ton. Adjustments for furnace efficiency only modestly reduce this disparity.

28. Thomson King, *Consolidated of Baltimore* (Baltimore: Consolidated Gas, Electric Light and Power Company, 1950), chap. 14; “Manufactured Gas for Home Heating,” *Gas Age* 39 (January 15, 1917): 57–60; “Block Rates Promote Heating,” *Gas Age* 45 (February 10, 1920): 103–19. USBM, *Mineral Resources 1928*, part 2, 575–76. Natural gas domestic sales about 1930 were the equivalent of 5.7 million tons of hard coal, but most of it was consumed in areas that had never used much hard coal. While a natural gas pipeline that entered Chicago in 1934 precipitated a fuel war, the duel was largely with soft coal for by then Pennsylvania anthracite had largely abandoned that city.
29. “Number of Gas Companies Promoting House Heating Shows Significant Growth,” *Heating and Ventilating* 26 (February 1929): 95–98; “Economics of House Heating with Gas,” *Heating and Ventilating* 26 (April 1929): 92–96; “Gas Heat in New England,” *Heating and Ventilating* 27 (August 1929): 67–70; “Gas Conversions Gain Favor with Utilities,” *Heating and Ventilating* 27 (September 1929): 90–1.
30. Harold Kanarek, “Disaster for Hard Coal: The Anthracite Strike of 1925–1926,” *Labor History* 14 (January 1974): 44–62, emphasizes the importance of that strike for the decline of anthracite but largely ignores the longer-term forces causing the industry’s eclipse.
31. “Learning that . . .” and “permanently lost” are from “Causes Alarm: Hard Coal Magnates Lose Markets,” *Boston Globe*, July 25, 1902; “Many turned . . .” from “Not So Bad for Coal Now,” *Boston Globe*, December 10, 1902. “City Now Under Cloud of Smoke,” *Philadelphia Inquirer*, June 18, 1902. “Soft Coal Eye,” *Boston Globe*, September 21, 1902. Entry of smokeless coal into the Chicago market is from “Soft Coal Men May Do Own Retailing Here,” *Boston Globe*, November 6, 1925. “Drug on the Market,” from “Few Soft Coal Stoves,” *Chicago Tribune*, October 8, 1902; “To Use Smokeless Coal,” *Chicago Tribune*, June 28, 1902; USGS, *Mineral Resources 1902*, 290 and 1905, 517.
32. Hollander, “Memorandum on Combination and Profits in the Anthracite Industry,” 996.
33. US Federal Trade Commission *Report*, 120–23. US Coal Commission, *Report*, part 1, 51.
34. US Fuel Administration, *The Distribution of Coal and Coke*, part 1 (Washington, DC, 1919), 14–15, 115–17. US Fuel Administration, *Fuel Facts* (Washington, DC, 1918). “Koppers Seaboard Coke,” *Brooklyn Daily Eagle*, December 1, 1919.
35. The 100-mile radius is from “Buckwheat Coal Demands Real Recognition in Anthracite Merchandising Problems,” *Coal Age* 27 (April 30, 1925): 638–41.
36. The industry allocations are from General Policies Committee, Anthracite Operators, *The Anthracite Emergency of 1922–1923 and How It Was Handled* (Philadelphia, 1923). “100,000 Ton Welch Anthracite Order,” *Boston Globe*, October 25, 1923. “States to Fight Coal Monopoly,” *Boston Globe*, August 22, 1925, contains the municipalities’ switch to coke.

37. "How Much Ash Is Found in Commercial Anthracite?" *Coal Age* 25 (February 21, 1924): 272.
38. "Very large number . . ." is from "No Need to Worry Over the Supply of Coal," *Boston Globe*, August 20, 1925. "Survey Shows Bitter Anti-Anthracite Campaign in New England," *Coal Age* 28 (October 29, 1925): 605. "Thinks Anthracite Strike Will Make Soft Coal Universal Domestic Fuel; President Urged Not to Interfere," *Coal Age* 28 (November 12, 1925): 671. "War to End War" from "States to Fight Coal Monopoly," *Boston Globe*, August 22, 1925. "How to Use Soft Coal and Coke in the Homes," *Boston Globe*, October 2, 1925. "West Virginia Smokeless Producers Plan Campaign to Capture New England," *Coal Age* 28 (November 12, 1925): 669.
39. Rudolf Kudlich, "Fuels Available for Domestic Use as Substitutes for Anthracite Coal," USBM *Report of Investigation 2520* (Washington, DC, 1923), 3.
40. "New Rates Assure Soft Coal Supply," *Boston Globe*, December 2, 1925. Massachusetts Special Commission on the Necessaries of Life, *Report 1927* (Boston, 1927), 104. While freight rates clearly set limits to coal markets, only a *change* in such rates might *change* anthracite demand. In fact, overall real freight rates on bituminous coal rose more than those on anthracite between 1915 and 1924. See Charles Reitell, "Railway Rates on Bituminous and Anthracite Coal," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* III (January 1924): 155–64.
41. "Substitutes for Coal," *Chicago Tribune*, October 24, 1925. "Good Coke Supply If Miners Strike," *New York Times*, August 24, 1925, contains the quotation and figures. In the mid-1930s, *expenditures* on soft coal were about five times those on hard coal and with soft coal cheaper the quantity disparity would have been even greater. See USBLS, "Family Expenditures in Selected Cities, 1935–36," *Bulletin 648*, vol. 1 (Washington, DC, 1942), table 7.
42. USBM, *Mineral Resources, 1928*, part 2, 478; "Anthracite," *New York Herald Tribune*, December 21, 1925.
43. "Solving Hard Coal's Commercial Problem," *Coal Age* 22 (October 26, 1932), 659. "Order takers" is from "Competitive Pressure Grows in Hard Coal Markets," *Coal Age* (April 2, 1925): 496. "Dead level . . ." is from "Anthracite Operators Realize Necessity for New Sales Program," *Coal Age* 33 (August 1928): 548. In comments on an earlier draft of this article Jack Brown suggested that the idea of marketing to counter decline may well be a modern invention.
44. While it seems remarkable that anthracite was so late to the standards party—the Chicago Board of Trade had established grain standards in the late 1860s—the difference probably reflects the nature of the two markets. Wheat and flour were comingled from many suppliers and often sold to large buyers, while hard coal came from an individual company and wholesalers and retailers had little countervailing power. See Charles Taylor, *History of the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago* (Chicago: Robert O. Law Company, 1917).

45. How Much Ash Is Found.” “Anthracite Trade near Accord on Uniform Standards,” *Coal Age* 27 (March 19, 1925), 436, contains the quotation; “Let Fine Sizes Be Fine in Quality,” *Coal Age* 27 (January 1, 1925). Better quality is from “First Annual Anthracite Conference Staged at Lehigh University,” *Coal Age* 43 (June 1938): 72–74.
46. “Anthracite Industry Rests Success for Future on Engineering and Merchandising,” *Coal Age* 37 (January 27, 1927): 107–8. “New England Dealers See Menace to Anthracite in Wider Use of Soft Coal,” *Coal Age* 27 (April 2, 1925): 512. “Dealer Customer Service Plan Is Inaugurated,” *Coal Age* 31 (March 3, 1927): 326–27. “How Anthracite Attacks Sales Problems,” *Coal Age* 33 (August 1928): 467–69. “Anthracite Battling to Regain Lost Markets Takes the Dealer into Partnership,” *Coal Age* 38 (March 1933): 82–84. USBM, *Mineral Resources 1926*, part 2, 553; 1927, part 2, 481; and 1929, part 2, 829–31.
47. For the Mt. Carmel Conference see USBM, *Mineral Resources 1927*, 481. For the Anthracite Institute see the chapters on anthracite in the 1927 and 1929 issues of USBM, *Mineral Resources*.
48. “New England Dealers See Menace to Anthracite.” Parker is from “Economic Problems of the Coal Industry,” *Coal Age* 30 (December 17, 1926): 816. *Report of the Federal Oil Conservation Board 1932* (Washington, DC, 1933), 7.
49. “Assisting . . .” is from USBM, *Mineral Resources 1928*, part 2, 576. “Buckwheat Coal Demands Real Recognition in Anthracite Merchandising Problems,” *Coal Age* 27, April 30, 1925: 638–41.
50. “Gas Proves to Be an Active Rival of Anthracite,” *Coal Age* 25 (May 22, 1924): 766. Mine prices are from USBM, *Minerals Yearbook 1947*, 275 and 355, while retail prices are from USBLS, “Retail Prices, 1890–1926,” *Bulletin* 445 (Washington, DC, 1927), table 16.
51. “Machines Help Anthracite Regain Lost Markets,” *Coal Age* 36 (February 1931): 64–65. Productivity data are author’s calculations bases on USBM data.
52. “Institute Hard Coal Research,” *Coal Age* 33 (October 1928): 652. “Anthracite Experiments with Research,” *Coal Age* 35 (January 1930): 12–13. “Anthracite Research Seeks New Markets for Both Fuel and Non-Fuel Uses,” *Coal Age* 39 (February 1934): 58–59. In 1938 anthracite researchers also held the first of what would prove to be a long-running series of conferences on anthracite technology at Lehigh University. These various research programs discovered that coal dust could be used as a filtration agent. They also investigated possible uses of ash as fertilizer and its potential as a lightweight aggregate in concrete mix. There were hopeful studies that claimed hard coal might again find a market as blast-furnace fuel.
53. An early Reading ad is “A Name Worth Knowing,” *Brooklyn Eagle*, November 22, 1927. “Let a little . . .” is from “The Battle Song of the Cities,” *Chicago Tribune*, March 13, 1928. “How Anthracite Attacks Sales Problems,” *Coal Age* 33 (August 1928): 467–69. “Announcing ‘Fyrewell’ It Makes the Best Fire Better,” *Boston Globe*, September 25, 1938. “Blue Coal Is Here,” *Boston Globe*, May 14, 1929.

CONTESTED GROUNDS

AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE 1777 PHILADELPHIA CAMPAIGN

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ABSTRACT: In the third year of the American Revolution, war moved into the Delaware River Valley and wreaked havoc. Throughout the series of battles for the American capital of Philadelphia, both the Continental Army and British forces had to contend with multiple environmental factors. The need for food and supplies dominated the armies' military strategies. Daily atmospheric conditions and fluctuating temperatures bred deadly diseases. Soldiers manipulated landscapes and waterways for their survival needs. Weather sometimes determined the outcomes of major battles. In their writings, Continental and British soldiers consistently reflected on these environmental conditions and used them to justify their battlefield performance. During the Philadelphia Campaign, neither army effectively harnessed nature to its advantage or overcame nature's challenges. Yet soldiers had a deep understanding that the success of their endeavor was directly related to environmental circumstances that they seldom could control.

KEYWORDS: Environmental history, American Revolution, military history, Pennsylvania, Delaware Valley, Battle of Brandywine, Battle of the Clouds

In August 1822 Elizabeth Smith traveled to her maternal grandmother's farmhouse in Chester County, Pennsylvania seeking to learn more about her family's involvement in the American Revolution. Her grandmother, Mary Frazer, was the widow of Persifor Frazer, late brigadier general of the Pennsylvania State Militia. Grandmother and granddaughter sat on the porch in the late afternoon, listening to the sounds of blue jays and cattle, looking at chickens on the hillside, and watching a gum tree near the well-cast shadows on the lawn. Smith described the "mingled smells of the damask monthly rose, the shrub, the sweet herbs, and the fox grapes,

coming from the old fashioned terraced gardens.” As the women gazed out on the landscape, Smith reminded herself that nearly forty-five years ago the Battle of Brandywine upset this bucolic scene. “We looked over the fields, and woods, and hills and meadows, now lying in such serene repose,” Smith wrote, “but which had been the scene of events so full of painful interest to [my grandmother] and her family, and which were also a part of the history of the country, in its great revolutionary struggle.” To Smith and others, woods, hills, meadows, and other natural features were more than reminders of war. According to the revolutionary generation, the natural world was an uncertain, yet active, participant in the struggle.¹

As the War for Independence engulfed southeastern Pennsylvania in 1777, individuals on both sides frequently commented on the environment around them. Before the September 11 Battle of Brandywine, a Hessian officer described Chester County, Pennsylvania, as “extremely mountainous and traversed by thick forests; nevertheless it is very well cultivated and very fertile.” A local citizen wrote, “The whole country abounded in forests interspersed with plantations more or less detached . . . both banks of the [Brandywine] creek were pretty densely covered with woods. The country is undulating, the larger hills usually skirting the creek separated by flats now forming beautiful and luxuriant meadows.” Patriot Elkanah Watson described the region as “a delightful country . . . which stretched from the Susquehanna to the Schuylkill . . . the hill-sides are laid out into regular farms and are under high cultivation. The verdure of the fields, and the neatness and superior tillage of the farms in the rich vales, were so grateful to the eye.” These rolling hills, thick woods, and fertile lands were more than just vistas. In fact, at the Battle of Brandywine and throughout the entire Philadelphia Campaign, the environment played a decisive, and to this point largely unknown, role in shaping military strategy and the outcomes of battles.²

For years, environmental historians have examined nature as it has related to warfare. Scholars have long established that geography, climate, natural resources, and other environmental features have consistently been crucial elements in combat. Some historians have researched increasingly specific environmental concerns, from the impact of forests to the effect of mosquito-borne illnesses. Others have considered how environmental history can reshape our understanding of entire wars. For instance, growing numbers of American Civil War historians are employing environmental perspectives in their scholarship. Works such as Lisa Brady’s *War Upon the Land* (2012), Kathryn Shively Meier’s *Nature’s Civil War* (2013), and the scholarly essay

collection *The Blue, the Gray, and the Green* (2015) all investigate the ways Civil War–era Americans developed relationships to landscapes they were so readily destroying.³

Although environmental historians generally have not taken to the War for Independence with the same enthusiasm as they have for the Civil War, a handful of works have established a broad environmental perspective of the American Revolution. Historian Elizabeth Fenn’s *Pox Americana* (2001) examined the 1775–82 North American smallpox epidemic that took more lives than the revolution itself. In *The Republic of Nature*, Mark Fiege devoted a chapter to the environmental history of the period, exploring how colonial nature, combined with geographic isolation from the mother country, contributed to the development of revolutionary antagonisms, and how the revolutionaries dealt with environmental obstacles. Historian David Hsiung’s article, “Food, Fuel and the New England Environment in the War for Independence” (2007), addressed some of the prevalent environmental concerns during the war’s early years in Massachusetts. Hsiung argued that securing grain, meat, and wood drove British and American military policies. He demonstrated how both armies’ survival depended upon “controlling essential environmental components” like plants, wood, and animals. “Britain did not lose the war because of trees, animals, and grains,” Hsiung claimed, “but its inability to obtain and control these elements of the environment contributed to the army’s defeat.” According to Hsiung, when thinking about the Revolution, military historians cannot take environmental factors for granted. By the time the war reached Philadelphia years later, the fate of both armies still depended on commanding these “elements of the environment.”⁴

In 1777 Philadelphia was the largest city in British North America and the capital of the recently declared independent United States. According to Continental Army major general Nathanael Greene, the Quaker City was the crown jewel of the thirteen colonies, “the American Diana.” However, Philadelphia’s significance extended beyond its urban center and into the countryside. Historian Craig Zabel described eighteenth-century Philadelphia as the nexus of an “agrarian kingdom, the gathering point for the agricultural and other natural riches of the countryside and an entrepôt that economically, politically, and culturally connected his city to the British empire and the rest of the world.” The region’s “major rivers, navigable streams,” and seaports encouraged the growth of the hinterland’s abundant manufacturing and agricultural resources. Beyond the city, surrounding-area farmers grew crops and raised livestock. Forest areas provided timber for fuel,

wagons, and building. The countryside generated large quantities of salt, limestone, and iron ore; sizable creeks powered flour and powder mills and forges. Beyond the city's political importance, the Philadelphia Campaign was also a fight for the control of even more crucial environmental resources.⁵

In the process of trying to capture or defend Philadelphia, the Crown Forces and the Continental Army had to contend with a variety of environmental factors. The armies had to navigate the region's powerful rivers, the Schuylkill and the Delaware, and overcome formidable creeks, such as the Brandywine and Wissahickon. They fought opposing soldiers not only for the control of territory, but also for the control of wild animals and livestock. Soldiers suffered from diseases keeping them off the front lines and in hospitals. And whether it took the form of heat, thunderstorms, or fog, the weather consistently affected both sides' strategies. The campaign was just as much a contest between American and British military strength as it was to see which side could more effectively harness the power of the natural world.

In the end, neither side would control the environment during the Philadelphia Campaign. Both the Crown Forces and the Continental Army struggled with natural disadvantages and enjoyed natural advantages. In that sense, in this campaign, nature was neutral. And yet this assessment can be pushed somewhat further. At multiple battles, the British reaped nature's benefits, such as by using fog to shield their movements at Brandywine or relying on storms to assist in their capture of Philadelphia. But in the end, these advantages were only momentary. While nature shielded the British at Brandywine, it also slowed their military maneuvers, allowing the Continental Army the time necessary to escape the battlefield. And while intense rain helped the British conquer Philadelphia, it also prevented a major clash at a time when the Continentals were badly bruised and unprepared for a fight. Nature took no side in the Philadelphia Campaign, but in the long run those same short-term advantages that created momentarily beneficial conditions for the Crown Forces ended up aiding the Continental Army.⁶

THE BRITISH VOYAGE AND EMBARKATION: JULY–SEPTEMBER 1777

In June 1777 both armies began to mobilize following their winter encampments. In late July approximately 17,000 British soldiers crammed onboard over 250 ships in New Jersey's Raritan Bay slated for Philadelphia. By the end

of the month, the fleet had reached the mouth of the Delaware River and appeared prepared to strike the American capital. At this juncture, however, British commander Sir William Howe decided to change course. Instead of striking the city from the river, he decided to land instead at the northern end of the Chesapeake Bay and make his approach overland—a costly decision. What was supposed to be a quick strike at the American capital became a damaging, “circuitous voyage.” Environmental factors would prevent the British from making landfall until August 25.⁷

While at sea, British soldiers complained of the heat, the wind, and strong thunderstorms. Howe’s secretary, Ambrose Serle, wrote, “The thermometer in the shade and at Sea stood frequently at 84 degrees and 86 degrees, what must it have been upon the shore?” Carl Baurmeister, a Hessian major, remembered that “during most of the voyage we had contrary wind and intense heat, which was accompanied almost daily by terrific thunderstorms, causing much suffering among men and horse and damage to the masts and sails.” Not only did the storms force Howe’s fleet to drop anchor and wait for the downpours to pass, they also claimed lives. Baurmeister believed the voyage cost the lives of twenty-seven soldiers and 170 horses, which he called “a natural consequence of spending more than five weeks on a voyage which on good weather can be made in six or eight days.” Serle also complained that the long voyage encouraged the spread of seasonal diseases such as “bilious fevers.” For five weeks, the Crown Forces were crowded into malodorous, steamy, lice- and rat-infested ships, where they ate “spoiled” bread and meat and drank “stinking water.”⁸

As the ships sailed into Chesapeake Bay, soldiers commented on the shoreline’s tobacco plantations, pastures, and forests. Few had positive impressions of this region. A Hessian soldier wrote that the landscape was “desolate” and nothing more than a “bare woods.” One of General Howe’s aides-de-camp, Friedrich von Muenchhausen, complained of the “intolerable heat” and remarked that if he had to stay in America, he would never return to “hot regions” like Maryland. Ambrose Serle believed that the area was “a mass of stagnated waters & mud of a vast extent. These Swamps & marshes render this Country so extremely unwholesome.” After disembarking a few days later, Captain Johann Ewald of the Hessian Jaegers wrote,

The whole peninsula, or headland, was a real wilderness. Just as we found the uncultivated vine, the sassafras tree, and wild melon in this region, so also was it full of different kinds of vermin. The woods, especially, are

filled with snakes and toads. Each tree was full of big chafers [cicadas], which made such noise during the night that two men cannot speak to each other and understand what was said. Added to this, a violent thunderstorm came with a downpour whereby the warmth of the air, which had been extremely intense during the day increased to such a degree that we believe we would suffocate in the fiery air.

For the Crown Forces in need of some relief following a cramped five-week voyage, the Chesapeake region was not too rewarding.⁹

The British made landfall near Head of Elk, Maryland on August 25 (although several larger ships trailed behind them as they were unable to find deep enough waters to drop their anchors). The weakened state of his army forced Howe to delay movements toward Philadelphia. General Washington's aide-de-camp Alexander Hamilton reported that the lengthy voyage had "made skeletons" of the British horses. On August 31 Muenchhausen wrote that the army planned to "stay at [Head of Elk] today and tomorrow to give our horses, which suffered exceedingly because of the unexpectedly long voyage, a chance to recover." Moreover, for several days after the landing, heavy rains pounded the area, further limiting British mobility. After a miserable, prolonged journey, the Crown Forces were eager for a fight, and a fresh meal.¹⁰

Despite the "great quantities of stores" abandoned by nearby residents, British soldiers tore through the surrounding countryside to satisfy their hunger. They killed wild animals, particularly local fowl, to feed their men. When wild creatures could no longer be found, they turned to area livestock such as cattle, sheep, and pigs. The British also confiscated locally grown crops, such as "orchard fruit and Indian corn." They seized acres of buckwheat, bushels of grain, rye, oats, barley, and potatoes. In one single raid, soldiers under the command of Hessian general Wilhelm von Knyphausen captured "261 head horned Cattle and 568 sheep and 100 horses." One farmer lost milk cows, "spring calves," sheep, swine, colts, as well as 230 bushels of wheat, 100 bushels of potatoes, 120 bushels of corn, 20 bushels of buckwheat, an estimated 70 pounds of damage to his pastures, 70 pounds of fruit, and over seven pounds of timber. Locals compared the devastation wrought by British to that wrought by a hurricane. Following the voyage, in search of fresh food, ravenous British and Hessian soldiers robbed households and family farms at a frantic pace. Hunger, thirst, and pain, products of their extended voyage, were motivating factors.¹¹

It did not take long after the landing for accounts of plunder to reach the British high command. "There was a good deal of plunder committed by the Troops," Major John André remembered, "notwithstanding the strictest prohibitions. . . . The soldiers slaughtered a great deal of cattle clandestinely." Ambrose Serle was "mortified by the accounts of plunder, &c., committed on the poor inhabitants by the Army and Navy." General Howe took notice. The day the army disembarked at Head of Elk, two British soldiers were hanged and six others were beaten "within an inch of their lives" for "marauding." In fact, within the next four weeks, five soldiers would be executed for plundering. In order to calm the apprehensive civilian population near the Chesapeake, the British issued a proclamation on August 27. Howe "hath issued the strictest Orders to the Troops for the Preservation of Regularity and Good Discipline," it read, "and has signified that the most exemplary Punishment shall be inflicted upon Those who shall dare to plunder the property, or molest the Persons of any of his Majesty's Well-disposed subjects." Plundering did more than create political problems with civilians. On August 29 Friedrich von Muenchhausen wrote, "Because of increasing acts of pillage and our corps, last night we lost several men who had advanced too far and were captured."¹²

The British troops were not the only soldiers marauding the countryside. General George Washington also had trouble preventing his men from "robbing orchards" or tearing down fences. Washington felt particularly incensed because he saw no reason his soldiers should disassemble fencing in "a country abounding with wood, & by men with hatchets in their hands". Nevertheless, the accounts of British plundering in late August were more frequent and severe. Four weeks later, when Crown Forces moved into Germantown, their conduct with local civilians and desire for goods were comparatively restrained. The voraciousness of the British quest for rations in the upper Chesapeake was directly related to the long, uncomfortable voyage they endured. The heat, lack of winds, and general suffering meant that once the army landed at Head of Elk, their hunger drove them to rob and pillage.¹³

Meanwhile, Washington's Continental Army, while better supplied than their adversaries, struggled to find suitable terrain. In the months prior, the Continentals enjoyed the defensive advantages of northern New Jersey's Watchung Mountains. They were able to launch a series of small attacks on the British and retreat into the relative safety of the north Jersey hills. But now, near Wilmington and the Christiana River, no such advantageous landscape could be found. "This country does not abound in good posts,"

Alexander Hamilton wrote. “It is intersected by such an infinity of roads, and is so little mountainous that it is impossible to find a spot not liable to capital defects.” Nathanael Greene agreed: “The face of the country is favorable to the Enemy, being very flat and level.”¹⁴

On September 3, the British, seizing upon these landscape advantages, attacked General William Maxwell’s Light Infantry at the Battle of Cooch’s Bridge in northern Delaware. It was the first sizable engagement of the campaign. Roughly 1,000 Continental soldiers were positioned in the woods, but after an intense exchange of “hot fire,” and with no hills or mountains to aid them, Maxwell’s soldiers speedily fled, throwing down their blankets and weapons in a hasty retreat. The only thing preventing a complete rout of the Patriot Light Infantry was an impassable swamp that blocked British maneuvers. Had it not been for the obstructive swamp, British engineer John Montrésor believed, the “little spirited affair” at Cooch’s Bridge would have been “so decisive.”¹⁵

BRANDYWINE: SEPTEMBER 11, 1777

About a week after the fighting at Cooch’s Bridge, Washington took up a position near Chadds Ford in Chester County, one of the most traveled fords along the Brandywine Creek. The creek winds its way through southern Pennsylvania and northern Delaware until it joins the Christiana River. Locals could only cross the Brandywine via its fords, of which there were several in the battlefield’s vicinity. Washington positioned nearly the whole of his army along the east side of the creek where they constructed defenses on hillsides that John André called “advantageous eminences.” As the British traveled toward the Brandywine, they removed felled trees cut down by the rebels who had hoped to obstruct roads along the way. John Montrésor described the trek through Chester County: “Our march this day about six miles through an amazingly strong country, being a succession of large hills, rather sudden with narrow vales, in short an entire defile. . . . Encamped on very strong ground.” The hills and meadows of southern Pennsylvania had replaced the wetlands of the Chesapeake region. General Howe quickly moved into position a few miles west of the Americans.¹⁶

As the British recuperated following their ocean voyage, the Continental Army endured ailments of their own. Washington’s soldiers made the overland march from central New Jersey to Philadelphia. According to Joseph

Plumb Martin, a private with the Eighth Connecticut Regiment, throughout these marches soldiers were often hungry, freezing, or ill, and would frequently rest in “woods or fields, under the side of a fence, in an orchard or in any other place but a comfortable one—lying down on the cold and often wet ground.” One soldier described the days in a poem. “Since we came here for to encamp / Our mornings have been very damp / But at noonday excessive warm / And like to do us all great harm.” For many, the heat of the summer of 1777 was unbearable. John Adams compared the prevailing Philadelphia heat to the “fierce Breath of an hot oven,” and locals living in southeastern Pennsylvania described the season “as hot a summer as they have known.” While the Continentals did not have to contend with tight quarters aboard ships, their march throughout the heat of summer encouraged the spread of camp diseases. Chester County resident Joseph Townsend wrote that many Patriot soldiers were incapacitated with disease “in consequence of their long marches through the excessive heat of that season of the year.” The army’s doctors converted several buildings, including the nearby Birmingham Meeting House, into hospitals to accommodate the sick troops. The long overland journey and the diseases it engendered forced Washington to engage the British at the Battle of Brandywine at less than full strength.¹⁷

On the morning of September 11, Crown Forces and Continentals were poised for one of the largest battles of the war. Howe divided his men, directing roughly half of his army under General Knyphausen straight at Washington across the Brandywine at Chadds Ford. Meanwhile, Howe and General Charles Cornwallis would lead the remainder of the troops on a flanking mission around the center of the action. Howe planned to march his army about six miles north of Chadds Ford and cross two smaller branches of the creek at Jeffries and Trimbles fords. From there, Howe could strike Washington’s right flank.¹⁸

At daybreak Howe moved from Kennett Square on his flanking mission, while Knyphausen’s troops made their way slowly toward Washington. The Crown Forces “arrived at a place where the road passes through some swampy land,” Major Baurmeister wrote, “On both sides of this lowland are hills and woods . . . full of enemy troops.” Fast-moving Patriots firing from “under the cover of trees” and darting throughout the woods prevented the effective use of British artillery. Thanks in part to marshes, trees, and hills, Knyphausen’s attack noticeably stalled and could not break the Continentals. Howe meanwhile continued his march around the fighting, through “hills, woodlands, marshes, and the steepest of defiles,” aided noticeably by a low-hanging mist

along the creek. Captain John Montrésor wrote, “A thick fog contributed greatly to favour our march.” The fog was so dense, local inhabitants scarcely knew Howe’s men were crossing through their property. At 8:30 a.m., Howe’s troops crossed the Brandywine near Trimbles Ford.¹⁹

By two o’clock in the afternoon, Howe’s soldiers had crossed the Brandywine. If they expected to find any relief from environmental obstacles following their fording of the creek, they were mistaken. Immediately after crossing Jeffries Ford the Crown Forces encountered a steep ravine. In order to attack Washington’s flank before nightfall, Howe had no choice but to send his army through this narrow gorge. Only a few soldiers could pass through the defile simultaneously, sometimes crossing in twos, inevitably slowing Howe’s movement. Multiple British soldiers that day were amazed not to find any Continentals using the topography along the ravine to their advantage. Captain Johann Ewald was shocked that the Americans had not made use of the steep hills and natural defensive positions. “I was astonished when I had safely reached the end of this terrible defile which was over a thousand paces long, and could discover nothing of the enemy,” he wrote. “The pass had been left wide open for us, where a hundred men could have held up either army whole day.” According to Ewald, both Howe and Cornwallis were also surprised to find no Continentals protecting the ravine. Having conquered another environmental obstacle, British officers celebrated their slow but safe passage and prepared to strike the Continental Army’s flank.²⁰

By early afternoon, the tide of battle turned. Knyphausen and his artillery had begun to relentlessly batter the Continentals near Chadds Ford, and Howe’s entire force had crossed the creek, completing their seventeen-mile march. After a much-needed rest, Howe and Cornwallis approached Washington’s flank, stretching their troops into a mile-wide column along Osborne’s Hill. Washington, now aware of Howe’s strategy, dispatched soldiers to the Birmingham Meeting House to hold off the British advance. Joseph Townsend, watching the battle near the meetinghouse, wrote, “[The British] arms and bayonets being raised shone as bright as silver, there being a clear sky and the day exceedingly warm.” Despite the tough fight his right flank gave the British, Washington’s army collapsed. Protected by Major General Greene’s division, the Continentals precipitously fled.²¹

Brandywine was a terrific victory for Crown Forces, but several British soldiers noted that their victory could have been more decisive. Friedrich Muenchhausen claimed, “If daylight had lasted a few hours longer, I dare

say that this day would have brought an end to the war. Without doubt we would have taken half of Washington's army and all of his cannon." Sergeant Thomas Sullivan of the British Forty-Ninth Regiment of Foot agreed that the Continental Army escaped "a total overthrow, that must have been the consequence of an hour's more daylight." Yet while multiple British officers agreed that their army nearly missed the opportunity to destroy or permanently weaken the Continentals, they failed to recognize that throughout the day natural barriers had markedly slowed their actions. The fords along the Brandywine forced Howe to consider an alternative flanking strategy to attack Washington. Marshes and woods around Chadds Ford prevented General Knyphausen from barreling through the Americans positioned there. The steep ravine near Jeffries Ford only allowed a handful of British soldiers to pass at a time, creating a natural bottleneck. While the British were able to overcome these and other obstacles, they certainly hampered their movements, providing the Continental Army enough time to defend themselves and eventually escape. Although Washington was unable to harness nature's power at Brandywine, it nonetheless aided him in keeping his force alive.²²

**THE BATTLE OF THE CLOUDS AND THE FALL OF PHILADELPHIA:
SEPTEMBER 16–26, 1777**

In the days following the defeat at Brandywine, Washington led his army through Philadelphia, and then recrossed the Schuylkill back into Chester County. Howe and the British forces remained at Chadds Ford, gathering supplies from farms and homes, preparing for the next major clash. For a few days the armies repositioned themselves, inching steadily closer to one another. On September 15 members of the Continental Congress wrote that they expected another massive battle to occur. Continental Army adjutant general Timothy Pickering ordered that ammunition be inspected, and that soldiers travel only with essential goods. General Washington emphatically promised the president of the Continental Congress that another fight was imminent. Meanwhile, Henry Melchior Muhlenberg, the father of both the North American Lutheran Church and a Continental brigadier general, noted in his journal that at his home in Trappe, Pennsylvania, it began to rain.²³

On September 16 it appeared as if the next large battle was inevitable. A number of cavalry, a few hundred Pennsylvania militia, and portions of

General Wayne's and General Maxwell's brigades engaged Cornwallis's Light Infantry and Hessian Jaegers in the valley near Whiteland Township amid a light rain. An artilleryman remembered that the Patriot riflemen covered the locks of their weapons with animal skins, to prevent misfires and keep their gunpowder dry. As the fighting intensified, so did the rainfall. Future Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall, a Continental soldier in the Eleventh Virginia Regiment, wrote, "Both armies immediately prepared, with great alacrity, for battle. The advanced parties had met, and were beginning to skirmish, when they were separated by a heavy rain, which becoming more and more violent, soon rendered the retreat of the Americans an absolute necessity." After suffering a few dozen casualties, the rebels retreated into a dense forest.²⁴

On both sides of the battle, soldiers described the effects of the rain. A Pennsylvania rifleman remembered that "the tremendous rain" incapacitated "small armes" and muskets on both sides. "I wish I could give a description of the downpour which began during the engagement and continued until the next morning," Carl Baurmeister wrote, "It came down so hard that in a few moments we were drenched and dank in mud up to our calves." A Virginia loyalist called the day's weather a "Mud deluge . . . [an] Equinoctial storm" that left "the Roads so deep there was no bringing on the Artillery." The near-action prevented by the rain on September 16 earned the name the Battle of the Clouds. Its effects were not limited just to that one day.²⁵

The strong weather swelled nearby streams and rivers to impassable levels. Lieutenant James McMichael, serving in the Thirteenth Pennsylvania Regiment, wrote that for eighteen hours the rain "fell in torrents," and that "the small brooks were so large by the excessive rain . . . that we had repeatedly to waid [*sic*] to the middle in crossing them." A Continental artilleryman from Reading, Jacob Nagle, remembered that the men needed to swim across small streams several times. The incessant rain made the roads "very heavy, and the lowlands overflowed." The high river levels and rushing waters made some crossings dangerous and others impossible. One of the major effects of the storm of September 16, therefore, was the limitation it posed on the armies' mobility. It was merely one consequence of the rain.²⁶

At Yellow Springs, following the battle, Continentals reckoned with a second major effect of the storm: the destruction of ammunition. While both armies' rounds suffered from the weather, the single-flap unseasoned leather used to make the Continental Army's cartridge boxes provided the American rounds little protection from the deluge. Adjutant General Pickering wrote

that the destruction was so widespread that “it became necessary to keep aloof from the enemy till fresh ammunition could be made up and distributed.” Jacob Nagle described the ammunition wagons as “dripping wet and shivering cold.” According to General Washington the forty rounds of ammunition provided to each soldier were “intirely [*sic*] ruined.” And his artillery commander, Henry Knox, estimated that the rain destroyed 400,000 individual rounds. Two days after the heaviest rains fell, the Continentals inspected the damage and determined that in their present state they could not engage the British. The storm also revealed the staggering supply deficiencies of the Continental Army, as men were in need of warm clothes and blankets. Washington maneuvered his water-logged army closer to Reading, further away from the enemy, avoiding, for the time being, another fight.²⁷

Meanwhile, the battles over forage raged on. Howe had all but severed his supply train from the Chesapeake Bay, creating an increased incentive to find food and goods. The Crown Forces continued marauding the countryside, leading them to the small community of Valley Forge along the Schuylkill. On September 18 the British descended into the town to destroy or capture supplies located near the forges. A small band of American soldiers, including Alexander Hamilton, escaped across the river, raging on account of the recent rains, with what supplies they could salvage. Three days later, Washington ordered Hamilton to Philadelphia to gather “many necessary articles of Cloathing [*sic*]” to prepare for the “approaching inclement season.” Feeding and sheltering men in the wake of changing environmental conditions continued to influence, if not dominate, both armies’ military policies.²⁸

The brunt of Washington’s army avoided Crown Forces until they could repair their soaked ammunition. Nothing but the Schuylkill stood between the British and Philadelphia. Despite Washington’s attempt to place some men near the river’s crossings, the Continentals could not adequately defend every single ford. “To defend an extensive river when it is unfordable is almost impossible,” Henry Knox believed, “but when fordable in every part, it becomes impracticable.” A British victory against Anthony Wayne’s men at Paoli on September 20 and the poor state of the Continental Army’s ammunition provided the British an opportunity to take the American capital. Congressman Richard Henry Lee expected the British to capture Philadelphia as soon as the water level in the Schuylkill lowered. He was right. By September 23 the water level receded, enabling the British to complete their crossing. They captured Philadelphia three days later without firing a shot. Congressman Elbridge Gerry described the

situation frankly: “The principal Cause of their obtaining the City without a second Battle . . . was a heavy rain.”²⁹

But for some in the Continental Army, the Battle of the Clouds was something of a godsend. As skirmishes began on September 16, soldiers in the army speculated that Washington had misjudged the terrain and provided his enemy with an advantageous position. Timothy Pickering wrote that as the first shots were fired, “It was now discovered that the ground on which the army was drawn up for battle . . . was not well chosen.” Furthermore, Persifor Frazer wrote that at the Battle of the Clouds the Continental Army “was inferior in numbers, in equipment, in discipline, and in morale, having just suffered defeat at Brandywine.” To some Continental soldiers, had it not been for the rain, a clash on September 16 would have meant certain defeat, if not destruction. Once again, natural conditions created short-term advantages for the British, but those same conditions managed to keep the Continental Army in the field another day.³⁰

GERMANTOWN: OCTOBER 4, 1777

A day before Howe’s army captured Philadelphia, they completed an eleven-mile march through “a great deal of wood land and some stony ground.” The woods and forests disappeared, revealing Germantown, one of the most scenic communities in the area. The Crown Forces commented on the “very beautiful” landscape surrounding them. A Hessian soldier described the area as “beautiful a region as to be seen in America. The wilderness ends and three or four houses stand near one another . . . the region is hilly and stony.” For the British troops who fought through the marshlands of the Chesapeake and the farmlands of Chester County, Germantown was surely an impressive sight. The Wissahickon Creek flowed through steep gorges, emptying into the Schuylkill near what used to be a series of dramatic waterfalls, sending white water cascading over river stones. Here is where the British focused the brunt of their force, and where Washington planned to launch his bid to recapture the Quaker City.³¹

Washington’s ambitious strategy (arguably his single-most ambitious strategy of the entire war) called on four columns of soldiers to begin a coordinated attack on the British army at Germantown before daybreak, following a long overnight march of nearly twenty miles. But a dark, cloudy night foiled Washington’s plan for a quick march. The Continentals planned to be in

position to attack Germantown by 2:00 a.m. but many soldiers did not arrive until the time the attack was supposed to commence at 5:00 a.m. Moreover, the long march led to “unspeakable fatigue” throughout the Continental ranks. The British also enjoyed some landscape advantages in defending their position. Johann Ewald was positioned along the Wissahickon when his men intercepted Washington’s right column of Pennsylvania militia. “Toward day-break on the 4th,” Ewald “immediately ordered the rocky heights occupied from the left bank of the Schuylkill along the ravine and bridge . . . and awaited the enemy. . . . I held out at this post until the end of the engagement.” Ewald protected the British left flank for the entire battle and made use of the “rocky heights” near the Wissahickon Creek. In some places, the attacking Continentals had to fight not only the British, but also nature.³²

“Bull-dogs” and “curs” barked at Washington’s soldiers as they marched on the Germantown Road before sunrise, alerting the Crown Forces to their presence. British soldiers under the command of Colonel Thomas Musgrave fired the opening shots of the battle as the main column of the Continental Army advanced “furiously thro’ buckwheat fields.” Musgrave’s men retreated south down the road, firing along the way. By 6:30 a.m. the Continentals had driven the British toward an impressive stone estate known as Cliveden, the summer home of Philadelphia’s Chief Justice Benjamin Chew. Musgrave led his force into Cliveden, preparing to defend the house to the last man. The colonel ordered nearby horses killed, preventing their capture by Americans. Under advice from Henry Knox, Washington decided to have several brigades attack the Chew House, halting his army’s momentum down the Germantown Road in hopes they could dislodge the British. The attack on Cliveden proved to be a fatal mistake. Musgrave’s men defended the stone fortress for hours. Johann Ewald heaped praise upon Musgrave after the battle, and Carl Baurmeister called it a moment of “courageous defense.” Musgrave’s men defended Cliveden valiantly, and Washington’s attack was undoubtedly misguided. The house itself, then, structurally played a major role in repelling the American assault.³³

Built in 1767, Cliveden was one of the first structures travelers would see when they entered Germantown traveling south on the community’s namesake road. None of the surrounding buildings were quite as impressive. More important, to the environment and to the battle, was the building’s composition. Historian of the Philadelphia Campaign Thomas McGuire wrote, “Cliveden was solidly built of Wissahickon schist, a locally quarried light gray stone glimmering with particles of mica. The front façade was

nearly two feet thick, constructed of large ashlar blocks carefully cut and laid in courses. . . . The back and side walls were formed with randomly laid rubble stone finished with layers of sand-colored-stucco scored to resemble cut stone.” Unlike the nearby residences and Quaker meeting houses (typically wooden buildings), Cliveden was an imposing stone structure. Continental firepower throughout the battle managed to tear off shutters and doors, but the building remained intact. In other words, the Wissahickon schist and local fieldstones repulsed the Patriots as much as Musgrave’s men did. At Germantown, even the earth below the Continental Army’s feet fought against them.³⁴

According to the generals of the Continental Army, fog also played a significant role in deciding the outcome of Germantown. For several days, the area along the river had been experiencing “foggy mornings,” a natural consequence of warmer river waters meeting cool night air as the seasons changed. “The fogg together with the smoke Occasioned by our cannon and musketry made it almost as dark as night,” Anthony Wayne wrote. Private Joseph Plumb Martin remembered that the “low vapor lying on the land . . . made it very difficult to distinguish objects at a distance.” According to John Marshall, “A fog of uncommon thickness,” threw the soldiers into “great confusion.” “In this unusual fog” Henry Knox could not determine what “to support or what to push.” The morning conditions caused the Continentals to significantly stumble as they approached Germantown.³⁵

Visibility was a major problem, leading to self-inflicted wounds in the Continental Army. Carl Baurmeister wrote that the fog limited visibility to fifty paces, while Knox claimed that visibility extended twenty yards, and Washington believed thirty yards. Regardless of the specific distance, the Continentals could not distinguish friend from foe, leading to cases of friendly fire. As Nathanael Greene’s column joined with the rest of the main assault around 7:30 a.m., they fired through the fog and on Anthony Wayne’s men to their right. They would not be able to recover, and Wayne’s startled soldiers fled. Soon after, the rest of the Patriot army followed. According to General Washington, “if the uncommon fogginess of the morning and the smoke has not hindered us from seeing our advantage, I am convinced it would have ended in a compleat Victory.” In fact, after the defeat at Germantown, Washington identified the fog as a factor in his army’s defeat in at least eleven separate letters.³⁶

Reflecting on the battle, William Howe’s aide-de-camp Freidrich Muenchhausen admitted the brilliancy of Washington’s four-pronged

strategy, calling it “very well planned” and praising the Continental Army’s intelligence network. In the end, it was nature that significantly impeded the plans of “Clever Washington.” Three days after the battle, Henry Knox, the architect of the imprudent attack on Cliveden, wrote, “had it not been for the unlucky circumstance of the fog, Philadelphia would probably have been in our hands.” Washington’s coordinated attack strategy suffered more from the fog than the Crown Forces defending the Germantown Road and Cliveden. For the noncombatants living along the road and near Cliveden, the destruction was palpable. After the campaign, a Philadelphian compared his city to a “dreary picture of want and desolation.” He lamented the “gardens ravaged and destroyed; forests cut down,” and could barely recognize the landscape that had been “a few weeks before, the most beautiful, the best cultivated and the most fertile environs of any city in America.”³⁷

CONCLUSION

Unfortunately for the Continental Army, the Philadelphia Campaign did not end at Germantown. The armies would continue to engage with some strength all the way into December from the banks of the Delaware to Whitemarsh. Unlike at the battle of the Clouds or Brandywine, Continental soldiers did not write that their defeat at Germantown had unintended silver linings that benefited the overall health of the army. Germantown was a stinging defeat, partially blamed on the misguided attack at Cliveden, the soldiers’ lack of discipline under fire, and the most discussed factor, the environment. A few days after the battle, Nathanael Greene assured his soldiers that “if the Weather had been clear,” they would have given the British a “Compleat route [*sic*].” Had it not been for the fog, the Continentals may not have lost their momentum down the Germantown road.³⁸

In fact, the memoirs and letters of soldiers on both sides are full of similar references throughout the Philadelphia Campaign. Men regularly wrote that had it not been for disadvantages in the landscape, untimely weather, or limited forage nearby, whole battles might have ended differently. In early September, at the small battle of Cooch’s Bridge in northern Delaware, John André remembered how a swamp prevented the British from outmaneuvering and overtaking the Continental light infantry. “The attempts made by our Troops to get round them were defeated by their being unable to pass a

swamp,” he wrote. After Brandywine, Carl Baurmeister was merely one of several officers in the Crown Forces who complained that nightfall prevented a more decisive British victory, if not the destruction of the Continental Army itself. Even George Washington frequently blamed nature in describing the fates that befell his army. After Germantown, it appears he could find no other reason than fog for his army’s defeat.³⁹

Soldiers sometimes used environmental obstacles to justify lackluster or poor battlefield performance. In hindsight, Washington’s misguided attack on Cliveden probably had more to do with his army’s defeat at Germantown than the fog. Yet because the Revolutionary generation’s livelihood was tethered more closely to environmental changes than ours is today, their frequent descriptions of the role nature played during this campaign highlight a very specific type of historical contingency. Would the British have been able to take Philadelphia had it not been for the storm that precipitously ended the Battle of the Clouds? Perhaps they could have, but certainly not as easily. The rain so decimated the Continental ammunition that it left their commanders little choice but to leave the route to the American capital wide open. Without the rain, another Brandywine-size engagement would have most certainly occurred, if not that day then very soon thereafter. Indeed, it was the weather and the situations it created that allowed the British to take the Quaker City without another major battle. The Battle of the Clouds is merely one example that demonstrates how throughout the campaign the environment was just as important in deciding outcomes as military strategy, battlefield leadership, or either army’s strength.

Also, weighing the natural advantages and disadvantages of the Philadelphia Campaign does not produce a clear assessment of which side benefited more from nature. At Brandywine, natural elements seemingly turned against the Continentals, creating conditions (be it fog, fords, and terrain) that allowed the British to nearly envelop Washington’s soldiers. However, those same environmental factors slowed British movements and prevented them from capitalizing on their victory. The Continentals could not defend Philadelphia on account of the Battle of the Clouds. More significantly, the rain from September 16 to 17 prevented another engagement at a time when Washington’s army was recovering from their defeat at Brandywine and unprepared for battle. While fog at Germantown wreaked havoc on the Continental Army’s strategy, within weeks American generals were considering sites and plans for re-forming the army during the upcoming winter encampment. And by June 1778 the Continental Army would emerge

stronger and more unified following their six-month stay at Valley Forge. Essentially, the short-term advantages the British gained from the environment in the end helped to preserve their enemy's army. Therefore, neither side could call nature an ally.⁴⁰

In years to come, scholars will continue to ask questions about the environmental history of the American Revolution. While a handful of historians have researched and written on this topic, the environmental history of this period has only scratched the surface. Moreover, the country's understanding of the War for Independence is so heavily imbued with nostalgia, images of heroism, and potent nationalism. Environmental history as a discipline can work to create more accurate narratives. By placing the Crown Forces and the Continental Army in their environmental context, we are reminded that their successes and failures more often depended on the conditions of rivers and roads than on their commitment to national ideals. Environmental histories of the American Revolution are small but essential steps in the direction of fully understanding and appreciating the United States' founding moments.

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NOTES

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 6. Brady, *War Upon the Land*, 2, 48.
 7. Thomas J. McGuire, *Brandywine and the Fall of Philadelphia*, vol. 1 of *The Philadelphia Campaign* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2006), 6, 65–66. As British forces boarded their ships near Staten Island and prepared to capture Philadelphia, the Quaker City was enduring another scourge of smallpox. The disease had a perennial presence in the city, so much so that those who traveled through the city understood Philadelphia as a kind of distribution center for the virus. See Fenn, *Pox Americana*, 83–85; Thomas J. McGuire, *The Surprise at*

- Germantown, or, the Battle of Cliveden October 4th 1777* (Philadelphia: Thomas Publications, 1994), 2; *Commemorating the 200th Anniversary*, David Library, 9; Alan Taylor, *American Revolutions: A Continental History, 1750–1804* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2016), 182.
8. Ambrose Serle, *The American Journal of Ambrose Serle: Secretary to Lord Howe, 1776–1778*, ed. Edward H. Tatum Jr. (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1940), 241–42; Carl Baurmeister, *Revolution in America: Confidential Letters and Journals 1776–1784 of Adjutant General Major Baurmeister of the Hessian Forces*, trans. and annot. Bernard A. Uhlendorf (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1957), 97–98; Friedrich Muenchhausen, *At General Howe's Side, 1776–1778: The Diary of General William Howe's aide de camp Captain Friedrich von Muenchhausen*, trans. Ernst Kipping and annot. Samuel Smith (Monmouth Beach, NJ: Philip Freneau Press, 1974), 23; McGuire, *Surprise at Germantown*, 2; Stephen R. Taaffe, *The Philadelphia Campaign, 1777–1778* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 50; Heinrich Carl Philipp von Feilitzsch, *Diaries of Two Ansbach Jaegers*, ed. and trans. Bruce E. Burgoyne (Bowie, MD: Heritage Books, 1997), 11. Head of Elk was named for its position near the end of the Elk River. The community was later renamed Elkton.
 9. Baurmeister, *Revolution in America*, 99; Serle, *American Journal*, 242, 249; Feilitzsch, *Diaries of Two Ansbach Jaegers*, 16; Wayne Bodle, “Learning to Live with War: Civilians and Revolutionary Conflict in the Delaware Valley in 1777,” paper presented to the Philadelphia Center for Early American Studies Seminar, February 17, 1995, VF Academic Papers, David Library; John André, *Major André's Journal: Operations of the British Army under Lieutenant Generals Sir William Howe and Sir Henry Clinton June 1777 to November, 1778, Recorded by Major John André, Adjutant General*, ed. C. DeW. Willcox, reprint (Tarrytown: W. Abbat, 1968), 38; Muenchhausen, *At General Howe's Side*, 24; Ewald, *Diary of the American War*, 75.
 10. Adding to the misery and hunger was the fact that Howe ordered “the stores and the camp equipage be left on board the ships after they made landfall, as not to burden an already weak army.” See André, *Major André's Journal*, 37–38; Alexander Hamilton, *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, ed. Harold C. Syrett and Jacob E. Cooke, vol. 1, 1768–1778 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 321 (hereafter cited as Hamilton Papers); Baurmeister, *Revolution in America*, 99; Serle, *American Journal*, 246; Muenchhausen, *At General Howe's Side*, 26. According to Captain John Montrésor, the Americans believed the British would be unable to launch an assault from Head of Elk because the water was not deep enough. Montrésor described in his journals the process by which larger ships were “cutting channels” through the muddy bottom of the bay, creating a space for the following vessels to drop anchor. See John Montrésor, *Collections of the New York Historical Society for the Year 1881, The Montrésor Journals*, ed. and annot. G. D. Scull (New York: Printed by the Society, 1882), 442.

11. Thomas Sullivan, "Before and After the Battle of Brandywine, Extracts from the Journal of Sergeant Thomas Sullivan of the H. M. Forty-Ninth Regiment of Foot," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 31 (1907): 409, <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000677665>; Montrésor, *Montrésor Journals*, 443, 445; André, *Major André's Journal*, 37; Ewald, *Diary of the American War*, 75; Baurmeister, *Revolution in America*, 99; William Brooke Rawle, "Plundering by the British Army during the American Revolution," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 25 (1901): 114, <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000677665>; British Depredations, 1777–1782, Chester County Archives, West Chester, PA, 75.
12. André, *Major André's Journal*, 37–9; Serle, *American Journal*, 245–46, 248–49; Baurmeister, *Revolution in America*, 395; Rawle, "Plundering by the British Army," 114–15; Muenchhausen, *At General Howe's Side*, 26.
13. September 10, 1777, and September 20, 1777, in the Daniel Morgan Orderly Book, *The Historical Society of Pennsylvania*, Philadelphia (hereafter cited as HSP); McGuire, *Surprise and Germantown*, 13.
14. Hamilton Papers, 321; Greene Papers, 149; Taaffe, *Philadelphia Campaign*, 61, 63.
15. John B. B. Trussell Jr., *The Pennsylvania Line: Regimental Organization and Operations, 1776–1783* (Harrisburg: PHMC, 1997), 259; Sullivan, "Before and After the Battle of Brandywine," 410; André, *Major André's Journal*, 42–43; Montrésor, *Montrésor Journals*, 446.
16. Hannah Benner Roach, "The Pennsylvania Militia in 1777," *Pennsylvania Genealogical Magazine* 23 (1964): 189; Feilitzsch, *Diaries of Two Ansbach Jaegers*, 17; André, *Major André's Journal*, 45; Montrésor, *Montrésor Journals*, 449.
17. Joseph Plumb Martin, *A Narrative of a Revolutionary Soldier: Some of the Adventures, Dangers and Sufferings of Joseph Plumb Martin* (New York: Signet, 2010), 59; so strong was the association between the Continental Army and disease that men of military age shied away from joining the force because of the high risk of illness. See Fenn, *Pox Americana*, 86, 99. James McMichael, "Diary of Lieut. James McMichael, of the Pennsylvania Line, 1776–1778," in *Journals and Diaries of the War of the Revolution with Lists of Officers and Soldiers, 1775–1783*, ed. William Henry Egle (Harrisburg, PA, 1893), https://archive.org/details/cihm_09819, 208; John Adams to Abigail Adams, August 13, 1777, *Adams Family Papers: An Electronic Archive*, Massachusetts Historical Society, <http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/>; Montrésor, *Montrésor Journals*, 444; Townsend, *Some Account of the British Army*, 20–21.
18. For several days, the Americans anticipated an attack, knowing full well that the British were growing desperate in their search for supplies. See Robert Kirkwood, *The Journal and Order of Book of Captain Robert Kirkwood of the Delaware Regiment of the Continental Line*, ed. Joseph Brown Turner, reprint (Wilmington: The Historical Society of Delaware 1910), <https://archive.org/details/journalorderboookirk,165>; Townsend, *Some Account of the British Army*, 18, 7–8.

19. Ewald, *Diary of the American War*, 83; Baurmeister, *Revolution in America*, 107; Sullivan, "Before and After the Battle of Brandywine," 414–15; Montrésor, *Montrésor Journals*, 449; Townsend, *Some Account of the British Army*, 8.
20. Frazer, *General Persifor Frazer*, 154–55; Ewald, *Diary of the American War*, 84; Michael C. Harris, *Brandywine: A Military History of the Battle that Lost Philadelphia but Saved America, September 11, 1777* (El Dorado Hills, CA, Savas Beattie, 2014), 392–93.
21. Muenchhausen, *At General Howe's Side*, 31; Thomas J. McGuire, "An Amazingly Strong Country . . .": *Contemporary Images of the Battle of Brandywine and the British Camp at Treddyfrin*, VF Battle of Brandywine, David Library; Townsend, *Some Account of the British Army*, 21. In the first volume of *The Philadelphia Campaign*, historian Thomas McGuire gives a detailed description of how the "heat of battle" affected the Revolution's soldiers. The smoke generated by thousands of muskets, combined with other factors, created a "maddening thirst" that "was a constant companion of the combat soldier." See McGuire, *Brandywine and the Fall of Philadelphia*, 264–65.
22. Muenchhausen, *At General Howe's Side*, 32; Sullivan, "Before and After the Battle of Brandywine," 416; for other testimonies, see André, *Major André's Journal*, 46–47, Ewald, *Diary of the American War*, 87 and Baurmeister, *Revolution in America*, 110.
23. Richard Henry Lee to Mann Page, *Letters of the Delegates of Congress, 1774–1789*, ed. Paul H. Smith et al. (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1981), Library of Congress American Memory edition, 667, and Henry Laurens to John Rutledge, *Letters of the Delegates of Congress, 1774–1789*, 675 (hereafter cited as *LDC*); Kirkwood, *Journal and Order of Book of Captain Robert Kirkwood*, 1743–75; Washington to the President of Congress, September 23, 1777, *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources*, vol. 9, ed. John C. Fitzpatrick (Washington, DC, 1933), 258 (hereafter cited as *WGW*); Henry Melchior Muhlenberg, *The Journals of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg in Three Volumes*, trans. Theodore G. Tappert and John W. Doberstein, vol. 3 (Philadelphia: The Evangelical Lutheran Ministerium of Pennsylvania and Muhlenberg Press, 1958), <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/001593848>, 75.
24. David G. Martin, *The Philadelphia Campaign: June 1777–July 1778* (Conshohocken, PA: Combined Books, 1993), 81–82; Roach, "The Pennsylvania Militia in 1777," 191; Jacob Nagle, *The Nagle Journal: A Diary of the Life of Jacob Nagle Sailor, from the year 1775 to 1841*, ed. John C. Dann (New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988), 10; John Marshall, *The Life of George Washington Commander in Chief of the American Forces, during the War which established the Independence of his Country, and First President of the United States*, vol. 3 (Philadelphia, 1804), <https://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/008644275>, 157–58.
25. McGuire, *Brandywine and the Fall of Philadelphia*, 290–91; Baurmeister, *Revolution in America*, 114.

26. *Battle of the Clouds Technical Report* (Chester County, PA, and Washington DC, 2013), 25; McMichael, "Diary of Lieut. James McMichael," 211; Nagle, *Nagle Journal*, 10–11; Montrésor, *Montrésor Journals*, 453; Muhlenberg, *Journals of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg*, 75; Muenchhausen, *At General Howe's Side*, 33.
27. On October 13, having learned from the experience at the Battle of the Clouds, Washington wrote Congress requesting modifications to newly manufactured cartridge boxes, and demanded that each cartridge box use carefully chosen leather and contain an additional "small inner flap for the greater security of the cartridges against rain and moist weather." See Washington to the President of Congress, September 23, 1777, *WGW*, 258, 262, 266; Taaffe, *Philadelphia Campaign*, 83; "Col. Timothy Pickering's Account of the Battles of Brandywine and Germantown," *Historical Magazine* 7, no. 7 (July 1863): 219; Nagle, *Nagle Journal*, 10–11; Henry Knox to Lucy Knox, September 23, 1777, in Henry Knox and Noah Brooks, *Henry Knox: A Soldier of the Revolution, Major-General in the Continental Army, Washington's Chief of Artillery, First Secretary of War under the Constitution, Founder of the Society of Cincinnati 1750–1806* (New York: G. P. Putnam, 1900), 105; Hamilton Papers, 331. There is also good reason to believe that Washington moved his army further west to protect Reading and Lancaster as opposed to Philadelphia. Should these two significant cities fall to the British, Washington would lose the breadbasket of the army (Lancaster) and one of the army's principal munitions producers (Reading). Stephen Taaffe argues that Washington understood that even if the United States lost its capital the war would continue. But if they lost Reading and Lancaster, the army would lose major supply centers. See Taaffe, *Philadelphia Campaign*, 88.
28. Andre, *Major André's Journal*, 43; Hamilton Papers, 321–22, 330; Hsiung, "Food, Fuel and the New England Environment," 621.
29. Taaffe, *Philadelphia Campaign*, 81; Knox and Brooks, *Henry Knox*, 105; Muhlenberg, *Journals of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg*, 77–78; Muenchhausen, *At General Howe's Side*, 32; Richard Henry Lee to Mann Page, *LDC*, 5; Montrésor, *Montrésor Journals*, 457; Elbridge Gerry to James Warren, October 6, 1777, *A Study in Dissent: The Warren-Gerry Correspondence: 1776–1792*, ed. Harvey Gardiner (Carbondale: University of Southern Illinois Press, 1968), 86; Roach, "The Pennsylvania Militia in 1777," 191; With the Continental army bottled up on the north bank of the Schuylkill, American soldiers took what they needed from local civilians. Henry Muhlenberg, located near the Continentals, wrote, "In our neighborhood, around Providence . . . the farms are being drained of wood, hay, and crops and they are being ruined. Under the disturbed circumstances I can neither read nor write." See Muhlenberg, *Journals of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg*, 81.
30. Martin, *The Philadelphia Campaign*, 81–82; "Col. Timothy Pickering's Account," 219; Frazer, *General Persifor Frazer*, 160, 401.

31. Taaffe, *Philadelphia Campaign*, 88; Montrésor, *Montrésor Journals*, 458; McMichael, "Diary of Lieut. James McMichael," 207–8; Feilitzsch, *Diary of Two Ansbach Jaegers*, 20.
32. John André believed Washington's attack was intended before daybreak, and wrote, "The Rebels were each equipped with a piece of white paper in his hat, which made us imagine they meant a surprise by night," André, *Major André's Journal*, 57; McGuire, *Surprise at Germantown*, 34; McMichael, "Diary of Lieut. James McMichael," 213; Ewald, *Diary of the American War*, 93. In addition to the four columns, Washington also directed about 500 militia to create a diversion in Philadelphia, by severing the Schuylkill's Middle Ferry rope at High Street (present-day Market Street). This was more than a diversion. It was also an action to control British access to the river. See Roach, "The Pennsylvania Militia in 1777," 201, and a discussion of the action in the *Pennsylvania Evening Post*, October 11, 1777, in *America's Historical Newspapers*, 491.
33. Martin, *Narrative of a Revolutionary Soldier*, 63; McMichael, "Diary of Lieut. James McMichael," 213; McGuire, *Surprise at Germantown*, 49; Ewald, *Diary of the American War*, 93, 96; Baurmeister, *Revolution in America*, 416–17.
34. Thomas J. McGuire, *Germantown and the Roads to Valley Forge*, vol. 2 of *The Philadelphia Campaign* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2007), 82; Ewald, *Diary of the American War*, 96; Baurmeister, *Revolution in America*, 416–17.
35. Montrésor, *Montrésor Journals*, 461; Muenchhausen, *At General Howe's Side*, 38; Anthony Wayne to Polly Wayne, October 6, 1777, 31, Wayne Papers, vol. 4 (September 1777–March 1778), HSP; Martin, *Narrative of a Revolutionary Soldier*, 63; Marshall, *The Life of George Washington*, 179–80; Knox and Brooks, *Henry Knox*, 110.
36. Baurmeister, *Revolution in America*, 119; Knox to Ward, October 7, 1777, 110; Washington to John Augustine Washington, October 18, 1777, and Washington to Thomas McKean, October 10, 1777, *WGW*, 346–47, 397–98; *George Ewing: A Soldier of Valley Forge* (Yonkers, NY, privately printed, 1928), <http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/000364750>, 13; James Duane to George Clinton, *LDC*, 75. It should also be noted, that in blaming the environmental factors for his army's defeat, the general might have been trying to shift some of the blame from himself. In hindsight, attacking the Chew House was a costly mistake, a mistake Washington wholeheartedly agreed to. In a sense, Washington might have been trying to shift the blame in order to make up for his blunder at Cliveden. Washington, *WGW*, 316, 318, 327, 330–31, 346–47, 355, 374, 397–98, 452.
37. Muenchhausen, *At General Howe's Side*, 39; Ewald, *Diary of the American War*, 93; Knox and Brooks, *Henry Knox*, 110; "Col. Timothy Pickering's Account," 9; Rawle, "Plundering by the British Army," 114.
38. Greene Papers, 171.

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39. André, *Major André's Journal*, 43; Baurmeister, *Revolution in America*, 110; Washington, *GW*, 316–18, 327, 330–31, 346–47, 397–98, 452.
40. Barbara Pollarine, *Great & Capital Changes: An Account of the Valley Forge Encampment* (Gettysburg, PA: Thomas Publications, 1993), 6–15, 19; Wayne Bodle, *The Valley Forge Winter: Civilians and Soldiers in War* (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002), 65–71.

“OUR GOD, AND OUR GUNS”

RELIGION AND POLITICS ON THE REVOLUTIONARY FRONTIER

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ABSTRACT: This article explores religion and politics on Pennsylvania’s revolutionary frontier through two key events, the Paxton Riots and the Whiskey Rebellion. The author argues religion shaped frontiersmen’s understanding of the proper role of government and provided justification for resistance and extralegal action. Moreover, the understanding of government promoted by religious leaders and frontier peoples presented an image of civil society and government at odds with the scholarly literature that often presents frontiersmen as antigovernment “proto-Lockeans,” prizing personal independence and individual rights. The words and actions of ministers, the Paxton Boys, and Whiskey Rebels adhered to a man in society, public welfare vision of government that set a high standard for the role of government in society and provided justification to both regulate and resist government when it failed to meet that standard. These events also demonstrate the continuity of a frontier political logic shaping events in the pre- and post-independence eras.

KEYWORDS: Religion and politics, Revolutionary era, Paxton Boys, Whiskey Rebellion, public welfare, Lazarus Stewart, Reverend John Elder, Herman Husband

Lying in his tavern bed in Westmoreland County, William Graham, a frightened excise collector, woke up in a start as a shadowy and masked figure claiming to be Beelzebub beckoned him to come forward to meet a “legion of devils.” That night, Graham suffered all the mischief frontiersmen could muster as a group of angry citizens made him stomp on his “Commission and all papers relating to his office” while he “imprecated curses on himself.” If that did not humiliate Graham enough, they broke his new pistols, “cut off one-half of his hair, queued the other side,” and “cut the cock off his hat . . . so as to render his queue most conspicuous.”¹ Using similar biblical and violent imagery, a crude 1792 anti-excise political cartoon depicts an exciseman

As Whiskey Rebels proclaimed in 1794, they acted as “glorious instruments in the hands of Providence.”⁷

Such a religious connection should not be all that surprising. As historian Carl Bridenbaugh wrote in 1962, “no understanding of the eighteenth century is possible” without “the religious theme.” He argued it was “part of their daily existence.”⁸ While historians since Bridenbaugh have reconstructed much of the religious landscape of early America, many climactic events have been plucked from their religious milieus and presented as entirely secular. Even the quintessential book on the Whiskey Rebellion, *The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution* by Thomas Slaughter (who deemed it “the most important incident of the nation’s first quarter-century under the Constitution”), hardly mentions religion. Slaughter manages some passing references to the “irreligiosity, immorality, and dirtiness” of frontier peoples, characteristics often ascribed them by biased outsiders and taken at almost face value by some historians.⁹ Similarly, literature on the Paxton Boys has focused on the secular and illegal nature of the uprising.¹⁰ Yet, religion was central to the everyday lives of people in early America. Due to the work of historian Marjoleine Kars, we now know that religion served as the glue of frontier communities. It informed frontier political philosophies and made it possible for people to “break loose together” during the Regulator rebellion in North Carolina.¹¹ Similarly, Brendan McConville’s work on early New Jersey demonstrates the primacy of religion in that colony’s land riots.¹² That comparable rebellions in Pennsylvania, deriving from similar circumstances and communities, were devoid of religious influence now seems rather spurious.

Part of the problem lies in the sources themselves. As is well known, not many ordinary people mobilizing in these uprisings left behind personal accounts. Much of our understanding of these events comes from some of the rebel leaders, government officials, and spectators. In order to get at the place of religion in these uprisings, then, it is necessary to reconstruct the religious context of participants’ everyday lives and unearth the thoughts and ideas of the religious leaders to which they looked for guidance.¹³ Of all the preachers who served important roles in the rebellions, of which there were many, John Elder and Herman Husband stand out.¹⁴ Both men were prominent local leaders, knew and guided the people who mobilized, and provided key ideas that shaped those resistance efforts.¹⁵

Such a focus does not merely demonstrate that religion was important, but also revises our understanding of frontier political ideology, an ideology that

held strong from the colonial period through to the era of the early republic. For a long time, scholars have viewed the frontier as fostering a peculiar vision of government and governance. After all, settlers made their way to the frontier to stake claim to land in an area that was largely unencumbered by a government that could intrude on their lives. In the process, it is commonly maintained, settlers developed a taste of their own self-possessed individualism and personal independence, and they worked hard to protect that status. Popular uprisings have been viewed as extensions of that quest, pitting, as Thomas Slaughter put it, “friends of liberty” against “friends of order,” which really boils down to Lockean liberalism versus law and government. The intersection of religion and politics, however, reveals a people who embraced a religious creed that promoted the benefits of government, particularly one that upheld, sometimes intrusively and rigorously, the public welfare.¹⁶

It is only with such reorientation that we can understand the pro-government slogans that fell from the lips and shot from the pens of the Paxton Boys, Whiskey Rebels, and their supporters, such as “LIBERTY and LAW,” the “Good Order of Government,” and “Liberty and Government.”¹⁷ They fervently believed that liberty necessarily depended on law and government, and that God ordained this goodly connection; central points often emphasized by their ministers. Those leaders declared from the pulpit, in the press, and on the roads, that law and government crucially upheld the public welfare and the needs of the community against the self-interest of the few. *Salus populi suprema lex est* (the welfare of the people shall be the supreme law) signified a message and a way of governance that relegated the individual subservient to the community. Frontier people and their ministers wholeheartedly believed a government predicated on such values guaranteed their collective liberty and legitimized government in the eyes of God.¹⁸ If government did not live up to those basic expectations, though, they had a duty to their neighbors and their God to take matters into their own hands, violently if necessary. Therefore, they did not just resist government; rather they sought to regulate it, bringing it in line with their own conception of its proper role and function—ideas taught and reinforced by powerful religious leaders, providing ideological consistency and religious legitimacy.

In December of 1763 the Paxton Boys, on two occasions in and near Lancaster, brutally massacred a group of peaceful Indians. The following spring, at the height of their fury, they marched on the colonial government in Philadelphia to demand it recognize their right to “liberty” and their own

understanding of good government. In the weeks and months after those fateful events, members and supporters of the Paxton Boys flooded the colony with political pamphlets and petitions elucidating for the first time a common set of frontier grievances and, for historians, a reference point for the political philosophy of many western Pennsylvania settlers.

These numerous pamphlets and petitions derided the failure, weakness, and unresponsiveness of the colonial government. A compelling thread of many of these was the salient notion that government should work for and represent the whole people, not a particular “set or class” of men. Self-interest, petitioners exclaimed, destroyed government. With that vision of government in mind, petitioners demanded equal representation of frontier counties in the legislature, a restructuring of the county and supreme courts, new policies and officers to regulate the local economy, and initiatives to defend the frontier. These reforms, petitioners cried, would finally make the government work for more than just “a Part of the Inhabitants.” As over 1,200 petitioners from Cumberland County put it, the structure of government, both provincially in the legislature and locally in law, favored the few and left the many to suffer, which “inconsistency” inflamed “the Minds of his Majesty’s other good Subjects,” increased “public Disturbances,” and threw “the province into the most violent Convulsions.”¹⁹

For many people on the frontier, the Paxton Boys, while brutal and violent, represented the will of “the people” in their attempt to promote a public welfare vision of liberty, law, and government. According to an Anglican minister from Lancaster, Thomas Barton, the Paxton Boys’ actions regulated a government that did not adhere to its proper role and purpose. “*Salus Populi suprema Lex esto*,” the minister wrote, “is a Sentence that deserves to be written in Letters of Gold—It is a Sentence that should be the MOTTO of every Government, where LIBERTY and FREEDOM have any Existence.” Yet, he argued, Pennsylvania’s government failed to live up to that vaunted ideal. Over the course of the 1750s and early 1760s, Barton admonished, the government proved incapable of protecting the inhabitants on the frontier, and that inability stemmed from the economic self-interest of eastern oligarchs who wanted to protect “their *darling Power*.” The needs and security of the public, the central object of “good government,” could not move men and measures. Instead, those in power treated the people “like *Asses*” who did not have the “*Privilege or Authority* to complain of their Sufferings or remonstrate their Grievances.” Only by responding to and upholding the public interest, as the author believed the Paxton Boys did, could Pennsylvanians finally “feel the happy Effects resulting from LIBERTY and LAW,” central elements of the “good Order of Government.”²⁰

Like Barton’s observation, the Paxton Boys viewed their violent actions as a necessary means to promote the welfare of the community. According to Lazarus Stewart, “what I have done was done for the security of hundreds of settlers on the frontier.”²¹ Westerners, he argued, had “waited long enough on government” and fervently believed they had been left to themselves, abandoned by a government corrupted by special interest and insensitive to the needs of the whole. As explained in their petitions, settlers had been “neglected by the Public.” They wanted a government to adhere to first principles and provide for the security and protection of the people, not a part or a regional section of them. The failure of the government to live up to that ideal made the Paxton Boys “mad with rage” and pushed them “to do what nothing but the most violent necessity can Vindicate.” The Paxton Boys, then, did not see their extralegal action as unlawful, but viewed it as a means to correct a government that proved incapable to defend the “Life, Liberty, and Security” of the community.²²

Religion crucially informed frontier settlers’ understanding of law, liberty, and government. Focusing on the motivations of the Paxton Boys, while it displays the importance of race and a deeply ingrained racism, also demonstrates the intersection of religion and political theory.²³ The Presbyterian religion shaped many of the members of the Paxton Boys’ understanding of civil society and guided their decision to partake in extralegal action. Ministers exhorted, on numerous occasions, that the government should provide for the security and protection of the community and that individuals, as part of that community, had a duty to their neighbors to intercede if government failed to meet that expectation; they rebelled against God if they did not act for the common good. After mid-century, the stark contrast between the ideal civil society and the reality of governance in the province infuriated many and provoked quite a few. This juxtaposition motivated the Paxton Boys just as much as their developing hatred of Indians. While racism fueled their bloodlust and inhibited them from viewing Indians as anything but “lawless savages,” the inability of the government to, in their mind, protect the public welfare, drove them to extralegal action.²⁴

People living in and around Paxton Township in Lancaster County (now in Dauphin County) were a religious lot. A majority of the inhabitants were recent immigrants. They were largely Scots by ethnicity, Irish by birth, and devoted to the Presbyterian Church. The religiosity of inhabitants near Paxton was well known. One traveler noted that a crowd of Paxtonians asked him, “Do you believe in scripture? If you do not, we have nothing to say

to you.”²⁵ These “children of Promise,” unlike many other inhabitants of Pennsylvania, had a regular pastor, John Elder, who served them from 1738 until his death in 1792, and was an important leader in Paxton. He kept his congregation and surrounding ones from breaking apart during the Great Awakening; a shocking outcome considering that he fervently supported the “old side” against religious enthusiasm, which must have rankled some.²⁶ More to the point, Elder was, as one local man noted, “so respected by every Body” that his community gave him command of the “Paxtang Rangers” who defended the back settlements from Indian raids during the Seven Years’ War and later no doubt comprised the bulk of the group now known as the Paxton Boys.²⁷

Elder’s Paxton Church, as all frontier Presbyterian churches, served as a gathering place for people as well as a focal point in the founding of Scots-Irish communities. In that one-story stone building, families prayed together, planned together, and sometimes church officials reprimanded them together. During the terrifying days of the Seven Years’ War in North America, local Presbyterians used the church as a sanctuary and deemed church attendance so important that they brought their guns with them rather than miss “the public services of the Sabbath.” Even Elder, the “fighting parson,” kept his rifle beside him at the pulpit as he occasionally preached a martial sermon on fighting “manfully under the Banner of ye Captain of our Salvation having put on ye whole Armour of God.”²⁸

Upon landing in America, Ulster Presbyterians often migrated westward and immediately set about building their churches. According to historian Patrick Griffin, as settlers constructed rough-hewn cabins in the areas in and around Paxton, they also erected temporary meetinghouses for religious gatherings. Recent immigrants believed religion, particularly the church, counteracted the “Hardships and difficulties” of “this American world.”²⁹ For many on the frontier, the church provided the essential service of ordering the life of the community. Ministers, church elders, and parishioners sat in “sessions” to uphold the moral, spiritual, and sometimes worldly laws of the community. The authority of the church in religious and sometimes secular matters was paramount for the Presbyterian inhabitants under its care.³⁰

The church’s concentration on order, stability, community, and its efforts to police congregants led ministers to convey a message to their parishioners that often conflated civil, philosophical, theological, and ecclesiastical doctrines into a workable image of society and government. Presbyterian churches exposed parishioners to a doctrine rooted in a confessional tradition

emphasizing community solidarity. Even in its ecclesiastical organization and worship, the church placed its community of believers, the “visible church,” above the individual. It maintained both the moral and spiritual integrity of the congregation through worship and church governance.³¹ Because of the church’s goal to provide for order and good government, followers and ministerial cohorts encouraged ministers to mix the civil with the spiritual in sermons. According to an ordination sermon by Charles Beatty in 1752, ministers should sermonize on “the Law as well as the Gospel” yet not so far “that Persons should seek Salvation by the Law.”³² As New Light Presbyterian minister Gilbert Tennant explained, law was a “so valuable and excellent Rule of Life” that ministers needed to make it part of religious teaching. “Law,” he argued, is “established by Faith.”³³

With the importance of law in mind, clergy modeled for their parishioners a powerful vision of government. While ministers consistently preached and upheld the authority of God’s Law, the guiding moral and spiritual principles that ordered the lives of congregants, many ministers went beyond strictly religious prescriptions and focused on the meaning and importance of civil society. By examining that, ministers also expounded on the state of nature, natural law, and its relationship to God. Such subjects, while seemingly outside the confines of religious importance, served a central purpose of reaffirming the centrality of community, law and government, and order and stability, crucial elements of Presbyterianism.

Ministers pushed the theme of community and law to extremes in North America and Pennsylvania in particular due to instability and lack of significant social organization. Geographic mobility, settlement patterns, and religious heterogeneity proved the need, at least from a clerical perspective, for community and order. After mid-century, apparent challenges to community, church, and, to some extent, the patriarchal family pushed many ministers to reaffirm the relationship of individuals to the wider community.³⁴ “Every man,” ministers argued, “is bound by the law of nature, not only to preserve his own life, liberty and property; but also that of others.” The reason for this reciprocal obligation of individuals in society, according to clergyman John Goodlet, was simple: “there is a natural relation between all mankind constituted by our glorious Creator, an universal brotherhood or fraternity.” Therefore, he argued, “every one by the law of nature is every one’s neighbor, and every one’s brother, and consequently ought to be his *helper* and *keeper*; that is, he ought to use all lawful means to preserve his life, property and freedom, as well as his own.”³⁵ In essence, ministers promoted

a relational theory of individual rights that were relative to the mutual obligations inherent in the social being of man.

Such a view of the community obligations intrinsic to the state of nature powerfully informed churchgoers' vision of civil society. As Goodlet expounded to his audience, since man in the state of nature "has a two-fold moral right," that of preserving himself and his neighbor, he therefore claimed a "power to repress the crimes committed against the law of nature."

Every man, [then,] by the right he hath to preserve mankind in general, may *restrain*, or, where it is necessary, *destroy* things noxious to them and so may bring such evil on any one who hath transgressed that law, as may deter him and others from doing the like mischief.

This great community responsibility of the state of nature, however, resulted in constant chaos and confusion with little "outward peace, order and safety." Thus, the minister told his listeners and readers, man formed civil society "to establish and settle a known law" to save the community from "disorder and ruin."³⁶

Gilbert Tennant argued similarly that neighbors possessed mutual duties to preserve the welfare of the community. "Man was made a sociable creature, to promote not only his own but the *public Good*." Anyone failing to live up to this standard by placing individual interests above the needs of the community was guilty of "*Self-love* which is criminal and vicious." Government, then, confirmed and upheld a basic understanding of natural law. The duty of the civil magistrate, Tennent explained, maintained natural law by punishing "Criminals in his own Community." The magistrate, ideally, embodied and protected the interest of the community from both internal threats and "from a foreign Enemy!"³⁷ In a "political society," another Presbyterian minister lectured, "*every one* even an *Infant* has the whole Force of the Community to protect him."³⁸

As minister of Paxton Presbyterian Church, John Elder regularly exposed his parishioners to similar theological and political doctrines as those highlighted above. In his sermons he often expatiated on the centrality of moral laws to the good order of the community and encouraged his parishioners to think of themselves as part of a society of believers with mutual needs and interests. "The way of man," Elder argued, "is not in himself." During church service, he led congregants in prayers to God to "Bless all Ranks & Orders of Men in this Part of thy World. May they all do ye Duties of their

several stations so as to promote thy glory & ye Publick Good.” Like other ministers, Elder regularly preached on the origins of civil society, tracing its development through a combination of biblical examples and natural law precepts. He told his listeners that the public good through the maintenance of the public peace constituted the ultimate purpose of government. As Elder noted in a sermon, the people should pray that their leaders and government officials served as a “Terror to evil Doers & an Encouragement & Protection to all those who do well.”³⁹

Such messages, while sanctioning the importance of the rule of law through the force of government, also promoted an underlining rebelliousness. Government required obedience, but that submission had limits. In the ideal, government protected and promoted liberty by upholding the obligations individuals owed to the community rooted in natural law. Yet, as Elder remarked to his parishioners, “Liberty does not consist in an Absolute Indifference.”⁴⁰ All people had to assure liberty’s existence by any means necessary, which sometimes meant challenging lawful authority. According to some Presbyterian ministers, during certain times and circumstances popular action proved acceptable and justified. “When man joins himself in civil society with others,” one argued, “he, as well as every one with him, gives up his rights which he has naturally, to be regulated by the laws made by the society, and to which he consents; at least so far as his own safety, and that of the *rest of society*, shall require.”⁴¹ Obedience, they cautioned, had limits.

If government failed to live up to expectations, the people had a right to act in the interest of the public good. According to Tennant, if the government did not punish criminals and protect inhabitants from a foreign enemy, it becomes “an empty Name, a meer *Cypher*, of no Moment and Consequence to Society” and therefore could not expect “Obedience” from its subjects.⁴² Another minister, “Sounding the Trumpet of Liberty and Truth,” argued people owed “*Caesar* the Things that are *Caesar’s*” only so long as Caesar upheld the “Agreement made when we threw off the State of Nature” for common protection. Therefore, “when I am not protected,” the minister exclaimed, the government could not expect submission, and this, for him, was “the Truth of Christ.”⁴³ All people, Joseph Montgomery, a minister born in Paxton Township, surmised, should “make use of such means as God and Nature hath put in our hands” for their common protection and safety.⁴⁴ If the people did not use the “means in our power” when the government failed to “observe its original design,” the Reverend John Carmichael argued, they “then tempt God, and rebel against his government.”⁴⁵ As told

by Presbyterian ministers, then, God sanctioned the forceful regulation of a wayward government.

Political theories expressed by Presbyterian ministers provided a particular vision of government predicated on the public welfare that also outlined the limits of political obedience. They exhorted a political creed upholding compliance and respect to government when it maintained its responsibilities of security, safety, law and order, but countenanced extralegal action that supplanted lawful authority when government failed in its duties. When the Paxton Boys justified their actions by referencing the economic “self-interest” of Pennsylvania’s politicians, unequal political representation favoring an elite eastern oligarchy, inept and corrupt courts and judges, as well as the failure of the government to arrest Native American “murderers” and provide protection during war, they drew on a shared language and vision of government taught by their ministers. God, they thought, approved their reasons and goals for resistance and extralegal action. Therefore, they only needed to look, as Stewart bluntly stated, “to our God, and our guns.”⁴⁶

This important religious connection was not lost on contemporaries. During the flood of pamphlets following the Paxton riots, both those writing for and against the Paxtonians focused on the religious dimensions of the uprising, often associating a “Presbyterian zeal” with the event.⁴⁷ For the opponents of the Paxton Boys, the “Piss-Brute-tarians,” those self-proclaimed religious men who thought they were fighting “the Lords Battles,” were false Christians. After all, was not Jesus Christ “the Prince of Peace”?⁴⁸ While historians have often characterized the backlash against Presbyterians for guiding the uprising as hyperbolic political rhetoric, many more Pennsylvanians highlighted the religious underpinnings of the event to justify the actions of the Paxton Boys.⁴⁹ In one pro-Paxton poem, significantly titled, “The Cloven-Foot Discovered,” the author painted the Paxton Boys as true Christians who were indeed engaged in “the Lords Battles” against the agents of the devil. Those agents were both enemy Native Americans and the colonial government. Therefore, the entire movement was cast as receiving the blessing of “kind Heav’n.”⁵⁰

The Paxton riots and the popular political debate it inspired had vast implications for the revolutionary period in Pennsylvania. They simultaneously demonstrated the strength of Presbyterians and their political exclusion. Immediately following the event, over twenty-five prominent ministers sent a circular letter to the colony’s vast congregations, expressing that though Presbyterians were “so numerous in the Province,” they were

"considered as Nobody . . . so that any Incroachments upon our essential and Charter Privileges may be made by evil-minded Persons, who think they have little to fear from any Opposition that can be made to their Measures by us." In response, Presbyterians founded a committee of correspondence that included both ministers and the laity, uniting the disparate congregations throughout the province to advance the "Welfare of Society and the general Good of the Community to which we belong."⁵¹ Such mobilization and the challenge to the traditional ruling powers that it signified marked a crucial transformation in the politics of the colony. By 1776 men in power feared this "dangerous combination of men, whose principles of religion and polity" were "equally averse to those of the established Church and Government" of Great Britain.⁵² It was no coincidence that during the debate over American independence, conservatives railed against the "Presbyterian Republicans," and middle colony delegates to the Continental Congress feared creating "an American Republic" because they thought it would be founded on "Presbyterian Principles."⁵³

Those principles, whether lauded or hated, had a longevity on the frontier sweeping beyond the Presbyterian religion. During the early republic, the religious revivals historians term the Second Great Awakening elucidated those same political ideals from the pens and mouths of powerful evangelical ministers who could and did inspire many on the frontier to take action.⁵⁴ The Whiskey Rebellion is a prime example. Frontier people then, like before, envisioned government as the protector of the public welfare and justified extralegal action as sanctioned by God. When they resisted Federalist policies in the 1790s, particularly a tax on whiskey, they, like the Paxton Boys before them, proclaimed their devotion to God and their struggle as upholding "Liberty and Government." In other words, they resisted to preserve government. Theirs was a struggle, as it had been during the American Revolution, to create and in this instance maintain what many called "the good order of government."⁵⁵ Therefore, it was not the tax on whiskey that inspired their rebellion, but what it symbolized for the future.

For many in western Pennsylvania, the tax on whiskey represented a vision of government proffered by the ruling Federalists challenging, to the very core, the proper role of government and the one they believed the revolution promised. Alexander Hamilton's tax, and federal intervention in the western economy more generally, instituted a favoritism, enshrined in positive law, that benefited a few wealthy elites to the detriment of the larger community. Hamiltonian government eschewed the public welfare, which frontier

petitioners thought “ought to be the true object of a republican government,” for private enterprise, which signified graft and corruption. For many westerners, “the middle and low class” should have “an equal privilege with those of the rich,” and it was the job of government, through regulatory policy, to maintain that equitable balance.⁵⁶

During the Whiskey Rebellion, frontier dwellers affirmed in a myriad of ways the importance of the “public welfare” to their own understanding of society and government. Their petitions drew on that salient principle and even their resistance efforts through ritualistic violence toward excisemen and compliant distillers reinforced the idea of the common good and the elevation of the community over the individual. For example, the Whiskey Rebels set up extralegal courts, adjudicated the guilt or innocence of offenders, demanded the resignation of officers, and sentenced those convicted to tar and feathering. Often, however, the extralegal court would commute the sentence to public humiliation and banishment. Both punishments, by casting off such offenders, reinforced the importance and strength of the community and its collective welfare against what many viewed as the self-interest of individuals. In a similar vein, when it seemed that many prominent inhabitants in Pittsburgh favored the excise and would not muster for “the Common Cause,” rebels berated them for failing to uphold “those duties that as men and fellow citizens we owe to each other,” declared the town “Sodom,” and threatened to march there and “destroy it by fire.”⁵⁷

Analogous to the Paxton affair, religion and politics fundamentally intertwined on the western edges of Pennsylvania to reinforce the importance of the public welfare and justify resistance, violent if necessary. Yet, the Whiskey Insurrection was in many ways different, as it took place during a period of millennial revivalism that crucially imbued modern political events with religious and prophetic significance—a connection Nathan O. Hatch argues originated in the Revolutionary era and aptly termed “civil millennialism.”⁵⁸ With that new understanding of the millennial in mind, many Whiskey Rebels felt they fought on the side of Christ against the forces of tyranny. Moreover, modern political events in Europe, particularly the French Revolution, demonstrated the global dimensions of this millennial mission. Although we often think of the Whiskey Rebellion as a secular event, the Federalist administration of the time found it little surprising that those men most active in the cause of resistance were local ministers and self-professed prophets.⁵⁹ Because the religious connection was so potent, prominent government officials tried to combat the “true religion” of the movement,

demanding rebels to consider whether their “insurrection” was the “work of God or of the Devil.”⁶⁰

The religious element of the uprising was the product of a rise in religious fervor during the early national period. Ministers, itinerant preachers, and bizarre prophets paraded the new United States whipping up the populace by combining religious messages about the coming reign of Christ with modern political events at home and abroad. Baptist ministers, such as David Philips and John Corbly, preached “vigorous and warlike sermons that heartened frontiersmen who came for many miles around.”⁶¹ Those same ministers proved the “most violent for resistance” during the rebellion. At the rather militant Parkinson’s Ferry (now Monongahela City) meeting in August 1794 to discuss whether or not westerners should peaceably submit to the laws of the country, Corbly forcefully favored resistance and denounced any thought of peaceful “petitions or remonstrances.” The federal government eventually arrested Corbly for his violent countenance the following November.⁶²

Baptist preacher Morgan John Rhee similarly converted many frontiersmen with his evangelical message of God’s intention to spread “the perfect law of liberty” through the whole earth and that the “*fire of freedom*” would reign supreme regardless of Federalist intentions. “*Citizens of America!*” he railed to an enraptured audience of frontier dwellers in Greenville, Alleghany County, an area that held out against the federal government’s peace offerings during the Whiskey Rebellion, “Guard with jealousy the temple of liberty. Protect her altar from being polluted with the offerings of force or fraud.” If they did not, he warned, frontiersmen would suffer like the people of Meroz whom God cursed for not helping the Lord in time of battle.⁶³ It is no surprise, then, that at a time of political turmoil in the United States, where ministers whipped up the general populace reeling from disenchantment, that church membership grew rapidly. According to historian Dorothy E. Fennell, the western sections of Pennsylvania, the same areas that rose up to protest Federalist policy, experienced a religious revival in the early 1790s.⁶⁴

Perhaps the most conspicuous of all frontier preachers during the late 1780s and early 1790s was the self-professed “Alleghany Philosopher” and biblical prophet, Herman Husband. Known at least as early as the 1770s as a local and political leader he lived on a large farm on the western edges of Bedford (now Somerset) County. In 1778 his neighbors elected him to the Assembly and within the year they used his home as a place of safe refuge during a horrible winter and amid circulating rumors of Tory plots and Indian raids. By the 1780s, he had taken to the road. Wearing his homespun

clothing and gripping a "Pilgrim's staff," Husband preached to all and sundry about the coming of the "New Jerusalem" and the imminent battle between God and the Devil.⁶⁵

Although eastern political leaders amused themselves by reading Husband's sermons and criticizing his message as "Balderdash," frontiersmen obviously found something important and relatable in his religious and political prophecies.⁶⁶ It should be remembered that Husband had experience leading men on the frontier in their resistance efforts, as he was involved in North Carolina's Regulator movement. Settlers demonstrated their continued admiration of Husband during the Whiskey Rebellion by choosing him to represent their interests on the leading Committee of Conference at Parkinson's Ferry in August 1794, and again as a representative at a popular meeting at Brownsville, and finally, they chose him to negotiate a peace with the United States Commissioners. Frontier dwellers had a great deal of confidence in this man.

Government officials also recognized Husband's leadership role. They received a steady stream of reports declaring Husband integral to inciting "insubordination against the excise and the state."⁶⁷ For instance, when rebels declared excise collector Benjamin Wells a traitor to the cause and burned his home, the stalwart collector trekked to Philadelphia and accused Husband as the grand instigator of these violent actions.⁶⁸ By the fall of 1794, President George Washington headed his army west, demanding Husband be found, arrested, and conveyed to Philadelphia "for winter quarters" by any means necessary, or as he put it, "by *Hook*, or by *Crook*."⁶⁹

It is easy to imagine why frontiersmen chose Husband and why the Federalist administration would want him arrested. Since the early 1780s, Husband had presented a cyclical vision of history to the public, one where a cosmic dialectic struggle constantly unfolded, pitting the forces of good against the diabolical machinations of evil. Significant for the purposes of armed resistance, Husband related that these battles did not take place in some ethereal cosmos or the heavens above, but occurred on the ground, often over political principles.⁷⁰ As Husband proclaimed, "Outward Civill Government" was "the true Church of God" and "the Lord's sanctuary," therefore, all divine encounters would take place within that asylum.⁷¹ In his sermons, he suggested that the American public, particularly the "common Men," should be on their guard to protect that sanctuary, especially after a revolution that "promised liberty." Democratic revolutions, he argued, were steps toward the Millennium and therefore precipitated

cosmic Manichean struggles. Although God ordained and supported the cause of democracy and equality, he cautioned, the devil, through his agents on earth, sought to overturn their hard work. In one sermon Husband argued that in “every Revolution” when “the foreign oppressor is thrown off as Rome over England, and as England over these states, then our leaders and designing men emediately Aim to take their place.”⁷²

Husband painted the Federalist administration and their policies as the representatives of the devil in their own time, an idea perhaps closer to home for many in western Pennsylvania. The government leaders were, he said, “Enclinable to Idollitry and the Worshipping of false Gods” which the “luxery, Greandier [Grandeur], Superfluity and Waste” of “their own institutions and Laws” clearly demonstrated. These “monarchical” men, he concluded, stalled and threatened a millennium that Americans forwarded in their revolution.⁷³ For Husband, Americans were in the midst of a holy war pitting the “divine spirit of God” that embraced the “publick welfare” against the devil and the beast of Revelations that crept into the world “through laziness” and “self-interest” to “Give up the publick welfare.”⁷⁴

According to Husband, divinely inspired government mirrored the fundamental ideas of the revolution, especially those promoted by popular committees and conventions in the halcyon days of 1776. He constantly reminded his listeners and readers of the revolution’s public, community, and egalitarian nature. In one prophetic sermon Husband quoted an *Address of the Deputies of the Committees of Pennsylvania*, authored by some of those who crafted the state constitution in the summer of 1776. Using their words and the spirit of their ideas, Husband pontificated that “our revolution” contended “for permanent Freedom” under a government that had “for its Object not the Emolument of one Man or Class of Men only, but the Safety, Liberty and Happiness of every Individual in the Community.”⁷⁵ Such an idea of liberty and government predicated on the public welfare was, Husband believed, “generally Inspired by the Same Spirit” that “Religious Professors called Christ.”⁷⁶ For Husband, the governments created in 1776 that enshrined the idea that individuals were “a part only of that community” laid the groundwork that Americans must revise and further to establish the kingdom of heaven here on earth.⁷⁷

For all the good done in that transformative year of 1776, Husband told his western audience, “our leaders and designing men,” in league with the devil, sought to scale the hard-won revolution back by introducing a government rooted in individual self-interest. Americans needed look no further

for proof of this malevolent design than to the federal Constitution, which Husband argued, “proceeded from the spirit of the serpent, or what we call tyranny.” That constitution and the men who supported it “falsely call themselves republicans” and, like the corrupted Esau, the brother of Jacob and grandson of Abraham, wanted to use an “iron hand” to bring America “back to a despotic form of government.”⁷⁸

In sermons and prophetic letters to the public, Husband castigated the whole scheme of the federal government and the officers at its helm. Men who basked in corruption, vice, and luxury created and supported the federal Constitution. Husband sneered that those same men displayed the pomp and parade of idolatry as they rode to the capital “in a coach or chariot with costly equipage,” rather than ride a “common ass,” signifying the coming reign of Christ.⁷⁹ These men of luxury, receiving bloated salaries to further their own venality, Husband railed, sold “our liberty” for “a mess of pottage.”⁸⁰ The new government would, he warned, produce standing armies to buttress men who prized “self-interest” and allow them to “lay taxes to the ends of our continent, to the oppression of the people.” The legislatures of the states would become a “mere shadow” of their former glory and the new general government would favor moneyed men, land jobbers, and speculators who “have it in view to serve themselves.” Therefore, the whole governing structure guided by “serpents, adders, [and] vipers,” would be “deaf to any petitions or remonstrances of the people,” and would eventually “tumble down into the old Egyptian sea of slavery.”⁸¹

While Husband provided a rather bleak vision of the future under the Constitution and the ruling Federalists, he did offer his listeners and readers hope that justified resistance. While he was not a proponent of violence, being a pacifist himself, Husband’s message struck a militant air. For those in his audience not inclined to his peaceable view, that rebellious message was not lost. Of particular importance was Husband’s investigation of ancient Athenian law based on the ideas of Solon. “If I remember right,” Husband noted in one of his sermons, “Solon’s laws punished those men, who remained neutral, in times of public dissention.” According to Husband, ancient republics, also inspired by God, relied upon the will of the people and, as tyrannical government encroached on the world, their direct action. If man did not obey the laws of Solon, they would, in time, become slaves. Using the story of Issachar, the son of Jacob in the Book of Genesis, Husband hammered home this crucial point. Issachar “was a strong ass of a man, that saw the land was good, and loved ease; and so bowed his shoulder, to bear

every usurpation of tyrants, 'till he became a despicable slave.” Although Husband believed “God shall overcome at the last,” the people, he argued, could not sit idly by “as we have all the combined powers of tyranny to oppose; who has held all the nations in the world in bondage, ever since before Noah’s days.” Summarizing, Husband told his listeners and readers that the exclusion of the common people from the government, the failure of the government to redress grievances or even hear the voice of the public was the work of the beast, which “common Men” could either rectify “by force of arms” or supinely accept and become slaves like Issachar.⁸²

Husband portrayed such violent resistance against tyrants as necessary, not only to safeguard the people from slavery, but also because God willed it. The intersection of individual self-interest and government “is so provoking to God” that “he has totally destroyed every government that ever ran or fell into such idolatry, luxury and waste.” Like most millennial prophets, Husband looked to the books of Revelations and Daniel to discover God’s true intentions for the world. In those books, Husband found assurance that God would jettison all the political corruption, exploitation, and greed that ultimately produced widespread poverty and undermined the public spirit and welfare of any good “Civill government.” Because humankind acted as God’s earthly instruments, it was only natural, or rather biblical, that the people should scorch corrupt governments from the earth.⁸³

Once those governments were eradicated, people could begin to establish their earthly and divinely inspired paradise, one started during the Revolution and stalled by Federalist policy and underlings. This earthly paradise would embrace everyone in a cooperative government where each person would “receive a proportionate part of the profits, equivalent to his labour and stock put in.” Theirs would be a government where “every workman and labourer has such an interest in the whole” that “it will excite industry and care through the whole, and like members of the natural body, such one will care for the rest.”⁸⁴ Husband’s vision for the future provided a stark contrast with the current reality of many westerners, but also provided a glimpse of light down a long, dark, demon-filled tunnel.

In treatises, sermons and open-air addresses, Husband combined ancient political principles with biblical prophecy to outline an earthly paradise, his “New Jerusalem.” In one sermon, for example, he likened his message and himself to the great Spartan legal reformer Lykurgus. His divinely inspired government and society would embrace the very essence of Lykurgan reform, for it enshrined the common good or what the Spartans termed “*homoioi*,”

a word denoting their status as equals, peers, or similars with a duty to the common welfare and mess. Significantly, Spartan understanding of “*homoioi*” rested on the principle that each received an allotment of land at birth, allowing them to contribute to their society and granting them political rights. Like Lykurgus, Husband promised that in the “New Jerusalem” every husband should receive 300 acres, each wife 200 acres and whatever their children inherited would augment a 100-acre tract granted to every child at birth by the state, though no family could exceed 2,000 acres. This equitable distribution of land, Husband proclaimed, was God-ordained.⁸⁵

Westerners railing against speculators and moneyed men (who, they reasoned, with government support gobbled up large swaths of land to the detriment of the middling and poorer sorts) related to the necessity of Husband’s reforms. During a September 1794 popular gathering in Cumberland County, it was resolved that the federal government’s support of speculators and others “is unjust and improper.” The assembled demanded “the equal division of landed property which ought to be encouraged by law.” Such an idea, they argued, was “an essential principle in every republican government”; anything less was “tyrannical and unjust.”⁸⁶

For Husband, these ideas were based on more than just ancient forms; he linked his “New Jerusalem” to biblical prophecies and the will of God. He stated, “God has ordered” that civil government should resemble “the true nature of things,” and it mirrored the “Body of Christ”: a “body made up of different members and classes of officers united into one general interest.” Husband therefore argued, “all should have the same care one for another, as the different members of the body natural have for each other.” As he contended in 1790, “for if one member in the body politic perish, it will affect all the members the same as happens in the body natural.” The people were intimately connected to each other through Christ and their all, as individuals, was only significant in as far as it pertained to the welfare of the whole. In essence, Husband outlined the ideal government, one establishing perfect balance between all its parts, whether that be geographic, social, or economic. Any disruption of that balance, then, challenged what “God has ordered;” a powerful vision given the religious sentiments, grievances, and proclivities of early modern peoples on the frontier.⁸⁷

God revealed such a government to Husband as he walked the steep rocky slopes of the Allegheny Mountains. Light stretching across them highlighted a doorway to the “New Jerusalem” and Husband searched the Bible for a basis and structure for this divinely inspired and revealed government. In his

search for “truth,” Husband discovered that God had earlier manifested the perfect structure of government to the prophet Ezekiel who tried, with little avail, to instruct “all those governments” in the world on the true principles of civil society, specifically that all governments needed to “tend to the justice, equity, good, and happiness of the whole community.” This meant that government, in its lawmaking, regulatory policies, and function, had to draw the line between what is right and what is wrong, what is vice and what is virtue, what is moral and what is immoral, for the sake of the whole.⁸⁸

The governments Ezekiel instructed failed to flourish. Destroyed by tyranny and beset by the difficulty of drawing the line between those black-and-white polarities, abortive governments stalled the progress of the millennium. Husband argued, however, that the line separating vice and virtue was clear in scripture, basing his whole vision of civil society on God’s creation of the “body politic,” a community entity with common interests among individuals. Husband reasoned that God made man for society “with no other aim but the common happiness of every individual. There is not, nor can be, any other social tie than that of the common interest. Therefore, nothing can be consistent with the order of society,” or God’s law, “unless it be consistent with the common utility of its members- this is the only criterion of vice and virtue.”⁸⁹

Husband’s “New Jerusalem,” then, visibly manifested a public welfare legal and political philosophy, wrapped in biblical legitimacy. The government and the people should figuratively and literally represent the “human body politic.” His plan outlined decentralized empires that maintained control through a federated system of states. Each state would act for the common good, regulating land purchases, the economy, private enterprise, as well as civil and criminal law. The state would provide for public education, share in the development of internal improvements, and support the arts. All would be done for and by the people through a participatory democracy predicated on the community’s welfare. Husband’s ideal government had no place for individualism and economic self-interest; community values reigned supreme.⁹⁰

The eruption of revolution in France gave cogency, meaning, and universal significance to Husband’s millenarian vision of liberty, government, and law. American newspapers, pamphlets, speeches, political societies, and sermons all referenced and fed off the rhetoric of French revolutionaries. The message of the public welfare, enshrined in French revolutionary actions, reaffirmed the importance of the common good to a revolutionary and republican heritage in which Americans shared and believed. Newspapers ran

stories and opinion pieces throughout the first half of the 1790s proclaiming in loud and vocal print, “These words, *Salus populi, suprema lex esto*, should be the motto of every patriot, and ought to be engraved, in characters of gold, on the frontispiece of all republican societies.”⁹¹ Popular democratic societies ran ads stating bluntly that the actions of revolutionaries in France confirmed, “the safety and welfare of the community, is, or ought to be, the first object of government.” If Americans did not stand up for those golden letters against “turbulent and designing men” intoxicated by “prosperity,” they “render themselves unworthy of the invaluable blessings of peace, the best boon of Heaven; and are in danger of losing them.”⁹²

In case readers and listeners in taverns, coffee shops, and open-air congregations missed the prophetic significance of those salient and pregnant Latin words, writers punctuated their opinions with scripture such as Isaiah 59:19, “When the enemy shall come in like a flood, the spirit of the Lord shall lift up a standard against him.”⁹³ More to the point, the *Pittsburgh Gazette* ran a series of “Singular Prophecies on the Present Times” equating the French Revolution with the “destruction of Antichrist.”⁹⁴ Enemies of the public welfare should therefore fear the handmaidens of God on a divinely inspired mission.

Francophilistic and revolutionary rhetoric, then, had a violent religious undertone. A revival of millennial writing in the 1790s crucially imbued modern political events with religious significance.⁹⁵ Husband, then, was part of a much larger religious and political trend in the United States. American ministers of all Christian persuasions inundated the public with published sermons linking the American and French revolutions to an imminent millennium. According to Anglican bishop Elias Lee, the American and French revolutions signified God’s plan to eradicate tyrants “as the chaff of the mountain before the wind.” These revolutions were, as the bishop pointed out, the beginning of a global struggle to restore “the human race to their inherent rights.”⁹⁶ Or, as a Baptist minister noted, the French Revolution served as evidence that the whole Christian world was in a pitched battle to “pursue the spirit of monarchy to its very last recess; and completely demolish the empire and kingdom of the Antichrist.”⁹⁷ These prophetic statements were not just commentaries on European events, but inherently oppositional tracts painting the Federalist Party as obstacles of the millennium, supporters of the beast foretold of in Revelations.

Over the course of the early 1790s, millennial writers, like Husband, increasingly cast the reigning Federalists as “monarchical,” a “beast with,

to be sure, seven heads, and ten horns.”⁹⁸ Prophetic exegesis informed a religious public that such “Monarchical Government” as the Federalist Party promoted “is the literal kingdom of Satan, and the antichrist or the Image of the beast” whereas “Representative government is the literal and peaceable kingdom of the Messiah.”⁹⁹ As one popular religious political tract excoriating Federalist policy explained in 1794, during the American Revolution “we were then taught” that the government would uphold the “pure religion of Jesus Christ” that is “*salus populi was suprema lex.*” The writer went on: “alas! alas! we have been deceived.”¹⁰⁰

Frighteningly, at least for many Federalists, revolutionary exegesis also prophesized that the proponents of “representative government” would ultimately “chace, break, and destroy Monarchical Government and spread itself over the earth.”¹⁰¹ Ministers, preachers, and itinerants of all Christian persuasions foretold that the people of the republics would actively rise up and reform the world in preparation for the coming reign of Christ. “Be alarmed, my dear countrymen . . . our new masters come like Job’s messengers, with worse and worse tidings” and therefore “your situation calls as loudly for your exertions as in 1774.” Leaving off this rebellious note, the author exclaimed “*vox populi vox Die* . . . the voice of the people is the voice of God.”¹⁰²

The words and spirit of revolutionary millennial exegesis spoke to lingering grievances, justified resistance, and gave hope for the future. Thousands of men mustered, took up arms, and marched on towns and federal officials. Liberty poles were erected and protected and men were tarred and feathered. Despite all of this, though, the mobilization of western farmers could never overcome the energy of the federal government and the army it commanded. By the winter of 1794 the rebellion was dead and the leaders were in jail. For his part, Herman Husband spent a brutal winter in prison, where he became sick and weak. Though he was finally released, that experience took its toll and he died somewhere on the road during his long march home. Yet, as the Paxton Riots some thirty years earlier demonstrate, the ideas undergirding the movement did not vanish with the rebellion. Five years after the Whiskey Insurrection, westerners again took up arms against Federalist policies and, like before, some clergy led them. In Northampton County, taking part in Fries’ Rebellion, Rev. Jacob Eyerman preached against unequal federal taxation and the individual self-interest of greedy politicians subverting the public welfare. He even promised to place his “black coat on a nail and fight the whole week and preach for them on Sundays.” According to one resident, without the preacher “nothing would have happened.”¹⁰³

Examining the religious dimensions of such events draws out the salience and longevity of crucial political principles that shaped and guided political action on the frontier. Westerners would most likely disagree with many modern scholars as to their own religiosity and, moreover, their political ideologies. They were, as rebels proclaimed in 1794, like the biblical warriors of old, “glorious instruments in the hands of Providence.” Moreover, those same rebels declared that they never demonstrated a “want of duty to a government”; rather they refused to “sacrifice” themselves to the “local interest” of eastern politicians. They fought for a “true government” that protected their collective “natural rights” against the “engrossing, forestalling, and avarice” of “evil” individuals encouraged by “our government.”¹⁰⁴ In essence, they wanted more government, not less, and desired that government protect the liberties of and assure equal opportunities for common people. Such was a political philosophy, promoted by their religion, consistently at odds with formidable ruling powers and the historical imagination. This should push us to rethink ingrained assumptions that irreligious frontiersmen embraced and fought for an emerging liberalism prizing small governments for their own personal independence.

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NOTES

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1. *Historical Magazine of Monongahela's Old Home Coming Week: September 6–13, 1908* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1908), 77.
2. “An Exciseman,” August 13, 1792, from the Philadelphia History Museum at the Atwater Kent, Philadelphia.
3. William Logan, quoted in Kevin Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost: The Paxton Boys and the Destruction of William Penn's Holy Experiment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 146.
4. Anonymous letter, February 29, 1764, in *Hazard's Register of Pennsylvania*, ed. Hazard, 12:10.

5. Lazarus Stewart, “Narrative of Lazarus Stewart,” in *Historical Collection of the State of Pennsylvania*, ed. Sherman Day (Philadelphia: George W. Gorton, 1843), 280.
6. “An Exciseman,” August 13, 1792.
7. *Carlisle Gazette*, July 9, 1794.
8. Carl Bridenbaugh, *Mitre and Sceptre: Transatlantic Faiths, Ideas, Personalities, and Politics, 1689–1775* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), xvii.
9. Thomas Slaughter, *The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
10. See, for example, one of the newer works on the Paxton Boys by Kevin Kenny. In it, he certainly recognizes religious differences, especially during the political debates inspired by the Paxton Boys, but dedicates very little time teasing out how or even if religion influenced the uprising. Most interpretations of the Paxton Boys start off noting that many of them were Presbyterians and that one of their ministers, John Elder, was an important community leader, though he did not lead the actual rebellion, but this background information is quickly abandoned, only to be used to explain the political fallout after the Paxton Boys’ trek home from Germantown in early 1764. See, for example, Brooke Hindle, “The March of the Paxton Boys,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 3, no. 4 (1946): 461–86; Peter A. Butzin, “Politics, Presbyterians and the Paxton Riots, 1763–64,” *Journal of Presbyterian History*, 51, no. 1 (1973): 70–84; Jeremy Engels, “‘Equipped for Murder’: The Paxton Boys and ‘the Spirit of Killing all Indians’ in Pennsylvania, 1763–1764,” *Rhetoric and Public Affairs*, 8, no. 3 (2005): 355–81. A recent book-length assessment of the Paxton Boys is Jack Brubaker’s *Massacre of the Conestogas: On the Trail of the Paxton Boys in Lancaster County* (Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2010).
11. Marjoleine Kars, *Breaking Loose Together: The Regulator Rebellion in Pre-Revolutionary North Carolina* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002).
12. Brendan McConville, *These Daring Disturbers of the Public Peace: The Struggle for Property and Power in Early New Jersey* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999).
13. As Alan Taylor pointed out about the Whiskey Rebellion, John Corbly and Herman Husband were “influential preachers and important rebels. . . . Until we come to terms with their roles, our understanding of the rebellion remains incomplete.” Alan Taylor, “Frontier Ferment” *Reviews in American History* 15, no. 1 (1987): 596.
14. Anglican minister Thomas Barton, as well as Presbyterian ministers Andrew Bay and John Steel, supported the Paxton affair. Bay and Steel, like John Elder, led some of the men who took part in the uprising during the Seven Years’ War, and continued that leadership in their local churches and communities. During the Whiskey Rebellion, Herman Husband was one of many religious leaders who countenanced and even participated in the rebellion. For example,

- Baptist ministers David Philips and John Corbly were vocal supporters and leaders.
15. The important role of ministers and preachers in early America, though often understated, should not be discounted. They were crucial community leaders, recognized for their persuasive power and the respect they garnered from their parishioners. Historian Spencer McBride has gone as far as to argue that without clergymen, politicians would have been “hard-pressed” to persuade “the many” to mobilize as energetically as they did during the American Revolution. More to the point, early American history is filled with instances of clergymen taking decisive roles in popular political affairs. In Massachusetts, for example, minister Samuel Ely mobilized many people in his community to shut down the local courts, instigating what one scholar deemed, “a civil war” that foreshadowed Shays’s Rebellion. Spencer W. McBride, *Pulpit and Nation: Clergymen and the Politics of Revolutionary America* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2016); John L. Brooke, “To the Quiet of the People: Revolutionary Settlements and Civil Unrest in Western Massachusetts, 1774–1789,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 46, no. 3 (1989): 425–62.
 16. In his work, *The Whiskey Rebellion*, Slaughter argues that frontier dwellers were, essentially, irreligious and prized a “liberty” representing “proto-Lockean” individualism at odds with the ideology of “order” promoted by the eastern “political overlords.” Such a dichotomy was certainly espoused by government officials during and after the rebellion; one need only read the thoughts of Alexander Hamilton or Judge Alexander Addison to reach such a conclusion. However, those ideas rarely reflected the thoughts and motivations of ordinary westerners who partook in the uprising. Similar to Slaughter, Mark H. Jones argues that frontier peoples sought a form of “civil libertarianism.” Exploring violent uprisings in northwestern Pennsylvania, Paul Moyer likewise contends, “The vision of personal independence that drew settlers to the frontier also drew them into conflict with Indians, governments, wealthy speculators, and fellow settlers who sought possession of the land.” Like Slaughter, Jones, and Moyer, Terry Bouton fuses together egalitarianism, individualism, and antigovernment proclivities to explain frontier political ideology. Slaughter, *The Whiskey Rebellion*, 32, 82–84; Jones, “Herman Husband: Millenarian, Carolina Regulator, and Whiskey Rebel” (PhD diss., Northern Illinois University, 1982), 154; Moyer, *Wild Yankees: The Struggle for Independence along Pennsylvania’s Revolutionary Frontier* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 7–10; Bouton, *Taming Democracy: “The People,” the Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
 17. Anonymous [Thomas Barton], “The Conduct of the Paxton Men” in *A LETTER from a GENTLEMAN in One of the Frontier Counties to His Friend in Philadelphia* (Philadelphia, 1764), in *The Paxton Papers*, ed. John Raine Dunbar (Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1957), 298. Though published anonymously,

- Barton likely authored "The Conduct of the Paxton Men," one of the incendiary pamphlets published in early 1764. His authorship of the pamphlet is discussed in James P. Myers, "The Rev. Thomas Barton's Authorship of *The Conduct of the Paxton Men Impartially Represented* (1764)," *Pennsylvania History* 61, no. 2 (1994): 155–84; quote of Whiskey Rebellion deposition in Bouton, *Taming Democracy*, 238.
18. The use of *Salus populi suprema lex est* was a common term employed by rebels and revolutionaries in the early modern world, particularly the religious and political radicals, the Levelers, during the English Civil War. The term also has significance for the state governments created during the American Revolution and the justification for regulatory policy during the nineteenth century. For an analysis of its significance for regulatory policy decisions in the nineteenth century see, William Novak, *The People's Welfare: Law and Regulation in Nineteenth-Century America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). For its importance to the American Revolution see Christopher R. Pearl, "For the Good Order of Government: The American Revolution and the Creation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1740–1790" (PhD diss., Binghamton University, 2013).
 19. See petitions sent to the Assembly between March 23 and May 25, 1764, in *Pennsylvania Archives* (hereafter *PA*), ed. John B. Linn and William H. Egle (Harrisburg, 1876), ser. 8, vol. 7, 5581–5610.
 20. [Barton,] "The Conduct of the Paxton Men."
 21. "Narrative of Lazarus Stewart," 280.
 22. *Declaration and Remonstrance of the distressed and bleeding Frontier Inhabitants of the Province of Pennsylvania*, in *The Paxton Papers*, ed. Dunbar, 104.
 23. For excellent examinations of race and racism on the frontier see James H. Merrell, *Into the American Woods: Negotiators on the Pennsylvania Frontier* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 284–88, 290–91; Collin G. Calloway, *The Scratch of a Penn: 1763 and the Transformation of North America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 77–79; Peter Silver, *Our Savage Neighbors: How Indian War Transformed Early America* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2008), 179–81; Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost*; Patrick Spero, "Creating Pennsylvania: The Politics of the Frontier and the State, 1682–1800" (PhD diss., University of Pennsylvania, 2009), 222–31, and his new book, *Frontier Country: The Politics of War in Early Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 148–69.
 24. Although there are many different theories for the organization and mobilization of violent crowds, both old and recent, a combination of approaches from political scientists, sociologists, and historians provides the best model to evaluate the mobilization of people and political violence. In his seminal work, *Why Men Rebel*, Ted Robert Gurr argues that political violence stems from "discontent" over a "perceived discrepancy between men's value expectations" and their perceived reality or what actually exists. While Gurr provides

- a logical connection for the formation of discontent, he does not offer a satisfying analysis of how that discontent turns into extralegal crowd action. However, the work of Rollo May and James Barton Hunt offer crucial insights into motivating factors for the transition from discontent to crowd action. In a word, they both argue “anxiety” is the key to the puzzle. According to May, anxiety is characterized by “feelings of uncertainty and helplessness in the face of danger.” The lack of resources to manage that fear, as Hunt argues, can result in potentially violent crowd action. Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 11–13; Rollo May, *The Meaning of Anxiety* (New York: Ronald Press, 1950), 190–91; James Barton Hunt, “The Crowd and the American Revolution, A Study of Urban Political Violence in Boston and Philadelphia, 1763–1776” (PhD diss., University of Washington, 1973), 12–13.
25. Anonymous letter, February 29, 1764, in *Hazard’s Register of Pennsylvania*, ed. Hazard, 12:10.
 26. William Henry Egle, *Glimpses of the History of Old Paxtang Church* (Harrisburg, PA: Harrisburg Publishing Company, 1890), 21–22. For how the Great Awakening divided communities, see Martin E. Lodge, “The Crisis of the Churches in the Middle Colonies, 1720–1750,” *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 95, no. 2 (1971): 195–220; Harry S. Stout, “Religion, Communications, and the Ideological Origins of the American Revolution,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 34, no. 4 (1977): 519–41; Frank Lambert, “The First Great Awakening: Whose Interpretive Fiction?” *New England Quarterly* 68, no. 4 (1995): 650–59; John Fea, “In Search of Unity: Presbyterians in the Wake of the First Great Awakening,” *Journal of Presbyterian History* 86, no. 2 (2008): 53–60; Thomas S. Kidd, *George Whitefield: America’s Spiritual Founding Father* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014), 58–147.
 27. Joseph Shippen to John Elder, July 12, 1763, quoted in Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost*, 120–21.
 28. John Elder, “A booklet of notes for sermons and prayers of Rev. John Elder,” Elder Collection, MG 070, Dauphin County Historical Society; William B. Sprague, *Annals of the American Pulpit* (New York: Robert Carter and Brothers, 1858), 77.
 29. Patrick Griffin, “The People with No Name: Ulster’s Migrants and Identity Formation in Eighteenth-Century Pennsylvania,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 58, no. 3 (2001): 598.
 30. See also Kenny, *Peaceable Kingdom Lost*, 27–28.
 31. Sydney E. Ahlstrom, *A Religious History of the American People* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1972), 265–79.
 32. Charles Beatty, *A Sermon Preached in Woodbury* (Philadelphia, 1752), 25–26.
 33. Gilbert Tennant, *Vindicae Legis: LAW established by Faith* (Philadelphia, 1745), 3.
 34. For an exploration of the breakdown of community, church, family, and law, the four ordering forces of the early modern world in eighteenth-century Pennsylvania, see, Pearl, “For the Good Order of Government,” 30–114.

- For how it was happening elsewhere, see Robert A. Gross, *Minutemen and Their World* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976).
35. John Goodlet, *A Vindication of the Associate Synod* (Philadelphia, 1767), 8–11. For a similar expression of ideas see Samuel Davies, *A Sermon on Man's Primitive State; and the First Covenant, Delivered before the Reverend Presbytery of New-Castle*, April, 1748 (Philadelphia); Davies, *Religion and Public Spirit: A Valedictory Address to the Senior Class, Delivered in Nassau Hall* (New York, 1761); Joseph Montgomery, *A Letter, from a Clergyman in Town* (Philadelphia, 1764); Elisha Williams, *The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants* (Boston, 1744). See also Francis L. Broderick, “Pulpit, Physics, and Politics: The Curriculum of the College of New Jersey, 1764–1794,” *William and Mary Quarterly* 6, no. 1 (1949): 42–68.
 36. Goodlet, *A Vindication of the Associate Synod*, 8–11.
 37. Gilbert Tennant, *The Late Association for Defence encouraged or The Lawfulness of a Defensive War Represented in a Sermon Preach'd at Philadelphia* (Philadelphia, 1748), 8–19.
 38. Elisha Williams, *The Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants* (Boston, 1744), 4. For an excellent investigation of the political thought of Pennsylvania's frontier dwellers see Kozuskanich, “‘Falling Under the Domination Totally of Presbyterians’: The Paxton Riots and the Coming of the Revolution in Pennsylvania,” in *Pennsylvania's Revolution*, ed. William Pencak (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010). See also Kozuskanich, “‘For the Security and Protection of the Community’: The Frontier and the Makings of Pennsylvania Constitutionalism” (PhD diss., Ohio State University, 2005). In these works, Kozuskanich nicely sums up the community-oriented political philosophy of frontier inhabitants in relationship to the military defense of the frontier. However, Kozuskanich often downplays the place and importance of religion in the forming, disseminating, and sustaining a “public welfare” “man in society” vision of civil society that frontier dwellers used to juxtapose all aspects of government not just military defense.
 39. Elder, “A booklet of notes for sermons and prayers.”
 40. *Ibid.*
 41. Goodlet, *A Vindication of the Associate Synod*, 11 (my emphasis).
 42. Tennant, *The Late Association for Defence*, 18–19.
 43. William McClenchan, *A Letter, from a Clergyman in Town* (Philadelphia, 1764), 5.
 44. Joseph Montgomery, *A Sermon Preached at Christiana Bridge and Newcastle* (Philadelphia, 1775), 28.
 45. John Carmichael, *A Self-Defensive War* (Philadelphia, 1775), 20.
 46. Stewart, “Narrative of Lazarus Stewart”; *Declaration and Remonstrance*, 101; extract from a Remonstrance presented to John Penn, February 24, 1764, in *Historical Collection of the State of Pennsylvania*, 279.
 47. *A Looking Glass for Presbyterians, Number II*, in *The Paxton Papers*, ed. Dunbar, 301.

48. Isaac Hunt, *A Letter from a Gentleman in Transylvania* (Philadelphia, 1764), 7; *A Dialogue, Between Andrew Trueman and Thomas Zealot*, in *The Paxton Papers*, ed. Dunbar, 89–90.
49. See, for example, James Hutson, *Pennsylvania Politics, 1746–1770: The Movement for Royal Government and Its Consequences* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 110–11; Alan Tully, *Forming American Politics: Ideals, Interests, and Institutions in Colonial New York and Pennsylvania* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 185–87; Alison Olson, “The Pamphlet War over the Paxton Boys,” *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 123, nos. 1/2 (1999): 31–55.
50. “The Cloven-Foot Discovered,” in *The Paxton Papers*, ed. Dunbar, 86.
51. “The Circular Letter and Articles of ‘Some Gentlemen of the Presbyterian Denomination,’ in the Province of Pennsylvania,” March 24, 1764, in Charles Augustus Hanna, *The Scotch-Irish: Or, the Scot in North Britain, North Ireland, and North America* (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1902), 2:4–5
52. Joseph Galloway, *Historical and Political Reflections on the Rise and Progress of the American Rebellion* (London, 1780), 54.
53. Thomas Bradbury Chandler, *A Friendly Address to All Reasonable Americans, on the Subject of Our Political Confusions: In Which the Necessary Consequences of Violently Opposing the King’s Troops, and of a General Non-Importation Are Fairly Stated* (New York, 1774), in *The American Revolution: Writings from the Pamphlet Debate, 1773–1776*, ed. Gordon S. Wood (New York: The Library of America, 2015), 294; John Adams to Abigail Adams, June 11, 1775, *The Adams Papers Digital Edition*, ed. Sara Martin (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2008–2017), <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/ADMS-04-01-02-0146> (accessed August 9, 2017). For more information on religion and the American Revolution see Mark A. Noll, *America’s God: From Jonathan Edwards to Abraham Lincoln* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 53–157; Noll, “The American Revolution and Protestant Evangelicalism,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 23, no. 3 (1993): 615–38; Gideon Mailer, *John Witherspoon’s American Revolution* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017); Thomas Kidd, *God of Liberty: A Religious History of the American Revolution* (New York: Basic Books, 2010); Christopher Pearl. “Pulpits of Revolution: Presbyterian Political Thought in the Era of the American Revolution,” *Journal of Presbyterian History* 95, no. 1 (2017): 4–17; McBride, *Pulpit and Nation*.
54. Nathan O. Hatch, *The Democratization of American Christianity* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989); Ruth Bloch, *Visionary Republic: Millennial Themes in American Thought, 1756–1800* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
55. For the meaning and significance of the term “Good Order of Government” for early Americans see Pearl, “For the Good Order of Government.”
56. *General Advertiser*, September 10, 1794. See also “Resolve of Ohio Country, Virginia,” September 8 and 9, 1794, in *PA*, 2:4, 269–71.

57. "Minutes of the Meeting at Pittsburgh," in *PA*, ser. 2, vol. 4, 31; Hugh Henry Brackenridge to Tench Coxe, August 8, 1794, *ibid.*, 143; John Wilkins to William Irvine, August 19, 1794, *ibid.*, 168–74.
58. Civil millennialism is defined by its reliance on thwarting "the precipitate advance of power rather than to advocate the conversion of sinners." For "Revolutionary millennialists" making America the "seat of Liberty" would assure "that America would become the principle seat of Christ's earthly rule." Nathan O. Hatch, "The Origins of Civil Millennialism in America: New England Clergymen, War with France, and the Revolution," *William and Mary Quarterly* 31, no. 3 (1974): 407–30.
59. According to the Supervisor of the Excise, George Clymer, the "clergy also are among the most outrageous" supporters of resistance to the excise. Clymer feared their power so much that he refused to venture farther than Pittsburgh to help enforce the excise. See George Clymer to Alexander Hamilton, October 10, 1792, in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, digital edition, ed. Harold C. Syrett (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011), <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/ARHN-01-12-02-0378> (accessed August 11, 2017). See also, *National Gazette*, November 28 and December 1, 1792.
60. *Pittsburgh Gazette*, December 27, 1794.
61. Rueben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, *Frontier Defense on the Upper Ohio, 1777–1778* (Madison: Wisconsin Historical Society, 1912), 24 n. 52.
62. James Ross, Jasper Yeates, and William Bradford to Secretary of State, August 17 and 30, 1794, in "Pennsylvania Whiskey Rebellion Collection," Library of Congress, MSS 16804. According to the United States Commissioners charged with restoring peace in the West, there were "three parties" in the resistance. The first were those who were "disposed to renounce all connection with the government & to maintain the present opposition by violence," the second countenanced peaceful resistance, and the third would submit to the laws. The commissioners pointed out that the third group was led by "men of property," while the violent party was led by clergy, particularly John Corbly, "a baptist Preacher." "The United States Commissioners to the Secretary of State," August 17, 1794, in *PA*, 2:4: 164–65. See also Hugh Henry Brackenridge, *Incidents of the Insurrection* (Philadelphia, 1795), 139.
63. Morgan John Rhees, *An Oration Delivered at Greenville* (Philadelphia, 1795), 5–8.
64. Dorothy E. Fennell, "From Rebelliousness to Insurrection: A Social History of the Whiskey Rebellion, 1765–1802" (PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1981), 93.
65. "A Letter from the Allegany Philosopher to his old Friend Chrononhontologos," August, 20, 1786, in *Ellicott's Maryland and Virginia Almanack for 1787* (Baltimore, 1787),
66. Richard Peters to James Madison, March 31, 1790, in *The Papers of James Madison*, digital edition, ed. J. C. A. Stagg (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010), 133.

67. Dr. Christian Boerstler, quoted in Jones, "Herman Husband," 359–60.
68. William Hogeland, *The Whiskey Rebellion: George Washington, Alexander Hamilton, and the Frontier Rebels Who Challenged America's Newfound Sovereignty* (New York: Scribner, 2006), 178–79.
69. George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, October 26, 1794, *The Papers of George Washington*, digital edition (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2008), <http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/GEWN-05-17-02-0077> (accessed August 15, 2017).
70. Husband argued that the "same two spirits among mankind" existed "since Adam's day." He argued Adam, Eve, and the serpent constituted the first, then, "among the Jews" there existed the Lord's people and Baal's people, in the "apostolic days" there existed "Christ and the Anti-Christ" and now, "the patriotic spirit, and spirit of tyranny." Lycurgus III [Herman Husband], *A Sermon to the Bucks and Hinds of America* (Philadelphia, 1788), iii.
71. Husband, *Manuscript Sermons*, Darlington Memorial Library, University of Pittsburgh, 4; Husband, *A Dialogue Between an Assembly-Man and a Convention-Man* (Philadelphia, 1790), 8.
72. Husband, *Manuscript Sermons*, 24–25; also quoted in Fennell, "From Rebelliousness to Insurrection," 206. Husband presents the same ideas in *A Sermon to the Bucks and Hinds of America*, iii.
73. Husband, *Manuscript Sermons*, 66.
74. Husband, "A Sermon," in *The Regulators in North Carolina: A Documentary History, 1759–1776*, ed. William Powell (Raleigh, NC: State Dept. of Archives and History, 1971), 228.
75. Husband, *Proposals to Amend and Perfect the Policy of the Government* (Baltimore, 1782), 32. See exact quote in "Letter from the Provincial Council to the 'Associators of Pennsylvania,'" in *Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania* (Harrisburg: Wm. Stanley Ray, 1903), 9:335.
76. Herman Husband, quoted in Jones, "Herman Husband," 94–95.
77. Husband, *XIV Sermons on the Characters of Jacob's Fourteen Sons* (Philadelphia, 1789), iv–xi. Quote from Pennsylvania Bill of Rights, "The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania," in *Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania* (Philadelphia: John Bioren, 1812), 5:425.
78. [Husband,] *A Sermon to the Bucks and Hinds*, 2, 15.
79. *Ibid.*, 6
80. Husband, *Manuscript Sermons*, 67.
81. Husband, *A Sermon to the Bucks and Hinds*, 4, 6, 14, 15; Husband, *XIV Sermons*, 6:19.
82. Husband, *XIV Sermons*, 5:18–19; 7:22, 29.
83. *Ibid.*, 23.
84. *Ibid.*, 46, as quoted in Fennell, "Rebelliousness to Insurrection," 224–25.
85. Husband, *A Sermon to the Bucks and Hinds of America*, 22–23.
86. *General Advertiser*, September 10, 1794

"OUR GOD, AND OUR GUNS"

87. Husband, *A Dialogue*, 5–6.
88. *Ibid.*, 6–7.
89. *Ibid.*, 11–12.
90. *Ibid.*
91. *American Daily Advertiser*, September 4, 1793; see also *Carlisle Gazette and the Western Repository of Knowledge*, November 13 and 19, 1793.
92. *American Daily Advertiser*, August 13, 1793.
93. *Independent Gazetteer*, April 30, 1789.
94. *Pittsburgh Gazette*, July 6, 1793.
95. For an excellent analysis of millennial writing in the early republic see Bloch, *Visionary Republic*, 150–86.
96. James Madison, *Manifestations of the Beneficence of Divine Providence Towards America* (Richmond, 1795), 7–10.
97. Elias Lee, *The Dissolution of Earthly Monarchies; the Downfall of the Antichrist; and the Full Display of Zion's King* (Danbury, 1794), 6.
98. *Ibid.*
99. Jedidiah Peck, *The Political Wars of Otsego: Or, Downfall of Jacobinism and Despotism* (Cooperstown, NY, 1796), 97.
100. *Independent Gazetteer*, June 14, 1794.
101. Peck, *Political Wars of Otsego*, 97.
102. *Independent Gazetteer*, June 14, 1794.
103. "The Trial of Jacob Eyerman," in *American State Trials*, ed. John D. Lawson (St. Louis, 1919), 11:191–93.
104. *Carlisle Gazette*, July 9, 1794.

“NOT SO FINE”

GOVERNOR JOHN FINE AND THE 1952 REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING STRUGGLE IN PENNSYLVANIA

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ABSTRACT: With the Korean War stalemated, inflation rising, and stories of corruption in the Truman White House on newspaper front pages, Republicans believed their nominee for president in 1952 was well positioned to capture the White House for the first time since 1928. But who would carry the Republican banner? In the dramatic contest between Ohio senator Robert A. Taft and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Pennsylvania governor John Fine intended to play a significant, perhaps even a kingmaker, role. This article traces Fine’s decision to withhold an endorsement of either candidate until the last possible moment at the Republican National Convention and its impact. As events played out, he waited too long, thereby alienating leaders from the two rival candidates’ camps and negating his influence. Worse for Fine, his inability to gain recognition from the convention chair to put Eisenhower over the top as the party nominee played out in full view of television cameras. Fine returned to Harrisburg as a failed kingmaker. His political misadventure blighted his prospects for a position in the Eisenhower administration or further elective office and political influence in Pennsylvania.

KEYWORDS: Presidential primary, Pennsylvania Republicans in 1952, John Fine, Robert A. Taft, Dwight D. Eisenhower, James Duff, Republican National Convention 1952

Pennsylvania Republicans had done their duty in 1948 by carrying the state for Thomas E. Dewey in his losing campaign against President Harry S Truman. In 1952 they sensed that the national political winds were blowing their way. Beset by a stalemated war in Korea, intimations of communist conspiracies and corruption within his administration, and the unhappy evidence of growing inflation, the president’s poll numbers were practically

in freefall. Voters were restless, signaling bad tidings for the incumbent. Who could carry the Republican banner and win?¹

GOP regulars in Pennsylvania favored the veteran Ohio senator Robert A. Taft, “Mr. Republican” and son of the nation’s twenty-seventh president, now making his third and final serious bid for the White House. Taft was a respected Senate veteran, a stalwart conservative whose opposition to New Deal/Fair Deal social welfare policies was proven and abiding. Yet many party activists in the Keystone State, and nationally, were dubious about Taft’s presidential prospects on two grounds. They questioned his resistance to the US playing a large role in world affairs, especially so in view of the communist challenge on many fronts, and doubted he could win against the incumbent, Harry Truman, or anyone else the Democrats might nominate for president in 1952. Seeking to capitalize on this resistance to a Taft candidacy, former Minnesota governor Harold Stassen threw his hat into the presidential ring in 1951. Stassen’s campaign, however, generated little enthusiasm outside his native state. The candidate preferred by many Pennsylvania Republicans was the military hero Dwight D. Eisenhower, who until early January 1952 did not acknowledge publicly that he was a Republican.²

In the fall of 1951 Eisenhower was in France, continuing his work reorganizing NATO into a credible military force. At his Paris headquarters Ike entertained a steady procession of political activists and officeholders seeking to persuade him to enter the presidential contest or, at minimum, not to rebuff efforts to draft him. Eisenhower’s declaration the following January to Massachusetts senator Henry Cabot Lodge that he would allow his name to remain on the Republican ballot for the March 10 New Hampshire primary opened a new, public phase in the presidential campaign. The Eisenhower for President movement, orchestrated by US senators James Duff of Pennsylvania, Frank Carlson of Kansas, and Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, and Philadelphia congressman Hugh Scott, among others, could now reboot.³ Robert Taft would have to fight for the nomination. Eventually, so would Eisenhower. In this struggle Pennsylvania and its rich trove of seventy delegates featured prominently.

Mid-century Pennsylvania Republicans defined their politics by ideological and personal feuds in which alliances sometimes shifted, but major fault lines persisted, including competition between anti-New Dealers and Republican progressives who accepted the welfare state and advocated a better deal for the state’s African American population. These alignments dated back at least to the Progressive Era and the debate over the proper

role of the federal government in regulating business enterprise. In 1952 the conservative, or Grundyite, wing of the party threw its support behind Senator Taft, a well-known staunch foe of both an expanded welfare state and key elements of President Harry Truman's communist containment policies, including the creation of NATO. The more moderate, internationalist faction embraced Eisenhower.⁴

Former US senator Joseph Grundy, then in his late eighties but still a political force, led the stalwarts. He operated in concert with Pennsylvania's senior US senator, Edward Martin, and former state senator G. Mason Owlett, who succeeded Grundy as head of the influential Pennsylvania Manufacturers Association, a pro-business, antilabor, low taxes, pro-tariff lobby. It was hardly surprising that this cohort supported Taft for president, as did former Pennsylvania governor Arthur James, who told Taft as the campaign opened in fall 1951 that he supported him without reservation. "Your courage and forthrightness in bearding the lions of the New Deal or the Fair Deal," James observed, "are what our Republican candidates have lacked in the past four national campaigns."⁵

Other party leaders dreaded a Taft candidacy, both on ideological and practical grounds. They believed that Taft's consistent hostility to now-embedded New Deal programs made little sense in a modern industrial society. Equally important, it went against the grain of public opinion. This reality, along with Taft's lack of personal warmth as a campaigner, foretold yet another Republican electoral disaster. In 1951 the acknowledged leader of the anti-Grundy, anti-Owlett, anti-Taft faction of the Pennsylvania GOP was the state's junior US senator, Jim Duff, a burly, pugnacious progressive whose signature crew cut gave him the appearance of a superannuated Marine. Elected governor in a landslide with the full backing of the Republican machine in 1946, once in office Duff recognized the state's stagnation under the governorship of his tight-fisted predecessor, Edward Martin. Duff soon authorized a major, ongoing road-building program, supported school consolidation, pursued environmental-cleanup measures, and introduced legislation to reform the state's antiquated tax system. Duff's program was anathema to GOP conservatives. In 1950 Duff, then running for the US Senate, pulled out all the stops for Judge John S. Fine's gubernatorial candidacy as an alternative to a colorless Lancaster congressman the Grundy team backed. Duff succeeded, at least in the short term.⁶

Fine was not chosen for his charisma or vision, but rather because of his life story and political base in Luzerne County, where Republicans needed a strong turnout in any hotly contested election. The son of a coal miner, Fine

had excelled in high school, skipped college, and graduated from Dickinson Law School en route to a career as a Republican operative and jurist, including a stint as party chairman in his home base. Fine won elections to county and Superior Court judgeships before being tapped by Duff to run for governor in 1950. Although low-key and often awkward on the stump, Fine handily prevailed in both the GOP primary and the general election in what was, nationally, a banner year for Republicans. Once in office, however, Fine’s overtures to the Grundy faction led to a noticeable cooling in his relationship with Duff. This coolness, combined with Fine’s conviction that he could be a kingmaker at the Republican National Convention, influenced his actions during the 1952 presidential campaign.⁷

What was Pennsylvania’s role to be in 1952 for choosing a party nominee? The situation, as one historian has put it, was “confusing.”⁸ Leading Pennsylvania political figures, notably Senator Duff and Congressman Scott, crisscrossed the nation in 1951 garnering support for General Eisenhower. Owing to their travels neither Duff nor Scott was especially active in the Keystone State. Because Pennsylvania’s April 22 presidential primary was essentially a beauty contest, with only a handful of delegates determined by primary ballots, it was expected that a substantial number of the delegates would follow the “Grundy machine” and back Taft. Some would follow the lead of Jim Duff, and the largest contingent would vote based on the leanings of Governor Fine, who through the winter and spring of 1952 steadfastly declined to express a preference.⁹

Fine added further uncertainty to the political picture in Pennsylvania when he said on several occasions—right up to the Chicago convention—that he might support General Douglas MacArthur depending on circumstances. For Fine, there seemed to be no down side to playing his cards close to his chest. “No one can say for sure,” a *Newsweek* reporter noted just before the Pennsylvania primary, how many delegates would be controlled by the Grundy, Duff, or Fine factions, but “everyone agrees that Fine is the single most powerful man in the Pennsylvania GOP.”¹⁰ With so many delegates’ presidential choice still uncertain in what promised to be a highly competitive contest, it stood to reason that both the Taft and Eisenhower factions would fight for every delegate in the Keystone State. This proved to be the case for only one of the two rival camps.

Taft and his top aides knew that Pennsylvania mattered, but they were surprisingly casual in early 1952 wooing delegates or canvassing the state’s voters. Taft operatives in Pennsylvania were few, and his leading advocates—notably

Grundy, Martin, and former GOP national chairman John Hamilton, a Philadelphia attorney—worked on the premise that by dint of his reputation Taft would claim a clear majority of Pennsylvania's seventy delegates. Between Grundyite control of a dozen or more delegates, and Governor Fine's following of perhaps three dozen more (Taft's men discounted the possibility that Fine would back MacArthur), Taft was, in this view, in a commanding position.¹¹ To this end Taft courted Fine, mostly through correspondence, until ratcheting up his personal appeals to the governor late in the campaign. For example, Taft sent Fine signed photographs and campaign documents to counter polls showing Eisenhower the stronger of the two Republicans against any potential Democratic foe. On one occasion Taft even drove to Harrisburg to confer with Governor Fine and make his pitch.¹²

Taft operatives' pursuit of Pennsylvania votes proved surprisingly sporadic and inept. An ordinarily shrewd political strategist, Eastern Campaign Manager John D. M. Hamilton largely ignored his home state, instead focusing attention on the Northeast and New Jersey. Neither Hamilton nor Senator Martin seems to have considered the implications of Eisenhower running strongly in the state's "beauty contest" primary on April 22. In an internal memo surveying the Pennsylvania political landscape and noting that Governor Fine was uncommitted in the presidential contest, Hamilton concluded that Pennsylvania's April 22 presidential primary was not the place to make a stand. A substantial primary campaign in the Keystone State, Hamilton wrote, was too costly, too time-consuming, and too unlikely to bring the result the Taft camp sought.¹³ Further, as Hamilton's correspondence during this period suggests, he simply assumed that the support of leading Republicans, including Governor Fine, Senator Martin, and former governor James would influence delegates more than any nonbinding primary vote. As a result, Robert Taft's name was not entered on the primary ballot. Aside from write-ins, Pennsylvania Republicans were left to choose between General Eisenhower and Harold Stassen, who repeatedly and disingenuously insisted he was running as a placeholder for Ike.¹⁴

This was a gift to the Eisenhower campaign, whose leaders had early on doubted James Duff's ability to influence delegate preferences. Duff knew otherwise. Even though delegate selection for the Chicago convention was not directly impacted by primary voters' expression of preference for president, Duff argued that a strong showing by Eisenhower in the preference primary would constitute a meaningful selling point for the general right up to the first balloting in Chicago. In this respect Duff proved prescient.¹⁵

As events unfolded, Eisenhower showed great strength in primary contests. On ballots as an absentee candidate he defeated Taft (who had campaigned there) handily in New Hampshire’s March 10 primary, where turnout tripled that of the 1948 presidential poll. Shortly thereafter Eisenhower won 108,000 primary votes in Minnesota as a write-in candidate, just behind favorite son Stassen, whose name was on the ballot. In April Ike lost Nebraska narrowly to Taft, ran ahead of Warren and Stassen in Wisconsin, and carried New Jersey with 61 percent of the vote. On April 22 in Pennsylvania, Eisenhower secured more than 800,000 votes to 128,000 for Stassen and approximately 178,000 for Taft, the latter through write-in votes. That month Ike scored further overwhelming victories in Massachusetts and Oregon. Taft won, largely uncontested, the primary in Illinois and subsequent state convention contests in West Virginia, North Dakota, and Wyoming. On June 3 Taft squeaked past Eisenhower in South Dakota’s primary, the final contest before Republicans would meet in Chicago to nominate their standard bearer in 1952.¹⁶

With Taft strong in states electing delegates through caucus, often where Republicans had little chance to prevail in November (notably the south), it was still Taft’s race to lose. In mid-May both the Associated Press and the United Press International, respectively, showed Taft leading Eisenhower in committed delegates. Those numbers did not discourage Eisenhower supporters. The polls, they said, consistently demonstrated that Eisenhower was the Republicans’ best hope of recapturing the White House after five successive defeats. Pennsylvania’s primary spoke loudly to this point. Taft men said the primary results in Pennsylvania meant little. They conceded that Eisenhower had the support of some Pennsylvania delegates to the Chicago convention, but were confident that at least a dozen would follow the counsel of Senator Martin and Joseph Grundy. That left most delegates presumably “waiting word” from Governor Fine, who was well positioned to bargain with either camp for his support. Engaging in what would prove to be major-league wishful thinking, one Pennsylvania Taft backer told *Newsweek* that the governor’s endorsement of Mr. Republican could pull upwards of sixty or more votes for Taft. “Jim Duff,” he said, “won’t be able to control more than eight delegates.”¹⁷

Fine downplayed the significance of the primary, telling reporters, “Election returns speak what partisans desire to read into them.”¹⁸ The governor relished the attention he received from all sides, including the MacArthur forces. He had early on told Taft supporters that he liked the Ohio senator

but would maintain his uncommitted status for the remainder of the 1952 preconvention campaign.¹⁹ Several Taft men were convinced that Fine was “on the fence” and open to persuasion. Taft’s public relations director, Lou Guylay, wrote his boss that he was cautiously optimistic Fine would support Taft at the GOP National Convention. He said that political reporters he spoke with had mixed opinions on the subject, but “most” thought Fine was leaning to Taft.²⁰ The caveat, John Hamilton added in a separate missive, was that Fine was holding his cards close as Pennsylvania’s “favorite son.”²¹

One alternative scenario, discussed in various news and opinion columns, had Fine joining a “bandwagon” for General MacArthur, who had made no secret of his interest in the Republican presidential nomination. MacArthur’s supporters—among them the Texas oil baron H. L. Hunt—kept in touch with Fine, and Fine did not discourage newspaper and magazine speculation that he was interested in MacArthur if political winds should blow that way. As late as July 3, with Republicans already streaming into Chicago for their conclave, Fine was quoted as saying he felt MacArthur could win and that MacArthur would be “above” the bitterness engendered by the Taft–Eisenhower struggle.²²

Meanwhile, Duff was generating headlines for his vigorous championing of Eisenhower’s cause in Pennsylvania and beyond its borders, even as some key members on Eisenhower’s team were increasingly concerned that Duff was irritating as many delegates as he might win over. Equally active on Eisenhower’s behalf, though less abrasive than Pennsylvania’s junior senator, was Congressman Scott, who traveled thousands of miles in the South and West gathering support for Eisenhower in caucus states.²³

Scott spoke to numerous Young Republican Clubs, student mock conventions, Citizens for Eisenhower groups (a crucial aegis for the Eisenhower campaign in 1952), and party fundraising dinners. He met privately to coordinate organizational efforts with pro-Eisenhower governors, notably Sherman Adams, in New Hampshire, and with Southern Republicans including John Minor Wisdom of Louisiana, Claude Vardaman of Alabama, and Elbert Tuttle of Georgia, each of whom would play critical roles in convention maneuvers. Scott also influenced the reluctant candidate with his infectious enthusiasm.²⁴ Wherever he went, in the four corners of the United States, Scott later recalled, “the big job . . . was to harness the outpouring of popular support [for General Eisenhower] and to translate it into Eisenhower delegates.”²⁵

While Scott operated in high gear, campaigning from coast to coast, and north to south, Fine took pleasure in the fact that he did not need to leave

the executive mansion in Harrisburg to be in the thick of things. As he put it in private correspondence, “I’m being kinda wooed.”²⁶ That was true. Press reports throughout the spring of ’52 referred to Pennsylvania and Michigan as the “focal points of pressure” for the competing camps. The undecided in each delegation could, according to a *Time* magazine report, “easily be enough delegates . . . to turn the decision of the Convention.”²⁷

As a result of the media hype, Fine found himself the subject of ongoing attention from a cadre of Taft and Eisenhower campaign aides, as well as supporters of the dark horse in the race, General MacArthur. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge and campaign manager Herbert Brownell, key Eisenhower supporters, reminded Fine that the fundamental issue in 1952 was to win back the presidency, not to make an ideological statement. Taft’s chances for election in November were slim, they argued; Ike was a winner. Fine, however, did not budge from his uncommitted stance, even after the state’s primary vote spoke volumes about Eisenhower’s popularity.²⁸

Analyzing the vote in Pennsylvania in a private memo directed to Eisenhower—then still based in France and winding up his work for NATO—Duff pointed out that Eisenhower had won sixty-six of the state’s sixty-seven counties, capturing nearly seventy-five percent of the total state-wide Republican vote. Even in Tioga County, Mason Owlett’s home, Ike won three times as many votes as Taft, despite the fact that Owlett has been “so viciously opposed to you.”²⁹ Summarizing the implications of the vote, Duff told Eisenhower that Republicans wanted Eisenhower for president. If the “Old Guard” tried to “hornswoggle us” they “will fail.” If they should succeed, Duff added, “it will destroy the Republican Party in Pennsylvania.” “I think in the final analysis we will be OK when the showdown comes.”³⁰

Senator Taft and his operatives put a different spin on the Pennsylvania primary vote, convincing themselves and seeking to persuade undecided delegates that it was essentially meaningless. Taft believed that a further personal appeal to Fine could help his cause, though he did not seek a second opportunity to meet Fine and Pennsylvania delegates until the Eisenhower forces had convened their own “session”—a picnic at the Eisenhower Farm in Gettysburg the second week of June—during which Eisenhower greeted delegates individually, gave a brief speech defining his candidacy’s goals, and met privately with the still-uncommitted governor.³¹

Fine continued discussing the presidential race with Taft backers, including former US senator Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota, who thanked him for his open-mindedness about Taft’s candidacy, adding that he had shared

with Taft how the Eisenhower forces were “putting on the heat and pressure in Pennsylvania.” The only way Fine could stay uncommitted, Nye subsequently told Taft, was if Taft forces were more proactive in communications with him. Other correspondents pressed the case for each of the major candidates, with Fine’s cousin Albert advocating for MacArthur, while Pennsylvania Young Republican leader Robert Kunzig told the governor that “Taft cannot win,” adding that Fine simply must support Eisenhower. Fine’s response to Kunzig: “There will be no commitment made, and I will see you when I get to Chicago.”³²

One month out from the July convention, the political situation remained fluid and unpredictable. *US News and World Report* weighed in on the candidates’ prospects, suggesting that Taft remained in the lead by forty delegates, but was still approximately sixty short of the 604 needed to nominate. Other assessments showed substantial gains by Eisenhower, though not enough certain votes to win. The outcome of the Republican nominating fight remained very much in doubt, and John Fine seemed poised to play the kingmaker.³³

Dwight Eisenhower returned from Europe and launched his active campaign early in June with a less-than-inspiring speech on a rain-drenched day in Abilene, Kansas. His supporters decided that the best way to persuade delegates that he was the man for the times was to “let the people meet him,” delegation by delegation. In some instances—for example, Ike’s encounters with delegates from northeastern states—the meetings took place at the Eisenhower residence on Morningside Heights at Columbia University, where he was formally on leave of absence as president. In one session, what Stephen Ambrose called “the most important” of all, the meeting occurred in Pennsylvania. John Fine was centrally involved.³⁴

The logistics for bringing most of Pennsylvania’s delegates to Eisenhower’s Gettysburg farm were complex. As his papers in the Pennsylvania State Archives amply confirm, Fine kept abreast of everything, including details about seating arrangements for Eisenhower’s motorcade (Ike would ride in the same car as Fine, Senator Duff, and state senator Harvey Taylor, a key player in Harrisburg). A press availability would follow the picnic at the farm and Eisenhower’s remarks to the assembled crowd.³⁵ The farm gathering, by the Eisenhower camp’s reckoning, was successful, with one major caveat. Ike “joked and bantered” with the close to 120 delegates and alternates who participated, answering questions—even impudent ones—in “his simple, forthright manner.” The general made a strongly positive impression on the delegates. What Eisenhower did not get out of the session was a commitment

from Governor Fine to back him. Fine was still not ready to get off the fence. Asked by a reporter whether he was now moving toward an endorsement of General Eisenhower, Fine replied, “Oh, I wouldn’t say that.” The most he *would* say was that Eisenhower had not harmed his chances in his meeting with Pennsylvania delegates.³⁶

Taft and his Pennsylvania backers took note. Aware that Taft needed to match Eisenhower’s direct appeal to the undecided and persuadable members of the Pennsylvania delegation, John Hamilton arranged for a second delegate conclave, this one at the Hotel Hershey on June 24. John Fine was involved with the planning of this meeting also, no doubt partly to maintain his neutral status. In Hershey Taft had a private breakfast with Fine, met personally with about a dozen delegates, and departed after an informal press conference and dinner, pronouncing himself satisfied with the outcome.³⁷

As testimony to his positioning on the catbird seat, Fine earned high marks from organizers of both events, including effusive thank you notes



FIGURE 1 Dwight Eisenhower’s motorcade through Gettysburg in June 1952 on the way to his farm. *Seated in back:* Governor Fine, Eisenhower, and Senator Duff. Courtesy: Eisenhower Farm National Historic Site.



FIGURE 2 Fine, Eisenhower, and Duff wave to the crowd on the porch of Ike's Gettysburg Farm. Courtesy: Eisenhower Farm National Historic Site.




FIGURE 3 Senator Robert Taft met with Pennsylvania GOP leaders at Hershey, June 24. *Left to right:* Former governor Edward Martin, Governor Fine, Taft, Senator Duff, and state senator Harvey Taylor. Courtesy: Pennsylvania State Archives, Jean Gerdes Photograph Collection (MG-347).

from the presidential candidates.³⁸ Taft went a step further, pitching his candidacy once more to Fine, noting that he was in the race to win and assure the restoration to Washington “of an Administration based on principles of liberty and economy.” Taft said he respected Eisenhower, but the general’s advisers were the same people who had run unsuccessful campaigns in the past several presidential elections. He hoped Fine would “decide to throw your influence on my side” and noted that he was impressed by Fine’s “conscientious approach to the whole problem.”³⁹

Looking ahead to Chicago, Fine set up additional meetings for the Pennsylvania delegation with Taft and Eisenhower to “hear their respective views” and enable them to make a “wise” decision. He planned to attend cocktail parties and other informal events with the candidates and their leading backers. Somehow this would shed the right light on what he needed to do for himself and his party. Taft’s hopes had been buoyed by Fine’s assurance in Hershey that he was genuinely undecided. Arriving in Chicago on July 2 to take up residence in a suite at the Conrad Hilton hotel, Fine remained silent about his presidential preference, milking his public neutrality for all it was worth. It could only have stoked his ego to see himself on the cover of *Time* magazine’s June 30 issue and its lead story headlined “President Maker?”⁴⁰

Fine’s reluctance to declare his support for Eisenhower frustrated a substantial cohort of the general’s supporters in the Pennsylvania delegation, one of whom, Temple University president Robert Johnson, did what he could behind the scenes to pressure Fine to get right with Ike. Working on the assumption that Fine planned to attend the governors’ conference scheduled for Houston in late June, Johnson wrote to the executive vice president of the *Houston Post*, Oveta Culp Hobby—a strong Eisenhower supporter—seeking her assistance. “Would you be good enough,” he wrote, “to try and organize a real effort to impress [Governor Fine] with the importance of coming out for Ike? . . . A little effort on entertainment, etc. of John Fine by the right people will do wonders. . . . We are all working night and day and we must not leave any stone unturned if we can help it.” There’s no indication what Hobby said directly in response to this request, given that Fine did not attend the Houston conclave. Hobby’s papers, however, show that she arranged for all Pennsylvania convention delegates to receive copies of the Eisenhower brief on the fight over seating of Texas delegates. One of her associates promised to send Johnson copies of a pamphlet then in preparation titled “The Texas Steal,” a reference to the arguably crooked way party regulars decided

allocation of delegates to the national convention at a separate convention in Mineral Wells on May 27. Johnson had expressed optimism that Fine was moving in the direction of supporting Eisenhower—but as the Pennsylvania delegates began packing their bags for Chicago, the governor still remained publicly uncommitted.⁴¹

Before departing Harrisburg for Chicago on the first of July, Fine arranged to converse once again with both leading candidates and their key advisers. He was acutely aware of the uncertainty about the delegate count and the likelihood that neither major contender had a lock on the 604 votes needed to nominate.⁴² Taft forces, according to a *Time* preconvention report, were claiming 469 delegates, Eisenhower forces 392, with Warren holding seventy-six favorite-son votes in California, Stassen twenty-six from Minnesota, and Governor Theodore McKeldin of Maryland at twenty-four. More than 200 delegates were either contested or still uncommitted. It became increasingly evident that three blocs of votes were critical to the outcome: three southern states—Texas, Georgia, and Louisiana—where two different slates of delegates were seeking recognition by the convention; Michigan, which would be influenced by its delegation leader, Arthur Summerfield; and Pennsylvania, at least nominally led by Governor Fine.⁴³

Eisenhower's top aides had already made their best arguments to Summerfield and Fine and, according to one account, Fine was "hinting" that he was leaning toward Eisenhower but still unprepared to commit. Consequently, Ike's aides' attention turned now to challenging Taft's domination of the three key southern delegations, seeking to replace them by challengers committed to Eisenhower. If the Taft delegates were seated, Eisenhower's chances of winning the nomination were noticeably diminished. Delegitimizing and disenfranchising members of a state delegation was no easy task, especially so given Taftite control of the convention's apparatus, including its credentials committee. But Herbert Brownell had a hook for his argument: the Taft machine had "stolen" delegates from Eisenhower, not only in Texas but also in Louisiana, and Georgia. The Eisenhower camp, consequently, would propose to change party rules to prevent contested delegates from voting on their own qualifications and those of other contested delegates until their credentials were approved by the convention. This was the substance of the "Fair Play" amendment, which generated enormous publicity in the days prior to the Chicago conclave's official opening. Taft's forces would be forced to defend the undemocratic processes by which delegations from Texas, Louisiana, and Georgia were determined, while

Eisenhower's could highlight the general's grassroots support in the south. So confident were the Eisenhower forces that they held the high ground that they stonewalled desperate efforts by Taft's managers to compromise the issue before the first formal convention balloting.⁴⁴

As a result of this standoff, Taft's agents played hardball, as they were in a position to do. Within the National Committee, Taft advocates were in firm control. One evidence of this was the decision to designate General Douglas MacArthur—a warm friend of Taft and foe of Eisenhower—as the convention keynoter. So it also went with the Credentials Committee, which favored Taft's positions on each delegate credentials challenge. Momentum favoring Fair Play, however, was growing. Pennsylvania's delegation head was not only sensitive to this fact, but also supportive of the challenge Eisenhower forces were posing. On Wednesday July 2, Fine met with Taft's floor manager, Thomas Coleman of Wisconsin, who made a final plea to back Taft both on the coming procedural vote relating to Fair Play and the subsequent presidential balloting. At the conclusion of their conversation, at which Fine made no commitment on either of these votes, he told Coleman that he expected to meet with Herbert Brownell in the morning. Coleman concluded from this conversation that Pennsylvania was probably a lost cause. (Taft himself was not yet persuaded of this.) Coleman also met with Michigan delegation chair Arthur Summerfield in a last-ditch effort to bring him into Taft's camp. Coleman walked away from that discussion without the commitment he sought.⁴⁵

In Chicago Fine was a whirlwind of activity. He began, according to one account, holding “incessant mouth-to-ear confabs with other key figures, scurrying down hotel corridors to elude the overcurious press and praising practically every candidate.” Perhaps Fine's most meaningful conversation before any balloting commenced occurred in his hotel suite with Summerfield, who headed a Michigan delegation that was, like Pennsylvania's, mostly uncommitted. The two men met at least seven times over the course of the next week, not including several encounters and whispered conversations on the convention floor.⁴⁶

Like Fine, Summerfield was much in demand. According to one recent scholarly account, Summerfield, a successful car dealer, was a staunch conservative, though more ideologically flexible and sophisticated than the average Taft supporter. As a member of the Republican National Committee, he had spoken out for conservative positions on issues, and he had consistently supported Senator Joseph McCarthy's anticommunist crusade.



FIGURE 4 Arthur Summerfield and Fine talk strategy in Fine’s hotel room at the Republican National Convention in Chicago. From *Life* magazine, July 21, 1952. Courtesy: Getty Images.

As counterpoint to this, however, Summerfield wanted above all to back a winner in 1952. Anyone who read polls could see that Ike was the party’s best hope for capturing the White House. Summerfield read polls; this clearly influenced his decision in Chicago.⁴⁷

The level of interest in the Pennsylvania and Michigan delegations was highlighted by the visits of key Eisenhower and Taft campaign operatives to Summerfield and Fine, respectively, and widely divergent speculation in the press about how events would play out. Henry Cabot Lodge—who ought to have known—observed in his memoirs that even as the Eisenhower campaign was steadily picking up delegates in the month of June, it could not expect a majority without both Summerfield and Fine coming out publicly on behalf of Ike. “Despite our efforts,” Lodge noted, “both men remained publicly noncommittal to the end.”⁴⁸

While exchanging views in Chicago, Summerfield and Fine, according to one account, “agreed not to reveal their decision immediately.” Before casting ballots for the nominees, they would first vote on the Eisenhower camp’s Fair Play amendment, which originally focused on the Georgia delegation but soon shifted focus to thirteen Taft delegates in Louisiana, who had been ruled legitimate by the National Committee (by a vote of 61–41) despite the

Eisenhower forces’ evidence that the “new” Republicans in Louisiana had soundly defeated the Taftites both in a January 1952 primary and subsequent caucuses.⁴⁹ The fact that both Summerfield and Fine favored the Eisenhower camp’s position—and that a strong majority of their respective delegations would join them when it came time to vote—marked a significant turning point in the convention’s proceedings, as well as their respective political fortunes.

On July 5 Dwight Eisenhower arrived in Chicago, traveling to his headquarters in the Blackstone Hotel. Almost from the moment of his arrival until the balloting over convention rules commenced, he met in his suite with a series of state delegations to express his convictions and answer their questions, taking breaks, as he later recalled, “only when it seemed desirable for me to dash off to meet a group that could not be accommodated in my suite.”⁵⁰ On Sunday July 6 Eisenhower met privately over dinner with Summerfield and Fine, both of whom stated they favored the general but were not ready to announce this. According to Eisenhower biographer Stephen Ambrose, neither man would even assure Eisenhower how their respective delegations would vote on the crucial Fair Play amendment. Eisenhower’s recollection differs. In his memoir, *Mandate for Change*, Ike noted he met with Summerfield and Fine because his campaign manager, Herbert Brownell, was convinced that if they jointly announced their support for his nomination, “the effect would be to start a movement among the uncommitted delegates that would almost certainly assure a nomination on the first ballot.”⁵¹ According to Eisenhower, he did little talking during the dinner as Summerfield and Fine discussed the political landscape. It must have been excruciating for Eisenhower that they promised to endorse him before the first presidential ballot, but could not do so yet. Could he take those promises seriously?

In Summerfield’s case, Eisenhower had more reason to be confident. Summerfield explained that he had promised each Republican presidential contender, including the favorite sons, the opportunity to address his delegation and time for the delegates to discuss their choices. He insisted he was solid for Ike. Fine told Eisenhower that he would wait only until Wednesday the ninth to make his views known publicly on both Fair Play and the presidential balloting, regardless of what Summerfield and Michigan did. The day after the dinner meeting with Eisenhower, Fine caucused with the Pennsylvania delegation and announced he would vote in favor of the Fair Play amendment and hoped others in the delegation would follow his lead.

Fine added that no delegation should be able to select a member of the Credentials Committee or vote on anything else until that committee reported to the convention. When Senator Edward Martin asked what would happen if there was a contest in every delegation, Fine replied, "then we would have to reorganize the Republican Party."⁵²

Mason Owlett agreed with Fine that the delegates should do "what is right," but smelled an effort by Eisenhower forces to "get rid of" Taft votes on the Credentials Committee. Fine was unmoved, noting that the American people would see the contest in terms of justice or injustice. After some further discussion, Fine called for a vote. Fifty-seven of the state's seventy delegates voted with him for Fair Play.⁵³ Fine here showed decisive leadership.

With the Michigan caucus Summerfield took a similar tack. He opposed the so-called Brown Amendment, introduced by Congressman Clarence Brown of Ohio in a bid to save at least seven Louisiana votes for Taft and perhaps tip more delegates in Taft's direction. In the formal balloting on the convention floor, following more than two hours of passionate debate, Michigan delegates voted 45-1 against the Brown amendment, which failed, 658-548. The vote was a strong affirmation of Brownell's strategy, a stinging defeat for the Taft forces, and a harbinger of the balloting for president soon to follow. The vote on Congressman Brown's amendment to Fair Play cost Taft votes he badly needed.⁵⁴ In the subsequent vote over seating a pro-Taft delegation from Georgia, Michigan divided 32-14 to overrule the Credentials Committee decision favorable to seating Taft delegates—a strong majority for the Eisenhower position on this issue.⁵⁵ Equally important, shortly after General Eisenhower's name was placed in nomination on July 10, during an "uproarious floor demonstration" for the general Summerfield announced his support for Eisenhower. And on the first ballot at the convention, Michigan delegates voted thirty-five for Eisenhower, eleven for Taft.⁵⁶

In his embrace of Eisenhower at a critical moment, Summerfield bitterly disappointed Senator Taft. Timed perfectly for maximum impact, his maneuvers earned him the chairmanship of the Republican National Committee and subsequently a place in Eisenhower's cabinet as postmaster general. In his reflections on the convention, Taft wrote that he had anticipated getting twenty-seven delegates from Michigan and made "every reasonable effort" to win Summerfield's support, which never materialized.⁵⁷

Arthur Summerfield had impeccable timing. Fine did not. Whether one blames Fine's maladroitness, simple bad luck, or some combination of the two, his convention hopes dissolved into frustration and chagrin, even as his

candidate prevailed at the close of the first ballot in Chicago. Why was this? Fine had evidently decided that he would follow Summerfield’s lead and declare for Eisenhower, but he intended to wait until Pennsylvania’s votes were needed to put Ike “over the top.” In using this tactic Fine gambled that (a) he could get the convention chair’s attention at the right moment; and (b) Pennsylvania’s vote would assure Eisenhower the nomination. As events turned out, it was a bad gamble.


The crux of the problem involved public relations and several devastating photographs as the bitter fight between Republican moderates and conservatives played out on national television. One of these, published in the *New York Herald-American*, showed Fine sprinting down an aisle at the convention seeking to lead Pennsylvanians in a brief informal caucus before the roll call began on the Georgia delegate challenge on July 8. He needed to caucus with his fellow Pennsylvanians in order to take their political pulse and expected to be recognized by temporary convention chairman Walter Hallanan, from whom he had obtained an oral agreement on a forty-five-minute recess.⁵⁸ An ardent Taft man, Hallanan smelled a rat, confirmed by a tip he received from Tom Coleman that Fine was about to announce his support for Eisenhower’s nomination. (The tip was incorrect, but the perception is what mattered.) Hallanan determined to forestall the “big splash” Fine hoped to make. The temporary chairman could see Fine quite plainly as Pennsylvania’s governor approached the podium, but he refused to recognize him, despite Fine’s pleas to do so, which became increasingly urgent and plaintive as seconds passed.⁵⁹ According to one account, Fine used his “elbow and his bulk to good advantage,” fighting his way to the rostrum, demanding to be recognized for moving a recess. When he continued to be ignored, Fine “beat a tattoo on [Hallanan’s] gavel arm,” to no avail.⁶⁰ Television viewers saw Fine “incoherent with rage” and “quivering from head to foot.” New York journalist Leonard Lurie wrote that “drool sputtered from [Fine’s] mouth as he raced up and down the aisle in front of his delegation.” It was, according to one observer, a monumental temper tantrum.⁶¹

It did not help matters that after Fine “stormed and raged and sputtered and fumed and waved his arms and jumped up and down,” he was effectively pushed off the platform by the Taft managers who controlled it. Then, when asked to announce Pennsylvania’s vote on the Georgia challenge the flustered Fine got the numbers wrong.⁶² He told the convention clerk that Pennsylvania’s vote was fifty-seven for Eisenhower position, and thirteen for Taft. In fact, it was fifty-two for Eisenhower, eighteen for Taft.

Fine Shows Convention How Mad He Can Get



Governor Fine bangs his fist on podium as he argues for a recess before voting on report to seat pro-Ike Georgians. Others are a reporter, Hallanan and Clerk Bellamy.



—Associated Press Wirephotos.

Here the Pennsylvania Governor lets loose with a roar as he shouts in full blast in his heated argument for a recess in the Georgia case. Back to camera is Clerk Bellamy.

FIGURE 5 News clipping from page 2 of the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, July 11, 1952, showing Fine's rant during the RNC convention. Courtesy: Newspapers.com.

Circumstances did not improve for the beleaguered governor when the balloting for president commenced two days later. Having made his way to the floor moments after consuming the second of two scotches in the

convention hotel with former Connecticut congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce, Fine started well enough, declaring his support for Eisenhower and delivering fifty-three votes for the general to fifteen for Taft and two for MacArthur. Hugh Scott, watching developments on the convention floor, noted that this was the result of “good work by Duff, a flood of wires from home [demanding support for Eisenhower] and the fact that Walter Hallanan had shoved Governor Fine too hard!”⁶³

With Eisenhower closing in on the 604 votes needed for nomination as the roll call advanced (Ike claimed 595 votes at the conclusion of the first roll call), Fine believed it was his moment—and Pennsylvania’s—to gain the spotlight by putting the general over the top. He had the votes he needed, but once again failed to get recognized, this time by permanent chairman Joseph Martin. By one columnist’s account, Martin was annoyed that Fine had paraded with Eisenhower forces when the general’s name was put in nomination, though why this should have mattered to Martin (who was neutral in the contest between Taft and Eisenhower) is questionable. A more plausible interpretation was proffered by Harold Stassen’s aide Bernard Shanley. In his diary Shanley recalled that Walter Judd, a friendly congressional colleague of Martin’s and a Stassen delegate to the convention, had approached Martin on the dais as the balloting proceeded and asked him to keep an eye out for Minnesota’s standard if he saw it “jiggled” at the conclusion of the first ballot. At least fifteen Minnesota delegates, including Judd, intended to switch their votes from favorite son Harold Stassen to Eisenhower, and thereby put him over the top for the nomination if their votes were needed.⁶⁴ Whatever Martin’s motive, he was not going to recognize Governor Fine. “Joe, look down here. Hey, Joe, Joe, look down here,” Fine pleaded. Martin instead recognized Minnesota delegation chair Senator Edward Thye, giving Minnesota, rather than Pennsylvania, the honor of assuring a first-ballot nomination for General Eisenhower.⁶⁵

The “kingmaker” from Pennsylvania had done his best, but he now looked more like a politician playing in a league beyond his abilities. Fine quickly and ardently embraced Eisenhower as the party’s standard-bearer and wrote Ike of his satisfaction with his nomination. In light of the televised and still-photo images in Chicago, however, Fine’s attempt to spin his satisfaction with the results did little to salvage his reputation back home. Compounding Fine’s discomfort were political cartoons satirizing his behavior at the convention, one of which, titled “Return of the Prodigal Son,” by Cy Hungerford of the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* showed a beat-up Fine returning from Chicago



FIGURE 6 A Cy Hungerford cartoon on page 1 of the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, July 15, 1952, poking fun at Fine's behavior at the convention. Courtesy: Newspapers.com.

in a barrel with an "I Like Ike" badge. An elephant points at him and says, "I saw you on TV." Constituents' letters to the governor censured him for his lack of decorum. Some of them enclosed copies of the cartoons to accent their criticism of the governor.⁶⁶

It must have been immensely frustrating for Fine to see himself criticized, caricatured, and then marginalized in his home state. Because he rejected Taft at a crucial moment, the Grundyites would have nothing to do with him. His colleagues Duff and Scott could bask in the success of the Eisenhower cause, aware they had contributed materially to Ike's advancement, while

Fine had played a waiting game. It is difficult to imagine how an Eisenhower movement *could* have succeeded without the work of Duff and Scott. Fine’s contribution to the Eisenhower cause seemed, to them and more detached observers, less than consequential. John Fine became a “tragic” character whose political capital was gone. His governorship had two full years to run and included some notable accomplishments. As a powerbroker, however, Fine was through. No meaningful role was offered him in the fall presidential campaign, nor was any federal post tendered him by Eisenhower once his administration took office in 1953. Returning home to Luzerne County after completing his term as governor, Fine remained politically engaged. But he was not even able to win a seat on the county Orphans Court when he ran in 1957. “It was,” Paul Beers wrote, “as sad a thumping as any ex-governor has ever suffered.”⁶⁷

Jim Duff, whose yeoman work for Eisenhower had earned him the right to the first call on key patronage jobs, suffered a fate similar to Fine. Duff remained at war with the conservative wing of the party, which paid him back when he ran for re-election in 1956, losing to Philadelphia mayor Joseph Clark in what should have been an easy race, riding Eisenhower’s coattails. Perhaps the biggest winner in Pennsylvania politics in 1952 was Congressman Hugh Scott. Once Eisenhower’s candidacy achieved its first objective—capture of the Republican nomination for president in 1952—Scott was asked to join the campaign’s inner circle in the fall campaign, where he performed useful chores as an adviser and liaison with southern voters. Both as a congressman and later as US senator, Scott was a steady and valued supporter of Eisenhower’s “Middle Way” presidency.⁶⁸

John Fine’s unhappy experience at the Republican convention did not change much history except for his own. Minnesota delegates stood ready to put Eisenhower over the top and prevent any potential collusion among Stassen, MacArthur, and Taft supporters seeking to prevent Eisenhower’s nomination on a second ballot. Hindsight makes plain that Fine’s refusal to commit himself to Eisenhower earlier was a miscalculation. But, in the context of the confusion and uncertainty about how the presidential balloting would unfold, was it a blunder of first magnitude? Almost no leading political observers *expected* that the Republican nomination would be decided on the first ballot in Chicago. Multi-ballot conventions were the norm, not the exception, into the 1950s. Fine kept abreast of media coverage. He believed he held good cards, perhaps the best. In the end he did not. In retrospect, Fine’s case was less “tragic” than other examples of how timing and luck can

make or break a political career. The Republican presidential nominating struggle in 1952 was a high stakes political game. Even as the Eisenhower forces prevailed in Chicago, John Fine lost.⁶⁹

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NOTES

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1. Pennsylvania was allocated seventy delegates to the Republican National Convention and thirty-two electoral votes in 1952, and it would be natural to expect a substantial historiography on presidential politics. Yet there is virtually no discussion of this subject in the scholarly literature. Most references to Pennsylvania in leading studies of politics and politicians at the national level are made in passing, in a phrase or a sentence. Most historians rely on the insightful but episodic and undocumented account in Paul B. Beers, *Pennsylvania Politics, Today and Yesterday: The Tolerable Accommodation* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1980).
2. Richard Norton Smith, *Thomas E. Dewey and His Times* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), chap. 17; Michael Bowen, *The Roots of Modern Conservatism: Dewey, Taft and the Battle for the Soul of the Republican Party* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), chap. 5; James T. Patterson's *Mr. Republican: A Biography of Robert A. Taft* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1972), 514. William B. Pickett, *Eisenhower Decides to Run* (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 2000), 118–19, cites a secret letter Eisenhower wrote to a handful of supporters on October 14, 1951, saying he was willing to stand for president. Eisenhower added that he wanted to be sure the public wanted him or he would not agree to be a candidate.
3. Michael J. Birkner, "Prowling for Ike': Hugh Scott and the Eisenhower Movement in 1952," paper delivered at the Pennsylvania Political Science

- Association Convention, March 31, 2006; Pickett, *Eisenhower Decides to Run*, chap. 10. Important “others” included volunteer movements organizing for Ike in 1951 that morphed into “Citizens for Eisenhower” once the general agreed to let his name remain on the New Hampshire primary ballot. See Jane Dick, *Volunteers and the Making of Presidents* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1980), 79–85; and Stanley M. Rumbough Jr., *Citizens for Eisenhower: The 1952 Presidential Campaign: Lessons for the Future?* (McLean, VA: International Publishers, 2013), esp. chaps. 5 and 6.
4. “Pennsylvania Politics,” *Life* 28 (May 8, 1950): 118–25; G. Terry Madonna, *Pivotal Pennsylvania: Presidential Politics from FDR to the Twenty-First Century* (Mansfield, PA: Pennsylvania Historical Association, 2008), chaps. 2 and 3. On Taft’s postwar criticisms of Truman’s policies see Patterson, *Mr. Republican*, 435–39, 476–84; and Clarence E. Wunderlin, *Robert A. Taft: Ideas, Tradition, and Party in U.S. Foreign Policy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), chaps. 4 and 5.
 5. Beers, *Pennsylvania Politics*, esp. 112–16; Madonna, *Pivotal Pennsylvania*, chap. 2; and G. Edward Janosik and Lewis A. Dexter, “Pennsylvania,” in *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952*, vol. 2, *The Northeast*, ed. Paul T. David, Malcolm Moos, and Ralph M. Goldman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954), 110–16. For quote, Arthur James to Robert A. Taft, October 18, 1951, copy in John D. M. Hamilton Papers, Box 12, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. Owlett was president of the PMA from 1943 to 1956.
 6. Beers, *Pennsylvania Politics*, 157–64, 179. On Owlett’s dislike for Duff, Smith, Dewey, 496. According to an article in the *Watertown Daily Times*, May 23, 1950, focused on Duff, when Owlett tried to tell Duff how to handle a particular issue while Duff was governor (1947–50), Duff threw him out of his office. Neither man forgot the episode. Article accessed in the E. Harold Young Papers, Box 2, Rauner Special Collections Library, Dartmouth College. In his profile of Duff for the book *Republicans on the Potomac: The New Republicans in Action* (New York: The McBride Company, 1953), 60–64, Jay Franklin (pen name for John Franklin Carter) observed that Duff was viewed as a “me-too-er” by Pennsylvania conservatives, meaning too much like a watered-down Democrat.
 7. On Fine’s cooling with Duff, see clipping from *Lancaster Intelligencer Journal*, July 27, 1951, drawing on an article in *Time* claiming that Fine was moving toward the Grundy camp, leaving Duff stranded in supporting Eisenhower. Accessed in Papers of Governor John Fine (MG-206), Box 8, Republican National Convention Papers Series, Pennsylvania State Archives (hereafter Fine Papers). For a thumbnail sketch of Fine’s background, see Madonna, *Pivotal Pennsylvania*, 39.
 8. Patterson, *Mr. Republican*, 551.
 9. Up to the Republican National Convention in July 1952 the number of Pennsylvania delegates that Fine controlled remained unclear. Some participant

- observers, including Hugh Scott and Temple University president Robert Johnson (an Eisenhower delegate) believed Fine controlled roughly thirty delegates. Harold Stassen aide Bernard Shanley and writers for *Time* and *Newsweek* suggested higher numbers. See, on this, Robert Johnson to Oveta Culp Hobby telegram, June 25, 1952, in Oveta Culp Hobby Papers, Box 1, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library; Hugh Scott, "Come to the Party" (draft of book with same title), p. 101, Box 29, Scott Papers, Small Library, University of Virginia; and Bernard Shanley Diary, dictated June 14, 1952, Bernard Shanley Papers, Box 2, Seton Hall University Special Collections. Shanley (mistakenly) believed Fine controlled sixty votes, a number he likely derived from reports in various newspapers and newsweekly magazines.
10. "Pennsylvania Bosses, Not the People, Pick the Candidate," *Newsweek* 39 (April 21, 1952): 28–29; quote from 28. A former US senator and leading Republican fundraiser from Massachusetts, Sinclair Weeks noted in his diary that Fine was "sitting on 40 delegates in PA, and seems to be for MacArthur." Weeks Diary, February 7, 1952, Box 81, Sinclair Weeks Papers, Rauner Library, Dartmouth College.
 11. See, for example, John Hamilton's blithe assurance to Iowa state representative Ernest Palmer that even without Taft campaigning in Pennsylvania, the Ohio senator was likely to claim fifty-five of the state's seventy delegates to the Chicago convention. Hamilton to Palmer, April 21, 1952, Box 10, Hamilton Papers.
 12. Robert A. Taft to John Fine, June 25, 1952, Fine Papers. On Taft's cultivation of Fine and visit to him in Harrisburg, Patterson, *Mr. Republican*, 551.
 13. Janosik and Dexter, "Pennsylvania," 273.
 14. Pickett, *Eisenhower Decides to Run*, 167. Ten of Pennsylvania's delegates were selected at large by state committees; the remainder were chosen by direct election as district delegates, but not legally bound to support any particular candidate. When the ten at-large delegates were chosen by the state committee on January 17, 1952, four Eisenhower delegates were named, three for Taft, and four uncommitted, according to the draft of Hugh Scott's book, *Come to the Party*. On Eisenhower's consistent strength in polling during the run-up to the convention, see "Taft Has Lead in Delegates: Ike Leads in Popular Polls," *Newsweek* 39 (June 23, 1952), 21. Gallup Polls published in late June showed both leading Democrats, Stevenson and Kefauver, beating Taft, while Eisenhower held substantial leads over both.
 15. For more on Duff in 1952 see Henry Cabot Lodge, *The Storm Has Many Eyes: A Personal Narrative* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), 79–80, 82–83, 86, 95; and Hugh Scott oral history interview conducted by Donald A. Ritchie, January 27, 1986, copy accessed in the US Senate Historical Office, Washington, DC. See also Janosik and Dexter, "Pennsylvania," 272–73.
 16. For the primary results in various states, Michael Barone, *Our Country: The Shaping of America from Roosevelt to Reagan* (New York: The Free Press, 1990),

- 249, and Patterson, *Mr. Republican*, 525–28; for quote, *Newsweek* 39 (April 21, 1952): 28.
17. Quoted in “Pennsylvania: Bosses, Not the People, Pick the Candidate,” 28. On the delegate count as of May 1952, see Patterson, *Mr. Republican*, 529.
 18. “Closer Than Ever,” *Time* 59 (May 5, 1952), quoted from CNN *Time* archive, “Back in Time,” www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1996/analysis/back.time/9605/03/index.shtml.
 19. For an example of Fine’s openness to persuasion and refusal to commit, see his letter to Taft supporter Kenneth Colegrove, April 24, 1952, Box 10, Hamilton Papers. Fine said his decision in Chicago would be “motivated solely by what is best for the nation, the state, and our party.” Colegrove kept on the Fine case in correspondence with John Hamilton. In June, he followed up on Hamilton’s suggestion that he write Fine about the results of a poll allegedly showing that 25 percent of voters would never vote for a military man for president. Colegrove to Fine, June 16, 1952, Fine Papers.
 20. Taft to Ernest L. Bertram, ca. December 1951, copy in Box 12, Hamilton Papers; Guylay to Taft, April 28, 1952, Box 452, Taft Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
 21. John Hamilton to Taft’s administrative assistant Jack Martin, June 4, 1952, Box 425, Taft Papers.
 22. H. L. Hunt to Fine, May 22, 1952, Fine Papers. “Pennsylvania Delegates Swing to Ike,” from *New York Times* syndicate, as published in *Toronto Globe and Mail*, July 7, 1952, accessed in Fine Papers.
 23. On the Eisenhower inner circle’s cooling toward Duff, see Pickett, *Eisenhower Decides to Run*, 167. By contrast, Scott won friends wherever he traveled. Scott interacted via correspondence and in person with dozens of Eisenhower backers from Maine to California. He would touch down in forty states in the course of his labors on behalf of Dwight Eisenhower and claims to have helped organize twenty-eight of them for the Eisenhower campaign. Scott’s expenses were underwritten by campaign contributions that Duff had procured, perhaps \$3,000 in total, according to Scott’s later recollection. For the number of states he visited and helped organize for Eisenhower, and Duff’s role in financially supporting his efforts, Hugh Scott, interview conducted by Frank Van Der Linden for the Formers Members of Congress Oral History Project, September 13, 1976, 26–27, 146. In this same oral history Scott claims he personally secured some 135–40 delegates for Eisenhower, a statement that is not necessarily false, but is impossible to corroborate.
 24. Scott’s full-bore effort on behalf of Eisenhower can be documented in his papers at the University of Virginia, and in Birkner, “Prowling for Ike.” For Scott’s retrospective view of the preconvention campaign, see Scott’s *Come to the Party: An Incisive Argument for Moderate Republicanism* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), chap. 5. The inspired work of Citizens for Eisenhower has never received its just recognition in scholarly literature, but

- see the memoirs by Jane Dick and Stanley Rumbough, respectively, cited in n. 3 above.
25. As quoted in Scott, "Come to the Party" draft.
 26. For reference to being "wooded," see A. H. Fine to Fine, June 3, 1952, Fine Papers. Relevant here is Dwight D. Eisenhower to Milton Eisenhower, May 15, 1952, in *The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower*, vol. 13, *NATO and the Campaign of 1952*, ed. Louis Galambos and Daun Van Ee (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 1214–15. In this letter Ike refers to efforts to reach out to Fine and Michigan Delegation chair Arthur Summerfield. For Fine's assertion of neutrality, see his letter of May 2, 1952, to Ralph Kennamer, a Taft supporter from Alabama, Fine Papers. He continued to insist on his uncommitted status through the month of June. See, for example, Fine to Robert Kunzig, June 30, 1952, Fine Papers.
 27. "'Ike' or Taft: Who Will Decide?" *US News and World Report* 32 (June 13, 1952): 15. This report suggested that Fine might well throw his "25 votes" to Douglas MacArthur.
 28. Janosik and Dexter, "Pennsylvania," 271. See also Brownell, *Advising Ike: The Memoirs of Attorney General Herbert Brownell* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 109; Henry Cabot Lodge, *The Storm Has Many Eyes* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1973), 110.
 29. Duff to Eisenhower, undated "Memorandum on Pennsylvania," but ca. late April 1952, Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential Series, Box 36, Eisenhower Library.
 30. *Ibid.* Eisenhower replied on May 1, 1952, saying he thought that Duff's assessment of the situation in Pennsylvania was "realistic." MacArthur received a meager 6,000 write-in votes statewide in Pennsylvania. Janosik and Dexter, "Pennsylvania," 270.
 31. There is considerable logistical material and correspondence relating to the Gettysburg and Hershey meetings with the leading Republican contenders in Fine's papers. Both candidates and their supporters thanked Fine profusely for his organizing these events and his fairness in dealings with Eisenhower and Taft, respectively. Fine was truly being "wooded."
 32. Nye to Fine, May 23, 1952; A. H. Fine to Fine, June 3, 1952; Robert Kunzig to Fine, June 29, 1952; and Fine to Kunzig, June 30, 1952, all in Fine Papers.
 33. "'Ike' or Taft: Who Will Decide," *U.S. News and World Report* 32 (June 13, 1952): 15–17; quote from 15. The author suggested that Governor Fine was ready to throw at least twenty-five delegates on the first ballot to General Douglas MacArthur. In his July 11, 1952, dispatch for the *New York Times*, "Taft Fights to Stop Eisenhower with Coalition in Ballot Today; Platform Wins Without Clash," W. H. Lawrence cited an Associated Press tabulation indicating that Eisenhower had forged into the lead with 523 delegates—still more than seventy short of nomination.
 34. Stephen Ambrose, *Eisenhower: Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890–1952* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 532.

35. For extensive documentation of the Gettysburg event, see Fine Papers. Arthur Nevins, *Gettysburg's Five Star Farmer* (New York: Carlton Press, 1977), 100–104, provides a detailed account of the preparations and activities related to the Gettysburg picnic.
36. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 532. Fine is quoted in Herbert S. Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades* (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 65.
37. Among other documents on the Hershey event in the Fine Papers, see notes on Hamilton's phone conversation with Fine, June 12, 1952. Hamilton's papers include an undated memo to Taft noting that Taft was “somewhat provoked” by the meeting Fine had arranged with Eisenhower in Gettysburg. Hamilton consequently suggested Taft approach Fine for equal time. This was the origin of the June 24 conclave in Hershey. Box 12, Hamilton Papers.
38. Eisenhower to Fine, June 19, 1952; Taft to Fine, June 25, both in Fine Papers. The head of the Taft for President committee in Pennsylvania, Robert Fisher, wrote on July 1, citing Fine's “unstinting efforts” to make Taft's “party at Hershey a success. . . . All the Taft people thank you from the bottom of their hearts.”
39. Taft to Fine, June 25, 1952, Fine Papers.
40. “I am primarily interested in principle—at this time,” Fine asserted with Delphic imprecision after meeting with Eisenhower at the general's Morningside Heights residence in New York City on June 8. Quoted in Janosik and Dexter, “Pennsylvania,” 274. Evidently, he said something similar to Taft in Hershey. On the publicity for Fine in *Time*, see issue of June 30, 1952, available at: <http://time.com/vault/year/1952>; also Madonna, *Pivotal Pennsylvania*, 39.
41. Robert Johnson, telegram to Oveta Culp Hobby, June 25, 1952; W. H. Francis Jr. to Robert Johnson, June 26, 1952, both accessed in Hobby Papers. Johnson predicted that if Fine would come out for Eisenhower before the balloting Ike would get “at least 58” of the seventy delegates. “Without him, 40.” Fine was one of two sitting Republican governors not to attend their conference in Houston.
42. In their respective memoirs, Herbert Brownell and Henry Cabot Lodge recall Brownell's efforts to swing Fine into the Eisenhower camp. Lodge recalls it yielded nothing until the convention, while Brownell makes no direct reference to his success with Fine, instead noting that he made substantial inroads with the “moderate faction” associated with Fine. See, on this matter, Brownell, *Advising Ike*, 109; and Lodge, *The Storm Has Many Eyes*, 102, 110. Key Taft advisers David Ingalls and Tom Coleman also sought Fine's ear at the convention, as evidenced in their correspondence with Fine in the Fine Papers.
43. “Shifts and Leanings,” *Time* 60 (July 7, 1952): 12–13. On the struggle over the southern delegations, I have drawn for this and the subsequent paragraph on Joel William Friedman, “Judge Wisdom and the 1952 Republican National Convention: Ensuring Victory for Eisenhower and a Two-Party System for

- Louisiana,” *Washington and Lee Law Review* 53 (1996): 42–43. See also “New Leaders, New Zeal, Take ‘Old’ Out of G.O.P.,” *Life* 33 (July 21, 1952): 16, 20. On Eisenhower’s commitment to meeting with Fine before the balloting in Chicago because Fine “controls a large part of the big and strategically important Pennsylvania,” see “Ike’s Date Book,” *Newsweek* 39 (May 26, 1952): 29.
44. Regarding “Fair Play”: the concept is usually credited to Herbert Brownell, but Henry Cabot Lodge in his memoir, *The Storm Has Many Eyes*, 107, says it was originally bruited by Hugh Scott. Whoever deserves the credit, the words reminded voters of the way in which a small cadre of so-called post office Republicans in Texas, Georgia, and Louisiana tried to control delegations for Taft despite ample evidence of Eisenhower’s popularity in those states. The Fair Play amendment gave the Eisenhower camp the high ground and put the Taftites on the defensive. See also “Steamroller at Work,” *Newsweek* 39 (June 23, 1952): 23. This same article stated flatly that Governor Fine “controls 32 votes of the key Pennsylvania delegation.” By contrast, the un-bylined reporter in *Time’s* July 7 issue speculated that Fine could control fifty-seven of the state’s delegates.
 45. Patterson, *Mr. Republican*, 550–51. On MacArthur’s role as keynoter and willing collaborator with Taft seeking to deny Eisenhower the nomination, see William Manchester, *American Caesar* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978), 684–85.
 46. “On Stage and Off, Summerfield and Fine Form [a] Dramatic Team,” *Life* 33 (July 21, 1952): 20–21. The *Life* photo spread includes numerous images of Fine during the convention, including one embarrassing shot of him picking his nose while apparently on the phone with Summerfield.
 47. For an insider’s view of Summerfield’s activity at the convention, see Katherine G. Howard, *With My Shoes Off* (New York: Vantage Press, 1977), 143. Howard was secretary of the Republican National Convention in 1952. Aware that auto executives in Michigan were almost unanimous in supporting Eisenhower for president, Summerfield was, by one account, secretly working in league with the Eisenhower camp in 1952. In public Summerfield claimed neutrality, going so far, according to historian Michael Bowen, as to lie to Michigan congressman Clare Hoffman about his preference for president. On this, Bowen, *The Roots of Modern Conservatism*, 116, 136–37. By contrast, in his memoir *Advising Ike*, 109, Eisenhower campaign manager Herbert Brownell refers to a visit he made to Summerfield in Michigan on behalf of the Eisenhower cause, but does not say how that visit impacted Summerfield’s leanings one way or another. One piece of evidence supporting Bowen’s argument is Eisenhower’s letter to his brother Milton, May 15, 1952, cited in n. 26 above. In that letter Ike alludes to contacts with Summerfield through an intermediary—journalist Milt Dean Hill—in which Summerfield explained his plans to orchestrate support for Eisenhower. Summerfield sought to become, in Milton Eisenhower’s words, “a major factor in your political strategy group.”

48. Lodge, *The Storm Has Many Eyes*, 102, 110. Lodge's comments were not literally true, if by "the end" one means convention balloting, but on his general point—that neither Summerfield nor Fine announced publicly their support for Eisenhower before the 'Fair Play' debate concluded—his recollection is accurate. On Summerfield's declaration for Eisenhower as nominating speeches were being made on July 11, see William Lawrence, "Taft Fights to Stop Eisenhower with Coalition in Ballot Today," *New York Times*, July 11, 1952.
49. Quoted in "On Stage and Off," *Life* 33 (July 21, 1952): 20. See also Friedman, "Judge Wisdom and the 1952 Republican National Convention," 50–60. According to James Reston, "Eisenhower in Bid for 2 Key States," *New York Times*, July 7, 1952, 1, 15, Fine and Summerfield suggested restricting the original Fair Play amendment to delegates facing a "major contest." Knowing how important Pennsylvania and Michigan were to Eisenhower's chances, and seeking the greatest possible support for Fair Play, Brownell immediately accepted the proposal. This took Florida, Mississippi, Kansas, and Missouri out of the debate. Lodge, *The Storm Has Many Eyes*, 102, 110.
50. Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1963), 41. On Eisenhower's tireless courting of delegates in the month leading to the Chicago convention, see Pickett, *Eisenhower Decides to Run*, chap. 15.
51. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 41. Ambrose, *Eisenhower*, 538. Unfortunately, Ambrose provides no citation for this assertion. Herbert Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades*, 89, misstates the date and purport of the meeting.
52. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change*, 41–42. See also the minutes of Pennsylvania delegation caucus meeting, July 7, 1952, in Fine Papers.
53. Minutes of Pennsylvania delegation caucus meeting, July 7, 1952, Fine Papers. See also William H. Lawrence, "Eisenhower in First Test Wins on Disputed Delegates, 658 to 548," *New York Times*, July 8, 1952.
54. Patterson, *Mr. Republican*, 554–55; Parmet, *Eisenhower and the American Crusades*, 88–89. Brown's move, historians agree, was a blunder. It changed the issue from the original Taft plan to "compromise" by accepting that the sixty-eight contested Taft delegates in Louisiana, Texas, and Georgia could not vote on *their own* delegate contest, but they *could* vote on the others. Instead, Brown's point of order would allow the contested delegates from these states to vote on their own qualifications. As one writer notes, "instead of casting . . . the Eisenhower forces as the leaders of a movement to change traditional party rules, Brown's amendment became the vehicle for the convention vote." It thus became easier for uncommitted delegates to vote with the Eisenhower forces. On this point, Friedman, "Judge Wisdom and the 1952 Republican National Convention," 67.
55. William H. Lawrence, "Taft Fights to Stop Eisenhower with Coalition in Ballot Today; Platform Wins without Clash," *New York Times*, July 11, 1952, 1; James W. Miller, "Michigan," in *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952*, vol. 4,

- The Midwest*, ed. Paul T. David, Malcolm Moos, and Ralph M. Goldman (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1954), esp. 50–55.
56. Janosik and Dexter, “Pennsylvania,” 52–54.
 57. See “Analysis of the Results of the Chicago Convention,” which Taft wrote while vacationing in Pointe-au-Pic, Quebec, the latter part of July 1952, in *The Papers of Robert A. Taft, Volume 4, 1949–1953*, ed. Clarence E. Wunderlin Jr. (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press 2006): 398–402; quotes from 400. Regarding Pennsylvania’s governor, Taft claimed that, contrary to expectation, Fine had “forced” his own representative on the Credentials Committee to “reverse the stand he had taken after hearing the evidence” (400–401).
 58. Newspaper publications of the photograph can be found in Fine Papers. For an excellent account of the maneuvering before the vote on the Fair Play amendment see Friedman, “Judge Wisdom and the 1952 Republican National Convention,” 33–97. However, Friedman does not discuss the critical roles of Michigan and Pennsylvania in the deliberations preceding the floor votes or the votes of these states on the Georgia contest that followed the Louisiana victory by Eisenhower forces.
 59. Scott, *Come to the Party*, 102. Also, “New Leaders, New Zeal,” 21; and for the quote, Fulton Lewis syndicated column, “Fine Got Political Lesson for Show of Bad Manners,” undated but ca. mid-July 1952, accessed in Fine Papers.
 60. “Daily Graphic” of the *New York Herald American*, July 10, 1952, copy in Fine Papers.
 61. Quoted in Beers, *Pennsylvania Politics*, 184–85.
 62. Undated letter to the editor of the *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette*, in Fine Papers; see also “The Sputtering Sphynx,” an editorial in the *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, July 14, 1952, copy in Fine Papers. An editorial in the *Peoria Journal*, undated, was titled “Pity Poor Pennsylvania.” It referred sarcastically to Fine’s “antics,” suggesting that Fine’s behavior during the Georgia delegate challenge “demonstrated a pique that would better befit a spoiled child than the governor of a great state.” “By his actions, he has been revealed to the nation as a very small man.” Fine Papers.
 63. Scott quote is from the draft of chapter 10 of his book *Come to the Party*. On the Scotches with Mrs. Luce, Beers, *Pennsylvania Politics*, 184–85.
 64. During the Eisenhower demonstration Fine had “trooped noisily down the center aisle of Convention Hall” with Eisenhower men Lodge and Dewey. This, according to conservative syndicated columnist Fulton Lewis Jr., was “an insult to Martin.” “Fine Got Political Lesson for Show of Bad Manners,” undated but circa mid-July 1952, Fine Papers. For Judd and Martin, see Bernard Shanley diary, dictated July 20, 1952, in Box 2, Shanley Papers, Seton Hall University Special Collections..
 65. Brownell, *Advising Ike*, 117–18; Alex Kirby, David G. Dalin, and John F. Rothmann, *Harold E. Stassen: The Life and Perennial Candidacy of the Progressive Republican* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2013), 147.

“NOT SO FINE”

66. The correspondence and cartoons are in Fine Papers.
67. Beers, *Pennsylvania Politics*, 188–89.
68. Scott’s political views and activities as a US senator are chronicled in his participant-observer memoir, *Come to the Party*.
69. For an argument, largely congruent with mine about Fine’s gamble, concluding that “the country judge turned governor was playing in a league well beyond his ability,” see Michael Young and G. Terry Madonna’s 2008 syndicated column, “Politically Uncorrected: When Just Fine Wasn’t Good Enough,” <https://www.fandm.edu/. . ./285288020884166995>.

2017 PENNSYLVANIA WINNERS AT THE NATIONAL HISTORY DAY COMPETITION

Linda Ries

Pennsylvania students included one national champion, one second-place champion, and one third-place champion among many others at the National History Day competition at the University of Maryland in June 2017. The theme was “Taking a Stand in History.” Our congratulations to all students!

National History Day (NHD) is a nonprofit education organization in College Park, Maryland. Established in 1974 NHD offers year-long academic programs that engage over half a million middle and high school students around the world annually in conducting original research on historical topics of interest (<http://nhd.org>).

For more information on the Pennsylvania and regional competition go to <http://pa.nhd.org>. Judges are key to the success of the National History Day program. If interested in participating, contact Jeff Hawks, NHD in PA Coordinator, at eddirector@armyheritage.org or 717-258-1102.

National Champion and National Endowment for the Humanities Scholar—Senior Individual Website

Title: “Beyond the Cardigan.” *Student:* Joanna Harlacher; *Teacher:* Elizabeth Lewis; *School:* Donegal High School, Mount Joy, PA.

Second Place—Junior Individual Exhibit

Title: “Mary Beth Tinker: The Voice behind Student Free Speech.” *Student:* Brendan Hung; *Teacher:* Joseph Echternach; *School:* Radnor Middle School, Bryn Mawr, PA.

Third Place—Senior Group Exhibit

Title: “A Force of Nature: Wangari Maathai Fights for the Environment and the People.” *Students:* Sara Skwaryk, Rebecca Wahlenmayer, and Elizabeth Wahlenmayer; *Teacher:* Randy Styborski; *School:* Girard High School, Girard, PA.

The George Washington Leadership in History Award—Junior Individual Performance

Title: “Taking a Stand in the Shadows: The Culper Spy Ring during the Revolutionary War.” *Student:* Lilianna Hug; *Teacher:* Annelise Carleton-Hug; *School:* Salamander Meadows Homeschool, Ohiopyle, PA.

Outstanding Entry from Pennsylvania—Junior Group Website

Title: “Quietly Taking a Stand in Every Neighborhood: How Mr. Rogers Changed Children’s Television and Influenced Generations.” *Students:* Isabelle Meyers, Henry Meyers; *Teacher:* Josh Elders; *School:* Peters Township Middle School, McMurray, PA.

Outstanding Entry from Pennsylvania—Senior Individual Performance

Title: “Rosa Parks: Taking a Stand by Sitting Down.” *Student:* Sydney Altemose; *Teacher:* Eric Mark; *School:* Bishop McDevitt High School, Harrisburg, PA.

The following entries finished in the top ten:

Fifth Place—Junior Individual Performance

Title: “Taking a Stand in the Shadows: The Culper Spy Ring during the Revolutionary War.” *Student:* Lilianna Hug; *Teacher:* Annelise Carleton-Hug; *Category:* Junior Individual Performance; *School:* Salamander Meadows Homeschool Ohiopyle, PA.

Fifth Place—Junior Group Website

Title: “Quietly Taking a Stand in Every Neighborhood: How Mr. Rogers Changed Children’s Television and Influenced Generations.” *Students:* Isabelle Meyers, Henry Meyers; *Teacher:* Josh Elders; *School:* Peters Township Middle School; McMurray, PA.

Sixth Place—Junior Individual Website

Title: “Hernando de Soto Polar: An Economic Answer to Terrorism.”
Student: Margaret Atkins; *Teacher:* Helena Ryder; *School:* Academy of Notre Dame De Namur, Villanova, PA.

Seventh Place—Senior Individual Performance

Title: “Rosa Parks: Taking a Stand by Sitting Down.” *Student:* Sydney Altomese; *Teacher:* Eric Mark; *School:* Bishop McDevitt High School, Harrisburg, PA.

Tenth Place—Senior Paper

Title: ““God Rewards Fools”- Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman’s Stand to Revolutionize Cryptography.” *Student:* Chloe Makdad; *Teacher:* Jessica Hetrick; *School:* Tyrone Area High School, Tyrone, PA.



FIGURE 1 Joanna Harlacher.




FIGURE 2 Brendan Hung.

NATIONAL HISTORY DAY CONTEST



FIGURE 3 Sydney Altemose.



FIGURE 4 Sara Skwaryk, Rebecca Wahlenmayer, and Elizabeth Wahlenmayer.

PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY



FIGURE 5 Lilianna Hug.



FIGURE 6 Isabelle Meyers and Henry Meyers.

NATIONAL HISTORY DAY CONTEST



FIGURE 7 Parade group photo.

NOTE

The editor thanks Jeff Hawks, Pennsylvania History Day coordinator, for his assistance with this article. All photos are courtesy of NHD in PA.

BOOK REVIEW

The Pennsylvania Updike

Adam Begley. *Updike*. New York: HarperCollins, 2014. 558 pp. Hardcover, \$29.99; paper, \$17.99.

Jack De Bellis with David Silcox. *John Updike's Early Years*. Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 2013. 174 pp. \$65.

James Plath, ed. *John Updike's Pennsylvania Interviews*. Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 2016. 265 pp. \$85.

The centrality of Pennsylvania, and especially of his native Berks County, in author John Updike's life, literary achievement, and ultimate vision comes through vividly in Adam Begley's biography *Updike*, Jack De Bellis's more specialized study *John Updike's Early Years*, and James Plath's collection of Updike's Pennsylvania interviews, many of which were done in Updike's home county. Until he was eighteen and left for Harvard, Updike said, "there were hardly twenty days that I didn't spend in Pennsylvania," and while after that departure he no longer lived in Berks County for an extended period, he said, "though I left Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania has never left me. It figures in much of my work, and not just the earlier."¹ Indeed, his early story "Friends from Philadelphia" and his first novels *The Poorhouse Fair*, *Rabbit, Run*, and *The Centaur*, are all set in barely fictionalized versions of his native Shillington, the nearby city of Reading, and other Berks County locations, which also provide locales not only for the early "Olinger" stories (the name refers to a town based on Shillington) but for some of the stories, poems, and novels written throughout a literary career of over fifty years and some sixty books including the massive *Rabbit Angstrom* tetralogy of novels,

arguably his greatest achievement. He even wrote a play about Pennsylvania's only president, James Buchanan.

Furthermore, many of the non-Pennsylvania novels and stories show the influence of Pennsylvania patterns. Ipswich, Massachusetts—the north-of-Boston town where Updike lived for many years and which is the model in the early, non-Pennsylvania novel *Couples* for his fictional Tarbox, Massachusetts—is another Shillington in many ways, with parallels including the small town named after a prominent family, the proximity of the countryside, the presence of a dominant church (Congregational in Tarbox rather than Lutheran in Shillington), and a close group of friends with a stream of erotic attraction running through it. In *Couples*, when countercultural youth gathering on the town green reject the dominant values of Tarbox, Adam Begley observes, “To Updike, Ipswich scorned was Shillington scorned” (322). Based in many of its aspects on Ipswich is Updike's Eastwick, Rhode Island, of *The Witches of Eastwick* and his last novel *The Widows of Eastwick*, and the Eastwick in these two books may be read, partially, as still another Shillington, but one beset by even darker forces.

John Hoyer Updike was born in Reading Hospital on March 18, 1932, the son of Wesley and Grace Hoyer Updike, a New Jersey father who became a math teacher at Shillington High School and a mother of Pennsylvania German descent with deep roots in Berks County. Both parents were graduates of nearby Ursinus College, although John's mother, an aspiring writer, also had an M.A. in English from Cornell. Living in straitened circumstances during the Depression, John's family included his maternal grandparents, John and Katherine Hoyer, and this close group of five occupied an ample white brick house bought in happier times in the town that remained a model of nurturing stability in John's mind. Even though the family was uprooted when he was fourteen by his mother's powerful desire to move about ten miles from Shillington to the farm and small sandstone farmhouse in which she had been raised, John continued to attend Shillington schools.

John Updike never tired of trying to describe the distinctive qualities of his Pennsylvania and how it differed from New England and elsewhere: “New Englanders are less giving, in a way, than the Pennsylvania Dutch.”²² “People in that part of Pennsylvania are somehow more open. And there's a sort of warmth that got me through the Rabbit novels. That Pennsylvania—Lutheran or something, I don't know what it can be traced to—but there's

something about it that makes it easy to write about.”³ Yet just as James Joyce had to leave Ireland to write about it in many of his finest works, Updike had to leave Berks County. Updike told one interviewer, “There comes a time when you must test yourself against the world,” and to another he said, “I think I couldn’t have had my writing career if I had stayed in Pennsylvania. On the other hand, I couldn’t have had my writing career if I hadn’t had all that Pennsylvania experience”⁴

Although John Updike attracted considerable personal interest and critical attention from nearly the beginning of his publishing career, he established early a pattern of making extensive use of his own life in his fiction, and he discouraged biographers from delving into it too deeply. As age and fame advanced, he may have attempted to forestall detailed biographical study with his own *Self-Consciousness: Memoirs* (1989). He wrote in his foreword, “I was told, perhaps in jest, of someone wanting to write my biography—to take my life, my lode of ore and heap of memories from me! The idea seemed so repulsive that I was stimulated to put down . . . these elements of an autobiography.”⁵ Updike’s death on January 27, 2009, however, both renewed interest in all facets of his work and opened the gates to more extensive biographical investigation and publication. Of the three books under review here, Adam Begley’s *Updike* and Jack De Bellis’s *John Updike’s Early Years* are both biographies, and James Plath’s *John Updike’s Pennsylvania Interviews* contains material for future biographical work as well as commentary on his own writing by Updike, himself.

Begley’s biography appeared in 2014, was widely reviewed and praised, and introduced Updike’s world readership to many details of his personal and creative life hitherto known only to relatively few scholars and persons close to him. A central focus of Begley’s rich and complex study is Updike’s early expressed desire to ride a “thin pencil line” out of Pennsylvania and into a wider world but that the stability of that Pennsylvania point of origin never left him. Indeed, Begley’s first chapter is “A Tour of Berks County,” and he concludes his narrative, “Up until the last weeks of his life, when he was too sick to write, he was always that little boy on the floor of the Shillington dining room, bending his attention to the paper, riding that thin pencil line into a glorious future, fulfilling the towering ambition of his grandest dreams. ‘I’ve remained,’ he once said, “all too true to my youthful self” (486).

The pattern of the firm Pennsylvania floor of experience and the artistic flight upward and outward driven by high if often carefully hidden ambition asserted itself early. An Olinger story called “Flight” concerns the intellectual

promise and prophecy of departure of a provincial boy, one among many Updike alter egos in his fiction. Unlike the biographical histories of childhood dislocation and slow, gradual development that characterize some American writers—the losses of a father and social position in the lives of Hawthorne, Melville, and Twain, for example—Updike's is a story of solid early support and development in his teens of larger artistic purpose. From the age of twelve first in Shillington and then in the old-fashioned Pennsylvania farmhouse without plumbing or electricity in Plowville, he read and studied the *New Yorker*, the sophisticated urban magazine that was to become his gateway to literary success. A childhood lover of Disney's cartoons, the teenage Updike was attracted as much to the *New Yorker's* famous drawings, as the cartoons were always called, as to the fiction or poetry. For Shillington school publications, Updike wrote numerous poems and prose pieces and contributed hundreds of his own drawings, activities he repeated for the *Harvard Lampoon*, which became his avenue to literary success in New York. Yet Updike's earliest significant published story, "Friends from Philadelphia," written at Harvard and accepted by the *New Yorker*, the venue for which he had trained for almost a decade, is set in a version of Shillington.

When Updike started at the *New Yorker*, his dream job, in his early twenties, he often wrote "Talk of the Town" pieces about New York, but he soon left the city for small-town and suburban Ipswich, Massachusetts. As Begley stresses, "He would not be a New York writer, and New York would not be his subject" (123), or, at least, not his central subject. As if to separate himself from New York and its literary world without forsaking literary use of experience and knowledge that would have been the envy of most young American writers of his era, Updike created Henry Bech, an alternative self who became the writer-protagonist in a number of books and stories and was a born and bred New Yorker. John Updike eventually ranged much farther afield in such books as *The Coup* (set in a fictional Islamic African country), *Brazil* (set in a Brazil interwoven with elements of the Tristan and Isolde myth), *In the Beauty of the Lilies* (ranging over four generations of a family and in settings from New Jersey and Delaware to New York City and Colorado), *Gertrude and Claudius* (a clever prequel to *Hamlet* and set, naturally, in Denmark), *Terrorist* (regarding an American-born Muslim teenager), and a trilogy of novels based on Hawthorne's *The Scarlet Letter*, as well as volumes of poetry, a play, and many reviews and other prose pieces about an extraordinarily wide variety of subjects. Shillington never left him, however. Describing Updike's last days, Adam Begley refers to a very late

poem, “He assured us one last time that Shillington, ‘draped in plain glory the passing days.’ Distilled over the decades, his nostalgia was now as pure as sunlight in the dead of winter: ‘Perhaps / we meet our heaven at the start and not / the end of life’ (482), suggesting the centrality of Pennsylvania, first and last, to him.

Over many years, Jack De Bellis has written extensively about John Updike and, with help in gathering material from Updike’s Berks County contact David Silcox, published in 2013 a very different kind of biography from Adam Begley’s more comprehensive study. De Bellis’s more specialized account in *John Updike’s Early Years* covers less time in Updike’s life than does Begley’s, but it includes unique records of many memories and observations from Updike’s Pennsylvania friends and acquaintances, material that is simply not available elsewhere. Three of Updike’s closest classmates, including one who dated him during his senior year of high school, died before De Bellis began the interviews from which much of this unique testimony is drawn, reminding us of the urgency of De Bellis’s project and how it soon would be impossible to repeat. This biographical study conveys a richness and immediacy of experience, and the testimonials included are especially important in critical analysis of a writer so much of whose material was so close to incidents in his early life. As De Bellis notes of the “two dozen interviews” in his “Introduction,” “the same voices that spoke to Updike spoke to me” (xix). De Bellis argues even more strongly than Begley for the influence of the physical and cultural Shillington—and especially for that of Updike’s high school classmates—on his work, uncovering numerous parallels between persons and places in life and art. Especially useful in this regard is material in the chapter, “Inspirations and Models.”

John Updike was a deeply ironic and often humorous writer, and students of the comic in his work will be delighted by a whole chapter in *Early Years* on clowning, including many school pranks. Updike became such a distinguished gray eminence in his later public appearances that we need to peel that back to recover the impishness, irreverence, cool comic distance, and even the ludic daring that was part of his life and is central to his complex vision. In his clowning, John Updike took after his extroverted father rather than his more withdrawn and sometimes moody mother, whose interest in writing inspired his creativity. Updike was a bookish and sometimes eccentric youth, but he was also a prankster and a risk-taker. He liked to drive dangerously, spinning his father’s old Buick on gravel, driving without his hands on the wheel, and sliding from the driver’s seat to the running board

and eventually into the back seat in an elaborate steering exchange (62). *Early Years* cites numerous reflections in Updike's works of this clowning and daredevil streak such as the dramatic schoolroom pranks in the opening chapter of *The Centaur* (64). Updike has been the victim of a certain amount of dour moralizing and simplistic moral judgment, partly because he was sometimes seen and envied late in life as a too-successful establishment writer, partly because of adventurous and transgressive sex in his art and life (especially during the Ipswich years), and partly because he often created flawed, compromised, and fallible characters such as the erratic Rabbit Angstrom. De Bellis's material on clowning and daring reminds us of the fundamental nature both of his comic vision and of his defiance of convention.

Although De Bellis's book focuses on Updike's early days, his knowledge of Updike's whole life and literary output is copious and detailed, and he provides numerous instances of later manifestations of the qualities and habits he describes in *Early Years*. For example, De Bellis has uncovered many instances in Updike's later life of his love for drawing even though he veered away professionally from this kind of creativity after his post-Harvard year at Oxford's Ruskin School of Drawing and Fine Art. De Bellis's detailed research has resulted in fifty-seven pages of useful appendices including an Updike chronology and listing of Updike's numerous published writings set in Pennsylvania, early contributions to his elementary school paper *The Little Shilling* and his high school continuations in *The Chatterbox*, and brief descriptions of Updike's high school administrators, teachers, and schoolmates before, in, and after his class of 1950, as well as elementary and junior high school faculty. The one thing missing is a map of Shillington as it was in Updike's youth, which would be useful to Updike's many readers not familiar with Berks County. Nevertheless, in its profusion of detail, *John Updike's Early Years* gives us an unparalleled view of Updike's Pennsylvania roots and contexts, and it provides valuable information and insights into the later literary consequences of the Pennsylvania Updike.

James Plath is the founding leader of the John Updike Society, which was organized soon after the author's death in 2009. Plath has done much to promote the enhanced interest in Updike's life and work following his death including assisting in the establishment of the *John Updike Review*. *John Updike's Pennsylvania Interviews* does invaluable service to other scholars in combing through and gathering together many of Updike's thoughts and others' impressions of him as expressed in regional sources such as the

Philadelphia Inquirer and the *Reading Eagle*, possibly fugitive and transient publications such as *Berks County Living* and a college student newspaper, and transcribed speeches and radio broadcasts. Here we have the questions and concerns of Pennsylvania interviewers and interlocutors, and we also have Updike as he chose to appear and respond in his home territory. Most numerous are the nine interviews by National Public Radio's Terry Gross; she is also the most skilled and aggressive interviewer. Among other matters, she is the most forward in pressing Updike on sex in his work, which he is more than willing to discuss but which was often minimized by more reticent interviewers and readers in his home territory. Also noteworthy are Updike's numerous comments on his youthful Lutheranism and its influence on his later life, for as a regular churchgoer, he was somewhat unusual among recent major American writers.

Although Plath lists himself as "editor" of *Pennsylvania Interviews*, he is a major Updike critic and scholar, and he supplies a perceptive and useful "introduction and conclusion in which he synthesizes some of the material in this anthology of interviews. He is particularly good at identifying common denominators in Updike's comments on Berks County and Pennsylvania in a larger sense. Quoting others, he includes a "Pennsylvania knowingness" that "the truth is good" but a respect for the "tolerant" and "amiably confused" and an appreciation for the "inevitable conflicts" in life and that "humans weaken." He notes Updike's identification of the "Pennsylvania essence" as a "doughy middleness" that signifies more than middle-class values in a middle-states location and doughy Pennsylvania Dutch food but rather an emphasis on kneading as the means to the end of a blended and molded whole, which in turn is related to the Pennsylvania "sense of community" (247–48, 251).

Begley's *Updike*, De Bellis's *John Updike's Early Years*, and Plath's *John Updike's Pennsylvania Interviews* complement each other and can profitably be read together both by scholars and general readers seriously interested in Updike. Among many instances of this is Plath's inclusion of William Ecenbarger's June 12, 1983, article, "Updike Is Home," a Shillington interview Begley also uses in his first chapter as illustrative of Updike's artistic method of turning his own experience into art, in this case a July 4, 1983, *New Yorker* story called "One More Interview" published less than a month after Ecenbarger's article, and both the interview and Begley's treatment of Updike's story are enhanced by the Shillington detail in De Bellis's book.

BOOK REVIEW

The original results of Adam Begley's research and reflection on John Updike's life and work are too numerous to list, here, and his biography is truly groundbreaking, but one especially illuminating aspect is detailed information on John Updike's world traveling—which was very extensive, especially later in his life—and its literary consequences. The boy from Shillington and Plowville traveled a long way in many senses, but Begley, De Bellis, and Plath agree in seeing John Updike's deepest commitment, wherever he traveled, as expressed in the statement that Pennsylvania, "is where the self I value is stored."⁶

RICHARD G. ANDRONE
Albright College, Emeritus

NOTES

1. Dorothy Lehman Hoerr, "In the Limelight: Shillington Native, World-Reknown[ed] Author John Updike." *Berks County Living*, November 2004, 48, with added text from the original tape-recorded interview. Reprint in Plath, ed., *John Updike's Pennsylvania Interviews*, 222. Chuck Ungar, director, "Profiles in Excellence: John Updike," Pennsylvania State University: WPSU-TV video segment, May 3, 1983; printed in Plath, ed., *John Updike's Pennsylvania Interviews*, 67–69.
2. Marty Crisp, "Defrocking the Muse." *Lancaster Sunday News*, February 4, 1996, H1, H3; reprint in Plath, ed., *John Updike's Pennsylvania Interviews*, 157–60.
3. Hoerr, "In the Limelight," 231.
4. Terry Gross, "Fresh Air with Terry Gross: John Updike (S)," *Fresh Air*, Philadelphia: WHY Radio, February 9, 1988; printed in Plath, ed., *John Updike's Pennsylvania Interviews*, 100. Carlin Romano, "The Playful Literary Legend," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, June 10, 2007, H1, H9; reprinted in Plath, ed., *John Updike's Pennsylvania Interviews*, 240.
5. John Updike, *Self-Consciousness: Memoirs* (New York: Fawcett Crest, 1989), xv.
6. Updike, as quoted in De Bellis, *John Updike's Early Years*, 23.

**PENNSYLVANIA STATE ARCHIVES
AND THE PENNSYLVANIA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION
SCHOLARS IN RESIDENCE PROGRAM, 2018**

The Pennsylvania State Archives and the Pennsylvania Historical Association invite applications for the 2018–2019 Scholars in Residence Program. The Scholars in Residence Program provides support for up to four weeks of full-time research and study in manuscript and state record collections maintained by the Pennsylvania State Archives in Harrisburg.

Residency programs are open to all who are conducting research on Pennsylvania history, including academic scholars, public sector professionals, independent scholars, graduate students, educators, writers, filmmakers, and others. Residencies may be scheduled for up to four weeks at any time during the period June 15, 2018–August 15, 2018; stipends are awarded at the rate of up to \$800 per week.

Applicants are encouraged to submit research topics related to Pennsylvania history, and as Pennsylvania relates to the Mid-Atlantic region. They are further encouraged to identify relevant archival collections, assess their availability and accessibility, and discuss their research agenda with appropriate staff prior to submitting a proposal. Because the State Archives is interested in making history meaningful and accessible to diverse audiences, research that is likely to result in widespread dissemination through nonspecialized publications, films, exhibitions, or other means is particularly welcome. Research topics that may have an impact on public policy are also most welcomed.

Applications will be evaluated by the following criteria: the significance of the research proposed; the clarity of the proposal; the quality of the work anticipated and the likelihood that the proposed project will be successfully completed; the relevance of the research topic to State Archives programs;

the value of State Archives resources to the proposed topic, including the imaginative use of nontraditional sources; and plans for dissemination of the results of the research.

For a full description of the residency program and application materials, as well as information about State Archives research collections, go to the PHMC Web site: <http://www.phmc.pa.gov/Archives/News-Programs/Pages/default.aspx>

You may also email: RA-PHMCscholars@state.pa.us or call (717) 705-5785 or write:

Scholars in Residence Program
Pennsylvania State Archives
350 North Street.
Harrisburg, PA 17120-0090

Deadline for application is February 15, 2018. Notification of awards will be made in early April. Please post or pass on to a colleague.

The Pennsylvania State Archives Scholars in Residence Program is made possible by the generous financial support of The Pennsylvania Heritage Foundation (PAHeritage.org) and the Pennsylvania Historical Association (PA-History.org).

The State Archives does not discriminate based on sex, race, creed, age, sexual orientation, national origin, or disability. Individuals with disabilities who require assistance or accommodation to participate in this program should contact the Archives at (717) 705-5785 or the Pennsylvania TDD relay service at (800) 654-5984 to discuss their needs.

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The Pennsylvania Historical Association announces the **Dr. Irwin M. Marcus Prize** for the for the best senior paper on Pennsylvania history at the Pennsylvania state competition of National History Day. The first award will be given at the 2018 competition in May. The award carries a cash prize and honors Dr. Marcus (1935–2016), who taught history at Indiana University of Pennsylvania and was a senior paper judge for History Day for over twenty-five years. The winning paper will be considered for publication in *Pennsylvania History*. For more information contact Jeff Hawks at: <https://www.armyheritage.org/education-programs/national-history-day-in-pa>.

2017 CRIST AND KLEIN PENNSYLVANIA HISTORY ARTICLE PRIZES AWARDED

The Robert G. Crist Prize is awarded for an outstanding article illuminating the history of Pennsylvania published by a graduate student in *Pennsylvania History* every odd-numbered year. Begun in 1997 (for the years 1995–96), the prize includes one year's complimentary subscription to *Pennsylvania History* and a cash award. Established in honor of Robert G. Crist, past president of the Association from 1991 to 1992, the prize is awarded at the annual conference banquet. At the 2017 PHA meeting in Scranton, the Crist Prize for 2014–16 was awarded to Katie A. Moore for "America's First Economic Stimulus Package: Paper Money and the Body Politic in Colonial Pennsylvania, 1715–1730," 83, no. 4 (Autumn 2016): 529–57. Katie was a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Boston when she wrote the article, and was awarded her Ph.D. in May 2017. Congratulations Katie!

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The Philip S. Klein Prize is awarded for the best scholarly article published in *Pennsylvania History* every odd-numbered year. Beginning in 1987 (for the years 1985–86), it is the first of two prizes established in honor of past president Philip Klein who served from 1954 to 1957. The prize is awarded at the annual conference and carries a cash award. At the 2017 PHA meeting in Scranton, the Klein Prize for 2014–16 was awarded to Richard P. Mulcahy, “The Justice, The Informer, and the Composer: The Roy Harris Case and the Dynamics of Anti-Communism in Pittsburgh in the Early 1950s” 82, no. 4 (Autumn 2015): 403–37. Richard is an associate professor of history and political science at the University of Pittsburgh at Titusville. Congratulations Richard!!

Carol E. Brier is the author, publisher and administrator of the John Jay Forum, launched in November of 2011. This forum is for education, research, and discussion of John Jay, his life and times and his legacy. It is a work in progress and one that will continue to evolve. The Forum contains references to books, articles, images, events, and links relating to John Jay. It is in the nature of a bibliography with references to books, articles, events, and links relating to John Jay and his family. It is a work-in-progress and can be accessed at www.jjforum.blogspot.com, or The John Jay Forum. Recently included is much information relating to Jay’s son, William, and his writings about the abolition of slavery and world peace. Ms. Brier has also authored *Mr. Jay of Bedford: John Jay, the Retirement Years* (2016), available from Heritage Books, Inc.

Building Museums is the theme of the **Mid Atlantic Association of Museums Conference** March 9–11, 2018, in Philadelphia. Join museum colleagues, architects, other design and construction professionals, and project funders in lively conversation about what is involved in a museum building project. Attend a day-long workshop on all the elements you need to know to plan, design, and build a successful and sustainable new museum or addition to an existing museum. Learn about planning and building best practices, and how to identify project “red flags.” Visit new and refurbished museums by attending behind-the-scenes tours. Meet the 2018 winners of the prestigious Buidly Award given to honor exemplary museum building projects. Network with conferees at special receptions and informal “birds of a feather” gatherings. Please visit MAAM’s website to view the Call for Sessions and other information at: midatlanticmuseums.org.

Find Your Centre: Cultivating Community Connections is the theme of the **PA Museums Annual Statewide Museum Conference**, Centre County, April 15–17, 2018. Museums and historical organizations are used to being pulled in different directions. One moment an institution is protecting its collection for future generations mostly out of the view of the public. The next moment there is a wedding being celebrated, caterers rolling carts down hallways, and musicians setting up to perform in a room. At the same time, someone is leaving a voicemail about something they have found in an attic, and the accountant just sent an email about the organization's 990. Whether it is hectic or not, the day-to-day work sometimes needs to be set aside for time to reflect, relax, and rejuvenate. Centre County, with its rich agricultural landscape, beautiful and industrious towns, and the presence of Penn State University, is in the center of Pennsylvania, and it provides an ideal backdrop for us to find our center together at our annual statewide museum conference. Our museum community will connect and learn as we enjoy special events showcasing our member museums, educational sessions and excellent speakers, honoring the winners of our annual special achievement awards, and opportunities to connect with our colleagues. We look forward to seeing you there! For more information, go to: pamuseums.org.

Historians Weigh in on the Confederate Monument Debate. In the wake of the recent controversy surrounding last summer's events in Charlottesville, Virginia, historians from across the country have written numerous op-eds in the hopes of providing readers with much-needed context surrounding the history of Confederate monuments. The American Historical Association has compiled an ongoing list of articles written by members, councilors, and staff. To highlight these important contributions, the AHA is proud to offer a resource page of historians' engagement on these issues: <https://www.historians.org/news-and-advocacy/everything-has-a-history/historians-on-the-confederate-monument-debate>.

APS Library Digital Humanities Fellowship deadline is February 1, 2018. Contact: libfellows@amphilsoc.org, with more information at <http://www.amphilsoc.org/library/fellowships/digital-humanities> This two-month fellowship is open to scholars who are comfortable creating tools and visualizations, as well as those interested in working collaboratively with the APS technology team. Scholars, including graduate students, at any stage of

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their career may apply. Special consideration will be given to proposals that present APS Library holdings in new and engaging ways. Stipend: \$6,000 for two months upon arrival at the APS Library. Notification of award by April 15.

APS Library Resident Research Fellowships deadline is March 1, 2018. Contact: libfellows@amphilsoc.org with more information at: <https://amphilsoc.org/library/fellowships/short-term-fellowships>. The Library Resident Research fellowships support research in the Society's collections. Applicants must demonstrate a need to work in the Society's collections for a minimum of one month and a maximum of three months. Applicants in any relevant field of scholarship may apply. Candidates whose normal place of residence is farther away than a 75-mile radius of Philadelphia will be given some preference. Applicants do not need to hold the doctorate, although Ph.D. candidates must have passed their preliminary examinations. **Stipend:** \$3,000 per month. Notification of awards in May.

PhotoHistory/PhotoFuture Conference, Rochester, New York, April 20–22, 2018. The conference is an opportunity for the presentation, analysis, interpretation and assessment of original scholarship on photography's history and future including applications, education, connoisseurship, preservation, and accessibility as viewed through multiple disciplinary lenses. PhotoHistory/PhotoFuture is a forum for reporting research findings, sharing current professional and scholarly practices, and discussing subjects pertinent to the broadly defined, multifaceted history and future of photography, including motion pictures. The conference will engage practitioners, librarians, archivists, and the diverse scholarly disciplines on historically significant subjects and topics of future interest. For more information: Bruce Austin (585) 475-2879, BAAGLL@RIT.EDU. Website: <https://www.rit.edu/twc/photohistoryconference>.

Society of Architectural Historians 2018 Annual International Conference will be held April 20–22, 2018, in St. Paul, Minnesota. The St. Paul conference will include thematic sessions, open sessions, and graduate student lightning talks that will draw architectural historians, art historians, architects, museum professionals, and preservationists from around the world together to present new research on the history of the built environment. In addition, roundtable discussions and architectural and landscape tours

are being planned to enhance the overall program. Contact: info@sah.org. Website: <http://www.sah.org/2018>.

Fellowships in the US Capitol Historical Society for 2018. Inaugurated in 1986, the Capitol Fellowship Program has provided financial support to more than fifty scholars researching important topics in the art and architectural history of the US Capitol Complex. Fellowship support permits scholars—selected on the basis of their qualifications and research proposals—to use the extensive documents housed in the Office of the Architect of the Capitol, the Library of Congress, and the National Archives. The Fellowship is funded by the US Capitol Historical Society and jointly administered by the Architect of the Capitol. Applications must be postmarked by March 15. (Letters of recommendation may arrive later but will be needed by the end of March for the evaluation process.) Applicants will be notified of the selection committee’s decision by May 15. The fellowship year begins on September 1 and ends on August 31. Information can be found on the website: <http://uschs.org/explore/capitol-fellowship>.

American Philosophical Society Phillips Fund for Native American Research for 2018. For research in Native American linguistics and ethnohistory, focusing on the continental United States and Canada. Given for a maximum of one year from date of award to cover travel, tapes, and consultants’ fees. Applicants may be graduate students pursuing either a master’s or a doctoral degree; postdoctoral applicants are also eligible. Award from \$1,000 to \$3,500.

Deadline March 1; notification in May. Contact: lmusumeci@amphilsoc.org. Website: <https://amphilsoc.org/grants/phillips>.

Call for Papers: 2018 International Graduate Historical Studies Conference. Theme: “Real and Imagined Borders: People, Place, Time.” Central Michigan University, Mt. Pleasant, Michigan, April 6–7, 2018. We invite graduate students from across the social sciences and the humanities to submit proposals for papers or panels that adopt an interdisciplinary or transnational approach, but we are also seeking papers or panels that approach historical topics in more traditional ways. All submissions must be based on original research. In keeping with the theme of the conference, individual papers will be organized into panels that cross spatial, temporal, and disciplinary boundaries. Send abstract (250–350 words) and a short

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curriculum vita as an attachment to histconf@cmich.edu. Preference will be given to papers and panels received during the early submission period which ends December 17, 2017. The final deadline for submission is February 11, 2018. The IGHSC will present cash prizes for the best papers in several categories. For more information, please e-mail histconf@cmich.edu or visit us at www.ighsc.info.

The State Museum of Pennsylvania has won the prestigious American Association for State and Local History (AASLH) 2017 Award of Merit for its new permanent exhibit “The Pennsylvania Turnpike: The Nation’s First Superhighway.” The exhibit was reviewed by Gerald Kuncio in the Winter 2017 issue of *Pennsylvania History*. Congratulations to the State Museum and the exhibit’s curator, Curt Miner!

On February 22–24, 2018, West Chester University will be hosting the annual conference of the **Consortium on the Revolutionary Era, 1750–1850** in Philadelphia (at the Waterfront Hilton). This is an interdisciplinary conference that focuses broadly on just about any topic imaginable during the period 1750–1850, and while it is broadly an Atlantic world focus, we have had papers dealing beyond the global world. This conference regularly welcomes academic papers from professors, independent scholars, and graduate students (and even the occasional truly exceptional undergraduate student) from such disciplines as history, literature, philosophy, art history, music history, languages, and so on. For more information about the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era and the conference, visit the CRE website: <http://www.revolutionaryera.org/>.